

THE MEMOIRS OF HARRY S. TRUMAN

A READER'S EDITION



EDITED BY
Raymond H. Geselbracht

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Editor's Preface

When the first volume of Harry S. Truman's memoirs, *Year of Decisions*, which covered the first year of Truman's presidency, was published in 1955, some of the book's reviewers, while acknowledging the importance and even grandeur of its content, noted its failings—its “faltering literary quality,” in one reviewer's words, its sometimes confusing arrangement, and, the most frequently voiced complaint, the incorporation into the text of lengthy historical documents and speeches. There were too many “dreary quotes,” as one reviewer put it. *Year of Decisions* was an important and distinguished book, most reviewers agreed, but it was hard to read.

There were other problems too that made *Year of Decisions*—and its companion volume, *Years of Trial and Hope* (1956)—difficult for readers to enjoy. There were no chapter titles and no subheadings; the narrative sometimes proceeded chronologically, sometimes thematically, and sometimes vibrated uncertainly between the two approaches; there were too many details, too many people present, too much plodding through wads and wads of facts; and the dry, characterless, and clumsy writing sounded too much like a team of ghostwriters and too little like Harry S. Truman.

It is my purpose in making this new “Reader's Edition” of Truman's memoirs to recover the essential story, told in the authentic voice of Harry S. Truman, that I believe is tangled up with the abovementioned problems and failings in *Year of Decisions* and *Years of Trial and Hope*. With this goal in mind, I have cut the original text by half, down to approximately the length originally called for in Truman's contract with his publisher. I have removed or summarized or shortened most of the historical documents and speeches that too often halted the narrative and disheartened the reader. I have titled the chapters and provided subheadings. In the part of the memoirs that is organized chronologically, I have corrected a major flaw in the sequence, and

in the part that is organized thematically I have brought together fragments of related text into appropriate chapters. I have significantly reduced the number of people who appear in the story, and have described almost all those who remain—still well over two hundred—in a listing in the back of the book.

Despite all my abridging and editing, almost everything in Truman's original memoirs is either included, sometimes in shortened form, or summarized in this new edition of *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*.

My introduction, titled "Harry Truman Writes a Book: The Making of *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*," relates the story of how the memoirs were written by Truman and his team of advisers and writers. I have also prepared a short Editor's Note which describes some further details of my editing process.

My wish is that a new generation of readers will find this edition of Truman's memoirs readily approachable and enjoyable to read, and will feel the thrill that I have felt of hearing the unique and authentic voice of Harry S. Truman telling the story of his life, his presidency, and some of the most important years in American history.

THE MEMOIRS OF HARRY S. TRUMAN

Introduction

Harry Truman Writes a Book

The Making of *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*

Harry Truman began reading books of history and biography when he was a schoolboy. This reading nurtured in him a love of history which endured through his life and which he came to regard as one of the most important influences on his life. “My debt to history is one which cannot be calculated,” he wrote in old age, when he was writing his memoirs.¹ His feeling for history was an essential part of who he was, and when he became vice president and then president of the United States, and realized that he himself would have a place in the history books, he began to take an interest in how the history of his life and career would be written. He found time during his brief vice presidency to write a fairly long autobiographical manuscript. This was perhaps a premature effort; vice presidents are typically accorded only a modest place in history. But Truman’s vice presidency was fated not to last very long—only eighty-two days—and on April 12, 1945, he took the oath of office as president of the United States. Now, as Truman understood, his life and the decisions he made during his presidency would attract the attention of historians forever.



For several years, Truman was swept along in the whirlwind of his presidency, and he devoted more time to making history than to reflecting upon it. After he got well into his second term, though, he began thinking about the legacy he would leave the country, and about the related issue of the

creation of a historiography about his presidency. He had learned from his reading of books of history that historians could not always be trusted. Too many historians, he felt, misrepresented the people and events they wrote about. He expressed this concern in a note he wrote to one of his White House aides in February 1950. He was worried about the mendacious ways in which his presidency was being framed by his political enemies, and feared that such highly flawed interpretations would make their way into serious works of history. “The lies are beginning to be solidified and made into historical ‘facts,’ ” he wrote to his aide. “The truth is all I want for history. If I appear in a bad light when we have the truth that’s just too bad. We must take it. But I don’t want a pack of lying so called historians to do to [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and to me what [some historians] did to Jefferson & Jackson.”² He wanted to do something to counter the lies that were beginning to be told about him and to begin to create an accurate record of his presidency. He asked his assistant press secretary to write brief accounts of some of the important events of his presidency, and he gave access to many of his most personal papers to a journalist, William Hillman, for the preparation of a book, *Mr. President* (1952), about him and his time in office. He also wrote during these final years of his presidency a second lengthy autobiographical manuscript. He was taking a few early steps toward the creation of a historiography of his life and presidency based on facts.

If Truman was worrying about the ways historians would portray him, he was also, as his presidency drew to a close, concerned about how he would earn a living after he left office. He would receive no pension either for his ten years of service in the Senate or for his time as president, or for anything else he had done during his life—except for his service in the Army and Army Reserve. For this he would receive about \$130 a month. He had some savings, but not enough to pay the substantial cost of being a former president for very long. What would he do? Besides being a public servant, he had in his life been a farmer, a banker, a haberdasher, a miner, and an oil well investor, but he wasn’t going back to any of those lines of work. He had once thought of becoming a lawyer after he left office, and he had even filled out an application for admission to the Missouri Bar. He included on the application the two years of night school law classes he had taken when a young man, and, more important, listed his impressive references: “All U.S. Senators from 1935 to date. V. P. U.S. A. 1932 to 1940. All Cabinet members U.S. A. at present.”³ But this, he knew, was foolishness. It was very clear to him how he could make a lot of money—by sitting on boards of directors and accepting similar sorts of sinecure relationships with corporations—but

he absolutely refused to, as he saw it, sell the presidency in this way. What else was there for him?

As his presidency approached its end, Truman met with two men who were to become his closest business associates in his postpresidential years. They were the journalist William Hillman—the author of *Mr. President*, whom Truman had once complimented by telling him he was, perhaps unusually for one of his profession, “really on the beam”⁴—and David Noyes, an advertising executive who had done some speechwriting for Truman during the 1948 campaign and may have provided a little writing help and some advice on other occasions. The meeting took place in September 1952 on the presidential yacht, *Williamsburg*. Both Hillman and Noyes advised Truman to write his memoirs.⁵ This was a bolder suggestion in 1952 than it would be today, because in 1952 there was very little tradition in the United States of presidents writing their memoirs. Ulysses S. Grant wrote a magnificent memoir, but it was about his Civil War service, not his presidency. Theodore Roosevelt wrote an autobiography, but he skipped through his presidency in two hundred pages of stiff, dutiful prose. Herbert Hoover was arguably the only former president who had published a substantial account of his time in office. Besides Hoover’s memoirs, which were published in 1951, Hillman and Noyes may also have been thinking of Winston Churchill’s memoir of World War II, which was, in six volumes, still coming out, and Dwight D. Eisenhower’s *Crusade in Europe*, about his World War II experiences, which came out in 1948. Eisenhower was paid \$625,000 for his book, and this was probably on the minds of Truman’s two advisers too.

Truman was won over, and on February 6, 1953, he signed a contract with Time, Inc., for his memoirs. He agreed to produce a manuscript of 300,000 words by the end of June 1955, and Time, Inc., agreed to pay him \$600,000 for all the rights to Truman’s work. Truman would receive no further royalties. One of Time, Inc.’s magazines, *Life*, would publish a series of articles drawn from the memoirs. Time, Inc., also subcontracted the serialization of articles drawn from the memoirs to *The New York Times*, and the publication of the memoirs in book form to Doubleday & Company.⁶ This was the first big presidential memoirs deal.

Truman’s former White House counsel, Samuel I. Rosenman, helped him minimize the taxes due on such an immense payout. He negotiated a deal with the Internal Revenue Service which allowed Truman to spread the payment over several years, thus avoiding the very high tax bracket that would apply to his income if he were to receive the \$600,000 in a single year. Rosenman’s argument to the IRS, which the agency accepted, was that

Truman was not providing personal services to Time, Inc., but rather selling them a piece of personal property. The sale of the memoirs to Time, Inc., Rosenman explained to Truman, “will be treated the same as if you sold your automobile on an installment plan, receiving installments of payments over a period of six years.”⁷

Truman announced publicly in late February that he had signed a contract to write his memoirs, which would be published in two years. He was committed—both to Time, Inc., and to the American people—to tell his story.⁸

Now he needed writers to help him. He knew he could never put pen to paper and write a book by himself. He felt he needed people with more education than he had, and with the right kind of mental discipline, to do the researching and writing. He was accustomed to working with writers. All of his presidential speeches, except for those he gave extemporaneously, had been written for him. He was used to working alongside his writers, helping them know what he wanted to say and how he wanted to say it, but he almost never sat down with pen and paper and wrote his own text. And the few times he did, everyone knew that the result could never be given as a speech. Truman was in fact a gifted writer who, in his personal writings, could express his most intimate thoughts and feelings with natural sincerity, without any barrier or filter between who he was and what he wrote. His love letters to Bess Wallace are some of the best love letters ever written. He could also on occasion cast a history or political science lesson into a perfect little epigram, as he did in “Polls—Public Opinion [and] Leadership,” in which he asks, “I wonder how far Moses would have gone if he’d taken a poll in Egypt?” and concludes: “It isn’t polls or public opinion of the moment that count. It is right and wrong and leadership—men with fortitude, honesty and a belief in the right that make epochs in the history of the world.”⁹ But a book of memoirs required a different kind of writing than this, and Truman knew he would need help.

