

# Hardware Security Project

*Boyoun Zhou\**

\*Boston University, MA

Created on Oct 4 2014, Modified on November 15, 2014

## Outline

- 1 **Preparation Work**
  - Contacting People
  - Conclusion
- 2 **Layout of Hardware Trojan Circuits**
  - Specs for Hidding HT
  - HT insertion AES-T100
  - Dummy Trojan
- 3 **Results**
  - Single Gate Simulation
  - Multiple Gates Simulation
  - Real Circuit Simulation
  - Power Results

# Outline

## 1 Preparation Work

- Contacting People
- Conclusion

## 2 Layout of Hardware Trojan Circuits

- Specs for Hidding HT
- HT insertion AES-T100
- Dummy Trojan

## 3 Results

- Single Gate Simulation
- Multiple Gates Simulation
- Real Circuit Simulation
- Power Results

Oct 8 , 2014

## Three Parts of Work

- *Sheng Wei*

- The main point of the paper is to develop an one-gate trojan trigger circuit. The attack circuitry is on TrustHub. TrustHub has various kinds of attacking circuits' verilog codes.
- Sheng works on only a small part of the project for developing triggers. He can help us develop the trigger but not the attacking circuit.
- Leakage power analysis has been applied for detecting trojans that are off at first and then turned on later. For example, trigger can comes from a counter.

## Three Parts of Work

- *Sheng Wei*

- The main point of the paper is to develop an one-gate trojan trigger circuit. The attack circuitry is on TrustHub. TrustHub has various kinds of attacking circuits' verilog codes.
- Sheng works on only a small part of the project for developing triggers. He can help us develop the trigger but not the attacking circuit.
- Leakage power analysis has been applied for detecting trojans that are off at first and then turned on later. For example, trigger can comes from a counter.

## Three Parts of Work

- *Sheng Wei*

- The main point of the paper is to develop an one-gate trojan trigger circuit. The attack circuitry is on TrustHub. TrustHub has various kinds of attacking circuits' verilog codes.
- Sheng works on only a small part of the project for developing triggers. He can help us develop the trigger but not the attacking circuit.
- Leakage power analysis has been applied for detecting trojans that are off at first and then turned on later. For example, trigger can comes from a counter.

## Three Parts of Work

- *Sheng Wei*

- The main point of the paper is to develop an one-gate trojan trigger circuit. The attack circuitry is on TrustHub. TrustHub has various kinds of attacking circuits' verilog codes.
- Sheng works on only a small part of the project for developing triggers. He can help us develop the trigger but not the attacking circuit.
- Leakage power analysis has been applied for detecting trojans that are off at first and then turned on later. For example, trigger can comes from a counter.



## Second part

### ● *Ronen*

- The whole circuit's photonics response is simulated by adding up single gate response. **Gate-to-gate wires are excluded.**
- There is a space issue with the single gate design. The attenuation for the reflected signal is too small. The way to solve this problem is to change the layout to bring more open space for Ronen.
- One good way to solve the signal attenuation is to utilize the open space for antenna design. My idea is to fill the antenna with the rest of the circuit. Ronen agrees that it will bring the reflected back signal much stronger.
- Ronen needs a month after I handling him the standard cells. So that will push my work's deadline to the end of Oct.

## Second part

### ● *Ronen*

- The whole circuit's photonics response is simulated by adding up single gate response. **Gate-to-gate wires are excluded.**
- There is a space issue with the single gate design. The attenuation for the reflected signal is too small. The way to solve this problem is to change the layout to bring more open space for Ronen.
- One good way to solve the signal attenuation is to utilize the open space for antenna design. My idea is to fill the antenna with the rest of the circuit. Ronen agrees that it will bring the reflected back signal much stronger.
- Ronen needs a month after I handling him the standard cells. So that will push my work's deadline to the end of Oct.

## Second part

### ● *Ronen*

- The whole circuit's photonics response is simulated by adding up single gate response. **Gate-to-gate wires are excluded.**
- There is a space issue with the single gate design. The attenuation for the reflected signal is too small. The way to solve this problem is to change the layout to bring more open space for Ronen.
- One good way to solve the signal attenuation is to utilize the open space for antenna design. My idea is to fill the antenna with the rest of the circuit. Ronen agrees that it will bring the reflected back signal much stronger.
- Ronen needs a month after I handling him the standard cells. So that will push my work's deadline to the end of Oct.

