

Information security and privacy

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Vocabulary

- **Virus** : a malware that infects a file and replicates by infecting other files
- **Worm** : a piece of malware that propagate automatically
- **Trojan** :
 - a malware hidden in a usefull software or file
 - a malware that stays on the victim's computer and communicate with a control center to carry out malicious activity
- **Rootkit** : hides the precense of a malware on a computer
- **Ransomware** : encrypts the files and request payment for decryption

- **Vulnerability** : weakness in the logic, the software or hardware of a system (bugs)
- **Exploit** : method/tool to make advantage of a vulnerability
- Vulnerability can be fixed by **patching** a system
- **Zero day** exploit : exploit for which no patch exists yet

Basic properties

Security

- Protects the data of data owners against attacks
- **Confidentiality** :
 - keep informations secret
 - give read access only to those who need to know
 - tools : access control, isolation, encryption
- **Integrity** :
 - keep information correct
 - prevent modification of the data
 - detect modification
 - tools add a hash, a MAC or a signature, make public
- **Availability** :
 - keep information available/systems running
 - tools : make copies, duplicate/distribute systems, prevent intrusions
- **Authenticity** :
 - demonstrate the authenticity of information
 - prevent fake information
 - detect modification
 - tools : add keyed hash (MAC) or a signature
- **Non repudiation** :
 - prevent denial of a statement
 - tool : add a signature as proof of origin

Privacy

- Protects the data *subject* against abuse
- **Confidentiality** :
 - keep information of *the data subject* secret
 - give access only to those who need to know
 - tools : access control, encryption, absence of data
- **Anonymity** :
 - prevent a link between data and a subject
 - reduce/modify information until no correlation is possible
 - tools : k-anonymity, defferential privacy
- **Absence of information** :
 - prevent revealing information
 - do not request, or delete information that is no longer needed
 - work on encrypted information

- tools : homomorphic encryption, private information retrieval, zero knowledge proofs

Cyber Threats

- A **threat** is a potential unwanted action that creates impact
- **Cyber attack lifecycle** :
 - Preparation
 - Gain access
 - Maintain access
 - Complete mission
 - Cover tracks
- **Commodity threats** :
 - Non targeted
 - Fully automated
 - Low risk to attackers
 - Short term financial gains
- **Hactivism** :
 - Politically motivated hacking
 - Variant of (anarchic) civil disobedience

Web application vulnerabilities

- **OWASP** : Open Web Application Security Project
 - Documentation on the top 10 critical security risk of web application
- **Injection** :
 - Context can be : HTML, JavaScript, JSON, SQL
 - Special character sequences in user inputs can trigger an action in the context
- **Injection protection** :
 - Refuse characters you do not want
 - Escape (encode) special characters when you use them
- **Direct object reference** : When a user-submitted parameter is a direct reference to a resource, a user may try to change it to access other resources

Software vulnerabilities

- **Buffers overflows** : while writing data to a buffer, overruns the buffer's boundary and overwrites adjacent memory location
- **Buffers overflows protection** :
 - **Stack canaries** :
 - * Push a random value on the top of the stack at the beginning of a function
 - * Before returning, verify that the value has not been modified
 - **Non executable memory** :
 - * Do not want to set execution permission on a page that can be written while the program is running
 - **Address space randomization (ASLR)** :
 - * Every time the program is started, it is loaded at a random address
 - * Every time the system boots, the OS is loaded at a random address

Crypto

- **Symmetric Crypto** : Encryption and decryption is done with the same key
 - Solve the problem of transferring large amount of confidential data
 - Creates the problem of transferring a symmetric key
- **Stream cypher** : Use the key and a pseudo random generator to generate a stream of random bits
- **Block cypher** : Encrypt fixed blocks of data
 - a *padding scheme* is used to fill the last block
 - a *mode of operation* is used to combine multiple blocks
 - DES (collisions and brute force) \Rightarrow AES
- **Mode of operation** :
 - ECB :
 - * Encrypt each block separately with the same key
 - * Same cleartext block results in same ciphertext block
 - CBC :
 - * Introduces the use of an *initialization vector* (IV) for the first block
 - * Each ciphertext block acts as a IV of the next block
 - * Decryption is the opposite of encryption
 - * Does not reveal any structure
 - * Malleability : flipping one bit in a ciphertext block flips the same bit in the next cleartext block and mangles the current block
 - * The last block must be padded to obtain the correct block size, if not carefully implemented, validation of padding can lead to leakage of the cleartext
- **Hash** function takes an arbitrary length input and generates a fixed length output
 - *Pre-image resistance* : Given a hash h , it is difficult to find a message m for which $h = \text{hash}(m)$
 - *Second pre-image resistance* : Given a message m_1 it is difficult to find a second message m_2 such that $\text{hash}(m_1) = \text{hash}(m_2)$
 - *Collision resistance* : It is difficult to find two arbitrary messages that have the same hash
 - SHA-3 : no weakness known
- **Messages authentication codes** (MAC) :
 - Like a hash function, but involves a symmetric key
 - The same key is used to generate the MAC and to validate it
 - If the key is known only to the two parties of an exchange, a correct MAC proves
 - * that the message was not created by a third party (authentication)
 - * that the message was not been modified (integrity)
- **Public-key Crypto** : Uses a pair of public (encryption) and private key (decryption)
 - Solves the problem of having to agree on a pre-shared symmetric key
 - No need to keep the public key secret (as the name suggests ^^)
- Asymmetric is powerful but orders of magnitude slower than symmetric crypto
- Asymmetric is typically used to exchange a symmetric key
- All these algorithms are only safe if you use keys that are long enough
 - symmetric : 128 to 256 bits
 - asymmetric : RSA 2048 bits, ECC 256 bits
 - hash function : 256 bits
- With public key crypto the public key does not have to be secret but it still has to be authentic (e.g. man in the middle attack)
 - We need a trusted third party to distribute the public keys
 - The Certification Authority certifies the keys by signing them
 - * If we trust the key of the CA, we can trust all keys signed by the CA
 - A signed key is a certificate. It contains at least :
 - * The identity of the holder
 - * The validity date of the certificate
 - * The public key of the subject
 - * The signature by the CA

