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**THESIS**

**DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE PROTOCOL FOR LOW BANDWIDTH NANOSATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS**

by

Cervando A. Banuelos II

**September 2017**

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Co-Advisor: Jim Horning

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**DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE PROTOCOL FOR LOW BANDWIDTH NANOSATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

Nanosatellites provide a light, efficient, and cost effective way for research institutions to carry out experiments in low Earth orbit. These satellites frequently use the ultra-high and very high frequency bands to transfer their data to the ground stations, and oftentimes will use the internet protocol and the Transmission Control Protocol as a standard for communication to ensure the arrival and integrity of the data transmitted. Due to bandwidth limitations and signal noise, these connection-based protocols end up accruing a large data bandwidth cost in headers and retransmission costs. Furthermore, due to connection unreliability, encryption and integrity checks present a challenge.

The aim of this thesis was to develop a software based low-bandwidth reliable network protocol that can support a cryptographic system for encrypted communications using commercial off-the-shelf components. This protocol would reduce the data overhead, retain the retransmission functionality and integrate support for a cryptographic system. Work consisted of developing the encryption mechanism, assessing its resilience to error propagation, and developing the protocol to work over a simulated network. The result of the study is a proof of concept that the protocol designed is feasible, applicable, and could be used as a communication standard in future projects.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

COTS commercial off-the-shelf

IP Internet Protocol

TCP Transmission Control Protocol

UHF ultra-high frequency

VHF very-high frequency

UDP User Datagram Protocol

NERDP Nanosatellite Encrypted Reliable Datagram Protocol

LEO low Earth orbit

CSP CubeSat Space Protocol

OSI

ISO

BER bit error rate

CRC32/CRC 32-bit cyclic redundancy check

HMAC keyed-hash message authentication code

XOR exclusive or logical function

AES 128 bit Advanced Encryption Standard

3DES Data Encryption Standard

MEROPE Montana EaRth Orbiting Pico Explorer

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# INTRODUCTION

## rESEARCH DOMAIN

Nanosatellites are small low Earth orbit (LEO) devices used to undertake space-based research in a cost effective manner. Nanosatellites typically have a mass of 1-10 kilograms, have a short life time of a few weeks or months in orbit, and are often constructed using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. COTS components are typically inexpensive, readily available, and can be easily repurposed for space missions. The use of these components helps keep the mission prices low and allows for a larger number of research institutions to carry out experiments and demonstrations in LEO.

Currently, nanosatellites and their COTS components rely heavily on pre-existing and well established communication protocols. These protocols are the same ones used in ground based internet communications and build on the Internet Protocol (IP) stack. Specifically, researchers will use two of the most common protocols: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP). These protocols operate at a network level on all computers on the ground, and provide a framework for communication to automate the transmission and receipt of data.

TCP is a connection-based protocol, meaning that it relies heavily on a persistent connection even if the connection is noisy or prone to errors in the data. TCP provides key services that are fundamental to the transmission of data such as retransmission of lost or deformed packets, acknowledgement of data received, integrity checks, and the ability to assemble the packets of data in the correct order. To achieve this, each TCP packet will contain anywhere between 20 to 60 bytes of data as a header containing the relevant information needed by the receiver to carry out these functions.

UDP on the other hand is a lighter protocol that does not rely on a persistent connection. UDP is a unidirectional packet sent by a transmitter to a receiver without any information for retransmission, or correct packet ordering. If an object is fragmented into discrete packets and transmitted with UDP, unlike TCP, these packets may or may not arrive, and they may or may not arrive in the right order without any mechanism to verify their order, without a mechanism to acknowledge their successful arrival to the recipient, and no way for the recipient to request the retransmission of a specific packet. UDP does provide a checksum for integrity validation of the packet, but not much more data is transmitted in its 8-byte header.

These data packets are frequently transmitted by nanosatellites over ultra-high and very-high frequency (UHF and VHF) bands. These radio frequencies allow researchers and the operators of the nanosatellites to communicate with the devices in orbit at a low financial cost as transmitting and receiving equipment is COTS. By using these bands, nanosatellite operators can also reduce the power consumption and internal space footprint of the communications components within the nanosatellite.

Nanosatellites provide an accessible opportunity for more institutions to carry out space-based research. The devices have lower expenses than other space missions, small, and the components are readily available to anyone. Since the launch of the first nanosatellites in the early 2000’s, the benefits provided rely heavily on the low cost and profile of the devices. Furthermore, the ability to transmit and receive the data from the devices is beneficial to research institutions who would otherwise have no way to extend their research projects to space exploration. To this end, it is important that a standard in data communication and transmission for nanosatellites be established to broaden the scope of the research capabilities of the nanosatellites. Said standard should take into account the technical limitations of the nanosatellites, be flexible in its application due to the various nanosatellite designs, be a software based solution, and provide an efficient mechanism for communication that improves upon existing communications protocols.

## Research problem and Motivation

The popularity of nanosatellites is due to largely to their relative simplicity and affordability. Unfortunately, these benefits come at a cost. These costs translate to signal noise, low-bandwidth, high packet drop rates, and low overall mission data transfers. These costs exacerbate the situation by limiting the range and length of experiments accessible and available, and by limiting the usage of well-established IP communication schemes and encryption methods

To make nanosatellites more accessible to multiple research institutions, and to simplify the communication schemes, researchers have designed nanosatellites to communicate over amateur radio bands in UHF and VHF using a variety of radio protocols. As mentioned above, the use of these protocols and these bands means that there is a relatively low data transmission rate accessible for space to ground communications. Surveys done by two teams, Bryan Klofas et al. in 2008, and Paul Muri and Janis McNair in 2012, show that nanosatellites, specifically CubeSats operating in the UHF band, typically have a baud rate ranging from 1200-9600 [1], [2]. Regardless of whether these satellites use transceivers either custom-built for the specific mission by the research institute, or use prefabricated COTS transceivers, if operating on the UHF or VHF band, a common communication protocol employed is the AX.25 protocol.

Klofas’ survey, dated in 2008, shows a comparison summary of the various communication transceivers, frequencies, in addition to the baud rate of 18 different satellites operating in UHF and VHF bands. This survey also specifies the data link layer protocol, Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Layer 2 as defined by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), used by these satellites. More specifically, the survey shows that out of the 18 satellites included in the paper, 14 devices utilize the AX.25 protocol for amateur packet radio [1]. Muri and McNair’s survey, shows a database of 30 satellites launched in the 2009-2011 timeframe; of these devices 16 utilized the AX.25 protocol [2].

The AX.25 packet radio protocol ensures the delivery of packet data encapsulated in frames and managed by the transceiver. This protocol provides a standard for the intercommunication between various ground stations and satellites in either half or full-duplex schemes. Unfortunately, this protocol does not intrinsically provide any support for the implementation of the IP protocols such as TCP or UDP, as those operate on the OSI Layer 3, the Network Layer [3]. The lack of network packet management functionality provided by TCP or UDP in the AX.25 protocol means that these protocols typically have to be added on top of the existing OSI Layer 2 much like those same IP protocols have to be used in addition to the Ethernet frames in standard internet communications.

From a security perspective, nanosatellite communication schemes lack a cryptographic method that ensures the confidentiality of the data transmitted. While there are some solutions that provide encryption of data, such as CubeSec and GndSec solutions devised by Challa et al. in [4], these solutions are hardware based. Limiting communications to specific hardware configurations places a constraint in the design and flexibility of nanosatellites. While hardware implementation of encryption may be faster for certain encryption methods as stated in [4], a low impact software encryption mechanism would be more favorable as it can be independent of specific hardware constraints. Additionally, using encryption methods such as AES means that if a large file is encrypted and transmitted, the receiver would have to wait to receive the whole object before decryption can begin which may not be in the best interests of the mission.

As mentioned above, TCP and UDP have their drawbacks in design and applicability. TCP is heavily connection based protocol that requires a persistent, connection, ideally running in full duplex mode. This allows the transmitter to receive acknowledgements while it transmits data packets. Unfortunately, due to the limitations of the AX.25 protocol in the amount of possible data transmitted per frame, the relatively higher noise rate of the UHF and VHF bands, and the size of the TCP header, TCP become unwieldly for nanosatellites with lower baud. At 9600 baud, a nanosatellite can transmit 9600 bits per second, and at half duplex this could present a large data cost to an already limited bandwidth.

An OSI Layer 4, Transport Layer, solution has been proposed by members of Aalborg University in Denmark called the CubeSat Space Protocol (CSP) [5]. This protocol was developed in C and modeled after the IP TCP standard and includes a header that is only 4 bytes long and supports eXtended Tiny Encryption Algorithm (XTEA) encryption and is designed to successfully integrate with several physical layer technologies. While this protocol does provide some additional functionality at a lower cost, it is limited to the specific physical layer drivers and is more centered towards network operations. This is reflected by looking at the packet structure and noticing that it uses 22 bits out of the available 32 just to establish a source, destination, and their corresponding ports [5]. Since most of the source and destination addressing can be done at the OSI Layer 2 for most radios, it is inefficient to use that much of the packet header in a redundant manner. Furthermore, CSP reserves several ports for buffer status, pings, and other network functions that may not be a priority for researchers or can again be derived from the radio protocol used. The use of XTEA does not allow partial decryption, as described above, and limits data validation to only after the entirety of the object has been downloaded. CSP documentation found in [5] does not readily outline the mechanism for packet receipt acknowledgement, packet retransmission, or data integrity checksums.

## Research Questions

The following questions are key for this investigation:

1. What are the processing, data overhead, and encryption costs of current communication protocols?
2. What are the processing and storage costs associated with using a one-time pad for encryption in nanosatellite communications, and how do they compare to CSP and XTEA?
3. Does the NERDP reduce the amount of data overhead and result in faster transfer times and/or a reduced number of packet exchanges than TCP?

## scope

The scope of this thesis is to investigate the technical needs of the small satellite and nanosatellite community operating in the UHF and VHF bands, focusing on their bandwidth their limitations and developing a versatile lightweight software solution that can meet those needs and increase the productivity of the satellite, labeled as the Nanosatellite Encrypted Reliable Datagram Protocol (NERDP). Focus will also include investigating the addition of confidentiality to the data payloads using a pre-loaded one-time pad (OTP) increasing the cybersecurity strength of the communications scheme. Development will target a software solution that can be run on COTS components, measure the performance of the OTP encryption, add integrity checks for the data transmitted, and add reliability to the data transmissions while maintaining hardware limitations in mind.

