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Updates to 3.2.4.1/4 relying on signature for personal vetting (#159)
* Updated vetting based on sig
* Additional frameworks
* Approved frameworks
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srdavidson committed Aug 4, 2022
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Showing 1 changed file with 28 additions and 3 deletions.
31 changes: 28 additions & 3 deletions SBR.md
Expand Up @@ -650,12 +650,37 @@ The CA SHALL document and publish information describing the eID and associated

4. **From a certificate supporting a digital signature applied by the Applicant**

If a digital signature is to be used as evidence, the CA or RA SHALL have the Applicant digitally sign the Certificate Request using a valid personal Certificate that was issued under one of the following standards: eIDAS Qualified Certificates as defined in ETSI EN 319 411-2 and validated according to ETSI TS 119 172-4, International Grid Trust Federation/IGTF, Adobe Signing Certificate issued under the AATL or CDS program, the Kantara identity assurance framework at level 2, NIST SP 800-63 at level 2, or the FBCA CP at Basic or higher assurance.
If a digital signature is to be used as evidence, the CA or RA SHALL have the Applicant digitally sign the Certificate Request using a valid personal Certificate that was issued under frameworks described in this section.

Identity attributes are evidenced by the Certificate, not by the signed document. The CA or RA SHALL only rely upon the signing Certificate as evidence for identity attributes if the signature is valid.
Identity attributes are evidenced by the signing Certificate, not by the content of the signed document. The CA or RA SHALL only rely upon the signing Certificate as evidence for identity attributes if the digital signature is valid.

The CA SHOULD consider requirements to avoid issuance of consecutive Certificates that are issued based on a preceding Certificate, where the original verification of the Subject's identity may have been conducted in the distant past.

a. Approved frameworks

* Adobe: Signing Certificate issued under the AATL program;
* Bermuda: Certificate issued by Authorised CSP accredited under the ETA
* Brasil: Certificate accredited under ICP-Brasil;
* European Union: Qualified Certificate accredited under eIDAS;
* International Grid Trust Federation: Certificates issued under Birch or Cedar assurance levels;
* Japan: Certificate issued by Authorized Service Provider under the e-Signature Act;
* Peru: Certificate accredited by INDECOPI;
* South Africa: Certificates accredited in accordance with section 37 of the ECTA;
* Switzerland: Qualified or Regulated Certificate accredited under ZertES;
* United States: Certificate issued with validation using NIST SP 800-63 at IAL2 (or Kantara IAL2) or higher.

b. Additional frameworks

The CA/Browser Forum S/MIME Certificate Working Group will consider additional trust service frameworks that provide an equivalent level of security and validation compared to these Requirements. Proposals that evaluate the additional framework against the following criteria SHALL be submitted to the questions@cabforum.org mailing list:

* Legal context: the framework SHALL be subject to regulatory provisions, established by the government in the relevant jurisdiction, including the different Certificate levels and legal effects of the trust services and the requirements imposed on the Certificate issuer/trust service provider;
* Supervision and auditing systems: the framework SHALL include appropriate rules providing for:
* supervision of the trust service provider, ensuring that trust service providers meet regulatory imposed provisions;
* requirements imposed on auditing bodies when conducting audits;
* supervision of the auditing bodies.
* Best practices and transparency: requirements for online, public disclosure of practices by the trust service provider in a CP and/or CPS.
* Identity validation: must provide a level of assurance equivalent to that of the identity validation methods described in these Requirements.

5. **From Enterprise RA records**

In the case of `Sponsor-validated` Certificates approved by an Enterprise RA, records maintained by the Enterprise RA SHALL be accepted as evidence of Individual identity.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -2064,7 +2089,7 @@ d. __Certificate Field:__ `subject:organizationIdentifier` (2.5.4.97)
1. Confirm that the organization represented by the Registration Reference is the same as the organization named in the `organizationName` field as specified in [Section 7.1.4.2.2](#71422-subject-distinguished-name-fields); and
2. Further verify the Registration Reference matches other information verified in accordance with [Section 3.2.3](#323-authentication-of-organization-identity).

**Note 2**: For the following types of entities that do not have an identifier from the Registration Schemes listed in [Appendix A](#appendix-a---registration-schemes):
**Note 2**: For the following types of entities that do not have an identifier from the Registration Schemes listed in [Appendix A](#appendix-a---registration-schemes):

* For Government Entities, the CA SHALL enter the text `Government Entity`.
* For International Organization Entities, the CA SHALL enter the text `International Organization Entity`. An International Organization Entity is founded by a constituent document, e.g., a charter, treaty, convention or similar document, signed by, or on behalf of, a minimum of two Sovereign State governments.
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