

Cryptography and security

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Contents

| | |
|---|----------|
| General | 1 |
| Diffie Helman (incomplete) | 1 |
| RSA (incomplete) | 1 |
| Elliptic Curve | 2 |
| Symmetric Encryption | 3 |
| Block cypher | 3 |
| Stream Ciphers | 4 |
| Bruteforce Inversion Algorithms | 4 |
| Integrity and Authentication | 5 |
| Public Key Cryptography | 6 |
| Trust Establishment | 7 |

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More fiches [here](#)

General

- $b \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ has a square root if and only if $b^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \mod p = 1$

Diffie Helman (incomplete)

- We check that X and Y are in $\langle g \rangle$
- Use a KDF to fix bad distribution of g^{xy}
- We check the lower order $X \neq 1, X^2 \neq 1$
- If $n = pq$ then \mathbb{Z}_n ring is isomorphic to $\mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ and \mathbb{Z}_n^* ring is isomorphic to $\mathbb{Z}_p^* \times \mathbb{Z}_q^*$

RSA (incomplete)

- Square and multiply algorithm to compute x^e or x^d
- Primality test : Verify that a number is prime
- To check if a number is coprime is another one use euclid algorithm

Assume a group $\langle g \rangle$ generated by some g of prime order q




Figure 1: Diffie Helman

- To compute the inverse of an elem use extended euclid algorithm
- $\varphi(p^\alpha) = (p-1)p^{\alpha-1}$
- We can compute square root of n in $\mathcal{O}(\log n)^3$
- Chose e : Pick a random value e until it is coprime with $\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$




Figure 2: RSA

Elliptic Curve

- All finite fields have a cardinality of form p^k where p is a prime number This prime number p is called the **characteristic** of the field.
- A **binary** field is a field with characteristic equal to 2
- Over a field \mathbb{R} , an elliptic curve with parameters a and b consists of a special point \mathcal{O} called the *point at infinity* and the points (x, y) which are the solutions of the equation $y^2 = x^3 + ax + by$
- Elliptic Curve over a **Prime Field**
 - The **discriminant** is $\Delta = -16(4a^3 + 27b^2)$
 - The curve is **non-singular** iff $\Delta \neq 0$
 - We define the **j-invariant** $j = 1728 \frac{4a^3}{4a^3 + 27b^2}$, two isomorphic curves have the same j-invariant
- Elliptic Curve over a **Binary Field**

- **Ordinary** curves are defined by two field elements denoted a_2 and a_6

$$E_{a_2, a_6}(\mathbb{K}) = \{\mathcal{O}\} \cup \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{K}^2; y^2 + xy = x^3 + a_2x^2 + a_6\}$$

- We define the **j-invariant** $j = \frac{1}{\Delta}$
- Simple factoring method : Pollard's (also called $p - 1$ algorithm)
- **Elliptic Curve Method** (ECM) is the best method to find p when it is small
- **ECDH** key exchange protocol is the variant of Diffie-Hellman protocol working over an elliptic curve group
 - We have two participants U and V using the same subgroup of order n generated by some point G over an elliptic curve.
 - They both select their secret key $d_U, d_V \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$
 - They compute their public key $Q_U = d_U.G$ and $Q_V = d_V.G$ which are points and exchange them.
 - Then, they both check that the received public key is actually a point of the curve which is generated by G , different from the point at infinity, and that its order is a factor of n .
 - They both compute the point P , either by $P = d_U.Q_V$ or by $P = d_V.Q_U$
 - They take the first coordinate x_P of P and convert it into a byte string Z
 - Finally they compute $K = KDF(Z)$

