

# **Worker Representation in Policymaking and Support for European Integration**

A longitudinal analysis of European-level trade union and professional association representation in the European Commission and European Parliament and support for European integration amongst non-unionised Baltic states and unionised Nordic states with lobbying accounts of the ETUC and ETUFs



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## Abstract

Labour organising and worker representation in policymaking have been absent in the Baltics since independence from the USSR, and socioeconomic conditions have been poor compared to the socialised Nordics. As such, the Baltics quickly integrated themselves into the EU, whereas the Nordics have been reluctant. Building a theoretical framework that understands support for EU integration in its relation to the benefits from membership and a recognition of worker representation in policymaking generating improved societal and labour market policies, this dissertation evaluates the relationship between worker representation in the EC and EP and popular support for EU integration in regions with contrasting domestic industrial relations, with an additional account of prominent labour interest lobbying actors. It used secondary data to perform a longitudinal analysis from 2008 to mid-2021 using multiple linear regression models with a culminative, multi-dimensional dependent variable of support for EU integration and a variety of independent variables measuring worker lobbying in the EP and EC to capture any relationships and trends.

The Baltics displayed a relationship between worker representation and support for integration in the EU, albeit only in Latvia, whereas the Nordics did not. Lobbying by all European-level trade unions and professional associations was associated more with support for EU integration than the most prominent labour interest lobbying actors alone in countries where applicable. Although the expected findings did indicate a relationship between worker representation and support for integration in the EU in regions with room for improvement in domestic labour relations and socioeconomic conditions, the lack of universality across the Baltics requires future research to explain support for EU integration in the rest of the region as it relates to worker representation or otherwise.

**Keywords:** European Union, European integration, worker representation, lobbying, labour organising

# Content

<b>Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>1. Introduction.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2. Literature Review .....</b>	<b>9</b>
2.1 European Integration .....	9
2.1.1 Theories of Integration .....	10
2.1.1.1 Neofunctionalism .....	10
2.1.1.2 Intergovernmentalism .....	10
2.1.1.3 Postfunctionalism .....	11
2.1.2 Baltic States .....	11
2.1.3 Nordic States .....	13
2.2 European Governance and Policy .....	14
2.2.1 EU Institutions and Functions .....	14
2.2.2 Shifting Governance .....	15
2.2.3 Social and Labour Policy amidst Regulatory Liberalisations .....	16
2.3 European Interest Representation .....	17
2.3.1 Interest Representation in EU Policymaking .....	18
2.3.1.1 Worker Representation vis-à-vis Corporate Lobbying .....	18
2.3.2 Interest Representation outside of the EU .....	19
2.3.2.1 Baltic States .....	19
2.3.2.2 Nordic States .....	20
2.4 Moving Forward .....	21
<b>3. Methodology .....</b>	<b>22</b>
3.1 Research Design .....	22
3.1.1 Theoretical Framework .....	22
3.1.2 Approaches and Data Collection .....	23
3.1.2.1 Case Study Selection .....	26
3.1.3 Method of Analysis .....	27
3.2 Limitations .....	29
<b>4. Results .....</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>5. Discussion .....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>6. Conclusion .....</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>7. Bibliography .....</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>8. Appendices .....</b>	<b>55</b>

## Abbreviations

<b>CEEC</b>	Central and Eastern European Countries
<b>EB</b>	Eurobarometer
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>ECB</b>	European Central Bank
<b>ECJ</b>	European Court of Justice
<b>ECSC</b>	European Coal and Steel Community
<b>ECTR</b>	European Commission Transparency Register
<b>EES</b>	European Employment Strategy
<b>EMCEF</b>	European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers' Federation
<b>EMF</b>	European Metalworkers' Federation
<b>EMU</b>	Economic and Monetary Union
<b>EP</b>	European Parliament
<b>EPSR</b>	European Pillar of Social Rights
<b>EPSU</b>	European Federation of Public Service Unions
<b>ESF</b>	European Social Fund
<b>ETUC</b>	European Trade Union Confederation
<b>ETUC/ETUF</b>	European Trade Union Confederation and (Prominent) European Trade Union Federations
<b>ETUF(s)</b>	European Trade Union Federation(s)
<b>ETUF: TCL</b>	European Trade Union Federation: Textiles, Clothing and Leather
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FDI</b>	Foreign Direct Investment
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>MEP(s)</b>	Member(s) of European Parliament
<b>NAP(s)</b>	National Action Plan(s)
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>OMC</b>	Open Method of Coordination
<b>PHARE</b>	Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy
<b>TU/PA(s)</b>	Trade Union and Professional Association(s)
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UNI-EUROPA</b>	European Trade Union Federation for Services and Communication
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Since the 2008 financial crisis there has been growing concern amongst European Union (EU) states over a rising dissatisfaction amongst their citizens at the consequence of European-level, and domestic, austerity policies and wider issues of poverty and social exclusion. Moreover, this trend accompanies the increasingly widely accepted recognition of the EU as an institution for business interests to dominant the legislators' consultancy meetings and the representation of interests during the policymaking process (Hanegraaff and Poletti, 2021). Representatives from member states in the EU, and member states themselves, have had troubles reaching consensus around labour and social policy, which has been partnered with a lack of commitment from the EU overall to correct market failures across the continent (Copeland and Daly, 2018). The latest big initiative by the EU, the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR), in its effort to create a 'Social Europe' and give greater or equal importance to the socialisation of Europe compared to the economic and financial aspects, has been described as weak in its current form. While social dialogue has no doubt increased inside of the EU, it is argued that initiatives such as this must continue to play catch up to budgetary and competition policy interests, with its prioritisation suffering at the hands of market solutions and a conflict in approaches towards social policy from eurosceptics (Hacker, 2019; Vesan and Corti, 2019).

While this concern has existed before, the juxtaposition of market-building and market-correcting asymmetries that the EU espouses are especially apparent as it has expanded its membership base, borders and scope of influence (Börzel et al., 2017). The study of trade unions role in influencing what is currently seen as soft or lacklustre European social and labour policy is key to ensuring the benefits of a Social Europe are realised and that increased support for Europeanisation and European integration can be achieved as not only is the EU, as it stands, dominated by business interests in terms of lobbying activity but because trade

union membership is in decline in a time in which protective legislation and labour organising more generally are being reduced in number or scale (Morantz, 2017). Moreover, as euroscepticism spreads across Europe and further integration becomes increasingly complicated, research today that focuses on the possible aspects influencing the political views held by European Union member state citizens is crucial for the future of the European project (Brack and Startin, 2015).

The scope of this dissertation shall concern the Baltic and Nordic EU region, made up of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia and Sweden, Denmark and Finland, respectively. Using a combination of secondary data this dissertation will aim to perform a longitudinal analysis over a span of more than thirteen years from 2008 to mid-2021. The demographics this dissertation aims to focus on is the entire population of the studied member states, using Eurobarometer surveys which weigh the data with every publication to gain a representative selection of the population at any given time. The Eurobarometer surveys are captured twice every year. A focus on the Baltic region and the Nordic region allows for a comparison between two types of populations, each with differing histories and attitudes towards not only the European Union and European integration, but labour and social movements such as collective bargaining, worker empowerment, labour organising, etc.

This dissertation aims to build on the existing literature surrounding EU integration and interest representation throughout Europe and the EU itself. It aims to build a theoretical framework from the literature surveyed in specific contexts relating to the experiences of domestic labour relations in the Nordic and Baltic region, respectively. Equally, it strives to gain an improved understanding of European social and labour policy and how worker representation can shape this policy in such a way that could influence support for European integration in member states, especially ones with ample room to develop improved domestic labour relations and socioeconomic conditions generally. Not only will this dissertation add to

the literature surrounding labour movements in the Nordics, Baltics and European Union, but also develop a more rounded understanding of EU integration theory and what influences states in supporting or opposing increased Europeanisation and connectedness to both the EU and neighbouring countries. It aims to bring new insights to the experience of workers in representing their interests at the European level and as to how the Nordic EU states and Baltic states differ in their approaches to European integration as related to domestic social and labour issues.

This research will contribute by expanding on the limited literature around the Baltic region, for EU integration and worker representation, as well as expand upon the existing EU integration support literature. The research question here concerns whether worker representation in the EU in the form of institutionalised trade union and professional association interest representation through lobbying and consultations with legislators in the European Parliament and European Commission is related to popular support for EU integration in the Baltics more than in the Nordic region. Equally, it will aim to study the effects of the most prominent trade union lobbyist organisations in a similar context to determine whether they are more influential in swaying the same support for EU integration within EU member states' publics in the Nordics and Baltics. The hypothesis for this will be spelled out after the following literature review which plans to survey the literature around this topic in detail building into a theoretical framework which will feature in the methodology section that shall outline the quantitative analysis methods that this dissertation will use to capture any trends and relationships. Then, an in-depth discussion of the results shall follow a clear retelling of any findings in the results chapter, aiming to expand on the research performed with relation to the literature review, the theoretical framework and external research similar to the topic at hand. Finally, a concluding summary will highlight all the main points and, together with the discussion section, will state any recommendations for future



researchers, legislators, or those wishing to influence social and labour policy at the European level or support for EU integration.

To build a theoretical framework and gain an understanding of the role of worker representation in pushing for more representative and reflective social and labour legislation and in generating support for political institutions and regimes and increased interconnectedness, this dissertation shall review the latest and foundational literature concerning European interest representation, namely of trade unions, both within and outside of the European Union. With this, this literature review aims to survey the most prominent understandings of European integration theory for laying the groundwork in establishing a theoretical connection between worker representation in the European Union and popular support for European integration through supposed improved social and labour policy leading to warmer attitudes towards Europeanisation. This dissertation's scope concerns two regions with starkly differing organised labour and collective action backgrounds: the Nordic EU-member states and the post-Soviet Baltic states. Equally, an account of trade unionism success in reducing inequalities, an overview of EU institutions and functions, EU social and labour policy history and the trends affecting lobbyists due to EU reforms will be covered.

## 2.1 European Integration

As the EU has grown from an institution for trade liberalisation to an all-encompassing, pre-eminent economic, societal and political union continent wide, the study of public support for European integration has also expanded (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016). Since the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by Denmark in 1992, public opinion has been crucial for the study of European integration (Franklin et al., 1994; Siune and Svensson, 1993; Worre, 1995).