## Approach

The process used for this investigation determined the current limitations in the transfer of data from nanosatellites deployed by the Naval Postgraduate School Space Systems Academic Group, and a survey of protocols used and the challenges encountered. This focused primarily on the application of TCP and UDP as the main protocols for data transfer, as none of these satellites support encryption. The NERDP prototype developed then focused on demonstrating TCP-like functionality in data packet reliability and retransmission at a lower cost in data and performance in UHF and VHF. This prototype was developed to operate as a proof of concept in a virtual network with limited applications, but with a modular approach that and support the addition of increased functionality depending on mission requirements. NERDP was designed to operate strictly in OSI Layer 3 and higher, leaving the Data Link Layer to the hardware specifications. For the information assurance component of the prototype, and independent module using OTP encryption was developed and its performance was measured. This was done independently of the overall protocol as the protocol can support it and other types of encryption, but does not necessarily require it. The conclusions and performance assessments can be found in Chapters VI and VII.

## Thesis Structure

The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter II continues the discussion of bandwidth in UHF and VHF bands further outlining the problem space, includes a brief survey of current communication schemes and notable nanosatellites and CubeSats relevant to this thesis, discusses the need for cybersecurity in nanosatellites and outlines the status quo, and discusses the different methods of encryption with a particular focus on OTP.

Chapter III discusses the methodology for development, goals, and robustness of the OTP encryption algorithm designed for this thesis.

Chapter IV discusses the methodology of the development of the NERDP, the structure, reliability mechanisms, and the data overhead reduction of the Network Layer software based protocol proposed in this thesis, NERDP, and includes a comparison to other IP protocols.

Chapter V discusses the data analysis of the error propagation simulated in the encryption algorithm, and the data collected in the FM band testing.

Chapter VI summarizes the results of the encryption scheme and NERDP as functions of overall system performance. This will evaluate the systems costs and their feasibility along with any potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

Chapter VII will provide main conclusions arrived on the applicability of the prototype and encryption scheme proposed, and outline the future work and next steps.

# Background

## Introduction

Bandwidth limitations in the UHF and VHF bands of nanosatellite communication schemes produce a restrictive environment for the transfer of data from the spacecraft to the ground stations. The root of the issues is discussed, and a notable CubeSat is explored. These surveys provide further context of the problem space and the limitations currently encountered by nanosatellite developers. The text also provides a brief overview of cybersecurity and information assurance in nanosatellites, and a discussion on encryption with a focus on one-time pads.

## Problem Space: Low Bandidth in UHF and VHF bands

As described in [1] and [2], most nanosatellites communicate in the UHF range and have a baud rate typically of 1200 to 9600. Several factors limiting this baud rate include, but are not limited to the hardware used, the power available to the communications array, antenna type, time window for communication, and angle on the horizon. Variations in all of these factors can create not only fluctuations in the baud rate but also in the quality of the signal. Lower signal quality introduces random noise and errors, typically in the form of flipped bits in the payload, and can compromise the integrity of the overall object being transmitted. This loss of packets due to signal noise, measured as bit error rate, is part of the reason some nanosatellites use protocols like TCP or CSP as they allow for the retransmission of lost packets and packets deemed too compromised.

### Common Nanosatellite Frequency and Bit Rate Ranges

The UHF an VHF bands are defined by radar-frequency letter band nomenclature, and also by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). These nomenclatures, while similar, can lead to some confusion. Radar nomenclature identifies the VHF band as a frequency range of 30-300 MHz, the UHF band as 200-1000MHz, the L-band as 1 - 2 GHz, and the S band as 2 - 4 GHz. Meanwhile The ITU nomenclature, while maintaining the same definition of the VHF band range, groups any frequency between 300 Mhz - 3 GHz as UHF [6]. Revisiting the surveys by Klofas et al., and Muri and McNair, shows that most CubeSats and nanosatellites transmit at the 435 MHz frequency [1], [2]. In the Klofas survey, of the 18 satellites examined, all but 3 devices operated on the range between 400.375 – 437.880 MHz with the outliers operating at 902 – 928 MHz and 2.4 GHz [1]. Muri and McNair, also showed similar results, with only 10 out of the 30 satellites recorded not operating in the ~437 MHz. frequency [2]. Researching this distribution further reveals that in an update to the Klofas’ survey to include CubeSats launched between 2003 - 2014, 112 out of 172 total transmitters recorded operated in the 437 MHz amateur radio frequency range, with an additional 40 devices still operating below 1000 MHz [7].

Bit rate is measured in amount of bits transmitted per second (bps) or baud rate, and is used to determine the rate at which data can be transmitted. On ground based systems, such as the internet, speed is typically measured in the megabit range (millions of bits per second) but due to the low power and the limited hardware of the nanosatellites, these ranges typically fall into the (kilobits per second) range. Again, the Klofas, and Muri and McNair surveys expose the data rates of several satellites. More specifically, out of 144 transmitters recorded by Klofas, including the other surveys, 121 transmitters operated at 9600 baud or less, with the second most common rate being 1200 bps [1], [2], [7]. These low bit rates are why these devices are labeled as low-bandwidth for the sake of this problem space and part of the reason why reducing data overhead is so important and significant.

Due to the prevalence of the 437 MHz frequency and a typical baud rate of 9600 or less in both early and more current nanosatellites, research and development of communication protocols should strive to operate at those target specifications. These specifications seem to provide the most cost effective hardware and communication packages for nanosatellites, as reflected by their popularity, but simultaneously also limit the usefulness of these devices. If experiments collect too much data, then it may be unfeasible for the data to be transmitted to the ground recipient. The problem is only exacerbated when a large portion of this limited bandwidth is needed to retransmit a large number of packets due to poor connection, and each of these packets has an unnecessarily large header attached to it.

### Bit Error Rate and Packet Loss

Data rates in satellites are dictated by the available power to the communications system, signal quality, distance between receiver and transmitter, atmospheric conditions, and many other factors. These factors impact the already limited bandwidth of the COTS components in nanosatellites and introduce errors in the bits transmitted. These errors can be resolved through error correcting schemes, and through data retransmission. These unavoidable occasional retransmissions is why protocols like TCP are preferred over protocols like UDP.

Error rates in data transmissions are known as bit error rate (BER), and are defined as the ratio of incorrect bits received divided by the total number of bits transmitted. This ratio is useful in evaluating the performance of the communication systems and to estimate the need for retransmission and error correction. In a 2012 report, authors Selva and Krejci utilize an estimated BER for calculations of approximately 10-5 [8]. While this estimate is only valid for a specific modulation used by the authors, it does give insight into the minimum BER expected for satisfactory performance by the communication devices.

BER impacts the integrity of specific bits that are transmitted, these bits then compromise entire bytes, and these result in compromised packets. Due to the low power of the transmissions, it is also possible for packets to not reach the ground station at all. These total packet losses result in missing data and, in the case of TCP, result in the ground station requesting multiple retransmission of packets. This constant change of state of the radio from receiving to transmitting accrues a time loss if the signal quality is poor enough to require multiple retransmissions. Furthermore, nanosatellites have a limited window of approximately 45 minutes of contact with the ground station per day. If changing states of the radio takes 1 second to transition between states, then the two seconds it takes to request a retransmission is 0.074% of the total time available per day. If an object requires multiple retransmissions to ensure integrity, then this accrued time from state switching is detrimental to the performance of the communication system. As described above, BER is unavoidable and by consequence so are retransmissions. Therefore, to ensure optimal data transfers, a protocol that improves on the TCP model and reduces the number of state changes would provide a better solution.

## Current nanosatellite communication standards


Current nanosatellites typically use the AX.25 packet radio protocol, as discussed above, and will sometimes encapsulate a Layer 4 protocol such as CSP, TCP, or UDP. Each of these Layer 4 protocols has advantages, disadvantages, and applicability, but all have a data overheads required in transmission. This overhead reduces the amount of data that can be transmitted by the satellite, and adds functionality not always needed in from the nanosatellite. Additionally, some of these Layer 4 protocols cause connectivity problems if the connection is unstable or reliable and compound the problem of reliability and retransmission, further increasing the accrued data overhead.

### Data overhead

Due to the various designs and OSI Layer 2 implementations, such as AX.25, the calculations for optimizing data overhead focus on Layers 3 and 4. These layers, the networking and transport layers, provide the infrastructure for transferring data packets, and for dictating their behavior. In typical internet applications, Layer 3 is responsible for routing and packet forwarding structures like IPv4, while Layer 4 provides the architecture for the connection behavior in protocols such as TCP and UDP. Anything higher than Layer 4, for all intents and purposes in nanosatellites, can be considered payload data, though it should be noted that the header of Layers 3-4 is often included as part of the payload along with Layers 5+ when viewed in reference to the Layer 2 protocol.

Since nanosatellites use AX.25 for the delivery of packets, and are largely point-to-point communication schemes, a networking layer that includes routing information can be foregone as this layer can be used to route packets to various IP addresses in the same network, and even make the transition through different routers. Point-to-point communication through packet radio carried out through AX.25 does not require routing or communication with multiple nodes, therefore the implementation of a header, such as an IPv4 is not necessary and abandoning it can reduce the overhead by 20–60 bytes [9].

Abandoning the need for a Layer 3 protocol introduces some challenges for IP based transport layer protocols. TCP is reliant on a persistent IPv4 based connection, and its data header includes information on the source and destination IP addresses and ports. This information supporting the range of functionality of TCP results in a header of 20-60 bytes [10]. Using the above information, a transport layer protocol that is independent of the network layer can reduce the data overhead of each packet transmitted by 40-120 bytes. In relation to packet loss and retransmission, the costs of IP/TCP overhead accrue quickly. A time diagram of TCP transmission with packet loss, either from integrity failure or packet drop, (Figure 1) demonstrates the overly verbose nature of TCP that leads to a large amount of packet transmissions.



1. TCP time diagram for transmission of 8 packets with retransmission of packet 4.

Each packet transmitted under TCP will have an IP header and a TCP header. Assuming no options, the total headers for Layers 3-4 in this scheme is 40 bytes, or 320 bits, per packet. In 8 packets this data accounts for 2560 bits. At 9600 bits per second the data overhead accounts for 26.7% of the data transmitted per second, assuming the baud rate is negligibly affected by the Layer 2 AX.25 protocol.