Truman also understood that he himself must be part of the story. But this was not what primarily interested him. Most importantly, he wanted his memoirs to be an accurate and unbiased work of history about his life and his presidency. He wanted them to be not so much an autobiography written from a subjective stance, but rather an objective account of his life and of the things he had done as president of the United States. To achieve the objectivity he wanted for his memoirs, he believed he had to know the facts and to rely on them, and that to discover these facts, he needed to consult the original historical documents of his presidency. Untiring research,

supplemented by his memory of events and people, would reveal the facts and assure objectivity.

He explained in a letter of November 15, 1954, to Edward Thompson, the managing editor at *Life* magazine, what his approach to his memoirs would be. He recalled what he had said at the time he signed his contract with Time, Inc., in February 1953:

I said then that I would write the facts as I knew them and only those that I could verify from the notes and papers in my possession. I pointed out that I would write about all events with which I had any connection exactly as they happened and that they would be based on what facts were known to me at that time, and that I would avoid interpreting those events in retrospect or in the light of later years and newer information.

To write such a book, founded on such a disciplined approach, Truman needed help to frame the writing project. Hillman, based in New York City, and Noyes, based in Los Angeles, would do this job, flying in to Kansas City once a month or so, and more often when necessary, to do the conceptual work, manage a writing staff, and form the crucial liaison between Truman and the writers that would assure that the memoirs would really be Truman's and not merely the product of a committee. (Time, Inc., helped reduce Truman's taxes, and in effect augmented its \$600,000 payment to him, by paying \$50,000 directly to Hillman for his own salary and that of some of the writing staff).¹⁰ Finding writers who combined the right skills and attitude proved difficult, with Hillman, Noyes, and Truman all eventually being drawn into the task of identifying the right people.

Noyes found the staff's first writer. He was Robert E. G. Harris, a journalism professor at the University of California at Los Angeles and an established columnist and editorial writer at the *Los Angeles Daily News* and *Los Angeles Times*. Noyes funded some of the activities of UCLA's journalism department and knew of Harris from this association, and he was also a reader of and admirer of his newspaper writing. He had first brought Harris to Truman's notice in May 1952, and Harris probably did a little speech-writing for Truman during the 1952 campaign. When Truman decided to hire him, Noyes expressed his confidence in the memoirs team's first writer. "Harris is much inspired about his new job . . ." Noyes told Truman. "It appears that we will have about as able and complete a staff as we could possibly wish for."¹¹

Truman had just come home after a monthlong vacation on a small, private island, not far from Honolulu, owned by California oilman Edwin W.

Pauley, with whom he had become friendly during his presidency. He was rested, but maybe not in the right mood to begin work on his book. He thought that his long holiday in the sun and sea breeze had made him “lazy in the head,” and he was feeling some misgivings about the big writing job he had signed himself up for. “I’m about to get started on the book,” he wrote his former secretary of state, Dean Acheson. “Wish I hadn’t signed a contract! . . . But since this job needs to be done I might as well do it.”¹²

Harris reported for work at Truman’s office on the eleventh floor of the Federal Reserve Building in Kansas City on July 27, 1953. Truman, Hillman, and Noyes had been hard at work developing an outline for the memoirs for several weeks. “I have been working like a Turk on the preliminary outline for the book,” Truman wrote to Acheson shortly after Harris’s arrival. “It is a terrific job. If I had known how much work it is I probably would not have undertaken it.”¹³

There was someone else Truman wanted on his writing staff. He tried to persuade his former White House aide Richard Neustadt to come work for him too.¹⁴ This was a magnificent idea. Neustadt had worked for Truman in the White House for about three years. He was an excellent writer and had done some speechwriting for Truman, notably on his last State of the Union address, one of the most important speeches of Truman’s presidency. Neustadt was, though, just starting a career as a political science professor at Cornell University, and he declined Truman’s invitation. Truman had to settle for two young men, Robert Goe and Dean Schedler, who had experience writing and editing for government agencies. They started work as assistants to Harris in late September 1953.

Hillman and Noyes from the beginning of their work with Truman believed that interviewing him was essential both to developing subject matter for the memoirs and to assuring that Truman’s voice and personality were at the heart of the text. They understood that research in the historical documentation of Truman’s presidency would be important too—and probably the most important source for the memoirs in Truman’s mind—but they believed interviews would be a crucial source for the intimately human aspects of the story. They began interviewing Truman in May, just as work on the memoirs was getting underway. When Harris arrived in July, he started interviewing Truman too, and interviewing in one shape or another, conducted by Hillman and Noyes and most of the writers who came and went, remained an important and ongoing activity for the duration of the project.¹⁵

Harris would frequently begin his day by interviewing Truman. The interview would then be quickly transcribed by Truman’s office staff, and Harris

would give the transcript to Goe and Schedler and have them check what Truman said against *The New York Times* and other publications, and also sometimes against the documentation in Truman's papers. They checked both for accuracy and to find detail to add to what Truman said. When this background research was completed, Harris would write a segment of text. Harris, Goe, and Schedler cut the transcripts up into segments which they filed by subjects that corresponded to sections of the memoirs as outlined by Hillman and Noyes. They made files, for example, on "Atomic Bomb," "Himmler's Peace Offer," "Taft-Hartley Act," "Steel Seizure," "Latin America," and many others. Harris turned the interviews and related material into draft text. By early October 1953, thirteen sections of text had been completed in draft form. These included sections on the 1948 campaign, post-war economic problems, civil rights, the Truman Doctrine, and the firing of Douglas MacArthur. Other topics were either in preparation or research work was being done on them.¹⁶

During Harris's tenure as chief writer, Truman held weekly meetings with the writing team. At one of these meetings—which Truman called "our weekly Cabinet meeting"—he complimented Robert Goe's draft about the offshore oil issue and talked at length about the Korean War and the steel mills seizure, both of which topics the writing staff was working on. These extended talks by Truman on the issues of his presidency guided the writing team's work as long as Harris headed the team.¹⁷

At the end of October, Harris wrote a rather strange memorandum to the staff. "As editorial director or consultant on this project," he wrote, "it is obvious I have been given the confining, day-in-day-out, week-to-week and month-to-month responsibility . . . of working closely with the President to shape the sort of material he wants." He stated that his authority came directly from Truman, and that he would not change "the direction or plan of the book, or the procedure" being employed to write the memoirs unless Truman himself told him to do so.¹⁸

Hillman and Noyes must have raised their eyebrows as they read Harris's memorandum, and Truman must have suspected that his writer was succumbing to one of the attacks of "Potomac Fever" that he noted sometimes afflicted members of the writing staff.¹⁹ Hillman, especially, must have suspected in Harris's memorandum a challenge to the responsibility he felt to oversee the work of the writing staff. He had come to believe that something was wrong with the way Harris was doing his job. "A lot of material . . . has not been properly handled, evaluated or developed," he wrote to Noyes on November 5. He believed that the writers should make more and better

use of the historical documents in Truman's papers. He had recently taken a quick look at Truman's collection of papers. "There are vast gobs of it," he wrote Noyes. He felt Truman needed to go through all of it to determine what documents should be used in writing the memoirs. "The boss will have to get down to [the] personal work of perusing these files alternately with you and me, and with no one else," he told Noyes, "and out of these joint sessions the real meaningful and fresh human facts of history will be drawn up." His encounter with these historical documents excited Hillman and made him feel that whatever had gone wrong on the writing staff could be corrected. "I think we had to go through this period," he wrote Noyes, "but now I know we are getting back on the track."²⁰

Despite Hillman's doubt about the merit of the work Harris and his staff were doing, the "Memorandum on Policy and Procedure" which Harris attached to his October 31 memorandum stated some very sound ideas and practices that probably reflected the views of everyone on the team. The memoirs, the memorandum argued, should be written in language such as Truman used when speaking—simple, clear, plain language, "with a minimum . . . [of] sophisticated phrases"; the basic working outline for the memoirs should be derived from interviews with Truman; research in Truman's presidential papers should supplement the interviews; Truman should review early drafts, and writers should revise them in accordance with his comments; the memoirs should be organized by topics treated in a roughly chronological order; and when a segment of the memoirs was in final draft form, it should be read to Truman by the writing staff and he should fill in from his memory "the between-the-acts material—day-to-day happenings of human and anecdotal interest . . ." These ideas influenced everyone on the project team throughout the writing of the memoirs.²¹

On November 5, Truman asked Harris for a summary of the chapters that had been completed, together with a total word count, that he could take with him to a meeting in New York with Kenneth McCormick, the editor-in-chief at Doubleday. The meeting took place on November 10. Truman told McCormick he had dictated about 300,000 words of text, about 65,000 of which were usable. McCormick was satisfied with Truman's report of his progress.

Once back in Kansas City, though, Truman began to share Hillman's concerns about Harris's work. He characterized the approach of Harris and his two assistants to their work as "anarchistic" and fretted that little was being accomplished.²² Truman was also becoming disenchanted with Harris's overreliance on oral interviews, which he felt had the result of producing

something that was not history at all, but rather a series of pleasant tales. Truman later told one of his writers that the text Harris wrote was more like a *Saturday Evening Post* story titled “My Life and Happy Times in the White House” than a presidential memoir. Truman allegedly stuck Harris’s manuscript on a shelf somewhere, and put a note on it, warning anyone who might think of looking at it, “Good God, what crap.”²³ Harris, Goe, and Schedler were all fired in January 1954.

