

China Tries to Tame Its Tiger Parents

By Shuli Ren


Not every child is Harvard material. That's the message China is sending to its supercompetitive tiger parents after calling a stop to after-school tutoring in July.

China is embracing what might be called the German model. Instead of going into academic institutions, many young Germans enter a “dual training” apprenticeship, splitting their time between classrooms at a vocational school and on-the-job training at a company. This is a great way for them to get good jobs. About 80% of Germany's large enterprises participate in dual training.

On Oct. 12, the State Council, China's ultimate governing body, issued a new guideline pushing for something similar. By 2035, the government vowed, the nation will have built a world-class vocational education system to develop highly skilled workers, with at least 10% of the entering class working toward a bachelor's degree.

China no longer wants so many young university graduates without practical skills—a group that has become a source of unemployment and social discontent. Last year, close to 10 million students enrolled in undergraduate programs, up 46% from a decade earlier. Last June, when the class of 2020 graduated, the unemployment rate for degree holders aged 20 to 24 was 19.3%, vs. the economy's overall 5%, according to HSBC Holdings Plc.

There are plenty of jobs, especially in the high-end manufacturing sector. But out of personal and family expectations, few fresh graduates want to go work in factories



and build electric vehicle parts. Instead, most want to go into consumer tech, media, or financial services.

As a result, the world's biggest factory is losing its edge. Last year, value added from manufacturing accounted for only 26% of China's gross domestic product, a 6 percentage point drop from just a decade earlier. By comparison, it took Germany three decades to hit a decline of this scale.

Chinese society can be surprisingly rigid. Schools informally classify children as “golden babies,” “silver babies,” and “copper babies”—usually based on where they're born and their parents' wealth. China has enough golden babies, or those who can make it to Tsinghua University and will develop world-class semiconductor chips one day. It has plenty of copper babies, who work in construction and factories making low-end exports such as clothes and toys. But it lacks silver babies, who can manufacture the high-value tech gear that golden babies design.

The question is whether China's tiger parents will let their babies do vocational training. In big cities, some parents wouldn't even allow their daughters to marry someone without a bachelor's degree. And if the daughter has a master's, good luck to her—she'll have to marry a Ph.D. So it's likely that Beijing will have to put incentives in place—such as free tuition at vocational schools, along with pay for on-the-job training—to get its tiger parents to accept the idea. **B** —Ren is a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion



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
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tame v. 驯服，制服，控制； adj. 驯服的，温顺的

(He'll need to tame his temper if he wants to succeed.)

material n. 人才 (a person considered as having qualities suited to a particular sphere of activity)

(I don't think he is college material.)

2 China is embracing what might be called the German model. Instead of going into academic institutions, many young Germans enter a “**dual training**” **apprenticeship**, **splitting** their time between classrooms at a **vocational school** and **on-the-job** training at a company. This is a great way for them to get good jobs. About 80% of Germany’s large enterprises participate in dual training.



dual ['dju:əl] adj. 两个部分的，双重的 (with two parts, or combining two things)

(Everything he says has a dual meaning.)

(dual personality / dual-purpose)

apprenticeship [ə'prentɪʃɪp] adj. 学徒期，学徒制 (apprentice n. 学徒)

split v. 分开，分摊，分组，分享，分裂，分手

vocational school 职业学校

on-the-job adj. 在职的

3 On Oct. 12, the State Council, China's **ultimate** governing **body**, issued a new guideline pushing for something similar. By 2035, the government **vowed**, the nation will have built a world-class vocational education system to develop highly skilled workers, with at least 10% of the entering class working toward a bachelor's degree.

ultimate **adj.** 最终的；最根本的

(most extreme or important because either the original or final, or the best or worst)

(ultimate decision/goal/responsibility)

(ultimately=finally)

body **n.** 团体，机构

(international/governing body)

vow **v.** 发誓； **n.** 誓言 (take/make a vow)

(After my illness, I vowed to exercise every day.)

4 China no longer wants so many young university graduates without practical skills—a group that has become a source of unemployment and social **discontent**. Last year, close to 10 million students **enrolled in** undergraduate programs, up 46% from a decade earlier. Last June, when the class of 2020 graduated, the unemployment rate for degree holders aged 20 to 24 was 19.3%, vs. the economy's overall 5%, according to HSBC Holdings Plc.

discontent n.&adj. 不满 (content n.&adj. 满意的)

(There was widespread discontent at/about/over/with the plan.)

enroll v. 参加, 登记 (to put sb onto the official list of members of a course, college, or group)

(I enrolled for/in/on the modern art course.)

