

# Serverless Security: What's Left to Protect?

Guy Podjarny, Snyk  
@guypod

# About Me

- Guy Podjarny, **@guypod** on Twitter
- CEO & Co-founder at Snyk
- History:
  - Cyber Security part of Israel Defense Forces
  - First Web App Firewall (AppShield), Dynamic/Static Tester (AppScan)
  - **Security**: Worked in Sanctum -> Watchfire -> IBM
  - **Performance**: Founded Blaze -> CTO @Akamai
- O'Reilly author, speaker



# Serverless Changes Security

# Serverless Is...

**Better for some security concerns**

**Neutral for some security concerns**

**Worse for some security concerns**



# When is Serverless Better for Security?



# **Serverless has no Servers!**

**(that you manage and secure)**

**Less need to worry about...**

# Vulnerable OS Dependencies

“patching” your servers

# Heartbleed




# Shellshock





Meltdown



Spectre

Verizon:  
“**Most attacks exploit known vulnerabilities that have never been patched despite patches being available for months, or even years**”


**Symantec:**  
“Through 2020, 99% of vulnerabilities exploited will continue to be ones known by security and IT professionals for at least one year”

# With Serverless, it's the platform's responsibility

And it's the platform operators core competency

# FaaS ~= PaaS

FaaS naturally relies less on OS dependencies



# Less need to worry about...

## Denial of Service

**DoS means a stream of  
specific “heavy” requests  
take down server(s) (e.g. ReDoS).**

In FaaS, there is no long standing server to take down

# Auto Scale FTW!

Deal with bad demand just like dealing with good demand

# Caveat: Concurrent execution limit

AWS Lambda default limit 1000 concurrent function executions pre region

# Caveat: Resource exhaustion

Back-end resources are often not equally elastic

# Caveat: **Limited in size**


100Gbps attack will still take you down...  
Consider a DDoS protection solution too.

# Caveat: Your bill

You still pay for extra traffic...

**Less need to worry about...**

**Long-lived  
Compromised Servers**



Attackers penetrate  
in **stages**



Attackers like to **lay in wait**

# FaaS forces Statelessness - including **bad state**

Attackers need to repeat attacks many times, risking detection & remediation

# Caveat: Containers are often reused

A compromised function may still compromise other users

# FaaS > PaaS

PaaS Servers are managed, but still live longer

# Security in Serverless

Better

Vulnerable OS Dependencies

Denial of Service

Long-lived Compromised  
Servers

# So attackers will go...



## Right?



# When is Serverless Neutral for Security?

# Still need to worry about...

## Permissions

and authorization



who can **invoke** your  
function?




# **Who can access code & env vars for your function?**



If your function was  
**compromised**, what can it do?


# AWS Security Policy




```
functions:  
  create:  
    handler: todos/create.create  
    events:  
      - http:  
          path: todos  
          method: post  
          cors: true  
  
  list:  
    handler: todos/list.list  
    events:  
      - http:  
          path: todos  
          method: get  
          cors: true  
  
  get:  
    handler: todos/get.get  
    events:  
      - http:  
          path: todos/{id}  
          method: get  
          cors: true  
  
  update:  
    handler: todos/update.update  
  
iamRoleStatements:  
  - Effect: Allow  
    Action:  
      - dynamodb:Query  
      - dynamodb:Scan  
      - dynamodb:GetItem  
      - dynamodb:PutItem  
      - dynamodb:UpdateItem  
      - dynamodb:DeleteItem  
    Resource: "arn:aws:dyna...  
  - Effect: Allow  
    Action:  
      - lambda:InvokeFunction  
      - lambda:InvokeAsync  
    Resource: "*"
```

# Easier

AWS Security Policy



# Safer





# Keep your policies granular

# iRobot automates IAM roles



Serverless Ops for the iRobot Fleet - Aaron Kammerer



# Use Least Privilege Principle



Policies continuously  
expand until somebody  
adds an asterix




**Adding permissions is easy.**  
**Removing permissions is hard**



**Caveat:**  
**FaaS permissions are limited to**  
**Platform actions**

# PureSec FunctionShield




Disable **outbound internet connectivity** (except for AWS resources) from the serverless runtime environment, if such connections are not required



Disable **read/write on the /tmp/ directory**, if such operations are not required



Disable **child process execution**, if such execution is not required by the function



Disable read access to the function's handler and **prevent source code leakage**

```
var AWS = require('aws-sdk');
const FunctionShield = require('@puresec/function-shield');
FunctionShield.configure({
  policy: {
    // 'block' mode => active blocking
    // 'alert' mode => log only
    // 'allow' mode => allowed, implicitly occurs if key does not exist
    outbound_connectivity: "block",
    read_write_tmp: "block",
    create_child_process: "block" },
  token: process.env.FUNCTION_SHIELD_TOKEN });
exports.hello = async (event) => {
  // ... // your code
};
```

