# 1. An Introduction to Social Choice

| There are   | many m   | ethods | that w | e will | consider   | in an | attempt    | to find   | a voting | system | that | most | accurately | reflects |
|-------------|----------|--------|--------|--------|------------|-------|------------|-----------|----------|--------|------|------|------------|----------|
| the voter's | choices. | For ea | ch met | hod,   | the voters | s mus | t cast the | eir ballo | ts.      |        |      |      |            |          |

| A  | ballot allows voters to choose one person for each posi-   |
|--|--|
| tion. The voter's opinions about the other candidates a    | <del></del>  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| Λ  | hallet allows waters to mark the condidates. This allows   |
| A  | ballot allows voters to rank the candidates. This allows s, and this information can be used in the voting system. |
| the voice to express opinions about an or the candidate    | s, and this information can be used in the voting system.  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| Notation: In the notes, when we list ABC, we will assur    | me that candidate A is the voter's first choice and candidate  |
|  | otation to indicate the voter's preference even if the voter is  |
| only allowed to indicate his/her first choice. In the bool | k, these preferences will be listed vertically.  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| Ties can occur in any voting system, but they rarely oc    | ccur when there are a large number of voters. However, it is   |
| advisable to determine a tie-breaking method prior to the  | ne vote. In November 2015, a Mississippi state representative  |
| •  | the vote was tied with 4589 votes for each candidate. The  |
| book will assume an odd number of voters to avoid ties     | •  |
| What are some other ways to break ties?                    |  |
| 2. Majority Rule an  | ND CONDORCET'S METHOD  |
| Definition 2.1 (Majority Rule).                            |  |
| Each voter votes for one candidate. The candidate with     | n the majority of the votes wins. Majority means more than   |
|  | dates, majority rule meets all three goals for fairness. The   |
| notes and book let the reader know the entire preference   | ce list of the voters. Assume that the voter votes for his/her   |

# **Definition 2.2** (Condorcet's Method).

first preference.

Each voter ranks the candidates (preference list voting). Each candidate is compared to every other candidate. If one candidate wins all of his/her one-on-one contests, he/she is declared the Condorcet winner.

## Example 2.3.

Assume that the following list reflects the voting preferences of all voters.

| Pref. List | XYZ | XZY | YXZ | YZX | ZYX | ZXY |
|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Voters     | 5   | 0   | 2   | 1   | 4   | 0   |

• Who is the majority winner?

| X |  |
|---|--|
| Y |  |
| Z |  |

• Who is the Condorcet winner?

| Pref. List | XYZ | XZY | YXZ | YZX | ZYX | ZXY |
|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Voters     | 5   | 0   | 2   | 1   | 4   | 0   |

| Contest | Votes for 1st contestant | Votes for 2nd contestant | Winner |
|---------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------|
| X vs Y  |                          |                          |        |
| X vs Z  |                          |                          |        |
| Y vs Z  |                          |                          |        |

#### Example 2.4.

Assume that the following list reflects the voting preferences of all voters. Who is the Condorcet winner?

| Pref. List | ABC | BCA | CAB |
|------------|-----|-----|-----|
| Voters     | 4   | 4   | 4   |

| Contest | Votes for 1st contestant | Votes for 2nd contestant | Winner |
|---------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------|
| A vs B  |                          |                          |        |
| A vs C  |                          |                          |        |
| B vs C  |                          |                          |        |

This is an example of Condorcet's \_\_\_\_\_\_because the voters' preferences are cyclic (the group of voters prefer A over B, B over C, and C over A). Condorcet's paradox is exhibited in the game Rock, Paper, Scissors.

#### 3. Other Voting Systems for Three or More Candidates

## **Definition 3.1** (Plurality Voting).

Each voter votes for one candidate. The candidate with the \_\_\_\_\_\_votes wins. A candidate can win a plurality vote with less than half the votes. The notes and book let the reader know the entire preference list of the voters. Assume that the voter votes for his/her first preference.

