

## Investment Symposium March 2012

## P1: Liquidity Measurement & Management – Theory and Practice

Jim Eibel Max Golts Bruce Phelps

**Moderator Chris Foote** 



## Liquidity Measurement & Management-Theory and Practice





## FHLB Membership & Liquidity Management


Presented by:

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#### **About the Federal Home Loan Banks**

- GSE created by FHLB Act of 1932 to provide liquidity to housing markets. Current mission includes community and economic development.
- 12 FHLBs are autonomous, member-owned financial services cooperatives
- Members/owners include banks, thrifts, credit unions, and insurance companies
- Individual banks linked by joint and several liability for repayment of System debt securities
- All consolidated obligations carry credit ratings from both Moody's (Aaa and P-1) and Standard & Poor's (AA+ and A-1+)





#### Insurers & the FHLBs' Mission

- Original signators of the Home Loan Bank Act
- Significant investors in
  - Residential mortgage assets
  - Section 42 LIHTC
- Direct lenders for community and economic development projects
- Charitable activities include support of affordable housing projects




#### **Analysis of FHLB Membership**


#### **Costs**

- Application process
- FHLBs vary in level of commitment to insurance sector
- Equity stake required
- Borrowings are collateralized

#### **Benefits**

- Access to reliable low-cost funding
- Customized funding structures out to 30 years
- Access to long-term letters of credit








### **Reliable Liquidity**

- Access to global capital markets
- Cooperative structure
- Collateralized
- FHLBs maintain large cash positions for benefit of their membership





#### **FHLB Borrowing Capacity**

		*Average
	FHLB	Borrowing
	Borrowing	Capacity by
	Capacity	Institution
Life	\$811 billion	22.1%
Health	\$20 billion	16.0%
PC	\$231 billion	22.0%
Total Industry	\$1.06 Trillion	21.2%

<sup>\*</sup>Based on 12/31/10 admitted assets and current FHLBI collateral haircuts.





#### **Stress Test Performance**

"During the recent liquidity crisis, money market investors ran away from debt issued or sponsored by depository institutions...

By issuing implicitly guaranteed debt, the FHLB System was able to re-intermediate term funding to member depository institutions through advances."

"The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The Lender of Next-to-Last Resort," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report no. 357, November 2008, p. 3.







### **AM Best's Perspective**

"FHLB programs provide financial flexibility for insurance company members and are an attractive source of capital due to the low rate offered for advances."

"A.M. Best's Perspective on Operating Leverage," Ratings Methodology, January 12, 2012.

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### **FHLB Liquidity Strategies**



### **#1 Back-up Liquidity**

- Augment and/or replace existing facilities
- Liquefy relatively illiquid assets
- Fund unexpected liquidity needs without selling earning assets
  - Avoid fire sales
  - Manage capital gains and losses
- Incorporate into ERM and rating agency presentations

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#### **#2 Adopt More Aggressive Posture**

- Actively reduce cash and liquidity balances
- Invest proceeds in higher yielding, collateraleligible assets
- Remain fully-invested and borrow, as needed, to fund shortfalls



### **#3 Actively Use for Tactical Funding**


- Take advantage of low rate environment to lock in term financing to fund working capital
- Opportunistic matched trades
- Utilize FHLB borrowings to assist in financing:
  - New facilities (CICA Program)
  - M&A
  - Etc.


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#### **#4 Improve Spread Lending Liquidity**

- Liquefy relatively illiquid earning assets
- Use FHLB funding agreements to
  - Execute tightly matched trades
  - Fill maturity gaps and reduce roll-over risk





#### Summary

- Buying illiquid asset = writing an "option to trade"
  - What's the structure of this option?
- Two relevant practical questions:
  - How to manage scheduled liquidity needs?
  - How to manage contingent liquidity needs?
- The (contingent) illiquidity risk can be mitigated with options
  - How expensive are these options?