## Second part

### ● Ronen

- The whole circuit's photonics response is simulated by adding up single gate response. **Gate-to-gate wires are excluded.**
- There is a space issue with the single gate design. The attenuation for the reflected signal is too small. The way to solve this problem is to change the layout to bring more open space for Ronen.
- One good way to solve the signal attenuation is to utilize the open space for antenna design. My idea is to fill the antenna with the rest of the circuit. Ronen agrees that it will bring the reflected back signal much stronger.
- Ronen needs a month after I handling him the standard cells. So that will push my work's deadline to the end of Oct.

## Second part

### ● *Ronen*

- The whole circuit's photonics response is simulated by adding up single gate response. **Gate-to-gate wires are excluded.**
- There is a space issue with the single gate design. The attenuation for the reflected signal is too small. The way to solve this problem is to change the layout to bring more open space for Ronen.
- One good way to solve the signal attenuation is to utilize the open space for antenna design. My idea is to fill the antenna with the rest of the circuit. Ronen agrees that it will bring the reflected back signal much stronger.
- Ronen needs a month after I handling him the standard cells. So that will push my work's deadline to the end of Oct.

## Third Part

- *CAD tools*

- I can see the layout, but the bindkeys have not been set. So I can not change anything. Once I get that done, I will contact Ronen for single gate simulation.
- 130nm Design rules have not been found for Ronen's design. I will also get this part as fast as possible.
- Jamie can not help and I can not get help from Cadence. So his help from Cadence will be lagged for a long time.

## Third Part

- *CAD tools*

- I can see the layout, but the bindkeys have not been set. So I can not change anything. Once I get that done, I will contact Ronen for single gate simulation.
- 130nm Design rules have not been found for Ronen's design. I will also get this part as fast as possible.
- Jamie can not help and I can not get help from Cadence. So his help from Cadence will be lagged for a long time.

## Third Part

- *CAD tools*

- I can see the layout, but the bindkeys have not been set. So I can not change anything. Once I get that done, I will contact Ronen for single gate simulation.
- 130nm Design rules have not been found for Ronen's design. I will also get this part as fast as possible.
- Jamie can not help and I can not get help from Cadence. So his help from Cadence will be lagged for a long time.



## Third Part

- *CAD tools*

- I can see the layout, but the bindkeys have not been set. So I can not change anything. Once I get that done, I will contact Ronen for single gate simulation.
- 130nm Design rules have not been found for Ronen's design. I will also get this part as fast as possible.
- Jamie can not help and I can not get help from Cadence. So his help from Cadence will be lagged for a long time.

# Outline

## 1 Preparation Work

- Contacting People
- Conclusion

## 2 Layout of Hardware Trojan Circuits

- Specs for Hidding HT
- HT insertion AES-T100
- Dummy Trojan

## 3 Results

- Single Gate Simulation
- Multiple Gates Simulation
- Real Circuit Simulation
- Power Results

- **CAD tools** Currently, we will work on the Nangate technology instead of 130nm. Current known ways to do the power simulation is to use encounter to simulate the vcd file from modelsim, which is not accurate. The accurate simulation needs extraction from layout.
- **Testbench** Testbench can be downloaded from Trusthub. We need to find a testbench that makes sense in terms of area, leakage power and layout.

- **CAD tools** Currently, we will work on the Nangate technology instead of 130nm. Current known ways to do the power simulation is to use encounter to simulate the vcd file from modelsim, which is not accurate. The accurate simulation needs extraction from layout.
- **Testbench** Testbench can be downloaded from Trusthub. We need to find a testbench that makes sense in terms of area, leakage power and layout.

- **CAD tools** Currently, we will work on the Nangate technology instead of 130nm. Current known ways to do the power simulation is to use encounter to simulate the vcd file from modelsim, which is not accurate. The accurate simulation needs extraction from layout.
- **Testbench** Testbench can be downloaded from Trusthub. We need to find a testbench that makes sense in terms of area, leakage power and layout.

