

SOCKS overTURNed



RP86: Using TURN relays as Proxies

Sean Liao


SOCKS

- Not short for anything
- Widely supported generic proxy protocol
- Layer 4
- SOCKS4 (1992) / SOCKS4a: TCP
- SOCKS5 (1996, RFC 1928): TCP & UDP

SOCKS





TURN - Traversal Using Relays around NAT



TURN

- Traversal Using Relays around NAT
- Designed / used primarily for audio / video communications
- Extension of STUN (Session Traversal Utilities for NAT) protocol
- Implemented by web browsers as part of WebRTC
- Layer 4
- Base protocol (RFC 5766): UDP/TCP/TLS to proxy, UDP to destination
- RFC 6062: TCP to destination

TURN



Basic TURN connection

```
// setup client for udp
turnConfig := &turn.ClientConfig{
    TURNServerAddr: p.turnAddress,
    Conn:           udpconn, // raw udp socket listener started earlier
    Username:       p.turnUser,
    Password:       p.turnPass,
    Realm:          p.turnRealm,
}
client, _ := turn.NewClient(turnConfig)
client.Listen()

// allocate a udp port on TURN relay
relayConn, _ := client.Allocate()

// read data from remote
_, sourceAddr, _ := relayConn.ReadFrom(buffer)

// write data to remote
relayConn.WriteTo(buffer, destinationAddr)
```

Chained Together

- Let SOCKS clients talk to TURN relays
 - Mask originating address
 - Access private network connected to relay
 - Access outside network using whitelisted relay
- Forwarding
 - TURN relay makes connection to final destination
- Reverse Connection
 - Red teaming
 - Establish connection through relay to known (whitelisted) endpoint
 - Serve connections in reverse direction, open up internal network

Related Work - Forward / Slack / Enable Security



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How we abused Slack's TURN servers to gain access to internal services

By: [Enable Security](#)

Publish date: Apr 6, 2020

Last updated: Apr 17, 2020

Tags: [webrtc security](#) [bug bounty](#) [research](#)

Executive summary (TL;DR)

Slack's TURN server allowed relaying of TCP connections and UDP packets to internal Slack network and meta-data services on AWS. And we were awarded \$3,500 for [our bug-bounty report on HackerOne](#).

Related Work - Reverse / CloudProxy

CloudProxy: A NAPT Proxy for Vulnerability Scanners based on Cloud Computing

Yulong Wang, Jiakun Shen

State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China

Email: {wyl, moretea_sjk}@bupt.edu.cn





Fig. 3. Overall Structure of CloudProxy

Forward UDP



TURN UDP

on incoming SOCKS packet

```
// retrieve existing session
uSess := conns[srcAddr.String()]

// start new session on demand
if uSess == nil {
    _, dconn, _ := f.Proxy.connectUDP()
    uSess = &session{dconn, srcAddr, srcConn}
    conns[srcAddr.String()] = uSess
    go uSess.handleIncoming()
}

// write to TURN relay
uSess.dconn.WriteTo(data, dstAddr)
```

on incoming TURN packet


```
// uSess.handleIncoming

// read packet
n, from, _ := dconn.ReadFrom(buf)

// wrap in SOCKS packet
datagram := socks5.NewDatagram(srcAddr, buf[:n])

// write to SOCKS client
srcConnconn.WriteToUDP(datagram.Bytes(), srcAddr)
```

Forward TCP



TURN TCP - Implement RFC 6062

```
// Update client.Allocate
// make protocol configurable
proto.RequestedTransport{Protocol: c.transportProtocol},

// Have the TURN relay connect to a remote destination
func (c *Client) Connect(peer *net.TCPAddr) (ConnectionID, error) {
    msg := stun.New()
    stun.NewType(stun.MethodConnect, stun.ClassRequest).AddTo(msg)
    stun.XORMappedAddress{peer.IP, peer.Port}.AddToAs(msg, stun.AttrXORPeerAddress)
    // other fields omitted

    res := c.PerformTransaction()

    // extract connection ID from successful response
    var cid ConnectionID
    cid.GetFrom(res)
}
```

