CAs create keys in a Key Ceremony (often with a Key Generation report) but might not be aware that key storage needs to be audited continuously with no gaps--for instance, with "parked" CA keys (CA keys that have not had a corresponding CA certificate issued). Currently, audits contain a list of names and SHA256 hashes of CA certificates that are in scope. But what about "parked" keys? The BRs should be amended to make it clear that period-of-time audits need to identify parked CA keys, too.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
@bcmorton provided me with an example that has been helpful. Anyone else with contributions to my understanding of this issue is invited to send them to me.
CAs create keys in a Key Ceremony (often with a Key Generation report) but might not be aware that key storage needs to be audited continuously with no gaps--for instance, with "parked" CA keys (CA keys that have not had a corresponding CA certificate issued). Currently, audits contain a list of names and SHA256 hashes of CA certificates that are in scope. But what about "parked" keys? The BRs should be amended to make it clear that period-of-time audits need to identify parked CA keys, too.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: