# Lei Xu

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855 Sherbrooke Street West Email: lei.xu2@mail.mcgill.ca Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7 Website: http://www.leixu.org Doctoral Studies McGill University Ph.D. Candidate in Economics 2010 - Present **Prior Degrees** McGill University M.A. in Economics 2009 - 2010 B.A. Joint Honors in Economics and Finance 2005 - 2009**Professional** Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto 2014 - 2015 Experience Visiting Scholar, Business Economics Unit Stern School of Business, New York University 2012 - 2014 Visiting Scholar, Business Economics Department References Professor Fabian Lange (McGill University) Professor Luís Cabral (NYU Stern School of Business) Professor Licun Xue (McGill University) Professor Mitchell Hoffman (Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto) Research Fields Primary Fields: Economics of Digitization, Applied Microeconomics Secondary Fields: Labor Economics, Industrial Organization **Working Papers** "What Makes Geeks Tick? A Study of Stack Overflow Careers" [Job Market Paper] Lead Author, with Tingting Nian (UC Irvine) and Luis Cabral (NYU Stern) "Platform Competition with Local Network Effects" Works In "Multi-Market Contact in Chinese Airlines Industry" with Wenbo Wang (HKUST) **Progress** and Lai Jiang (UBC) "Information Organization and Entry Deterrence" Conference 2015 INFORMS Annual Meeting Philadelphia, PA November 2015 Presentations NBER Summer 2015: Economics of IT and Digitization, Boston, MA July 2015 Discussant: Chris Forman, Georgia Tech Platform Strategy Research Symposium, Boston, MA July 2015

Fourth Society of Labor Economists World Conference (SOLE), Montreal June 2015

European Asso. for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE), Portugal August 2013

13th International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC), Boston

12th International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC), Chicago

Seminars	CIREQ Seminar, McGill University CEPA Seminar, University of Toronto CIREQ Seminar, McGill University NYU Stern IO Seminar, NYU Stern CIREQ Seminar, McGill University	2015 2015 2014 2013 2013
Research Interests	Digital Economy, Telecommunication, Airline Competition, Platform Competition, Online Labor Market, Information Technology	
Teaching Interests	Data Analytics, Economics of Digitization, Empirical Methods and Research Design, Microeconomics, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Information/Digital Technologies, Entrepreneurship and Technology Strategy	
Programming Languages	Python, SQL, $\slash\hspace{-0.6em} ^{\slash\hspace{-0.6em} \text{Python}}$ , SQL, $\slash\hspace{-0.6em}^{\slash\hspace{-0.6em} \text{P}}$ TEX, Stata, Matlab, Fortran, R	
Scholarships and Awards	FQRSC Stipend FQRSC Stipend William Dawson Scholarship Grad Excellence Award in Economics Internal SSHRC Grant FQRSC Stipend McCall MacBain Fellowship Principals Graduate Fellowship Provosts Graduate Fellowship	2015 2014 2013 2013 2012 2012 2011 2010 2009
Languages	English (fluent), Madarin Chinese (native), French (intermediate)	
Teaching Assistantships	Macroeconomics and Applications (Prof. Mayssun El-Attar Vilalta, Eval: 4/4) Macroeconomics and Applications (Prof. Paul Dickinson, Eval: 3.9/4) The Chinese Economy (Prof. Christopher Green, Eval: 3.6/4) Labour Economics (Prof. Jennifer Hunt, Eval: N/A) Economic Statistics Honors (Prof. Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, Eval: 3.6/4) Introduction to Economic Theory Honors (Prof. Daniel Parent, Eval: 4/4)	2012 2011 2011 2010 2010 2009
Research Assistantship	Zhou, Jidong. 2014 "Multiproduct Search and the Joint Search Effect", American Economic Review, 104(9), 2918-2939.	
Personal Information	Citizenship: China Permanent Residence: Canada	

#### References

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# Job Market Paper

# "What Makes Geeks Tick? A Study of Stack Overflow Careers" with Tingting Nian (UC Irvine) and Luis Cabral (NYU Stern)

Many online platforms such as most famously Wikipedia rely on users to voluntarily provide content. What motivates users to contribute content for free is however not well understood. In this paper, we use a revealed preference approach to show that career concerns play an important role in user contributions on Stack Overflow, the largest online Q&A community. We investigate how activities that can enhance a user's reputation vary before and after the user finds a new job. We contrast this with activities that do not help in enhancing a user's reputation. After finding a new job, users contribute 25% less in reputation-generating activities on Stack Overflow. By contrast, they reduce their non-reputation-generating activity by only 8% after finding a new job. These findings suggest that users contribute to Stack Overflow in part because they see this as a productive way to improve their probability of finding employment. We provide direct evidence against alternative explanations such as integer constraints, skills mismatch, and selection into treatment (Ashenfelter's Dip). The results suggest that, beyond altruism, career concerns play an important role in explaining voluntary contributions to Stack Overflow.

# Working Paper

# "Platform Competition with Local Network Effects"

This paper presents a dynamic model of price competition between two platforms on which consumers value *local* network effects. Specifically, each consumer's utility level depends on the number of her *neighbors* in the same platform. Consumers in different *neighborhoods* choose their networks, and each platform competes for new customers in different *neighborhoods* with a homogeneous entry price. I characterize equilibrium market structure with a combination of analytical and numerical solutions, and compare them to results from network effect models that are *global*, in which a consumer benefits from *all* other consumers on the same platform. I provide sufficient conditions such that one firm dominants both *local* markets, as well as sufficient conditions that each firm only dominate *one local* market.