This must have been a difficult time for Truman. Almost a year had passed since he signed the contract with Time, Inc., and he had accomplished almost nothing toward producing a manuscript. Some of Harris’s work probably proved useful, but the stack of papers on the shelf that later writers called with amusement the “Good God manuscript” was influential primarily as a reminder of a false start. In addition to his problems with his writers, Truman wasn’t always enjoying the historian’s task he had engaged himself in. He found the research in his presidential documents difficult and, at least sometimes, boring. He had loved history all his life, but he didn’t like writing his own history. “The past has always interested me for use in the present,” he wrote Dean Acheson, “and I’m bored to death with what I did and didn’t do nine years ago.”²⁴

Fortunately, by the time the Harris team departed, a new writer had come on Truman’s staff. Hillman had apparently found him. He was Morton Royse, a historian who had taught at prestigious universities and had a good number of publishing credits. He had also been an aviator during World War I, a newspaper reporter and magazine writer, and a spy with the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. His current project was a history of world national movements, and he already had 2,200 pages of manuscript.²⁵ Hillman was impressed with him and he was hired, probably sometime in November 1953.

Royse started strong. “The new professor is tops,” Truman wrote to David Noyes on December 22. “He’s really come into the spirit of what we are trying to do.” Truman hoped his team was on the right track now. “I hope that you and Bill [Hillman] can be here for a while after January 2nd and that we may be able to come out with at least six hundred thousand dollars’ worth of words . . .”²⁶

For about five months, Royse was the only full-time writer on the staff. He was apparently a meticulous, even plodding researcher who felt there was always more research work to do. This was very different from Harris’s more carefree approach, and Truman was evidently pleased with the change. Royse may have been responsible for the moment-by-moment character of

some of the chapters at the beginning of the memoirs—the 111 pages on Truman's first eighteen days as president, for example, and the 84 pages on the two-week-long Potsdam Conference in Germany. He may also have been at least partly responsible for the introduction into the memoirs of a large number of original documents from Truman's papers.

Work apparently progressed satisfactorily for three or four months, and Truman seemed very pleased with Royse's contribution. "Doctor—Excellent," he wrote on a draft chapter titled "The Press." And elsewhere on the same draft, Truman wrote, "Dr.: This strikes me just right. HST."²⁷ In early April, Truman turned down an invitation from his oilman friend Edwin Pauley to spend a month on his private island in Hawaii. "I wish I could be with you on the trip to Honolulu," he wrote Pauley, "but I am working my head off on this history of the period and we are making a great deal of progress." He would remain in Kansas City, on the job, working with his mid-1955 deadline in mind.²⁸

But a major problem was gradually emerging. Royse's conscientious research and concern with narrative detail were taking a lot of time and creating a perhaps disproportionate number of pages for the brief chronological period covered in the chapters on the early months of Truman's presidency. In May 1954, Royse was still coming to Truman to ask questions about the Potsdam Conference, and Truman was apparently becoming annoyed at having to deal over and over with things he thought were already decided and done. Hillman and Noyes were increasingly worried that at the present pace, the memoirs could not possibly be finished by the deadline date.²⁹ They were probably thinking, too, that under Royse's leadership the memoirs would swell far beyond the 300,000 words called for in the Time, Inc., contract. Hillman might have remembered the immense history of national movements that Royse was writing when he came to Truman's staff and wondered if the memoirs were on the way to becoming another endless project for Royse.

The gathering explosion finally occurred sometime in May. Hillman had apparently been leaning hard on Royse to finish some segment of the memoirs, and one day a note from Royse appeared on Hillman's desk. It was headed simply, "Friday." ". . . I checked out of the [building] about 5 minutes ago," Royse began. "I'm telling you this, because I can now take great pleasure in telling you I did not finish [the work you gave me]." Hillman must have realized he was reading a defiant manifesto, and that Royse had bolted, maybe for good. "There may be two pages of text left," the note went on. "You go ahead, Mr. City Editor, & turn out your damn edition." He told

Hillman he had left fifty pages of manuscript and four files of documents in his desk drawer. "Get busy at them. I'll be around later—but the way I feel now I'd rather take a few days off—Actually, I think you[re] nuts. . . . You'll pressure yourself out of a book, brother, whoever comes in after I leave."³⁰

Royse was gone by the end of the month. Truman had no writers left on his staff, his book was nowhere near being completed, and his deadline was only about a year away. One writer after another had let him down. He must have worried his memoirs might never be finished.

He turned to the two major universities in the Kansas City region for help—telephoning the president of the University of Missouri and the chancellor of the University of Kansas—and he quickly found two new writers. They were Herbert Lee Williams, a journalism instructor from the University of Missouri, and Francis Heller, a political science professor from the University of Kansas. Williams came to Kansas City right away, Heller a few weeks later when the teaching term ended at his university. By the end of June, the new writing team was picking up where their predecessors had left off.³¹

In retrospect, Williams and Heller seem to have been the saviors of the project. It doesn't seem certain the memoirs could have survived a new round of writers like Harris, Goe, Schedler, and Royse. Williams and Heller quickly showed themselves to be very different from their predecessors. They were not exactly a team. They were quite different in their personal habits, and it was probably fortunate that Williams's office was on the tenth floor and Heller's was on the eleventh. They took their assignments from Hillman and Noyes separately. But they were alike in that both worked quietly and competently and completed their assignments, one after another, in good time. Hillman and Noyes were very pleased with their new writers. "I think our two men have done very well," Noyes wrote Hillman on July 9, "and there seems to be no reason why, if they stay at it, this project cannot be concluded in its essentials in a few months." Hillman agreed, and wrote Noyes that the next time he came to Kansas City he would talk with Williams and Heller to secure them for the memoirs project at least through the end of the year. "We certainly were lucky finally to get the right combination," Hillman concluded.³²

By midsummer, Hillman and Noyes felt the project was in very good shape. The writing was proceeding well, and plenty of documents had been identified for use in the chapters that remained to be written. Hillman and Noyes gave Williams and Heller a list of topics each was to work on. Williams was assigned almost all the domestic policy topics and the long

account of Truman's life before he became president. Heller was given almost all the foreign and defense policy topics—the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, Palestine, the Berlin Airlift, NATO, and the Korean War. Some of these topics had been worked on by the earlier writers, in which case Williams's and Heller's task was to revise earlier drafts. Williams and Heller usually had to work up their assigned chapters from the beginning, doing research in Truman's papers before starting to write. Hillman and Noyes pored over their list of topics again and again with Truman, revising it as often as necessary. In late August, they gave their two writers their assignments for the following three months, and they reported to Truman that unless something unforeseen occurred, "work on the first completed draft of the memoirs should be completed on Thanksgiving day."³³ In the weeks that followed, Williams and Heller produced about 28,000 words a week—a frenetic pace which resulted in a swelling of the manuscript to about 800,000 words by October.³⁴ This was already almost three times the word count called for in Truman's contract, and the work wasn't finished yet.

Williams found his work to be at once thrilling and emotionally complex. He has left an account of his time as a writer on Truman's memoirs staff, titled "I Was Truman's Ghost." He found the job thrilling because it challenged him to turn a dense and complicated fabric of facts, documents, and oral testimony into a story that was understandable and interesting to the average reader. He found it emotionally complex because he had to write as if he were Truman, often in the first person singular, always suppressing his own personality, beliefs, and feelings. "I found . . .," he wrote, "that . . . I had to psych myself up for each assignment." The reason Williams was able to write as if he were Truman was that Truman and his assistants had developed a disciplined process, including, besides the interviews with Truman that had been conducted since the first days of the project, long meetings among the writer of a newly completed draft of a chapter and Truman, Hillman, and Noyes. "It was in these get-togethers that the memoirs got on a true course," Williams believed. It was here that Truman's voice was put into the text and that the memoirs became his. Truman would listen carefully as someone, usually Hillman, read the text aloud, frequently stopping so that he and Noyes could ask Truman if he wanted to change anything, or if he could think of any interesting details or anecdotes to add. Sometimes a former Cabinet secretary or White House aide would join in to help Truman remember important details of an event and impressions of the people who participated in it. Williams asked questions too, feeling that he brought in the perspective of the people who would one day be reading the memoirs.

These meetings, Williams wrote, “elicited much of the conversational and anecdotal material from Truman which otherwise would have been missing from the record.” After a meeting ended, Truman’s office staff would type up a transcript, which Williams would use to prepare a new draft. When it was finished, Truman would take it home and read it to Bess. The next day, Williams would look through the draft for the few final changes that Truman typically wrote in.³⁵

Heller remembered other ways by which Truman made the memoirs his. Heller’s office, unlike Williams’s, was in Truman’s office suite, and Heller found Truman accessible and always willing to answer questions, and even on occasion to review a few newly written pages. Heller paid close attention to all the comments and changes Truman made in new segments of text. Sometimes Truman would include a lengthy note in the text he returned to Heller. The most notable instance of this was when he handed Heller several pages of longhand notes recounting all the thoughts that went through his mind when he was waiting to be called into the arena where the delegates to the 1948 Democratic National Convention were meeting. Heller also established a rule for himself that whenever he encountered documentation that included Truman’s own words—such as the many interviews with Truman that had been conducted by Hillman, Noyes, and others—he would, if possible, include it in some way in the draft text he was working on.³⁶

From the time Williams and Heller began working on the memoirs staff—in May and June 1954, respectively—they never faltered in their work. Every day, every week, every month, more and more text accumulated, and Hillman and Noyes crossed one topic after another off their list. The two writers were an excellent team, despite never working in close physical proximity and never developing any personal closeness. They were capable people who quietly wrote, and wrote, and wrote.

