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There are two natural ways to specify the outcome of a game.

- 1. Describe the physical situation that results.
- 2. Describe how much  $\mbox{\bf utility}$  each player gets from that result.

 Utility
 Ordinal and Cardinal Utility
 Dominance Arguments
 Some Famous Cames 0000000000

 Utility
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- We are usually going to be focused on the second.
- That's because we want to know what makes sense from the players' perspectives.
- And just knowing the physical outcomes doesn't tell us that.

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tably Conference Arguments Constructed Matter
Conference Arguments Constructed Construction
Conference Arguments

- It's not score.
- The players are aiming to maximise their own number, not maximise the difference between the numbers.



Figure: A memorable scoreboard

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### Compared Com

- The players would prefer a 3-4 result (i.e., 3 for them, 4 for other player) to a 2-1 result.
- So this is very much unlike soccer, even though the numbers will often feel a lot like soccer scores.

Utility	Ordinal and Cardinal Utility	Dominance Arguments	Some Famous Games
What is Util	itv		

- It's not money, for two distinct reasons.
- First, the players might care how much money the other players get.

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Utility and Altruism

Consider these three situations

- 1. Billy gets \$90, Suzy gets \$100.
- 2. Billy gets \$100, Suzy gets nothing.
- 3. Billy gets \$110, Suzy gets \$100.

How do you order these in terms of utility to Billy, from highest to lowest?

Utility and Altruism

- We don't know given just this description.
- If Billy wants Suzy to get money, he might prefer option 1 to option 2.
- If Billy wants Suzy to not have money, he might prefer option 2 to option 3.

What is Utility

Desirated and Carden Maley

Desirated Association of Carden

Desirated Ass

- It's not money, for two distinct reasons.
- Second, getting twice as much money typically doesn't produce twice as much utility.

Utility Control and Constrain Utility

What is Utility

It is, more or less, desirability.

Outcome O<sub>1</sub> has more utility for player X than outcome O<sub>2</sub> iff X prefers to be in O<sub>1</sub> than O<sub>2</sub>.

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### **Utility and Numbers**

- Now you might have noticed something odd there.
- · We are trying to define this numerical quantity, but we've just told you something about when it is bigger or smaller.
- Surely we need to say something more, like how much bigger or smaller it is in different situations.

Unility 00000000000	Ordinal and Cardinal Utility	Dominance Arguments	Some Famous Games
Ordinal and Card	linal Utility		

Utility

A utility function (for a particular agent) is a mapping U from situations to numbers satsifying this constraint.

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•  $U(S_1) > U(S_2)$  iff the agent is better off in  $S_1$  than in  $S_2$ .

Welfare

This isn't part of the formal theory, but we usually implicitly assume (at least in our narratives), the following principle.

The agent is better off in  $\mathcal{S}_1$  than in  $\mathcal{S}_2$  iff, given a choice and assuming they are fully informed, they prefer being in  $\mathcal{S}_1$  to  $S_2$ .

That is, we'll usually speak as if a radically subjectivist view of welfare

is correct. I've been doing this already, and I'm going to keep doing it.

**Ordinal Utility** 

- When we say that we're working with ordinal utility functions, really the only principle that applies is the one from two slides back.
- · Higher utilities are better, i.e., are preferred.
- The term ordinal should make you think of 'orders'; all an ordinal utility function does is provide a rank ordering of the outcomes.

Two Functions

So if we're working in ordinal utility, these two functions describe the same underlying reality.

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Utility 00000000000	Ordinal and Cardinal Utility	Dominance Arguments	Some Famous Games
Cardinal LII	-ili+v		

- In cardinal utility theory, the differences between the numbers matter.
- The numbers now express quantities, and the two functions from the previous slide do not represent the same underlying reality.

Cardinal Utility (Detail)

- There is a fussy point here that's worth going over.
- Even cardinal utility functions don't come with a scale.
- So two functions with different numbers in them can still express the same underlying reality.

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Ordinal and Cardinal Utility

Dominance Arguments

Some Famous Games

#### Cardinal Utility (Detail)

The standard way to put this is that (cardinal) utility is defined only up to a **positive, affine transformation**. That means that if  $U_1$  and  $U_2$  are related by the following formula, then they represent the same state of affairs.

$${\it U}_2({\it o}) = {\it a}{\it U}_1({\it o}) + {\it b}$$
 where  ${\it a}>0$ 

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#### Celsius and Farenheit

- The main real world cases of scales that are related in this way are temperature scales.
- To convert between Celsius and Farenheit you use the formula  ${\it F}=1.8{\it C}+32.$
- But the scales are just two ways of representing the same physical reality.

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### Cardinal Utility (Detail)

- So there is no such thing as one outcome being twice as good as another.
- But we can say a lot of things about differences.

