

## Oil Analyst

## Non-OPEC+ Supply: A Softer Floor

- We recently reduced our Brent price forecast and expected trading range by \$5 to \$65-80/bbl, following a downgrade to our US GDP growth forecast and after the decision of OPEC8+ to proceed with flexible production increases while Brent traded near \$70/bbl. However, with recession risks rising and elevated spare capacity, medium term risks to our price forecast remain to the downside. To quantify this downside, we trace out the short-run non-OPEC+ supply curve.
- We find that non-OPEC+ production growth decreases by 0.3mb/d over 12 months for each \$10/bbl oil price decline with Brent >\$70/bbl, with this response increasing to 0.65mb/d with Brent at \$50-70/bbl.
- The US drives most of this supply elasticity, where shale oil production growth decreases by 0.2mb/d over 12 months per \$10/bbl price drop with Brent >\$70/bbl, with this drag rising to 0.5mb/d per \$10 with Brent at \$50-70. The supply response jumps sharply when Brent prices fall below variable costs (\$30/bbl), triggering well-head shut-ins.
- Outside of the US, the response by non-OPEC+ producers is also non-linear but smaller. Initially, higher decline rates drive the production response (0.1mb/d lower production over 12 months per \$10/bbl lower crude prices when Brent is above \$60/bbl) with this impact doubling as prices decline to \$40-60/bbl. As prices drop further to well-head variable costs, large production shut-ins are possible.
- We estimate that 2026 non-OPEC+ supply growth would fall from 1.05mb/d to 0.6mb/d with Cal26 Brent prices at \$60/bbl (vs. our \$68/bbl base case), and to -0.1mb/d at \$50/bbl. These negative production impacts would in turn support prices by \$5 and \$13/bbl, respectively, precluding further downside, and supporting our soft floor in the mid \$60s below Brent.
- The non-OPEC+ supply response offers a softer price floor than OPEC+ cuts, and a market relying more on the former will tend to exhibit lower prices and higher implied volatility. These findings reinforce our focus on moderate but not extreme medium-term price downside and our recommendation for producer three-way hedges once prices recover somewhat further in the short-term.

**Callum Bruce, CFA**

+1(212)902-3053 | callum.bruce@gs.com  
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC

**Yulia Zhestkova Grigsby**

+1(646)446-3905 | yulia.grigsby@gs.com  
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC


**Daan Struyven**

+1(212)357-4172 |  
daan.struyven@gs.com  
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC

**Ephraim Sutherland**

+1(972)368-0395 |  
ephraim.sutherland@gs.com  
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC

Exhibit 1: Non-OPEC+ Supply Responds More Significantly to Prices When Prices Are Low



Non-OPEC+ excludes main non-OPEC countries in OPEC+ (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Oman, Malaysia), global biofuels (incl. US ethanol), processing gains, and US Gulf crude oil. In 2025, we forecast US L48 (crude and NGLs) to amount to 18.6mb/d, with ex-US Non-OPEC+ amounting to 30.1mb/d. To find WTI-equivalent prices, subtracting \$4/bbl from the Brent prices and ranges quoted will be sufficient.

Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

## Non-OPEC+ Supply: A Softer Floor

We recently lowered our Brent price forecast and expected trading range by \$5 to \$65-80/bbl, following a downgrade to our US GDP growth forecast and after the decision of OPEC8+ to proceed with flexible production increases while Brent traded near \$70/bbl. The OPEC8+ decision to raise production mechanically increases the pressure on non-OPEC+ to rationalize production to rebalance the market, which looks well supplied in both 2025 and 2026 (assuming no major supply disruptions).

Rising recession risks and elevated spare capacity skew the medium terms risks to our price forecast to the downside. To quantify this downside, we trace out the short-run non-OPEC+ supply curve. We believe producers respond most to 12-month ahead prices versus spot prices, as decisions taken now take roughly this long to significantly affect production volumes.

