

**Problem 1.**

Your friend shows you an algorithm INV that can invert a given function  $f$  in PPT, but only for those  $f(x)$  where the first 20 high-order bits of  $x$  are all 1's. However, if the first 20 bits are not all 1's, you assume that for any PPT adversary A, the probability that A inverts F becomes negligible as the length of the input increases. Could  $f$  be a one-way function? (Prove your answer). If not, is there a way to use  $f$  as a building block to build a one-way function? If so, show how to do it and prove your answer; if not, show a counterexample.

**Problem 2.**

Let  $f(*)$  be any one-way function. Define  $f_k(*)$  to be the function that applies  $f$  sequentially  $k$  times. For any  $k$ , give an example of a function  $f$ , such that  $f_k(x)$  is a one-way function, but  $f_{k+1}(x)$  is not a one-way function.

[Hint: you can assume that  $g$  is a one-way permutation, and construct  $f_k(*)$  using  $g$ .]

**Problem 3.**

Explain the similarities and the differences between ZK proofs and ZK arguments, and give formal definitions for both.

**Problem 4.** Let  $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  be a multivariate polynomial over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}$  of the total degree  $d$ . In the **sumcheck protocol**, a prover  $\mathcal{P}$  claims that  $S = \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} f(x)$  equals to some value  $S^*$ .

1. Outline the steps of the sumcheck protocol between the prover and verifier.
2. Explain how the verifier's final check ensures soundness.
3. Why is it crucial that  $f$  has low total degree? What goes wrong if  $f$  has degree  $> d$ ?

**Problem 5.** Consider a zero-knowledge proof for the statement: "A given graph  $G$  is 3-colorable." Would this protocol be *perfect*, *statistical*, or *computational* zero-knowledge? Briefly justify your answer.

**Problem 6.** Consider a secure pseudo-random generator (PRG)  $G$  that maps  $n$ -bit seed  $s$  to  $2n$ -bit output  $G(s)$ . Define  $LH(*)$  to be a function that takes as an input  $2n$  bits, and outputs the first half of its input bits. Define  $RH(*)$  similarly (for the right half). Define:

$$F(s) = G(LH(G(s)))G(RH(G(s)))$$

1. What is the output length of  $F$ ?
2. If  $G$  is a secure PRG, is  $F$  a secure PRG? Either show a counter-example or prove it.