UDP, the other popular IP protocol in nanosatellites, is a connectionless protocol that still relies on the IP infrastructure of Layer 3. This Layer 4 protocol uses one-way datagrams to transmit data between two nodes. These datagrams provide a header per packet that includes source and destination ports, much like TCP, and also provides and integrity check for the data transmitted. The drawbacks of this protocol include the lack of functionality for retransmission and correct packet assembly order. TCP utilizes sequence numbers in the headers to assemble the packets in the correct order and detect if a packet is dropped. UDP’s lack of sequence check creates a challenge for data retransmission and object reconstruction. TCP also provides functionality to ensure the delivery of the packets through the form of acknowledgements per packet, while UDP has no such mechanisms. The advantage of UDP is its simplicity and significantly smaller header than TCP. Assuming 20 bytes are still used for the IP header, UDP only requires an additional 8 bytes as a header as opposed to the 20 required by TCP [11].

It should also be noted that the standards for both UDP and TCP outline 2 bytes for each of the destination and source ports in the protocol. These two bytes, or 16 bits, are unsigned integers and result in 216, or 65536, possible ports for data receipt and transmission [10], [11]. Such a large number of ports is useful in internet and network communications, but may be excessive for use in nanosatellites. A protocol with a reduced number of ports would reduce the overhead in headers at little to no cost in functionality.

CSP, as described earlier, is a protocol designed specifically to be used with nanosatellites and CubeSats. This protocol provides support for integrity checks through a 32 bit cyclic redundancy check (CRC32 or CRC) and keyed-hash message authentication codes (HMAC), flags to signal if packets are encrypted, and 12 bits for destination and source port assignments (26 = 64 possible ports) [5]. This functionality is all outlined in the protocol header which is only 4 bytes, 32 bits, long. CSP provides retransmission functionality and encryption support, and can be used independently from an IP layer. This reduces a header of 40 bytes of IP/TCP by 90% to only 4 bytes.

Looking closer at the mechanisms of CSP, it becomes evident that the 4-byte header is a misleading statement. The header itself only contains a single bit flag denoting if the packet is encrypted, if a CRC is included in the payload, or if the packets have an HMAC, without in fact containing any of these checks within the header itself [5]. If a packet is designated with a CRC32 then the payload data will include 4 additional bytes of information doubling this “non-payload” overhead; similarly if a packet is flagged to contain an HMAC, this will add 2 bytes of data to the overhead potentially increasing the header from 4 bytes to 10 [5]. Additionally, the documentation of CSP is unclear how much overhead the retransmission infrastructure would add to the total overhead

Data overhead is important in these situations where the baud rate is limited to a noisy and error prone 9600. While land based communications can reliably use TCP and UDP for IP based communication, the overhead accrued with them is too high for a limited connection. These protocols also provide unused functionality in point-to-point connections that results in additional space that could be better utilized by the protocol. Other protocols like CSP promise small headers and increased functionality, but upon closer inspection fail to disclose the structure and variable “non-payload” data accrued in their functions. This data overhead in turn, while still lighter than IP-based protocols, still leaves room for improvement in reducing the overhead.

### Connection issues

While all protocols discussed do suffer from connection issues such as error rates and packet loss, the delay in packet transmission and acknowledgement of receipt in TCP creates a specific problem that is exacerbated by the potential delays in transmission of packets. Due to the distance, fleeting window for transmission, and the delays in change of state in the radio hardware, there is a possibility that the TCP connection times out from inactivity or failure to receive the proper acknowledgement. Figure 1 demonstrates the state dependency of TCP, which can have a negative impact on the performance of the system.

While TCP timeouts can be set by the user to extend or shorten the time “transmitted data may remain unacknowledged before a connection is forcefully closed” [12], these values are user defined and can vary from application to application. Nanosatellite designers could decide to implement the IP/TCP model on the AX.25, as described above, with a long TCP timeout wait to ensure the connections aren’t dropped. This creates the problem of resource allocation and the state dependency of TCP. If a connection is kept alive for too long, there is the possibility of resource exhaustion since all of the resources will have to be allocated and maintained. The constant change of TCP between packets and acknowledgements can also create a resource allocation problem where power consumption and time are excessively consumed. Conversely, if the TCP timeout is set too short, there is the possibility of connection timeout any time the nanosatellite loses connection with the ground station or the connection is poor. If a connection times out, the connection must be reestablished through a three-way handshake, and the file download must be restarted. These increase the data overhead, and detract from the useful windows of the nanosatellite.

UDP does not suffer from this problem of timeout and reliance on persistent network connectivity nor does it rely on the state of the transmitter and receiver, but again does not have any higher functionality. The documentation is unclear on whether or not CSP employs a connection timeout, nor does it divulge how communications are initialized in comparison to the TCP three-way handshake. Regardless, a protocol designed to take into account the state of the transmitter and receiver, carefully weigh the limitations and benefits of a connection timeout, and provide an infrastructure for state recovery would be beneficial for nanosatellite communications.

## The need for cybersecruity in nanosatellites

Bandwidth limitations and unreliable connections are not conducive to a strong cybersecurity posture that ensures data confidentiality, integrity, and assurance. The approach, “any data is better than no data” reduces the applicability of compression, encryption, and integrity checks on data being transmitted and received. The application of a stronger security posture is not new to nanosatellites, as evidenced by the integration of XTEA encryption in CSP, but few cases exist of other cybersecurity methods to safeguard the data being transmitted. The few cases surveyed demonstrate a preference to hardware and radio solutions instead of software solutions. A software solution that provides the functionality and infrastructure for a stronger cybersecurity posture would be a welcome paradigm shift in approaching communication schemes of nanosatellites.

### Data usage in nanosatellites

The amount of data transmitted by a nanosatellite is largely governed by its baud rate, lifetime, and orbit. These conditions can vary dramatically from mission to mission and design specifications of the nanosatellite. Looking at the first one hundred CubeSats in 2013, Michael Swartwout determined that the average lifetime of nanosatellites is typically less than 200 days [13]. Additionally, Selva and Krejci assume an average access window of 5 minutes [8]. Assuming that there are 9 passes total per day on an orbit, the total window of a nanosatellite can be estimated.

Extending the duration of the orbit to a calendar year, 365 days and assuming 45 minutes of access per day at a baud rate of 9600 the total data transferred in bits can be estimated for a single year to 1.183 gigabytes. This is the total data transmitted by the satellite including the headers of protocols. Assuming that the actual payload of the data is encapsulated by AX.25, and protocols like IP/TCP, then the actual useable data is less than these 1.183 gigabytes.

### Nanosatellite communications information security standards

Currently there is no clear standard for information security in the transmission of data from nanosatellites and CubeSats to ground stations and the current methods offer few security features [4]. This lack of standard impedes a clear and thorough assessment into their shortcomings and methods on which to improve those shortcomings. A survey into the security protocols of CubeSats shows a preference towards hardware base implementations of security in the data transmitted.

Information security consists of three components:

1. Confidentiality
2. Integrity
3. Availability

Confidentiality refers to the property of the system to only allow authorized users or parties to access the data. For data to be considered confidential and secure, this property must be maintained at all times even if the data is transmitted across a network or between nanosatellites and ground stations. A common method to ensure the confidentiality of data transmitted is through encryption. Encryption ensures confidentiality through hard-to-solve mathematical cryptograms, by making the solutions to the cryptograms too complex for an adversary to solve in a reasonable amount of time, but allowing the intended and authorized parties with the correct keys to access the information.

Data integrity is the property of the system that ensures the data is not tampered with in transit, storage, or at any other time by unauthorized users or environmental noise. In the case of nanosatellites, integrity allows verification that the data transmitted and the data received between nanosatellites and ground stations is equivalent to the transmitted data. A common mechanism to integrate this property into systems is the inclusion of a CRC on each packet of data transmitted. This checksum allows the receiver too verify if the data was altered at any time between transmission and receipt.

Availability is the property of the system that ensures data is available when requested. Consuming an excessive amount of system resources can create a denial of service situation where authorized users cannot access the information. Exhaustion of memory, bandwidth, processing power, and signal interference are all mechanisms that can be used to affect the availability of information between nanosatellites and ground stations.

Information security in nanosatellites largely focuses on the confidentiality properties of the communication system. Integrity is easily achieved in the datastream by including a CRC on each packet transmitted, while availability impacted through FM interference is a subject field all on its own. To this end, information security is reduced to confidentiality, specifically the impact encryption has on the ease of transmission. It should be noted that confidentiality does in fact play a small role in the integrity and availability of data transmitted. If a large object is encrypted successfully, but takes a long time to transmit, while the integrity of each transmitted and received packet may be easily verified, neither integrity or validity of the data within the object can be verified until the whole object is received and decrypted. This could lead to a situation where the bandwidth is exhausted by the data transmission only to result in poor or useless data and a waste of limited resources. In another scenario, if the encrypted data is only partially received and the nanosatellite window ends, while each packet can be checked for integrity there is no way to ascertain the validity of the data being received until all of the object is received. Because of these limitations, a protocol that encrypts a stream of independent bytes, rather than the object as a whole would be preferable. Such a protocol would allow the constant decryption of data as it is being received and allow for data checks to be carried out on partial and incomplete data.

### Nanosatellite communications information security assessment

A survey of information security systems in nanosatellites and CubeSats is inconsistent and unfeasible due to the various protocols carried out by the hundreds of satellites, and due to the small sample size of actual documented implementations of information security protocols. As described above, integrity and availability mechanisms can be easily surveyed in protocols like TCP and CSP, as they all account for packet repeatability and support checksums, but their approach to confidentiality through encryption is not as clear cut. The approach to confidentiality is further complicated through the addition of hardware based confidentiality instead of software based mechanisms. A survey into CSP, CubeSec and GndSec, and the MEROPE CubeSat system illustrates the challenges of implementing confidentiality mechanisms into nanosatellites and provides a measure with which to evaluate the performance of other protocols and mechanisms.

