Simultaneous 3-Player Game

50 pesos must be distributed among 3 players. Each player can choose $x_i \in [0, K]$ where x_i is an integer. Moreover, if the sum of what each player chooses exceeds 50, then the 50 pesos go to player 3 and the other players get 0. But if the sum is less than or equal to 50, each player gets what they chose. In other words, the payouts would be:

$$(0;0;50)$$
 if $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 > 50$

$$(x_1, x_2, x_3)$$
 if $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \le 50$

- 1. If K=40, determine if the following cases are NE, and in the case that there are incentives for deviation, indicate which player has such deviation incentive and to what strategy.
 - (a) (40, 40, 40)
 - (b) (0,0,40)
 - (c) (20, 20, 40)
 - (d) (25, 25, 25)
- 2. Find all the NE if K = 60

Answers

- 1. (a) It is a Nash equilibrium since even if player 1 or 2 change their choice, the sum will always be greater than 50 and they will have a payout of 0. On the other hand, player 3 has the maximum payout (50) and therefore has no incentive to deviate.
 - (b) It is not a Nash equilibrium because both player 1 and player 2 can choose a number between 1 and 10 and receive a payout greater than 0, since the sum would not be greater than 50.
 - (c) It is a Nash equilibrium, just like in the first case, player 1 and player 2 cannot get a payout greater than 0 no matter what they do, the sum is always greater than 50 and therefore player 3 gets everything. And player 3 has no incentives to lower their choice since they are getting the maximum payout.
 - (d) It is a Nash equilibrium, although player 1 or player 2 choose a lower number, the payout they get is equal to 0. While player 3 cannot get a higher payout
- 2. If K = 60, then the Nash equilibria are as follows:
 - (x_1, x_2, x_3) where $x_3 \in [50, 60]$ and $x_1, x_2 \in [0, 60]$. For example (0, 0, 50), (10, 4, 60), (2, 1, 55)
 - (x_1, x_2, x_3) where $x_3 \in [0, 49]$, $x_1 + x_3 \ge 50$ and $x_2 + x_3 \ge 50$. For example: (20, 15, 45), (2, 2, 49), (10, 5, 46), (1, 1, 49), (4, 4, 46)