#### Liquidity Discount

- Illiquid asset is bought at a discount to its "fundamental value"
  - Buying illiquid asset = writing an "option to trade"
  - The illiquidity discount = price of the "liquidity option"
- A few models pricing these liquidity options
  - In particular, Golts-Kritzman model (2010)
  - Applicable to a wide variety of assets/investments
  - Published in *The Journal of Derivatives*

http://www.iijournals.com/doi/abs/10.3905/jod.2010.18.1.080



#### Holding Illiquid Portfolios

- · A good source of alpha: buy illiquid at a discount
  - Problems: drawdown, meeting cash flow needs in a crisis
  - ${\sf -}$  Scheduled cash flow: regular expenses, costs, fees, etc
- Unscheduled cash flows: margin calls, redemptions, etc.
- Standard solution: maintain sizable cash reserves
  - Lost opportunity
  - May burn through fixed cash reserves in a crisis
- Another solution: buy a portfolio of puts with expiries matching your cash flow horizon/schedule
  - In a severe crisis the puts will expire in the money, paying cash
  - The deeper the crisis, the more cash you get
  - No need to trade in very illiquid conditions



#### Liquidity Options: Concepts

- Fundamentals are properties of the asset/investment
- Liquidity is specific to the market player
- Price depends on three things:
  - Volatility of an observable *reference process:*  $\sigma$
  - Time to expiry: T
  - Length of the liquidity interval:  $\tau$
- The price of liquidity option increases
  - With increasing volatility
  - With increasing time to expiry
  - With decreasing length of the liquidity interval
- Structure
  - Bermudan or cliquet/ratchet



#### Liquidity Options: Example

Parameters	Description	Value
tau	liquidity interval length	1-quarter
Т	lock-up period (time to expiry)	3-years
В	downside barrier	74%

Date	VIX (%)	Liquidity Option Price
1/3/2007	12.04	0.0005%
1/3/2008	22.49	6.72%
1/2/2009	39.19	70.92%
1/4/2010	20.04	2.45%
1/3/2011	17.61	0.58%
1/3/2012	22.97	7.88%



#### Liquidity Options Embedded in Bonds

- Buying a bond involves writing two options
  - Default option (Merton, 1974)
  - Liquidity option
- 3-year floating-rate bond, was sometimes treated as "cash"

Date	VIX (%)	Liquidity-Adjusted Bond Price
1/3/2007	12.04	99.999%
1/3/2008	22.49	93.285%
1/2/2009	39.19	29.084%



#### Liquidity Options: Formulas

- Standard option pricing inputs: S, K, σ, τ, r
- · Black-Sholes for European options

Price = 
$$e^{-r\tau}(KN(-d_2) - SN(-d_1))$$

• First-passage options: same inputs, barrier B = e⁻⊓K

Price = 
$$e^{-r\tau}(KN(-d_2) + SN(-d_1))$$

• Liquidity options are cliquets of the first-passage options, resetting at the start of every liquidity interval



#### Liquidity Options: Greeks

- · Vega and Gamma are always positive
- Vega tends to be high, a property shared with volatility instruments like variance swaps or VIX futures
- New Greek: Lambda, the sensitivity to the liquidity interval τ
  - Lambda is always negative
  - The price of the liquidity option decreases as the length of the liquidity interval increases



#### Liquitility

- · Concept I heard from Aaron Brown
  - The idea: crisis volatility spikes and liquidity gaps are related
  - How to bake them into one pie?
- In the context of liquidity options
  - Volatility of an observable *reference process:*  $\sigma$
  - Time to expiry: T
  - Length of the *liquidity interval:* τ
- · A liquitility candidate:

$$\sigma\sqrt{T/ au}$$



Fidelity. Asset Manager

#### Conclusion

- A very liquid instrument may become illiquid in a crisis
- Liquidity and volatility are intricately related
- Liquidity risks can be mitigated with properly structured portfolios of options tailored to meet the cash flow needs

Fidelity. Asset Management



# Liquidity Measurement & Management – Theory and Practice





### **Liquidity Cost Scores (LCS)**™

**Incorporating Quantitative Bond-Level Liquidity Measures** in Portfolio Management

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9 March 2012



#### **Liquidity Cost Scores (LCS™) – Definition**

We define a bond's liquidity as the cost of immediately transforming the bond to cash, and *vice versa*, for normal trade amount