Cost-benefit analyses, for individuals (Gabel, 1998; Tucker et al., 2002) *and* nations (Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996; Carrubba, 1997), namely socioeconomic opportunistic

factors such as job security, have dominated utilitarian understandings of public support for EU integration (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016). Identity approaches, in contrast, study the compassion for EU institutions, fellow and neighbouring citizens, and minorities (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2006; Hobolt and De Vries, 2016). Cue-taking approaches concern intermediaries such as political parties and news outlets on support for European integration, such as varying identity or economic anxieties from eurosceptic political parties during elections (Anderson, 1998; Weßels, 1995; Vliegthart et al., 2009; Hobolt, 2009).

## **2.1.1 Theories of Integration**

### **2.1.1.1 Neofunctionalism**

Neofunctionalist scholars generally agree that feedback loops, policy spill-over and competition between constituent actors while pushing for their own respective interests in pluralistic arenas generate incremental steps towards reinforcing stable equilibriums of integration within the entire system, even in the face of political setbacks (Truman, 1951; Dahl, 1961; Easton, 1965; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; Schmitter, 2005 & 2009; Jones et al., 2016; Bergmann and Müller, 2021). Jones et al. (2021) describe this as “failing forward”. Mattli and Stone Sweet (2012) note that it is only radical political changes that can disrupt this stability.

### **2.1.1.2 Intergovernmentalism**

In contrast, integration in intergovernmentalism results from cooperative mutual goals between constituent actors in addressing economic interests. Integration is strengthened in episodes, instead of through incremental steps resulting from long-term equilibriums. Equilibrium in this understanding result in integration deadlocks with no changes; it is disturbed only by rare episodes (typically “lowest common denominator solutions” (Jones, et

al., 2021, p1519)). New intergovernmentalist academics suggest that disequilibrium can result from pro-integration leaders against disenchanted publics, and thus reverse integration (Bickerton et al., 2015; Hodson and Puetter, 2019). However, due to the continuation of EU integration despite increases in populist, eurosceptic political actors, as well as various EU crises, this approach is highly criticised (Kleine and Pollack, 2018; Bulmer, 2015; Hodson and Puetter, 2019).

#### 2.1.1.3 Postfunctionalism

Postfunctionalism shifts the focus to functional pressures and exclusive identities to reflect on the politicisation and identity politics of integration, not the outcomes. Left-right politics and party competition is said to lead to support or opposition for integration, and multilevel governance is directly challenged by political cleavages from either concern about EU legitimacy or from widespread dissent perpetuated by political leaders. It understands that multiple equilibriums can be met, from the unmoving status quo to incremental reforms or even disintegration.

#### 2.1.2 Baltic States

Since independence from the Soviet Union in 1990, “chronic under-financing”, decreased economic output and soaring inflation has resulted in reduced standards of living and employment in every Baltic state (Jacobsson and West, 2009, p108). This, as well as the lack of government machinery and political control, has meant the Baltics have viewed the EU as an enticing welfare society, vital also for security and economic interests (Kerikmäe et al., 2018).

European economic aid was first received through agreements based on each state’s association with PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the

Economy) in 1991, but for full EU membership the Baltics had to demonstrate stable institutions, a working market economy and the ability to support the EC's political, economic and monetary aims established in the 1994 Copenhagen Summit before any transition period could be agreed (Kerikmäe et al., 2018).

They applied in 1995 with relatively stabilised internal conditions and each joined in 2004. The Treaty of Amsterdam constitutionalised the European Employment Strategy (EES) which, in attempting to push for active labour market policies, coordination of social and economic policies, tax and benefit reforms and better education, encouraged states to submit National Action Plans (NAPs) (replaced by national reform programs in the Lisbon Strategy of 2005) to receive European Social Fund (ESF) benefits and country-specific development guidance from the EC. Equally, EU law (*'acquis communautaire'*) required ascending states to implement European health and safety legislation and certain labour laws (Jacobsson and West, 2009).

The required market liberalisations resulted in each country becoming competitive and fast-growing economically: GDP doubled from 1996 to 2003. Equally, this trend affected welfare approaches where the Baltics opted for individualistic models over state interventionism. Scandinavian attitudes, in contrast, were seen as “too socialist” (Jacobsson and West, 2009, p103).

Today the Baltic states are some of the most integrated in Europe (Gastinger, 2021; Dandashly and Verdun, 2020; Buzek, 2013).

### 2.1.3 Nordic States

Only 3 of the 5 sovereign Nordic states are EU members (Sweden, Denmark and Finland)<sup>1</sup> albeit with several opt-outs and different levels of integration (Miljan, 1977; Wallace, 1999). They are described as “reluctant and self-serving” (Grøn and Wivel, 2017, p269).

Although not homogenous, some underlying themes do prevail. The Nordic states have ingrained similarities concerning welfare and labour market policies, each has a modern history of labour and social policies such as minimum wages, reputable work-life balances, extensive welfare spending and high-standard working conditions because of strong trade unions and collective bargaining, often institutionalised at government level, described as ‘social corporatism’ (Katzenstein, 1985) or ‘Scandinavian corporatism’ (Christiansen, 2017).

Reluctancy towards European integration stems from anxieties over supranational-level limitations over collective bargaining, including free movement of labour and internal welfare concerns. Despite this, these states commit themselves to free trade as a means of economic growth to support their expansive welfare states (Grøn and Wivel, 2017; Jensen, 2015; Schouenborg, 2013).

Increased European Parliament and European Council power vis-à-vis the European Commission also concerns the Nordics over the diminishing role of ‘small states’ in protecting sovereignty and internal labour relations; the Commission has historically been more accommodating to small state interests (Grøn and Wivel, 2017; Bunse et al., 2005; Geurts, 1998).

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<sup>1</sup> Denmark opts out of justice and home affairs, citizenship and defence cooperation; Sweden and Denmark opt out of the euro. Finland is most integrated (Grøn and Wivel, 2017).

## **2.2 European Governance and Policy**

To better understand the policymaking process and the channels of influence for interest groups, this section will gain an overview of key EU institutions and functions, especially within the context of EU social and labour policy today and the background trends of neoliberalism in Europe.

### **2.2.1 EU Institutions and Functions**

The European Commission (EC) is the executive of the EU. It initiates and upholds laws and represents the EU abroad. It has 27 commissioners, one from each state, approved by the European Parliament (EP). The EP must also approve the EC's president (Christiansen, 2019; Egeberg, 2019; Best, 2019).

With the Council of the European Union ('the Council'), the EP can pass, reject or amend (with exceptions) EC-initiated bills, though much of the work is done by various committees (Kohler, 2013). The EP is the only directly elected body of the EU with 207 Members of European Parliament (MEPs). It elects its own President and Vice-President (Burns, 2019; Smismans, 2019; Best, 2019). The Council consists of government ministers from each state with a rotating presidency every 6 months. It also drafts guidelines for member states and assists in foreign policy (Lewis, 2019; Best, 2019).

The European Council comprises of heads of state from each EU member and the Council President and EC President. It can only guide policy, not propose laws. However, they appoint a President, Vice-President and Executive Members of the European Central Bank (ECB) (Lewis, 2019; Verdun, 2019; Best, 2019).

Primary law outlining the general governance makeup and basic policy is enshrined in the Treaty of the European Union. New laws generally use the ordinary legislative procedure

where both the EP and Council can debate, examine and amend EC-proposed legislation. The special legislative procedure is used when amendments cannot be made by the EP or Council (Church and Phinnemore, 2019; Best, 2019).

### **2.2.2 Shifting Governance**

Since the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the EC has had almost all legislative power. Over time, however, the EP has transformed from a discussion forum to equal co-legislator with the Council (Kohler, 2013; Hix and Høyland, 2013).

The EP's consultative role on legislation, established in the Treaty of Rome 1957, was expanded to include financial budgets in the 1970s giving it veto power over nonessential expenditure. Moreover, a European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling in 1979 established a delay power for the EP, which today allows it to have the final word in budgetary procedures (Kohler, 2013). The Single European Act 1987 introduced the 'cooperation procedure' giving the EP a second round of reading for consultation (Hix and Høyland, 2013).

The founding treaty of the EU, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, expanded the legislative powers of the EP greatly through the 'codecision procedure'. Notably, it gained the right to formally request legislation from the EC. It also introduced a conciliation committee if the Council did not agree with EP amendments, generating a 'common position' which would be adopted unless overturned by the EP; effectively giving the EP veto power in the codecision procedure. The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 established this procedure as the new ordinary legislative procedure used for all EU legislation with few exceptions (Kohler, 2013; Hix and Høyland, 2013).

Tripartite meetings, or 'trilogues', are the most recent development in involving the EP, EC and Council. It aims to resolve conflicts that occur under the codecision procedure



through informal meetings, thus giving the EP another opportunity to influence policy (Greenwood and Roederer-Rynning, 2019).

### 2.2.3 Social and Labour Policy amidst Regulatory Liberalisations

Despite a social aspect in the Treaty of Rome 1957, social policy (*'social acquis'*) has been widely neglected in favour of liberal, market solutions addressed only by minimum standards and soft-law approaches (Polomarkakis, 2019; Schiek, 2017).

Social integration entered the agenda in 1974 with the Social Action Programme, though was widely dismissed because of member state unwillingness which continued into the 1980s (Geyer, 2000). Even the Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and the Social Chapter measure in the Maastricht Treaty were given non-binding status due to UK reluctance (Polomarkakis, 2019; Anderson, 2015). Nonetheless, a 'Social Europe' emerged as a counter measure to the free market Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Polomarkakis, 2019).

The Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 pushed for full employment and social rights and protections, with further soft-law policies like the Social Policy Agenda and Charter of Fundamental Rights (which later became binding with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009) in the Treaty of Nice, and the expansion of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC)<sup>2</sup> to include social and labour policy in the Lisbon Strategy (Kountouros, 2003).

The eurozone crisis, austerity measures and the view of the EU as illegitimate, bureaucratised and unaccountable painted the EU as a "neoliberal leviathan" (Polomarkakis, 2019, p190), which emphasised the need for social policy vis-à-vis financial interests.

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<sup>2</sup> A cooperative framework between EU states, with EC as surveyor, to create non-binding employment, social and education legislation (EUR-Lex, 2017).