In the 2000 presidential election, George Bush won the plurality of the votes, but polling data indicates that Al Gore would have won using the Condorcet method.

## Example 3.2.

Assume that the following list reflects the voting preferences of all voters.

| Pref. List | XYZ | XZY | YXZ | YZX | ZYX | ZXY |
|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Voters     | 5   | 0   | 2   | 1   | 4   | 0   |

Who is the plurality winner?

| X |  |
|---|--|
| Y |  |
| Z |  |

#### **Definition 3.3** (Manipulable voting system).

A voting system is \_\_\_\_\_\_\_if there are elections in which it is to a voter's advantage to submit a ballot that misrepresents his or her true preferences.

Plurality voting is manipulable. This is often exhibited in our presidential elections by voters who support a third-party candidate but vote for a candidate from one of the two major parties.

One of the strengths of Condorcet's method is that it is not manipulable.

### **Definition 3.4** (Borda Count and other Rank Methods).

A \_\_\_\_\_method of voting assigns points in a nonincreasing manner to the ordered candidates on each voter's preference list ballot then sums these points to arrive at a group's final ranking (more points indicate a higher ranking).

#### Example 3.5.

Assume that the following list reflects the voting preferences of all voters.

| Pref. List | XYZ | XZY | YXZ | YZX | ZYX | ZXY |
|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Voters     | 5   | 0   | 2   | 1   | 4   | 0   |

Who is the plurality winner?

|   | 1st place $\times$ pts | 2nd place $\times$ pt | $3rd place \times pts$ | Total |
|---|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------|
| X |                        |                       |                        |       |
| Y |                        |                       |                        |       |
| Z |                        |                       |                        |       |

Ranking:

## Example 3.6.

A sports award uses a rank method with 5 points for first place, 3 points for second place, 2 points for third place, 1 point for 4th place, and 0 points for any place below 4th place. Rank the candidates (A, B, C, D, E, F, G) for this award.

| Pref. List | ABCDEFG | CDFAEBG | ADCBEGF | BACDFGE | ACBDFEG |
|------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Voters     | 4       | 3       | 2       | 1       | 5       |

|   | 1st place $\times$ 5 pts | 2nd place $\times$ 3 pts | $3rd place \times 2 pts$ | 4th place $\times$ 1 pt | Total |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------|
| A |                          |                          |                          |                         |       |
| В |                          |                          |                          |                         |       |
| С |                          |                          |                          |                         |       |
| D |                          |                          |                          |                         |       |
| Е |                          |                          |                          |                         |       |
| F |                          |                          |                          |                         |       |
| G |                          |                          |                          |                         |       |

Ranking:

Rank methods are often used for sports award rankings.

# Definition 3.7 (Runoff Election).

If there is no majority winner, \_\_\_\_\_ is taken after eliminating one or more of the candidates. The top two candidates could be in the runoff, or the Hare System (described below) could be used.

#### **Definition 3.8** (Hare System).

If there is no majority winner, then the candidate with the fewest number of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_votes is eliminated and the results are calculated again. If there is still no majority winner, the process continues until a majority winner is found or the remaining candidates are tied.

## Example 3.9.

Use the Hare system to determine a winner.

| Pref. List | XYZ | XZY | YXZ | YZX | ZYX | ZXY |
|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Voters     | 3   | 2   | 1   | 5   | 4   | 2   |

| Candidate | Votes in 1st round | Votes in 2nd round |
|-----------|--------------------|--------------------|
| X         |                    |                    |
| Y         |                    |                    |
| Z         |                    |                    |

Winner using the Hare system:

## **Definition 3.10** (Sequential Pairwise Voting).

In sequential pairwise voting candidates are compared two at a time in a \_\_\_\_\_\_order known as an agenda. The winner of the pairing is compared to the next candidate on the pre-determined list. This process continues until a winner is determined.