Liquidity Cost Score (LCS)<sub>i,t</sub>  $= OASD_{i,t} \times (bid \ spread_{i,t} - ask \ spread_{i,t}) \qquad \text{if spread quoted}$   $= (Offer \ Price_{i,t} - Bid \ Price_{i,t})/Bid \ Price_{i,t} \qquad \text{if price quoted}$ 

A bond's Liquidity Cost Score (LCS) is the cost – as a percent of the bond's price – to execute a round-turn transaction

#### Example:

A bond with an OASD of 5 has a trader-quoted bid spread of 40bp and an ask spread of 25bp Given the bid-ask spread of 15bp, the bond's LCS =  $5 \times .15 = 0.75\%$ 

In other words, an immediate round-turn would currently cost 75bp of the bond's price



## LCS is built on Trader Indicative Bid-Ask Spread Data

- Barclays (IG & HY) credit traders send out hundreds of messages each day, giving simultaneous bond-level bid-ask spread indications for normal institutional transaction amounts
- This information is collected by Barclays Capital Index Production for index price verification
  - We use parsing algorithms so that quotes are accurately matched to CUSIPs
  - CUSIPs are then matched to bond-level indicative and analytical information from the Barclays Capital Family of Indices
- We do not always believe trader quotes. Some are commitments to make a market, others are only indications and it may be difficult to execute at those quotes. We adjust these trader quotes wider



## For Non-trader Quotes Bonds We Use an LCS Model

- For the credit market we observe that
  - Liquidity varies by sector, subordination, size, age, risk characteristics, TRACE volume, etc.
  - How often a bond has been trader-quoted over recent months is important in determining its liquidity
  - Technical issues also affect liquidity. For example, seasoned bonds often become more liquid as they
    approach maturity → Interactive term between age and original maturity
- We use LCS values for trader-quoted bonds to estimate the LCS for a non-quoted bond based on its observed characteristics

 $\begin{tabular}{ll} Estimated LCS Non-Quoted Bond &= f [...sector; age; OAS; amount outstanding; trading volume; \\ & benchmark status; ...] \\ \end{tabular}$ 

 This attribute-based score is adjusted, based on how often the bond was quoted in recent months

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
0	Investment SYMPOSIUM Maruging Global Investment Challenges
L	CS Coverage

Index (100% coverage)	Inception Date	LCS (%) a/o Feb 29, 2012
USD Credit IG	Jan-07	1.166
USD Credit HY	Jan-07	1.772
USD Treasuries	Nov-09	0.029
USD TIPS	Jul-10	0.172
USD Fixed Rate Agency MBS	Mar-10	0.107
Pan-Euro Credit IG	May-10	0.883
Pan-Euro Credit HY	May-10	2.061
Pan-Euro FRN Credit	May-10	0.888
GBP Credit 100–200mm (Amt Outstanding)	Feb-11	2.065
Pan-Euro IG Local Currency Sovereigns		
(constituents of Pan-Euro Treasury Index)	Feb-11	0.305
Pan-Euro IG Local Currency Sovereign Linkers	Mar-11	0.864

#### In progress:

USD-Denominated EMG Bonds EUR Covered Bonds

Source: Barclays Capital





## The LCS Extended Coverage Model for Non-Index USD Credit Bonds

- Provides LCS values for non-index credit bonds
- Uses the parameters estimated by the LCS Model every month, and applies them to client-supplied bond characteristics

CUS	SIP	Ticker	Price	OAS	Spread Duration	Industry Class 3	Structure	HYIG Flag	Issue Size	Issue Date
65655	59BK	NTKS	107	538.544	0.465	CAPITAL_GOODS	2nd Lien	HY	753,333	12/17/2009
02378	BJAS	AMR	101.375	305.145	0.372	TRANSPORTATION	EETC	HY	391,909	1/30/2002
02378	BJAT	AMR	96.5	724.174	1.981	TRANSPORTATION	EETC	HY	297,430	5/24/2001
02378	BJBG	AMR	100.5625	448.224	0.23	TRANSPORTATION	EETC	IG	322,404	6/20/2002





### **LCS Updates Are Posted in the LCS Report**





Contains up-to-date

- Summary of LCS levels across markets
- New Developments, Asset class coverage
- Model enhancements
- Updated constituents and tracking performance for TCX replicating baskets
- LCS Applications
- Empirical studies using