Truman’s editors at Time, Inc., were concerned about what was going on in Kansas City. In early November 1954, *Life*’s Edward Thompson flew in from New York to look over what Truman and his staff had accomplished. He was quickly confronted with the problem of the immensity of what had already accumulated. The manuscript was much too long—more than twice the contract’s 300,000-word limit, and with more accumulating every day. It would have to be cut down to reasonable size. Thompson assured Truman that much of the cutting would be easy. The manuscript incorporated too many unnecessary historical documents from his papers. Take these out, Thompson advised. “The book will be greatly helped . . . —it will make more sense and you will gain valuable space—if you can sit down and tell in your

own words what was transpiring.”³⁷ A few weeks later, Thompson offered to send an editor to Kansas City to help Truman make the needed changes. Truman replied that he wasn’t quite ready for this. He wanted first to complete what he called “elaborating my notes,” by which he meant getting into his draft all the facts from his historical documents that he thought were necessary. He assured Thompson that he was “on the home stretch” in this work and needed only a little more time.³⁸

The first draft of the memoirs was probably completed, as Hillman and Noyes had advised Truman back in August it would be, by Thanksgiving, or if not quite by then, certainly by the end of the year. It was a gargantuan production, filling twenty-three binders and totaling about 4,300 typed pages. It was about four times as long as Truman’s contract called for. The draft was organized according to a table of contents drawn up by Hillman and Noyes. There were four parts: “My First Days as President”; “War Ends in Europe”; “War in the Pacific”; and “Rebuilding.” This was a misshapen scheme which put only 425 of the draft’s 4,300 pages in its first two parts, and all the rest in the last two parts. The first three parts of the table of contents are reasonably well ordered, but the last part, representing almost 60 percent of the text of the first draft, appears very confused. This suggests that Hillman and Noyes had a good grasp of what would be in the first half of the memoirs, but only vague ideas about the second volume. It also showed a conflicted attitude toward chronology. The parts of the draft that were destined for the first volume were predominantly chronological in character, whereas the parts which were to go into the second volume were more often arranged thematically.³⁹ The conflict was further indicated by the decision, made probably by Noyes early in the writing process, to have the chapters in the first volume about Truman’s youth and pre-presidential career follow a lengthy account of the first three weeks of his presidency. The result was that the hero of the memoirs was not born until page 112.

Although too long and in some respects flawed and undisciplined, the first draft of the memoirs was an important achievement. It seems to have included all the content of the final published memoirs, if in sometimes rough form. A lot of work remained—cutting, reorganizing, rewriting, finishing the job of putting Truman in the text and making the memoirs truly his. But this work could be undertaken with the knowledge that most of the creative work had already been done.

Hillman and Noyes began transitioning the staff—theirelves included—from a headlong rush of researching and writing, and never looking back, to a more deliberate, self-critical phase in which text was reorganized, cut back,

checked for accuracy and appropriateness, and rewritten over and again until everything was right.

First, the text had to be reorganized. The sprawling and misshapen table of contents, developed to help organize the first draft, had to be transformed into something suitable as an organizing scheme for a published book. Two hundred sixty-five sections divided very unequally into four poorly conceived parts would not do. Hillman and Noyes created a new chapter outline mapping most of the first draft's sections to thirty newly framed chapters which relate the story of approximately the first year of Truman's presidency. These new chapters survived the subsequent editing process to appear almost intact in the first volume of the published memoirs. The "Chapter Outline" document also identifies other sections of text that needed to be condensed or reorganized, and it suggests places where more color and atmosphere were needed, and a simpler human touch.⁴⁰ Another document written at about this same time, titled "Proposed Sequence for Rewrite for Second Draft," prescribes in more detail changes needed in specific sections of the first draft text. "Re-write from State Dept. language," it says of one section; "Paraphrase Hurley cables," it says of another section; and of others, "Needs pulling together," "Break up," "Synopsize," "Get HST comments," "Long Marshall memo has to be reduced," "Big document needs working on," "Cut down to bone and put in HST language," and "Squeeze it if possible."⁴¹

Before work on a new draft could begin, Truman had to deal with a personnel problem. Williams left the staff in mid-December to take a job at the University of Michigan. It was a fine position, and Truman understood why Williams had to leave. But this left him with only one writer, and he must have been concerned that the problems of earlier months might return. He went to see Heller in his office and asked him if he thought he could finish the writing job by himself. Heller liked what he was doing, researching and writing, and he liked working for Truman too. He told Truman he could do it. Hillman and Noyes were apparently not pleased when they learned that Truman had given the responsibility for completing the manuscript to one person who had, besides a job with Truman, a busy life at the University of Kansas. But Truman trusted that Heller wouldn't let him down.⁴²

So, with a single writer taking on the immense task of converting the bloated, unruly, and often inadequate first draft into publishable text, work got underway. Truman felt enough confidence in his team to make a statement to the press in mid-January 1955. His memoirs, he told the *Kansas City Star*, would probably be ready for publication sometime in early or mid-April. Heller's heart must have skipped a few beats when he heard

this—rewriting 4,300 pages in six months! “The main difficulty now,” Truman told the *Star*, “is cutting it down to size . . .” Writing his memoirs, he said, “is a much bigger job than I thought when I undertook it.”⁴³

Hillman and Noyes made longer trips to Kansas City than they had earlier on. They focused on two tasks: identifying what to cut out of the manuscript and reorganizing the first draft—particularly the part which would make up the second volume. This part was often not organized into recognizable chapters.

Truman’s editors in New York were following his progress and were aware of the shortcomings of the first draft. Kenneth McCormick at Doubleday sent Truman eighteen pages of comments about it. He told Truman that his passion for the facts had caused him to include hundreds of pages of documents in the text, and that they had to come out, or be summarized. Readers would never get through such a mass of undigested documents, he said. Edward Thompson at *Life* sent an editor, Ernest Havemann, out to Kansas City to help Truman cut the manuscript down. Havemann discovered that much of the first half of the draft was taken up with documents included in their entirety. In a way, this was good news. If the documents were removed, he believed, the remaining text could be turned into useful, straightforward narrative “simply by substituting the President’s own explanation of what the documents and the events meant to him, and why he did what he did when he did it.” Havemann thought he might be able to help Truman tell his story in his own words by interviewing him.⁴⁴

Truman had already been through enough interviewing and probably doubted it was the answer to the problem presented by the documents. The documents were there because Truman wanted to write a factual account of his presidency. Everyone, it seemed, wanted him to tell his story in his own words. Thus all the interviews—with Hillman, Noyes, Harris, Royse, and others. Truman wanted to tell the story in his own words too, but only to a point. He could tell some things in his own words, but he wanted most of his story told by an objective and knowledgeable author who possessed a trained and disciplined mind, had read and absorbed the relevant documents, knew the facts and understood the issues, and commanded a prose style equal to the task at hand. Truman knew he could not be this author, at least not alone. He believed he could do the job with a lot of help, and he was getting it, from his advisers and writers and from former members of his administration too. Truman, and everyone on his staff, liked Ernest Havemann, but Truman did not believe he had the right answers to the questions confronting him, and Havemann was sent back to New York in mid-March.

Kenneth McCormick also came to Kansas City, from March 9 to 11, to read through the manuscript in order to get ideas for promoting the book. A few weeks after McCormick's visit, Truman wrote to tell him that he and his staff had settled on a title for the book: *The Life and Work of One President*. But everyone soon got over their enthusiasm for this awkward title and it was never mentioned again.⁴⁵

Meanwhile, Hillman and Noyes were continuing to organize the first draft material into chapters that would be suitable for the published memoirs. What would become the second volume of the memoirs—which was nowhere evident in the disorder of the latter stretches of the first draft—was taking form.⁴⁶ All this while, Heller was writing and revising, day after day, without evident fatigue and without any sign of Potomac Fever. As he had told Truman, he could finish the job by himself.

By early June, Truman and his team had finished what they called the corrected draft. It was 1,774 pages long, cut well down from the 4,300 pages of the first draft. Truman referred to the corrected draft as the “next to final draft.” The new draft was slightly revised and was then retyped, mimeographed, and assembled into four large “books,” two books each for the two volumes of the published memoirs. The job was almost done, and Truman was confident he could meet his June 30 deadline.