# Serverless is *a bit* better for authorization

if managed properly, which it often isn't

# Still need to worry about...

## Securing Data (at rest)

# FaaS apps still store data

and that data can be stolen or tampered with

Bad:  
**FaaS means more state  
outside the server**

can no longer keep sensitive data “on the machine”

Good:  
**FaaS allows more granular  
data access controls**

Control which functions can access which data

# Tips & Tricks


- Encrypt all sensitive persistent data
- Encrypt all sensitive off-box state data
- Minimize functions that can access each data store
- Use separate DB credentials per function
  - And control what these credentials should do
- Monitor which functions are accessing which data

# Still need to worry about...

## Vulnerabilities in Your Code



**Serverless doesn't protect  
the Application Layer**



**SQL Injection**  
**Cross Site Scripting**  
**Remote Command Execution**  
**Cross Site Request Forgery**  
**Bad auth logic**

...

| OWASP Top 10 - 2013                                  | → | OWASP Top 10 - 2017                                  |
|--|---|--|
| A1 – Injection                                       | → | A1:2017-Injection                                    |
| A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management    | → | A2:2017-Broken Authentication                        |
| A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)                      | ⬇ | A3:2017-Sensitive Data Exposure                      |
| A4 – Insecure Direct Object References [Merged+A7]   | U | A4:2017-XML External Entities (XXE) [NEW]            |
| A5 – Security Misconfiguration                       | ⬇ | A5:2017-Broken Access Control [Merged]               |
| A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure                         | ↗ | A6:2017-Security Misconfiguration                    |
| A7 – Missing Function Level Access Contr [Merged+A4] | U | A7:2017-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)                   |
| A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)               | ☒ | A8:2017-Insecure Deserialization [NEW, Community]    |
| A9 – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities     | → | A9:2017-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities  |
| A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards             | ☒ | A10:2017-Insufficient Logging&Monitoring [NEW,Comm.] |

# App Sec Tips

- Dynamic App Sec Testing
- Static App Sec Testing
- Standardize input processing to include sanitization
  - Use shared libraries across functions
- Make API Gateway models as strict as possible
- Secure each function independently
  - Secure unit tests FTW!

**Still need to worry about...**

Vulnerable  
Application Dependencies

# Serverless functions use Application Dependencies

npm, Maven, PyPi, nuget...

# For many functions, the majority of code is dependencies

3rd party code can hold vulnerabilities just like 1st party code

# Example: Fetch file & store in s3 (Serverless Framework Example)

```
'use strict';

const fetch = require('node-fetch');
const AWS = require('aws-sdk'); // eslint-disable-line import/no-extraneous-dependencies

const s3 = new AWS.S3();

module.exports.save = (event, context, callback) => {
  fetch(event.image_url)
    .then((response) => {
      if (response.ok) {
        return response;
      }
      return Promise.reject(new Error(
        `Failed to fetch ${response.url}: ${response.status} ${response.statusText}`);
    })
    .then(response => response.buffer())
    .then(buffer => (
      s3.putObject({
        Bucket: process.env.BUCKET,
        Key: event.key,
        Body: buffer,
      }).promise()
    ))
    .then(v => callback(null, v), callback);
};


```

19 Lines of Code

```
"dependencies": {
  "aws-sdk": "^2.7.9",
  "node-fetch": "^1.6.3"
}
```

2 Direct dependencies

19 dependencies (incl. indirect)

191,155 Lines of Code



More code ~=  
More Vulnerabilities



**Over time, dependencies grow  
stale & vulnerable**

Security

## Equifax's disastrous Struts patching blunder: THOUSANDS of other orgs did it too

Those are just the ones known to have downloaded outdated versions

EQUIFAX DATA BREACH

### Equifax's Mega-Breach Was Made Possible by a Website Flaw It Could Have Fixed

## Failure to patch two-month-old bug led to massive Equifax breach

Critical Apache Struts bug was fixed in March. In May, it bit ~143 million US consumers.

DAN GOODIN - 9/13/2017, 11:12 PM



The platform manages  
OS Dependencies.

You need to manage  
App Dependencies.



# <Shameless Plug>

# Snyk for Serverless! (and PaaS)

**Source control**



GitHub

Add projects



GitHub Enterprise

Contact us to enable



GitLab

Connect to GitLab



Bitbucket Server

Contact us to enable

**Platform as a Service**



Heroku

Connect to Heroku



Cloud Foundry

Connect to Cloud Foundry



Pivotal Web Services

Connect to Pivotal



IBM Cloud

Connect to IBM Cloud

**Serverless**



AWS Lambda

Add projects



Azure Functions

Connect to Azure Functions



Google Cloud Platform

Coming soon!

# Snyk for Serverless! (and PaaS)



## Which AWS Lambda functions do you want to test?

Snyk supports Node and Java projects. We require a `package.json` or `pom.xml` to be able to test your function.

- us-east-1
  - us-east-1
  - helloworld
    - \$LATEST
    - shaun-greeter
    - staging
  - lambda-fixture
    - \$LATEST
    - TEST
    - outreach
    - SLATEST

Issues Dependencies

- High severity 2
- Medium severity 4
- Low severity 5
- Patched 0
- Ignored 0

MEDIUM SEVERITY

🛡️ **Uninitialized Memory Exposure**

Vulnerable module: [stringstream](#)  
Introduced through: [twilio@2.11.1](#)

**Detailed paths**

- Introduced through: [aws-node-twilio-send-text-message@0.0.1](#) → [stringstream@0.0.5](#)  
**Remediation:** Your dependencies are out of date, otherwise you would have used `stringstream` instead of `stringstream@0.0.5`. Try reinstalling your dependency. One of your dependencies may be bundling outdated modules.

**Overview**

[stringstream](#) Encode and decode streams into string streams in node.js  
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to **Uninitialized Memory Exposure**.

| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| H        | 1     |
| M        | 12    |
| L        | 2     |

[View report](#)

λ us-east-1/aws-auth0-protected-endpoints-dev-publicEndpoint

[package.json](#)

| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| H        | 1     |
| M        | 0     |
| L        | 3     |

[View report](#)

λ us-east-1/aws-java-simple-http-endpoint-dev-currentTime(\$LATEST) 🔒

[pom.xml](#)

| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| H        | 12    |
| M        | 1     |
| L        | 0     |

[View report](#)

λ us-east-1/aws-node-twilio-dev-sendText(\$LATEST) 🔒

[package.json](#)

| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| H        | 2     |
| M        | 4     |
| L        | 5     |

[View report](#)

dev



snyk

# Fix during Dev

## Open a fix PR

[github.com/guypod/goof](https://github.com/guypod/goof)

[View test report](#)

1. Choose which vulnerabilities you would like to fix.
2. Open a pull request with the upgrades and patches to address these vulnerabilities.
3. The repository will be watched for new vulnerabilities and you will receive an alert if a new vulnerability affects your project.

### Vulnerabilities with a fix


An upgrade or patch is available to fix the vulnerable dependencies.

- L** [Regular Expression Denial of Service \(DoS\)](#) in hawk
- H** [Content & Code Injection \(XSS\)](#) in marked
- H** [Cross-site Scripting \(XSS\) via Data URIs](#) in marked
- M** [Remote Memory Exposure](#) in mongoose

## [Snyk Alert] Fix for 4 vulnerable dependency paths #9872

**Merged** BerkeleyTrue merged 1 commit into [staging](#) from [snyk-fix-9a4b3f6d](#) on Jul 25, 2016

[Conversation](#) 1   [Commits](#) 1   [Files changed](#) 1



snyk-bot commented on Jul 24, 2016

Contributor +

The following newly disclosed vulnerabilities impact one or more of the npm packages this project uses:

- [npm:minimatch:20160620](#)

As these vulnerabilities are now publicly known, attackers can try to use them against your application, making fixing them a matter of urgency.

To help expedite the fix, Snyk created this pull request with the necessary changes to address the vulnerabilities.

This pull request includes:

Reviewer

No review

Assignee

No one assigned

Labels

None yet

Projects



</Shameless Plug>

# Security in Serverless

**Better**

Vulnerable OS Dependencies

Denial of Service

Long-lived Compromised  
Servers

**Neutral**

Permissions

Securing Data at rest

Vulnerabilities in your code

Vulnerable App Dependencies

# Neutral ~ = Worse

By eliminating some threats,  
Serverless shifts attacker attention to what's left



# When is Serverless Worse for Security?



Serverless doesn't create  
**new security problems.**

# Serverless means more...

**Independent Services**  
**Flexible Interfaces**  
**Use of 3rd party services**  
including the risks that entails!

# More need to worry about...

## Third Party Services

and securing data in transit

For each service, **worry** about...

**what data are you sharing?**

and how well does the other service manage it?

# For each service, **worry** about...


## Is data in **transit** secured?

Is it using HTTPS? Is it within a VPC? Is it encrypted?

# For each service, **worry** about...

## **who are you talking to?**

You use an API key, but how do you authenticate them?  
Validate HTTPS cert, especially when exiting your network



**For each service, worry about...**

**Do you trust its responses?**

If the other service is compromised, can it be used to get to you?

For each service, **worry** about...

## How to store **API keys**?

Be sure to use a KMS and rotate keys!


# For each service, **worry about...**

- What **data** are you **sharing**?
- Is **data in transit** secured?
- Who are you talking to?
- Do you **trust** its **responses**?
- How to store **API keys**?