The European Semester method of policy coordination has been increasingly ‘socialised’ to reflect the desires of member states. Moreover, the European Pillar of Social Rights was launched in 2016 to push for equal opportunities, better working conditions and improved social protections, although unbinding (Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 2018). The Social Fairness Package in 2018 with the European Labour Authority has also ensured increased labour market mobility (Polomarkakis, 2019).

### **2.3 European Interest Representation**

Vital for democracy in Europe is that it produces reflective policy. Interest representation in policymaking is one avenue to achieve this. This section will give an overview of the latest literature in this area in the EU, the Baltics and the Nordics.

A review of the literature spanning multiple policy domains finds that organised labour influences the details, implementation and results of legislation that protects workers almost unilaterally. Morantz (2017) finds that the existing literature supports the role of unions in shaping worker protection laws, especially for occupational safety and health, compliance with and increased promotion of quotas and regulatory aims that improve working conditions and standards of living, as well pushing for increased worker representation in the policymaking process both in private corporations and government (Morantz, 2017). Ahlquist’s (2017) findings corroborate this in surveying the existing literature to suggest that labour unions, both inside of and outside government, assist in reducing wage and income inequalities and decelerating the growth of the top earners in societies, and reducing economic inequalities across nations.

### **2.3.1 Interest Representation in EU Policymaking**

#### **2.3.1.1 Worker Representation vis-à-vis Corporate Lobbying**

Worker representation in EU policymaking is institutionalised through participation in trade unions and professional associations at the supranational level. Although it is not hugely influential when considering corporate interests, its position is strong compared to the rest of the world and indeed most European states individually (Bieler and Schulten, 2008).

The primary channel of influence for workers is through lobbying by seeking to influence or push for relevant policy. The ETUC and ETUFs, for example, are ‘social partners’ meaning they are consulted on all proposed employment and social legislation from the EC (ETUC, 2021; Greenwood, 2007), though, notably, not wage bargaining or organising rights (Larsson, 2015). Welz (2008, p244) acknowledges that this can relegate trade unions to a ‘euro-corporatist’ puzzle piece (Larsson, 2015), but states that the institutionalisation of social dialogue since 1987 means that trade unions have a “semi-legislative” and binding policymaking function. However, some scholars argue that this channel of influence has a limited effect for EU workers (Clauwaert, 2011; Glassner and Pochet, 2011).

The EP’s increasing powers have meant that trade unions have increasingly focused their lobbying efforts towards this avenue of influence (ETUC, 2021; Larsson, 2015). This includes meetings of the trade union intergroup and contacts with left-leaning MEPs (Bieler, 2005; Erne, 2008; Greenwood, 2007).

Inside of and outside the EU, lobbying is said to favour specific interests over pluralistic ones. As a result, policy leans towards increasing the concentration of wealth, and individual firms with specific interests, as Denzau and Munger (1986) argue. The limited resources of legislators mean social and labour organisations do not enjoy the same influence as corporate lobbyists (Olson, 1982; Ibenskas and Bunea, 2020; Hanegraaff and Poletti, 2021).

It is generally agreed that corporate interests in the EU are much stronger than social or labour equivalents. Moreover, MEPs are said to give more recognition to business groups more than trade unions, NGOs or professional organisations (apart from leftist MEPs) (Dølvik & Ødegård, 2012; Polomarkakis, 2019; Coen et al., 2021; Hanegraaff and Poletti, 2021).

Profit seeking, issue polarisation and “agencification” (Hanegraaff and Poletti, 2021, p851) of the EU has led to a virtual dominance of business representation (Dellis and Sondermann, 2017; De Bruycker, 2017; Albareda and Braun, 2019).

### **2.3.2 Interest Representation outside of the EU**

#### **2.3.2.1 Baltic States**

Social dialogue in the Baltics has been described as weak and getting weaker since independence from the USSR. Bargaining coverage, union density, employer organisations and wage agreements are amongst the worst/lowest in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). There has been no decline in trade unionism in the Baltics because its establishment has failed at every attempt (Kalanta, 2019).

There is no tradition of social dialogue in the post-Soviet Baltics (Ost, 2000; Petrylaitė, 2017). After independence each state opted for a market-led economy with rapid liberalisations with the aim, amongst other things, of joining the EU and the euro (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012; Kalanta, 2019; Bieler and Salyga, 2020). It has involved abandoning state interventionism and opening to foreign trade and direct investment (FDI) (Bohle, 2008).

Since independence, unions struggled to find their place in the new market system; membership rates declined, as did trust in labour unions, seen as Soviet carry-overs (Ost, 2009).

Despite increased working conditions generally, it's argued that EU legislation has been improperly applied in the Baltics, especially due to failures of administration and practical enforcement of EU standards stemming from centralised control and weak local government (Jacobsson and West, 2009; Eamets and Masso, 2005; Ost, 2000; Woolfson and Sommers, 2016).

Welfare in the Baltics has been shaped through cooperation between enterprise and government institutions, and wage coordination and bargaining coverage has come because of international competitiveness and employers' organisations (Kalanta, 2019; Hancké, 2013; Traxler, 1998).

#### 2.3.2.2 Nordic States

Trade unionism and interest representation in policy and governance is historically very strong in the Nordics. Interest groups are institutionalised in labour market, agricultural, education, health and industrial policy. This 'Nordic Model'<sup>3</sup> typically involves tripartite agreements between capital, labour and the state (Hilson, 2008; Christiansen et al., 2010; Öberg, 2015; Svensson, 2015; Rothstein, 1992; Blom-Hansen, 2001; Kantola et al., 2018).

However, it is said that corporatism has declined in Denmark and Sweden since the 1980s, but less so in Finland where it has persisted and adapted (Christiansen et al., 2010; Kantola et al., 2018). Social partnerships and industry cooperation, as well as policy consultations, are said to have decreased in Sweden, but increased in Denmark and Norway (Siaroff, 1999; Compston, 1998). In Finland especially, interest representation occurs more

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<sup>3</sup> Or 'Scandinavian corporatism' as many aspects can be found in Norway and Iceland (Christiansen et al., 2010; Óskarsdóttir, 2018).

through informal contacts today than traditional policy preparation processes and consultative committees (Kantola, et al., 2018).

There is wider consensus that business representation has increased to the detriment of trade union representation, although unions do remain powerful in comparison to the rest of the world (Öberg et al., 2013; Magnusson, 2018; Allern et al., 2007, Kantola et al., 2018).

## **2.4 Moving Forward**

While the EP as another important channel of influence for worker representation has become more powerful alongside the EC (of whose influence is, however, limited considering the dominance of corporate interests), EU social and labour legislation has begrudgingly improved over time. With this, it has solidified European integration as being a slow, recurrent process, often irreversible without radical political will. The Nordics have been reluctant in fully integrating with the EU over anxieties concerning supranational overreach, whereas the Baltics have speedily integrated themselves in hopes of gaining various benefits albeit to the detriment of domestic social and labour market policies.

The literature highlights that worker representation activity at the European level is limited in terms of influence but does not spell out its value in swaying popular support for EU integration, especially in member states without a background of labour organising and collective bargaining customs and poorer relative socioeconomic situations. Equally, insights in to why this is the case have been lacking due to the ambiguous nature of EU lobbying, of which have not been helped by the focus primarily on corporate interest representation.

This dissertation uses the most common techniques in public support for EU integration research, including new datasets for a rounded account of the most prominent trade union organisations at the European level. Covering a timespan of over thirteen years, it will provide a valuable addition to existing literature for both EU integration theory and European-level trade union activity.

This section shall cover the research design, statistical analysis methods and limitations (and workarounds or outweighing benefits) of the given approaches.

## 3.1 Research Design

### 3.1.1 Theoretical Framework

To justify my hypothesis and research questions, a theoretical background backing the plausibility and legitimacy of this dissertation must first be established.

Trade unions play a strong part in improving and developing beneficial labour regulations for workforces, and indeed wider society. Such regulatory benefits are typically gained through the representation of workers in policymaking or bargaining negotiations. EU integration theory, especially utilitarian understandings, outline that EU-derived benefits play a determining factor in publics' attitudes towards EU integration. This dissertation thusly follows these two premises to hypothesis that worker representation in EU policymaking acts to develop EU-wide or member-state focused social and labour regulations that benefit the workforce and public to a degree in which the respective state's support for EU integration will be affected, thus displaying a relationship.

To extend this, it is postulated that the degree to which support for EU integration is stronger in this relationship would occur more in the regions that have space for improvement

in labour relations. It is expected that support for EU integration will increase alongside benefits of EU membership. Therefore, EU member states with relatively poor working conditions and standards of living will seek to highly support EU integration to better their domestic circumstances, and as the benefits accumulate and become realised, support will strengthen too. Conversely, for states with pre-existing labour organising traditions and relatively high standards of living, the perceived or actual benefits from EU integration will be less important and minimal, or have no effect. They may even be regressive due to market liberalisations and deregulations, supranational-level limitations over internal labour market policies, etc. from EU membership.

### **3.1.2 Approaches and Data Collection**

This dissertation shall use secondary data for the independent and culminative dependent variable. All data comes directly or indirectly from EU institutions, allowing access to difficult to obtain insider sources. The independent variables cover interest representation in policymaking from trade unions and professional associations in the EC and EP with a combination of three datasets (*see* Table 1 and Table 2). The Council, ECJ, etc. are not focused on. The EC and EP have expansive, readily-available and easily-codifiable datasets allowing for quantitative analyses that are both replicable and easily-comparable for this dissertation and other researchers, and the status of prominent trade unions as ‘social partners’ (direct consultation with the EC) and the increased legislative powers of the EP mean that these institutions are amongst the most crucial for lobbyists, and thus also researchers.