Symmetric Encryption

Block cipher

- **Block ciphers** encrypt/decrypt data by *blocks* of fixed length (typically 64 or 128 bits)
- **DES** : Blocks of 64 bits with a key of 56 effective bits (actually the key has 64 bits but one bit per byte is used for the checksum)
 - Internally the 56 bits key is expanded into a number of 16 48 bits subkeys
 - The encryption goes through 16 rounds each of which uses one subkey as a round key
 - The round follows the **Feistel Scheme** :
 - * The block is split into two halves
 - * The right half goes through a round function with the round key
 - * The output of this round function is XORed to the left half
 - * The two halves are then exchanged before the next round starts
 - * In the last round the exchange of halves is omitted
 - * The *round function* is invertible
 - * The inverse transform is actually another Feistel scheme with the round key in reverse order
 - There are many known attacks against DES
- Since 56 bits for a secret key are considered as too short, people considered triple encryption. This is the **triple-DES** standard
 - There are two variants :
 - * Triple DES with two keys : $K_1 = K_2$
 - * Triple DES with three keys

$$3DES_{K_1, K_2, K_3}(X) = DES_{K_3}(DES_{K_2}^{-1}(DES_{K_1}(X)))$$

- A block cipher should be secure against **key recovery** and **decryption attack**
- **AES** (Advanced Encryption Standard) it encrypts blocks of 128 bits using keys of 128, 192, 256 bits.
 - Its structure consists of a keylength-dependent number of rounds (10, 12, or 14 rounds) in which a round key is used
 - In AES, a message block and a *round key* are represented as a 4×4 matrix
 - Each byte actually represents an element of $GF(2^8)$ with reference polynomial $P(X) = X^8 + X^4 + X^3 + X + 1$. I.e., a bitstring $a_7 \dots a_0$ represents the polynomial $a = a_7X^7 + \dots + a_1X + a_0$ and additions and multiplications are done modulo 2 and modulo $P(X)$
 - The addition in the field corresponds to the XOR of the bitstrings
 - To multiply a by $0x02$ we just shift the byte a by one bit to the left and XOR the $0x1b$ if there is a carry bit

- To multiply a by $0x03$ we can multiply by $0x01$ and by $0x02$ and add (XOR) the two results
- In AES we only need to multiply by $0x01$, $0x02$ and $0x03$
- Each round consists of four types of successive transform
 - * *AddRoundKey* which adds (XOR) the round key to the block
 - * *SubBytes* which substitutes every byte a by the byte $S(a)$, following a table S (called the *S-box*)
 - * *ShiftRows* which consists of a circular shift of every row of the block by a variable number of positions
 - * *MixColumns* which consists of multiplying all columns of the block to the left by a predefined matrix M
- To decrypt we just have to invert all subroutine processes
- If we want to encrypt a message which consists of several blocks, we need to plug the block cipher into a **mode of operation**
 - **Electronic Codebook** (ECB) mode consists of encrypting each block separately, using the block cipher
 - * This is however insecure for most of applications : indeed in the messages that applications want to encrypt, it is very likely that some blocks of data repeat
 - **Cipher Block chaining** (CBC) mode, each block of plaintext is XORed to the previous ciphertext block before being encrypted. The first plaintext is XORed to an initial vector IV. There are three ways to use IV:
 - * Use a constant, publicly known IV
 - * Use a secret IV (so the secret key becomes (IV, K))
 - * Use a fresh random IV for every message x and add it as a part of the ciphertext
 - The **Output Feedback** (OFB) mode uses an IV. It consists of defining the sequence $k_i = ENC_K(k_{i-1})$, $i = 2, \dots$ and $k_1 = ENC_K(IV)$. It requires the IV to be unique, due to the properties of the one-time-pad, we then call the IV a nonce
 - The **Cipher Feedback** (CFB) mode is defined by $y_i = x_i \oplus ENC_K(y_{i-1})$, $i = 2$, and $y_1 = x_1 \oplus ENC_K(IV)$. The nonce IV options are the same as for OFB mode. The CFB works even if the last plaintext block is incomplete
 - The **Counter** (CTR) mode uses a nonce t_i for every block. The encryption of x_i is $y_i = x_i \oplus ENC_K(t_i)$. The nonce is based on a counter. The CTR mode works even if the last plaintext is incomplete