Unfortunately, the order of the pairings can affect who wins the election. However, this process is used by our legislature as bills are presented. As amendments to the bill are proposed, the votes are either for the current version of the bill or the amended version. After that process has concluded, a final vote (yes/no) is taken on the amended version (rather than allowing a choice of no bill, original version, or amended version).

# Example 3.11.

Assume that the following list reflects the voting preferences of all voters.

| Pref. List | ABDC | CABD | BDCA |
|------------|------|------|------|
| Voters     | 1    | 1    | 1    |

(a) Who is the Condorcet winner?

| Contest | Votes for 1st contestant | Votes for 2nd contestant | Winner |
|---------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------|
| A vs B  |                          |                          |        |
| A vs C  |                          |                          |        |
| A vs D  |                          |                          |        |
| B vs C  |                          |                          |        |
| B vs D  |                          |                          |        |
| C vs D  |                          |                          |        |

Who is the sequential pairwise winner for each of the following agendas? (b) ABCD? (c) BCDA? (d) CABD? (e) DBAC?

# 4. Approval Voting

| Each voter votes for all th | e candidates they find | acceptable (approve of). |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| The candidate with the      |                        | wins.                    |

# Example 4.1.

A family is deciding what to serve for dinner on Saturday and Sunday. Mom draws up a list and the votes are listed below. What will the family have for dinner this weekend?

|                  | Mom | Dad | Boy | Girl 1 | Girl 2 | Total |
|------------------|-----|-----|-----|--------|--------|-------|
| Liver and Onions | Y   |     |     |        |        |       |
| Lamb Stew        | Y   |     | Y   |        |        |       |
| Fish Sticks      | Y   |     | Y   | Y      |        |       |
| Fried Chicken    |     | Y   |     | Y      |        |       |
| Hamburgers       | Y   | Y   | Y   | Y      | Y      |       |
| Spaghetti        | Y   | Y   |     | Y      | Y      |       |

# Example 4.2.

A group is deciding what movie to see. The votes are listed below. What movie will they go see?

|              | 8 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 1 | Total |
|--------------|---|---|---|---|---|-------|
| Spectre      | Y |   | Y |   | Y |       |
| Star Wars    | Y | Y |   |   |   |       |
| Bridged      | Y |   | Y |   | Y |       |
| Joy          |   | Y |   | Y | Y |       |
| Sisters      |   | Y |   | Y | Y |       |
| Hunger Games |   |   | Y | Y | Y |       |

# 5. Fairness Criteria

**Definition 5.1** (Majority Criterion). If a candidate receives a majority of the first place votes, then that candidate should be declared the winner.

# Example 5.2.

Assume that the following list reflects the voting preferences of all voters.

| Pref. List | XYZ | YZX | ZYX |
|------------|-----|-----|-----|
| Voters     | 16  | 8   | 7   |

(a) Who is the majority winner?

| X |  |
|---|--|
| Y |  |
| Z |  |

(b) Use the Borda count to determine the winner.

|   | 1st place × pts | 2nd place × pt | $3rd place \times pts$ | Total |
|---|-----------------|----------------|------------------------|-------|
| X |                 |                |                        |       |
| Y |                 |                |                        |       |
| Z |                 |                |                        |       |

(c) Would you consider the Borda count method as "fair" considering the majority criterion?

**Definition 5.3** (Condorcet Criterion). If a candidate is favored when compared one-on-one with every other candidate, then that candidate should be declared the winner.

# Example 5.4.

Assume that the following list reflects the voting preferences of all voters.

(a) Who is the Condorcet winner?

| Pref. List | DABC | ACBD | BCAD | CBDA | CBAD |
|------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Voters     | 120  | 100  | 90   | 80   | 45   |

| Contest | Votes for 1st contestant | Votes for 2nd contestant | Winner |
|---------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------|
| A vs B  |                          |                          |        |
| A vs C  |                          |                          |        |
| A vs D  |                          |                          |        |
| B vs C  |                          |                          |        |
| B vs D  |                          |                          |        |
| C vs D  |                          |                          |        |

(b) Who is the plurality winner?

| Pref. List | DABC | ACBD | BCAD | CBDA | CBAD |
|------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Voters     | 120  | 100  | 90   | 80   | 45   |

| A |  |
|---|--|
| В |  |
| С |  |
| D |  |

(c) Who is the majority winner?