**Table 1:** Interest representation in European Commission

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Timeframe and source</u>
No. lobbying organisations	2008 – 2010 ( <b>Intereuro</b> ); 2016 – mid-2021 ( <b>ECTR</b> )
No. staff by lobbying organisation	2016 – mid-2021 ( <b>ECTR</b> )
Grant funding from EC (€)	2016 – mid-2021 ( <b>ECTR</b> )
No. lobbying meetings with EC members <sup>4</sup>	2016 – mid-2021 ( <b>Integrity Watch (EC)</b> )

**Table 2:** Interest representation in European Parliament

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Timeframe and source</u>
No. EP-accredited lobbyists by organisation	2008 – 2010 ( <b>Intereuro</b> ); 2016 – mid-2021 ( <b>ECTR</b> )
No. lobbying meetings with MEPs ( <i>ETUC and ETUFs only</i> )	Mid-2019 – mid-2021 ( <b>Integrity Watch (EP)</b> )

Drawing inspiration from Hanegraaff and Poletti's recent 2021 study on corporate lobbying in the EU, this dissertation shall combine data from the Intereuro project and the European Commission Transparency Register (ECTR), and Integrity Watch EU. Lobbyist registration to the ECTR was not required until late 2014, meaning data before this time is scarce and unreliable. Since, however, the ECTR has proven to be valuable in comprising a wealth of information about lobbyist organisations, publishing data twice a year (Hanegraaff and Poletti, 2021). The short timeframe is overcome with the addition of the Intereuro project, from 2008 to 2010, which recorded interest organisation activity in the EC of the most prominent lobbyists through direct information from EC staff. Although the mapping approaches are different, they share constant datapoints (*see* Table 1 and Table 2). Results from both were filtered to only include trade union and professional associations operating at the European level. Organisations spanning national, regional *and* European are omitted as this dissertation only wishes to measure lobbyist activity at the European level only.


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<sup>4</sup> Includes commissioners, cabinet members, and directors-general.

Integrity Watch EU (hosted by Transparency International [*see* transparency.org]) includes records of MEP lobbying and EC lobbying meetings. It allows for a near-complete and constantly-updated database of lobbyist activity from senior EU public officials from 2016 onwards, pulling directly from EU institution websites (including the ECTR).

Attempts today to conceptualise EU integration support centre around utilitarian, identity and cue-taking approaches. For this quantitative analysis, cue-taking approaches like party manifestos or news cycle analyses are not appropriate. The former two are codified and available, and shall be used here. The dependent variable draws inspiration from Guinaudeau and Schnatterer's (2017) 'European Mood' indicator using the Eurobarometer biannual surveys on public opinion to create a culminative measure of support for EU integration. For each case this dissertation shall compute an average of the available measures to construct a variable of support for EU integration (*see* Figure 1 and Table 3).

**Figure 1:** Support for European Integration Index



Eurobarometer surveys are used widely in support for EU integration studies (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998; Hobolt and De Vries, 2016; Guinaudeau and Schnatterer, 2017). This dissertation shall focus on a maximum of seven utilitarian and identity measures. Eurobarometer surveys come pre-weighted for different sample sizes to represent respective populations, allowing for comparisons over long time periods and against other EU states. They repeat the same questions (or, at least, ask similar) with every publication, allowing long-term trends to be captured. The data selected ranges from 2008 to mid-2021, and it uses random probability sampling to gain a representative dataset of any one population,

allowing for generalisations to be drawn. Other similar surveys like the European Election Survey or the European Social Survey lack the volume and history of data.

**Table 3:** European Barometer (EB) Support for European Integration Measures

**Utilitarian Measures**

- Membership of EU as good or bad
- Trust in the EU<sup>5</sup>
- Perceived benefit of the EU
- Satisfaction with EU democracy

**Identity Measures**

- Level of attachment to the EU or Europe
- ‘Feeling’ like a citizen of the EU
- Positive or negative image of the EU

Using several indicators of worker interest lobbying activity allows for aspects to be highlighted and singled-out, seeing which is most impactful. The culminative support for EU measure using both utilitarian and identity measures avoids traditional one-dimensional support for EU understandings, which are less demanding as they do not necessitate a desire for *increased* interconnectedness and Europeanisation, only mere EU government regime or institution legitimacy support (Guinaudeau and Schnatterer, 2017).

### 3.1.2.1 Case Study Selection

This dissertation shall focus on all trade union and professional association lobbying activity in the EC and EP from 2008 to mid-2021, with a focused account of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and three prominent European Trade Union Federations (ETUFs) by membership size (Müller and Platzer, 2020): the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU), the European Trade Union Federation for Services and

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<sup>5</sup> Where unavailable, ‘trust in the EC’, ‘trust in the EP’, or an average of both will be used instead.

Communication (UNI-EUROPA) and IndustriAll<sup>6</sup>. The limitation of Intereuro only covering the *most prominent* lobbyist organisations will be addressed by this focused account. The general analyses (not the focused accounts of only the ETUC and selected ETUFs) of all TU/PAs will include the ETUC and selected ETUFs too.

This dissertation will study the relationship between TU/PA representation in the EC and EP and support for EU integration between a region with pre-existing traditions of labour organising and high relatively standards of living and a region with no pre-existing traditions and relatively poorer standards of living. Thus, the Baltic region with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the Nordic region with Sweden, Denmark and Finland were chosen. As with the theoretical framework above, the Baltic region has ‘more to gain, less to lose’ in supporting EU integration to achieve (or because of) increased worker representation at the European level. The Nordics have ‘less to gain, more to lose’, so to say, in contrast with their pre-existing history of organised labour, representative policy and collective action. This allows for the Nordic cases to act as a control. While the chosen statistical analyses cannot infer any causality, the comparison between the two regions allows for connections to be captured.

### 3.1.3 Method of Analysis

Using all available datapoints from 2008 to mid-2021 collectively, this dissertation shall follow the robust techniques backed by Gabel (1998) in running a multiple regression analysis to find which measure of TU/PA interest representation in the EU correlates most strongly to support for EU integration *and* to provide an overall model to find a best fitting relationship between the independent and dependent variables; this dissertation aims see which

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<sup>6</sup> In 2012, the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF), the European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers’ Federation (EMCEF) and the European Trade Union Federation: Textiles, Clothing, Leather (ETUF:TCL) merged into IndustriAll (Müller and Platzer, 2020).

‘predictor’ has the greatest influence on the outcome (Field, 2018, p373). The very same shall be performed with a focus on only the ETUC and prominent ETUFs (with the inclusion of an additional measures, *see* Table 2). These statistical analyses will run measures of interest representation in the EU against support for EU integration in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, respectively.

Analysis will be done using IBM SPSS. In cases where data is missing it shall be treated as null and not affect the results. Microsoft Excel shall be used for some data synthesising and preparation, but not analysis (*see* Section 8). If model correlations are found within strong confidence intervals (95%, addressing p-values,  $p < 0.05$  (Field, 2018, p90)) this dissertation will be able to reject the null-hypothesis where applicable, highlight the greatest predictor, provide a comparison between the Baltic and Nordic region and constituent states too and understand the significance of the ETUC/ETUFs. This dissertation shall report the adjusted  $R^2$  value<sup>7</sup> to determine the overall fit of the model in explaining support for EU integration from TU/PA lobbying activity in the EC and EP (between 0 and 1, where 1 represents a model that explains all variation in the findings and 0 explains none) and the standardised coefficients beta values<sup>8</sup> to determine the greatest effect of any predictor. Where correlation diagrams are used to demonstrate the strongest relationships in any one regression model, Pearson’s  $r$  value will be reported (between -1 and 1) (Field, 2018, p338).

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<sup>7</sup> Adjusted R squared is required in opposition to R squared as the former increases where an independent variable improves the predictability of a model, but the latter increases with volume of variables regardless of their potentially improved predictability (Field, 2018, p350, p389-390).

<sup>8</sup> Standardised coefficients report the standard deviations and are required for comparison between multiple independent variables that do not use the same measurement scales (Field, 2018, p371-375).


### 3.2 Limitations

One limitation of multiple regression research and correlation analysis is the directionality problem; it does not suggest which variable comes before the other. This dissertation, thusly, cannot establish concrete conclusions of causation. Equally, this analysis does not account for differences in domestic worker representation on support for EU integration. Its scope is concerned only with European-level worker representation as a higher authority over EU member states that act to address national-level shortfalls in domestic worker representation on a supranational level.

Additionally, neither the ECTR nor the Intereuro project categorise worker organisations as just ‘trade unions’, but ‘trade unions and professional associations’. However, such lobbyist organisations align with the research aims of this dissertation as they typically operate for the interest of their members in a fashion similar to trade unions with their expenditure often going towards the public’s benefit (EC, n.d.). This once again highlights a disadvantage of using secondary data, as follow up questions cannot be asked, synthesis of multiple sources can be difficult or incomplete and control of collection methods is relinquished to other parties. Once again, however, without this large scale of data and insider-access, although with admitted sacrifices, this analysis would not be possible.

The first action this dissertation completed was constructing a culminative measure, presented as an average total percentage (higher percentage = more support), of support for EU integration from various recoded support/against EB measures biannually from 2008 to mid-2021. This acted as the dependent variable for all statistical analyses. It shows only the percentage of *support* for EU integration in the selected EU member states; it does not record *neutral* or *oppositional* responses. Not every EB survey is the same and some publications have missing datapoints, but an average percentage could still be generated with never less than three indicators at any stage. Estonia was the only case to show an overall decrease in support for EU integration from 62.50% in 2008 to 60.60% in 2021 with a peak of 68.74% in 2020, yet recovered from a low of 43% during 2011. Latvia demonstrated the largest increase of all cases with a 20.80pp increase from 38% in 2008 to 58.80% in 2021. Lithuania (62% to 65.60%), Sweden (48.25% to 51.60%), Denmark (62.25% to 63.20%) and Finland (45.25% to 50.80%) all showed increases in support also (*see* Figure 2 and Figure 3).


**Figure 2:** Support for European Integration in Nordics from 2008 to mid-2021



This culminative measure is less reactive and more unvarying than any one measure of support for EU integration. It increases/decreases only fractionally compared to the predictors

that make it up. For example, there are large decreases in feelings of attachment towards the EU in all cases except Latvia and a consistent increase in perception of EU membership as both good and beneficial across the board, yet the overall measure of support for EU integration remains relatively subdued in comparison (*see* Section 8, Table 31).


**Figure 3:** Support for European Integration in Baltics from 2008 to mid-2021



The independent variables were recorded from the ECTR, Intereuro and Integrity Watch. They included total measurements of all trade union and professional association lobbyist organisations in the EP and EC as well as collective measurements of the ETUC and prominent ETUFs.




**Figure 4:** Staff in Trade Union and Professional Associations and ETUC and Selected ETUFs from 2016 to mid-2021



As the number of TU/PA lobbying organisations increased (from 78 in 2008-2010 to 164 in mid-2021 (*see* Section 8, Table 30)) so too did the staff numbers and funding from grants for these organisations (from 404 and €9.7m in 2016 to 699 and €15.9m in mid-2021 (*see* Figure 4 and Figure 5)).