CSP is designed to support the XTEA encryption algorithm. XTEA was introduced by the TEA designers David Wheeler and Roger Needham as a solution to correct two weaknesses in TEA [14]. Like its predecessor, XTEA is designed to be minimal while still providing a high level of confidentiality on information. It is a symmetric block cipher with a block size of 64-bits and a key size of 128-bits [14]. In CSP the keys are shared before the launch of the system and can be updated by using the previous keys to exchange a new key. CSP headers have a flag signaling if the packets are encrypted, with no other cryptographic information being exchanged. This allows for data packets to be encrypted and secure within a strong key space, but several attacks are documented against XTEA that would break the confidentiality of the data stream. XTEA encryption is based on the number of rounds used to encrypt the plaintext, increased rounds provide stronger security but come at an increased computational cost. This computational cost makes XTEA deceivingly small the level of security is entirely dependent on the computational power as denoted by the number of rounds undertaken to produce the cipher text. Another detriment to XTEA is the size of the block. As a block cipher, it must use blocks of a predetermined size in its algorithm. At 64 bits, or 8 bytes, this is a large block, especially if the packet sizes of each data packet is small. In the event that a one byte segment of information needs to get encrypted, that means the block would have to be padded with 7 bytes of null information. The addition of these blocks could potentially increase the size of the data transmitted in an already limited bandwidth environment. XTEA in CSP operates as a cipher in counter mode [5]. In this mode each block is encrypted independent of one another through a series of exclusive logical or functions (XORs) and summation to keep a successive counter of blocks successfully encrypted. This allows for the parallelization of encryption for faster encryption schemes, but again it does come at a cost in system memory and processing power. In error propagation, if a cipher is run and the cipher text is downloaded without integrity check, XTEA in counter mode does guarantee that the error propagation ratio between cipher text and plain text is 1. This means for every byte affected in the cipher text, only the corresponding byte in the plain text will be affected upon decryption [15]. This is a valuable feature for an encryption scheme that has to operate under very noisy conditions, and give XTEA a preference over other encryption mechanisms that propagate the errors during encryption to two or more blocks [15]. In 2004, Ko et al. published a vulnerability of XTEA that could lead to a complete compromise of XTEA in data that has undergone 27 rounds of XTEA [16]. This vulnerability would allow the use of related keys and differential analysis of the encryption mechanism on 27 rounds of XTEA with a success rate of 96.9% [16]. To circumvent this vulnerability, XTEA would require more than 27 rounds, and thus significantly increase the associated processing cost of confidentiality. In 2009, Lu presented a related-key rectangle attack on 36 rounds of XTEA [17]. This attack, much like Ko et al.’s attack, would require an increased number of rounds in XTEA to ensure confidentiality. This is a tremendous burden for a low power system onboard a nanosatellite that could leave transmitted data vulnerable.

Developed by Challa et al., the CubeSec and GndSec security solution is described by its developers as “very light-weight” and provides authentication, confidentiality, and integrity through the use of symmetric pre-shared keys [4].The proposed solution by the authors uses Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Data Encryption Standard (3DES) in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and is implemented through hardware [4]. The reason for hardware implementation of these block ciphers is due to the high processing and time cost associated with AES and DES hardware, which the authors document in [4]. Using microcontrollers to encrypt the data and spare the processor from computing power is a resource efficient approach, but still comes with some associated costs. While methods like XTEA are directly measured in computing resources, the CubeSec and GndSec mechanism’s cost is in weight and volume on the spacecraft. The authors profile the encryption hardware with a footprint of approximately 5cm by 5cm and a total weight of approximately 9.6 grams [4]. While this footprint may seem trivial in larger spacecraft, the authors also recommend a redundant backup system that effectively doubles this physical footprint and can be a serious detriment to nanosatellites [4]. Additionally, the authors do not discuss the financial costs of the additional hardware, which should be taken into consideration given that the hardware is not recoverable after a mission. Some of the advantages offered by this system is the strong implementation of security through AES and 3DES operating at 128 bits. Additionally, much like XTEA in counter mode, GCM allows for parallelization of encryption, resulting in much higher encryption rates, while keeping the encryption costs within the hardware implementation and not severely impacting the power consumption of the spacecraft as a whole. Overall the CubeSec and GndSec system provides a valuable solution to information security, but at a cost in space, weight, and system complexity that may keep it out of reach from institutions.

An interesting case is the Montana EaRth Orbiting Pico Explorer (MEROPE) CubeSat built by the Space Sicence and Engineering Laboratory at Montana State University [18]. The journal article goes at great lengths to explain the need for COTS subsystem designs in CubeSats to mitigate the lack of expertise in CubeSat design teams. The communication subsystem design goal was to have a device with a low volume profile that communicates using the AX.25 protocol [18]. Analyzing the design and performance specifications described by the authors, it is clear that the MEROPE CubeSat did not have a mechanism to provide confidentiality to the data it was transmitting. The lack of such a protection and goal to make the MEROPE communication subsystem as COTS as possible, indicates a serious vulnerability in the design of the MEROPE and in other CubeSats: most teams lack a network design and information assurance specialist. While the MEROPE team was well versed in the design and application of AX.25 protocols and was able to build the communication subsystems, they do acknowledge their lack of technical expertise and the driving factor it was in the selection of their COTS communication subsystem. This assessment indicates the vulnerability of not only MEROPE, but also of other CubeSats. The community seems to lack a clear information security standard which could be explained by a lack of information security professionals actively involved in the development of the satellites.


Overall the survey of these systems indicates a serious need for information security standards that provides a high degree of confidentiality. While no system implementation comes without a cost, designing a protocol that minimizes the costs of current systems would be an asset to the community. Such a protocol would require the participation of information security professionals and nanosatellite designers to ensure a high degree of information assurance, keep within the operational parameters of designers, and maintain the functionality provided by other more data expensive protocols. Such a solution could provide an open source flexible standard that can be used by any design team regardless of technical expertise.

## Encryption and One-time-Pads

Encryption provides information security to data stream through cryptography. The strength of encryption varies between encryption mechanisms and the many modes they run on. Some provide stronger encryption, making them really hard do crack but come at a large cost in memory and processing power, while others are light weight but have vulnerabilities. The strength of the encryption mechanism is typically measured by the ability of the adversary or unauthorized party to decipher what the data being stored is within a reasonable amount of time. As processing power continues to increase, the strength of these mechanisms falters, and stronger, more computationally expensive systems are required. There are encryption mechanisms that are classified as “perfectly secure” that can be implemented easily. These mechanisms are defined as perfectly secret as an encryption scheme due to the fact that the cipher text reveals nothing about the plain text, and that a given cipher text can be translated into any plain text of equal length to the cipher text with all possibilities equally mathematically probable [19]. A one-time pad (OTP) is such a mechanism.

### Evaluating the strengths of one-time pads

OTPs are, as described above, perfectly secret. This means that a string of length *n* when encrypted with a OTP of the same length, produces a cipher text of equal length. If an adversary intercepts a cipher text encrypted with a OTP, and assuming the message is limited to capital alphabetic characters, any combination of letters is equally probable (Figure 2).



1. One-time pad example on alphabetic message of length 6 and a few possible solutions

OTPs are also efficient methods of encryption as each byte of information is encrypted only once in an XOR operation. This eliminates the need for multiple passes to ensure a high level of confidentiality, at a low processing cost. Furthermore, unlike block ciphers with fixed block sizes that result in padding of data and extra data being sent, OTPs do not alter the length of the message being sent. These properties arise from the fact that OTP encryption encrypts each byte individually and independently from the rest of the data [19]. This increases the encryption strength and also limits the propagation of errors as each affected byte in cipher text will only affect the corresponding plain text byte upon decryption. OTPs are to this day the strongest method of encryption.

### Limitations of one-time pads

OTPs have certain limitations to ensure their perfect secrecy and limitations that limit their proliferation into practical uses. In 1919, Gilbert S. Vernam was awarded a patent for an encryption mechanism using a OTP and the XOR operation [20]. This system would encrypt a message with a OTP stored in a punch tape stored in a loop, which was later revealed to be vulnerability. By storing the OTP in a loop and reusing the key, cryptanalysis was possible as the key and character combinations were bound to be repeated in a cyclical manner, allowing adversaries to crack OTP encryption in Vernam’s device [21]. In order to mitigate this vulnerability, the OTP key must be non-repeating or reusable and must also be truly random. These two criteria must be true for the entirety of the OTP, meaning the OTP must be at least as long as the total data transmitted through the mechanism. This drawback prevents the practical implementation of a prolonged use of OTP for the transmission of large volumes of data, as this rapidly increases the required size of the OTP. Another detriment of using the OTP for the transmission of large amounts of data is the need for the OTP to be truly random. If a pseudo-random number generator is used, like the large portion of random number generators in computer system, the adversary may be able to correctly deduce the pseudo random number generator and seed. This would result in the adversary being able to predict and effectively break the OTP encryption of the data. Truly random numbers can be generated through entropic processes such as radioactive decay or quantum events, and can be difficult to generate. This can be mitigated with large repositories of existing random numbers, but again, this presents the opportunity for an adversary to deduce which repositories are being used. Another challenge for OTP usage is the need to exchange the OTPs with the keys between the users. Asymmetric encryption mechanisms allow for the establishment of secure tunnels so that keys can be exchanged and create tunnels of information that are encrypted through symmetric keys. OTP transmissions would either still require asymmetric key mechanisms and a large transfer of data for the contents of the OTP, or some physical exchange of OTPs. This presents a challenge since the nodes transmitting and receiving may not all be physically accessible.

These are a few of the limitations of using a OTP as an encryption mechanism. Despite its strength and perfection, practical limitations make the deployment of OTP encryption mechanisms, especially in larger data transfers as we see on the internet today. There are mitigation techniques to overcome the limitations of OTPs, such as the availability of large storage disks and large repositories of quantum information. Exchanging keys, presents a physical problem that can be avoided if the original OTP was large enough to accommodate the total lifetime data transmission and the keys were exchanged once. Overall, OTPs are a strong albeit slightly impractical encryption mechanism that compensates for their logistical hurdles through the level of security they provide.

### One-time pads in nanosatellites

Nanosatellites are prime candidates for the implementation of a OTP encryption mechanism. Their design and operation conditions are ideal for OTPs, and such a mechanism would provide the security needed by the spacecraft.

Several of the drawbacks of using a OTP presented above, can be effectively mitigated just through normal satellite operations. A OTP remains valid as long as the OTPs used by the receiver and transmitter are kept secret. In the case of nanosatellites, the vulnerability of an adversary obtaining the OTP is drastically reduced as one of the OTPs will be in LEO. Another shortcoming described was the need to have a OTP be as long as the total data transmitted throughout the life of the mechanism if key exchanges are to be avoided and the OTP must be full of truly random numbers. As described above, the total data usage of a nanosatellite in a year can be estimated to be about 1.183 gigabytes. Even if a nanosatellite mission has a lifetime of several years, data storage is currently compact enough in solid state media that a device storing a large OTP would not be a problem. In the case for the need of truly random data, several universities provide free open repositories of terabytes of quantum data to be used as random data. This can mitigate the need to build a mechanism to generate the data, especially if it such repository data can be made private.