#### **Current Liquidity Environment**







#### **LCS Uses: Credit OAS Decomposition**

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## **Using LCS to Decompose Bond Spreads** into Liquidity and Default Components

OAS of a bond = Risk premium + Expected default losses + Expected liquidity costs

$$OAS_{it} = \alpha_t + \beta_t CDS_{it} + \gamma LCS_{it} + \eta_{it}$$

 $\hat{\beta} * \overline{CDS} = \text{Default Cost};$   $\hat{\gamma} * \overline{LCS} = \text{Liquidity Cost}$  $\hat{\alpha} = \text{Risk Premium}$ 

- Month-by-month cross-sectional regression of bond-level OAS on CDS and LCS
- Universe comprises trader-quoted USD IG 5-yr bonds, whose tickers are part of the CDX
- Over the last few months, the risk premium and the liquidity contribution to OAS has been low



Source: Barclays Capital



### **Value of Spread Decomposition**

- Evaluating whether to invest in credit: Are spreads wide due to default risk or liquidity risk/high risk premia?
- Identifying relative value across individual credit bonds
- Regulators can monitor separately the liquidity and credit risk embedded in credit portfolios (capital adequacy)
- Constructing targeted hedges for specific drivers of OAS changes

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LCS Uses: LCS-Adjusted Tail Risk (VaR)



#### Why Modify Traditional Tail-Risk Models?

- Investors ask how to measure their capital-at-risk, highlighting the high illiquidity during difficult market conditions
  - The mark-to-market portfolio value was especially difficult in the (cash) credit market during the crisis
  - Investors experienced large losses more frequently than suggested by tail-risk models
    - Since transactions costs are likely to spike during market downturns, incorporating such costs provides a more realistic picture of portfolio performance in tail events

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#### **Incorporating LCS into a Tail-Risk Model**

- As we saw, transaction costs are time-varying. Transaction costs increase substantially during stressed credit markets, e.g., LCS for the Credit IG index was 2.598 in November 2008, and dropped to 0.803 in May 2011
- So the LCS of each bond needs to be calculated separately for every path in the VaR simulation
  - The Tail-Risk model generates sector-level and market-level OAS changes for each simulation path
  - We use the OAS change in each simulation path to determine the "liquidity regime" for that path
  - Bond-level LCS varies by regime, and the bond's OAS in that simulation path
  - We model each bond's "liquidation cost" for a simulation path by subtracting one-half of its LCS value (a %) from the bond's modeled return for that path



#### **Results**

			Mar-11		Nov-08				
Asset Class	Portfolio	99% VaR (in %)	99% LCS VaR (in %)	Difference	99% VaR (in %)	99% LCS VaR (in %)	Difference		
Only Rates	100% Rates	-4.6	-4.7	0.0	-2.2	-2.4	0.1		
	60% Rates, 40% Liquid Credit	-2.8	-2.9	0.1	-3.5	-3.9	0.4		
Rates + Liquid Credit	40% Rates, 60% Liquid Credit	-4.3	-4.4	0.1	-4.7	-5.2	0.5		
	0% Rates, 100% Liquid Credit	-4.3	-4.5	0.2	-7.2	-8.1	0.9		
Rates + Risky Illiquid	60% Rates, 40% Illiquid Risky Credit	-4.5	-4.6	0.1	-4.4	-5.2	0.8		
Credit	40% Rates, 60% Illiquid Risky Credit	-4.6	-4.8	0.2	-6.4	-7.7	1.3		
Credit	0% Rates, 100% Illiquid Risky Credit	-5.1	-5.4	0.4	-10.6	-12.7	2.0		
Rates + Illiquid Low-	60% Rates, 40% Illiquid Low-OAS Credit				-3.5	-4.2	0.6		
OAS Credit	40% Rates, 60% Illiquid Low-OAS Credit				-4.7	-5.6	0.9		
UAS Credit	0% Rates, 100% Illiquid Low-OAS Credit	I			-7.2	-8.7	1.5		

