Plan for Interest-Relativity Book

Introduction

What the view is:

- An interest-relative theory of belief
- An interest-relative theory of knowledge
- Used to hope that the second was solely derived from the first; now not so clear

What's distinctive about the view:

- Invariantist
- Grounded in a theory of belief
- Integrated with game theory and decision theory; supports, and supported by, an epistemic interpretation of some problematic parts of game theory and decision theory.

1 Belief

- Defining the Target

    - Not ordinary "I believe"
    - More like settled the question

- Problems about conjunction
- Problems about long-shot bets

Inputs: ss1,2 of CWD; intro of KBI, intro of GBC

2 Belief and Interests

- Setting out Interest-Relative Account
- Importance of theoretical as well as practical interests; responses to Brown and to Ross&Schroeder
- How to handle impractical propositions
- Caveats about modals - need to fuss about updating for epistemic modals, need to fuss about conditional values claims for

Inputs: ss2,3 of CWD; s2 of KBI; part of s1 of GBC (updating), part of s3 of GBC (theoretical interests part)

3   Conjunctions and Prefaces

- Prove that we keep a form of conjunction closure
- Argue that's closure enough
- Reject Christensen's arguments that preface shows we should have less closure

Inputs: ss4,5,6 of CWD

4   Beliefs and Action

- Interest-relative explanation of the high-stakes/long-shot cases
- Note that it is odds, not stakes, that matter.
- Respond to Fantl&McGrath's objections to this way of doing things
- Respond to Ross&Schroeder's Stability objection

Input: s6,7 of CWD; intro of DIRI; part of s3 of GBC (stability)

5   Games, Decisions and Knowledge

- How Knowledge enters into decision theory (s1 of KBI)
- How Knowledge enters into game theory (s1 of GBC)

Inputs: s1 of KBI, s1 of GBC

6   Knowledge and Justification

- How games show knowledge has its own interest-relativity, not reducible to interest-relativity of belief (s3 of KBI)
- Williamson's argument that JTB without knowledge is everywhere (s1 of M&E)
- How this shows everything ever said about "Gettier cases" is wrong (s2, 3 of M&E)

Inputs: s3 of KBI, s1–3 of M&E

7   Objections to Interest-Relativism

- Whack-a-mole on objections

Input: DIRI

8 Credences

- Big project of chapter: defend use of credences in epistemology
- Show how to reduce credences to comparative confidence
- Perhaps, respond to Ben Levinstein's accuracy-based objections to doing this
- Show that the reduction supports probabilism

Inputs: s2 of GBC, chapter 3 of dissertation

9 Contextualism

- Some people try to explain some of the data I've used with contextualist tools
- Lots of reason to think that won't work
- Ordinary language data about questions doesn't support contextualism
- And contextualism doesn't help resolve good arguments for scepticism

Inputs: QC, some stuff from scepticism papers

Conclusion

Wrap it all up!

Abbreviations

- **CWD** - Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment?
- **KBI** - Knowledge, Bets and Interests
- **GBC** - Games, Beliefs and Credences
- **DIRI** - Defending Interest-Relative Invariantism
- **M&E** - Margins and Errors
- **QC** - Questioning Contextualism