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 We spent the last two classes on testimony, and in particular on when it is rational to believe something on the basis of testimony.

 Testimony is basic, and rationally believing testimony requires just an absence of reasons for doubt.

Two Theories

- Testimony is basic, and rationally believing testimony requires just an absence of reasons for doubt.
- Testimonial belief is inferential, and rationally believing testimony requires reason to think the speaker is telling the truth

Two Theories

Reductionism Rationally believing testimony requires reasons to accept.

These come apart when there are no reasons to accept or reject.

Two Theories

Reductionism Rationally believing testimony requires reasons to accept.

Anti-Reductionism Rationally believing testimony requires absence of reasons to reject.

These come apart when there are no reasons to accept or reject.

Philosophy and Psychology

General background assumption:

People are rational.

Review (And Finishing Up)

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Review (And Finishing Up)

 So which of the theories of rationality is correct is linked to empirical work on what people actually do.

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 They say their opponents add mental steps to what's a much simpler process.

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- They say their opponents add mental steps to what's a much simpler process.
- This was a common late C20 response to philosophical views in many topics.

 A general response to over-intellectualisation objections in many domains.

Paris School

People do have lots of rules, life hacks in 2010s lingo, to get around. But...

They don't apply them in high stakes cases.

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- And they don't apply them when it is obvious they would fail.

Paris School

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- They don't apply them in high stakes cases.
- And they don't apply them when it is obvious they would fail.
- So they must be checking every time whether this is a high-stakes/obvious-fail situation.

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Vigilance

My favorite example: walking down a busy street or corridor.

 We somehow track everyone, while attending to almost no one.

Vigilance

My favorite example: walking down a busy street or corridor.

- We somehow track everyone, while attending to almost no one.
- Really big question: How on earth do we do this, and can we invent a machine that does something similar?

Vigilant Hearers

Sperber et al think that we are also vigilant in hearing.

 Everything gets a rough check, almost always subconsciously.

Vigilant Hearers

Review (And Finishing Up)

Sperber et al think that we are also vigilant in hearing.

- Everything gets a rough check, almost always subconsciously.
- Some things get more thorough check.

Review (And Finishing Up)

New informants

- New informants
- Surprising that info is either true or known

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- Reason to deceive

- New informants
- Surprising that info is either true or known
- Reason to deceive
- High stakes

Big Question

Review (And Finishing Up) 000000000000000

Is this plausible as a model of how human hearers operate?

Today

Review (And Finishing Up)

• What kind of thing is rationality?

> The writers we'll look at move back and forth between talking about rational belief and justified belief.

Terminology

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Terminology

- The writers we'll look at move back and forth between talking about rational belief and justified belief.
- I'm not going to get into whether these are different, or what the differences might be.
- Treat them as the same, knowing that, as always, it might be more complicated than that.

Internalism and Externalism

Imagine that one person is rational, and another irrational.

• How must they differ?

Imagine that one person is rational, and another irrational.

- How must they differ?
- Could they be internally alike?

Rationality is a function of what's internal to the person.

 Two people who are internally alike are either both rational, or both irrational.

Internal?

What does 'internal' mean here? Two prominent options (which I'm stating but won't go into)

1. Physical, e.g., brain states, sense organs, etc.

Internal?

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- Physical, e.g., brain states, sense organs, etc.
- 2. Phenomenological, e.g., feelings, sensations, etc. This is sometimes called access internalism; rationality just depends on what the thinker has access to.

How Does It Depend?

Again, two big theories, though these aren't exclusive or exhaustive

1. Evidential; rationality is a matter of having beliefs based in the right way in evidence, which (on this view) is a special kind of internal state. Sometimes this is called foundationalism

How Does It Depend?

Again, two big theories, though these aren't exclusive or exhaustive.

- 1. Evidential; rationality is a matter of having beliefs based in the right way in evidence, which (on this view) is a special kind of internal state. Sometimes this is called foundationalism.
- 2. Coherence: rationality is a matter of internal states coherina.

We'll come back to this, because some of the objections to internalism target just one or the other theory.

Externalism

Externalism is simply the denial of internalism.

 It says that sometimes internal duplicates differ in rationality.

Strong Externalism

A really strong form of externalism says that only external factors matter to rationality.

 This is not a popular view, though the Srinivasan paper we'll read next comes very close to defending it.

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- This is not a popular view, though the Srinivasan paper we'll read next comes very close to defending it.
- But external here typically means "not exclusively internal"

The most popular form of externalism these days is **process reliabilism**. This has two parts.

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- In general, rational beliefs are those that are produced by reliable processes.
- But there is an exception: beliefs that fail some internalist test might be 'defeated', and not rational.

Process Reliabilism

Process reliabilism is most associated with Alvin Goldman, a former professor here at UM.

Indeed, I think some of the most important statements of it were from his time at UM.