In the US, we previously found that shale oil (crude and NGL) production growth decreases by 0.3mb/d over 12 months per \$10/bbl price drop with Brent prices >\$70/bbl, but that this drag rises to 0.5mb/d per \$10 with Brent in the \$50-70 range. The supply response jumps sharply when Brent prices fall below variable costs (\$30/bbl), triggering well-head shut-ins. While well-head shut-ins are relatively instantaneous, the typical rig-based US shale response takes more than 12 months.

The non-OPEC+ ex US supply response is also lagged and non-linear. The short-run response is driven initially by 1) higher decline rates, that 2) increase during more extreme price moves, before prices reach well-head variable costs that require 3) production shut-ins.

### 1) Decline Rates: The Short Cycle Response of Long-Cycle Production

The typical initial response of conventional (non-shale) non-OPEC+ producers to lower prices is to cut maintenance capital expenditures that limit underlying decline rates and allow decline rates to accelerate. According to the IEA, underlying annual natural decline rates of conventional crude projects are around 8-9% if no additional investments are made. In practice, companies limit decline rates to 4-5% by investing in field extensions, managing reservoir pressure, and enhancing oil recovery rates.


We use annual field level production data to distinguish between growing and declining (post-peak) projects for non-OPEC+ ex-US production. We measure decline rates by comparing year-over-year production for the sample of declining projects, keeping this project sample constant within each comparison year-pair but varying across comparison year-pairs.<sup>1</sup>

We find that decline rates are negatively related to oil prices in non-OPEC+ ex-US (Exhibit 2). This was especially clear following the Global Financial Crisis. We find a c.4% beta between prices and decline rates, meaning that a \$-10/bbl (-15%) price decline

<sup>1</sup> The sample of projects/fields that are classified as 'post peak' changes each year. This definition ensures that the same projects are being compared in the measure year (Y) and the base year (Y-1).

results in a 0.5% increase in decline rates (Exhibit 2). Applying this to the 24mb/d declining project base for non-OPEC+ ex-US production yields a 120kb/d impact via higher declines over the next 1-2 years for Brent prices above \$50/bbl.<sup>2</sup>

**Exhibit 2: Lower Oil Prices Tend To Lead To Higher Decline Rates For Existing Declining Fields**



Change in prices and decline rates use a weighted average of 1-year and 2-year changes using annual data. RHS uses 2009-2024 data.

Source: Woodmac, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research


## 2) Accelerated Decline Rates: For More Extreme Price Moves

These decline rates increased notably during the more extreme price moves as firms aggressively curtailed expenditure of all forms to protect cash flows. We investigate this further by reviewing the non-OPEC+ ex-US supply response during the 2016 and 2020 oil price drops.

To analyze the price elasticities in these periods we compare realized supply figures with IEA forecasts in the prior year.<sup>3</sup> We find that non-OPEC+ ex-US supply exhibited a price elasticity of 6% in 2016 and 12% in 2020, 2x and 4x the average elasticity seen historically, respectively (Exhibit 3). The most price elastic countries are the highest cost, short-cycle locations (e.g. Colombia, Canada, Argentina). However, given the 2020 experience likely included some well-head shut-ins in these countries, we assume a 6% elasticity, equivalent to 0.3mb/d impact per \$10/bbl oil price decline for non-OPEC+ ex-US supply for Brent prices below \$50/bbl.

<sup>2</sup> The implied price elasticity of all non-OPEC+ ex-US production (declining and non-declining) is therefore 2.5% ((0.12/30)/15%)

<sup>3</sup> Specifically, for 2016 we compare realised data to the IEA's Jun-15 OMR which provides the first forecasts of 2016 non-OPEC supply. For 2020, we compare realised data to the IEA's Dec-19 OMR, the last one before the Covid-19 pandemic started to impact prices and balances.

**Exhibit 3: Supply Elasticity Increases Around More Extreme Price Moves**

2016 realised elasticity measured versus Jul-15 IEA OMR and Brent forward curve as of that date. 2020 realised elasticity measured versus Dec-19 IEA OMR and Brent forward curve as of that date.