**Figure 5:** Funding for Trade Union and Professional Associations and ETUC and Selected ETUFs from 2016 to mid-2021




However, the growth has not been the same in the case of the ETUC and selected ETUFs, with a decrease in funding from €5.9m in 2016 to €4.3m in mid-2021 and a mere staffing increase of 15 people compared to all TU/PAs with an additional 295 people over the same timeframe (*see* Figure 4 and Figure 5).

Following the theoretical framework laid out in the methodology chapter, this dissertation had a secondary aim to explore the increasing empowerment of the European Parliament compared to the European Commission and thus the increasing importance of this channel for policy influence for lobbyists. As with the measures detailed above, the number of EP-accredited lobbyists increased from 71 in 2016 for all European-level trade union and professional association to 172 in mid-2020. In just a span of one year, however, it decreased to its lowest point recorded at just 59 EP-accredited lobbyists in mid-2021. A similar trend occurred for the ETUC and selected prominent ETUFs: from 14 in 2016 to a peak of 35 in 2019, then a decline to 5 at the midpoint of 2021 (*see* Figure 6). Meanwhile, the number of lobbying meetings with EC members for the ETUC and selected ETUFs has varied from 2015 to 2019, but all cases increased in either mid-2019 or 2020 (the ETUC and EPSU, however, both decreased in 2020 to 25 and 4, respectively, but not to level lower than the beginning of the records in 2015 at 16 and 3, respectively) (*see* Figure 7).

**Figure 6:** Trade Union and Professional Association and ETUC and Selected ETUFs European Parliament Accredited Lobbyists from 2016 to mid-2021



**Figure 7:** ETUC and Selected ETUFs Lobbying Meetings with EC Members from 2015 to 2021



A multiple linear regression analysis through generating a model of combined independent predictor variables was used to test the hypotheses that European-level trade union and professional association interest representation in lobbying in EP and EC policymaking would be related to popular support for EU integration, as well as to determine the strongest factor in predicting any change. Equally, it allowed for comparisons to be made between the

models to determine whether the strongest effect was in the Baltics or the Nordics (where theory suggests the Baltics would be more susceptible), and whether the most prominent trade union organisations outperformed all collective trade unions and professional associations in predicting popular support for EU integration. By measuring the adjusted  $R^2$  value this dissertation can state what percentage variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables in any given model of support for EU integration.

The linear regression models were found to have a negative relationship for the measures of trade union and professional association interest representation in the EP and EC with popular support for EU integration in Estonia (*adj.  $R^2$  = -.079,  $p$  = .56*), Lithuania (*adj.  $R^2$  = -.044,  $p$  = .52*) and Finland (*adj.  $R^2$  = -.363,  $p$  = .89*) (see Table 4, see Section 8 for full data). All of which, however, have insignificant  $p$ -values ( $p > 0.05$ ), thus not allowing for either the rejection of the null-hypothesis that there would be a stronger predictor model in the Baltics compared to the Nordics (nor, in fact, the reversal occurrence), nor any contradictions to the hypothesis that trade union and professional association interest representation in EP and EC policymaking have an effect on popular support for EU integration in the respective states.

**Table 4:** Model for Support for EU Integration\*\*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
Estonia	.560	.313	-.079	.0630491	.313	.798	4	7	.563
Latvia	.951	.904	.849	.0371087	.904	16.483	4	7	.001
Lithuania	.580	.336	-.044	.0736825	.336	.885	4	7	.519
Sweden	.732	.535	.270	.0482407	.535	2.016	4	7	.197
Denmark	.683	.467	.162	.0466616	.467	1.533	4	7	.291
Finland	.364	.133	-.363	.0659633	.133	.268	4	7	.890

\*\* Predictors: (constant), total TU/PA organisations, total TU/PA funding, total TU/PA staff, total TU/PA EP-accredited lobbyists

There are positive relationships for Denmark (*adj.  $R^2$  = .162,  $p$  = .29*), Sweden (*adj.  $R^2$  = .270,  $p$  = .20*) and Latvia (*adj.  $R^2$  = .849,  $p$  = .001*). However, Latvia is the only significant finding ( $p < .05$ ). This dissertation cannot reject the null-hypothesis that across-the-board TU/PA representation has no relationship with support for EU integration because there is a


significant finding in Latvia that outlines that 84.9% of the variance in popular support for EU integration is explained by the independent variables, predominantly the number of TU/PA organisations ( $\beta = 1.226$ ,  $p = .001$ ); for every 1 unit of change in the number of TU/PA organisations there is a change of 0.5% ( $B = .005$ ,  $p = .001$ ) for support for EU integration in Latvia. Equally, 77% ( $R^2 = .771$ ,  $p < .001$ ) of variance in support for EU integration in Latvia is explained by this single independent variable (*see* Table 4, Table 5 and Figure 8).

**Table 5:** Coefficients in Support for EU Integration in Latvia\*

Predictors	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(constant)	.249	.101		2.468	.043
TU/PA organisations	.005	.001	1.226	5.799	.001
TU/PA staff	.000	.000	-.271	-1.283	.240
TU/PA funding	-1.532E-8	.000	-.335	-1.828	.110
TU/PA EP-accredited lobbyists	.000	.000	-.080	-.466	.656

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Latvia

**Figure 8:** Support for European Integration in Latvia by Trade Union and Professional Association Lobbying Organisations in the European Commission and the European Parliament



Firstly, despite the planned inclusion of the independent variable of lobbying meetings with MEPs for the ETUC and selected ETUFs models, it was discovered that there were not enough datapoints available and a model was unable to be generated. Once omitted, however, models of multiple linear regression could accurately be calculated.

To determine whether the most prominent trade union organisations outperformed all collective trade unions and professional associations in effecting support for EU integration a linear regression model was also used. All cases report positive relationships (Estonia:  $adj. R^2 = .269$ ,  $p = .226$ ; Latvia:  $adj. R^2 = .613$ ,  $p = .04$ ; Lithuania:  $adj. R^2 = .360$ ,  $p = .55$ ; Sweden:  $adj. R^2 = .380$ ,  $p = .15$ ; Denmark:  $adj. R^2 = .363$ ,  $p = .16$ ), except for Finland ( $adj. R^2 = -.002$ ,  $p = .48$ ), but none were significant ( $p > .05$ ) except Latvia ( $p = .041$ ) (see Table 6). Thusly, no comparison can be made with insignificant findings between the most prominent trade union organisations and the collective trade unions and professional associations on support for EU integration except in the case of, again, Latvia, where the model for only the ETUC and selected ETUFs shows that 61.3% of the variance in popular support for EU integration is explained by its independent variables compared to the 84.9% when considering all TU/PA organisations.

**Table 6:** Model for Support for EU Integration (ETUC and Selected ETUFs)\*\*


Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
Estonia	.749	.561	.269	.0518841	.561	1.920	4	6	.226
Latvia	.876	.768	.613	.0594410	.768	4.960	4	6	.041
Lithuania	.600	.600	.360	-.066	.0744787	.360	4	6	.545
Sweden	.792	.628	.380	.0444535	.628	2.532	4	6	.149
Denmark	.786	.618	.363	.0406873	.618	2.425	4	6	.159
Finland	.632	.399	-.002	.0565495	.399	.996	4	6	.477

\*\* Predictors: (constant), ETUC and selected ETUFs staff, ETUC and selected ETUFs funding, ETUC and selected ETUFs EP-accredited lobbyists, ETUC and selected ETUFs EC meetings

The only indicator in any ETUC/ETUFs linear regression model with any significance ( $p < 0.05$ ) was the number of EP-accredited lobbyists predictor in Sweden. It showed that for

every 1 unit of change in the number of ETUC/ETUFs lobbyists there is a change of 0.4% ( $B = .004, p = .048$ ) for support for EU integration in Sweden with a somewhat strong correlation indicating that 56% of variance in support for EU integration in Sweden is explained by this lone independent variable ( $R^2 = .557, p = .005$ ) (see Figure 9 and Section 8, Table 21).

**Figure 9:** Support for European Integration in Sweden by ETUC and Selected ETUFs European Parliament Accredited Lobbyists



This section shall interpret the results found and displayed above and detail their significance as related to the literature review and theoretical framework outlined earlier in this dissertation. Equally, this dissertation aims to give suggestions to both future researchers and legislators in how to best improve support for EU integration in both the Baltics and the Nordics, respectively. It finds that the null-hypothesis can be rejected and thus support the notion that TU/PA lobbying activity is related to support for EU integration in the Baltics more-so than in the Nordics, but only in one state. Equally, it discusses the findings of the focused account of the ETUC and selected ETUFs and its unexpected weak or lack of a relationship in swaying support for EU integration through influencing social and labour policy.

The expected result for this dissertation was that European-level trade union and professional association lobbying activity would be related to popular support for EU integration to a higher degree in the Baltics than in the Nordics. The multiple linear regression models support the claim that this relationship would be negligible in the Nordic region due to the relatively protective nature of domestic industrial relations and the lesser requirement for superior aid or intervention to improve working conditions, empower workers, etc. due to the previous pre-existing practices of collective bargaining and labour organising generating such benefits beforehand. Notable, however, is that no significant *regressive* trends were found, only a lack of relationships and no significance overall. The unrelated nature of support for EU integration in the Nordics and European-level trade union and professional association lobbying activity supports the understanding of the Nordics as “reluctant and self-serving” (Grøn and Wivel, 2017, p269; Miljan, 1977; Wallace, 1999) and having resistant domestic industrial relations to supranational legislation or aid in both the early stage and late stage of Nordic EU membership (Dølvik, 1995; Andersen, et al., 2014).



One caveat in the Nordic case is the borderline significant finding of a positive correlation between support for EU integration in Sweden and the number of ETUC/ETUF EP-accredited lobbyists. This overall model it constitutes showed no significant relationships, but this independent variable's effect alone was unexpected. However, considering the country's protective nature over social and labour policy (Grøn and Wivel, 2017), and the EP's increased powers (Hix and Høyland, 2013), these findings may be better suited to explain the EU's legitimacy/democratic deficit within the Nordic states (Archer, 2007; Leruth, 2017; Sorace, 2017) and not the obstacle (or lack thereof) of poor working conditions, worker empowerment, etc. Given this strengthened theory of the unrelated nature of EU TU/PA lobbying activity and support for EU integration in the Nordics, future research and legislators should focus on other utilitarian aspects, or identity or cue-taking approaches, to better explain or improve support for EU integration in Sweden, Denmark and Finland.