TLS and HTTPS

- **TLS** Transport layer Security : provide a secure channel between two communicating peers
 - The server is authenticated with a certificate
 - It proves its identity by signing some information received from the client with its private key
 - Client and server create a symmetric key using asymmetric crypto
 - They use a symmetric cipher to encrypt data:
 - They use HMAC to guarantee integrity
- Let's Encrypt \Rightarrow free certificates
- A **Public key infrastructure** (PKI) distributes public keys using certificates
- HSTS and Certificate transparency protect against MITM and fraudulent CAs

Database Security

- **Access control** : Least privilege
- Granularity at the row level can be achieved by defining *views*
- SQL databases also support *role based* access control
- To limit the impact of SQL injection, use different DB users for different accesses

Layer	Function	Protect against
Hardware / OS	Data is encrypted when read/write to disk	Stealing/cloning virtual machines
Database	DB encrypts when read/write to file	Access by OS users/admins
Network	DB encrypts when read/write to network (e.g. TLS)	Hackers cannot sniff data in transit
Application	Application encrypts when read/write to the DB	Access by admins, memory dumps by OS admins

- If the data is encrypted in the database then the DB cannot
 - search with wildcards (e.g. `WHERE name='Pete%'`)
 - sort, compare or aggregate data
 - \Rightarrow the DB is pretty useless

Password Storage

- Classic way : use **salt** and **iterations**
- Modern way : use a **memory hard function**
- **Time-memory trade-offs** :
 - We create a *reduction* function r : it takes a hash as input and produces a password from our set
 - We build chains : $p_1 \xrightarrow{\text{hash}} h_1 \xrightarrow{\text{reduce}} p_7 \xrightarrow{\text{hash}} h_7 \xrightarrow{\text{reduce}} \dots \xrightarrow{\text{hash}} h_3$
 - We only keep the first and last element of each chain
 - * this is where we save memory
 - * we pay for this with more time to crack the password
 - We build a table with several chains
 - Hellman's original trade-off becomes inefficient when there are too many chains in a single table
 - * For each collision of the reduction function, we end up with two identical chains
 - **Rainbow table** solve the collision problem by using a different reduction function in each column
- If you search through all columns of all tables :
 - Hellman : t^2 memory look-ups, t^2 hash operations
 - Rainbow : t memory look-ups, $\frac{1}{2}t^2$ hash operations
- Adding a random value (**hash**) to the hash function prevents :

- cracking multiple hashes with a single hash calculation
- calculating the hashes in advance
- Another simple way to slow the attacker is to apply the hash functions multiple times
- **Memory hard function**
 - the function run through many steps
 - intermediate steps results are stored in memory
 - each step depends on results from previous steps

Access Control

- **Access control** defines and enforce the operations that can do an objects
- Principle of **least privilege**
 - subjects should have the minimum rights necessary to their job
- Multiple level of access control :
 - Network
 - Operating system
 - Application
 - Within an enterprise
- Multiple approaches to access control
 - **Role-based Access Control (RBAC)**
 - * Simplifies the specification of premission by grouping users into roles
 - * A role can contains multiple permissions
 - **Discretionary Access Control (DAC)**
 - * Access control is at the discreton of the object owner
 - * Owner specifies policies to acces resources it owns
 - **Mandatory Acces Control (MAC)**
 - * Tries to ensure that even someone with acces cannot leak the data
 - * Depends on the trusted software and admins
 - * no write down
- **ACL vs Capabilities**
 - Think of a door protected by a bouncer vs a door protected by a lock
 - ACL :
 - * The bouncer knows exactly who can get in
 - * People don't know where they can get in and where thay cannot
 - Capabilities :
 - * Doors do not know who will show up with a key
 - * People know exactly for which doors they have a key
- Modern Oses make use of all of these types :
 - DAC with ACLs for file and most objects
 - DAC and capabilities for privileged operations
 - Using groups to implement RBAC
 - Mac for protectiond the integrity of a system