Truman wanted to be certain his memoirs were factually accurate. His own personal assistants were doing all they could in this regard, and Truman decided as well to send the new draft to two of his most trusted advisers, Samuel I. Rosenman and Dean Acheson, for review. He sent them the draft for the first volume in early June, and the draft for the second volume not long after.⁴⁷

Rosenman was startled when the first half of the draft appeared in his mailbox. “I find that was quite a chore which you sent me,” he wrote Truman on June 14, “in the form of 900 typewritten pages to be read and returned to you with critical comments so that you can get . . . your manuscript to the publisher by June 30.”⁴⁸ Rosenman managed to go through 258 pages the next weekend, and he sent his comments about the first volume in three installments, on June 20, 22, and 24. Truman turned Rosenman’s comments over to Heller, who considered each one and reported back to Truman about any changes he made in response to them. “We made good use of those comments,” Truman told Rosenman. “I know what you want is frankness and sincerity,” Rosenman wrote his old boss. “That is what I have tried to give you.”⁴⁹

Rosenman sent his comments about the second half of the memoirs to Truman on about August 4. As with his comments on the first volume, this second set concerned primarily factual details, but he also made a few

broader criticisms. Most importantly, he did not like some aspects of Truman's account of his Palestine policy—for instance, Truman's emphasis on the pressure some Jewish leaders put on him to recognize the new state of Israel. He thought Truman was being unfair to himself in suggesting that this pressure was one of the reasons for his decision to recognize Israel. "I do not think that the pressure had anything to do with it," Rosenman argued, "and [believe] that you would have done what you did in due time, whether there was pressure or not." Rosenman also thought Truman should omit the admittedly colorful story about his Kansas City friend Eddie Jacobson coming to Washington and persuading him to meet with Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann. Truman would have met with Weizmann without Jacobson's intervention, Rosenman argued, and, besides this, placing so much importance on a single meeting obscured the real reasons why Truman recognized Israel. Rosenman also objected to what he called a lengthy history lesson—the material that Truman had given Francis Heller in handwritten form—that Truman inserted into an otherwise interesting and dramatic account of his appearance at the Democratic National Convention in 1948. "This foray into history, I think, should be omitted," Rosenman wrote. He also thought Truman spent too much time recounting the story of the firing of Douglas MacArthur as commander of United Nations forces in Korea. "I agree that the removal of MacArthur and that whole story is a very important one," he wrote. "But I doubt whether history will consider it that important." The MacArthur section, he advised, should be considerably shortened.⁵⁰

Dean Acheson provided his extensive comments to Truman in six long letters which he sent over a month's time in June and July. Most of his suggestions concerned factual matters which Truman and his staff could quickly act on. But Acheson, like Rosenman, found some parts of the text to be broadly objectionable. The section about U.S. policy toward Palestine, Acheson believed, was especially problematic. "I never was enthusiastic about the policy and, therefore, am not a sympathetic critic," he wrote Truman. "Some things, however, seem clearly wrong." Truman, for example, talked about the principle of self-determination, but in Palestine, U.S. policy seemed to apply this principle to the Jews but not to the Arabs. It also seemed wrong, Acheson argued, for Truman to say that he wanted a solution in Palestine to be reached peaceably, but at the same time to insist that the solution should include an increased immigration of Jews into Palestine—the one thing the Arabs would never accept. Acheson admitted that he objected to essentially Truman's entire account of U.S. policy in Palestine, and that he objected too—very strongly—to Truman's assertion that some State Department officials were anti-Semitic.⁵¹

Acheson also found unacceptable—here agreeing with Rosenman—the lengthy American history lesson in the middle of Truman’s account of his appearance at the 1948 Democratic National Convention. “Here again I am going to step on your toes,” he warned. “These pages ought to come out. . . . They slow up the story.”⁵² He felt much the same way about Truman’s account of the federal budget process. “I don’t think that a general exposition of budgetary principles adds a great deal to your autobiography,” he advised. The whole thing could be deleted, or at least be much reduced. “This is not my cup of tea,” he said.⁵³

Truman and his staff, with Heller taking a leading role, carefully considered all the comments, suggestions, and criticisms that Rosenman and Acheson made, and made many changes in the text in response to them. Truman stood fast on his account of U.S. policy in Palestine, though, as he did on his telling of MacArthur’s firing; and the lengthy ramblings on American history in the account of the 1948 Democratic National Convention and the didactic essay on the federal budget process stayed in the text.

Two other former advisers also provided comments: former Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder, who reviewed the section on the federal budget, without feeling Rosenman’s and Acheson’s distaste for it; and former Solicitor General Philip Perlman, who reviewed the sections on Truman’s policies relating to internal security and to the government’s seizure of the steel companies in 1952.

Truman and his staff worked through the reviewers’ comments regarding what became the first volume of the memoirs before the June 30 deadline, but they didn’t take up the comments on the second volume until sometime in October. Any changes made in the manuscript after June 30 would be sent to the publisher, which would revise the manuscript.

Truman delivered the manuscript of his memoirs to Time, Inc., on his deadline date, June 30, 1955, and received in return a check for \$110,000 and five promissory notes—one for each year from 1956 through 1960. The first four were for \$100,000, the last one for \$90,000. According to the contract, Time, Inc., owned the copyright for the memoirs, and Truman would receive no payments beyond the \$600,000 already paid and promised. The manuscript was almost 600,000 words long, twice the length called for in his contract with Time, Inc. To accommodate this discrepancy, Truman and Time, Inc., agreed when Truman delivered his manuscript to an amendment to the contract which acknowledged the manuscript’s actual length.⁵⁴

What kind of book had Truman and his helpers turned over to Time, Inc.? One that was strongly fact-based and that drew extensively from the documents in Truman’s presidential files. One that told the story of Truman’s

life and presidency exactly as it happened, as nearly as Truman was able to tell it. It was a book written in straightforward language; it was fundamentally unembellished and completely trustworthy. And somehow—as a result of all the interviewing and conferring, and the sympathetic editing and rewriting—the real Harry S. Truman sometimes broke through the small army of people who at different times in different ways laid hands on the text, and made his voice clearly heard.

In all these essential ways, Truman's book was a success, and Time, Inc., was mostly pleased with it, despite its excessive length. But in time, problems would be recognized, some of them emerging directly out of the text's strengths. Most significantly, the emphasis on facts and reliance on historical documents too often overwhelmed the need to present a well-told story. Truman and his writers removed hundreds of pages of reproduced documents from the first draft of the memoirs during the editing process, but they still left many in, and these remaining documents clogged up the storytelling and made it difficult to follow the narrative. The reliance on facts was a problem too. There were simply too many of them. Truman too often seemed to want to include every detail of an event, every person who was present—and in these fact-burdened stretches, the memoirs are not good reading.

Another problem arose from the key question of whether the text should be organized chronologically or thematically. Truman and his advisers never identified a satisfactory answer to this question. They knew from early on that they would have to either choose one or another of these approaches or combine them somehow. Back in February 1953, when Truman signed his contract with Time, Inc., Edward Thompson sent him a long letter in which he posed the chronological/thematic question. "You may want to stick to a strictly chronological treatment," he wrote, "or you may want to take [the main themes of your presidency] and devote chapters to them. The answer," Thompson concluded, "will be more obvious when the material has been sorted out." Instead of sorting matters out and making a decision, though, Truman and his team settled into a hybrid approach which often created problems for readers. In chapters that were on balance thematic, for example, the themes would sometimes be broken up into chronological segments and assigned to different and widely separated chapters. Foreign aid was handled in this way, as were atomic energy and the Fair Deal. Readers of the memoirs were thrust into this confused arrangement and challenged to keep reading in the faith that the story would sort itself out as they read.⁵⁵

Another problematic feature of Truman's book was its ending. One would have expected the story to end when Truman's presidency ended on January

20, 1953. Instead, he ends it two months earlier, in mid-November. The last two months of Truman's presidency were surprisingly eventful for a lame-duck president. Truman received two important reports from commissions he had set up, one about the country's health care needs and one about immigration policy; he expected both these reports to have enduring value. He presented two of his most important addresses as president during these last few weeks too—his State of the Union Address and his Farewell Address. He made in these addresses some predictions regarding the eventual end of the Cold War which would appear remarkably prescient when reviewed forty years later. In January 1953, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill visited Washington for two days of important meetings with Truman and his advisers. All these things were worthy of mention in the memoirs, as would have been an account of Truman's tense encounter with a surly president-elect Eisenhower on the morning of inauguration day; and Truman might have ended his memoirs by telling the moving story of the welcome he and Bess received when they arrived home in Independence late in the night of January 21. He wrote about it in his diary, concluding the entry, "It was the pay-off for thirty years of hell and hard work."⁵⁶ What an ending for the memoirs that would have been!

But Truman instead ended his book with an account of his only meeting with president-elect Eisenhower, on November 18, 1952, two weeks after the election. Truman's purpose in inviting Eisenhower to meet with him was to arrange for an orderly transition of power to the new administration. But something was wrong about the meeting from its very beginning. Eisenhower seemed suspicious about something, and, as Truman wrote in his diary, "he had a chip on his shoulder."⁵⁷ Truman was puzzled by Eisenhower's attitude. He thought that maybe he was intimidated by the immensity of the responsibility he was stepping into, or that he was still under the influence of what Truman thought had been a thoroughly dishonest Republican campaign. Truman wasn't sure what the problem was, but he was worried by his encounter with Eisenhower, and he ends his memoirs by telling the reader, somewhat mysteriously, that his worries did not go away. "I kept thinking about it." These are the memoirs' final words.

It's unclear why Truman chose this portentous ending. It must have been a deliberate choice. He had learned during the 1952 campaign to distrust, and maybe even dislike, Eisenhower, and he seems to want to warn his readers about his successor. Take care that you are well led by this man, he seems compelled to say, because you can't necessarily trust him. Perhaps this feeling was for Truman what was strongest in memory about the eleven weeks or

so between Election Day and inauguration day. The best way to end the memoirs, he may have felt, was with ominous foreshadowing and cautionary warning, all wrapped up in a few ambiguous words.

