

CI tools




Jenkins



Travis



codeship



TeamCity



AppVeyor



Circle CI



LambCI



AWS CodePipeline



Concourse CI

design goals

design goals

- “pipeline as code”


design goals

- “pipeline as code”
- reproducible builds


reproducible builds

NPM default - get latest
“compatible” version, ie. 1.X.X

```
license": "ISC",  
"dependencies": {  
  "bluebird": "^3.5.0",  
  "co": "^4.6.0",  
  "do-not-download-this-package": "^1.0.0",  
  "do-not-download-this-package-neither": "^1.0.0"  
},  
"scripts": {}  
}
```



reproducible builds



The screenshot shows a dark-themed instance of the Visual Studio Code (VS Code) code editor. The interface includes:

- EXPLORER** pane on the left, listing files and folders. A yellow oval highlights the entry for `{ package-lock.json`.
- OPEN EDITORS** list on the left, showing `serverless.yml`, `package-lock.json`, `index.html static`, `launch.json .vscode`, and `get-index.js functions`.
- BIG-MOUTH** folder structure on the left, including `.serverless`, `.vscode`, `examples`, `functions`, `node_modules`, `static` (with `index.html`), `tests`, and `seed-restaurants.js`.
- Editor** pane in the center, displaying the contents of `package-lock.json`. The JSON file lists various dependencies and their versions, including `@serverless/fdk`, `@types/graphql`, `@types/node`, and `agent-base`.
- Terminal** pane on the right, showing a long list of command-line logs.

use `npm ci` during CI to restore
exact version



Search the docs...

User guide▼

Developer guide▼

Blog

Demo▼

About

Postmortem for Malicious Packages Published on July 12th, 2018

Summary

On July 12th, 2018, an attacker compromised the npm account of an ESLint maintainer and published malicious versions of the [eslint-scope](#) and [eslint-config-eslint](#) packages to the npm registry. On installation, the malicious packages downloaded and executed code from [pastebin.com](#) which sent the contents of the user's [.npmrc](#) file to the attacker. An [.npmrc](#) file typically contains access tokens for publishing to npm.

The malicious package versions are [eslint-scope@3.7.2](#) and [eslint-config-eslint@5.0.2](#), both of which have been unpublished from npm. The [pastebin.com](#) paste linked in these packages has also been taken down.

[npm has revoked](#) all access tokens issued before 2018-07-12 12:30 UTC. As a result, all access tokens compromised by this attack should no longer be usable.

The maintainer whose account was compromised had reused their npm password on several other sites and did not have two-factor authentication enabled on their npm account.

We, the ESLint team, are sorry for allowing this to happen. We hope that other package maintainers can learn from our mistakes and improve the security of the whole npm ecosystem.

<https://eslint.org/blog/2018/07/postmortem-for-malicious-package-publishes>




Aleksandar Simovic

@simalexan

Following



Interesting talk by [@tlhunter](#)
“Real World Attacks in the npm Ecosystem”
[#SFNode](#) meetup



3:55 AM - 5 Apr 2019 from [Capital One](#)

2 Retweets 8 Likes



2

8





brian leroux

@brianleroux

Following



🤔 A few things we npm package authors/maintainers can do today:

- 🔒 Enable 2fa for everyone like rn
- 🔑 Revoke/reset all your tokens *
- 📌 Pin all deps to an exact version in package.json as a practice so auto-upgrades cannot burn us

* Don't forget your CI! 😭

6:00 PM - 12 Jul 2018

54 Retweets 108 Likes



7


54

108



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Why is **Snyk** different?

design goals

- “pipeline as code”
- reproducible builds
- fast!

prefer CI tools that lets you use
containers to run each step

build script

```
if [ "$1" = "deploy" ] && [ $# -eq 4 ]; then
    STAGE=$2
    REGION=$3
    PROFILE=$4

    npm install
    AWS_PROFILE=$PROFILE 'node_modules/.bin/sls' deploy -s $STAGE -r $REGION
elif [ "$1" = "int-test" ] && [ $# -eq 4 ]; then
    STAGE=$2
    REGION=$3
    PROFILE=$4

    npm install
    AWS_PROFILE=$PROFILE npm run int-$STAGE
elif [ "$1" = "acceptance-test" ] && [ $# -eq 4 ]; then
    STAGE=$2
    REGION=$3
    PROFILE=$4

    npm install
    AWS_PROFILE=$PROFILE npm run acceptance-$STAGE
else
    usage
    exit 1
fi
```

build script

Build

Execute shell

Command `./build.sh test test eu-west-1 non_prod`

See [the list of available environment variables](#)

Execute shell

Command `./build.sh deploy test eu-west-1 non_prod`

See [the list of available environment variables](#)

Execute shell

Command `./build.sh validate test eu-west-1 non_prod`

See [the list of available environment variables](#)

Why you should use temporary stacks when you do serverless

AWS, CloudFormation, Programming, Serverless / September 12, 2019

Check out my new course [Learn you some Lambda best practice for great good!](#) and learn the best practices for performance, cost, security, resilience, observability and scalability.



One of the benefits of serverless is the pay-per-use pricing model you get from the platform. That is, if your code doesn't run, you don't pay for them!

Combined with the simplified deployment flow (compared with applications running in containers or VMs) it has enabled many teams to make use of temporary CloudFormation stacks.

In this post, let's talk about two ways you should use temporary CloudFormation stacks, and why. ***Disclaimer:** this shouldn't be taken as a prescription. It's a general approach that has pros and cons, which we will discuss along the way.*

Temporary stacks for feature branches

It's common for teams to have multiple AWS accounts, one for each environment. While there doesn't seem to be a consensus on how to use these environments, I tend to follow these conventions:

- dev is shared by the team, this is where the latest development changes are deployed and tested end-to-end. This environment is unstable by nature, and shouldn't be used by other teams.
- test is where other teams can integrate with your team's work. This environment should be fairly stable so as not to slow down other teams.

<https://theburningmonk.com/2019/09/why-you-should-use-temporary-stacks-when-you-do-serverless/>

design goals


- “pipeline as code”
- reproducible builds
- fast!
- secure


Ops


Dev


Staging

Prod









▼ What Is IAM?

- Understanding How IAM Works
- Overview: Users
- Overview: Permissions and Policies

What Is ABAC for AWS?

- Security Features Outside of IAM
- Quick Links to Common Tasks

Getting Set Up

► Getting Started

► Tutorials

► Best Practices and Use Cases

► IAM Console and Sign-in Page

► Identities

► Access Management

► Access Analyzer

► Troubleshooting IAM

► Reference

Resources

Making Query Requests

Document History

AWS Glossary

What Is ABAC for AWS?

[PDF](#) | [Kindle](#) | [RSS](#)

Attribute-based access control (ABAC) is an authorization strategy that defines permissions based on attributes. In AWS, these attributes are called *tags*. Tags can be attached to IAM principals (users or roles) and to AWS resources. You can create a single ABAC policy or small set of policies for your IAM principals. These ABAC policies can be designed to allow operations when the principal's tag matches the resource tag. ABAC is helpful in environments that are growing rapidly and helps with situations where policy management becomes cumbersome.

For example, you can create three roles with the `access-project` tag key. Set the tag value of the first role to `Heart`, the second to `Sun`, and the third to `Lightning`. You can then use a single policy that allows access when the role and the resource are tagged with the same value for `access-project`. For a detailed tutorial that demonstrates how to use ABAC in AWS, see [Tutorial: Using Tags for Attribute-Based Access Control in AWS](#).

