Title: Epistemic Permissivism and Symmetric Games

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Abstract: Permissivism in epistemology is a family of theses, each of which says that rationality is compatible with a number of distinct attitudes. This paper ar- gues that thinking about symmetric games gives us new reason to believe in permissivism. In some finite games, if permissivism is false then we have to think that a player is more likely to take one option rather than another, even though each have the same expected return given that player’s credences. And in some infinite games, if permissivism is false there is no rational way to play the game, although intuitively the games could be rationally played. The latter set of arguments rely on the recent discovery that there are symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria. It was long known that there are symmetric games with no pure strategy symmetric equilibria; the surprising new discovery is that there are symmetric games with asymmetric equilibria, but no symmetric equilibria involving either mixed or pure strategies.