TURN TCP - Implement RFC 6062

```
// Associate an new tcp connection with a remote connection on the TURN relay
func (c *Client) ConnectionBind(dataConn net.Conn, cid ConnectionID) error {
    msg := stun.Build(
        stun.NewType(stun.MethodConnectionBind, stun.ClassRequest),
        cid,
        // other fields omitted
    )

    // write binding request
    dataConn.Write(msg.Raw)

    // read response, limit to response bytes only
    dataConn.Read(buf)

    // omitted verify success
}
```

TURN TCP

```
// same as before
// but specify transport protocol in turnConfig
controlConn, _ := net.Dial("tcp", turnAddress)
client, _ := turn.NewClient(turnConfig)
client.Listen()
client.Allocate()
```


```
// make relay connect to remote destination
connectionID, _ := client.Connect(dstAddr)
```

```
// open new connection for data
dataConn, _ := net.Dial("tcp", turnAddress)
// associate connection with connect attempt
client.ConnectionBind(dataConn, connectionID)
```

```
// read from TURN relay / destination
dataConn.Read(buffer)
```

```
// write to TURN relay / destination
dataConn.Write(buffer)
```


Reverse



Proxy

```
// connect to TURN relay with UDP
_, uconn, _ := proxy.connectUDP()

// connect with QUIC over TURN connection
qSession, _ := quic.Dial(uconn, serverAddr, serverHost, tlsConf, quicConf)

for {
    // wait for incoming connections from server
    stream, _ := qSession.AcceptStream(ctx)

    // extract protocol and destination address
    proto := readMessage(stream)
    addr := readMessage(stream)

    // serve connection
    switch proto {
        case "tcp":
            go serveTCP(addr, stream)
        case "udp":
            go serveUDP(addr, stream)
    }
}
```

Server

```
// accept incoming QUIC connection and start SOCKS servers
qListener, _ := quic.ListenAddr(serverAddr, tlsConf, nil)
for {
    qSession, _ := qListener.Accept(ctx)
    go func(){
        srv := socksServer()
        srv.ListenAndServe(&conn{qSession})
    }()
}
```

```
// example for incoming SOCKS/TCP to TCP/QUIC/TURN
stream, _ := conn.qSession.OpenStream()
writeMessage(stream, "tcp")
writeMessage(stream, dstAddr)
```

```
// tell client connection is successful
reply := socks5.NewReply(socks5.RepSuccess, /* omitted */)
reply.WriteTo(clientConn)
```

```
// copy data between connections
go io.Copy(clientConn, stream)
io.Copy(stream, clientConn)
```

Problems

- TCP support
 - Only a single server implementation supports it: Coturn
 - No client (or server) library support in any language, implement it in Go
- TURN sessions
 - Single connection to host:port per session, problems with HTTP1, virtual domains
 - No closing connections
- DNS resolution
 - SOCKS library and TURN work with IP addresses
 - Split horizon DNS

Code

- Extended Library
 - pion/turn rfc6062 branch
 - <https://github.com/pion/turn/tree/rfc6062>
- Proxy code
 - <https://github.com/seankhliao/uva-rp2/tree/master/cmd/proxy>

Testing

- Find TURN relays in the wild
 - Use popular videoconferencing solutions
- Use own account / credentials
 - “insider”
- Patch Chromium to dump out credentials
 - Not the same as login credentials
 - Each service has its own way of transferring TURN credentials

Services

	UDP	TCP
Zoom	no TURN	
Google Meet	no TURN	
Cisco Webex (CiscoThinClient)	Drops after allocate	
GoToMeeting (Citrix)	“Wrong Transport Field”	
Slack (Amazon Chime)	Forbidden IP	X
Microsoft Teams / Skype	V	X
Facebook Messenger	V	X
Jitsi Meet	V	X
Riot.im (Matrix)	V	X
BlueJeans	V	X