Source: IEA, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

**3) Well-Head Shut-Ins: A Firmer Floor For Non-OPEC+ ex-US Supply**


As prices fall even further towards well-head variable costs (cash costs), operators can shut-in production (turning wells off at the well-head) to avoid negative operational cash flows. This rapid process at low prices creates a much firmer floor for crude oil pricing than the slow-moving process of accelerated decline rates.

Exhibit 4 shows the non-OPEC+ ex-US variable cost curve, with cash costs for non-OPEC+ ex-US production only becoming relevant below \$25/bbl Brent. The highest variable cost locations - namely Canada, Colombia, China - have large shares of higher cost unconventional supply (heavy oils, shales) with somewhat higher cash costs than the country average.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The US average variable cost is \$22/bbl with 75% of production in a \$15-35/bbl Brent range. Due its short-cycle nature, US shale defines the right tail of the non-OPEC+ variable cost distribution.

**Exhibit 4: Well-Head Shut-Ins Rise Significantly When Brent Prices Fall Below \$20/bbl**

Non-OPEC+ ex-US oil production by variable cost



Non-OPEC+ ex-US excludes main non-OPEC countries in OPEC+ (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Oman, Malaysia), global biofuels (inc. US ethanol), processing gains, and US Gulf crude oil. This chart only includes countries with production over 0.1 mb/d and is shown as a country-level average. We utilise the field level cost curve for our full non-OPEC+ ex-US supply response analysis.

Source: Wood Mackenzie, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research


Intersecting the decline rate analysis above with the above cash cost distribution for non-OPEC+ ex-US countries allows us to form the short-run non-OPEC+ ex-US supply curve ([Exhibit 5](#)).

The short-run cost curve is very inelastic (steep) for most price levels, but this price response increases exponentially once prices start to encroach upon well-head variable costs. Given fixed costs to stopping and restarting production and lags in decision-making, we believe 3-6 months forward prices matter more than current spot prices for shutting in wells today.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> This is a shorter time horizon than for decline rates and US shale, where the impacts on production are more lagged. Our analysis, by looking at annual price changes as well as changes in the forward Brent strip across different dates approximates this forward-looking process.

**Exhibit 5: Non-OPEC ex-US Supply Is Very Inelastic, But The Response Increases Exponentially At Lower Oil Prices**

Non-OPEC+ ex-US 2025 supply curve (LHS) and marginal price elasticity of supply (RHS)




Excludes main Non-OPEC countries in OPEC+ (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Oman, Malaysia), ex-US biofuels, and processing gains.

Source: Woodmac, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

**Tracing Out The Short-Run Non-OPEC+ Supply Curve**

Combining this Non-OPEC+ ex-US short-term supply curve with our prior work on the US Lower 48 (crude and NGL) we can create the short-run total Non-OPEC+ supply curve ([Exhibit 6](#)).

**Exhibit 6: Our Non-OPEC+ Oil Supply Curve Remains Steep Unless Prices Are Very Low**

Excludes main Non-OPEC countries in OPEC+ (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Oman, Malaysia), global biofuels (inc. US ethanol), processing gains, and US Gulf crude oil.


Source: Wood Mackenzie, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Similar to the US, we find that the response of non-OPEC+ ex-US producers is also non-linear but generally weaker.

Initially, the production response is defined by higher decline rates (0.12mb/d lower production over 12 months per \$10/bbl lower crude prices when Brent is above \$60/bbl) with this impact doubling as price moves become more extreme (0.25mb/d per \$10/bbl when Brent is \$40-60/bbl). As prices approach well-head variable costs, significant production shut-ins are possible, amounting to almost 1mb/d when Brent is in the \$30s, and increasing exponentially below this level ([Exhibit 7](#)).

Aggregating this with our US oil supply elasticities, we find that non-OPEC+ production growth decreases by 0.3mb/d over 12 months for each \$10/bbl oil price decline with Brent >\$70/bbl. This price response increases to 0.63mb/d when forward Brent prices are \$50-70/bbl, 1.25mb/d when prices are \$30-50/bbl, and significantly higher still at even lower prices.<sup>6</sup>

**Exhibit 7: Non-OPEC Supply Response Increases Below \$70/bbl Brent, Jumps Significantly Below \$30/bbl Brent**



Excludes main Non-OPEC countries in OPEC+ (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Oman, Malaysia), global biofuels (inc. US ethanol), processing gains, and US Gulf crude oil.

Source: Wood Mackenzie, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

## Non-OPEC Supply: A Key Potential Rebalancing Mechanism

We next analyze the stabilizing impact on prices from lower non-OPEC+ production in lower price scenarios using our new short-run supply curve.


We estimate that 2026 non-OPEC+ supply growth would fall from 1.05mb/d to 0.6mb/d with Cal26 Brent prices at \$60/bbl (vs. our \$68 base case), for instance in the case of weaker demand due to further tariff escalation, and would fall further to -0.1mb/d at \$50/bbl. These negative production impacts would in turn support prices by \$5 and \$13/bbl, respectively, precluding further downside, and supporting our soft floor in the mid \$60s below Brent ([Exhibit 8](#)).

<sup>6</sup> To be clear, we believe these prices to refer to the forward strip more than spot prices, as such the elasticities to spot prices will be less. A simple regression of 12m Brent prices on spot prices over the last 10 years gives a beta of 70%.



**Exhibit 8: Non-OPEC Supply Responds Nonlinearly to Lower Prices**

Price sensitivity of 2026 non-OPEC+ supply growth forecasts



Excludes main Non-OPEC countries in OPEC+ (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Oman, Malaysia), global biofuels (inc. US ethanol), processing gains, and US Gulf crude oil.


Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

**Endogenising the Non-OPEC+ response**

We take account of this feedback loop between prices, non-OPEC+ supply, and global demand when analyzing price risks around our base case, allowing us to simulate the price impact of scenarios ([Exhibit 9](#)). The supply response is more lagged and stronger at lower prices, while the demand response is relatively instantaneous and stronger at higher prices, as income effects become more important.

The non-OPEC+ supply response offers a softer price floor than OPEC+ cuts, and a market relying more on the former will tend to exhibit lower prices and higher implied volatility. These findings reinforce our focus on moderate but not extreme downside risk to medium-term prices and our recommendation for producer three-way hedges once prices recover somewhat further in the short-term.

Exhibit 9: Our Risk Framework Incorporates Supply Feedback Loops



We assume that the risk premium jumps to the 90th percentile of its historical distribution from 1995 if Iran supply falls 1mb/d persistently and to the 97th percentile if additionally Russia supply falls by 1mb/d for 2 months. We assume that the risk premium drops to the 40th percentile if the US imposes a 10% universal tariff and to the 45th percentile if OPEC+ raises supply for 18 months.

Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

# Disclosure Appendix

## Reg AC

I, Callum Bruce, CFA, hereby certify that all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect my personal views, which have not been influenced by considerations of the firm's business or client relationships.

Unless otherwise stated, the individuals listed on the cover page of this report are analysts in Goldman Sachs' Global Investment Research division.

## Disclosures

### Regulatory disclosures

#### Disclosures required by United States laws and regulations

See company-specific regulatory disclosures above for any of the following disclosures required as to companies referred to in this report: manager or co-manager in a pending transaction; 1% or other ownership; compensation for certain services; types of client relationships; managed/co-managed public offerings in prior periods; directorships; for equity securities, market making and/or specialist role. Goldman Sachs trades or may trade as a principal in debt securities (or in related derivatives) of issuers discussed in this report.

The following are additional required disclosures: **Ownership and material conflicts of interest:** Goldman Sachs policy prohibits its analysts, professionals reporting to analysts and members of their households from owning securities of any company in the analyst's area of coverage.

**Analyst compensation:** Analysts are paid in part based on the profitability of Goldman Sachs, which includes investment banking revenues. **Analyst as officer or director:** Goldman Sachs policy generally prohibits its analysts, persons reporting to analysts or members of their households from serving as an officer, director or advisor of any company in the analyst's area of coverage. **Non-U.S. Analysts:** Non-U.S. analysts may not be associated persons of Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC and therefore may not be subject to FINRA Rule 2241 or FINRA Rule 2242 restrictions on communications with subject company, public appearances and trading securities held by the analysts.

#### Additional disclosures required under the laws and regulations of jurisdictions other than the United States

The following disclosures are those required by the jurisdiction indicated, except to the extent already made above pursuant to United States laws and regulations. **Australia:** Goldman Sachs Australia Pty Ltd and its affiliates are not authorised deposit-taking institutions (as that term is defined in the Banking Act 1959 (Cth)) in Australia and do not provide banking services, nor carry on a banking business, in Australia. This research, and any access to it, is intended only for "wholesale clients" within the meaning of the Australian Corporations Act, unless otherwise agreed by Goldman Sachs. In producing research reports, members of Global Investment Research of Goldman Sachs Australia may attend site visits and other meetings hosted by the companies and other entities which are the subject of its research reports. In some instances the costs of such site visits or meetings may be met in part or in whole by the issuers concerned if Goldman Sachs Australia considers it is appropriate and reasonable in the specific circumstances relating to the site visit or meeting. To the extent that the contents of this document contains any financial product advice, it is general advice only and has been prepared by Goldman Sachs without taking into account a client's objectives, financial situation or needs. A client should, before acting on any such advice, consider the appropriateness of the advice having regard to the client's own objectives, financial situation and needs. A copy of certain Goldman Sachs Australia and New Zealand disclosure of interests and a copy of Goldman Sachs' Australian Sell-Side Research Independence Policy Statement are available at: <https://www.goldmansachs.com/disclosures/australia-new-zealand/index.html>. **Brazil:** Disclosure information in relation to CVM Resolution n. 20 is available at <https://www.gs.com/worldwide/brazil/area/gir/index.html>. Where applicable, the Brazil-registered analyst primarily responsible for the content of this research report, as defined in Article 20 of CVM Resolution n. 20, is the first author named at the beginning of this report, unless indicated otherwise at the end of the text. **Canada:** This information is being provided to you for information purposes only and is not, and under no circumstances should be construed as, an advertisement, offering or solicitation by Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC for purchasers of securities in Canada to trade in any Canadian security. Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC is not registered as a dealer in any jurisdiction in Canada under applicable Canadian securities laws and generally is not permitted to trade in Canadian securities and may be prohibited from selling certain securities and products in certain jurisdictions in Canada. If you wish to trade in any Canadian securities or other products in Canada please contact Goldman Sachs Canada Inc., an affiliate of The Goldman Sachs Group Inc., or another registered Canadian dealer. **Hong Kong:** Further information on the securities of covered companies referred to in this research may be obtained on request from Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. **India:** Further information on the subject company or companies referred to in this research may be obtained from Goldman Sachs (India) Securities Private Limited, Research Analyst - SEBI Registration Number INH000001493, 951-A, Rational House, Appasaheb Marathe Marg, Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400 025, India, Corporate Identity Number U74140MH2006FTC160634, Phone +91 22 6616 9000, Fax +91 22 6616 9001. Goldman Sachs may beneficially own 1% or more of the securities (as such term is defined in clause 2 (h) the Indian Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956) of the subject company or companies referred to in this research report. Investment in securities market are subject to market risks. Read all the related documents carefully before investing. Registration granted by SEBI and certification from NISM in no way guarantee performance of the intermediary or provide any assurance of returns to investors. Goldman Sachs (India) Securities Private Limited compliance officer and investor grievance contact details can be found at this link: <https://publishing.gs.com/disclosures/hedge.html> - /general/equity. **Japan:** See below. **Korea:** This research, and any access to it, is intended only for "professional investors" within the meaning of the Financial Services and Capital Markets Act, unless otherwise agreed by Goldman Sachs. Further information on the subject company or companies referred to in this research may be obtained from Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C., Seoul Branch. **New Zealand:** Goldman Sachs New Zealand Limited and its affiliates are neither "registered banks" nor "deposit takers" (as defined in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989) in New Zealand. This research, and any access to it, is intended for "wholesale clients" (as defined in the Financial Advisers Act 2008) unless otherwise agreed by Goldman Sachs. A copy of certain Goldman Sachs Australia and New Zealand disclosure of interests is available at: <https://www.goldmansachs.com/disclosures/australia-new-zealand/index.html>. **Russia:** Research reports distributed in the Russian Federation are not advertising as defined in the Russian legislation, but are information and analysis not having product promotion as their main purpose and do not provide appraisal within the meaning of the Russian legislation on appraisal activity. Research reports do not constitute a personalized investment recommendation as defined in Russian laws and regulations, are not addressed to a specific client, and are prepared without analyzing the financial circumstances, investment profiles or risk profiles of clients. Goldman Sachs assumes no responsibility for any investment decisions that may be taken by a client or any other person based on this research report. **Singapore:** Goldman Sachs (Singapore) Pte. (Company Number: 198602165W), which is regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore, accepts legal responsibility for this research, and should be contacted with respect to any matters arising from, or in connection with, this research. **Taiwan:** This material is for reference only and must not be reprinted without permission. Investors should carefully consider their own investment risk. Investment results are the responsibility of the individual investor. **United Kingdom:** Persons who would be categorized as retail clients in the United Kingdom, as such term is defined in the rules of the Financial Conduct Authority, should read this research in conjunction with prior Goldman Sachs research on the covered companies referred to herein and should refer to the risk warnings that have been sent to them by Goldman Sachs International. A copy of these risks warnings, and a glossary of certain financial terms used in this report, are available from Goldman Sachs International on request.

**European Union and United Kingdom:** Disclosure information in relation to Article 6 (2) of the European Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) (2016/958) supplementing Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (including as that Delegated Regulation is

implemented into United Kingdom domestic law and regulation following the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union and the European Economic Area) with regard to regulatory technical standards for the technical arrangements for objective presentation of investment recommendations or other information recommending or suggesting an investment strategy and for disclosure of particular interests or indications of conflicts of interest is available at <https://www.gs.com/disclosures/europeanpolicy.html> which states the European Policy for Managing Conflicts of Interest in Connection with Investment Research.

**Japan:** Goldman Sachs Japan Co., Ltd. is a Financial Instrument Dealer registered with the Kanto Financial Bureau under registration number Kinsho 69, and a member of Japan Securities Dealers Association, Financial Futures Association of Japan Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association, The Investment Trusts Association, Japan, and Japan Investment Advisers Association. Sales and purchase of equities are subject to commission pre-determined with clients plus consumption tax. See company-specific disclosures as to any applicable disclosures required by Japanese stock exchanges, the Japanese Securities Dealers Association or the Japanese Securities Finance Company.

## Global product; distributing entities

Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research produces and distributes research products for clients of Goldman Sachs on a global basis. Analysts based in Goldman Sachs offices around the world produce research on industries and companies, and research on macroeconomics, currencies, commodities and portfolio strategy. This research is disseminated in Australia by Goldman Sachs Australia Pty Ltd (ABN 21 006 797 897); in Brazil by Goldman Sachs do Brasil Corretora de Títulos e Valores Mobiliários S.A.; Public Communication Channel Goldman Sachs Brazil: 0800 727 5764 and / or [contatogoldmanbrasil@gs.com](mailto:contatogoldmanbrasil@gs.com). Available Weekdays (except holidays), from 9am to 6pm. Canal de Comunicação com o Público Goldman Sachs Brasil: 0800 727 5764 e/ou [contatogoldmanbrasil@gs.com](mailto:contatogoldmanbrasil@gs.com). Horário de funcionamento: segunda-feira à sexta-feira (exceto feriados), das 9h às 18h; in Canada by Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC; in Hong Kong by Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C.; in India by Goldman Sachs (India) Securities Private Ltd.; in Japan by Goldman Sachs Japan Co., Ltd.; in the Republic of Korea by Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C., Seoul Branch; in New Zealand by Goldman Sachs New Zealand Limited; in Russia by OOO Goldman Sachs; in Singapore by Goldman Sachs (Singapore) Pte. (Company Number: 198602165W); and in the United States of America by Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC. Goldman Sachs International has approved this research in connection with its distribution in the United Kingdom.

Goldman Sachs International ("GSI"), authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority ("PRA") and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority ("FCA") and the PRA, has approved this research in connection with its distribution in the United Kingdom.

**European Economic Area:** GSI, authorised by the PRA and regulated by the FCA and the PRA, disseminates research in the following jurisdictions within the European Economic Area: the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Italy, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Finland and the Republic of Ireland; GSI - Succursale de Paris (Paris branch) which is authorised by the French Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution ("ACPR") and regulated by the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution and the Autorité des marchés financiers ("AMF") disseminates research in France; GSI - Sucursal en España (Madrid branch) authorized in Spain by the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores disseminates research in the Kingdom of Spain; GSI - Sweden Bankfilial (Stockholm branch) is authorized by the SFSA as a "third country branch" in accordance with Chapter 4, Section 4 of the Swedish Securities and Market Act (Sw. lag (2007:528) om värdepappersmarknaden) disseminates research in the Kingdom of Sweden; Goldman Sachs Bank Europe SE ("GSBE") is a credit institution incorporated in Germany and, within the Single Supervisory Mechanism, subject to direct prudential supervision by the European Central Bank and in other respects supervised by German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin) and Deutsche Bundesbank and disseminates research in the Federal Republic of Germany and those jurisdictions within the European Economic Area where GSI is not authorised to disseminate research and additionally, GSBE, Copenhagen Branch filial af GSBE, Tyskland, supervised by the Danish Financial Authority disseminates research in the Kingdom of Denmark; GSBE - Sucursal en España (Madrid branch) subject to a limited extent) to local supervision by the Bank of Spain disseminates research in the Kingdom of Spain; GSBE - Succursale Italia (Milan branch) to the relevant applicable extent, subject to local supervision by the Bank of Italy (Banca d'Italia) and the Italian Companies and Exchange Commission (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa "Consob") disseminates research in Italy; GSBE - Succursale de Paris (Paris branch), supervised by the AMF and by the ACPR disseminates research in France; and GSBE - Sweden Bankfilial (Stockholm branch), to a limited extent, subject to local supervision by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen) disseminates research in the Kingdom of Sweden.

## General disclosures

This research is for our clients only. Other than disclosures relating to Goldman Sachs, this research is based on current public information that we consider reliable, but we do not represent it is accurate or complete, and it should not be relied on as such. The information, opinions, estimates and forecasts contained herein are as of the date hereof and are subject to change without prior notification. We seek to update our research as appropriate, but various regulations may prevent us from doing so. Other than certain industry reports published on a periodic basis, the large majority of reports are published at irregular intervals as appropriate in the analyst's judgment.

Goldman Sachs conducts a global full-service, integrated investment banking, investment management, and brokerage business. We have investment banking and other business relationships with a substantial percentage of the companies covered by Global Investment Research. Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, the United States broker dealer, is a member of SIPC (<https://www.sipc.org>).

Our salespeople, traders, and other professionals may provide oral or written market commentary or trading strategies to our clients and principal trading desks that reflect opinions that are contrary to the opinions expressed in this research. Our asset management area, principal trading desks and investing businesses may make investment decisions that are inconsistent with the recommendations or views expressed in this research.

We and our affiliates, officers, directors, and employees will from time to time have long or short positions in, act as principal in, and buy or sell, the securities or derivatives, if any, referred to in this research, unless otherwise prohibited by regulation or Goldman Sachs policy.

