

## Knowledge and Reality, Lecture 06

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Review

Why Internalism

Why Externalism

Why Externalism

Srinivasan

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Rationality is a function of what's internal to the person.

• Two people who are internally alike are either both rational, or both irrational.

Externalism is simply the denial of internalism.

 It says that sometimes internal duplicates differ in rationality.

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The most popular form of externalism these days is **process** reliabilism. This has two parts.

- In general, rational beliefs are those that are produced by reliable processes.
- But there is an exception; beliefs that fail some internalist test might be 'defeated', and not rational.





Many reasons, we'll focus on three. The first two were mentioned last time.

- 1. Anti-luck.
- 2. Cases.
- 3. Evil Demons



The evil demon usually comes into epistemology as part of an argument about scepticism.

- E.g., you don't know you're not being deceived by an evil demon, so you don't know that you have hands.
- But here is gets used for a debate about rationality.

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Imagine a person who seems, from the inside, to be just like an actually rational person.

- But in fact they are the victim of an evil demon, so their beliefs are all false.
- Reliabilists say they are irrational, but they are intuitively rational.



What should reliabilists say about this case?

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Imagine two evil demon victims.

- A is, from the inside, a paradigm of rationality.
- B is, from the inside, a conspiracy theorist who leaps to conclusions, believes everything he's told, etc., etc.



Can reliabilists say something about the intuitive differences between A and B?



**Three Arguments** 

Again, there are many, but I'll just look at these three.

- 1. Speckled hen
- 2. Why care about rationality?
- 3. Involuntarism

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How many visible white speckles?

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Speckled Hen

 But it seems that any number you came up with by just guessing would not be a rational belief.

• So rationality requires more than internal states, it requires a reliable connection to the world.

• The right answer does just depend on your internal

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Why Care?

Rationality should be something we care about.

- But if given a choice between being evidence-responsive, and being reliable, we should choose being reliable.
- And same for coherent versus reliable.

Why Care?

- Belief, in some sense, aims at the truth.
- Rationality means something like doing well in
- So, being rational should mean something like doing well in getting to the truth.
- That means reliability.

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Are there hand-wavy moves on the previous slide that might not hold up to strict scrutiny? Yes! Proview Why Internalism Octobood Octobo

- We evaluate the voluntary parts of human behavior by whether they make sense, and the involuntary parts by whether they work.
- Belief is involuntary.
- So we should evaluate it by how well it works.

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- This argument concedes that if belief were voluntary, internalism would be plausible/correct.
- But, it says, belief is involuntary.

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Whether someone has, say, a good or bad digestive system is not a strictly internal matter.

- Having a good digestive system just is being good at digesting common foods.
- And what the common foods are is external.
- The involunarists say belief is the same.

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- 1. Belief really is voluntary.
- 2. Enough things connected to belief are voluntary that we can use something like internalist criteria.

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- In cases involving accurate beliefs under oppressive circumstances, reliability is enough for rationality.
- So internalism is false as applied to these rather important actual cases.



- 1. Instinctive correct belief.
- 2. Instinctive correct belief which persists despite counter-evidence.

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3. False belief that matches lots of testimony.

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- Internalism.
- This is incompatible with all of the cases.

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- Process reliabilism, with the defeater condition.
- This is incompatible with the second case.

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Three Rival Theories

- I don't know of anyone who has this view, but the third case seems designed to oppose a view that someone probably should have.
- Call it the generous view of rationality.

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Here's how the 'generous' view (my term) works. A belief is rational iff it is:

- 1. Formed by a reliable process; or
- 2. Properly based in the evidence.

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No one has this view, but it seems interesting because it gets a lot of cases right, especially evil demon cases.

• But it gets the third of Srinivasan's cases wrong.



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What do you think about the three cases?

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What role do the cases play in Srinivasan's theory?

- 1. Trigger snap reactions that theory is judged against?
- 2. Make us reflect on what we want a theory of good belief for?

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- My (idiosyncratic) view is that 1 isn't a very good reason to think about cases like these.
- But 2 could be a good reason.

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What general lessons about belief can we draw from reflection on these kinds of cases?



On the next slide is one kind of argument I think can be drawn from these cases (not sure if it's a fair reading of the paper though).



- 1. Rational, justified belief is a matter of doing well in believing.
- 2. Doing well in believing, for creatures like us, involves picking up on subtle cues.
- 3. This is often something that is not available to consciousness, or available to reasoning.
- 4. So rationality isn't just about reasoning from conscious states.

Racists and Clairvoyants

To end, let's look at Srinivasan's argument that her examples generalise to promote a simple, or what she calls **radical** externalism.

• I found this part of the argument rather odd.

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- 1. Nour is justified in believing her host is racist.
- 2. Nour's case is just like Bonjour's case of Norman.
- 3. So Norman is justified in his clairvoyant beliefs.

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- Why should we believe premise 2 here?
- I know why an internalist should believe it, by stipulation the cases are pretty similar from the inside, but why should an externalist believe it?

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- The Nour example is pretty realistic, the Norman case is totally not.
- There is an explanation for why Nour could have this ability; there is no explanation for Norman.
- Nour's ability is widespread; Norman's is idiosyncratic.

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So here's a view that is untouched by Srinivasan's example, but agrees with Bonjour about Norman.

 A belief is justified iff it is produced by a process that is reliable, and widely shared among similar people.



This could obviously do with some more care about the details - I literally just made it up - but it feels more natural given the Marxist motivations to think about groups than individual reliability.



Onto the most notorious part of recent epistemology: The Gettier Problem

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