Source: Barclays Capital

- Transaction costs increase as portfolios have greater proportions of credit bonds, and even more when these bonds are illiquid. These costs are more prominent in Nov 2008, compared to Mar 2011
- Expected tail losses increase more in Nov 2008 relative to Mar 2011 with LCS VaR compared to traditional VaR
- The low-OAS illiquid portfolio has tail properties similar to the liquid portfolio according to the traditional VaR model, but larger tail losses according to LCS VaR
- During normal times, liquid credit portfolios help diversify the risk of tail events in interest rates, even after considering the transaction costs

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LCS Uses: Constructing Liquid Credit Cash Portfolios (TCX)



### **Credit Replication with Liquid Bonds**

- Clients often seek to obtain short-term credit beta exposure (e.g., replicate the Barclays Capital Credit Index)
  - Long or short; Funded or unfunded
- Clients have difficulty constructing basket of cash bonds to track index
  - How to construct a basket of cash bonds to track a desired credit beta?
  - How to identify the set of liquid bonds?
  - Synthetic replication of credit indices (e.g., swaps & CDX) can have high monthly tracking errors
- USD Credit TCX
  - Tracks excess returns of US Credit Index
  - Transparent, published construction rules
    - 50 Highly liquid (top 20% by LCS) bonds
    - Maximum ticker weight: 5%
    - Rebalanced monthly

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### USD Credit TCX: Constituents (as of 12/31/11)


					MV [%]		US Corp TES	Shirtliffing					MIV [%]		US Carp TES
002824AT	ABT	ABBOTT LABORATORIES-CLOBAL	5.88	5/15/2016	2.04	0.29	100	6174466Q	MS	MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER-GLO	6.63	4/1/2018	2.92	1.02	-1
02687408	AIG	AMERICAN INTL CROUP	4.55	9/15/2016	2.65	0.61	1	652482BT	NWSA -	NEWS AMERICA INC	6.90	3/1/2019	1.59	0.87	- 6
03116286	AMON	AMGENING	1.66	11/15/2014	1.34	0.33	1	64971MZC	NYCCEN	NEW YORK NY CITY TRANSITIONAL	5.27	8/1/2006	4.38	0.39	N/A
09251180	APC	ANADARKO PETROLEUM	7.63	3/15/2014	1.09	0.25	2	694308GL	PCG	PAGFIC GAS & ELECTRIC	5.63	11/30/2017	2.11	1.32	8
06739FFZ	BACR	BARCLAYS BANK PLC	5.20	7/10/2014	5.00	0.24	1	713445EK	PEP	PEPSICO INC	3.75	3/1/2014	1.50	0.31	2
055451AH	DHP	SHP SILLITON FINANCE	650	4/1/2019	250	0.54	1	822582AD	<b>RDSALN</b>	SHELL INTERNATIONAL FINANCE	6.35	12/15/2006	1.92	1.44	1
S1102AAB	ERITEL	BRITISH TELECOM PLC-GLOBAL	5.15	1/15/2013	0.86	0.73	5	010392FA	50	ALABAMA POWER	5.80	11/15/2013	2.41	0.27	20.0
172967FT	5	CITICROUPING	4.50	1/14/2022	2.25	0.60	107	85771PAF	STLNO	STATOS.	2.15	1/23/2022	0.82	0.74	N/A
1363758H	CNECN	CANADIAN NATIONAL RWY	4.40	3/15/2013	1.88	0.18	6	00209AAF	Ť	ATET WRELESS SVCS INC-CLOBAL	8.75	3/1/2001	2.24	1.60	6
260543CD	DOW	DOW CHEMICAL	2.50	2/15/2016	0.50	0.39	1	00206RA1	T	ATST CORP - CLOSAL	5.50	2/1/2018	0.76	0.87	2
260543CE	DOW	DOW CHEMICAL CO	5.25	11/15/2041	2.59	1.47	1	00206RAZ	T	ATET INC - CLOBAL	7.56	8/15/2021	0.50	0.80	-1
25459HAZ	DTV	DIRECTY HOLDINGS/FINANCE	638	3/1/2041	1.55	1.34	10	87612EAV	TCT.	TARGET CORP	3.88	7/15/2020	0.75	0.61	1
25459HAY	DTV	DIRECTY HOLDINGS/FINANCE	3.50	3/1/2016	1.80	0.39	1	587325AV	TWC	TIME WARNER CABLE INC	3.50	2/1/2015	1.80	0.44	- 4
26875PAC	EOC	EOC RESOURCES INC	4.10	2/1/2021	0.54	0.76	1	887317AF	TWX	TIME WARNER INC	4.55	3/15/2000	1.47	1.02	2
29379VAV	EPO	ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPER	5.70	2/15/2042	3.91	1.41	2.7	90261 XGD	UBS	UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND	4.88	8/4/2020	650	0.71	- 1
186106CD	FE	CLEVELAND ELECTLUM	5.65	12/15/2013	5.00	0.26	7	50344NAA	USB	USE CAPITAL XII	6.63	12/15/2009	1.55	2.01	- 4
369626XZ	CE	CENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL-CLORA	6.75	3/15/2032	1.68	1.41	1	STOTETAL.	VALERZ	VALE OVERSEAS LTD	4.63	9/15/2020	1.43	0.77	1
36962C4D	CE	GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL	6.00	8/7/2019	2.40	0.77	1.	925524BG	VIA	VIACON INC	4.50	3/1/2021	1.53	0.73	3
377372AD	CSK	GLAXIOSASTHILBSE CAPITAL INC.	5.65	5/15/2018	1.31	0.41	1	92343VAY		VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC.	3.00	4/1/2016	0.50	0.57	2
459056W	IREO	INTERNATIL BANK RECON DEV	9.25	7/15/2017	4.81	0.29	N/A	92976WW	WEC	WACHOVIA CORP	5.50	5/1/2013	2.07	0.13	1
50075NAS	RFT	KRAFT FOODS INC-GLOBAL	650	8/11/2017	1.15	0.50	1	94109 AX	WMI	WASTE MANAGEMENT INC	2.60	9/1/2016	2.00	0.44	1
50075NAZ	RET	KRAFT FOODS INC-GLOBAL	650	2/9/2040	2.30	1.38	1	931142CK	WMT	WAL-MART STORES-GLOBAL	650	8/15/2037	2.11	1.14	.1
494550BI	KIMP	KINDER MORGAN ENERGY PARTNERS	4.15	3/1/2022	2.50	1.03	1.	96950HAD	WPZ	WILLIAMS PARTNERS LP	7.25	2/1/2017	1.74	0.43	1
502413AY	LLL	L-3 COMMS CORP	5.20	10/15/2019	1.05	1.10	2	96950FAD	WPZ	WILLIAMS PARTNERS LP	5.25	3/15/2020	2.21	0.94	
59156RAU	MET	METLIFEINC	6.75	6/1/2016	4.33	0.60	2	964121CD		XEROX CORP	4.50	5/15/2021	0.96	0.77	1
								**********		USDCreditTCX				0.749	2.3
										US IG Credit Index				1.409	4.2