It was expected that European-level TU/PA lobbyist activity would positively influence support for EU integration in countries where aspects such as social mobility, labour empowerment, working conditions, etc. were relatively poorer, such as the Baltics. However, the insignificant results and lack of relationships from the linear regression models in Lithuania and Estonia were unexpected. In a similar vein to the Nordic cases, there were no notable effects of European-level TU/PA lobbyist activity on support for EU integration. While it may be the case that Estonia and Lithuania aimed for EU membership because of the supposed welfare benefits (Kerikmäe et al., 2018), it cannot be ruled that such benefits resulted from European-level TU/PA lobbyist activity in the EU in a way that would affect support for further EU integration. The trends here suggest that most of the Baltic region's developments towards rapid liberalisations and market-led economies [and general opposition to any interventionist social/labour policy (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012; Kalanta, 2019; Bohle, 2008; Jacobsson and West, 2009) and a lack of trust in labour unions (Ost, 2009)] have assisted in generating a

hesitancy or resistance towards European labour market legislation and/or stimulated support for EU integration, thus suggesting indifference to trends in European-level trade union and professional association lobbying activity in policymaking. The Estonian and Lithuanian cases support Aidukaite and Hort's (2019) findings in highlighting the stagnation of the 'Baltic miracle' (supposed recovery from the 2008 financial crisis) and the failure in bringing about social protections, similarly supporting the argument that, despite EU ascension, the region still suffers regarding income inequalities, poverty and social spending compared to the rest of the CEEC, perhaps in part due to the region's resistance towards the socialisation of the economy (Jacobsson and West, 2009). Moreover, it emphasises the heterogeneity of development in the Baltic region. Further contributions focusing on the differing experiences and recovery paths from the 2008 financial crisis in the Baltics in relation to their respective dispositions towards European social and labour policy would be vital for researchers in the region, trade unionists and EU legislators alike.

The most significant finding from this thesis is the highly explanatory relationship and correlation found in Latvia. The linear regression model shows a strong relation between European TU/PA lobbying activity with variance in support for EU integration. The hypothesis of this dissertation was that this relationship would occur to a higher degree in the Baltics than the Nordics. The Baltics, unlike the Nordics, do not have a background of collective bargaining or labour organising (post-Soviet), and thus it was expected that increases in support for EU integration as a result of TU/PA lobbying efforts would result. Although this dissertation cannot reject the null-hypothesis to argue that this trends occurs to a greater degree in *all* Baltic states than in Nordic states, there is a significant finding in one instance to indicate that it can be rejected on the basis that if one were to search for an EU member state in the Nordics and Baltics in which this relationship did occur, they would find the most significant finding to

have occurred inside of the Baltic region with, simultaneously, no relationship in the Nordic EU region.

While Estonia is consistently highlighted as the most developed Baltic nation, Latvia is often labelled as the least. Its poorer relative socioeconomic status compared to Lithuania, Estonia and the Nordics, would suggest that the results found in this dissertation were expected. The strong relationship reflects the theoretical framework in suggesting that, as is likely, the EU state (or state within a region) with the ‘most to gain, least to lose’ would be best situated out of all cases considered to benefit from improved policy from European TU/PA lobbying activity. This emphasises the need for increased study into the heterogeneity of the Baltic region, and the limited scope it also suggests for EU social and labour policy on support for EU integration which seemingly plateaus in states once the most egregious socioeconomic conditions are addressed. These findings align with Polomarkakis’s (2019) suggesting that the EU’s soft social and labour policies have limited real-world impacts.

Correlation analysis uncovered that the greatest predictor for EU integration support in Latvia was the number of TU/PA organisations in EU lobbying. This contrasts the lobbying literature which suggests that diffuse interests fare worse in influencing policy than collective ones due to legislators’ limited resources (Larsson, 2015). However, it may suggest that increases in numbers of lobbying organisations do not necessarily mean an increased plurality of interests. Pivotal for trade unionists wishing to influence EU policy would be research into the effects of increased policy interests compared to increased TU/PA organisations on gaining improved social and labour policy, and thus, in theory, popular support for EU integration.

Equally, the duality of experiences in trade unionism and labour representation in policymaking with differing attitudes to European integration align with the findings of Adamczyk (2018). It highlights the similar optimism of CEEC in joining the EU to improve

industrial relations, yet relative failures in counteracting negative trends of open market policies, and the resistance found in Nordic states who are anxious over reversing domestic trends of collective bargaining (Adamczyk, 2018).

To gain an improved understanding of the strength of the most prominent trade unions at the European level, this dissertation conducted the same regression analysis to explain variations in support for EU integration in the Nordics and Baltics considering only ETUC and prominent ETUF lobbying activity. All models showed no significant relationship, except, again, Latvia's. It was less explanatory than the same model with using *all* European-level TU/PA lobbying organisations, however. It was expected that the ETUFs, and ETUC especially, would be more influential in achieving support for EU integration through improved social and labour policy considering their position as a European 'social partner' and superior status in the EU (ETUC, 2021; Greenwood, 2007). The findings here suggest that, in fact, the volume of TU/PA lobbying organisations may be more vital than fewer, yet supposedly stronger groups in terms of influencing legislation and gaining support for EU integration. Additionally, it suggests a parallel with the above argument that counteracts the theory that, supposedly, plural interests (or a plurality of organisations) are weaker comparatively to specific lobbying interests. Given the findings here, and the fact that corporate interests reign supreme in European lobbying (Dølvik & Ødegård, 2012; Polomarkakis, 2019; Coen et al., 2021; Hanegraaff and Poletti, 2021), these findings may be explainable in terms relating to the limited nature of resources of EU legislators. It could be suggested that the best way to compete for the limited resources of legislators is to 'cast a wider net', so to speak. The results here assist in creating new research opportunities concerning how best for trade union lobbyists to address their limited influence on European policy, especially in comparison to the domination of corporate interests.

This dissertation successfully addressed the research question to see whether European-level trade union and professional association lobbying activity in the EP and EC influenced popular support for EU integration in the Baltics more than in the Nordics. It can conclude that there is a relationship between these two variables in the Baltic region and not the Nordic EU region. However, it did not happen universally across the Baltic region, only in Latvia. This finding speaks to the differences in development in the Baltic region, especially considering each state's various recovery paths from the 2008 financial crisis. Simultaneously, the findings may better suited to add to future research concerning the EU's apparent limited powers and legislation in addressing social and labour issues in member states to a degree where it plateaus in influencing support for further integration, especially in regions that show antipathy towards socialisations of the economy (Jacobsson and West, 2009). Where this relationship does occur, however, it was the overall number of TU/PA organisations that had the strongest relationship with popular support for EU integration. Moreover, it was found that the ETUC and the most prominent ETUFs were less influential than all European trade union and professional association lobbying organisations in swaying support for EU integration. These findings could be crucial in assisting future research as to the effectiveness of an increased plurality of European lobbying organisations pushing for social and labour policy operating in opposition against the ruling and more powerful business interests. Finally, there was some evidence to suggest that the Nordic region, particularly Sweden, may be more influenced in popular support for EU integration in relation to the EU addressing legitimacy issues and not social and labour policy issues. Future research for the Nordic region would likely benefit from studying support for EU integration in the context of other utilitarian or identity approaches.

## Conclusion

6

This dissertation aimed to answer the primary question of whether worker representation in the EU in the form of institutionalised trade union and professional association interest representation through lobbying in the European Parliament and European Commission was related to popular support for EU integration in the Baltics more than in the Nordics. This dissertation can successfully say that it found a relationship between these two variables in the Baltic region, and none, as expected, in the Nordic region. Specifically, it was found that the most explanatory relationship came with the number of trade union and professional associations in lobbying, which influenced the variations on popular support for EU integration most significantly. Therefore, it can be taken away from this dissertation that there is a relationship between trade union and professional association lobbying activity in the EU and popular support for EU integration in states where there is ‘room for improvement’ in the domestic labour market in terms of not only improving the socioeconomic conditions of the citizens that live in that state/region but also the labour market relations backgrounds in terms of aspects such as collective action, labour organising, worker empowerment, etc. Moreover, it found that the most prominent trade union lobbyists were less influential than all trade union lobbyists collectively at the European level in terms of influencing support for EU integration in states where it applied.

It was expected that the results would apply unanimously across the Baltic region, however. It was found that the only relationship occurred in Latvia. With later reference to previous studies done on the Baltic region, this allowed for the findings to be revised and the overall understanding reconsidered to, in fact, paint the results as unsurprising considering the variations in socioeconomic development in the Baltic region, where Latvia is often highlighted as the state in need of the most development, as well as the limited scope of EU

social and labour policy, particularly in regions with a blemished view of labour market policies.

The multiple linear regression models used and subsequent correlation analyses for expanding upon relationships found provided a multi-layered snapshot of trade union and professional association lobbying activity for every series of time captured from 2008 to mid-2021. However, it was unexpected that the independent variable concerning the number of lobbying meetings with MEPs for the ETUC and selected ETUFs would be unsuitable for the linear regression models due to too few datapoints, but it proved more helpful once removing it regardless. The calculations would not have been possible otherwise. Moreover, the culminative dependent variable for support for EU integration allowed for a rounded understanding of support for EU integration that captured not just utilitarian understandings of why states favour increased Europeanisation, but also identity factors.

This dissertation opened up questions about legitimacy concerns in the Nordics, heterogeneity in the Baltics (especially related to diverging recovery paths from recession), how best workers can influence policy in the EU and whether a plurality of interests and/or groups is best suited to combat the dominance of corporate lobbying, and the limited nature of EU social and labour policy.

The research here has helped to push the understandings of support for EU integration as it relates to worker representation in the EU, and the related EU social and labour legislation, in regions that look to the EU for support and development to a greater degree than regions that do not, both in terms of varying backgrounds of labour organising practices and domestic socioeconomic conditions, namely the Nordics and Baltics. Equally, this dissertation can assist in guiding future research as EU lobbying data becomes increasingly transparent and available,

specifically for the study of worker movements to influence policy in a business-oriented arena.