Any concern Truman felt about shortcomings that remained in the manuscript that he delivered to Time, Inc., was overshadowed by his satisfaction at having completed what had proved to be a difficult task. “It is almost as much satisfaction to get this *Time* contract behind me as it was to get out [of] the White House,” he wrote to Dean Acheson a few weeks after he had finished the job.⁵⁸

Life began serializing the memoirs on September 26, 1955. It published five weekly articles, totaling 75,000 words, about one-fourth of the first volume of the published memoirs. *The New York Times* began publishing thirty daily installments of the memoirs, which also comprised about a fourth of the first volume, on September 25, 1955. Doubleday & Company published the first volume of *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, subtitled *Year of Decisions*, on November 2, 1955.

Truman did not want to promote his book, but he agreed to participate in one publicity event for each volume. The first was to be in Kansas City, and the second in New York. Doubleday wanted Truman to sign ten thousand copies of the first volume in advance of the November 2 event in Kansas City, and it suggested that Truman use a signing machine. Truman didn’t like the sound of this, and he refused to sign any more books than he could sign during the event itself—no advance signing and no machine! “I cannot possibly enter into a program [of signing autographs] which would look as if I were selling autographs instead of a book,” he told Doubleday. “I want the book sold on its merit. If it cannot be sold that way, then it’s not worth having.” When Doubleday’s advertising department tried to get Truman involved in some other promotional activities, he sent off a letter saying, “I don’t want to be involved in any advertising stunt whatever. . . . I want no advertising by anyone.”⁵⁹

As the release of *Year of Decisions* drew close, Doubleday prepared for a big event at the Muehlebach Hotel in Kansas City. “Your publication date has taken on the proportions of the biggest launching of any book within my memory,” a Doubleday executive wrote Truman. The company estimated that 7,500 people might show up, and that the event would get wide media coverage.⁶⁰

The book launch started at 9:45 in the morning in the Muehlebach’s Grand Ballroom. A color guard composed of Boy Scouts escorted Truman into the room. A dignitary said a few appropriate words, and representatives

of B'nai B'rith presented an award to Truman. Then came the Masons, and after them, the old soldiers of Truman's World War I battery, very proud of their "Captain Harry," and next came members of the Junior Chamber of Commerce. Then there was a break in the proceedings, allowing Truman perhaps to have some lunch, or to sign more books. Truman might have thought about Eddie Jacobson during this lull in the festivities. The haberdashery shop the two of them had run together thirty-five years earlier had been right across the street from the Muehlebach. Eddie wasn't with Truman this day, though; he had died a week earlier, and Truman must have felt his absence.

At two-thirty, the Women's Chamber of Commerce entered the ballroom, followed by the Women's Fan Club of the Kansas City Athletics baseball team and the head of the winning team of the recent United Fund drive. The Lion's Club arrived at three, the Business and Professional Women's Club at four, and St. Stephen's Choir at five. Somehow Truman kept signing books as all this was going on. Finally, at five-thirty, a Girl Scout honor guard entered and escorted Truman out of the room. The day was done, and the first volume of Truman's memoirs, *Year of Decisions*, was launched into the world.⁶¹

Doubleday's president wrote to Truman two days later. "I never saw a more genuine response to a person," he said, "than the appearance of those thousands of people to greet you." The Kansas City police estimated that six thousand people came to see Truman at the Muehlebach; Doubleday estimated that Truman autographed four thousand copies of his book. Sixteen thousand copies were very quickly sold in Kansas City.⁶²

Year of Decisions was widely reviewed. Historian Allan Nevins, writing in *The New York Times Book Review*, noted some of the book's failings—its faltering literary quality, its confusing arrangement, its incorporation of too many speeches and documents—but concluded that it was "a volume of distinction. It has force, clarity and sincerity," and it "well expresses one of the most conscientious, dynamic and . . . clear-sighted Presidents we have ever had. . . . To the major crises he brought statesmanlike insight, energy and courage. There was greatness in the man, and the flavor of the greatness comes over into his book."⁶³ Another reviewer emphasized the "plain speaking" quality of Truman's book. "Mr. Truman's style," this reviewer wrote in *The New Republic*, "is exactly like Mr. Truman himself, clear and unmistakable as the sound of a slamming door, dogged, graceless, downright, and wholly without sham as it is without mannered beauty."⁶⁴

Although most reviewers focused on the many important events of Truman's presidency, others grumbled about the shortcomings of *Year of*

Decisions. “To tell the truth,” a reviewer complained, “the greater part of *Year of Decisions* makes rather dull reading. We are peering through the dark glass of a ghosted official record.” Another reviewer commented on all the “dreary quotes,” and another, though picking *Year of Decisions* as a “Book of the Year,” noted crossly that “in Mr. Truman’s book the facts are just dumped down in front of you.”⁶⁵

Doubleday printed 100,000 copies of *Year of Decisions*, which sold well. The book debuted on *The New York Times* bestseller list on November 20 in the tenth spot. It rose the next week to number 6, stayed in approximately that position for the next eight weeks, then declined week by week until February 19, 1956, when it was number 16. Then it fell off the list—but after a good run of fifteen weeks.

The second volume, subtitled *Years of Trial and Hope*, went through the same publication process as *Year of Decisions* when it appeared in early 1956. *Life* began publishing its five weekly installments on January 20; *The New York Times* put out the first of its thirty daily articles on January 22; and Doubleday published the complete text on March 5. *Years of Trial and Hope* had a shorter stay on the bestseller list—eight weeks—and it rose only to number 8.

The publication of this second volume of Truman’s memoirs was enlivened by some moments of controversy. General Douglas MacArthur managed to get from *The New York Times* a prepublication copy of the sections dealing with his firing as head of United Nations Command during the Korean War, and he did not like what he read. He wrote up a quick, but lengthy, rebuttal, accusing Truman of “twisting the facts to serve his own ends,” composing “a labyrinth of fancy and fiction, distortion and misrepresentation,” and giving in to “those petty instincts based upon spite and vindictiveness.” The *Times* published MacArthur’s intemperate rebuttal on February 9. Truman did not respond to it. His book, he told his editor at *Life*, was based on facts and on the documents in his presidential files. He felt no surprise at MacArthur’s “blow up,” as he called it. “When an egoist is punctured,” he wrote his editor, “a lot of noise and whistling always accompanies the escaping air.”⁶⁶

Truman never made peace with how little money he made on his memoirs. The income tax brackets were punishing to high earners in the 1950s, and Truman struggled from the time he signed his contract with Time, Inc., to find ways of lowering his tax liability. He had probably hoped the IRS would consider his earnings from his memoirs to be capital gains, which would be taxed at a much lower rate than regular income. Eisenhower had several years earlier benefited from the characterization of his income from

his World War II memoir, *Crusade in Europe*, as capital gains. But because of Eisenhower's well-publicized use of this tax dodge, Congress passed a law forbidding its ever being used again.⁶⁷

Truman may have done a little better financially than he thought he had. Although his top tax bracket was 75 percent during the first three years he received his payments from Time, Inc., rising to 81 percent in the last two years, his income tax returns for those years show that he paid a little less than 50 percent of his income in taxes.⁶⁸

But he never saw it this way. He contended that as a result of his failure to get the favorable tax treatment the IRS had accorded to Eisenhower, he had to pay 67 percent of his earnings from his memoirs for taxes, and most of the rest of the \$600,000 he got from Time, Inc., he contended, went to pay the expenses of his writing and office staffs. He was left, he figured, with only about \$37,000 for his three years' work on the memoirs. Once, when he was in a cranky mood, he claimed he ended up with nothing after all the taxes and office expenses were paid. This was in 1962, when his editor at Doubleday told him that his book was still selling well, and that the company was doing a new printing. "I have no personal interest in [what you tell me]," Truman responded, "because I never did get anything out of it from start to finish. I only had to pay taxes." He added a postscript: "I paid 4/5 of what you paid and all the rest was the cost of the book to me. The 4/5 was tax."⁶⁹

Truman's failure, as he saw it, to achieve a measure of financial independence from his memoirs deal caused him to feel grieved at the situation he found himself in as a former president. He had no pension from his service as senator and president, no substantial income from any other source, and only modest savings, but he had to maintain an office, including a secretary and other staff, in order to do what former presidents were expected to do—answer the thousands of letters people sent him, make appearances and speeches, remain involved in the nation's public life. Truman thought the government should pay most of a former president's expenses, and in early 1957 he wrote to House majority leader John W. McCormack to make his argument, and specifically to ask the government to pay 70 percent of the costs of his office and staff during the three years he was working on his memoirs. "It seems rather peculiar," Truman concluded his argument to McCormack, "that a fellow who spent eighteen years in government service and succeeded in getting all these things done for the people he commanded should have to go broke in order to tell the people the truth about what really happened." McCormack went to work in Congress for Truman. The result was the Former Presidents Act of 1958, which gave Truman and other

former presidents, present and future, a substantial pension and paid some of the expenses of maintaining a post-presidential office.⁷⁰

Although Truman apparently found the experience of writing his memoirs to be disagreeable, he involved himself in similar projects for the rest of his active life—that is, for another ten years after he completed his memoirs. This was partly because he continued to follow the guidance of William Hillman and David Noyes in his business affairs. His new ventures included a syndicated column on world affairs for the North American Newspaper Alliance, which ran for eight years beginning in 1957; another book, *Mr. Citizen* (1960), about his life as a private citizen after leaving office; and a twenty-six-part television documentary version of his memoirs, titled *Decision: The Conflicts of Harry S. Truman*, which was broadcast in 1964–1965.

