TWO POWERS IN HEAVEN; OR, THE MAKING OF A HERESY

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If you come to a fork in the road, take it.

Lawrence Peter Berra
(with gratitude to Vincent P. Bynack)

Among his many achievements, James Kugel has also done very important work in the field of establishing connections between rabbinic and other Judaisms in the early period, notably in his classic, *In Potiphar's House*.[1] I hope therefore to be honoring his career and person with this contribution.

Scholarship on the *Memra*, particularly in the twentieth-century, has tended to recapitulate the rabbinic repudiation of Logos theology rather than interrogate it. A not-atypical scholarly comment on the Rabbis and the *Memra* reads: "Students of Rabbinic Judaism were convinced from the outset that the theory represented by views [of the *Memra* as a Logos-like intermediary] was incorrect, and that the *Memra* could not be an hypostasis within the Godhead: the fundamental monotheism of mainstream Rabbinic Judaism could tolerate no such *deuteros theos*."[2] This argument, as I have shown elsewhere,[3] is incoherent and circular because it is the "fundamental monotheism" of the Rabbis that is the discursive project both of their texts and our scholarship. The conviction of "students of rabbinic Judaism" is a parade example of begging the question. The formulation is accordingly instructive heuristically precisely because the problematic should be to see how "the fundamental mainstream

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[1] James L. Kugel, *In Potiphar's House: the Interpretive Life of Biblical Texts* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990).

[2] Robert Hayward, *Divine Name and Presence: The Memra* (Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies; Totowa, N,J.: Allanheld, 1981), 4.

[3] Daniel Boyarin, "The Gospel of the *Memra*: Jewish Binitarianism and the Crucifixion of the Logos," *HTR* 94 (2001): 243–84.

of rabbinic Judaism" emerged, struggled with others, and finally became hegemonic.

The position that I occupy here is quite different in some respects from that of the pioneering work of Alan Segal. Segal writes, "A few have even suggested that there was no concept of orthodoxy in rabbinic Judaism. Part of the importance of these reports about 'two powers in heaven' is that they show us that the rabbis, in common with their brethren in the diaspora, were concerned about the theological and orthodox center of Judaism when other sectarian groups of their day seemed willing to compromise Judaism's integrity."[4] While I am in total sympathy with Segal's critique of those who see rabbinism as a doctrine-free orthopraxy, from my point of view, the orthodoxy that the Rabbis were concerned about was an orthodoxy that they were making by *constructing* "Two Powers in Heaven" as heresy, at just about the same time that bishops were declaring the belief in "One Power in Heaven"—"Monarchianism"—a leading heresy of Christianity.[5] The Rabbis, by defining elements from within their own religious heritage as not Jewish, were, in effect, producing Christianity, just as Christian heresiologists were defining traditional elements of their own religious heritage as not Christian and thereby producing Judaism. The Christian heresiologists, as was their wont, were more explicit about naming the "heresy" as Judaism, while the Rabbis, as theirs, were more circumspect. Neither was "protecting the integrity of the theological and orthodox center" of their respective religions,[6] but rather constructing them through discursive analogue of the psychic process known as splitting, wherein unwanted parts of the psyche are projected "out there," producing a sense of good self and bad other:

> In so far as the objects which are presented to [the ego] are sources of pleasure, it takes them into itself, 'introjects' them . . .; and, on the

[4] Alan F. Segal, *Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports About Christianity and Gnosticism* (SJLA 25; Leiden: Brill, 1977), x.

[5] Thus the question posed by Segal: "A most significant question is whether or not such ideas were ever current within rabbinic Judaism" (Segal, *Powers*, 69) begs the question. Rabbinic Judaism, in my view, is precisely the religion that is made by expelling "such ideas" by crossing them and their traditionalist believers with a border of orthodoxy. On Monarchianism, see also Ronald Heine, "The Christology of Callistus," *JTS* 49 (1998): 56–91.

[6] Segal is capable, of course, of seeing the matter in a much more critical and nuanced light also: "Preliminary indications are, therefore, that many parts of the

> other hand, it expels whatever within itself becomes a cause of unpleasure (. . . the mechanism of projection). . . . For the pleasure-ego the external world is divided into a part that is pleasurable, which is incorporated into itself, and a remainder that is extraneous to it. It has [also] separated off a part of its own self, which it projects into the external world.[7]

I am suggesting that this is a useful analogy for understanding how Christianity and Judaism each produced their respective other by disavowing parts of themselves.

Pointing to a conceptual difficulty raised by Segal's otherwise excellent book will help make clearer the difference and the stakes involved between our approaches to the same materials and questions. Segal summarizes his results on his first page: "It became clear that 'two powers in heaven' was a very early category of heresy, earlier than Jesus, if Philo is a trustworthy witness, and one of the basic categories by which the rabbis perceived the new phenomenon of Christianity. It was one of the central issues over which the two religions separated."[8]

The conceptual problem should be clear. Particularly insofar as the very category of heresy in Judaism did not exist in the first century or indeed before the rabbinic formation,[9] a point that Segal himself makes elsewhere,[10] "Two Powers in Heaven" could not have been an early category of heresy but could only have been one of the options for Jewish belief at the time. If, then, the Rabbis named this as a heresy, which they did, and made it a sort of touchstone for splitting between their "orthodox" Judaism and the *minut* of Christians (and others), this cannot be formulated as one of the issues

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Jewish community in various places and periods used the tradition which the rabbis claim is an heretical conception of the deity" (*Powers*, 43). Yet he is still willing to speak of a "theological and orthodox center of Judaism," which these "many parts of the Jewish community" seem "willing to compromise."

[7] Sigmund Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (ed. and trans. J. Strachey; 24 vols.; 1915; repr. London: Hogarth, 1957), 14:136.

[8] Segal, *Powers*, ix.

[9] As I have argued in Daniel Boyarin, "A Tale of Two Synods: Nicaea, Yavneh and the Making of Orthodox Judaism," *Exemplaria* 12 (2000): 21–62. Cf. also the complications that Segal makes for himself on *Powers*, 215, because he has not completely clarified these two issues (the existence of "Two Powers" theology and the appearance of the notion of heresy) separately.

[10] Segal, *Powers*, 5–6.

over which the two religions separated but as the means through which a border was inscribed. That is, through the naming of "Two Powers" as heresy and the deeding (avidly colluded in by some Christians) of that doctrine to Christianity, an ancient Jewish doctrine was marked as a heresy, and the two "religions" were produced as different.[11] I would thus rewrite Segal's sentence in my own terms in the following way: There is significant evidence (uncovered in large part by Segal) that in the first century many—perhaps most—Jews held a binitarian doctrine of God.[12] This Jewish doctrine was named *minut* by the Rabbis as an important part of the project of constructing Jewish orthodoxy as separate from Christianity.[13]

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[11] This position is comparable to the general view of Lawrence H. Schiffman, "At the Crossroads: Tannaitic Perspectives on the Jewish-Christian Schism," in *Aspects of Judaism in the Greco-Roman Period: Jewish and Christian Self-Definition* (ed. E. P. Sanders, A. I. Baumgarten, and A. Mendelson; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), 2:115–56, 338–52. Schiffman sees a transition from "sectarianism" to "consensus" in the rabbinic period and even remarks that certain views that had been accepted among Jews were now defined as *minut* and thus left to the Christians. He even considers the rise of Christianity a main cause for this development within Judaism. My disagreements with Schiffman would be two: First of all, he would locate this development a century earlier than I would, and secondly, for his "consensus" I would substitute orthodoxy.

[12] Segal, *Powers*, 43.

[13] At the same time that I am (gratefully) building on the vital work that Segal performed in his book, I must comment that Segal consistently confounds his own project and mislays, as it were, his own best insights. He writes: "It is not possible to decide exactly when rabbinic opposition to such doctrines started. For one thing, it is nearly impossible to be sure of the wording of rabbinic traditions before 200 C.E much less before 70 C.E., when the rabbis became the leaders of the Jewish community [sic!]. Most rabbinic traditions, at least as we have them, were written subsequently. So we cannot blithely assume that the rabbinic reports date from the Second Commonwealth" (*Powers*, 43). So far so good, but then he continues, "However, with Philo's evidence, we have reason to suppose their antiquity." Segal has begun asking about the dating of the rabbinic opposition to the doctrine and seems to have tried to supply an answer by citing Philo, but Philo, of course, is only evidence for the *existence* of the doctrine and not for rabbinic opposition to it; in fact he himself (Philo) holds a version of the "heresy," as stated explicitly by Segal (*Powers*, 50). This ambiguity as to the question at hand pervades Segal's discussion and frequently weakens his answers considerably. A clearer distinction between the search for the doctrine and the search for its expulsion as "heretical" would have served Segal's inquiry well. There is, I submit, no pre-Christian (or even first-century) evidence for the latter. This distinction should also serve (negatively) the enterprise of the search for the so-called Jewish origins of Gnosticism. See the otherwise compelling Menahem Kister, "'Let Us Make a Man'—Observations on the Dynamics of Monotheism," in *Issues in Talmudic Research: Conference Commemorating the Fifth Anniversary of the Passing of Ephraim E. Urbach, 2 December 1996* (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences, 2001 [Hebrew]), 53, who also seems to hold that there is some essentialist entity called "Jewish Monotheism," which various doctrines can

Just as for Christian orthodoxy, the arch-heresy for the Rabbis also involved, not surprisingly, a "flaw" in the doctrine of God:[14] "Two Powers in Heaven"—"binitarianism"—of which one major manifestation was traditional Jewish Logos theology.[15] I would suggest that this issue of the doctrine of God is one archaeological site where making the distinction between the (metaphorically) excavated Synagogue and the House of Study[16] or between rabbinic and other forms of Jewish piety in the rabbinic period becomes crucial.[17] Alejandro Díez Macho has observed that it is no mere coincidence that the more rabbinized of the Targums (Targums *Onkelos* and *Pseudo-Jonathan*) and rabbinic literature itself suppress the use of the term *Memra* quite observably. Indeed, in rabbinic literature, it has disappeared entirely,[18] and in the more rabbinized Targums, it appears much less frequently, suggesting a struggle between the forms of piety that were current in the Synagogues and those that were centered in the Houses of Study of the Rabbis. This strongly implies that Logos theology was a living current within non-Christian Judaic circles from before the Christian era until well into late antiquity, when the Palestinian Targums were produced.[19] We must avoid the serious

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threaten or endanger, rather than seeing that very entity itself as a constructed and contested field as I suggest we must.

[14] See the near-classic Richard P. C. Hanson, *The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy 318–381 A.D.* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988).

[15] Boyarin, "Jewish Binitarianism."

[16] Thus, for instance, it has often been remarked that nearly all of the late ancient Synagogues excavated in Palestine significantly contradict rabbinic prescriptions for the building of such edifices.

[17] Cf. Galit Hasan-Rokem, "Narratives in Dialogue: A Folk Literary Perspective on Interreligious Contacts in the Holy Land in Rabbinic Literature of Late Antiquity," in *Sharing the Sacred: Religious Contacts and Conflicts in the Holy Land First-Fifteenth Centuries C.E.* (ed. G. Stroumsa and A. Kofsky; Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 1998), 109–29, esp. 128, who somewhat underplays this dimension in my opinion. For other instances of disparity between the "Judaism" of the Rabbis and that of the Synagogue in late antique Palestine, see William Horbury, "Suffering and Messianism in Yose Ben Yose," in *Suffering and Martyrdom in the New Testament: Studies Presented to G. M. Styler* (ed. W. Horbury and B. McNeil; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 143–82.

[18] See, however, Hans Bietenhard, "Logos Theologie im Rabbinat. Ein Beitrage zur Lehre vom Worte Gottes im rabbinischen Schrifttum," *ANRW* II, 19.2:580–618.