The drawbacks of OTP encryption make it impractical for use in large transfers of data over large networks such as the internet. Point-to-point communication between a ground station and a nanosatellite with limited bandwidth and total lifetime data transfers present ideal candidates for the implementation of a OTP encryption mechanism. These mechanisms provide perfect secrecy, a high level of confidentiality, are lightweight, and can

## Chapter Summary

A survey into the current state of CubeSat and nanosatellite communications, demonstrated the need for information security standards, and the need for lighter protocols due to the limited bandwidth of the devices. Designing a lightweight protocol for use with nanosatellites has to take into considerations the large number of constraints in data transfer rates, error rates, and processing and transmitting power available to the spacecraft while keeping in mind the design and data transfer needs of the designers. Mechanisms like IP/TCP provide the functionality at a high overhead cost, while on the information security side, encryption mechanisms are a constant balance between weight, power, and processing costs. Nanosatellites provide a unique opportunity to establish a new protocol for low bandwidth communications that provides the necessary functionality and that integrates the infrastructure needed for an encryption mechanism based on a OTP. Communicating at 9600 baud over UHF and VHF is an error prone, slow connection that is currently without a clear standard. To remediate this the Nanosatellite Encrypted Reliable Datagram Protocol (NERDP) is proposed.

# ENcryption Mechanism

## Introduction

Nanosatellites have limited processing power and as such require lighter encryption schemes. Protocols like CSP use XTEA, but still require multiple rounds of encryption to ensure that the encryption is strong. To mitigate this, the proposed NERDP encryption would be reliant on a practical implementation of a one-time pad (OTP). This mechanism would ensure perfect secrecy, and result in a strong encryption of the file at a low processing cost. The text draws from discussions with the Space Systems Academic Group at the Naval Postgraduate School about the requirements needed of an encryption scheme and the limitations of the nanosatellites.

A key approach to the design of the mechanism was to treat the encryption and decryption scheme as a modular addition to the NERDP. By doing so, it allowed greater flexibility into the implementation of the mechanism and allowed NERDP to be a standalone protocol that can operate even without encryption. This approach allowed the independent development of the two artifacts, and made the NERDP more flexible should it be used in conjunction other encryption schemes. This design decision also had to be kept in mind when designing both artifacts, to make each as independent of one another as possible, while maintaining their compatibility.

## Goals of encryption mechanism

The encryption mechanism functionality of NERDP is specifically designed to take into account the multiple limitations of nanosatellites and small satellites. To ensure the development of the protocol aligned with the needs of nanosatellite designers, the encryption mechanism chosen needed to balance several attributes and performance factors while still being a feasible alternative to current encryption mechanisms.

The encryption mechanism needs to be lightweight in its processing performance to accommodate the various types of satellites that will be implementing NERDP, to this end one of the goals established was the minimization of rounds or iterations needed to encrypt the file. By reducing the number of rounds and iterations, the processing cost is reduced and reduces the minimum processing power needed by the hardware. On that same vein, it was also decided that the mechanism should minimize the operations needed to carry out the encryption itself and should work with basic operations. This minimization of steps within the actual encryption of the data and the use of only basic mathematical operations, such as XOR, reduces not only the processing power and time needed by the encryption mechanism, but also reduces the overall size and complexity of implementing the encryption scheme in the operation of the nanosatellite communications package. Finally, the third performance measure that should be balanced is the size of any supporting key infrastructure such as keys or certificates.

Finding a balance of these three key goals was crucial in designing the implementation of the encryption mechanism. To simplify the decision making process in the design of the mechanism, they were prioritized from most to least important as follows:

1. Number of iterations and processing
2. Complexity and number of operations per iteration
3. Size of supporting infrastructure


The reasoning behind this prioritization was the realization that currently memory and storage space are much less expensive both financially and volume-wise. By reducing the cost of the supporting infrastructure, in this case the large size of the OTP required to encrypt all of the data transmitted throughout the lifetime of the spacecraft, design of the encryption mechanism could then be focused on reducing iterations and complexity and the impact they have on processing and power consumption.

## Development of encryption mechanism

Keeping in mind the goals of the encryption mechanism and the target community requirements facilitated the development of the mechanism. This development was carried out in a virtual environment to better measure its performance and to observe the data being encrypted.


### Mechanism development and platform

The mechanism needed to be developed in a platform that could emulate the functionality that a nanosatellite was capable of. Since most nanosatellites, as discussed earlier, utilize COTS components, development was carried out trying to emulate COTS software and operating systems and could be scaled down to more appropriate hardware if needed. To emulate this readily available COTS software, a virtual machine was run on an Alienware Area 51 PC operating a 64-bit Windows 10 Home, an x64 based Intel Core i7-6800K CPU at 3.40GHz processor, 16 gigabytes of memory, and 1 terabyte of hard disk space (Figure 3).



1. Host system specifications for hosting development platform

The virtual machine hypervisor selected was Oracle VirtualBox version 5.1.16, and hosted a Linux virtual machine running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, at 2 gigabytes of available memory, 16 gigabytes of available hard disk space, and utilizing 1 core of the host machine processor. The mechanism was written to operate on Python 3.5.2 in the Linux virtual machine, and written on the host Windows machine on Sublime Text Editor 3 Build 3126 (Figure 4).




1. Hypervisor and virtual machine specifications for platform


This setup allowed a quick development and testing of the platform and encryption mechanism. By utilizing Python, but not utilizing any external libraries or dependencies, the development of the platform can be modeled in other languages with relative ease since one of the goals of the platform is also the utilization of basic logical operators. Since OTP encryption is largely dependent on the use of XOR to encrypt the data, Python allows a user-friendly environment that allows functions also found in other languages like x86 NASM Assembly [22].

### Mechanism design and operation

Setting up the testing platform and environment allowed the encryption mechanism to be written in Python and be tested in Linux and the results recorded and verified. The design was to utilize a pre-written message and OTP and carry out an XOR operation between the message and the corresponding OTP. The message would then be written to a file, read from the file, and then decrypted by carrying out an XOR operation with the OTP of the simulated receiver (Figure 5). Since both OTPs have been pre-shared and are just in fact being read from the same buffer, the writing to a file and reading from a file is utilized to simulate the data transmission (Figure 6).



1. OTP encryption utilizing logical exclusive or (XOR) function on a single byte



1. OTP encryption scheme on an entire message

Development largely focused on encrypting 75 unique ASCII characters comprised of all alphanumeric characters, common punctuation and symbols, and the NULL character stored in a variable called “string” (Figure 7). It should be noted, that this data was only used due to the ease of visual representation of data, when in reality any value that can be stored in a byte should be equally capable of being encrypted by the mechanism without any alteration.




1. ASCII characters used to test and analyze the encryption mechanism

Development utilized a pre-populated OTP the same value for every character. In this case the ASCII character ‘1’ was utilized and stored in a variable titled “padLong” to later be used (Figure 8). It should be noted that this OTP, while violating the criteria for true secrecy wherein each value of the OTP must be a random value, still provides a working example of OTP encryption. Once developed, this OTP can be replaced with true random values and the mechanism will achieve true secrecy with no other modifications.




1. Test OTP utilized for development of mechanism

In order to achieve the encryption of the whole message in Python, the mechanism takes the data to be encrypted and converts it to an integer representation utilizing the ord() functionality. For this platform, a function was written that takes a string containing the message to be encrypted and a list containing the individual values of the OTP as its input. Python then utilizes the bitwise XOR operation and appends the message to a list called “encryptedMsg” so that it can be stored or transmitted and returns the values of this list back to the main program body (Figure 9). To decrypt the message, a function is also created that will take the data received,



1. Function developed to encrypt a message of arbitrary length with a corresponding OTP

This simple operation is all that is required to encrypt any message with a OTP and falls in line with two of the goals initially established for developing an encryption mechanism for NERDP. By only requiring one single pass per byte needed to encrypt, OTP encryption dramatically reduces the number of operations needed to encrypt the data. On the receiving end, in order to decrypt the data, the receiver must take the data received into a list and carry out the same operation (Figures 5,6). When written into Python, the decryption mechanism is nearly identical as the encryption mechanism for each byte. In decryption, each byte is again converted into its integer representation, and then, for the sake of viewability, it is converted back to its ASCII representation (Figure 10). This conversion is not necessary under normal operation of the decryption mechanism, and can be avoided. It was introduced into the platform to aid in data collection and processing since all of the characters in the decrypted message were representable by ASCII.



1. Function developed to decrypt a message of arbitrary length with a corresponding OTP

Overall the goal of the encryption and decryption mechanism was simple and straightforward. Utilizing logical bitwise operator XOR, the platform developed illustrates the lightweight properties of the encryption mechanism utilizing a OTP. A critical note to take into consideration, is that the message transmitted during development was only 75 bytes long and thus the OTP was also 75 bytes. Under normal operation, the OTP would have to be the same size of the total data sent over the lifetime of the nanosatellite. This operation would also require the ability to read and establish an offset from which the OTP would be read by the mechanism from the OTP preloaded file. While these mechanisms add complexity and require additional hard disk space, the complexity can be mitigated since all encryption mechanisms require input to be read from the file being encrypted and as established before, additional space for supporting infrastructure is favorable over increased costs in processing and complexity.

## evaluating mechanism performance

Development of the encryption and decryption mechanism was driven largely by performance metrics and the goals established for the design. By developing in Linux and Python, the mechanism can be ported to other platforms with ease and its performance can be relatively consistent throughout. To better evaluate the mechanism, several key performance metrics were decided upon and development was designed around them.

### Data sizes of encrypted files

Treating the encryption mechanism as a modular addition to NERDP allowed development to focus on encryption of data as independent of the packet structure of NERDP. This allowed for entire files of data to be encrypted and stored without being dependent on the behavior of NERDP. While the encryption mechanism complexity and performance has already been established as lightweight despite the large space needed to store the OTP, performance of the encryption mechanism focused on analyzing the sizes of the original files and the encrypted counterparts.

The goal of encryption is to increase the confidentiality of the data being transmitted at a cost of processing power, time, and space to store the encrypted data. Some ciphers can be used in line with the data transmitters and encrypt data as it is packed and transmitted. The OTP encryption mechanism designed for NERDP, reads segments of data from the file and the OTP, encrypts them, and then transmits them. This allows for reduced memory costs as a full encrypted copy of the object being transmitted does not need to be stored by the transmitter. Additionally, if NERDP is implemented without OTP encryption, each data packet can then exclude the encryption step or carry out a different type of encryption without significantly altering the protocol. Having established the low processing power and time costs for OTP, the data sizes before and after encryption was utilized as a performance measure to ensure no undue memory burden was placed to store the encrypted data. Thankfully, thanks to its operation and design, OTP encryption does not alter the length or size of an object being encrypted.