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7

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# Appendices

8

**Table 7: Model for Support for EU Integration in Estonia\***

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
				R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
.560**	.313	-.079	.0630491	.313	.798	4	7	.563

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Estonia

\*\* Predictors: (constant), total TU/PA organisations, total TU/PA funding, total TU/PA staff, total TU/PA EP-accredited lobbyists

**Table 8: Coefficients in Support for EU Integration in Estonia\***

Predictors	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(constant)	.307	.172		1.791	.116
TU/PA organisations	-.001	.001	-.395	-.698	.508
TU/PA staff	.000	.000	.641	1.136	.293
TU/PA funding	4.116E-9	.000	.142	.289	.781
TU/PA EP-accredited lobbyists	.001	.001	.427	.923	.386

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Estonia

**Table 9: Model for Support for EU Integration in Estonia (ETUC and Selected ETUFs)\***

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
				R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
.749**	.561	.269	.0518841	.561	1.920	4	6	.226

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Estonia

\*\* Predictors: (constant), ETUC and selected ETUFs staff, ETUC and selected ETUFs funding, ETUC and selected ETUFs EP-accredited lobbyists, ETUC and selected ETUFs EC meetings

**Table 10: Coefficients in Support for EU Integration in Estonia (ETUC and Selected ETUFs)\***

Predictors	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(constant)	.793	.433		1.830	.117
ETUC/ETUFs staff	.003	.005	.230	.640	.546
ETUC/ETUFs funding	-6.619E-8	.000	-.720	-1.659	.148
ETUC/ETUFs EP-accredited lobbyists	.001	.002	.156	.533	.613
ETUC/ETUFs EC meetings	-.002	.002	-.416	-1.146	.295

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Estonia



**Table 11: Model for Support for EU Integration in Latvia\***

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
				R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
.951**	.904	.849	.0371087	.904	16.483	4	7	.001

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Latvia

\*\* Predictors: (constant), total TU/PA organisations, total TU/PA funding, total TU/PA staff, total TU/PA EP-accredited lobbyists

**Table 5: Coefficients in Support for EU Integration in Latvia\***

Predictors	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(constant)	.249	.101		2.468	.043
TU/PA organisations	.005	.001	1.226	5.799	.001
TU/PA staff	.000	.000	-.271	-1.283	.240
TU/PA funding	-1.532E-8	.000	-.335	-1.828	.110
TU/PA EP-accredited lobbyists	.000	.000	-.080	-.466	.656

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Latvia

**Table 12: Model for Support for EU Integration in Latvia (ETUC and Selected ETUFs)\***

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
				R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
.876**	.768	.613	.0594410	.768	4.960	4	6	.041

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Latvia

\*\* Predictors: (constant), ETUC and selected ETUFs staff, ETUC and selected ETUFs funding, ETUC and selected ETUFs EP-accredited lobbyists, ETUC and selected ETUFs EC meetings

**Table 13: Coefficients in Support for EU Integration in Latvia (ETUC and Selected ETUFs)\***

Predictors	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(constant)	.693	.496		1.395	.212
ETUC/ETUFs staff	.004	.005	.218	.834	.436
ETUC/ETUFs funding	-9.697E-8	.000	-.669	-2.122	.078
ETUC/ETUFs EP-accredited lobbyists	.003	.002	.315	1.480	.189
ETUC/ETUFs EC meetings	.000	.002	.014	.054	.959

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Latvia

**Table 14: Model for Support for EU Integration in Lithuania\***

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
				R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
.580**	.336	-.044	.0736825	.336	.885	4	7	.519

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Lithuania

\*\* Predictors: (constant), total TU/PA organisations, total TU/PA funding, total TU/PA staff, total TU/PA EP-accredited lobbyists

**Table 15: Coefficients in Support for EU Integration in Lithuania\***

Predictors	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(constant)	.529	.201		2.621	.034
TU/PA organisations	.003	.002	.881	1.584	.157
TU/PA staff	.000	.000	-.290	-.523	.617
TU/PA funding	-5.922E-9	.000	-.172	-.356	.732
TU/PA EP-accredited lobbyists	.000	.001	-.224	-.494	.636

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Lithuania

**Table 16: Model for Support for EU Integration in Lithuania (ETUC and Selected ETUFs)\***

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
				R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
.600**	.600	.360	-.066	.0744787	.360	4	6	.545

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Lithuania

\*\* Predictors: (constant), ETUC and selected ETUFs staff, ETUC and selected ETUFs funding, ETUC and selected ETUFs EP-accredited lobbyists, ETUC and selected ETUFs EC meetings

**Table 17: Coefficients in Support for EU Integration in Lithuania (ETUC and Selected ETUFs)\***

Predictors	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(constant)	.947	.622		1.522	.179
ETUC/ETUFs staff	.002	.007	.127	.293	.779
ETUC/ETUFs funding	-7.357E-8	.000	-.673	-1.285	.246
ETUC/ETUFs EP-accredited lobbyists	.000	.003	-.017	-.048	.963
ETUC/ETUFs EC meetings	-.003	.003	-.426	-.973	.368

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Lithuania

**Table 18: Model for Support for EU Integration in Sweden\***

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
				R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
.732**	.535	.270	.0482407	.535	2.016	4	7	.197

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Sweden

\*\* Predictors: (constant), total TU/PA organisations, total TU/PA funding, total TU/PA staff, total TU/PA EP-accredited lobbyists

**Table 19: Coefficients in Support for EU Integration in Sweden\***

Predictors	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(constant)	.398	.131		3.032	0.19
TU/PA organisations	.001	.001	.326	.701	.506
TU/PA staff	.000	.000	-.340	-.731	.488
TU/PA funding	4.040E-9	.000	.150	.371	.722
TU/PA EP-accredited lobbyists	.001	.001	.718	1.890	.101

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Sweden

**Table 20: Model for Support for EU Integration in Sweden (ETUC and Selected ETUFs)\***

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
				R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
.792**	.628	.380	.0444535	.628	2.532	4	6	.149

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Sweden

\*\* Predictors: (constant), ETUC and selected ETUFs staff, ETUC and selected ETUFs funding, ETUC and selected ETUFs EP-accredited lobbyists, ETUC and selected ETUFs EC meetings

**Table 21: Coefficients in Support for EU Integration in Sweden (ETUC and Selected ETUFs)\***

Predictors	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(constant)	.447	.371		1.205	.274
ETUC/ETUFs staff	.002	.004	.153	.463	.660
ETUC/ETUFs funding	-1.329E-8	.000	-.155	-.389	.711
ETUC/ETUFs EP-accredited lobbyists	.004	.002	.665	2.473	.048
ETUC/ETUFs EC meetings	-.002	.002	-.276	-.827	.440

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Sweden

**Table 22:** Model for Support for EU Integration in Denmark\*

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
				R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
.683**	.467	.162	.0466616	.467	1.533	4	7	.291

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Denmark

\*\* Predictors: (constant), total TU/PA organisations, total TU/PA funding, total TU/PA staff, total TU/PA EP-accredited lobbyists

**Table 23:** Coefficients in Support for EU Integration in Denmark\*

Predictors	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(constant)	.330	.127		2.599	.035
TU/PA organisations	.000	.001	-.200	-.402	.700
TU/PA staff	9.001E-5	.000	.150	.302	.772
TU/PA funding	1.313E-8	.000	.538	1.246	.253
TU/PA EP-accredited lobbyists	.001	.001	.845	2.077	.076

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Denmark

**Table 24:** Model for Support for EU Integration in Denmark (ETUC and Selected ETUFs)\*

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
				R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
.786**	.618	.363	.0406873	.618	2.425	4	6	.159

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Denmark

\*\* Predictors: (constant), ETUC and selected ETUFs staff, ETUC and selected ETUFs funding, ETUC and selected ETUFs EP-accredited lobbyists, ETUC and selected ETUFs EC meetings

**Table 25:** Coefficients in Support for EU Integration in Denmark (ETUC and Selected ETUFs)\*

Predictors	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(constant)	.805	.340		2.368	.056
ETUC/ETUFs staff	.001	.004	.133	.398	.705
ETUC/ETUFs funding	-5.345E-8	.000	-.692	-1.709	.138
ETUC/ETUFs EP-accredited lobbyists	.002	.001	.420	1.541	.174
ETUC/ETUFs EC meetings	-.002	.002	-.466	-1.377	.218

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Denmark

**Table 26:** Model for Support for EU Integration in Finland\*

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
				R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
.364**	.133	-.363	.0659633	.133	.268	4	7	.890

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Finland

\*\* Predictors: (constant), total TU/PA organisations, total TU/PA funding, total TU/PA staff, total TU/PA EP-accredited lobbyists

**Table 27:** Coefficients in Support for EU Integration in Finland \*

Predictors	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(constant)	.474	.180		2.640	.033
TU/PA organisations	.000	.001	-.106	-.167	.872
TU/PA staff	-7.213E-5	.000	-.108	-.171	.869
TU/PA funding	3.946E-9	.000	.146	.265	.799
TU/PA EP-accredited lobbyists	.001	.001	.455	.877	.410

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Finland

**Table 28:** Model for Support for EU Integration in Finland (ETUC and Selected ETUFs)\*

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
				R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
.632**	.399	-.002	.0565495	.399	.996	4	6	.477

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Finland

\*\* Predictors: (constant), ETUC and selected ETUFs staff, ETUC and selected ETUFs funding, ETUC and selected ETUFs EP-accredited lobbyists, ETUC and selected ETUFs EC meetings

**Table 29:** Coefficients in Support for EU Integration in Finland (ETUC and Selected ETUFs)\*

Predictors	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(constant)	-.052	.472		-.109	.916
ETUC/ETUFs staff	.006	.005	.529	1.259	.255
ETUC/ETUFs funding	4.204E-8	.000	.491	.967	.371
ETUC/ETUFs EP-accredited lobbyists	.001	.002	.143	.419	.690
ETUC/ETUFs EC meetings	-.001	.002	-.182	-.428	.683

\* Dependent variable: support for EU integration in Finland

**Table 30: ECTR, Intereuro and Integrity Watch raw data on trade union and professional association lobbying activity in the EC and EP (2008 to mid-2021)**