Defense - Network / Firewall Operators

- TURN (RFC8155): Server auto discovery
 - mDNS / Anycast
 - Run your own STUN/TURN relay?
 - Clients need to support this
- Deep Packet Inspection / Network Flow Analysis (?)
- Push security to endpoints

Defense - TURN Operators

- Hiding Servers
 - Non default ports
 - Load balancers with TLS SNI (Server Name Indication)
- Authentication
 - “long-term credentials” are short term & on demand in practice
 - Requested over HTTP+JSON, XMPP, gRPC, ...
 - Linked / additional auth
 - Verify realm
- Restricting Services
 - Limiting sessions
 - Disable unused protocols, ex. TCP
 - Block internal ranges
 - Block low ports
 - Architectural changes?
 - P2P Mesh vs MCU (Multipoint Conferencing Unit) vs SFU (Selective Forwarding Unit)

Conclusion / Future Work

- Can work
 - UDP works everywhere
 - Very little TCP support
- Red Teaming
 - Only need UDP and whitelisted server
- Difficult to protect against
 - Designed to tunnel through
- Credentials are hard to get
 - Reverse engineer credential exchange for stable credentials
- IPv6 support
- Masking traffic as audio / video
- Embed into applications / webpages
- Integrate into frameworks / Metasploit
- Reuse code from existing applications, browsers, meeting software
- Coopt WebRTC?

Scan the Internet

- IPv4 only
- UDP/3478 only, services may run on TCP and/or different ports
- Technically only tests for STUN presence, all TURN functionality is behind authentication
- Any valid STUN response message counts as hit
- Map addresses back to services through AS, rDNS, extracting SAN / DNSName from attempting a TLS connection
- Sometimes servers include a SOFTWARE attribute

Results

- 39740 hits

- 4693 AS

- 5405 Amazon
- 2533 Alibaba
- 2186 Hetzner
- 1694 Microsoft
- 1650 DigitalOcean
- 1446 OVH
- 823 Google

- 22800 have rDNS:

```
1065 static
588 mail
453 my
207 turn
126 cloud
101 matrix
66 www
60 server
57 join
44 meet
36 vcse
35 expe
34 mx
30 sip
29 stun
27 video
27 smtp
25 xmpp
23 nextcloud
22 hn
21 coturn
19 expe01
18 pbx
18 ns1
17 meeting
17 jabber
17 bbb
```

- 3542 have TLS certs:

```
2481 *
812 www
574 matrix
522 turn
269 cloud
163 mail
117 stun
114 securium
114 alpeinsoft
94 conference
77 meet
76 swiss-securium
76 jiochat
75 nextcloud
69 pubsub
66 upload
65 web9
63 smtp
62 proxy
60 imap
58 chat
53 coturn
43 mcu1
42 rec
42 qos
42 mnsbone
42 mns
```

Results

Server Software

- Amazon Connect
- ApolloProxy-1.20.0.21 'sunflower'
- Coturn-4.5.0.2 'dan Eider'
- Huawei Stun Server
- IPFX Turn Server
- P1 STUN library
- restund v.E5.1.110.44786 (- / win32)
- reTURNServer 1.10.0 (RFC5389)
- TANDBERG/4120 (X7.2.1)
- Tokbox
- TurnServer 0.7.3
- zt v0.4.14 (x86_64/linux)

Example Core Product

meet.securmeet.com
matvid.loveatfirstswipe.com
readyformarriage.love www.readyformarriage.love
adorapp.com www.adorapp.com
*.bramble.io bramble.io
turn.dateoverseas.com
*.talktome.com talktome.com
*.tutoring.co.kr tutoring.co.kr

Example Internal Software

nextcloud.isn.eu.com
video.bebo-hannover.de
binconsulting.com.au www.binconsulting.com.au
matrix.oh-no.solutions
bbb.oakleydataservices.com
office.hgb-leipzig.de