While it is possible to pad the data to further obfuscate the length of the message being sent to a designated length, this is not necessary and provides an advantage of block ciphers which require data be padded to a multiple of the bit size of the block needed [15]. This advantage supports the selection of OTP encryption as a feasible encryption mechanism for bandwidth limited operations where file sizes and data transferred are sought to be kept at a minimum.

### Processing and iterations

As discussed in the design of the mechanism, OTP encryption provides a lightweight solution for encryption. By requiring a single iteration and operation of the file being encrypted, the mechanism leaves a very small system footprint on the performance of the communication system as a whole. Reduced iterations and processing time, in turn result in less lag and delays when the encryption mechanism is used to encrypt data packets as they are being streamed. Further comparison of OTP encryption to XTEA encryption in Python on a Linux environment is discussed in Chapter V, Results and Analysis.


Overall, OTP encryption provides a lightweight option for encrypting data. This mechanism has low impact on processing power consumption, and can be easily integrated to transmit data quickly in NERDP. These benefits come at a cost in disk space, as several gigabytes of data must be stored on the spacecraft to ensure the perfect secrecy of the transmission. Due to modern data storage capabilities, these costs are easily mitigated and the benefits far outweigh them.

## Robustness to error in transmission

Due to the low power conditions over UHF and VHF in which nanosatellites operate, the signal quality can be impacted by the introduction of errors in to the data stream. These errors can vary in severity and frequency, and can have an impact on the data being transmitted. If the error rate is too high, then the data may be useless, but unfortunately no signal is ever without error. In order to assess the robustness to error of OTP encrypted data, its behavior under several types of error needs to be predicted, evaluated, and ultimately simulated under the assumption that there is no error correction mechanism or data integrity requirement being implemented.

### Insertion and deletion of data

Assuming that a data packet of a given length is properly read, encrypted and transmitted by the nanosatellite, it is possible for the data to arrive either incomplete or with random noise inserted into the packet. This types of error are significant because they produce a shift in the data and can potentially affect an entire packet. If the receiver is only expecting *n* bits from the transmitter, and it receives *n* + *x* bits, where x is the number of bits inserted, then the receiver will truncate the data received at *n* bits and *x* bits of data will be lost. This will also affect the data “downstream” of the site of insertion as each bit will now be shifted and can affect the value of all the subsequent bytes and thus the encrypted message sent within this packet. Conversely, if a transmission loses *x* bits in the packet, a similar effect occurs as all bits are shifted to the start of the message and the data is incomplete (Figure 11). Such an error occurs when the connection is not stable and data is lost or dropped in transmission.




1. Inserting or deleting a single bit in the first byte propagates throughout all subsequent data until the end of the packet.

Either one of these errors can have disastrous consequences for data encrypted with a OTP. Since each byte is encrypted independently with its corresponding byte from a OTP, if all of the bits are shifted from either insertion or deletion, it is possible that large portions of the entire data packet sent become indecipherable by the OTP. Additionally, since either one of these errors can occur at any given time, and can occur multiple times, it is possible to impact entire packets and lose large segments of data without being able to recover any portion of that data.

### Replacement of data


A more common error, and the error defined by the BER discussed earlier, is the replacement of data during transmission. Assuming, again, that a data packet of a given length is properly read, encrypted and transmitted by the nanosatellite, it is possible for noise and interference to alter the values of the existing data at random points in transmission. These errors known as “bit flips” will alter the data of the transmission and change the value of bits. These errors will either affect a single bit or can also occur in bursts affecting several bits at a time. While individual bit flips only affect the byte of encrypted data containing the flipped bit, burst errors can occur at any given time. If a burst error occurs where several bits are flipped at the start or beginning of a byte, it is possible that multiple bytes are affected as the error “spills” over into the next byte (Figure 12).



1. Replacing one or more bits can have a varying degree of impact on the data, but effects do not propagate to subsequent data

Fortunately, this type of error does not alter the overall length of the encrypted data packet being transmitted and by consequence each bit after the error is unaffected by the replacement of the data. This type of error only affects individual bytes who happen to be impacted by the bit flips. In the event of a noisy signal where the rate of bit flips is high, it is still possible to do some data recovery of partial information as a large portion of the data may still be intact. This benefit directly translates to the decryption of the data since each byte is encrypted independently, and only the affected cipher text bytes will alter the data in the corresponding decrypted data bytes.

The platform utilized to develop the encryption mechanism was also used to simulate these errors. Utilizing the Python script used to encrypt and decrypt data and the *numpy* and *binascii* packages, the platform was used to simulate multiple rounds of single bit and multiple bit flip errors on the encrypted data, and then decrypted to analyze its impact on the original message. These errors were introduced given a normal distribution and a given probability to simulate various rates of error. First the data was converted from its raw bytes into its binary representation by the *binascii* package and put into a list. For any given bit at position *n*, if the probability landed that it needed to be flipped, the bit would then be flipped from “1” to “0” or vice versa and a counter of bits flipped would be incremented to later ensure the probabilities are behaving as predicted. Once every bit of the encrypted message was processed, it was converted back to its ASCII byte representation with the *binascii* package and compared to the original message received (Figure 13).



1. Function used to simulate individual bit flips in the OTP encrypted data and compared to original data

In order to simulate a burst of bit flips a similar process was done, but with a key difference. If a bit was determined probabilistically that it was going to be flipped, the function would also flip the subsequent two bits for a total of 3 flipped bits. This would create random bursts in the encrypted data and would then be compared to the original (Figure 14).



1. Function used to simulate burst bit flips in OTP encrypted data and compared to original data

While there are other types of errors that can occur, these 3 errors are by far the most common and are the ones that can have the most serious impact to the effective decryption of data by the receiver. The low power combined with the already low bandwidth make errors prevalent in the datalink, so understanding the behavior of the encryption mechanism is crucial. Further results of the simulated errors are discussed in Chapter V, Results and Analysis.

## possible solutions for error propagation

While the error propagation from signal noise may affect substantial amounts of data, thankfully the error can be contained within the data packets and not affect the whole data stream. Analyzing the errors and simulating the errors in a controlled environment allows for an assessment of possible solutions to mitigate the impact of the various types of errors. While some hardware is available that does error correcting on both the transmitting and receiving end, the focus for the evaluation of the encryption mechanism is centered on possible software solutions integrated into either the encryption mechanism or NERDP. Most solutions center the usage of a data integrity check such as a CRC to verify if an error occurred, then depending on the type of error several error correction mechanisms are suggested.

### Encryption mechanism error correction

At its current stage of development, the encryption mechanism does not provide any functionality in correcting error on either the transmitter or receiving end. One of the drawbacks the modularity of the encryption mechanism is the disconnect between the encryption module, the NERDP scheme, and the AX.25 (or other) protocol. Drawing from the OSI layer model, the encryption operates at the application layer while most errors occur at the physical layer. This disconnect does not mean that there are no possible solutions to introduce error correction into the encryption mechanism. Assuming that the protocol used integrates an integrity check in the form of a CRC, it is possible to develop functionality that can help detect and correct possible errors in the data.

Creating a buffer larger than the theoretical data expected and further subdivision of the data within the payload of the packet transmitted and the introduction of parity bytes can be used to narrow down where in the payload the insertion or deletion error occurred during decoding. By introducing markers periodically throughout the data in the payload, it is possible to detect where the bit shift may have happened. If every *nth* byte is full of zeroes or ones, any shift caused by insertion or deletion has a probability of altering one or more parity bytes. If that byte is altered, then the encryption mechanism can go in and start deleting a bit before the parity byte affected and seeing if all subsequent parity bits fall into alignment. Additionally, the mechanism can either shift all those bits to the left or the right to attempt to find the combination with the most parity bytes aligned. In the event of data replacement, data validation of every byte may be the best approach. If the data is expected to contain bytes of a certain type or and the data does not match, it is possible to attempt to substitute multiple likely values into the data.

The downside to correcting these data sets is the fact that the perfect secrecy of the OTP means that all combinations are theoretically equally possible. This makes the attempts to “guess” the correct combination of bits that will provide the right CRC or checksum a computationally expensive problem. Error correction in the signal from the perspective of the encryption mechanism while hypothetically possible is not realistic or feasible.

### Data loss and reliability

Integrity checks are easy to implement and are computationally inexpensive. Calculating the CRC or checksum of a message provides a mechanism to validate the data received with the data sent. These integrity checks not only allow the validation of data, but can also be used to reject data sets deemed too unreliable or tainted. Due to the high levels of noise in the nanosatellite transmission signal, data loss from deletion of entire packets in the transmission and from the invalidation of packets from lack of integrity is not uncommon.

Mitigating this data loss through error correction and prevention can get computationally expensive and introduce so much complexity to a system that it defeats its goals of being lightweight. As a solution against this, the concept of reliability is introduced as a tenet for mitigating data errors and a crucial function of NERDP. Reliability offers the ability to discard packets based on their lack of integrity and request retransmission of packets. This retransmission is used seeking that the errors accrued in the first packet no longer affect the same packet that has now been retransmitted. If the retransmitted packet also fails the integrity check, then a retransmission is requested and can be requested ad nauseam until the integrity check is passed. A possible solution to this possible infinite retransmission, is the averaging of data packets to construct a full packet out of the existing malformed packets. If both the original and retransmitted packets both fail the integrity check, the receiver can examine the differences between both of the packets and attempt to combine several permutations of the differences in the packets and calculate the integrity of these packets. If after *n* tries, the packet still has not passed the integrity check, a retransmission can be requested and each bit can be compared to the same bit in other packets. This surveying will determine what value of the bit is the most common in the other packets and will select that value to use in its recalculation of the CRC or checksum. This approach could reduce the number of retransmissions as each retransmission makes the sampled message more likely to pass the integrity check. Unfortunately, this reconstruction comes at the cost of the already limited bandwidth of the nanosatellite.

Mitigating error propagation is no small task. Integrity checks, retransmissions, and error correction are limited in their scope and can only provide so much mitigation before their costs become too high. Selecting the appropriate settings for the data being transmitted and limiting the retransmission of data to ensure that resources are well invested are the ways we can currently manage error propagation. In some cases, disregarding integrity checks, accepting incomplete data, and doing away with all encryption is the only option in these volatile environments because some data is better than no data at all.