YEAR	Jan-08	Jul-08	Jan-09	Jul-09	Jan-10	Jul-10	Jan-11	Jul-11	Jan-12	Jul-12	Jan-13	Jul-13	Jan-14	Jul-14	Jan-15	Jul-15	Jan-16	Jul-16	Jan-17	Jul-17	Jan-18	Jul-18	Jan-19	Jul-19	Jan-20	Jul-20	Jan-21	Jul-21
EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONS AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS: TOTAL ORGANISATIONS						78											91	108	129	135	129	140	146	140	146	150	158	164
EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONS AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS: COLLECTIVE STAFF NUMBERS																	404	573	651	516	513	580	557	596	619	663	691	699
EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONS AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS: COLLECTIVE EP- ACCREDITED MEMBERS						62											71	97	101	107	121	145	157	146	171	172	97	59
EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONS AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS: COLLECTIVE FUNDING (€)*																	9,711,011	10,468,752	10,478,752	8,762,981	8,903,514	7,909,617	8,805,679	10,995,176	10,770,682	8,649,285	10,271,821	15,975,470
ETUC, EPSU, UNI-EUROPA AND INDUSTRIALL: STAFF NUMBERS																	44	49	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	59	59	59
ETUC, EPSU, UNI-EUROPA AND INDUSTRIALL: EP-ACCREDITED MEMBERS																	14	20	15	15	22	27	35	31	33	33	13	5
ETUC, EPSU, UNI-EUROPA AND INDUSTRIALL: FUNDING (€)																	5,980,823	6,121,982	6,121,982	5,339,063	5,534,542	4,854,965	5,530,631	5,530,631	5,267,720	4,538,494	4,224,575	4,363,990
ETUC, EPSU, UNI-EUROPA AND INDUSTRIALL: LOBBYING MEETINGS WITH EC MEMBERS																21	13	26	20	28	10	23	13	17	10	40	39	
ETUC, EPSU, UNI-EUROPA AND INDUSTRIALL: LOBBYING																									28	45	27	59



AVERAGE %	38.0 0%	35.8 8%		38.6 0%	35.7 0%	38.6 7%	40.6 7%	37.6 0%	38.0 0%	43.5 2%	45.5 0%	47.7 5%	47.4 0%	49.2 5%	50.3 0%	54.5 0%	53.5 1%	51.7 5%	54.7 7%		58.4 0%	55.9 0%	59.6 6%	60.8 9%	62.0 9%	59.9 3%	62.2 0%	66.1 9%	58.8 0%
LITHUANIA (LT)																													
SATISF W/ EU DEMOC.					48%	49%			48%	51%	52%	54%	51%	61%	55%	64%	59%	59%	63%		62%	62%	65%	65%	67%	66%	64%	66%	66%
FEEL LIKE EU CITIZEN						56%		56%		60%	64%	65%	64%	71%	71%	78%	77%	74%	74%		77%	77%	78%	77%	80%	81%	81%	82%	80%
ATTACH MENT TO EU				77%						34%			39%				51%				53%	55%	56%	56%	59%	62%	64%	62%	56%
TRUST IN EU	62%	56%		59%	50.5 0%	54%	61%	52%	50%	47%	49%	51%	52%	58%	59%	68%	59%	55.5 0%	55%		65%	64%	66%	65%	72%	66%	59%	70%	69%
MEMB. GOOD	60%	55%		57%	51%	48%		49%		51.6 0%		63.9 0%			66.6 0%		67.9 0%		65.7 0%			66.2 0%	64.9 0%	63.6 0%	68.7 0%	62.9 0%		72.2 0%	
IMAGE OF EU	51%	48%		46%	44%	42%	47%	47%	31%	35%	38%	38%	38%	48%	50%	55%	53%	43%	44%		51%	46%	47%	48%	53%	50%	51%	57%	57%
EU BENEFIT	75%	69%		71%	66%	66%	72%	67%				88.1 0%					87.2 0%		88.1 0%			86.1 0%	89.7 0%	85.9 0%	89.3 0%			91.2 0%	
AVERAGE %	62.0 0%	57.0 0%		62.0 0%	51.9 0%	52.5 0%	60.0 0%	54.2 0%	43.0 0%	46.4 3%	50.7 5%	60.0 0%	48.8 0%	59.5 0%	60.3 2%	66.2 5%	64.8 7%	57.8 8%	64.9 7%		61.6 0%	65.1 9%	66.6 6%	65.7 9%	69.8 6%	64.6 5%	63.8 0%	71.4 9%	65.6 0%
SWEDEN (SE)																													
SATISF W/ EU DEMOC.					51%	49%			52%	45%	50%	46%	50%	51%	48%	51%	49%	50%	48%		51%	52%	53%	57%	62%	59%	57%	60%	59%
FEEL LIKE EU CITIZEN						66%		67%		65%	73%	69%	69%	77%	76%	78%	72%	74%	75%		76%	77%	76%	82%	83%	79%	75%	74%	66%
ATTACH MENT TO EU				88%						37%			36%				44%				48%	47%	51%	50%	50%	54%	47%	46%	39%
TRUST IN EU	47%	54.5 0%		46%	53%	43%	47%	46%	43%	36%	33%	36%	40%	37%	48%	48%	46%	55.5 0%	43%		48%	52%	51%	59%	56%	53%	50%	58%	52%
MEMB. GOOD	54%	59%		54%	57%	54%		56%		60.3 0%		61.7 0%			59.9 0%		64%		66.1 0%			66.3 0%	70.1 0%	75.4 0%	78.4 0%	73.9 0%		68.3 0%	
IMAGE OF EU	42%	44%		40%	41%	40%	34%	33%	31%	31%	28%	29%	31%	42%	40%	42%	39%	36%	35%		43%	41%	42%	53%	50%	50%	51%	46%	42%
EU BENEFIT	50%	53%		47%	55%	52%	55%	53%				59.9 0%					65.3 0%		65.7 0%			62.8 0%	65.9 0%	72.6 0%	71.5 0%			64.9 0%	
AVERAGE %	48.2 5%	52.6 3%		55.0 0%	51.4 0%	50.6 7%	45.3 3%	51.0 0%	42.0 0%	45.7 2%	46.0 0%	50.2 7%	45.2 0%	51.7 5%	54.3 8%	54.7 5%	54.1 9%	53.8 8%	55.4 7%		53.2 0%	56.8 7%	58.4 3%	64.1 4%	64.4 1%	61.4 8%	56.0 0%	59.6 0%	51.6 0%



DENMARK K (DK)																																
SATISF W/ EU DEMOC.				67%	66%			65%	64%	65%	64%	63%	66%	63%	68%	62%	63%	59%			66%	64%	67%	68%	75%	73%	73%	70%	74%			
FEEL LIKE EU CITIZEN					67%		69%		75%	74%	71%	71%	73%	74%	74%	76%	77%	74%			81%	79%	80%	78%	82%	79%	80%	76%	76%			
ATTACH MENT TO EU				86%					43%			44%				46%				51%	50%	51%	49%	60%	53%	52%	53%	59%				
TRUST IN EU	60%	58%		58%	59.5 0%	61%	56%	52%	50%	49%	48%	51%	45%	45%	51%	57%	47%	53.5 0%	45%		56%	52%	57%	60%	68%	63%	63%	62%	61%			
MEMB. GOOD	65%	64%		65%	65%	66%		55%		65.6 0%		64.3 0%			61.1 0%		65.4 0%		61.9 0%			65.1 0%	74.1 0%	73.5 0%	75.3 0%	74.8 0%		72.3 0%				
IMAGE OF EU	47%	42%		41%	44%	39%	35%	33%	32%	32%	34%	36%	34%	35%	39%	39%	36%	34%	32%		42%	41%	43%	48%	54%	55%	45%	47%	46%			
EU BENEFIT	77%	76%		77%	75%	76%	70%	70%				80.9 0%					82%		83.5 0%			79.6 0%	83.3 0%	82.4 0%	85.3 0%			82.3 0%				
AVERAGE %	62.2 5%	60.0 0%		65.4 0%	62.1 0%	62.5 0%	53.6 7%	55.8 0%	49.0 0%	54.7 7%	55.2 5%	61.2 0%	51.4 0%	54.7 5%	57.6 2%	59.5 0%	59.2 0%	56.8 8%	59.2 3%		59.2 0%	61.5 3%	65.0 6%	65.5 6%	71.3 7%	66.3 0%	62.6 0%	66.0 9%	63.2 0%			
FINLAND (FI)																																
SATISF W/ EU DEMOC.				46%	49%			49%	52%	52%	50%	56%	56%	51%	56%	52%	53%	52%		61%	58%	58%	56%	67%	59%	47%	49%	49%				
FEEL LIKE EU CITIZEN					76%		77%		71%	78%	73%	73%	79%	76%	81%	75%	82%	79%		81%	81%	79%	81%	85%	81%	71%	74%	71%				
ATTACH MENT TO EU				85%					33%			37%				35%				47%	45%	45%	42%	50%	48%	41%	43%	38%				
TRUST IN EU	52%	58%		52%	59%	50%	49%	53%	44%	41%	47%	41%	47%	48%	54%	58%	44%	58%	51%		59%	53%	53%	52%	58%	56%	49%	50%	54%			
MEMB. GOOD	44%	48%		52%	51%	45%		47%		50%		49.3 0%			48.7 0%		54.2 0%		55.8 0%			56%	58.6 0%	63.1 0%	63.4 0%	65.7 0%		66.6 0%				
IMAGE OF EU	34%	28%		33%	35%	32%	27%	31%	22%	21%	22%	22%	23%	34%	35%	37%	32%	33%	33%		39%	41%	40%	40%	44%	45%	35%	40%	42%			
EU BENEFIT	51%	57%		60%	60%	54%	51%	61%				60.7 0%					65.6 0%		65.6 0%			62.4 0%	66.7 0%	64.1 0%	69.8 0%			70.8 0%				
AVERAGE %	45.2 5%	47.7 5%		56.4 0%	50.2 0%	51.0 0%	42.3 3%	53.8 0%	38.3 3%	44.6 7%	49.7 5%	49.3 3%	47.2 0%	54.2 5%	52.9 4%	58.0 0%	51.1 1%	56.5 0%	56.0 7%		57.4 0%	56.6 3%	57.1 9%	56.8 9%	62.4 6%	59.1 2%	48.6 0%	56.2 0%	50.8 0%			