# Worry about **1st party services** too!

Don't let your least secure function take down the system

# Use AWS X-Ray for visibility



## Example app.js - HTTP Client

```
var AWSXRay = require('aws-xray-sdk');
var http = AWSXRay.captureHTTPs(require('http'));
```

To enable tracing on all HTTP clients, call `captureHTTPsGlobal` before you load `http`.

## Example app.js - HTTP Client (Global)

```
var AWSXRay = require('aws-xray-sdk');
AWSXRay.captureHTTPsGlobal(require('http'));
var http = require('http');
```


[Image via Yan Cui's blog](#)

# More need to worry about...

## Attack Surface

mo' functions, mo' problems

# Serverless -> Granularity -> Flexibility






# Flexibility -> Risk

Harder to define what's “right”, more use-cases to abuse

# A function is a perimeter

That needs to be secured



# Tips & Tricks

- Test every function for security flaws, independently
- Don't rely on limiting access to a function
  - Access controls will change over time, without code changes
- Use shared input/output processing libraries
  - Make it easier to process input securely than insecurely
- Limit functionality to what you actually need
  - Sometimes you need to work more to let functions do less
- Monitor both individual functions and full flows

# More need to worry about...

## Security Monitoring


mo' functions, mo' problems

# why NOT deploy a function?

Super easy, (effectively) zero cost

# Easy deployment + min cost = **LOTS** of functions

Many of which are lightly used



**Easy to add,  
Hard to remove**

# Policies tend to expand...

Expanding is easy, contracting is hard



**LOTS** of functions,  
many of which are **lightly used**,  
**with overly open policies...**

our future?



**Every Function  
introduces Risk**



**No ops cost !=  
No cost of ownership**

Risk & Management costs still exist

# Tips & Tricks

- Consider before you deploy. Do you need this?
- Separate networks/accounts for groups of functions
- Track what you have deployed, and how it's used
- Minimize permissions up front
- Chaos-style reduce permissions and see what breaks
- Monitor for known vulnerabilities in functions

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**Worse**

Third Party Services


Attack Surface

Security Monitoring



# Tools?

# Serverless Monitoring and Security in Use or Planned for Use



Source: The New Stack Serverless Survey 2018. Q. Please indicate which of the following your organization is using or planning to use within the next 18 months. n=382

@ 2018 THE NEW STACK


# Monitor attacks in the SOCC (Security Operation Control Center)

**Protego**

The Protego dashboard provides a comprehensive view of security posture across various resources. It includes a Posture Explorer (77% Posture), Resource Explorer (91% Performance), Task Manager (58 tasks), and Application Defense (Code Protection, External API Validation, Data Protection, IP Protection, Interface Minimization, Control Flow Protection). Key metrics like Open Tasks (59), Attacks Blocked (0), and Recent Updates (2) are displayed.

## Twistlock

The Twistlock Monitor / Runtime dashboard displays real-time monitoring and auditing. It shows a list of incidents, such as 'Blocked process' and 'Crypto miner', with detailed logs and forensic data. A radar view of the incident is also provided.



## PureSec



snyk.io

# Monitor & Fix vulnerable libs in Dev & CI/CD

[Snyk Alert] Fix for 4 vulnerable dependency paths #9872

Merged BerkeleyTrue merged 1 commit into staging from snyk-fix-9a4b3f6d on Jul 25, 2016

Conversation 1 Commits 1 Files changed 1

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This pull request includes:



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### us-east-1

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> helloworld      | <input type="checkbox"/> huge-npm-dep-tree               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> \$LATEST        | <input type="checkbox"/> \$LATEST                        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> shaun-greeter   | <input type="checkbox"/> vulnerable-func-dev-currentTime |
| <input type="checkbox"/> staging         | <input type="checkbox"/> \$LATEST                        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> lambda-fixture  | <input type="checkbox"/> github-outreach                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> \$LATEST        | <input type="checkbox"/> \$LATEST                        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> TEST            | <input type="checkbox"/> pr                              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> outreach        | <input type="checkbox"/> \$LATEST                        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> \$LATEST        | <input type="checkbox"/> dev                             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> dev             | <input type="checkbox"/> generate-pull-request           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> github-outreach | <input type="checkbox"/> prod                            |

### us-east-2



# Summary



**Serverless dramatically reduces  
some top security threats**



But...



**Security is hard -  
and attackers don't give up**

# Serverless shuffles security priorities

Previously easy attacks are now hard.  
Attackers will move on to the next item on the list

# Security in Serverless

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Vulnerabilities in your code

Vulnerable App Dependencies

**Worse**

Third Party Services

Attack Surface

Security Monitoring

# Serverless is defined now. Let's build Security in.

Thank You!

Guy Podjarny, Snyk  
@guypod