## Chapter Summary

Taking into consideration the environment, operation, and implementation of nanosatellites, an encryption mechanism for the NERDP was proposed. This encryption mechanism was designed to operate on any nanosatellite capable of running the most basic of software, and was demonstrated using Linux and Python in a virtual environment. This design was bounded by goals and guidelines that accurately reflected the needs of the small satellite and nanosatellite community. This encryption mechanism provides a strong information security posture at a low cost to processing and time. Its constraints from a data storage perspective and its vulnerability to errors were taken into consideration into its design and implementation. A thorough analysis still supports that the OTP encryption method may be the fastest most reliable encryption method for nanosatellites. Utilizing Python as a development and testing platform for the design of the encryption module supported by NERDP provides a proof of concept of the implementation of an encryption scheme and highlights the feasibility of utilizing it in future nanosatellite and small satellite missions.

# NERDP structure and development

## Introduction

Nanosatellites have limited bandwidth when operating in the UHF and VHF bands. This bandwidth commonly operates at 9600 baud as described in Chapter II. This limited bandwidth, in combination with the propensity to errors in the noisy signal, results in a restrictive environment for which normal packet transfer protocols may not be well suited. A high loss of data packets due to signal noise and failure to meet integrity requirements can be mitigated in IP connections like TCP by requesting a retransmission of the data [10]. While this solution may be inexpensive in connections operating at a million-bits-per-second data transfer rate, in the limited bandwidth environment of nanosatellites, they begin to accrue a data overhead cost. Furthermore, in order to waste less bandwidth, some nanosatellite designers may opt to use small data packet sizes for the packets over the AX.25 protocol. While TCP can send several kilobytes of data in a single packet, making its 20 byte header comparatively small, small packet sizes of less than a hundred bytes are gravely impacted by a 20% header cost [10].

The retransmission and ability to rebuild received objects from packets in the correct order, referred to as reliability, is a crucial component of protocols like TCP and CSP. These protocols ensure that the data received is not only properly ordered but also ensure the receivers can request retransmission of specific data packets. Unfortunately, TCP is a very verbose protocol that sends an acknowledgement of each data packet and is better suited for a full-duplex structure as opposed to a half-duplex (Figure 1). Implementing reliability through IP/TCP in nanosatellites is expensive since TCP cannot operate without the IP header. To mitigate this, the NERDP protocol proposes a solution that will bypass the need for the IP header, and as long as data is transmitted and received by a Layer 2 protocol like AX.25, the receiver will be able to reliable reassemble the data.

## Goals for NERDP Functionality

NERDP is designed to work in a limited bandwidth environment. More specifically, it is also designed to take into account the need for small packets and large numbers of retransmissions from the spacecraft. These design criteria align with the current needs of nanosatellite and small satellite designers who are forced to use COTS protocols like TCP, but cannot afford the bandwidth to do so.

The protocol for transferring data packets, assembling them in the right order, and requesting retransmissions, needs to have a minimal footprint on the size of the data being transmitted by Layer 2 protocols like AX.25. Minimizing packet headers and extraneous packet transmissions are two key components in achieving this low footprint. In the case of TCP, every packet must be acknowledged by the receiver; this is a clear example of extraneous packet transmissions that NERDP sought to minimize to reduce the total volume of data transferred. On that same vein, each TCP and IP header utilize large amounts of data to specify the target machine IP address and port number on which the data should be sent too, along with other extraneous data for routing and networking that is not relevant to the operation and transmission of data by nanosatellites. By designing a protocol that provides key functionality with minimal components, the nanosatellite can better use its limited bandwidth and increase the throughput of the entire data transfer.

Another goal of NERDP design was to make it modular and flexible to support the various nanosatellite designs. This could mean that NERDP could serve as a feasible alternative to UDP that did not require the IP header, or be usable without encryption, reliability, or integrity. Modifying the logic at no extra data cost to the header, would allow for NERDP to be a feasible multi-tool transfer of data in bandwidth limited connections.


## Overview of NERDP behavior

The base behavior of NERDP is to facilitate the segmentation of objects into small data packets before transmission by a Layer 2 mechanism. These data packets are associated into frames of 255 packets and are transmitted sequentially with intervals for synchronization and retransmission of packets within a particular frame. Unlike TCP which requests retransmissions on a packet by packet basis, NERDP utilizes a burst retransmission request. A burst retransmission request is a single packet sent by the receiver after the transmitter has finished sending a frame. This single packet in one transmission, requests all possible missing packets from the frame. Once they are received and the frame is completely downloaded, the receiver signals the transmitter to begin the transmission of the next data frame. Once the next frame begins to send the data to the receiver, the previous frame is discarded making it impossible to retransmit that data unless the whole process is restarted. This sequential transmission of frames continues until the entirety of the object has been sent

Under ideal conditions with no errors, regardless of whether or not the data is encrypted, a nanosatellite can use NERDP without any retransmission of packets from loss of data or failure to pass an integrity check.

### Base NERDP behavior


Typical operation of NERDP in the request of an object from a nanosatellite begins by the nanosatellite being in a perpetual listen state where it is constantly receiving data, and the ground station sending a request (REQ) packet to the nanosatellite over port 0 with the object name and the port number the ground station requests the data packets to be sent (Figure 15).



1. Requesting an object to a specific ground station port sent from port 0


NERDP operates on a system of channels for different types of data analogous to TCP’s and UDP’s port number. These ports redirect the different types of packets and data to different logic within the receiving and transmitting logic. NERDP packet designs currently are designed to utilize 16 destination and 16 source ports for all transfer of data. These ports are specified in the packet header for each packet to route the packet to the correct parsing logic. Currently port 0 is used for all control packets for data transfer, port 1 is used for satellite state of health data, while data transfer packets are limited to ports 2 and higher.

Once the nanosatellite receives the request packet, it proceeds to find open the object and sends an acknowledgement (ACK) packet to the ground station’s port 0. This acknowledgement contains metadata about the data transfer such as the offset at which the satellite started reading from the OTP (if encryption is enabled) and the size of the object. This data allows the ground station to decrypt the packets with the corresponding OTP information and be able to estimate the number of packets it is expecting (Figure 16).




1. Acknowledgement of object request sent to ground station port 0 containing OTP offset data and object size data

Immediately after sending the acknowledgement packet, the transmitter begins sending packets of data (DAT) size *n* to the receiver’s requested port, where *n* is the size of packet determined by the design of the radio. The transmitter takes *n* bytes from the object, calculates their CRC, and then proceeds to encrypt it if encryption is enabled. These components are then organized into data packets that are sent sequentially and received by the receiver. Each packet header also contains a packet identification number between 0 and 255, to allow NERDP to reassemble the data in the correct order. Each frame is comprised of 256 of these packets, or however many packets are needed in the last frame before the end of the object. The receiver then decrypts the packet utilizing the data from the acknowledgement packet if encryption is enabled, verifies the integrity of the data and stores it in a buffer. Only after it has received all of the packets expected for that frame does it write them to a file (Figure 17). It should be noted that the final file written by the receiver contains the acknowledgement data along with the object data.




1. Transmission of an entire data frame to ground station’s requested port

Immediately following the transmission of the last data packet in the frame, if the entirety of the object has not yet been sent, NERDP sends a synchronization (SYN) packet from the transmitter to the receiver requesting the burst retransmission of all packets the receiver did not receive. Under ideal situations, there is no need for retransmission and instead the receiver writes the stored packets to a file, clears the buffer, and responds with a continue (CON) packet indicating the transmitter should continue the transmission of the object with the next frame (Figure 18).



1. Synchronization and continuation of data transfer from nanosatellite to ground station using NERDP

The last frame containing data, or in the case of small files the only frame, does not need to send the full 256 packets of information and can have any number of packets between 1 and 256. When the transmitter reaches the target size of the object it is transferring, it sends a finalization (FIN) packet instead of a synchronization packet to port 0. This packet serves as an indicator to the receiver that the entirety of the object has been transmitted. The receiver will then, if any packets are missing, will request the retransmission of packets. Under ideal circumstances, no retransmission is required and the receiver will write the current data received in the frame to a file, and instead of a continuation packet, the receiver will also reply with a finalization packet to the transmitter’s port 0. This then returns the state of the transmitter to its initial state where it awaits another request (Figure 19).




1. Finalization of data transmission with a final data frame with only 3 data packets

The base behavior of NERDP was designed with the elimination of unnecessary retransmission as a core tenet. By separating the data packet transmission into frames of packets, the need for an individual acknowledgement for each one of the received data packets is eliminated. This facilitates the use of small data packets to mitigate errors and signal noise, and allows for breakpoints in the data transmission at predictable locations. Under normal operation, at any of these breakpoints, if a finalization packet is received by the transmitter instead of a request for packet retransmission or a continuation packet, the transmission of the data is immediately terminated and the spacecraft returns to its initial state awaiting a request. This function gives the ground station operator the ability to terminate the transmission early if necessary in the event that the data is corrupted or invalid. This ability allows for a better use of the window of time the nanosatellite is available as the ground station does not have to wait for the transfer of the entire unwanted object.

### Reliability and retransmission


In the event of errors in the data, NERDP has integrity built into every packet in the form of a 16-bit CRC. This CRC allows the receiver and transmitter to validate each one of the packets received. This validation ensures no corrupted data is received stored. To mitigate the gaps in the data, NERDP was also designed with reliability in mind in the form of retransmissions. This functionality allows the retransmission of any packet within a given frame, and is extended to even control packets destined to port 0. If any packets are lost or corrupted in a particular frame, they can always be requested again by the receiver, and put in the appropriate location in the reconstructed buffer.

Assuming normal operation allows for a ground station receiver to request an object from a nanosatellite transmitter, if one or more packets are lost NERDP on the ground station waits until the entire frame has been sent and a synchronization (SYN) packet has been received. It is here where the ground station instead of continuing onto the next frame, instead generates a bit mask of 256 bits. These bits are all initialized at 0, and NERDP on the ground station flips the *nth* bit to 1 if the *nth* packet of the frame is missing. This generates 256 bits of 0’s and 1’s that can then be transmitted as 32 bytes as the payload of a missing (MIS) packets request packet. This triggers the retransmission from the transmitter which is again immediately followed by another synchronization packet. If the receiver is now satisfied with the data, it will then write the data to file and send the transmitter a continue packet to begin the transmission of the next frame (Figure 20). If the receiver still requires additional retransmissions, missing packet requests are recalculated and sent to the transmitter and the cycle repeats until the receiver is satisfied with all of the packets in a frame.