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and build electric vehicle parts. Instead, most want to go into consumer tech, media, or financial services.

high-end

adj. 高端的

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lose edge 失去优势

edge n. 优势(an advantage over others)

(In terms of experience, she definitely had the edge over the other interviewees/candidates.)

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scale n. 规模, 等级, 级别(the size or level of sth)

(We don't yet know the scale of the problem.)

(This century has witnessed environmental destruction on an unprecedented scale.)

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rigid **adj.** 严格的，僵化的(not permitting any change)

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put sth in place 付诸实践

incentive n. 激励, 刺激(sth that encourages a person to do sth)

(There is little incentive for people to leave their cars at home when public transport remains so expensive.)

(These kids have no incentive to learn.)

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EDUCATION

Training tomorrow's scientists

Prioritizing STEM diversity, equity, and inclusion requires rethinking graduate education

By **Ashley Huderson**

How do you engage with an institution that was not designed with women or people of color in mind? How do you dismantle years of discrimination and unequal treatment? When addressing such questions, I am reminded of a saying my mother liked to use. When asked “How do you eat an elephant?” she would reply, “One bite at a time.”

This approach works in many contexts but is especially applicable to the challenges faced by academic institutions as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields aim to increase diversity and become more inclusive and equitable. Although the importance of these elements to the scientific enterprise is implied, many STEM educators hesitate to participate in discussions surrounding diversity, equity, and inclusion because they think they lack the knowledge and/or training needed to engage intelligently or because they fear that their efforts will not result in change. However, as institutions begin to prioritize diversifying STEM, faculty must consider

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how their teaching and mentoring approaches affect these issues. In *Equity in Science*, Julie Posselt demonstrates how we can take steps to mitigate systemic discrimination in STEM education.

Posselt examines existing equity, diversity, and inclusion efforts across a number of graduate STEM fields, including astronomy, physics, chemistry, geology, and psychology. Her case studies—which include an ethnographic assessment of a geology field course; a comparative analysis of the trajectories of high-diversity STEM graduates; and an overview of the barriers, lessons learned, and design of several STEM Ph.D. programs—reveal key ways that privilege and power operate in scientific organizations and have created a culture of exclusion and sameness. The book closes with targeted recommendations for how individuals, departments, and scholarly societies can create systemic and sustainable change.

So how does Posselt suggest we dismantle our “elephant”? What does that first bite look like? She argues that we must revisit and reorganize the practices and priorities that have been socialized throughout STEM culture, and she encourages readers to reimagine the community’s boundaries of what constitutes good science and to

rethink the practices and the qualities we associate with good scientists. The only way to ensure that science is equitable, she argues, is to restructure scientific culture through a lens that respects and shows cultural differences and encourages those in nonmarginalized positions to acknowledge their power and privilege and the benefits that are conferred to certain groups.

We must also center the voices, needs, and stories of people from marginalized groups.

Posselt argues that we must design STEM graduate programs with a diversity, equity, and inclusion lens that dismantles traditional community norms and values, including assumptions about scholastic ability, admission requirements, and curriculum structure. She lays out recommendations for the retention

and recruitment of traditionally marginalized groups in graduate programs. These recommendations include downplaying or eliminating Graduate Record Examination scores as admission criteria; creating “bridge” programs that create a clear and intentional pathway through the STEM pipeline at various critical junctions; providing faculty mentors who share students’ identities; and tracking program-level data, disaggregated by race or ethnicity and gender. She even provides recommendations for improving equity and inclusion within existing scientific collaborations, including ways to manage impervious and wayward colleagues. Here, she advises how to assess a collaborator’s willingness to change and discusses how to overcome different types of resistance.

Posselt argues that advancing the movement for diversity, equity, and inclusion in science requires more effective collaboration across boundaries that typically separate scholars. She highlights how these collaborations tend to lie at the intersection of diverse identities, including gender, race, economic status, and discipline. Although its conclusions and recommendations are not exactly novel, the book succeeds in illustrating the depth to which diversity, equity, and inclusion are lacking at every level of STEM culture. ■



Equity in Science
Julie R. Posselt
Stanford University Press,
2020. 240 pp.



To increase STEM workforce diversity, we must dismantle norms that discriminate against marginalized groups.

10.1126/science.abd9804