## Time Stamp

Oct 15 , 2014

# Outline

## 1 Preparation Work

- Contacting People
- Conclusion

## 2 Layout of Hardware Trojan Circuits

- Specs for Hidding HT
- HT insertion AES-T100
- Dummy Trojan

## 3 Results

- Single Gate Simulation
- Multiple Gates Simulation
- Real Circuit Simulation
- Power Results

## A 'Good Trojan' in Information Leakage

### Size

The area of added circuit must be small due to extra energy consumption and die size.

### Side-Channel Leakage

In order to leak information, the circuit must consume more energy for secret info transmitting. A '*good Trojan*' must consume energy as small as possible but leak information as much as possible.

### Trigger

The attacker must be hard to be triggered. This is due to extensive functional testing.



## A 'Good Trojan' in Information Leakage

### Size

The area of added circuit must be small due to extra energy consumption and die size.

### Side-Channel Leakage

In order to leak information, the circuit must consume more energy for secret info transmitting. A '*good Trojan*' must consume energy as small as possible but leak information as much as possible.

### Trigger

The attacker must be hard to be triggered. This is due to extensive functional testing.

## A 'Good Trojan' in Information Leakage

### Size

The area of added circuit must be small due to extra energy consumption and die size.

### Side-Channel Leakage

In order to leak information, the circuit must consume more energy for secret info transmitting. A '*good Trojan*' must consume energy as small as possible but leak information as much as possible.

### Trigger

The attacker must be hard to be triggered. This is due to extensive functional testing.

## A 'Good Trojan' in Information Leakage

### Size

The area of added circuit must be small due to extra energy consumption and die size.

### Side-Channel Leakage

In order to leak information, the circuit must consume more energy for secret info transmitting. A '*good Trojan*' must consume energy as small as possible but leak information as much as possible.

### Trigger

The attacker must be hard to be triggered. This is due to extensive functional testing.

# Outline

## 1 Preparation Work

- Contacting People
- Conclusion

## 2 Layout of Hardware Trojan Circuits

- Specs for Hidding HT
- HT insertion AES-T100
- Dummy Trojan

## 3 Results

- Single Gate Simulation
- Multiple Gates Simulation
- Real Circuit Simulation
- Power Results

## AES-T100 Explanation

- *Side Channel Attack* This method is implemented with power side channel attack. It leaks the secret information through CDMA channel.
- *CDMA Leakage* The attacking circuit consists of a PRNG for spread spectrum. In this way, the leakage information will be distributed through many cycles so that the leakage power analysis can not detect the information
- *Demo from Paper* It is implemented with FPGA. The author used 8 flipflops to mimic a huge capacitor.

## AES-T100 Explanation

- *Side Channel Attack* This method is implemented with power side channel attack. It leaks the secret information through CDMA channel.
- *CDMA Leakage* The attacking circuit consists of a PRNG for spread spectrum. In this way, the leakage information will be distributed through many cycles so that the leakage power analysis can not detect the information
- *Demo from Paper* It is implemented with FPGA. The author used 8 flipflops to mimic a huge capacitor.

## AES-T100 Explanation

- *Side Channel Attack* This method is implemented with power side channel attack. It leaks the secret information through CDMA channel.
- *CDMA Leakage* The attacking circuit consists of a PRNG for spread spectrum. In this way, the leakage information will be distributed through many cycles so that the leakage power analysis can not detect the information
- *Demo from Paper* It is implemented with FPGA. The author used 8 flipflops to mimic a huge capacitor.

## AES-T100 Explanation

- *Side Channel Attack* This method is implemented with power side channel attack. It leaks the secret information through CDMA channel.
- *CDMA Leakage* The attacking circuit consists of a PRNG for spread spectrum. In this way, the leakage information will be distributed through many cycles so that the leakage power analysis can not detect the information
- *Demo from Paper* It is implemented with FPGA. The author used 8 flipflops to mimic a huge capacitor.



# AES-T100

- **Functionality** Leaks the keys of AES.
- **Trigger Condition** Always on.
- **Location** Highlighted.

HT insertion AES-T100

## AES-T100

- **Functionality** Leaks the keys of AES.
- **Trigger Condition** Always on.
- **Location** Highlighted.

# AES-T100


- **Functionality** Leaks the keys of AES.
- **Trigger Condition** Always on.
- **Location** Highlighted.

# AES-T100

- **Functionality** Leaks the keys of AES.
- **Trigger Condition** Always on.
- **Location** Highlighted.