[19] Note how different this formulation is from the traditional scholarly one whereby John's Logos was influenced by the Targum's *Memra*. See, e.g., Martin McNamara, "Logos of the Fourth Gospel and *Memra* of the Palestinian Targum," *ExpTim* 79 (1968): 115–17.

methodological error of regarding all non-rabbinic religious expression by Jews during the rabbinic period as somehow not quite legitimate or of marginalizing it by naming it as syncretistic or uninformed, thus simply reproducing the rabbinic ideology, rather than subjecting it to historical criticism.[20] In other words, the consensus of scholars of rabbinic Judaism referred to by Robert Hayward simply replicates the consensus of the Rabbis themselves, whereas the current scholarly task is to read this latter consensus against its grain, in order to see what it is that it mystified in order to construct its hegemony.[21]

Extant rabbinic texts demonstrate that the Rabbis, too, knew of Logos theology, but that they constructed their own "orthodoxy" by excommunicating the Jewish Logos from within their midst. As Hayward put it, "The Logos is an intermediary, and Abelson rightly remarks that the Rabbis repudiate all intermediaries."[22] This repudiated or disowned entity, however, was a part of themselves.[23]

"We must think of heresy not so much as something that attacked the church from without, as of something that grew up within it,"

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[20] An error committed as well by the otherwise very astute Darrell D. Hannah, *Michael and Christ: Michael Traditions and Angel Christology in Early Christianity* (WUNT 2.109; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 109–10.

[21] See also Naomi Janowitz, "Rabbis and Their Opponents: The Construction of the 'Min' in Rabbinic Anecdotes," *JECS* 6 (1998): 449–62; Christine E. Hayes, "Displaced Self-Perceptions: The Deployment of *Mînîm* and Romans in *B. Sanhedrin* 90b–91a," in *Religious and Ethnic Communities in Later Roman Palestine* (ed. H. Lapin; Potomac, Md.: University Press of Maryland, 1998), 249–89.

[22] Hayward, *Divine Name and Presence*, 4.

[23] Compare the very helpful discussion of J. Rebecca Lyman of Christian heresiology:

> I am suggesting that problems of assimilation and authority were already present in the form of universal Christianity taught by Justin, which could lead to the polemical invention of "Gnosticism" as philosophical and superstitious at once, whatever may have actually been taught by Valentinus or Ptolemy. Irenaeus's concern with identifying valid sacraments, lasting conversions, and legitimate successions reveals the instability of the inherited discourse of Justin, and the necessity of establishing the correct *diadoche* and belief within the baptized community itself. If we restore a primary teaching identity to Irenaeus as a leader, the controversial rhetoric of his text reflects a continuing debate over identity and authority by competitive intellectuals within the community rather than a defensive protection against outsiders. ("The Politics of Passing: Justin Martyr's Conversion as a Problem of 'Hellenization,'" in *Conversion in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages* [ed. A. Grafton and K. Mills; Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, forthcoming])

writes C. K. Barrett, paraphrasing Bartsch,[24] and the same goes, *mutatis mutandis*, for the House of Study. Having shown the likelihood that Logos theology is an ancient heritage of the Jews, we can begin to imagine a complex process of splitting (the psychoanalytic term is chosen advisedly) that ultimately gave rise to Judaism and Christianity. Christianity and Judaism became constructed in part through the rabbinic repudiation of all intermediaries, that is, its alienation of that native son, the Logos, and at the same time through the orthodox Christian nomination of this very repudiation when enacted by Christians as heresy and as "Judaizing." Theorist Homi Bhabha has given a perfect description of this psycho-cultural process:

> Produced through the strategy of disavowal, the *reference* of discrimination [heretics, DB] is always to a process of splitting as the condition of subjection: a discrimination between the mother culture and its bastards, the self and its doubles, where the trace of what is disavowed is not repressed but repeated as something *different*—a mutation, a hybrid [a *minut*, a Jewish-Christianity, DB]. It is such a partial and double force that . . . disturbs the visibility of the colonial presence and makes the recognition of its authority problematic. To be authoritative, its rules of recognition must reflect consensual knowledge or opinion; to be powerful, these rules of recognition must be reached in order to represent the exorbitant objects of discrimination that lie beyond its purview.[25]

One could hardly hope for a more precise description of the heresiological process in general, or of the specific instance of the production of that bastard, "Two Powers in Heaven," as that which is not so much repressed but disavowed, produced as a mutation, a hybrid, a "Jewish Christianity."[26]

The Rabbis, I suggest, were engaged in a strenuous project of divesting "Judaism" of Logos theology and thus were absorbed in the same search for a doctrine of God that animated Christians, as well.[27] Rather than the heresy of "Two Powers in Heaven" being

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[24] C. K. Barrett, "Jews and Judaizers in the Epistles of Ignatius," in *Jews, Greeks and Christians: Religious Cultures in Late Antiquity. Essays in Honor of W. D. Davies* (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 220–44, here 223.

[25] Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 111.

[26] Even to the point of helping us understand the insistence on "consensual orthodoxy."

[27] As Winston points out, even this divestiture was not total, since there are occasional midrashic texts that do refer to a hypostasized Divine Speech (the דבור),

interpreted, then, as an outside intruder into the world of "orthodox" Judaism, I suggest that the construction of this "heresy" in rabbinic texts represents the border making and self-definition that ultimately produced orthodox rabbinism.

Rabbinic discourse about "Two Powers in Heaven" is not a rabbinic "report" of essential differences between Christianity (or "Gnosticism") and Judaism, but rather a rabbinic production of that which marks the defining limits of what the Rabbis take to be Judaism via the abjection of one traditional element in Jewish religiosity, a production almost identical, as we shall see, to the Christian heresiological naming of "One Power in Heaven" (Monarchianism) as "Judaism," when, in fact, it was, of course, an internal and once-acceptable version of Christian theology.[28] I am suggesting that for the Rabbis, the discourse of heresiology, that is the collection of laws and narratives about *minut* and especially about the "heresy" of "Two Powers in Heaven," is not *about* Christianity but may, in part, be a response *to* Christianity. Thus when we examine particular instances of such discourse, we need not expect to find notions particular to Christianity but rather a general formation of a space between self and other produced by marking certain differences within and differences between. "Jewish-Christian" heresies function in the same way for Christian identity-formation. As Jonathan Z. Smith has written:

> From heresy to deviation to degeneration to syncretism, the notion of the different which claims to be the same, or, projected internally, the disguised difference within has produced a rich vocabulary of denial and estrangement. For in each case, a theory of difference, when applied to the proximate "other," is but another way of phrasing a theory of the "self."[29]

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specifically the ten Words that we know of as the ten commandments; David Winston, *Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria* (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1985), 16.

[28] Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, 44–45 provides elegant theoretical analysis of the mechanics of such specular differentiating and identification, without, however, being able to see such processes as mutual (quite). See also discussion in Virginia Burrus, *The Sex Lives of Saints* (Divinations: Reading Late Ancient Religions; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, forthcoming), chapter 3; and especially Willis Johnson, "Textual Sources for the study of Jewish Currency Crimes in 13th-century England," *British Numismatic Journal* 66 (1996): 21–32.

[29] Jonathan Z. Smith, "Differential Equations: On Constructing the 'Other,'" (lecture; Tempe, Arizona, 1992), 14, Pamphlet.

"Two Powers in Heaven" is such a "disguised difference within."

Karen King has observed that "the attempt at domination in naming one's opponents (as heretics, for example) has a reciprocal effect on the namer as well."[30] Taking up this observation, I am hoping to show how crucial elements of rabbinic Judaism were formed in the attempt at "othering" these *minim*. Once again, to adopt a formulation of King's, "Constructing a heretical other simultaneously and reciprocally constructed an orthodox self."[31] Another way of saying this would be to suggest that while there were genuine differences between nascent "Judaism" and "nascent" Christianity, they were not necessarily precisely where the discourse of *minut* would place them, but this discourse, itself, helped to shape and make the difference between the "two religions" in the place that we still, to this day, take it to be, such as, for instance, in the acceptance or rejection of the "Logos" and "Logos theology." Put one final way, I am partially reversing Alain Le Boulluec's claim (made, to be sure, with respect to Christianity) that strategies initially developed in conflict with Jews and Greeks were adapted by Christians in their fight against internal differences,[32] suggesting, rather, that the tools that the Rabbis developed in their own struggles for power and identity ended up (in the same process) in marking difference between Judaism (rabbinic) and Christianity.

I. "Two Powers in Heaven" as Jewish Theology

The notion of a second and independent divine agent can be found already in the Bible itself, as has been emphasized by earlier scholars. Darrell Hannah makes the point that the Exodus angel . . .

> becomes to some extent an expression of the divine absence in that he is a substitute for Yahweh (Ex. 33:1–3). As a replacement for the divine presence, it would appear that the angel of the Exodus is beginning to have a quasi-individual existence. Significantly, unlike מלאך יהוה [the angel of the Lord] in the patriarchal narratives, the Exodus angel

[30] Karen L. King, *What is Gnosticism?* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003).

[31] Ibid.

[32] Alain Le Boulluec, *La notion d'hérésie dans la littérature grecque II^e–III^e siècles* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1985), 16; King, *Making Heresy*, chapter 2.

> is spoken of by God in the third person (23:20–21, 32:34 and 33:2–3). So the Exodus angel seems to betray a certain development in the מלאך יהוה concept, away from an extension or manifestation of the divine presence and toward an individual existence.[33]

Hannah makes the significant double observation that in the earlier strata of biblical writing, the patriarchal narratives and the Exodus, there is frequent confusion, if not conflation, between the Angel of H' and H' himself, and that this particular hypostasization seems to disappear during the period of the monarchy, to be replaced by a host of angels who are fully separate beings and clearly subordinate to God.[34] This ambiguity in the early biblical narratives, particularly when they are read together—as one phenomenon—with the later texts and ideas, was to fuel much interpretative controversy and angst in the early years of Judaeo-Christianity, for many of these very passages served as the origin and prooftext for Logos theology, as manifested in Justin Martyr's *Dialogue* on nearly every page. What is important in this context, however, is not so much the implication of the biblical passages themselves, but the strenuous energy that rabbinic literature mobilized in order to *deny* these implications, an expenditure of energy that indicates the attractiveness of the *deuteros theos* idea among Jews.

An elegant example of this energy can be found in the following early rabbinic midrash:

> "H' smote every first-born in the land of Egypt" [Exod 12:29]: I might have understood by means of an angel or by means of an agent, therefore Scripture teaches: "And I have smitten all of the first-born" [Exod 12:12]; not by means of an angel and not by means of an agent. (*Mek.*, *Pisḥa* 13)[35]

Precisely the sort of ambiguity that would lead to the theological ambivalence and the production of notions of a fully divine angel is thoroughly repulsed by the rabbinic midrash. It has frequently been theorized that when the midrash writes "I might have understood," another, "sectarian," interpretation is being raised in order to discredit it. This, in any case, would be a fine example for that the-

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[33] Hannah, *Michael and Christ*, 21.

[34] Ibid., 22.

[35] S. Horovitz and Israel Abraham Rabin, eds., *Mechilta d'Rabbi Ismael* (ed. S. Horovitz; Jerusalem: Wahrmann Books, 1970), 43; compare also p. 33.

ory. Ancient Jews and Christian writers like Justin would certainly have seen in this combination of verses evidence for their various versions of Logos theology, and it is these findings that the Rabbis dispute here vigorously.[36] However, there is more, for there are ancient variants of the text that explicitly add to "not by means of an angel, and not by means of an agent"—"not by means of the Logos [לא על ידי הדיבר]."[37]

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[36] Judah Goldin, "Not by Means of an Angel and not by Means of a Messenger," in *Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough* (ed. J. Neusner; Leiden: Brill, 1968), 412–24.

[37] See Arthur Marmorstein, *The Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 57: "Israel was delivered neither by the Logos, nor angels, but by God Himself." This version of the text was originally published from more than one Geniza fragment by Israel Abrahams, "Some Egyptian Fragments of the Passover Haggada," *JQR* o.s. 10 (1898): 41–51, who understood these readings as "repeated references to the Memra or Logos" (41). The Targum reads here, "And I will pass in my *Memra* [var. I will be revealed in my *Memra*] through the land of Egypt this night *of the Passover*, and I will kill all the first-born in the land of Egypt" (*Targum Neofiti 1: Exodus* [trans. M. McNamara; notes by R. Hayward; The Aramaic Bible; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994], 47–48). In my opinion, it is very difficult to see this as a mere *façon de parler*. According to the Wisdom of Solomon 18, this plague was carried out precisely by the Logos. See, *The Wisdom of Solomon* (AB 43; trans. and commentary by D. Winston; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1979), 313, and see also his fascinating notes (with which I partially disagree for reasons that will be obvious), 317–19; and Joseph Reider, *The Book of Wisdom: An English Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (Dropsie College Edition: Jewish Apocryphal Literature; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 210–11, with whom my disagreement is even sharper. Similarly, for Melito, it was Christ who executed the plague; see Melito of Sardis, *On Pascha and Fragments* (OECT; ed. S. G. Hall; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), line 657. For the view which I maintain, see Shlomo Pines, "'From Darkness to Light': Parallels to *Haggada* Texts in Hellenistic Literature," in *Studies in Literature Presented to Simon Halkin* (ed. E. Fleischer; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1973 [Hebrew]), 176–79. Aside from every other argument, if the *Memra* of the Targum was "purely a phenomenon of translation, not a figment of speculation," as George Foot Moore maintained (*Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era* [New York: Schocken, 1971], 1:419), and if the Logos of Wisdom "is in reality God himself in one of his aspects," and, therefore, "our author's position is almost identical with that of the rabbis" (Winston, *Wisdom*, 319), then why all the rabbinic textual energy expended in denying that God had any agent in the execution of the plague (even if we grant, with Winston, that "not by means of the Logos" is a Byzantine innovation in the text)? Pines, it should be emphasized, was also one of the first to see that "influences" could run from Christian texts, such as Melito, to rabbinic texts, an important line of research continued in Israel Jacob Yuval, "Easter and Passover as Early Jewish-Christian Dialogue," in *Passover and Easter: Origin and History to Modern Times* (Two Liturgical Traditions 5; ed. P. F. Bradshaw and L. A. Hoffman; Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 127–60. See also Menahem Kasher, *Hagadah Shel Pesah: Lel Shimurim* (Jerusalem: Bet Torah Shelemah, 1982), 42 and now Israel Jacob Yuval, *Two Nations in Your Womb: Perceptions of Jews and Christians* (Tel-Aviv: Alma, 2000 [Hebrew]), 95–97. Yuval quite brilliantly argues that certain

One very rich example for my purposes here has been treated by Hayward, but I interpret the text differently. The text is from the fourth-century midrash, the *Mekhilta d'Rabbi Ishmaʿel*, to Exod 20:2:

> I am the LORD your God [Exod 20:2]: Why was it said? For this reason. At the sea He appeared to them as a mighty hero doing battle, as it is said: "The LORD is a man of war." At Sinai he appeared to them as an old man full of mercy. It is said: "And they saw the God of Israel" (Ex 24:10), etc. And of the time after they had been redeemed what does it say? "And the like of the very heaven for clearness" (ibid.). Again it says: "I beheld till thrones were placed, and one that was ancient of days did sit" (Dan 7:9). And it also says: "A fiery stream issued," etc. (v. 10).[38] Scripture, therefore, would not let the nations of the world[39] have an excuse for saying that there are two Powers, but declares: "The LORD is a man of war, the LORD is His name." He, it is, who was in Egypt and He who was at the sea. It is He who was in the past and He who will be in the future. It is He who is in this world and He who will be in the world to come, as it is said, "See now that I, even I, am He," etc. (Deut 32:39). And it also says: "Who hath wrought and done it? He that called the generations from the beginning. I, the LORD, who am the first, and with the last am the same" (Isa 41:4).[40]

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features of the Haggada for Passover, namely the total absence of Moses, can be best explained as tacit polemic against "Christian" notions of mediation.

[38] Segal understands the citation of verse 10 as an attempt to answer the claim of the heretics because it says that "A fiery stream issued from *Him*," implying only one divine figure, and writes that, "the argument of the rabbis is not completely convincing for the text may only be referring to one of the two figures at this point" (*Powers*, 40 n. 9). Segal misconstrues the text, however. According to midrashic form the citation "and it also says" must be a continuation of the problem and not the answer. The "etc." refers then to the following verses in which it seems clear that two divine figures are envisioned, and this citation is, then, indeed part of the problem (and not an unconvincing solution, *pace* Segal). The solution comes with the citation of Exod 20:2, which is precisely what the midrashic form would lead us to expect.

[39] Segal remarks that the text has "identified the people who believe in 'two powers in heaven' as gentiles" (*Powers*, 41) and then later is somewhat nonplussed, remarking, "they must have been gentiles well-versed in Jewish tradition to have offered such a dangerous and sophisticated interpretation of Dan 7.9f" (*Powers*, 55). Well, Gentiles who are so well-versed and who would make such a dangerous and sophisticated interpretation, precisely of Daniel 7, are called Christians! What he misses is that "nations of the world" in the *Mekhilta* usually refers to Christians, "the Church from the *ethne*," to be sure, although he does allow for this as a possibility (*Powers*, 56–57). It is precisely with reference to that group that the *Mekhilta* frequently insists on referring to God as "He who spoke and the world was," which I have interpreted as an attack on the *Memra*, as an insistence that there is none; only the "Father" spoke and the world was.

[40] Horovitz and Rabin, *Mechilta*, 220–21. Cf. the following parallel text:

It is the passage from Daniel that is alluded to, *but not cited*, in the anti-"heretical" discourse, the "Son of Man" passage so pivotal for the development of early Christology, that is the real point of contention here and the reason for the citation of Exod 20:2. There

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> H' is a man of war; H' is his name [Exod 15:3]: Why was it said? For this reason. At the sea He appeared to them as a mighty hero doing battle, as it is said: "The LORD is a man of war." At Sinai he appeared to them as an old man full of mercy. It is said: "And they saw the God of Israel" (Ex 24:10), etc. And of the time after they had been redeemed what does it say? "And the like of the very heaven for clearness" (ibid.). Again it says: "I beheld till thrones were placed, and one that was ancient of days did sit" (Dan. 7.9). And it also says: "A fiery stream issued," etc. (v. 10). Scripture, therefore, would not let the nations of the world have an excuse for saying that there are two Powers, but declares: "The LORD is a man of war, the LORD is His name." He, it is, who was in Egypt and He who was at the sea. It is He who was in the past and He who will be in the future. It is He who is in this world and He who will be in the world to come, as it is said, "See now that I, even I, am He," etc. (Deut 32:39). And it also says: "Who hath wrought and done it? He that called the generations from the beginning. I, the LORD, who am the first, and with the last am the same" (Isa 41:4).

From: *Mekilta DeRabbi Ishmael* (ed. and trans. J. Z. Lauterbach; 1934; repr., Philadephia: Jewish Publishing Society, 1961), 2:31–32; Horovitz and Rabin, *Mechilta*, 129–30. For extensive discussion of this and parallel passages, see Segal, *Powers*, 33–57. I will refer to this analysis as relevant for my particular focus on the text and the questions involved.

Reading this parallel text, Hayward argues that the purpose of this text is to say that "the fact that the divine Name YHWH is found twice in one verse of Scripture is not to be taken as a point of departure for the heretical proposition that there are two Lords." Hayward, however, misunderstands how midrash "works." The verse that is cited at the opening of the midrash is not the verse that causes the problem but the verse that will provide a solution to the problem. The point of the midrash is to demonstrate the *necessity* for the verse cited in the lemma by showing that without it, there would be some error or difficulty. The text cited in my main text demonstrates in any case that the so-called repetition of the name is not the difficulty here. Indeed, Exod 15:3, "The LORD is a Man of War; The LORD is His name," is taken by the Rabbis to mean that the two appearances of God, as youth and elder, are two modalities of the same person—dynamic Modalism—and not two persons, thus refuting the "heretics." Hayward is in good company here. So too Segal, *Powers*, 36. I believe that the same false interpretation is proffered by Segal to *Sifre Deuteronomy* 379, where the text cites the verse, "So now that I, even I, am He," as a *refutation* to heretics, while Segal sees it as the heretical provocation (*Powers*, 86). The verse asserts the identicality of God with himself, making it an effective refutation of binitarianism rather than a support for it. Even less plausible is Segal's remark with regard to another passage that it, too, "uses the repetition in scripture as an occasion to discuss 'two powers in heaven'" (*Powers*, 90). The alleged "repetition" here is simply the use of the conjunctive "and" which Rabbi Aqiva used for all sorts of *drashot* on many themes and has absolutely nothing to do with "Two Powers." Cf. also Elliot R. Wolfson, *Through a Speculum That Shines: Vision and Imagination in Medieval Jewish Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 32–35.

are two descriptions of God as revealed in the Torah, one at the splitting of the Red Sea and one at the revelation of the ten commandments at Sinai. In the first, God is explicitly described as a warrior, that is, as a young man, as it were, while at the latter, as the Rabbis read it, God is described as an elder, full of wisdom and mercy. The problem is the doubling of descriptions of God as *senex* (judge) and *puer* (man of war) and the correlation of those two descriptions with the divine figures of Ancient of Days and Son of Man from Daniel, which together might easily lead one to think that there are Two Powers in Heaven, indeed that God has two persons, a Father-person and a Son-person. These were, of course, crucial loci for Christological interpretations. The citation of God's Name in Exod 20:2, at the beginning of those same ten commandments, thus answers possible heretical implications of those verses by insisting on the unity of H' in both instances. The text portentously *avoids* citing the Daniel verses most difficult for rabbinic Judaism, 7:13–14: "I saw in the vision of the night, and behold with the clouds of the Heaven there came one like a Son of Man and came to the Ancient of Days and stood before him and brought him close, and to him was given rulership and the glory and the kingdom, and all nations, peoples, and languages will worship him. His rulership is eternal which will not pass, and his kingship will not be destroyed."[41] The tacit contention with the Logos theology of the Targum appears especially strong when we remember that in targumic texts, we can find the Son of Man identified as the Messiah.[42] Furthermore, in a talmudic passage to be discussed below (*b. Ḥag.* 14a), Rabbi Aqiva himself is represented as identifying the "Son of Man" with the heavenly David, and thus with the Messiah, before being "encouraged" by his fellows to abandon this "heretical" view. This would suggest the possibility that there were non-Christian Jews who would have identified the Messiah himself (necessarily incarnate) as the Son of Man.

Hayward believes that this midrash represents an assertion of *Memra* theology and concludes, therefore, that "this midrash presents *Memra*-

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[41] For another instance in which, also in a polemical context, the Rabbis avoid citing the really difficult part of Daniel 7, see Segal, *Powers*, 132.

[42] Sigmund Mowinckel, *He That Cometh: The Messiah Concept in the Old Testament and Later Judaism* (trans. G. W. Anderson; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956), 357. See also Moshe Idel, *Messianic Mystics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 89.

Theology in Rabbinic terms, and is a means of proving nothing less than the unity of God, the *very opposite* of the use to which the Gnostics or Christians are supposed to have put it."[43] However, there is no reference whatsoever to the *Memra* in this or any other rabbinic text, so it seems entirely unjustified to see here a presentation of *Memra* theology. Indeed it is much more plausible to see here a polemic against a *Memra* theology that would indeed project in rabbinic terms any doctrine of the *Memra* as "Two Powers in Heaven" and thus *minut*.

Segal has suggested independently that "in view of the importance of the name of God in this midrash it is not unlikely that the midrash is relying on the mysterious name of God which was revealed to Moses at the burning bush. 'I am that I am' is being interpreted with past and future implications of the Hebrew verb forms and is being understood to be an eternal pledge to remain with Israel."[44] We have seen, however, that this revelation and its mysterious name are indeed a central locus for deriving the *Memra*, and our text makes no mention whatever of that hypostasis, suggesting that rather than *Memra* theology being elaborated here, it is being silently refuted, along with, perhaps, its more radical form: Logos (Son of Man) Christology. In a slightly later, but still classically rabbinic, parallel to these texts (cited as well by Segal), we find, "And thus Daniel says: 'I beheld till thrones were placed, and one that was ancient of days did sit.' Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba taught: Should a whoreson say to you, 'They are two gods,' reply to him, I am the one of the sea; I am the one of Sinai!"[45] This seems quite plausibly an allusion to Christians who would read the Daniel passage as referring to one like a Son of Man (the warrior at the Sea; the Son) and an Ancient

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[43] Hayward, *Divine Name and Presence*, 31.

[44] Segal, *Powers*, 37. Segal prefers to analyze the shorter version of the *Mekhilta DeRashbi*. However, it is almost certain that this text is dependent on the earlier *Mekhilta d'Rabbi Ishmaʿel* and frequently misunderstands his sources, as held with respect to this passage by Jacob Z. Lauterbach, "Some Clarifications on the Mekhilta," in *Sefer Klausner Maasaf le-Mada: Ule-Sifrut Yafah Mugash le-Prof. Josef Klausner le-Yobel Ha-Shishim* (ed. N. H. Torczyner et al.; Tel-Aviv: Hozaat Va ad-Hayobel, 1937 [Hebrew]), 181–88; and strongly demonstrated recently in general by Menahem Kahana, *Two Mekhiltot on the Amalek Portion: The Originality of the Version of the Mekhilta De'Rabbi Ishma'el with Respect to the Mekhilta of Rabbi Shim on Ben Yohay* (Jerusalem: Hotsa'at sefarim a. sh. Y. L. Magnes, ha-Universitah ha-'Ivrit, Keren ha-Rav David Mosheh ve-'Amalyah Rozen, 1999 [Hebrew]).

[45] *Pesiq. Rab.* 21 100b.

of Days (the judge at Sinai; the Father), not least owing to the pejorative reference to the interlocutor as "whoreson," a charge that since Celsus at least had been known as a Jewish calumny against Jesus.[46] Jewish/Christian binitarianism is being answered, therefore, by rabbinic Modalism; or rather, Jewish/Christian Modalism is being constructed as Jewish, Jewish/Christian binitarianism as *minut*.[47]

Interestingly enough, Justin's construction of Trypho and his teachers as the opponents of Logos theology can be seen as precisely part of the same cultural "conspiracy." That is, both the Rabbis and Justin agree that the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy, or between Judaism and Christianity (and vice-versa), is marked by the signifier of the Logos. The rabbinic text could almost be the answer of a very articulate and learned Trypho against the Logos theology of Justin or the Christology of the Fourth Gospel.[48] The whole point of this text is to combat the "heresy" that there are two Gods, two Powers in Heaven, God and his Logos or Son (of Man), by offering what is a Modalist solution: the seeming appearance of two persons is only a manifestation of different aspects of the same person. That which Hayward took to be the problem of the Midrash, the dual appearance of the name H' in the verse, is precisely the solution: both appearances are the same God, the same hypostasis. As in the Christian Modalist "heresy," the Rabbis believe in "one identical Godhead Which could be designated indifferently Father [Old Man] or Son [Mighty Hero]; the terms did not stand for real distinctions, but were mere names applicable at different times."[49]

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[46] As argued, correctly in my view, by R. Travers Herford, *Christianity in Talmud & Midrash* (1903; repr., New York: KTAV, 1978), 304, as well as by Jacob Z. Lauterbach, *Rabbinic Essays* (New York: KTAV, 1973), 549. Oddly, Segal claims both that a "gnostic impulse" was the cause of the redaction of this text (*Powers*, 54) and then later, "'two powers' refers to Christians and not extreme gnostics" (*Powers*, 58), on the basis of the same passage. I obviously agree with the latter point and not the former. See too Wolfson, *Through a Speculum*, 39–40.

[47] For at least a hint that Modalism is the dominant rabbinic doctrine of God, see Elliot R. Wolfson, "Judaism and Incarnation: The Imaginal Body of God," in *Christianity in Jewish Terms* (Radical Traditions; ed. T. S. Frymer-Kensky; Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2000), 239–54, esp. 241.

[48] I am accordingly in great sympathy with the line of argument taken by Díez Macho in general and particularly in A. Díez Macho, "El Logos y el Espíritu Santo," *Atlántida* 1 (1963): 381–96, esp. 392.

[49] J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (rev. ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 120.

It now becomes clear why midrashim of this period, especially in covert or overt polemic against Christianity, designate God fairly routinely as "The One Who Spoke and the World Was." This is a name for God that resists *Memra* or Logos interpretations of Genesis 1, and, therefore, a designation for God that serves to displace *Memra* theology, naming it implicitly as the "heresy" of "Two Powers."[50] Although Hayward is absolutely correct in his assertion that "the identity of those who taught that there were two *ršwywt* [powers] in heaven is uncertain: favourite candidates have included Gnostics and Judaeo-Christians,"[51] for this particular text, there really is little doubt to whom the reference is. The text tells us who its opponents are: "The Nations of the World," which in this midrash (and other works of this period, the late third century) refers to Christians and in particular Gentile Christians.[52] However, insofar as we have seen that *Memra*/Logos theology is not a Gentile product, or even a specifically Christian product in its origins, this rabbinic text represents the movement of repudiation of which I have been speaking. That which is a difference *within* Judaism is projected onto an external other, not only Christian, but Gentile Christian, referred to as the "Nations of the World" to distance it from Israel, to render its binary opposition to Israel even more unequivocal, a virtual given.

As in Christian heresiology, the difference within has been renominated a contamination from without. As in Christian heresiology, where *disbelief* in "Two Powers in Heaven," so-called Sabellianism, Modalism, or Monarchianism ("One Power in Heaven"), is named—accurately—"Judaism,"[53] to produce a binary opposition between the inside and the outside of Christianity and to disavow the threatening

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[50] This was surely not the most common or general designation for the deity in rabbinic texts. Thus, for instance, the slightly earlier Mishna usually refers to God as "Heaven." This shift in the midrashic literature of the latter half of the third century seems to me significant, therefore, particularly as it comes in texts that can be otherwise arguably read as anti-Christian propaganda.

[51] Hayward, *Divine Name and Presence*, 31.

[52] Daniel Boyarin, *Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism* (The Lancaster/Yarnton Lectures in Judaism and Other Religions for 1998; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 113. For this identification, see also Yuval, *Nations*, 91 n. 111.

[53] Note that according to Hippolytus, Noetus (the most important of the early modalists) used the same verses to argue against the Second Person that the Rabbis used against Two Powers heretics; Segal, *Powers*, 229.

difference within (the Modalists "argued that the Power issuing from the Godhead was distinct only verbally or in name"),[54] here in the rabbinic text the *belief* in "Two Powers in Heaven" is being excommunicated from within Judaism and named (albeit slightly, but *only* slightly obliquely) as "Christianity." "Modalism" is, of course, rabbinic Jewish orthodoxy: All doubleness and all difference within God suggested by the Bible are to be understood, according to the Rabbis, as only aspects of the one God.

In other "Judaisms" (including some later versions of rabbinic Judaism), this was not the case. Daniel Abrams has recently named this a virtually perennial issue in Jewish conceptions of God:

> One of the central aspects of Jewish theology, and Jewish mysticism in particular, is the conception of the nature of God's being and the appearance of the divine before humanity. No one view has dominated the spectrum of Jewish interpretations, since the biblical text is the only common frame for the wide variety of speculations. At issue is whether the one God depicted in the Hebrew Bible is manifest to humans directly or through the agency of a divine, semidivine, or created power.[55]

Elliot Wolfson, in a typically brilliant reconstruction, has shown that in rabbinic and extra-rabbinic traditions of Jewish late antiquity (including texts of the Gnosis falsely so-called), Jacob himself, the Father of Israel, is recognized as precisely a second divine figure.[56] If prior to the rabbinic intervention a Jew could believe comfortably in the Logos or Wisdom or Metatron[57] or Yaho'el or the supernal

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[54] Kelly, *Doctrines*, 119–20. For a fine succinct discussion of Modalism, see Kelly, *Doctrines*, 119–23.

[55] Daniel Abrams, "The Boundaries of Divine Ontology: The Inclusion and Exclusion of Metatron in the Godhead," *HTR* 87 (1994): 291–321, here 291.

[56] Elliot R. Wolfson, "The Image of Jacob Engraved Upon the Throne: Further Reflection on the Esoteric Doctrine of the German Pietists," in *Along the Path: Studies in Kabbalistic Myth, Symbolism, and Hermeneutics* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1995), 4–7 and throughout. See especially his statement: "In the earliest sources the motif of the icon of Jacob engraved on the throne may have been related to the hypostatization of the Logos" (18).

[57] In this context fit as well Enoch traditions. As Abrams has again phrased the point well: "Moshe Idel has drawn our attention to texts that understand Enoch to be the angelic figure of Metatron and yet others where Metatron is identified with God, bridging all the gaps between humanity and God" ("Metatron," 292–93; citing Moshe Idel, "Enoch is Metatron," *Imm* 24/25 [1990]: 220–40). See also Gedaliahu Stroumsa, "Form(s) of God: Some Notes on Metatron and Christ," *HTR* 76 (1983): 269–88.

Jacob as a hypostasized virtual second God,[58] once the denial of such beliefs had been named "Judaism" by Christians in order to set themselves off theologically from Jews, the countermove for rabbinic Jews resisting Christianity was an obvious one. "Two Powers in Heaven" became the primary heresy for the Rabbis, and Modalism, the Christian heresy par excellence, became the only "orthodox" theology allowed to Jews. We could, moreover, almost as easily describe the developments in the opposite direction, namely that Christianity insisted on separate persons and rejected modalism as a response to the rabbinic insistence that binitarianism was equal to ditheism. In this context, it is important to remind ourselves that Justin himself and other "orthodox" theologians of the second century were constantly defending themselves against charges from other Christians that their theology was ditheistic.[59] The same process of splitting between Christian and Christian, with one group being marked as not-Christian and thus Jews, can thus be seen at work.

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[58] Idel, *Messianic Mystics*, 85–94. Almost unbelievably we learn there of a medieval Jewish mystic who writes, "'Enoch is Metatron' . . . and the first name out of the seventy names of Metatron is Yaho'el whose secret is Ben [Son!]" (85). As Idel remarks compellingly, it is impossible to imagine that in the Christian Middle Ages an orthodox Jewish thinker would have produced such a "dangerously" Christian-sounding text, and therefore we must almost perforce be dealing with a mythologoumenon from the time when Judaism and Christianity were not yet distinct theological entities, when it was still possible for the second God to be referred to as the "Son" by "Jewish" writers. It is not the Logos that distinguishes "Judaism" from "Christianity." See also Nathaniel Deutsch, *The Gnostic Imagination: Gnosticism, Mandaeism, and Merkabah Mysticism* (Brill's Series in Jewish Studies; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 98; and Gedaliahu Stroumsa, *Savoir et salut* (Paris: Cerf, 1992), 58–59. As Idel perspicaciously puts the possibilities: "How early such a text was is difficult to calculate. Whether this text reflects a pre-Christian Jewish concept of the angelic son who possesses or constitutes the divine name is also hard to ascertain. If late, the Christian, or Jewish-Christian, nature of such a Hebrew text cannot be doubted" (*Messianic Mystics*, 87). But in any case, stunningly, it cannot be doubted that it remained in the end part and parcel of a non-Christian "Jewish" traditional mythologoumenon/theologoumenon. The reader, interested in early Christology, who reads these pages of Idel's work will be, I think, illuminated. Another important example of the same phenomenon, of distinctly christological motifs preserved in early medieval Kabbalistic texts, is exposed in Elliot R. Wolfson, "The Tree That is All: Jewish-Christian Roots of a Kabbalistic Symbol in Sefer Ha-Bahir," in *Along the Path*, 63–88. Also, Wolfson, "Judaism and Incarnation," 244–46 is very important.

[59] See Hippolytus, *Haer.* 9.7 (*ANF* 5:130):

> And having even venom imbedded in his heart, and forming no correct opinion on any subject, and yet withal being ashamed to speak the truth, this Callistus, not only on account of his publicly saying in the way of reproach to us, "Ye are Ditheists," but also on account of his being frequently accused

Over and over again, in contexts within which the Targum has the activity of the *Memra*, the rabbinic midrash has the designation of God as "He who spake and the world was," thus constituting a most impressive body of important evidence for the tacit, but nonetheless vigorous, repudiation of *Memra* theology on the part of the Rabbis. At Exod 4:31, the *Targum Neofiti* reads:[60] "And Israel saw the mighty hand which the LORD performed on the Egyptians, and the people were afraid from before the Lord and believed in the name of the *Memra* of the LORD, and the prophecy of Moses his servant," while the same midrash that I have cited above, the *Mekhilta*, comments:

> *And they believed in the Lord and in his servant Moses.* If you say that they believed in Moses, is it not implied by *Kal vaḥomer* that they believed in God? But this is to teach you that having faith in the shepherd of Israel is the same as having faith in Him who spoke and the world came into being. . . . Great indeed is faith before *Him who spoke and the world came into being.* (*Bešallaḥ* 6)[61]

In other words, once more, precisely in a context in which the targumic tradition refers to the *Memra* as a hypostasis, a person of the

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by Sabellius, as one that had transgressed his first faith, devised some such heresy as the following. Callistus alleges that the Logos Himself is Son, and that Himself is Father; and that though denominated by a different title, yet that in reality He is one indivisible spirit. And he maintains that the Father is not one person and the Son another, but that they are one and the same; and that all things are full of the Divine Spirit, both those above and those below. And he affirms that the Spirit, which became incarnate in the virgin, is not different from the Father, but one and the same. And he adds, that this is what has been declared by the Saviour: "Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?" For that which is seen, which is man, he considers to be the Son; whereas the Spirit, which was contained in the Son, to be the Father. "For," says (Callistus), "I will not profess belief in two Gods, Father and Son, but in one. For the Father, who subsisted in the Son Himself, after He had taken unto Himself our flesh, raised it to the nature of Deity, by bringing it into union with Himself, and made it one; so that Father and Son must be styled one God, and that this Person being one, cannot be two."

[60] Hayward, *Divine Name and Presence*, 82. Hayward himself wishes to learn from here a point directly opposite to mine. For Hayward the designation of God as "He who spake and the world was" is "intimately bound up with the Targumic Memra" (87), a point with which I certainly agree, seeing it, however, in direct contrast to Hayward, as the denial of the Memra, and not as its assertion. It is not the Memra, the Logos, the Word, that does these activities, say the Rabbis, but God himself, the God who spake and the world was, without any intermediary hypostasized Word.

[61] Lauterbach, *Mekilta DeRabbi Ishmael*, 1:252.

Godhead, the rabbinic midrash insists on referring to YHWH as the one who spoke and the world was. Do not follow those Jewish traditions that understand Genesis 1 as describing a creative Word, a *Memra*, a Logos, separate from God, say the Rabbis implicitly, as is their wont, but rather understand that God (I was almost tempted to write "the Father") is the only creator, and his word is no more separate from him than any speech from its speaker. In an astonishing convergence, however, Nicene orthodoxy also effectively "crucifies the Logos." While not ceasing to speak of the Logos, in the move to a trinitarian theology within which the entire trinity is both self-contained and fully transcendent, Athanasius and his fellows insist that God alone, without a mediator, without an angel, without a Logos, is the creator. Logos theology is, ultimately, as thoroughly rejected within Nicene Christianity as within orthodox rabbinism.[62]

II. The Apostasy of Rabbi Akiva

The heresiological energy that was being expended within rabbinic circles to produce the heresy of "Two Powers in Heaven"—that is, to externalize, Christianize, the internal theologoumena of a second or assistant God—helps us understand some rabbinic texts that are otherwise mysterious.[63] One of the most evocative and revealing of these texts involves the heresy of Rabbi Aqiva in a discussion about the "Son of Man" passage from Daniel:

> One verse reads: "His throne is sparks of fire" (Dan 7:9) and another [part of the] verse reads, "until thrones were set up and the Ancient of Days sat" (7:9). This is no difficulty: One was for him and one was for David. As we learn in a *baraita*: One for him and one for David; these are the words of Rabbi Aqiva. Rabbi Yose the Galilean said to him: Aqiva! Until when will you make the *Shekhina* profane?! Rather. One was for judging and one was for mercy. Did he accept it from him, or did he not? Come and hear! One for judging and one for mercy, these are the words of Rabbi Aqiva. (*b. Ḥag.* 14a)

As we see from this passage, the second-century Rabbi Aqiva is portrayed as interpreting these verses in a way that certainly would seem

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[62] Virginia Burrus, *"Begotten, not made": Conceiving Manhood in Late Antiquity* (Figurae; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

[63] Segal, *Powers*, 47–49.

consistent with "Two Powers in Heaven." The crux is his identification of David, the Messiah, as the "Son of Man" who sits at God's right hand,[64] thus suggesting not only a divine figure but one who is incarnate in a human being as well[65]—"I am [the Messiah] and you shall see 'the son of man' sitting on the right hand of power and coming in the clouds of heaven" (Mark 14:62). Hence, his objector's taunt: "Until when will you make the Divine Presence profane"?![66] Rabbi Aqiva is seemingly also projecting a divine-human, Son of Man, who will be the Messiah. His contemporary R. Yose the Galilean (perhaps a more assiduous reader of the Gospels) strenuously objects to Rabbi Aqiva's "dangerous" interpretation and gives the verse a "Modalist" interpretation. Of course, the Talmud itself must record that Rabbi Aqiva changed his mind in order for him to remain "orthodox." "Two Powers in Heaven" is thus not foreign even at the very heart of the rabbinic enterprise. Even a figure like Rabbi Aqiva has to be educated as to the heretical nature of his position.[67]

It is not too much to suggest, I think, that the pressure against "Rabbi Aqiva's" position was generated by the hardening of Logos theology and its variants into Christology as that was beginning to take place in the second century. "Orthodox" Jewish versions of this theological option must then be "corrected"—not incidentally with many of the techniques which Christians in the post-Nicene era were to use in order to produce the "Fathers" as speaking with one theological voice.[68] Segal also writes, "By the third century . . . the rabbis seem to be fully aware of the kinds of claims that could be made

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[64] As it is almost impossible not to hear echoes of Ps 110:1 here or of the story of *Aḥer* who sees Metatron sitting at God's right hand and writing the merits of Israel. But if this seems over-reading, I can let go of it and the point still stands if a bit less elegantly.

[65] Segal, *Powers*, 47.

[66] Segal writes that "both apocalyptic Jews and Christians can be shown to combine the angelic or divine interpretations of the passage with their messianic candidate" (*Powers*, 49). *Pace* Segal, the doctrine of God's two attributes is not used here as a remedy to Messianism per se but as a remedy to binitarianism.

[67] Moreover, as pointed out by Segal, "nor was R. Akiva alone in the rabbinic movement in identifying the figure in heaven as the messiah" (*Powers*, 48).

[68] E.g., "the coercive inscription of consensuality by which an authoritative patristic body of literature is continually reconstituted as such—not least via lengthy catenae of citations meant to demonstrate widespread ancient unanimity on a given point" (Burrus, *Begotten*, 16); see also Patrick T. R. Gray, "'The Select Fathers':

about a 'son of man' or Metatron or any other principal angel. So they reject the idea of divine intermediaries totally."[69] I would agree with Segal but argue that there is important evidence that they did not do so entirely successfully. In the late-ancient mystical text known as "The Visions of Ezekiel," a secondary divine figure, Metatron, is posited on the grounds of Dan 7:9f. This is the same figure who in other texts of that genre is called "The Youth," נער, i.e., that figure known by other Jews (e.g., the Fourth Evangelist) as the "Son of Man"![70] Putting together the different bits and pieces that other scholars have constructed into a new mosaic, I would suggest that we have a very important clue here to follow. From the text in Daniel it would seem clear that there are two divine figures pictured, one who is ancient and another one who is young. "Son of Man" here in its paradigmatic contrast with the Ancient of Days should be read as youth, young man (as it is even in the rabbinic texts that deny that it represents a second person). The usage is similar to "sons of doves" meaning young of the dove as in Num 6:10. It should be noted that the figure of the "Youth" appears as well (at least once) in texts accepted into the rabbinic canon itself, such as *Num. Rab.* 12:12, and explicitly denoted there as Metatron.[71] We end up with

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Canonizing the Patristic Past," *StPatr* 23 (1989): 21–36; Mark Vessey, "The Forging of Orthodoxy in Latin Christian Literature: A Case Study," *JECS* 4 (1996): 495–513; Éric Rebillard, "A New Style of Argument in Christian Polemic: Augustine and the Use of Patristic Citations," *JECS* 8 (2000): 559–78. My point is not, of course, that rabbinic culture was less "coercive" in its "consensuality," just that different textual strategies were mobilized to secure that consent.

[69] Segal, *Powers*, 71.

[70] Ibid., 67. See Nathaniel Deutsch, *Guardians of the Gate: Angelic Vice Regency in Late Antiquity* (Brill's Series in Jewish Studies; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 45–46, from whose discussion it would seem that Metatron is paradoxically the Ancient of Days here (and not the Son of Man), a development that I am at a loss to understand, nor am I convinced that it is a necessary one in the context. The rabbinic texts that Deutsch adduces to indicate identification of the Youth (Son of Man) and the Ancient of Days seem to me less than relevant since they are primarily evidence, on my view, precisely for rabbinic Modalism, in contrast and in opposition to the distinction of persons in the other texts. I thus thoroughly disagree with Deutsch's conflation of the rabbinic virtual polemic against binitarianism with binitarianism itself. Somewhat polemically myself, I daresay that more sustained reading of these texts together with early Christian traditions would reveal much that is left obscure in most scholarly treatments of them (as well, perhaps, as obscuring some matters that are revealed in contemporary scholarship).

[71] *Contra* Segal, *Powers*, 67, who claims that the name נער is never used in this sense in rabbinic literature (unless I have misread him).

a clear indication of a second divine person, called the Youth (Son of Man), about whom it can be discussed whether he is *homoousios*, *homoiousios*, *homoion*, or *anomoion* with the first person. When he is called or calls himself the "Son of Man," this is a citation of the Daniel text. He is called the "Youth," i.e., the "Son of Man," in contrast to the "Ancient of Days."[72] These traditions all understand accordingly that two divine figures are portrayed in Daniel 7, whom we might be tempted to call the Father and the Son. Evidence for this concatenation of Enoch, Metatron, and the Son of Man can be adduced from *1 Enoch* 71, in which Enoch is explicitly addressed as the Son of Man, and Enoch is, of course, Metatron before his apotheosis.[73] Non-rabbinic and even anti-rabbinic ideas (that is, ideas that the Rabbis themselves mark as heretical) appear more than occasionally in the heart of rabbinic literature.[74] It is not, then, as Segal would have it, that "other groups beside Christians were making 'dangerous' interpretations of that verse [Dan 7:9]," as that this commonplace of theological, mystical hermeneutics had become dangerous to the Rabbis and had to be expelled from its original home. For Segal, the "enemy" is still outside, external, marginal to the rabbinic community and religious world: "Identifying the specific group about whom the rabbis were concerned in this passage can not be successful."[75] He still worries that "determining the identity of the group of heretics in question remains a serious problem,"[76] as if there *were* a real group of external heretics to whom the texts refer, while from my point of view, the Rabbis are implicitly saying: We have met the heretics and they are us, expelling the Two-Powers heresy from within themselves. Although he uses the point to slightly different purpose, I would endorse the formulation of Nathaniel Deutsch who writes with respect to the same texts that Segal treats and which I

[72] Although Scholem famously interpreted "youth" in these contexts as "servant," there is little warrant for this interpretation; David J. Halperin, "A Sexual Image in Hekhalot Rabbati and Its Implications," *Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought* 6 (1987): 117–32, esp. 125.

[73] See on this also Deutsch, *Guardians*, 32. For Metatron as Enoch, see Idel, "Enoch."

[74] Cf. "The line between rabbinic and Hekhalot literature is sometimes difficult to discern" (Deutsch, *Guardians*, 49).

[75] Segal, *Powers*, 71.

[76] Ibid., 55.

read here: "The reification of boundaries, therefore, rather than their crossing, is the goal of these passages."[77]

I would read the famous narrative of Elisha ben Abuya's apostasy, in the sequel to the story of Rabbi Aqiva—where, upon seeing a vision of the glorious being named Metatron sitting at the right hand of God, he concluded that there are "Two Powers in Heaven" and became a heretic—as a further oblique recognition and allegorical representation of the fact that this heresy was once comfortably *within* "Judaism" and has only lately become *Aḥer*, "Other"—*Aḥer* being, of course, the pejorative nickname for this once "kosher" Rabbi after his turn to "heresy." A brief look at this text will help make this point. According to the Talmud:

> Our Rabbis have taught: Four went into the *Pardes*, and who are they? Ben 'Azzai and Ben Zoma, *Aḥer*, and Rabbi Aqiva. . . . *Aḥer* chopped down the shoots. Rabbi Aqiva came out safely. . . .
>
> '*Aḥer* chopped down the shoots': Of him the verse says, "Do not let your mouth cause your flesh to sin" [Qoh 5:5]. What does this mean? He saw that Metatron had been given permission to sit and write the good deeds of Israel. He said, but it is taught that on high there will be no sitting, no competition, no . . ., and no tiredness! Perhaps, G-d forbid, there are two powers! They took Metatron out and whipped him with sixty whips of fire. They said to him: "What is the reason that when you saw him, you did not get up before him?" He was given permission to erase the good deeds of *Aḥer*. A voice came out from heaven and said: Return O backsliding ones [Jer 3:14, 22]—except for *Aḥer*. He said, "Since that man has been driven out of that world, let him go out and enjoy himself in this world!" He went out to evil culture. He went and found a prostitute and solicited her. She said, "But aren't you Elisha ben Abuya!?" He went and uprooted a radish on the Sabbath and gave it to her. She said, "He is an other [*Aḥer*]." (*b. Ḥag.* 15a)

This is a remarkable story that, as can well be imagined, has excited much scholarly attention. Yehuda Liebes emphasizes correctly that it is impossible to see this as a narrative of a real Elisha who joined a heretical sect.[78] Segal nicely observes that "in its present context

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[77] Deutsch, *Guardians*, 48. Deutsch is referring to the ontological boundaries between divine and human that the texts reify, while I, to the social boundaries between orthodox and heretical. It can be seen that the two reifications are homologous.

[78] Yehuda Liebes, *The Sin of Elisha: Four Who Entered* Pardes *and the Nature of Talmudic Mysticism* (Jerusalem: Academon, 1990 [Hebrew]), 12.

[the story] is an etiology of heresy. It explains how certain people, who had special Metatron traditions, risk the heretical designation of 'two powers in heaven.'"[79] This can be pushed a bit further. The structural comparison with Christian etiologies of heresy and heresiarchs suggests that, like those, *Aḥer* represents older theological traditions which have been anathematized as heresy by the authors of the story. Almost certainly underlying *Aḥer*/Elisha's vision of Metatron is the same passage in Daniel that "misled" Rabbi Aqiva, taking the "One like a Son of Man" as a separate person. The latter's error was hermeneutical/theological, the former's is visionary/theological, but the error is essentially precisely the same, the assumption that the second throne is for a second divine figure. Whether called Metatron or David, the second divine figure is the Son of Man.[80] Locating this "heretical" interpretation right at the heart of the rabbinic academy and indeed among some of its leading figures strongly suggests that these views had been current in the very Jewish circles from which the Rabbis emerged and were eventually anathematized by them and driven out. Metatron is punished by being scourged with sixty *pulse* of fire. As we learn from *b. B. Meṣi'a* 47a, this practice (whatever it quite means in terms of *realia*) represents a particularly dire form of anathema or even excommunication. The dual inscription of excommunication in the narrative, that of Metatron on the one hand and of his "devotee" on the other, suggests strongly to me that it is the belief in this figure as second divine principle that is being anathematized (although somehow the Rabbis seem unable to completely dispense with him—he was just too popular it would seem).

A further parallel is instructive. In an amazing passage in *b. Yoma* 77a, which I cannot discuss here at length, the archangel Gabriel is

[79] Segal, *Powers*, 62.

[80] According to this reading, it is the "sitting" that is the crux of the matter, as it invokes the Daniel 7 passage as interpreted, e.g., in Mark, with the "Son of Man" sitting at the right hand of God, the source of Rabbi Aqiva's "error" as well (see above). This passage deserves a longer treatment than I can give it here, particularly in the light of questionable interpretations of the textual evidence that have been offered recently (see Deutsch, *Guardians*, 48–77). Since these interpretations rely on variant readings within the Ashkenazi manuscript tradition as relating to different stages of redaction within the rabbinic period, they rest on a very weak reed, but fuller demonstration of this point as well as reinterpretation will have to wait for another context.

taken out to be scourged with the sixty *pulse*, because he acted independently of the divine will, another seeming case of "Two Powers in Heaven." Note that in that story, as opposed to the *Aḥer* one, the *possibility* of the high angel acting independently is comprehended. It is almost as if not only the heresy of Two Powers but also the Second Power itself is being suppressed in these accounts. The statement that Rabbi Aqiva came out safely (lit. "in peace"), while *Aḥer* died in infamy, would, on this possible but by no means proven interpretation, then represent a Rabbi Aqiva who turned away from "heresy" to orthodoxy and an Elisha who remained adamant in the old views.

The two others who entered *Pardes* [the Garden, Paradise] with Rabbi Aqiva and *Aḥer* in search of enlightenment were Ben Zoma and Ben ʿAzzai. Of one we are told that he died and of the other that he became insane. Is it accidental that we read then in *Genesis Rabbah* the following astounding text: "Rabbi Levi said: There are among the expounders [דרושות], those who expound, for instance Ben Zoma and Ben ʿAzzai, that the voice of the Holy, Blessed One became Metatron on the water, as it is written, 'The voice of God is on the water' [Ps 29:3]."[81] This extraordinary passage "remembers," as it were, that such central rabbinic figures, whose halakhic opinions are authoritatively cited in the classic rabbinic literature, were, like Rabbi Aqiva himself, champions of a distinct Logos theology which had to be somehow warded off via the legendary narrative of their bad end. Only Rabbi Aqiva repented of his former views, and therefore, we are told, only he of the four "entered in peace and left in peace" (*b. Ḥag.* 14b). All four of the relevant Rabbis made statements indicating that they had believed in a *deuteros theos*. The *Pardes* is not, therefore, on this reading, so much the site of mystical experience, or of philosophical speculation, but the trace of the ancient Logos theology. It seems hardly irrelevant that it is on this very page of the Talmud that we are told that "the world was created with ten Words," which became afterwards the main prooftext for the mystical doctrine of the hypostases (ספירות).[82]

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[81] *Gen. Rab.* 5.

[82] Daniel Abrams, *"The Book of Illumination" of R. Jacob Ben Jacob HaKohen: A Synoptic Edition from Various Manuscripts* (New York: New York University, 1993 [Hebrew]), 70. For another recent discussion of the "*Aḥer*" material, see Abrams, "Metatron,"

Segal claims that: "Rabbinic theology could withstand, and may even have encouraged, the mythic or dramatic depiction of God's attributes in various forms, including at times a *logos*-like manifestation, depicted as an angelic being such as Metatron" and, moreover, that "those who adopt a more literal view of the rabbis' view of divine unity may find any hint of plurality to be heretical. Here, however, I argue that the rabbis objected only to an opposition or competition of wills."[83] To claim this, however, is to assume that there is no opposition or competition of wills *among the Rabbis*. There are places indeed where *some* Rabbis' "theology could withstand, and may even have encouraged, the mythic or dramatic depiction of God's attributes in various forms, including at times a *logos*-like manifestation," but this view was vigorously disputed and finally ousted by other Rabbis, at least in its more obvious forms. This perspective obviates the need to draw a distinction between two different versions of "Two Powers" theology, one acceptable and one unacceptable.[84] Our story of Rabbi Aqiva's "heresy" certainly does not suggest a "Gnostic" version of "Two Powers" in opposition to the other, but rather a very "Christian"-appearing version in which the second power is precisely the "Son of Man" doing his Father's will by inscribing Israel's virtues.[85] This story of Rabbi Aqiva and his fel-

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293–98. Dunn, in contrast, still speaks of "the emergence of the 'two powers heresy,'" in James D. G. Dunn, *The Partings of the Ways Between Christianity and Judaism and Their Significance for the Character of Christianity* (London: SCM Press, 1991), 219, which, of course, I would regard rather as the rabbinic projection and abjection of the Two Powers heresy. This is doubly surprising, in that Dunn's view of the history of Judaism is nuanced enough to contain a statement like, "the period between 70 and 100 saw the first proponents of rabbinic Judaism taking a deliberate step to mark themselves off from other claimants to the broad heritage of pre-70 Judaism" (Dunn, *Partings*, 221), a formulation with which I would completely agree in spite of dating this development quite a bit later than Dunn does, given the methodology—which Dunn himself insists on elsewhere—of dating material in rabbinic texts as roughly pertaining to the time of attestation and not the time of which the text speaks. This difference in dating is, of course, highly significant, because insofar as Dunn allows himself to credit certain developments, such as the introduction of the "curse of the heretics," to the "historical Yavneh" and to see these as representing a growing early consensus in Judaism, he will predate "partings of the ways" far earlier than I would.

[83] Segal, *Powers*, 298.

[84] Cf. Segal, *Powers*, 5–6.

[85] Cf. Dunn, *Partings*, 218–19; and a small library of prior literature.

lows constitutes, on this reading, a highly compressed synecdoche of the process of the repudiation of Logos theology.[86]

Further evidence for the notion that Logos theology was a once-accepted but now rejected theologoumenon within rabbinic circles is constituted by remnants (almost revenants) of that very theology within the texts. A very rich example has been discussed by Azzan Yadin.[87] The text in question is to be found in the *y. Sukkah* 1:1 [51,d] (with a parallel in the same text at *y. Šabb.* 1:2 [2,d]):[88]

> Rabbi Abbahu teaches in the name of Rabbi Shim'on ben Laqish: "There I will meet you and I will speak to you from above the cover of the Ark from between the two cherubim" (Ex 25:22). And it is written, "You have seen that I spoke to you from the heavens" (Ex 20:19). Just as the verse cited there refers to a different domain [*reshut*], so the verse here refers to a different domain [*reshut*].

As Yadin points out, the term *reshut* (the same term as that used for "Two Powers"), which I have translated here "domain," is ambiguous in reference. Sometimes it can mean a legal domain, in the sense of a territory controlled by a particular instance of ownership or authority. The Palestinian Talmud emphasizes this meaning in using this verse to prove that when God spoke from above the cover of the Ark, this demonstrates that the Ark constitutes a separate domain of control within the Temple precincts. However, as Yadin emphasizes, this usage of the midrash within the halakhic context of the Talmud is very forced and artificial: "The significance of this rather

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[86] Compare the similar conclusion, expressed in different theoretical terms, of Segal himself:

> Since the tradition comes to us only in a later text, we must be prepared to accept the probability that the alternate interpretation of Dan 7:9f.—namely, that the two thrones were for mercy and justice—was a later addition, ascribing the 'orthodox' interpretation to a great rabbinic leader, whom time had proven wrong. Thus, the messianic controversy over Dan 7:13 is probably from R. Akiba's time; the mercy-justice revision is probably from his students." (*Powers*, 49)

Once again, and with the risk of introducing tedium, the way that my formulation would be different would be precisely by shifting "time had proven wrong" to something like, the rabbinic production of orthodoxy was being enacted through this story of Rabbi Aqiva's error and his reproof and repentance.

[87] Azzan Yadin, "'Two Verses Contradict and a Third Resolves': The Theological Dimension of Rabbi Ishmael's 'Shnei Ketuvim'," *JSQ* (2003): forthcoming.

[88] I have used Yadin's translation but modified it here and there.

forced series of arguments is that the *derashah* was not generated by the previously established height of the Ark. Instead, the Palestinian Talmud is making a concerted effort to contextualize Resh Laqish's [third-century] *derashah* in a halakhic context (the height of ten *tefaḥ* marks the end of one *reshut* and the beginning of another) not provided by the *derashah* itself."[89] This argument to the effect that the present use of the *derashah* is not and cannot be its "original" meaning and, indeed, that concerted effort is being made to neutralize the original meanings suggests to Yadin that the midrash originally was making use of another sense of *reshut*, the sense in which it is used in the context of discussion of the "heresy" of "Two Powers [*reshuyot*] in Heaven," reconciling the two verses (one that indicates that God spoke from the heaven and one that He came down, as it were, to speak below) by suggesting that the Speaker who spoke below is not the speaker who spoke above. To represent this well-known sense of *reshut*, Yadin cites the following evocative text:

> "See, then, that I, I am He" (Deut 32:39): This is the refutation to those who say that there is no *reshut* (i.e., atheists who claim that there is no power in heaven). He who says that there are two powers in heaven is refuted by saying it has already been written, "There is no God beside Me" (Deut 32:39). (*Sifre Deut.* 329)[90]

Yadin concludes his discussion by referring to this instance in the Palestinian Talmud as "an acceptable, legal understanding camouflaging a no-longer acceptable theological position."[91] Thus, the theology of "Two Powers in Heaven" (a High God and an intermediary for creation, revelation, and redemption, as we still find in the *Memra* theology of the Targums) was once, at least, an acceptable theological current within the circles from which the Rabbis and their theologies grew, but was offered up, as it were, in the dual production of rabbinic Judaism as Judaism and patristic Christianity as Christianity.

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[89] Yadin, "Two Verses."

[90] *Sifre on Deuteronomy* (ed. L. Finkelstein; 1939; repr., New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1969), 379.

[91] Yadin, "Two Verses."

III. Justin's Jewish Heresiology

As one very telling piece of evidence for the idea that there was a virtual "conspiracy" between the Rabbis and the Christian discourse of orthodoxy, I would adduce the apparent fact it is in Justin Martyr that we find for the first time *hairesis* in the sense of "heresy" attributed to Jewish usage as well. In the *Dialogue*, Justin addresses the Jew Trypho in attempting to convince him of the existence of the Logos:

> I will again relate words spoken by Moses, from which we can recognize without any question that He conversed with one different in number from Himself and possessed of reason. Now these are the words: *And God said: Behold, Adam has become as one of Us, to know good and evil.* Therefore by saying *as one of Us* He has indicated also number in those that were present together, two at least. *For I cannot consider that assertion true which is affirmed by what you call an heretical party among you, and cannot be proved by the teachers of that heresy* [Οὐ γὰρ ὅπερ ἡ παρ' ὑμῖν λεγομένη αἵρεσις δογματίζει φαίην ἂν ἐγὼ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἢ οἱ ἐκείνης διδάσκαλοι ἀποδεῖξαι δύνανται], that He was speaking to angels, or that the human body was the work of angels. (*Dial.* 62.2)[92]

Justin quotes Gen 3:22 to prevent the Jewish teachers' "distortion" of Gen 1:26, "let us make," since in the later verse it is impossible to interpret that God is speaking to the elements or to himself. In order, however, to demonstrate that his interpretation whether God is speaking to the Logos is the only possible one, Justin has to discard another possible reading that some Jewish teachers, those whom Trypho himself would refer to as an *hairesis*, have offered but cannot prove: that God was speaking to angels.

The text is extremely difficult, and the Williams translation does not seem exact, but nevertheless periphrastically captures the sense of the passage. A more precise translation, although still difficult, would be: "For I cannot consider that assertion true which is affirmed by what you call an *hairesis* among you, or that the teachers of it are able to demonstrate."[93] "It" in the second clause can only refer

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[92] *Justin Martyr: The Dialogue with Trypho* (Translations of Christian Literature; ed. and trans. A. L. Williams; London: SPCK, 1930), 129; *Dialogus Cum Tryphone* (Patristische Texte und Studien 47; ed. M. Marcovich; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1997), 176–77, emphasis added.

[93] I am grateful for Erich Gruen's and Chava Boyarin's help with construing this

to *hairesis*, so Williams's translation is essentially correct, although somewhat smoothed out. Justin cannot consider the assertion true, nor can he consider that the teachers of the *hairesis* can prove it. There are two reasons for reading *hairesis* here as "heresy." First, this is consistent with the usage otherwise well attested in Justin with respect to Christian dissident groups, and therefore seems to be what Justin means by the term in general; and second, the phrase "what you call" implies strongly a pejorative usage.

This interpretation is consistent with the view that a major transition took place within Judaism from a sectarian structure to one of orthodoxy and heresy and that it presumably took place between the time of Acts and that of Justin.[94] As Marcel Simon comments:

> When this passage, written in the middle of the second century, is compared with the passage in Acts, it seems that the term *hairesis* has undergone in Judaism an evolution identical to, and parallel with, the one it underwent in Christianity. This is no doubt due to the triumph of Pharisaism which, after the catastrophe of 70 C.E., established precise norms of orthodoxy unknown in Israel before that time. Pharisaism had been one heresy among many; now it is identified with authentic Judaism and the term *hairesis,* now given a pejorative sense, designates anything that deviates from the Pharisaic way.[95]

There is a noteworthy (if somewhat later) rabbinic parallel to this passage, which, to my knowledge, has not been noted in the literature.[96] According to Justin, those whom the "Jews" denominate a

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passage, although neither are responsible for my interpretation of it. Cf. the old translation in the *ANF* edition: "For I would not say that the dogma of that heresy which is said to be among you is true, or that the teachers of it can prove that [God] spoke to angels, or that the human frame was the workmanship of angels" (Justin Martyr, *Dial.* 62 [*ANF* 1:228]). David Runia for his part translates: "For personally I do not think the explanation is true which the so-called sect among you declares, nor are the teachers of that sect able to prove that he spoke to angels or that the human body is the creation of angels" (David T. Runia, "'Where, Tell Me, is the Jew?': Basil, Philo and Isidore of Pelusium," *VC* 46 [1992]: 178).

[94] For Luke-Acts, see Hubert Cancik, "The History of Culture, Religion, and Institutions in Ancient Historiography: Philological Observations Concerning Luke's History," *JBL* 116 (1997): 673–95, esp. 677, 688.

[95] Marcel Simon, "From Greek Hairesis to Christian Heresy," in *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition: in Honorem R. M. Grant* (ThH 53; ed. W. R. Schoedel and R. L. Wilken; Paris: Beauchesne, 1979), 101–16, here 106.

[96] Jarl Fossum, "Gen 1,26 and 2,7 in Judaism, Samaritanism, and Gnosticism," *JSJ* 16 (1989): 202–39. That is, apparently even not in the very recent Kister, "'Let Us.'"

heresy interpret God as speaking here to the angels.[97] In the *Mekhilta d'Rabbi Ishmaʿel*, a late third-century or early fourth-century midrash, we find recorded the following dialogue:

> Papos [mss. Papias] expounded: 'Behold, Adam has become as one of Us,' *like one of the serving angels*. Rabbi Aqiva said: Shut up, Papos! Papos said to him, and how will you interpret 'Behold, Adam has become as one of Us'? [Aqiva answered] Rather the Holy, Blessed One gave before him two ways: one of life and one of death, and he chose the way of death.[98]

Although much about this text and its context remains obscure, it is clear that a marginal, even heretical figure, Papos, is being ascribed here a view very close to that which Justin is claiming for the *hairesis* among the Jews.[99] Rabbi Aqiva's response—"Shut up"—is a representation of the intensity of the response that the alleged Papos's

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[97] Cf. Simon, "Hairesis," 106; Le Boulluec, *La notion*, 78 who both consider Justin's "*hairesis*" here as unidentifiable. Furthermore, Runia writes, "If Justin's evidence is taken seriously, at least one branch [of *minim*] represents a Gnosticizing group within Judaism, whose negative attitude to material creation encourages them to introduce angels into the interpretation of the creation account" ("Where is the Jew," 179). Given the interpretation of this verse in *Genesis Rabbah*, cited by Runia himself, this conclusion is hard to maintain. I detect no phantom Gnostics here. See also Ephraim E. Urbach, *The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs* (trans. I. Abrahams; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1975), 203–8, who cites the Justin passage but seems not to have seen the relevance of the *Mekhilta* to it.

[98] Lauterbach, *Mekilta DeRabbi Ishmael*, 1:248.

[99] See Menahem Kahana, "The Critical Editions of *Mekhilta De-Rabbi Ishmael* in the Light of the Genizah Fragments," *Tarbiz* 55 (1985): 499–515 [Hebrew], who shows that ancient manuscripts preserve traditions from which it appears that Papos/Papias maintained "gnosticizing" views, a not irrelevant point for our comparison here with Justin. (See, however, Kister, "'Let Us,'" 34.) Note that it is precisely with reference to Gen 3:22 that the "heretical" view is attributed in both Justin and the *Mekhilta*, while the interpretation that Gen 1:26, "Let us make man," is addressed to angels can be found in the "orthodox" rabbinic voice of *Gen. Rab.* 8, as pointed out in Runia, "Where is the Jew." On the Justin passage, see now Kister, "'Let Us,'" 42–43, as well. Kister observes there that the rabbinic formulation that "God took counsel with the angels" constitutes a mitigation of the Logos-theological view (as expressed by Justin) that God actually had a partner in the creation of Adam. Note that this "solution" was unavailable for Gen 3:22, explaining, perhaps, why here Papos's view was considered heresy, even though it is seemingly closely related to the "orthodox" statement of *Genesis Rabbah*. Particularly impressive is Kister's brilliant suggestion that the speaker in *Genesis Rabbah* who says that "God spoke to his heart" intends to understand God's hypostasized Wisdom, or Logos (Kister, "'Let Us,'" 45–46). For reasons that should be obvious, I would not agree, however, to Kister's strong nexus between Justin and Plato's *Timaeus*. Kister himself supplies a better explanation, namely that the Jewish Logos/Sophia doctrine grew up in Second-Temple theology as a way of deflecting polytheistic

interpretation aroused and thus of its apparent heterodox nature. Justin thus does seem to have here accurate information about a Jewish sectarian interpretation of the verse and asserts that the "Jews" refer to it as *hairesis*, presumably in Hebrew *minut*. The *Mekhilta* text, therefore, provides evidence—albeit somewhat ex post facto—for the authenticity of Justin's information and its richness of detail. At least, we might see here a sort of *terminus post quem* for this contestation in Rabbi Aqiva's second century, very close to the time that Justin was beginning to confront his Gnostics as well.[100]

For Simon, it is obvious that when Justin refers to "your teachers" here the Pharisees are the object, while the *hairesis* in question "designates anything that deviates from the Pharisaic way."[101] There is, however, another important wrinkle that Simon has seemingly overlooked, for in another passage in Justin, "Pharisees" are named as one of the heresies, and not as "authentic Judaism":[102]

> For I made it clear to you that those who are Christians in name, but in reality are godless and impious heretics, teach in all respects what is blasphemous and godless and foolish. . . . For even if you yourselves have ever met with some so-called Christians, who yet do not acknowledge this, but even dare to blaspheme the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, who say too that there is no resurrection of the dead, but that their souls ascend to heaven at the very moment of their death—do not suppose that they are Christians, any more than if one examined the matter rightly he would acknowledge as Jews those who are Sadducees,[103] or similar sects of

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understandings and out of the reading of Genesis with Proverbs 8 ("'Let Us,'" 53). On this point, see also M. J. Edwards, "Justin's Logos and the Word of God," *JECS* 3 (1995): 261–80; and Virginia Burrus, "Creatio ex Libidine, or the Secret of God's Desire: Rereading Ancient Logos," to appear in *Other Testaments*, eds. Yvonne Sherwood and Kevin Hart (Sheffield: Sheffield University Press, 2003). Cf. *b. Sanh.* 38b, where "heretical" interpretation of Gen 1:26 as implying two creators is "refuted."

[100] In other words, I am saying that this text can certainly not be dated before Rabbi Aqiva and possibly could be later. Assuming a dating, then, sometime between the mid-second century (or a bit earlier) and the late third is reasonable. Looking for discursive developments from about the middle of that period, we would land somewhere in the late second century, roughly the time of Justin.

[101] Simon, "Hairesis," 106.

[102] Even in Marcel Simon, *Jewish Sects at the Time of Jesus* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1967), 85–107, where he discusses the entire Justinian catalogue of Jewish heresies, Simon ignores Justin's mention of the Pharisees, so set is he on his notion that orthodox Judaism at this time is consubstantial with Pharisaism.

[103] Who also deny the resurrection of the dead and are, therefore, singled out. See Le Boulluec, *La notion*, 71–72.

> Genistae, and Meristae, and Galileans, and Hellelians,[104] and Pharisees and Baptists[105] (pray, do not be vexed with me as I say all I think), but (would say) that though called Jews and children of Abraham, and acknowledging God with their lips, as God Himself has cried aloud, yet their heart is far from Him. (*Dial.* 80.3–4)[106]

It is highly significant for understanding this passage that the Rabbis themselves, as Shaye Cohen has emphasized, never understand themselves as Pharisees, thus explaining how for them, too, "Pharisee" could be a designation of a sect or even heresy: "The tannaim refused to see themselves as Pharisees."[107] Indeed, as we shall see below, in the Tosefta, a rabbinic text of approximately a century after Justin,

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[104] Following the conjecture, Ἑλληλιανςῶν (accepted in *Dialogus Cum Tryphone*, 209), which gives "Hellelians" and not "Hellenians" as Williams has it. To this, compare the text from the Tosefta which refers to the Shammaites and the Hillelites as having divided the Torah into two Torahs (*t. Soṭah* 14:9). See also for discussion Daniel Gershonson and Giles Quispel, "'Meristae,'" *VC* 12 (1958): 19–26; Matthew Black, "The Patristic Accounts of Jewish Sectarianism," *BJRL* 41 (1959): 285–303; Simon, *Sects*, 74–85; Leslie W. Barnard, *Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 49–52.

[105] I would take "Genistae and Meristae" as a Greek *calque* on the Tosefta's *minnim weparošim*, i.e. as those who separate themselves. For μερισμός as a term of art in (proto)heresiology, see Ignatius's *Phld.* 2:1 (William R. Schoedel, *Ignatius of Antioch: A Commentary on the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch* [Hermeneia; trans. and ed. W. R. Schoedel; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985], 197). Cf. Gershonson and Quispel, "'Meristae.'" The Galileans are to be plausibly identified with the *minim gliliim* [Galilean heretics] of the Mishna *Yadayim*, a reading only found in manuscripts of the Mishna, as observed by Yaakov Sussmann, "The History of *Halakha* and the Dead Sea Scrolls—Preliminary Observations on *Miqṣat Maʿase Ha-Torah* (4QMMT)" [Hebrew], *Tarbiz* 59 (1990): 11–76, 51, who does not connect them with Justin's notice here. These Baptists are almost surely the "morning baptizers" mentioned as heretics in *t. Yad.* 2:20 (*Tosephta: Based on the Erfurt and Vienna Codices, "Supplement" to the Tosephta* [ed. M. S. Zuckermandel with S. Lieberman; Jerusalem: Bamberger & Wahrmann, 1937 (Hebrew)], 684). The net result is that Justin seems to have had very good knowledge of Jewish heresiology, indeed, even of some of its obscure corners which increases my confidence in his knowledge of matters Jewish and even rabbinic in his time.

[106] Williams, *Dialogue*, 169–71; *Dialogus Cum Tryphone*, 208–9. For the crucial (Platonic) distinction between being called a Jew and being one, see Shaye J. D. Cohen, *The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties* (Hellenistic Culture and Society 31; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 60–61. See on this passage Le Boulluec, who considers that "La représentation hérésiologique a cependant besoin de déformer la conception juive des divers courants religieux pour attendre son efficacité entière" (*La notion*, 71). In my view, this is less of a deformation than Le Boulluec would have it.

[107] Shaye J. D. Cohen, "The Significance of Yavneh: Pharisees, Rabbis, and the End of Jewish Sectarianism," *HUCA* 55 (1984): 27–53, here 29.

"Pharisee" is associated with *min*, as precisely heretics to be anathematized. Those whom we (and other Jewish texts, such as those by Josephus and Acts) called Pharisees, were, for the Rabbis, simply Rabbis. Cohen has captured the import of this passage when he writes: "This rabbinic ideology is reflected in Justin's discussion of the Jewish sects: there are Jews, i.e., the 'orthodox,' and there are sects, among them the Pharisees, who scarcely deserve the name Jew."[108] Indeed Justin testifies that the name "Jew" would be denied to any of these sectarians, including Pharisees. Let me clarify this point once more. It is not that the Rabbis would deny the legitimacy of "historical" Pharisees such as Rabban Gamaliel. Nothing could be more implausible than that. It is rather—I suggest, following Cohen—that they would not use the name "Pharisees" for their legitimated ancestors.

Matthew Black, followed by L. W. Barnard, explained away the references to Sadducees and Pharisees as heresies in Justin by virtual sleight of hand,[109] analogous to the attempts to emend the Tosefta and remove the curse against the Pharisees there as well.[110] Such a notion that both Sadducees and Pharisees were sects, and therefore "heretics," could very well have been characteristic of a second-century Judaism moving toward a notion of "orthodoxy" in which all *named* sects are *ipso facto* heresies. There are Jews, and there are *minim* (= "kinds"), a usage that can perhaps be compared with that of Athanasius, for example, for whom there are "Christians" and there are "Arians."[111] Even more appositely, one might quote Justin himself:

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[108] Cohen, "Yavneh," 49.

[109] Black, "Patristic"; and Barnard, *Justin Martyr*, 50–52.

[110] See also Le Boulluec: "La suggestion de M. Black . . . . est tout à fair fantaisiste" (*La notion*, 72).

[111] Earlier, Justin's explanation of the origins of the philosophers' *haireseis* bears some relation to this topos:

> But the reason why [philosophy] has become a hydra of many heads I should like to explain. It happened that they who first handled philosophy, and for this reason became famous, were followed by men who made no investigation after truth, but were only amazed at their patience and self-restraint and their unfamiliar diction, and supposed that whatever each learned from his own teacher was true. And then they, when they had handed on to their successors all such things, and other like them, were themselves called by the name borne by the originator of the teaching. (*Dial.* 2.2; Williams, *Dialogue*, 4)

> And there shall be schisms and heresies . . . many false christs and many false apostles shall arrive, and shall deceive many of the faithful, . . . but these are called by us after the name of the men from whom each false doctrine and opinion had its origin. . . . Some are called Marcionites, some Valentinians, some Basilideans, and some Saturnalians and some others by other names. (*Dial.* 35.6)

"We," of course, are called "Christians." Assuming the same topos, the Rabbis, therefore, as Catholic Israel, could hardly recognize a named sect, the Pharisees, as their predecessors, whatever the historical "reality."[112] The Rabbis are just "Israel." This interpretation is consistent with the other rabbinic evidence, as well as with the hypothetical etymology of the term *min* offered here.

By naming the traditional Logos or *Memra* doctrine of God a heresy, indeed, *the* heresy, "Two Powers in Heaven," the rabbinic theology expels it from the midst of Judaism, hailing that heresy at least implicitly as "Christianity," at the same time that in a virtual cultural "conspiracy" the emerging Christian orthodoxy embraces the Logos theology and names its repudiation "Judaism." We have seen this historical, socio-cultural process being virtually enacted within Justin's *Dialogue*. Without ascribing a literal value to the term "conspiracy" here, I would, nevertheless, point to the striking cooperation of the two discursive forces. The orthodox rabbinic solution to

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The implication of this statement is, of course, that there is "philosophy" and there are the *haireseis* (although the term is not used here) named after the divergent originators of each school. See also the same topos vis-à-vis Christian heresies:

> And they say that they are Christians. . . . And some of them are called Marcionites, and some Valentinians, and some Basilidians, and some Satornalians, and others by other names, each being named from the originator of the opinion, just as also each of those who think they are philosophers, as I said already in the beginning [of my discourse], thinks it right to bear the name of the father of that system. (*Dial.* 35.6; Williams, *Dialogue*, 70)

Of course, from the point of view of the Rabbis, the name "Christian" would be just such an "other name."

See also *Cod. theod.* 16.5.6: "The contamination of the Photinian pestilence, the poison of the Arian sacrilege, the crime of the Eunomian perfidy, and the sectarian monstrosities, *abominable because of the ill-omened names of their authors*, shall be abolished even from the hearing of men" (Clyde Pharr, *The Theodosian Code and Novels, and the Sirmondian Constitutions: a Translation with Commentary, Glossary, and Bibliography* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952], 451, emphasis added).

[112] Cf. also on these points Stephen Craft Goranson, "The Joseph of Tiberias Episode in Epiphanius: Studies in Jewish and Christian Relations," (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1990), 80.

the problem of verses that seem to imply any doubleness in God is to read them modalistically: one refers to God's aspect, or quality, of mercy and the other to God's aspect of justice. In precise symmetry, Christian orthodoxy of the second century regarded Modalism as a heresy, a heresy that could easily be named "Monarchianism," "One Power in Heaven," expelling the once "orthodox" Sabellius (and even Pope Callistus),[113] as the Rabbis had done in their stories with Elisha. J. N. D. Kelly makes the point that already in Justin's day, other Christians were accusing him of ditheism because he argued that the Logos is "something numerically other" (*Dial.* 128.3).[114] By constructing his opponent in the *Dialogue* as a "Jew," then, Justin is also engaged in splitting, taking a part of his own self, so to speak, and projecting it outward as Judaism. The notion of conspiracy should be clear by now; Justin and the Rabbis, ostensibly bitter opponents, in a strong sense fondly desire the same consummation. At the same time that the Jew was being hailed by the Christian heresiologists,[115] via their calling Monarchianism and Modalism "Judaism," the Rabbis were constructing their own orthodoxy by naming the believer in "Two Powers in Heaven," the "Christian," as their heretic-in-chief and thus in some sense calling Christianity into existence as a separate social entity. Once more, the heresiologists got that right, just as the Rabbis who identified "Two Powers in Heaven" with the Christianity that they were expelling from within got that right.[116] Judaism is Monarchianism; Monarchianism is Judaism, and the Rabbis by identifying "Two Powers in Heaven" as the arch-heresy thus participated in the discursive work of the making of Christian orthodoxy, while the Christian heresiologists who insisted that one *must* assert the existence of separate "persons" in order to be an orthodox Christian—in order, that is, not to be a Jew—similarly participated in the discursive work of the making of orthodox rabbinic Judaism.

The function of the denomination "Two Powers in Heaven" for rabbinic ecclesiology is thus formally and structurally equivalent to *Ioudaïzein* (Judaizing) within Christian writing of the time. Just as the

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[113] Heine, "Callistus."

[114] Kelly, *Doctrines*, 83–132.

[115] Virginia Burrus, "Hailing Zenobia: Anti-Judaism, Trinitarianism, and John Henry Newman," *Culture and Religion* 3:2 (2002) 163–177.

[116] See also *b. Sanh.* 38a.

latter is a term of approbation and exclusion of Christians from the community because they hold ideas from within Christianity that have become anathema to certain teachers and leaders, those figures who are named as possessing the heretical notion of "Two Powers in Heaven" are Jews holding one traditional Jewish theological position who are now declared anathema in the new regime of the Rabbis. Thus, this "heresy" is the exact structural parallel for the Rabbis of Sabellianism within Christian discourse at the same time, an aspect of Judaeo-Christian religious imagination that threatens the being constructed differentiation between the emerging twin religions—the twin orthodoxies struggling to emerge from Rebecca's womb, to use Alan Segal's elegant conceit.[117]

It is this supersession of the Logos by Writing that arguably gives birth to rabbinic Judaism and its characteristic forms of textuality. I would thus reverse Melito's famous παλαιὸς μὲν ὁ νόμος, καινὸς δὲ ὁ λόγος ("Of old there was the Nomos, the Law, now there is the Logos"), claiming for the Rabbis that formerly there was the Logos, but now God's Word can be found, literally, only in the black marks on the white parchment of the *Nomos*.[118] This theological stance, which finally only after much struggle came to characterize the

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[117] Alan F. Segal, *Rebecca's Children: Judaism and Christianity in the Roman World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).

[118] In a fascinating study, Glenn Chesnut has shown that the Logos and the Nomos were, in some important Hellenistic philosophies, alternate names for the *same* principle of divine order present in the soul of the ruler-savior (Glenn F. Chesnut, "The Ruler and the Logos in Neopythagorean, Middle Platonic, and Late Stoic Political Philosophy," *ANRW* II, 16.2:1310–32, esp. 1312–13). For the king as "Living Nomos," see Chesnut, "Ruler and the Logos," 1317; and Frances Dvornik, *Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy* (2 vols.; Locust Valley, N.Y.: J. J. Augustin, 1966), 1:245–48. And for the king as "Living Logos," in parallel with Nomos, see Chesnut, "Ruler and the Logos," 1323, referring to Plutarch, *Princ. iner.* 780c. I disagree somewhat, however, with Chesnut's interpretation of this passage. The text reads:

> Τίς οὖν ἄρξει τοῦ ἄρχοντος; ὁ
> νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς
> θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων,
> ὡς ἔφη Πίνδαρος, οὐκ ἐν βιβλίοις ἔξω γεγραμμένος οὐδέ τισι ξύλοις, ἀλλ' ἔμψυχος ὢν ἐν αὐτῷ λόγος.
>
> Who, then, shall rule the ruler? The
> Law, the king of all,
> Both mortals and immortals,
> as Pindar says—not law written outside him in books or on wooden tablets or the like, but reason endowed with life within him. . . . (Fowler, LCL)

rabbinic doctrine of God, carried in its wake profound shifts within rabbinic textuality, even between the earlier Palestinian and the later Babylonian Talmuds, shifts that were ultimately to serve as the very difference between Christianity and Judaism.

It is actually clear from this passage that Plutarch is *not* speaking of the King as a Living Nomos or as a Living Logos but rather as the lifeless Logos being endowed with life by dwelling within a human being. The comparison with Paul's comments in 1 Corinthians about the Law written on tablets and the Law written on the heart seems more apposite here than notions of Incarnation or other christological intimations.

THE IDEA OF BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION

Essays in Honor of James L. Kugel

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BRILL
LEIDEN · BOSTON
2004