

# 444 Lecture 4.5 - Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

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# Plan

To describe the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium.

# Reading

Bonanno, section 4.4.

# Definition

A set of strategies for each of the players is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if

- The set forms a Nash equilibrium.
- In every subgame, the set forms a Nash equilibrium.


# Subgame Perfect and Nash

The second clause is non-trivial.


- It rules out players doing certain kinds of odd things at nodes that are not reached.
- At subgame perfect equilibrium, each player's strategies make sense given the other player's strategies, and they are disposed to keep making sense under different assumptions about what they might do.

# Finding Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

- Find the minimal subgames.
- Act as if the initial node of that subgame is a terminal node, with its payouts being the equilibrium payouts of the subgame.
- If there are multiple equilibria, duplicate the tree enough times to cover each of them - you'll have multiple subgame perfect equilibria.
- Repeat until you've covered the whole tree.



The large game




**Player 3**

	$g$	$b$
$c$	2 3	0 2
$d$	3 1	1 2

**Player 2**

The left subgame






Player 3


	$g$	$h$
$c$	2 (3)	0 (2)
$d$	(3) 1	(1) (2)

Player 2

The left subgame with labeled best responses




The big game with reduced left subgame



Player 2

	E	F
Player 1 C	(3, 0)	(1, 1)
D	(1, 1)	(1, 0)

The middle subgame with labeled best responses



The big game with reduced middle subgame


## The right subgame

	A	B
e	1, 1	2, 0
f	2, 1	0, 1

- Player 2 is row
- Player 3 is column
- Player 1 is ignored, because they have no moves

## The right subgame with labeled best responses

	A	B
e	1, <span style="border: 1px solid black;">1</span>	<span style="border: 1px solid black;">2</span> , 0
f	<span style="border: 1px solid black;">2</span> , <span style="border: 1px solid black;">1</span>	0, <span style="border: 1px solid black;">1</span>



The big game with reduced right subgame

- Only Nash equilibrium is Player 1 plays  $b$ .

# Summary

So the subgame perfect equilibrium is:

- Player 1 plays b, C.
- Player 2 plays d, f, F.
- Player 3 plays h, A.

And the payouts are reverse order of their names: 3, 2, 1.



## For Next Time

We will start looking at games with cardinal utility.