After this, Truman gradually receded into a smaller and smaller world centered on his home in Independence, Missouri. His media projects had helped bring him financial security in his old age, and he could sit quietly in his study for the rest of his life, reading the many books of history and biography in his library without worrying about money.

By writing his presidential memoirs, Truman set an example for the presidents who followed him into the strange sunset experienced by former presidents of the United States, and, as of early 2019, every one of his successors who had completed his term of office either has written or is writing his memoirs.

NOTES

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16. See the three boxes of such files (currently numbered boxes 643–645) toward the beginning of Truman Papers: Post Presidential Files: Memoirs File; Hillman Papers: Memoirs File: Memorandum, "Topics Completed in First Draft Form," n.d.
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18. Robert E. G. Harris, "Covering Statement Attached Memorandum [regarding] Mr. Truman's Memoirs," Oct. 31, 1953, Hillman Papers: Memoirs—Drafts, Correspondence, Notes, etc.
19. Truman, *Mr. Citizen* (New York: Bernard Geis, 1960), 88–89, quoted in Heller, "Harry S. Truman: The Writing of His Memoirs," in Egerton, ed., *Political Memoir*, 261.
20. Hillman to Noyes, Nov. 5, 1953, Truman Papers: Post Presidential Papers: Name File: Noyes, David M. [2 of 2].
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40. “Chapter Outline,” Hillman Papers: Memoirs File: Notes on Book Writing Procedures and Chapter Outline.
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42. Heller, “Harry S. Truman: The Writing of His Memoirs,” in Egerton, ed., *Political Memoir*, 265.
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Editor's Note

I include here some notes about my editing process that were not included in the Editor's Preface.

The first half of the memoirs—up through chapter 16, about military demobilization and Truman's universal military training proposal following the war—tilts toward the chronological approach; the second half tilts toward the thematic approach. The great chronological fracture in the original text is in this new edition mended by moving up the birth of the hero—Harry S. Truman—to page 1 from page 112. Themes are mended as well, by bringing together separated thematic segments into new chapters—five of them, on foreign aid, atomic energy, international challenges at the end of World War II, economic problems after the war, and the Fair Deal. In a few instances where a chronological focus has created a thematic monstrosity, a chapter has been broken up and its pieces redistributed. One chapter in the original text, for example, combined sections on ending the war in the Pacific, forming a provisional government for Poland, preparing for the Potsdam Conference, and creating a new Cabinet. These pieces have been moved to new locations.

Ellipses denote deleted text, except for instances (noted below) when changes are made without notice. Additions to the text—very brief and intended either to fully identify someone or complete the sense of an otherwise incomplete sentence—are placed in brackets. Editorial summaries of portions of the original text are in italics. These summaries, with minor exceptions, do not include anything—informational or interpretive—that significantly adds to the content of the original text.

With the goal of shaping sometimes out-of-date or clumsy writing into a form attractive to twenty-first-century readers, many changes have been made in the text without notice: minor changes in punctuation; the

combination of short paragraphs; the replacement of personal pronouns with proper names, and the reverse; and the replacement of one form of a name with another—“Churchill” for “the British Prime Minister,” for example. Acronyms have usually been replaced with full agency names—for example, “Atomic Energy Commission” for “AEC,” and “United Nations” for “U.N.”

Truman and his writers, and perhaps most Americans in the 1940s and 1950s, often anachronistically called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics “Russia” and its people “Russians.” Similarly, they often called the United Kingdom “Great Britain” or “Britain,” or even sometimes “England.” These usages have been retained.

Truman’s use, correct for the time the memoirs were being written, of the Wade-Giles system of romanizing Standard Chinese has been retained for the names of Chinese people and places. Thus “Mao Zedong” (as romanized according to the currently widely used Pinyin system) is “Mao Tse-tung” and “Zhou Enlai” is “Chou En-lai.” Beijing is a special case in the memoirs. The Wade-Giles form would be “Peking” (meaning “northern capital”), but Truman calls the city “Peiping” (meaning “northern peace”), which is the Wade-Giles romanization of the name for the city which most Chinese used during the time, 1928 to 1949, when it was not the capital of China.

Truman’s now anachronistic use of “Formosa” instead of “Taiwan” is retained, as are the few appearances of “Constantinople” instead of “Istanbul.” His use of now little-used geographic terms such as “the orient” and “the Far East” is also retained.

The term “communism” is not capitalized. “Communist” is only capitalized if it refers to the Communist Party. In the context of the Chinese Civil War, “Communist Chinese” and “Chinese Communists” are capitalized. Both sides in the civil war were called after their political parties, the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party; on one side were the Communists, Communist Chinese, or Chinese Communists, and on the other side were the Nationalists, Nationalist Chinese, or Chinese Nationalists. After the People’s Republic of China was established in September 1949, Truman and his advisers continued to refer to its people and leaders, collectively, as the Chinese Communists or Communist Chinese.

The historical documents and presidential speeches which remain in the text have not been edited, except that often they have been shortened, with omissions noted by ellipses. Some quoted documents and speeches have been converted to block text format.

The pages in the published memoirs from which chapters in this edition are drawn are listed at the end of each chapter. In noted instances, segments

of text have been moved from the order of their presentation in the original text.

All of the photographs used in this *Reader's Edition* of Truman's memoirs are from the Harry S. Truman Library, with the exception of the photograph showing Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, which is from <https://publicdomaininpictures.net> (accessed May 29, 2019).

Preface by Harry S. Truman

Why I Have Written These Memoirs

I have often thought in reading the history of our country how much is lost to us because so few of our presidents have told their own stories. It would have been helpful for us to know more of what was in their minds and what impelled them to do what they did. The presidency of the United States carries with it a responsibility so personal as to be without parallel. Very few [people] are ever authorized to speak for the president. No one can make decisions for him. No one can know all the processes and stages of his thinking in making important decisions. Even those closest to him, even members of his immediate family, never know all the reasons why he does certain things and why he comes to certain conclusions. To be president of the United States is to be lonely, very lonely at times of great decisions.

Unfortunately, some of our presidents were prevented from telling all the facts of their administrations because they died in office. Some were physically spent on leaving the White House and could not have undertaken to write even if they had wanted to. Some were embittered by the experience [of being president] and did not care about living it again in telling about it. As for myself, I should like to record, before it is too late, as much of the story of my occupancy of the White House as I am able to tell. The events, as I saw them and as I put them down here, I hope may prove helpful in informing some people and in setting others straight on the facts.

No one who has lived through more than seven and a half years as president of the United States in the midst of one world crisis after another can possibly remember every detail of all that happened. For the last two and a half years I have checked my memory against my personal papers, memoranda, and letters and with some of the persons who were present when certain decisions were made, seeking to recapture and record accurately the significant events of my administration. I have tried to refrain from

hindsight and afterthoughts. Any schoolboy's afterthought is worth more than the forethought of the greatest statesman. What I have written here is based upon the circumstances and the facts and my thinking at the time I made the decisions, and not what they might have been as a result of later developments. . .

. . . The one purpose that dominated me in everything I thought and did [during the time I was president] was to prevent a third world war. One of the events that has cast a shadow over our lives and the lives of peoples everywhere has been termed, inaccurately, the "cold war." What we have been living through is, in fact, a period of nationalistic, social, and economic tensions. These tensions were in part brought about by shattered nations trying to recover from the war and by peoples in many places awakening to their right to freedom. More than half of the world's population was subject for centuries to foreign domination and economic slavery. The repercussions of the American and French revolutions are just now being felt all around the world. This was a natural development of events, and the United States did all it could to help and encourage nations and peoples to recovery and to independence.

Unhappily, one imperialistic nation, Soviet Russia, sought to take advantage of this world situation. It was for this reason, only, that we had to make sure of our military strength. We are not a militaristic nation, but we had to meet the world situation with which we were faced. We knew that there could be no lasting peace so long as there were large populations in the world living under primitive conditions and suffering from starvation, disease, and denial of the advantages of modern science and industry. There is enough in the world for everyone to have plenty to live on happily and to be at peace with his neighbors.

I believe, as I said on January 15, 1953, in my last address to the American people before leaving the White House: "We have averted World War III up to now, and we may have already succeeded in establishing conditions which can keep that war from happening as far ahead as man can see."

H.S.T.
Independence, Missouri
August 5, 1955

Year of Decisions, ix–xi; repeated but not dated in *Years of Trial and Hope*

Childhood, Boyhood, Youth

1884–1901

Childhood memories on my grandfather's farm—we move to Independence—friends and neighbors, and Bess Wallace—"a very happy time"—school days—my love of history—my first job—graduation from high school

. . . I was born in Lamar, Missouri, at four o'clock in the afternoon on May 8, 1884. When I was about a year old, the family moved to Cass County, Missouri, south of Harrisonville, where my father ran a farm and where my brother Vivian was born on April 25, 1886. In 1887 we moved to the Sol[omon] Young farm [—my mother's father's farm—] in Jackson County, two miles south of Hickman's Mill and six miles north of Belton in Cass County. Later on, a railroad promoter by the name of Blair built a rail line from Kansas City to Springfield, Missouri, and established a station a mile south of the Young farm. It was named Grandview because it was on a high point of land, the highest point in the vicinity, in fact. Lawrence, Kansas, is visible forty miles west, Kansas City eighteen miles north, Lee's Summit eight miles east, and Belton six miles south. The site would have made a wonderful observatory from which to study the heavens.



My sister Mary Jane was born there on August 12, 1889.

