

# Lei Xu

## Current Contact Information

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<b>Doctoral Studies</b>	<b>McGill University</b> Ph.D. Candidate in Economics	2010 - Present
<b>Prior Degrees</b>	<b>McGill University</b> M.A. in Economics B.A. Joint Honors in Economics and Finance	2009 - 2010 2005 - 2009
<b>Professional Experience</b>	<b>Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto</b> Visiting Scholar, Business Economics Unit	2014 - 2015
	<b>Stern School of Business, New York University</b> Visiting Scholar, Business Economics Department	2012 - 2014
<b>References</b>	<b>Professor Fabian Lange</b> (McGill University) <b>Professor Luís Cabral</b> (NYU Stern School of Business) <b>Professor Licun Xue</b> (McGill University) <b>Professor Mitchell Hoffman</b> (Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto)	
<b>Research Fields</b>	Primary Fields: Applied Microeconomics, Labor Economics, Industrial Organization Secondary Fields: Economics of Digitization, Game Theory	
<b>Working Papers</b>	<b>“What Makes Geeks Tick? A Study of Stack Overflow Careers”</b> <b>[Job Market Paper]</b> with Tingting Nian (UC Irvine) and Luis Cabral (NYU Stern) <b>“Platform Competition with Local Network Effects”</b>	
<b>Works In Progress</b>	<b>“Multi-Market Contact in Chinese Airlines Industry”</b> with Wenbo Wang (HKUST) and Lai Jiang (UBC) <b>“Information Organization and Entry Deterrence”</b>	
<b>Conference Presentations</b>	NBER Summer 2015: Economics of IT and Digitization, Boston, MA Platform Strategy Research Symposium, Boston, MA Fourth Society of Labor Economists World Conference (SOLE), Montreal 13th International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC), Boston 12th International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC), Chicago European Asso. for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE), Portugal	July 2015 July 2015 June 2015 April 2015 April 2014 August 2013
<b>Seminars</b>	CIREQ Seminar, McGill University CEPA Seminar, University of Toronto CIREQ Seminar, McGill University NYU Stern IO Seminar, NYU Stern CIREQ Seminar, McGill University	2016 2015 2014 2013 2013

<b>Programming Languages</b>	Python, SQL, L <sup>A</sup> T <sub>E</sub> X, Stata, Matlab, Fortran.	
<b>Scholarships and Awards</b>	FQRSC Stipend	2015
	FQRSC Stipend	2014
	William Dawson Scholarship	2013
	Grad Excellence Award in Economics	2013
	Internal SSHRC Grant	2012
	FQRSC Stipend	2012
	McCall MacBain Fellowship	2011
	Principals Graduate Fellowship	2010
	Provosts Graduate Fellowship	2009
<b>Languages</b>	English (fluent), Madarin Chinese (native), French (intermediate)	
<b>Teaching Assistantships</b>	Macroeconomics and Applications (Prof. Mayssun El-Attar Vilalta, Eval: 4/4)	2012
	Macroeconomics and Applications (Prof. Paul Dickinson, Eval: 4/4)	2011
	The Chinese Economy (Prof. Christopher Green, Eval: 3.6/4)	2011
	Labour Economics (Prof. Jennifer Hunt, Eval: N/A)	2010
	Economic Statistics Honors (Prof. Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, Eval: 3.6/4)	2010
	Introduction to Economic Theory Honors (Prof. Daniel Parent, Eval: 4/4)	2009
<b>Research Assistantship</b>	Zhou, Jidong. 2014 “Multiproduct Search and the Joint Search Effect”, <i>American Economic Review</i> , 104(9), 2918-2939.	
<b>Personal Information</b>	<b>Citizenship:</b> China	
	<b>Permanent Residence:</b> Canada	

## References

### Professor Fabian Lange

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### Professor Mitchell Hoffman

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## Job Market Paper

**“What Makes Geeks Tick? A Study of Stack Overflow Careers”** with Tingting Nian (UC Irvine) and Luis Cabral (NYU Stern)

The success of a platform depends crucially on a thorough understanding of the motivations behind user participation. However, identifying incentives behind voluntary contribution has always been a challenging task. In this paper, we use a revealed preference approach to show that career concerns play an important role in user contributions on Stack Overflow, the largest online Q&A community. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we show that the event of finding a new job implies a reduction of 25% in reputation-generating activity, but only a reduction of 8% in non-reputation-generating activity. We provide direct evidence against alternative explanations such as integer constraints, skills mismatch, and selection into treatment (Ashenfelter’s Dip). Our findings suggest that, beyond altruism, career concerns play an important role in explaining voluntary contributions to Stack Overflow.

## Working Paper

### **“Platform Competition with Local Network Effects”**

This paper presents a dynamic model of price competition between two platforms on which consumers value *local* network effects. Specifically, each consumer’s utility level depends on the number of her *neighbors* in the same platform. Consumers in different *neighborhoods* choose their networks, and each platform competes for new customers in different *neighborhoods* with a homogeneous entry price. I characterize equilibrium market structure with a combination of analytical and numerical solutions, and compare them to results from network effect models that are *global*, in which a consumer benefits from *all* other consumers on the same platform. I provide sufficient conditions such that one firm dominates both *local* markets, as well as sufficient conditions that each firm only dominates *one local* market.