The views attributed to third party presenters at Goldman Sachs arranged conferences, including individuals from other parts of Goldman Sachs, do not necessarily reflect those of Global Investment Research and are not an official view of Goldman Sachs.

Any third party referenced herein, including any salespeople, traders and other professionals or members of their household, may have positions in the products mentioned that are inconsistent with the views expressed by analysts named in this report.

This research is focused on investment themes across markets, industries and sectors. It does not attempt to distinguish between the prospects or performance of, or provide analysis of, individual companies within any industry or sector we describe.

Any trading recommendation in this research relating to an equity or credit security or securities within an industry or sector is reflective of the investment theme being discussed and is not a recommendation of any such security in isolation.

This research is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any security in any jurisdiction where such an offer or solicitation would be illegal. It does not constitute a personal recommendation or take into account the particular investment objectives, financial situations, or needs of individual clients. Clients should consider whether any advice or recommendation in this research is suitable for their particular circumstances and, if appropriate, seek professional advice, including tax advice. The price and value of investments referred to in this research and the income from them may fluctuate. Past performance is not a guide to future performance, future returns are not guaranteed, and a loss of original capital may occur. Fluctuations in exchange rates could have adverse effects on the value or price of, or income derived from, certain investments.

Certain transactions, including those involving futures, options, and other derivatives, give rise to substantial risk and are not suitable for all investors. Investors should review current options and futures disclosure documents which are available from Goldman Sachs sales representatives or at <https://www.theocc.com/about/publications/character-risks.jsp> and [https://www.fiadocumentation.org/fia/regulatory-disclosures\\_1/fia-uniform-futures-and-options-on-futures-risk-disclosures-booklet-pdf-version-2018](https://www.fiadocumentation.org/fia/regulatory-disclosures_1/fia-uniform-futures-and-options-on-futures-risk-disclosures-booklet-pdf-version-2018). Transaction costs may be significant in option strategies calling for multiple purchase and sales of options such as spreads. Supporting documentation will be supplied upon request.

**Differing Levels of Service provided by Global Investment Research:** The level and types of services provided to you by Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research may vary as compared to that provided to internal and other external clients of GS, depending on various factors including your individual preferences as to the frequency and manner of receiving communication, your risk profile and investment focus and perspective (e.g., marketwide, sector specific, long term, short term), the size and scope of your overall client relationship with GS, and legal and regulatory constraints. As an example, certain clients may request to receive notifications when research on specific securities is published, and certain clients may request that specific data underlying analysts' fundamental analysis available on our internal client websites be delivered to them electronically through data feeds or otherwise. No change to an analyst's fundamental research views (e.g., ratings, price targets, or material changes to earnings estimates for equity securities), will be communicated to any client prior to inclusion of such information in a research report broadly disseminated through electronic publication to our internal client websites or through other means, as necessary, to all clients who are entitled to receive such reports.

All research reports are disseminated and available to all clients simultaneously through electronic publication to our internal client websites. Not all research content is redistributed to our clients or available to third-party aggregators, nor is Goldman Sachs responsible for the redistribution of our research by third party aggregators. For research, models or other data related to one or more securities, markets or asset classes (including related services) that may be available to you, please contact your GS representative or go to <https://research.gs.com>.

Disclosure information is also available at <https://www.gs.com/research/hedge.html> or from Research Compliance, 200 West Street, New York, NY 10282.

© 2025 Goldman Sachs.

You are permitted to store, display, analyze, modify, reformat, and print the information made available to you via this service only for your own use. You may not resell or reverse engineer this information to calculate or develop any index for disclosure and/or marketing or create any other derivative works or commercial product(s), data or offering(s) without the express written consent of Goldman Sachs. You are not permitted to publish, transmit, or otherwise reproduce this information, in whole or in part, in any format to any third party without the express written consent of Goldman Sachs. This foregoing restriction includes, without limitation, using, extracting, downloading or retrieving this information, in whole or in part, to train or finetune a machine learning or artificial intelligence system, or to provide or reproduce this information, in whole or in part, as a prompt or input to any such system.