Stream Ciphers

- **Stream ciphers** are used to encrypt streams of data on the fly. The main principle is that we use one-time-pad with a pseudorandom key-stream defined from a secret key and a nonce
- **RC4** generates a key-stream of bytes from a secret key (to be used only once) which is a sequence of bytes of total length between 40 bits and 256 bits
 - They are many known weaknesses in RC4
- **A5/1** uses a 64 bits secret and a 22 bit counter, used a nonce. The key and the counter are first transformed into an initial state. Then, an automaton based on asynchronous linear feedback shift registers generates a key stream of bits
 - They are many known attacks against A5/1

Bruteforce Inversion Algorithms

- Let \mathcal{K} be a set of given size N . Consider the **random key guessing game** during which a challenge selects a key $K \in \mathcal{K}$ at random, then an adversary makes guesses for the value of K until it is correct
 - The average case complexity is $\frac{N+1}{2}$
 - If the distribution is arbitrary and unknown, the best strategy is to enumerate the value of \mathcal{K} in a random order
 - If the distribution is known, we can enumerate the value of \mathcal{K} by decreasing order of likelihood and obtain the optimal complexity which is called the **guesswork entropy**
 - If the adversary is given a clue which we call a *witness* w . Then the optimal strategy is to enumerate all $k \in \mathcal{K}$ by decreasing order of $P(K = k \mid w)$

- A **dictionary attack** consists of preparing a complete table for the inverse function. The attack then works with constant complexity but requires a memory of $\mathcal{O}(N)$, and a preprocessing of $\mathcal{O}(N)$ as well
 - With an incomplete dictionary of size D , the precomputation time is $\mathcal{O}(D)$, the complexity is $\mathcal{O}(D)$ the time complexity of the attack phase is $\mathcal{O}(1)$, but the probability of success is $\frac{D}{N}$ and not 1 anymore
 - The attack can be enriched by considering a multi-target version : Instead of targeting a single K , the goal is to recover at least one K_1, \dots, K_T of T targets. In that case the dictionary attack needs a precomputation time of $\mathcal{O}(D)$, a memory complexity of $\mathcal{O}(D)$ a time complexity of the attack of $\mathcal{O}(T)$, but a probability of success of $1 - e^{-\frac{DT}{N}}$
- **Meet in the middle attack on double encryption.** Consider a double encryption scheme :

$$Enc_{K_1, K_2}(x) = ENC_{K_2}(ENC_{K_1}(x))$$

where the keys belong to a set of \mathcal{K} of size N . We assume a known plaintext scenario where a pair (x, z) with $z = ENC_{K_1, K_2}(x)$ is known

- The **meet in the middle** algorithm consists of
 - * Preparing a dictionary of $(ENC_{k_1}(x), k_1)$ pairs
 - * Makes an exhaustive search on k_2 to compute $y = ENC_{k_2}^{-1}(z)$
 - * Looks for (y, k_1) in the dictionary and print (k_1, k_2) if there is such an entry
 - * Complexity is $\mathcal{O}(N)$ both in time and space