Cardinal Utility (Detail)

- If the difference between O<sub>1</sub> and O<sub>2</sub> is the same as the difference between O<sub>2</sub> and O<sub>3</sub>, that will stay the same under any positive affine transformation.
- Indeed, for any k, if the difference between O<sub>1</sub> and O<sub>2</sub> is k times
  the difference between O<sub>2</sub> and O<sub>3</sub>, that will stay the same under
  any positive affine transformation.

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Dominance Arguments

### A Simple Game

	Left	Right
Up	4, 1	2, 0
Down	3, 0	1, 1

Here's how to read this table.

- 1. Two players, call them Row and Column.
- 2. Row chooses the row, Column chooses the column - between them they choose a cell.
- 3. Each cell has two numbers the first is Row's payout, the second is Column's payout.

Utility 0000000000	Ordinal and Cardinal Utility	Dominance Arguments	Some Famous Games
Strong Do	minance		

	Left	Right
Up	4, 1	2, 0
Down	3, 0	1, 1

- Whatever Column does, Row is better off playing Up rather than Down.
- We say that Up **strongly dominates** Down.

Utility	Ordinal and Cardinal Utility	Dominance Arguments	Some Famous Games
0. 5			
Strong Doi	MINANCA		

	Left	Right
Up	4, 1	2, 0
Middle	5, 0	0, 0
Down	3, 0	1, 1

- Adding options doesn't change things.
- Up still dominates Down, even if it isn't always best.

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Utility	Ordinal and Cardinal Utility	Dominance Arguments 0000●0000	Some Famous Games
Strong Dor	minance		

	Left	Right
Up	3, 1	0, 0
Middle		2, 0
Down	0, 0	3, 1

- This is **not** a case of dominance.
- Even though Middle is never the highest value, it isn't dominated by any one option.

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Strategy  $\mathcal{S}_1$  strongly dominates strategy  $\mathcal{S}_2$  if for any strategy  $\mathcal{S}$  by the other player(s), if S is played, then  ${\rm S}_1$  returns a higher payoff than  ${\rm S}_2.$ 

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### Weak Dominance

Strategy  $S_1$  weakly dominates strategy  $S_2$  if for any strategy S by the other player(s), if S is played, then  $S_1$  returns a payoff that is at least as high  $S_2$ , and for some strategy by the other player(s),  $S_1$  returns a higher payoff than  $S_2$ .

• The difference is that weak dominance allows for ties.

Utility 00000000000	Ordinal and Cardinal Utility	Dominance Arguments	Some Famous Games
Two Domir	nance Notions		

Strong Dominance

Always better.

Weak Dominance

- Never worse.
- Sometimes better.

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Utility	Ordinal and Cardinal Utility	Dominance Arguments	Some Famous Games
00000000000	0000000000	00000000●	
Weak Dom	ninance		

	Left	Right
Up	4, 1	2, 0
Down	3, 0	<b>2</b> , 1

- I've changed the payoffs in the bottom right cell.
- Now Up does not strongly dominate

  Down
- But it does weakly dominate Down.



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Utility 00000000000	Ordinal and Cardinal Utility	Dominance Arguments 00000000	Some Famous Games 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Prisoners' [	Dilemma		

	Соор	Defect
Соор	3, 3	0, 5
Defect	5, 0	1, 1

Utility 000000000000	Ordinal and Cardinal Utility	Dominance Arguments 00000000	Some Famous Games
Generic Sy	mmetric Game		

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## Prisoners' Dilemma

Utility Conditional Confinal Mality Conditional Confinal Mality Conditional Conditional Confinal Mality Conditional Conditiona

X Y
X a, a b, c
Y c, b d, d

Ordinal constraints c > a, d > b

• a > d

Cardinal constraints

• 2a > b + c

	Coop	Defect
Coop	5, 5	0, 4
Defect	4, 0	2, 2

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### Stag Hunt

# X Y X a, a b, c Y c, b d, d

Ordinal constraints

• a > c, d > b

• a > d

Cardinal constraints

• a + b < c + d

title of the Sexes

Row 4, 1 0, 0
Col 0, 0 1, 4

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Utility 00000000000	Ordinal and Cardinal Utility	Dominance Arguments 00000000	Some Famous Games
Battle of th	ne Sexes (relabel	led)	

relabelled)	Chicken

	Self	Other
Self	0, 0	4, 1
Other	1, 4	0, 0

	Attack	Retreat
Attack	-99, -99	2, 0
Retreat	0, 2	1, 1

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	Rock	Paper	Scissors
Rock	0, 0	-1, 1	1, -1
Paper	1, -1	0, 0	-1, 1
Scissors	-1, 1	1, -1	0, 0

We're jumping ahead to section 2.5 of Bonanno.

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