(d) Who is the winner using the Hare method?

| Candidate | Votes in 1st round | Votes in 2nd round | Votes in 3rd round |
|-----------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| A         |                    |                    |                    |
| В         |                    |                    |                    |
| С         |                    |                    |                    |
| D         |                    |                    |                    |

(e) Who is the winner using the Borda count?

| Pref. List | DABC | ACBD | BCAD | CBDA | CBAD |
|------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Voters     | 120  | 100  | 90   | 80   | 45   |

|   | 1st place × pts | 2nd place × pt | 3rd place × pts | Total |
|---|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|-------|
| A |                 |                |                 |       |
| В |                 |                |                 |       |
| С |                 |                |                 |       |
| D |                 |                |                 |       |

(f) Which of the method failed to meet the Condorcet criterion for this example?

**Definition 5.5** (Monotonicity Criterion ). This was initially described in section 9.1. Assume that candidate A won the election, but the votes were recounted. The only errors discovered were that some votes originally counted for other candidates should have been counted for candidate A. Then candidate A should still win the election. A candidate who wins a first election and then gains additional support, without losing any of the original support, should also win a second election.

#### Example 5.6.

The IOC was voting for the Winter Olympics to be held in Quebec (Q), Salt Lake City (L), Ostersund (T) or Sion (S). They took a straw vote (a preliminary vote that is not binding) on the first day. They took a binding vote on the second day. A total of 87 votes were cast (fictional data).

(a) Use the Hare Method to determine the winner from Day 1.

| Candidate | Votes in 1st round | Votes in 2nd round | Votes in 3rd round |
|-----------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Q         |                    |                    |                    |
| L         |                    |                    |                    |
| S         |                    |                    |                    |
| Т         |                    |                    |                    |

(b) That night, the 12 people who preferred TQSL and TSLQ decided to move Q to the top of their list without changing any other preferences. Use the Hare Method to determine the winner from Day 2.

| Day 2 Pref. List | TLSQ | LQTS | QSTL | QTSL | QTSL |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Voters           | 21   | 24   | 30   | 6    | 6    |

| Candidate | Votes in 1st round | Votes in 2nd round | Votes in 3rd round |
|-----------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Q         |                    |                    |                    |
| L         |                    |                    |                    |
| S         |                    |                    |                    |
| Т         |                    |                    |                    |

(c) In this example, did the Hare method violate the monotonicity criterion?

**Definition 5.7** (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives). If a candidate would be declared the winner of an election and one or more of the non-winning candidates is removed, then the previous winner should still be declared the winner.

In other words, in order for a candidate to go from losing an election to winning an election, at least one voter should have to reverse his or her ranking of that candidate and the previous winner.

#### Example 5.8.

There are 3 candidates and 20 voters with preferences listed below.

(a) Who would be the winner using Hare's method?

| Candidate | Votes in 1st round | Votes in 2nd round |
|-----------|--------------------|--------------------|
| X         |                    |                    |
| Y         |                    |                    |
| Z         |                    |                    |

(b) If candidate Z dropped out before the election and no voters changed their preference, who would win the election?

| Pref. List | XYZ | ZYX | YXZ |
|------------|-----|-----|-----|
| Voters     | 7   | 8   | 5   |

| Candidate | Votes |
|-----------|-------|
| X         |       |
| Y         |       |

**Definition 5.9** (No Perfect System). We have seen problems with all of the methods that we discussed. Kenneth Arrow proved that with three or more candidates, there does not (and cannot ever) exist a voting system that always produces a winner, satisfies the Pareto condition (if every voter prefers candidate X over candidate Y, then candidate Y will not be a winner), and satisfies the Irrelevant Alternatives condition that is not a dictatorship.