Integrity and Authentication

- In a **Commitment scheme**, there are two participants, the sender and the receiver, running a protocol in two phases: The commitment phase and the opening phase. The sender wants to commit on message X without revealing it.
 - The sender picks some random r and computes $(c, k) = Commit(X, r)$
 - He then reveals c to the receiver
 - In the opening phase, the sender reveals k and the receiver can compute $Open(c, k) = X$
 - The correctness requirement implies that $Open(Commit(X, r)) = X$ for any X and r
 - The commitment must be **hiding** : The receiver shall not retrieve any information about X during the commitment phase (This is similar to encryption)
 - **Compared to encryption there is a second security property which is required** The commitment must be **binding** : the sender shall not be able to construct c, k, k' such that $Open(c, k) \neq Open(c, k')$
- **Pseudorandom generator** is typically an automaton initialized with a seed, with a seed, which updates its state and outputs a number at every generation. Cryptographic pseudorandom generators must be such that the generated sequence of random numbers
- **Key derivation function** (KDF) typically maps some random value with imperfect distribution into a symmetric key which has a distribution close to uniform
- A **hash** function maps a bitstring of arbitrary length to a bitstring of fixed length. There are three main uses of hash functions :
 - Domain expansion
 - Commitment
 - Pseudorandom generation
- We often require hash function to be **collision-resistant**
 - It must be impossible to find x and y such that $H(x) = H(y)$ For this reason $H(x)$ is often called the *digest* or *fingerprint* of *hash* of x
- A **Message Authentication Codes** (MAC) typically appends a *tag* to message. This tag is computed based on a secret key and the message. The message is authenticated if it comes with a correct tag, based on the secret key
- **HMAC** is one of the popular MAC algorithm

$$HMAC_K(X) = trunc(H((K \oplus opad) \parallel H((K \oplus ipad) \parallel X)))$$

where *opad* and *ipad* are constants defined by the standard

- **CBCMAC** is another popular construction based on a block cipher. The tag of a message is the last ciphertext block of the CBC encryption of the message. The algorithm is secured in two cases :
 - The application makes sure that all messages have exactly the same length
 - The tag is only available to the adversary in some encrypted form
- **PMAC** is a block-cipher based construction. It is also proven secure if block cipher is a pseudorandom permutation
- **VCMAC** is an analog to the vernam cipher for authenticated messages which provides unconditional security. To authenticate a message X , we essentially encrypt a value $h_K(X)$ using the vernam cipher, where h is an ϵ -XOR-universal hash function
- **Authentication modes of operation**
 - In *CCM mode*, the message is concatenated with its CBCMAC, then encrypted in CTR mode
 - In the *GCM mode* the message is concatenated with its universal hash, then encrypted in CTR mode
- A **universal hash function** $GHASH_H(X_1, \dots, X_m)$ for a sequence of blocks X_1, \dots, X_m and a key H which is neither block. Each block is taken as an element of $GF(2^{128})$ and we define

$$GHASH_H(X_1, \dots, X_m) = X_1 H^m + \dots + X_m H$$

in $GF(2^{128})$

- Let $\theta > 0$ be a real number. If we pick n independent and uniformly distributed elements X_1, \dots, X_n in a set of cardinality N , if $n = o(N)$ as N goes to infinity then the probability that at least two elements are equal is

$$P[\exists i < j X_i = X_j] = 1 - \frac{N!}{(N-n)!N^n} = 1 - e^{-\frac{n^2}{2N} + o(1)}$$

- If we repeatedly pick samples until we find a collision, the expected number of samples before we stop with a collision is $\sqrt{\frac{\pi}{2}} \times \sqrt{N}$
- There exist also constant-memory algorithms to find collisions with complexity $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{N})$. For instance the Floyd cycle algorithm can be used.
- Symmetric encryption must face the generic attacks of complexity 2^n , when n is the bitlength of the key. We take this as a reference for a security : a symmetric encryption scheme is secure if this is the best attack we can mount on it. So the keylength is the security parameters. In general we say that the bitlength-equivalent security is n if the best attack needs 2^n operations