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- Indeed, I think some of the most important statements of it were from his time at UM.
- Another important figure (who we'll read in a related context soon) is the Cuban-American philosopher Frnest Sosa

Why Internalism

This is an enormous debate, but I'll pull out three reasons that I think are significant.

1. Anti-luck.

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- 2. Cases.

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- 1. Anti-luck.
- 2. Cases.
- 3. Evil Demons

Anti-Luck

 Saying something is rational is a way of saying that it's not a lucky guess, and if it's false, it's unlucky.

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- Saying something is rational is a way of saying that it's not a lucky guess, and if it's false, it's unlucky.
- External factors are basically matters of luck.
- So rationality should depend only on internal factors.

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A person has (somehow) acquired clairvoyant powers.

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Cases

Lawrence BonJour introduced the following kind of case.

- A person has (somehow) acquired clairvoyant powers.
- They have these beliefs about distant parts of the world that just come to them.
- And these beliefs are true.

1. Is simply trusting this new clairvoyant sense rational for the person?

Why Internalism

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Why Internalism

2. If not, is this a problem for reliabilists.

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 E.g., you don't know you're not being deceived by an evil demon, so you don't know that you have hands.

Fvil Demon

The evil demon usually comes into epistemology as part of an argument about scepticism.

- E.g., you don't know you're not being deceived by an evil demon, so you don't know that you have hands.
- But here is gets used for a debate about rationality.

Sympathy for the Devil (Victim)

Imagine a person who seems, from the inside, to be just like an actually rational person.

But in fact they are the victim of an evil demon, so their beliefs are all false.

Sympathy for the Devil (Victim)

Imagine a person who seems, from the inside, to be just like an actually rational person.

- But in fact they are the victim of an evil demon, so their beliefs are all false.
- Reliabilists say they are irrational, but they are intuitively rational.

Question

What should reliabilists say about this case?

Variant

Imagine two evil demon victims.

• A is, from the inside, a paradigm of rationality.

Imagine two evil demon victims.

- A is, from the inside, a paradigm of rationality.
- B is, from the inside, a conspiracy theorist who leaps to conclusions, believes everything he's told, etc., etc.

Question

Can reliabilists say something about the intuitive differences between A and B?

Why Externalism

Three Arguments

Again, there are many, but I'll just look at these three.

1. Speckled hen

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- 2. Why care about rationality?

Three Arguments

Again, there are many, but I'll just look at these three.

- 1. Speckled hen
- 2. Why care about rationality?
- 3. Involuntarism

Speckled Hen



How many visible white speckles?

 The right answer does just depend on your internal states.

Speckled Hen

- The right answer does just depend on your internal states.
- But it seems that any number you came up with by just guessing would not be a rational belief.

Speckled Hen

- The right answer does just depend on your internal states.
- But it seems that any number you came up with by just guessing would not be a rational belief.
- So rationality requires more than internal states, it requires a reliable connection to the world.

Rationality should be something we care about.

But if given a choice between being evidence-responsive, and being reliable, we should choose being reliable.

Rationality should be something we care about.

- But if given a choice between being evidence-responsive, and being reliable, we should choose being reliable.
- And same for coherent versus reliable.

• Belief, in some sense, aims at the truth.

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- Rationality means something like doing well in believing.

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- So, being rational should mean something like doing well in getting to the truth.

- Belief, in some sense, aims at the truth.
- Rationality means something like doing well in believing.
- So, being rational should mean something like doing well in getting to the truth.
- That means reliability.

Are there hand-wavy moves on the previous slide that might not hold up to strict scrutiny? Yes!

 We evaluate the voluntary parts of human behavior by whether they make sense, and the involuntary parts by whether they work.

Voluntarism

- We evaluate the voluntary parts of human behavior by whether they make sense, and the involuntary parts by whether they work.
- Belief is involuntary.

- We evaluate the voluntary parts of human behavior by whether they make sense, and the involuntary parts by whether they work.
- Belief is involuntary.
- So we should evaluate it by how well it works.

Somewhat Concessive

 This argument concedes that if belief were voluntary, internalism would be plausible/correct.

Somewhat Concessive

- This argument concedes that if belief were voluntary, internalism would be plausible/correct.
- But, it says, belief is involuntary.

Whether someone has, say, a good or bad digestive system is not a strictly internal matter.

 Having a good digestive system just is being good at digesting common foods.

Whether someone has, say, a good or bad digestive system is not a strictly internal matter.

- Having a good digestive system just is being good at digesting common foods.
- And what the common foods are is external.

Evaluation

Whether someone has, say, a good or bad digestive system is not a strictly internal matter.

- Having a good digestive system just is being good at digesting common foods.
- And what the common foods are is external.
- The involunarists say belief is the same.

1. Belief really is voluntary.

Two Objections

- Belief really is voluntary.
- 2. Enough things connected to belief are voluntary that we can use something like internalist criteria.

We'll look at a very recent contribution to this debate, Amia Srinivasan's argument for externalism from cases involving oppression.