

A Taxonomy of operational security considerations for manufacturer installed keys and Trust Anchors

Michael Richardson
<mcr@sandelman.ca>

<https://www.sandelman.ca/SSW/talk/2023-t2trg-taxonomy-installed-keys/>



An even briefer history of this draft

- ANIMA documents
 - masa-considerations
 - registrar-considerations
 - common contents,
- Went to SECDISPATCH in virtual interim meeting in July 2022, at IETF108
 - <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/108/session/secdispatch>

- Adopted by T2TRG Jan. 2023.

- ?

- Profit!


Non-Goals of the document

- 1) Not aiming to write an ISO27001-ish evaluation process.
- 2) Not going to make any recommendation as to an appropriate solution for a given risk situation.



Goals of this document

- Enumerate the reasonable, and maybe some less reasonable ways to provision and secure keys, and give them **names**.
- Not just the most secure way, because it is not always worth it.



admin:password

Recent events at CA/B FORUM and LAMPS

- CA/Browser Forum decided that code-signing keys need to be in an HSM
- CA that signs code-signing key must have some kind of attestation from HSM about key provenance
- CSR needs to hold this attestation
- LAMPS still debating about what the format of attestation will be

Taxonomy: Key Generation Process

- where/how is the device key generated

- internal?
- external/factory?
- ~~CPU provisioned seed?~~
- ~~threshold methods?~~



- ++ Key Attributes
 - > Source/Creation (enum)
 - >> Loaded
 - >> Device Derived (e.g. Derived from a device permanent master secret such as a TPM hierarchy seed)
 - >> Generated on Device
 - >> Key Agreement (???) (Derived from a key agreement)
 - >> Co-Generated (???) (Securely cogenerated on more than one machine)
 - >> KDF (???) (Derived from a master secret which was in turn derived from a two - or greater - party protocol).
 - > Protection (enum - ordered from least to most protected)
 - >> Unknown
 - >> None/Software
 - >> Extractable/Migratable (by the user)
 - >> Extractable for Backup (encrypted under a key migratable to another HSM)
 - >> Extractable for Storage (encrypted under a PUF, not migratable)
 - >> Non Extractable

LAMPS notes:

<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/d0xsQZIBgizetVRaZVULmTkEdIk/>

Next Steps

- Additional bikeshedding over some of the terminology/definitions
- Promote the terms more widely
 - Within the IETF and IRTF and also outside
 - Listen to feedback, look for awkward usages
- Publish in late 2023

Questions!

