

# Software security fiche

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## General

- **Security** is the application and enforcement of *policies* through *mechanisms* over data and resources
  - *Policies* specify what we want to enforce
  - *Mechanisms* specify how we want to enforce the policies (i.e. an implementation/instance of a *policies*)
- **Software Security** is the area of Computer Science that focuses on testing, evaluating, improving, enforcing, and proving the security of software.
- A **Software bug** is an error, flaw, failure, or fault in a computer program or system that causes it to produce an incorrect or unexpected result, or to behave unintended ways. Bugs arise from mistakes made by people in either a program's source code or its design, in frameworks and operating systems, and by compilers

- A vulnerability is a software weakness that allows an attacker to exploit a software bug
- Ethics
  - Black hat: Attack other systems for profit (illegal)
  - Grey hat: look out for your own benefit
  - White hat: Honest security professional

## Basics

### Basic security principles

- CIA Security triad
  - **Confidentiality** : an attacker cannot recover protected data
  - **Integrity**: an attacker cannot modify protected data
  - **Availability**: an attacker cannot stop/hinder computation
  - Accountability/non-repudiation may be used as fourth fundamental concept: it prevents denial of message transmission or receipt
- The **Threat model** defines the abilities and resources of the attacker. Threat models enable structured reasoning about the attack surface
- Security is
  - expensive to develop
  - expensive to maintain
  - may have performance overhead
  - may be inconvenient to users
- Fundamental security mechanisms
  - **Isolation**: Isolate two components from each other. One component cannot access data/code of the other component except through a well-defined API.
  - **Least privilege**: The principle of least privilege ensures that a component has the least privilege needed to function.
    - \* Any further removed privilege reduces functionality
    - \* Any added privilege will not increase functionality
    - \* This property constraints an attacker in the obtainable privilege
  - **Fault compartments**: Separate individual components into smallest functional entity possible. These units contain faults to individual components. Allow abstraction and permission checks at boundaries
  - **Trust and correctness**: Specific components are assumed to be trusted and correct according to a specification
- **Abstraction** is the act of representing essential features without including the background details or explanations. Abstraction allows an encapsulation of ideas without having to go into implementation details
- **OS abstraction**
  - *Single domain OS*
    - \* A single layer, no isolation or compartmentalization
    - \* All code runs in the same domain: the application can directly call into operating system drivers
    - \* High performance, often used in embedded systems
  - *Monolithic OS*
    - \* Two layers: the operating system and applications
    - \* The OS manages resources and orchestrates access
    - \* Applications are unprivileged, must request access from the OS
    - \* Linux fully and Windows mostly follows this approach for performance (isolating individual components is expensive)
  - *Micro Kernel*
    - \* Many layers: each component is a separate process
    - \* Only essential parts are privileged

- \* Applications request access from different OS process
- *Library OS*
  - \* Few thin layers, flat structure
  - \* Micro-kernel exposes bare OS services
  - \* Each application brings all necessary OS components
- **Hardware abstraction**
  - Virtual memory through MMU/OS
  - Only OS has access to raw physical memory
  - DMA for trusted devices
  - ISA enforces privilege abstraction
  - Hardware abstractions are fundamental for performance
- **Access Control**
  - **Authentication** : Who are you ?
  - **Authorization** : Who has access to object
  - **Audit/Provenance** : I'll check what you did
- There are three fundamental type of **identification**
  - What you know : username, password
  - What you are : biometrics
  - What you have : smartcard, phone
- **Information Flow control** : Who can see what information ?
  - Access policies are called access control models
- Type of **access control**
  - **Mandatory Access Control** (MAC)
    - \* Rule and lattice-based policy
    - \* Centrally controlled
    - \* One entity controls what permissions are given
    - \* Users cannot change policy themselves
    - \* Examples : The admin sets permissions for each file
    - \* Bell and LaPadula : *read down and write up* => enforces *confidentiality*
    - \* Biba : *read up and write down* => enforces *integrity*
  - **Discretionary Access Control** (DAC)
    - \* Object owner specifies policy
    - \* MAC requires central control, DAC empowers the user
    - \* User has authority over her resources
    - \* User sets permissions for her data if other users want access
    - \* Examples : Unix Permissions
  - **Role-Based Access Control** (RBAC)
    - \* Policies defined in terms of roles (sets of permissions), individuals are assigned roles, roles are authorized for tasks.

## Secure software lifecycle

- **Secure software engineering**
  - Prevent loss/corruption of data
  - Prevent unauthorized access to data
  - Prevent unauthorized computation
  - Prevent escalation of privilege
  - Prevent downtime of resources
- **Secure development Cycle** (SDC)
  - **Requirement Analysis** : Define scope of a project and security/privacy boundaries. Define security specification, identify assets, assess environment, and specify use/abuse cases
    - \* **Threat Modeling** : threats, attack vector, and emergency plans (i.e. how to react when things go wrong)
    - \* **Security requirements** : privacy policy, data management plan

- \* **Third party dependencies** : define third party dependencies along with their update policies, risk analysis on dependencies
- **Design** : the classic design phase focuses on functionality requirements. here we make security concerns an integral part of the analysis
  - \* Continuously **update threat model** as requirements change
  - \* **Security design review** : a major milestones, review security design and its interaction with functionality/requirements
  - \* **Design documentation** : up-to-date document of requirements and functionality with security assessments
- **Implementation** : During implementation, the design may be slightly refined and the security documents must be updated accordingly along with continuous reviews and analysis
  - \* Continuous **code review** ensure software is built according to specification and checked for bugs
  - \* **Static analysis** ensures high code quality and highlights flaws
  - \* **Vulnerability scanning** of external dependencies for exploits
  - \* **Unit tests** ensure functionality/security across components
  - \* **Accountability** : use a source code/version control system
  - \* **Coding Standards** : assertions and documentation
  - \* **Continuous integration** : run unit tests, static analysis, and linter whenever code is checked in
- **Testing** : Completed components are rigorously tested before they are finally integrated into the prototype
  - \* **Fuzzing** is a form of probabilistic test integration
  - \* **Dynamic analysis** complements fuzzing with heavy-weight tests based on symbolic execution and models
  - \* **Third party penetration testing** provides external validation and clean slate testing
- **Release** : Before release of the final prototype, verify the base assumptions from the initial requirements analysis and design
  - \* **Security review** : check for compliance of security properties
  - \* **Privacy review** : check for privacy policy compliance
  - \* **Review all licensing agreements**
- **Maintenance** : After shipping software, continuously maintain security properties
  - \* **Track third party software** and update accordingly
  - \* **Provide vulnerability disclosure contacts** through, e.g. a bug bounty program or at least a public contact
  - \* **Regression testing** : whenever an update is deployed recheck security and functionality requirements
  - \* **Deploy updates securely**

## Policies and Attacks

Security policies

Bug, a violation of a security policy

Attack vectors

## Stopping Exploitation

Mitigations

Advanced mitigations

## Finding bugs

Testing

Sanitizer

## Case study ?

Browser security

Web security

Mobile Security

## Summaries

- **Basis Security principles**
  - Software security goal: allow intended use of software, prevent unintended use that may cause harm
  - Security triad : Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
  - Security of a system depends on its thread model
  - Concepts: isolation, least privilege, fault compartments, trust
  - Security relies on abstractions to reduce complexity
- **Secure software lifecycle**
  - Secure software development enforces security principles during software development
  - Software lives and evolves
  - Security must be first class citizen
    - \* Secure Requirements/specification
    - \* Security-aware Design (Threats?)
    - \* Secure Implementation (Reviews?)
    - \* Testing
    - \* Updates and patching