Authentication

- Access control only makes sense if we can *authenticate* subjects
- **Password**
- **Something you own** : hardware/software token
- **OATH** is a standard that describes
 - How **OTPs** are generated from a seed
 - An XML fommat for importing the seeds into a authentication server
- **Biometrics**
 - no hashing is possible

- it is impossible to change a stolen finger
- **Challenge-response** : Rather than sending the password to the server
 - The server sends a random challenge to the client
 - The client uses the hash of the password to create a response
- **Kerberos** uses a three steps approach
 - An authentication server (AS) authenticates the client and delivers a ticket granting ticket (TGT)
 - The client can then present the TGT to the ticket granting server (TGS) to get a ticket for the service he wants to use
 - The client can access the service
- **OAuth2** is a protocol used for delegated authentication on the internet
 - Facebook, Google, Twitter etc. can be used to authenticate and access other application

Network and Operational Security Practices

- Secure communication, outside of our network
 - TLS, IPsec, VPNs
- **Network segmentation** : Break down the network based on system and data classification or into functional zones
 - Access from zone to zone can be managed by access control list (ACLs) in router or firewalls
 - Prevents all-at-once compromise of facilities
 - Protects the data center from external threats
 - Containment zones aims at stopping attacks from spreading between zones
- **Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)**
 - A physical or logical subnet that contains and exposes an organization's external-facing services to an untrusted network
 - An external network node can access only what is exposed in the DMZ
- **Zero trust network**
 - Do not trust anybody, not even internal machines
 - More work for configuring machines
 - Less work on configuring the network
 - Greatly reduces the impact if one machine is compromised
- **Virtual private network**
 - Encryption and encapsulation keep the network private
 - Before a packet is sent over the public network, it is encrypted and encapsulated with an IP header with the public address
 - Let remote workers access the internal company network
 - Interconnecting remote sites for a company
- **Firewalls**
 - Enforce network level access control
 - Firewalls operate at the network layer
 - Firewalls should also be present within the network
 - Principle of default deny
- **Proxies**
 - They operate at the application level
 - **(Direct) proxies** : between the client and internet
 - * Protect our users when they access servers on the internet
 - **Reverse proxies** : between internet and the server
 - * Protect our servers when accessed by users from the Internet
 - **Web proxies** protect users by
 - * Analyzing all data downloaded from the web with anti-virus software
 - * Blocking access to dangerous sites
- **Web application firewall (WAF)**
 - It stands in front of your web server and receives the requests from the internet.
 - It analyses the request, and if it deems them safe, it forwards them to the real server

- **Instructions detection systems**
 - Inspects traffic for all application to detect protential intrusions
 - **Signatures based** system
 - * Network traffic is compared to signature form a pattern database
 - * *Snort* is an example of signature based IDS
 - **Anomaly based** system
 - * IDS creates traffic profile during normal operation to callibrate
 - * Looks for unusual packets
 - Possible issues
 - * False posititves (too many alarms)
 - * False negatives (too many sucessful attacks)
- Keeping **audit trails** (logs) is an important part of network security
- Good way to protect data : **Backups**
 - We also need restorations tests, to check if we are actually able to restore data from backups
 - We also need a **Disaster Recovery Plan** (DRP) that explains in details how to rebuild each system in case of a major failure

Trusted Computing

- **Trusted hardware** : A piece of hardware can be trusted if it always behaves in the expected manned for the intended purpose
- **Attestation** : It can be prove that it does what you think it does
 - Attest there is secure hardware
 - Attest the state of the OS
 - Attest state of the code
 - **Secure boot**
- **Sealing** : It can store secrets in unprotected memory
 - The device derives a key that is tied to its current status and stores the encrypted data
 - Data can only be decrypted by a device with the same status
- **Isolation** : It is not possible to *peek* inside
 - Requires protection against side channel attacks
 - Trusted hardware offers one well identified entry-point to interact with the software
 - **Tamper resistance** : hard to open
 - **Tamper evident** : You can see if it has been opened
 - **Tamper responsive** : Delete keys when attacked
 - **Resitance to side channel attacks** and physical probing
- **Trusted Execution Environments** (TPM) : Isolated processing environment in which applications can be securely executed irrespective of the rest of the application
 - Dedicated devices : Strong physical protections
 - Secure enclaves : Prtected regions of memory
 - Enable processes to run while being protected from attacks perpetrated by the OS, hypervisor, firmware, drivers, or remote attackers
- **Non-volatile Storage**
 - **Endorsement key** (EK)
 - * Created at manufacturing time
 - * Signed by manufacturer
 - * Cannot be changed
 - * Used for *attestation*
 - **Storage Root Key** (SRK)

- * Used for encrypted storage
 - **OwnerPassword**
 - They are private and never leave the TPM
- **Platform Configuration registers** (PCR lol)
- **Side channels** : Determine the secret key of a cryptographic device by measuring its execution time, its power consumption, or its electromagnetic field
 - Learn how the system's secret by observing how different computations are
 - Difficult to create trusted hardware resistant to side channel
- For trusted hardware we need to **trust the manufacturer**