1. Retransmission of packets 1,54, and 202 utilizing the 32-byte mask in the MIS packet payload and continuing the transmission

In the event that an object requires a single frame less than 255 packets, or in the event of the last frame is less than or equal to 256 packets, the transmitter sends a finalization packet to the receiver. If the receiver requires retransmission of specific packets, it again calculates the 32-byte mask that specifies which packet is missing and sends a missing packet request to the transmitter. The calculation of this mask takes the object size received from the initial ACK packet and will calculate how many packets it expects in the final frame. If the frame requires less than 256 packets, it will pad the byte mask with 0’s for all packets not expected. This makes the byte mask always equivalent to 32 bytes, regardless of the number of packets in the frame. Much like a synchronization packet, NERDP on the transmitter will retransmit the missing packets requested and send a finalization packet to the receiver. The receiver can either request retransmission of packets again, or it can respond with a finalization packet signaling the end of the transmission (Figure 21).



1. Retransmission of Packets in a frame containing less than 256 packets utilizing the MIS packet as a response to the FIN packet

NERDP consolidates the request for retransmission of individual packets into a single byte mask packet that allows for burst retransmission. This mechanism is good for the retransmission of data packets, and even entire frames, but it does rely on the successful receipt of an acknowledgement, synchronization and finalization packets to the receiver. If any of these control packets are lost in flight or fail the integrity check, NERDP has some mechanism to mitigate loss of control packets.

In the event of a loss of the acknowledgement packet in the first frame, NERDP on the ground station still receives and stores the other data it receives until the receipt of a synchronization or finalization packet. To mitigate the need for the object size and OTP offset in the acknowledgement packet which NERDP needs to operate successfully, upon the receipt of a synchronization or finalization packet, if the ground station NERDP sends a missing packet retransmission request to the transmitter specifically only asking for the acknowledgement packet and listens for data from the transmitter. Upon receipt of the retransmitted acknowledgement packet and subsequent synchronization or finalization packet, the ground station NERDP is now capable to create the appropriate size byte mask for the retransmission of packets.

After the transmission of every synchronization or finalization packet by the transmitter, NERDP utilizes timeout conditions specified by the user and the corresponding baud rate. This transitions the satellite to a listen state wherein it will only wait a limited window of time for a finalization packet or a missing packet request. The first timeout window is fully dependent on the number of packets sent so as to reduce the dead time the satellite waist for incoming data. If the timeout is reached, the synchronization or finalization packet is retransmitted, this time with the timeout reduced. This reduction in timeout is due to the fact that the other end of NERDP now no longer has to process a full frame of data, and only has to process a single packet. After two retransmissions, if the transmitter does not receive an appropriate packet, the connection is dropped and the transmission ends. The listening logic of every data packet has a long standardized timeout so as to maximize the data captured, and if the timeout is reached, then the connection terminates and the limited data is written to file. If the ground station NERDP does not receive an expected synchronization or finalization packet after sending a missing packet request, it will also send two retransmissions with short time outs. This also happens if no data is received immediately after sending a continuation packet. This behavior attempts to trigger transmission from the nanosatellite NERDP transmitter and prevent the connection from timing out from lack of receipt of data from the ground station.

These retransmission mechanisms are designed into NERDP to provide reliability in communication and mitigate errors in the data. Loss of data is not uncommon in poor connections, and the ability to retransmit the data and be able to reassemble the data in the correct order is crucial to the function of nanosatellites. NERDP reliability functionality is specifically designed to reduce the cost of data overhead and the need for constant change of state of the hardware radios from receive to transmit. By implanting bursts of packets as frames and a very light header, nanosatellites can throughput more data in their limited bandwidth and provide more functionality as research platforms.

### Packet integrity in NERDP

Packet integrity is crucial in noisy data as it allows the receiver to separate valid data from malformed data. Every packet in NERDP can be subjected to integrity checks to verify their integrity, and said checks can be used to purposefully drop malformed packets if data integrity is a high priority. Natively, NERDP integrates the use of a 16-bit CRC for integrity checks and validation. This CRC is directly built into the header and can be calculated either before or after the encryption of the data, depending on the implementation of the user.

Objects transmitted over NERDP can vary in the degree of integrity required to ensure their validity. While stronger forms of integrity checks other than a 16-bit CRC exist, NERDP is currently dependent on the size of the integrity check value being 16-bits. This value can be calculated by a 16-bit CRC or a checksum algorithm. The only caveat is that the same algorithm be used on both ends of the transmission.

Overall, data integrity in NERDP is integrated at the packet header level. The packet headers were designed with data integrity at the forefront and take up 50% of the total packet header. Design of NERDP focused on noisy signals, and a small reliable integrity check is crucial to the functionality of NERDP.

Prioritizing the development of an integrity check value does come at a price in the functionality of NERDP. By increasing the steps necessary before transmission of the packets, NERDP increases the processing cost of transmitting data. Such a cost is unavoidable if integrity is to be implemented at the packet level. If an integrity check is integrated at the frame or object level the scheme risks requiring large number of retransmissions, and bandwidth usage should be prioritized over processing costs, especially if they are small integrity checks on each packet.

### Encryption integration

The advantage of having a modular design where the encryption scheme of the data is completely external to the actual functionality of NERDP is the ease of integration or separation of encryption from NERDP. This modularity gives NERDP the ability to operate with different implementations of encryption, or utilize the OTP encryption module designed for it.

If a transmission utilizes OTP encryption, the acknowledgement packet provides an offset to the encryption and decryption module indicating where the OTP should be read from. At the end of every encrypted transmission, this offset is increased by the size of the object transmitted to select new data from the OTP.

Encryption and decryption can be carried out easily in the transfer of the data, or can be taken out altogether if the designers choose to focus on other aspects of the protocol. This optional encryption can help NERDP become a standard in data transmission as it allows multiple listening stations to communicate with the nanosatellite without the need to exchange a OTP with all of them.

### NERDP information security posture

NERDP provides a solution to all 3 components of information security: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Ideally a system must attempt to reach the highest possible standard for each one of these components, but unfortunately some implementations are costlier than others.

NERDP provides, with the integration of OTP encryption, a very high level of confidentiality at a low cost of processing but at a high cost in system hard disk space. The need for a large infrastructure to support his high level of confidentiality may be prohibitively expensive for some space craft designs. Thankfully, NERDP does provide the flexibility for the encryption of packets, frames, and objects depending on the implementation. By replacing the encryption module utilized when each packet is encrypted with the OTP with an alternate encryption mechanism, the system can remain confident. Ultimately the confidentiality of the NERDP system is only as strong as the encryption mechanism utilized.


Data integrity is provided on each packet by 16-bits in the packet header. NERDP does not require a specific integrity check, and any integrity check that provides a 16-bit checksum or signature of the data can be used. It is possible for NERDP to be modified to use larger integrity checks. This will come at a cost of data overhead and is not recommended. Currently TCP and UDP headers do not require more than 16-bits to provide integrity of the data transmitted [9] [10]. NERDP design mirrored heavily the implementation of integration checks of both IP protocols.

Availability is the property of NERDP to provide the data to any authorized listener making a request. While there is currently no method to authenticate the users making the request from a nanosatellite employing NERDP, that can be mitigated with an authentication scheme that requires a password or authentication in the request package. This functionality can be implemented either within NERDP or at the application layer and requires future investigation. NERDP does provide the ability to mitigate data loss in the event of interference or error. This makes the data constantly available to any receiving platform.

Overall, the security posture of NERDP is strong especially given the limitations in processing and bandwidth nanosatellites operate under. Finding a balance of all three components of information security is application and design-specific, so a quantifiable approach to evaluate the posture is hard to assess. Nonetheless, NERDP provides the functionality typically associated with a larger protocol, at a fraction of the data overhead. The ability to maintain the information security state on par with other protocols truly makes NERDP behavior an asset to nanosatellite communications.

## packet header structure

The packet header for all NERDP packets, regardless of packet type is standardized to 4 bytes or 32 bits. These 32 bits are comprised of all the information needed to route the packets to the correct port for processing, the integrity check value, and the information needed to reassemble the received packets in the correct order in every frame (Figure 22).



1. NERDP 32-bit packet header containing the source port, destination port, checksum, and the packet identification number

In order to properly identify the type of packet received, NERDP has to be able to route the packets to specific ports. These ports provide different logic and parsing for the data packets and, as discussed earlier, some ports are specific for different functions. In the event that packets need to be sorted by their different source ports, NERDP must also be able to provide that functionality. NERDP packet headers are designed to include 4 bits of data for the source port and 4 additional bits for the destination port. Combined they form a total of 1 byte on the packet header and provide 16 destination and 16 source ports for communications.

Regardless of whether the integration is carried out pre or post encryption, or if the data is even encrypted, after the source and destination port byte come the two bytes utilized for integrity check. As discussed earlier, the size of this checksum is drawn largely from the size of checksums in UDP and TCP [9] [10]. These 16 bits, or 2 bytes, provide the space for a cryptographic integrity check in the form of a checksum or CRC. NERDP does not enforce a particular type of integrity check, and like encryption, the calculations are done by a module that can be integrated or omitted depending on the implementation. By making the integrity check modular, NERDP can be treated independent of the integrity calculation. Regardless of the integrity check used, 2 bytes is half of the packet structure and should be more than enough to ensure integrity.

Finally, the last byte of the packet provides a packet identification number. This byte is used to dictate the order of the packet in the frame and is maintained by NERDP as the packet is transmitted. By limiting the packet number to 1 byte, NERDP is only capable of sending a maximum of 256 packets per frame. While this frame may be small compared to the thousands of packets some objects may require, due to the noisy signal and high number of retransmissions expected, 256 packets is manageable frame size that ensures a more stable transfer of data. This is important if the connection is poor and the data requires a high level of integrity. If no integrity is required, the light exchange of two packets with no payload data (the synchronization and continue packets) to continue to the next frame are a small 8-byte price to pay relatively speaking to ensure reliability of the data (Figure 18).

Overall the design of the packet header is compact and provides the infrastructure for all of the key functionality of NERDP. Most of the packet header is dedicated to the integrity check due to the large size of the integrity check. The main goal behind the design of the header was to take the most common packet type, assumed to be the data type packet, and minimize the packet header for it. This minimization did remove some functionality as packet type, but that can be mitigated by the control packet design. By pushing some of the packet header that is not required for all packets and leaving only the essentials, the NERDP packet can be a lightweight and feasible solution.

## Packet design

### Control packets

### Data packets

### State of health packets

## NERDP proof of concept platform development

### Mechanism development and platform

### Protocol operation in test platform

## Evaluating performance of NERDP

### Data overhead compared to TCP, UDP, CSP

### Reliability as a data loss mitigation method

## Making NERDP open source

## Chapter Summary

# appendix. Optional

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If you apply Heading 2 style in your appendices, and the lettering does not begin with “A,” simply right click on the first Heading 2 of the appendix, and choose “Restart at 1.”

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