Public Key Cryptography

- In **public key cryptography** we have two probabilistic algorithms *Gen* and *Enc* and one deterministic one *Dec*. *Gen* generates a pair (pk, sk) where pk is called the **public key** and sk the **secret key**, and such that for any X in the domain, we always have $Dec_{sk}(Enc_{pk}(X)) = X$
- In a key agreement protocol (also called **key exchange** or **key establishment**), there are two probabilistic interactive algorithms with no input which generate the same output (the key) when interacting with each other. It should be such that this output is secret even though the messages between the two algorithms are public
- In **static mode** the public keys are long term values
- In **ephemeral mode** the public keys are freshly generated for each session of the protocol
 - It adds the property of *forward secrecy* : If the any long term-term is corrupted in the far future, this cannot compromise the secrecy of encryptions which are done using the output of the output of the key exchange
- In **semi-static mode**, one key is fresh and the other is a long term one
- We say that a digital scheme has the property of **message recovery** if from $\sigma = Sig_{sk}(X)$, we can extract X by $Ver_{pk}(\sigma)$. In many concrete schemes, the output of $Sig_{pk}(X)$ is of the form $X \parallel \sigma$ where σ is called the *signature*. In that case, $Ver_{pk}(X \parallel \sigma)$ is aborting if σ is an invalid signature of X
- A popular way to construct a signature scheme (without message recovery) from a random permutation is by using a hash function. In this construction, we have $Sig(X) = InvPerm(h(X))$
- Lot of stuff around signature ... not done yet ...

- So far the best way to **break RSA is to factor** N . The keys must be chosen such that factoring N is infeasible. We just have to adjust the length of p and q and avoid some known forms of weak moduli
- For scheme such as **Diffe Hellman, ElGamal**, the best way is to solve the discrete algorithm problem. Either we work in a subgroup of \mathbb{Z}_p^* given a prime p
- The following security parameters propose equivalent security
 - Symmetric encryption with a 82-bit key
 - RSA with a 1613-bit modulus
 - Discrete logarithm with a subgroup of order q of \mathbb{Z}_p^* , where p has 1613 bits and q has 145 bits
 - An elliptic curve over a field whose cardinality has 1613 bits
 - A hash function with digest length of 163 bits
- A **public key cryptography** is a tuple $(Gen, \mathcal{M}, Enc, Dec)$ with a plaintext domain $\mathbb{M} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$ and three efficient algorithms Gen , Enc , and Dec . The algorithm Dec is deterministic out output either something in \mathcal{M} or an error. It is such that

$$\forall X \in \mathcal{M} \quad P[Dec(sk, Enc(pk, X)) = X] = 1$$

where (pk, sk) is generated from running Gen

- **Digital signature scheme** is a tuple $(Gen, \mathcal{D}, Sig, Ver)$ with a message domain $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$ and three efficient algorithms Gen , Sig , and Ver . The algorithm Ver is deterministic and outputs 0 (*reject*) or 1 (*accept*). It is such that

$$\forall X \in \mathcal{D} \quad P[Ver(pk, X, Sig(sk, X)) = 1] = 1$$

where (pk, sk) is generated from running Gen

- A digital signature scheme $(Gen, \mathcal{D}, Sig, Ver)$ is (q, t, ϵ) -**secure against existential forgery under chosen message attacks** if for any probabilistic algorithm A limited to a time complexity t and q queries, the advantage is bounded by ϵ

Trust Establishment

- **Password access control** To avoid leakage from the database we can avoid storing the password by saving only a hash of it. To secure against multi-target attacks and time-memory tradeoffs, we can add a salt which has to be stored as well. So the database contains $(ID, salt, H(ID \parallel salt \parallel w))$ triplets, where w is the user password
- **Challenge/response access control** consists of sending a challenge c to the client to which he must answer by some $r = f_K(c)$ where K is his key and f is a pseudorandom function
- **One time password (OTP)** Essentially we have a long list of passwords and each password can only be used only once. Typically, the sequence is generated from a secret seed backward : from the last to be used to the first one. Each password is the image of the next password by a one way function. So the server only stores the last used password and checks that the new one hashes onto the stored one
- **Strong authentication** is the techniques using several factors. We can use factors based on *what we know*, on *what we process*, or on *what we are*
- The main security properties that we must obtain for **secure communication** are:
 - *Confidentiality* : Only the legitimate receiver can retrieve the message
 - * Enforce by symmetric encryption
 - *Authentication* : Only the legitimate sender can create a new message
 - * Enforce using a MAC
 - *Integrity* : the received message must be equal to the sent one
 - * Enforce using a hash function or with a MAC