Source: Barclays Capital: Monthly LCS Report & Barclays Capital Live



## **USD Credit TCX Performance: Tracking Credit Index Excess Returns**

- From February 2007 through December 2011, the TCX had mean excess return tracking error of -4.0bp with tracking error volatility of 75bp
- Overweight to Lehman subordinated bonds caused underperformance of 444bp in Sept 2008





#### **USD TCX vs. IRS+CDX Performance**

	Mean N	Ionthly TE	Volatility (TEV)			
	TCX	IRS+CDX	TCX	IRS+CDX		
Feb 07-Dec 08	(8.6)	71.7	111.6	188.0		
Jan 09-Dec 11	(1.1)	(33.6)	38.3	123.6		
Feb 07-Dec 11	(4.0)	7.5	75.0	159.1		

- Overall, the TCX tracked the US Credit Index excess returns with less than half the volatility of an IRS+CDX ("RBI") basket
- IRS+CDX outperforms Credit Index when the latter does poorly, and vice versa. May be undesirable for clients looking to time credit exposure!


#### Comparing RBI, TCX vs. Credit Index Excess Returns: Feb 07-Dec 11



Source: Barclays Capital



#### **TCX Reference Guide**



- 1. Constituents published in monthly LCS report (BCL keyword: QPSpubs) and as central portfolio on POINT 2. Returns published on the index website (BCL keyword: indexmap)
- 3. Under development

Source: Barclays Capital



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