HT insertion AES-T100


# Trojan Free Layout



**Figure:** AES-T100 Trojan Free Circuit

HT insertion AES-T100


## Trojan Free Layout Without Filler Cells



**Figure:** AES-T100 Trojan Free Circuit without Filler Cells

HT insertion AES-T100


# Trojan In Layout



**Figure:** AES-T100 Trojan Inserted Circuit

HT insertion AES-T100

## Trojan Free Layout Without Filler Cells



**Figure:** AES-T100 Trojan Inserted Circuit without Filler Cells



# Outline

## 1 Preparation Work

- Contacting People
- Conclusion

## 2 Layout of Hardware Trojan Circuits

- Specs for Hidding HT
- HT insertion AES-T100
- Dummy Trojan

## 3 Results

- Single Gate Simulation
- Multiple Gates Simulation
- Real Circuit Simulation
- Power Results

## b15-T100

- **Functionality** Slows down part of the circuit by reducing the clock frequency by half.
- **Trigger Condition** Observes 0xFF for the address bus for bits 8-15.
- **Location** Tightly placed at the bottom left section of the layout.
- **P&R Problem** I did not finish place and route due to ec535 hw due.....

## b15-T100

- **Functionality** Slows down part of the circuit by reducing the clock frequency by half.
- **Trigger Condition** Observes 0xFF for the address bus for bits 8-15.
- **Location** Tightly placed at the bottom left section of the layout.
- **P&R Problem** I did not finish place and route due to ec535 hw due.....

## b15-T100

- **Functionality** Slows down part of the circuit by reducing the clock frequency by half.
- **Trigger Condition** Observes 0xFF for the address bus for bits 8-15.
- **Location** Tightly placed at the bottom left section of the layout.
- **P&R Problem** I did not finish place and route due to ec535 hw due.....

## b15-T100

- **Functionality** Slows down part of the circuit by reducing the clock frequency by half.
- **Trigger Condition** Observes 0xFF for the address bus for bits 8-15.
- **Location** Tightly placed at the bottom left section of the layout.
- *P&R Problem* I did not finish place and route due to ec535 hw due.....

## b15-T100

- **Functionality** Slows down part of the circuit by reducing the clock frequency by half.
- **Trigger Condition** Observes 0xFF for the address bus for bits 8-15.
- **Location** Tightly placed at the bottom left section of the layout.
- **P&R Problem** I did not finish place and route due to ec535 hw due.....

# Outline

## 1 Preparation Work

- Contacting People
- Conclusion



## 2 Layout of Hardware Trojan Circuits

- Specs for Hidding HT
- HT insertion AES-T100
- Dummy Trojan

## 3 Results

- Single Gate Simulation
- Multiple Gates Simulation
- Real Circuit Simulation
- Power Results

# Single Gate Simulation





# Outline

## 1 Preparation Work

- Contacting People
- Conclusion


## 2 Layout of Hardware Trojan Circuits

- Specs for Hidding HT
- HT insertion AES-T100
- Dummy Trojan

## 3 Results


- Single Gate Simulation
- Multiple Gates Simulation
- Real Circuit Simulation
- Power Results

# Circuit with Trojans Response




**Figure:** Circuit with Trojans

# Circuit without Trojans




**Figure:** Circuit without Trojans

# Response Comparison




**Figure:** Response Comparison

## Error Rate of False Alarm



**Figure:** Error Rate of False Alarm

## Error Rate of Miss Test



**Figure:** Error Rate of Miss Test

# Outline

## 1 Preparation Work

- Contacting People
- Conclusion

## 2 Layout of Hardware Trojan Circuits

- Specs for Hidding HT
- HT insertion AES-T100
- Dummy Trojan

## 3 Results

- Single Gate Simulation
- Multiple Gates Simulation
- Real Circuit Simulation
- Power Results


## Trojan Free Response




# Trojan In Response

## Trojan In minus Trojan Response

# Error Rate of False Alarm



# Error Rate of Miss Test



# Outline

## 1 Preparation Work

- Contacting People
- Conclusion

## 2 Layout of Hardware Trojan Circuits

- Specs for Hidding HT
- HT insertion AES-T100
- Dummy Trojan

## 3 Results

- Single Gate Simulation
- Multiple Gates Simulation
- Real Circuit Simulation
- Power Results