

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities

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**Curriculum Vitae
Fall 2018****GUILLERMO CABRAL****Personal Data***Address*

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Citizenship: Paraguay (J-1 Visa)

Major Fields of Concentration

Public Economics, Labor Economics

Education

<i>Degree</i>	<i>Field</i>	<i>Institution</i>	<i>Year</i>
PhD	Economics	University of Minnesota (expected)	2019
Certificate of Graduate Studies	Economics	Universidad Torcuato Di Tella	2011
BA	Economics (with merit)	University Catolica (Paraguay)	2008

Dissertation

Title: "Universal Basic Income and the Mirrless Model"

Dissertation Advisor: Professor Larry Jones

Expected Completion: Summer 2019

References

Professor Larry Jones	(612) 624-4553 lej@umn.edu	Department of Economics University of Minnesota 4-101 Hanson Hall 1925 Fourth Street South Minneapolis, MN 55455
Professor V. V. Chari	(612) 626-7151 chari002@umn.edu	
Professor Christopher Phelan	(612) 626-2533 cphelan@umn.edu	

Honors and Awards

Spring 2018	<i>Distinguished Instructor</i> , Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota
Fall 2014, Spring 2016	<i>Distinguished Teaching Assistant</i> , Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota
2013	<i>Christopher Sims Fellowship</i> , Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota
2010	<i>Itaipu Binacional Fellowship</i> , University Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina

Teaching Experience

June 2016 -	<i>Instructor</i> , Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
May 2018	Instructor for <i>Economy of Latin America</i> .
Spring 2016	<i>Teaching Assistant</i> , Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Led recitation sections for <i>Principles of Microeconomics</i> .
March 2011 -	<i>Teaching Assistant</i> , University Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
June 2012	Taught <i>Public Finance</i> and <i>Topics in Macroeconomics</i> .

Professional/Research Experience

June 2015 -	<i>Research Assistant</i> , Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
December 2015	Minneapolis, Minnesota.
August 2012 -	<i>Junior Professional Associate</i> , World Bank, Paraguay Office, Asunción, Paraguay.
June 2013	
March 2011 -	<i>Research Assistant</i> , University Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
June 2012	Research assistant for Juan Pablo Nicolini and Lucia Quesada

Papers

“Tax Simplicity and Universal Basic Income”
“Demographics, Labor, and the Great Recession”

Computer Skills

Matlab, Fortran, STATA

Languages

Spanish (native), English (advanced), Portuguese (intermediate)

Abstract

“Tax Simplicity and Universal Basic Income”

In this paper I analyze the convenience of a cash transfer program, or universal basic income (UBI), combined with a flat or linear marginal tax rate on income. Proponents of a policy of cash transfers argue that if combined with a simplification of welfare programs and the tax system, it could generate enough benefits through a reduction of administrative costs and a reduction of distortions, especially in the labor market.

This idea is not new in economics, and numerical results in models as in Mirrlees (1971) have lump-sum components that can be interpreted as UBI. Also, Mirrlees has noted that the optimal marginal non-linear tax rate is close to a linear tax system. I start by double-checking Mirrlees' calculations and determining that those numbers hold for a wide range of parameters. For a utilitarian planner, if a simplification of the tax system results in a value of 0.18% - 0.5% of GDP, a linear tax system is desirable.

Second, I analyse the effects of introducing uncertainty in the optimal non-linear tax system. I introduce uncertainty in the preference of the agent. I show that heterogeneity could be a factor in making the optimal non-linear tax system closer to a linear tax system. In the extreme case where heterogeneity increases to its maximum possible value, the optimal tax system tends toward a linear tax system.