My [paternal] grandfather [Anderson Shipp] Truman lived with my father wherever he went, and I remember him very well. He was a dignified, pleasant man, particularly with Vivian and me. I fear he spoiled us. My grandfather Young and our lovely grandmother [Harriet Louisa Gregg]

Young], who had beautiful red hair and who made wonderful cookies, also gave us free rein. My grandmother [Mary Jane Holmes] Truman had died before my parents were married.

We had the whole . . . [six hundred] acres [of the Grandview farm] to play over. . . . Some of my happiest and most pleasant recollections are of the years we spent on . . . [this] farm when I was between the ages of three and six.

I had a bobtailed Maltese gray cat and a little black-and-tan dog not much bigger than the cat. The old cat was named Bob, because one day when he was asleep in front of the big fireplace in the dining room a coal of fire popped out, lit on the end of his tail, and burned off about an inch of it. I can well remember his yowls, and I can see him yet as he ran up the corner of the room all the way to the ceiling. The little dog was called Tandy because of his black-and-tan color. These two animals followed Vivian and me everywhere we went, and me alone when Vivian was asleep or too tired to wander over the farm. I was missed on one occasion and was discovered in a cornfield a half mile from the house, enjoying the antics of the cat and dog catching field mice.

On another occasion, we were playing south of the house in a beautiful pasture with a lovely maple grove in front of it. We had a new little wagon all painted red. I would pull Vivian and a neighbor boy our age named Chandler, and then the Chandler boy, with Vivian's help, would pull me. We discovered a mud hole at the end of the grove, and I pulled the wagon with the two boys in it into the hole and upset it. It seemed a good thing to do, and it was repeated several times, taking turn about. When my mother found us, we were plastered with mud and dirty water from head to foot. What a grand spanking I got as the ringleader!

Then there was a long porch on the north side of the house which made a great race track, a swing in the front hallway for rainy days, and a big one in the yard for sunny ones.

My grandfather Young would take me to the Belton Fair, when it was running, in a big two-wheeled cart with high wheels. . . . I would sit in the judges' stand with Grandpa and watch the races, eat striped candy and peanuts, and have the best time a kid ever had.

We had an old bachelor uncle named Harrison Young who visited us once in a while. He lived in Kansas City, which seemed a long way off, and he would bring Vivian and me the most wonderful things to play with and all kinds of candy, nuts, and fruit. When he came it was just like Christmas.

My grandfather Young had a half sister in St. Louis who would visit us about once a year. When she came, she would take us over to the back

pasture, which seemed miles away but wasn't more than a half mile. We would hunt birds' nests in the tall prairie grass and gather daisies, prairie wild flowers, and wild strawberries. When we returned to the house we'd require a good scrubbing and a long nap.

In the fall, when the apples and peaches were ripe, they were picked, the peaches dried and the apples buried in the ground with straw and boards above them. In midwinter the apples would be dug up, and were they good! My mother and grandmother dried a lot of peaches and apples, and what fine pies they would make in the winter. There were peach butter, apple butter, grape butter, jellies and preserves, all made in the kitchen by Mama, Grandma, and the German hired girl. All were good cooks. Later, after the fall freeze, came hog-killing time, with sausages, souse, pickled pigs' feet, and the rendering of lard in a big iron kettle in the smokehouse. Vivian still has that kettle. Mama used to tell me that the only reason it was there was because it had been too heavy for the Kansas Red Legs to carry when they robbed the house during the Civil War, burned it, and killed all the four hundred fat hogs, taking only the hams.

We had a cousin, Sol Chiles, who lived with us at the time. He was about eighteen years old, and he really made life pleasant for us. About the time we moved to Independence, he went to live with his mother, my mother's older sister, Aunt Sally. She was a lovely person, as were all my many aunts.

There was Aunt Sue, who lived in Arizona. She was my mother's oldest sister and the best talker of them all. Later on, she taught me to play cribbage. Aunt Ada, Mama's youngest sister, lived in Illinois. She taught me how to play euchre. Aunt Laura, Mama's other sister, lived in Kansas City, and we always enjoyed visiting her.

My father had three sisters and a brother. The youngest was Aunt Matt who was a schoolteacher. She'd come to see us, and it was an event, sure enough. She taught us all sorts of outdoor games. Aunt Ella lived in Independence. She was my father's oldest sister, and we saw a lot of her and her three daughters after we moved to Independence. We grew and went to school with cousins Nellie and Ethel Noland, Aunt Ella's daughters. Nellie would translate my Latin lesson for me when I was in high school, and I would escort Ethel to parties and learn how to be polite from her. I was always afraid of the girls my age and older. Aunt Emma, Papa's other sister, lived on a farm about four miles northeast of the Young farm. There were four children in her family, and we really had a grand time when we spent the day with them.

Those were wonderful days and great adventures. My father bought me a beautiful black Shetland pony and the grandest saddle to ride him with I

ever saw. Vivian has just had that lovely saddle rehabilitated for his granddaughter, sixty years later. My father would let me ride over the farm with him beside his big horse. He and Grandpa Young were partners in the operation of the farm and the handling of herds of cattle and mules as well as hogs and sheep. I became familiar with every sort of animal on the farm and watched the wheat harvest, the threshing and the corn shucking, mowing and stacking hay, and every evening at suppertime heard my father tell a dozen farm hands what to do and how to do it. In addition to the six hundred acres where we lived, there was another farm of nine hundred or a thousand acres four miles away, which had to be operated too.

When we moved to Independence in December 1890, my father bought a big house on South Crysler Street with several acres of land, a wonderful strawberry bed, and a fine garden. At the same time, he was operating a farm southeast of town and went into buying and selling hogs, cattle, and sheep. We began making acquaintances with neighbor boys as soon as we were settled. We had an old Negro woman who washed for us every week and sometimes cooked for us. She had three boys and two girls, and what a grand time we had. There was also another family of Negroes who were friends of our cook. There were a boy and a girl in that family.

With our barns, chicken house, and a grand yard in which to play, all the boys and girls in the neighborhood for blocks around congregated at our house. We always had ponies and horses to ride, goats to hitch to our wagon, which was made like a big one. An old harness maker in Independence made Vivian a set of double harness just like the big set. We would harness two red goats to the little wagon and drive it everywhere around the place. . . .

About this time my parents decided that we should start attending Sunday school. My mother took us to the nearest Protestant church, which happened to be the First Presbyterian at Lexington and Pleasant streets, and we attended regularly every Sunday for as long as we lived in Independence.

We made a number of new acquaintances, and I became interested in one in particular. She had golden curls and has, to this day, the most beautiful blue eyes. We went to Sunday school, public school from the fifth grade through high school, graduated in the same class, and marched down life's road together. For me she still has the blue eyes and golden hair of yesteryear.

My mother had taught me my letters and how to read before I was five years old, and because I had a hard time reading newspaper print I was taken to an oculist for an eye examination. I was fitted with glasses and started to school in the fall of 1892, when I was eight years old. The glasses were a great help in seeing but a great handicap in playing. I was so carefully cautioned

by the eye doctor about breaking my glasses and injuring my eyes that I was afraid to join in the rough-and-tumble games in the schoolyard and the back lot. My time was spent in reading, and by the time I was thirteen or fourteen years old I had read all the books in the Independence Public Library and our big old Bible three times through. . . .

I have one or two vivid recollections of the Crysler Street place that deserve mention. In the fall of 1892, Grover Cleveland was re-elected over Benjamin Harrison, who had defeated him in 1888. My father was very much elated by Cleveland's victory. He rode a beautiful gray horse in the torchlight parade and decorated the weather vane on the tower at the northwest corner of the house with a flag and bunting. The weather vane was a beautifully gilded rooster.

In 1896, my father sold the house on Crysler Street and bought one at 909 West Waldo Avenue at North River Boulevard. North River was the road to Wayne City Landing, which was the river port for Independence before the railroad came.

My first year in school was a happy one. My teacher was Miss Mira Ewin, with whom I became a favorite, as I eventually did with all my teachers. When I started the second grade, my teacher was Miss Minnie Ward. In January of 1894, my second year at Noland School, Vivian and I had severe cases of diphtheria from which I had difficulty recovering. My legs, arm, and throat were paralyzed for some months after the diphtheria left me, but Vivian made a rapid and complete recovery. My father and mother had sent Mary Jane back to the farm, and she did not have the disease. She also missed the measles and the mumps when we had them later.

The school board had decided to build a new school on South River, just back of the present auditorium of the Latter-Day Saints, and I never returned to the Noland School. The new school was the Columbian, and I went to summer school to Miss Jennie Clements the summer after my sickness to catch up. I skipped the third grade and went directly into the fourth, Miss Mamie Dunn was my teacher.

We found West Waldo Street to be a most pleasant neighborhood, and there were boys and girls our age all around us with whom we became acquainted at once. Next door, to the east, lived the Burrus family. There were three boys and five girls, three of the girls the ages of Vivian, Mary, and me. Next door east of the Burrus family lived the Wrights. Miss Emma and Miss Florence were lovely ladies. Miss Florence was a schoolteacher at the Ott School and Miss Emma taught music. Arthur Wright was the oldest boy and was a partner with his father in a tailor shop in Kansas City. Lofton

Wright was the second boy in the family and died after an operation for appendicitis. The youngest boy was named James, who became a very good friend of mine and who died of a heart attack at the age of thirty-five. West on Waldo lived the Pittman family. There were Miss Maud, a schoolteacher, and Miss Ethel, then an older boy, and Bernard, who was Vivian's age and his pal. South and west of us on Blue Avenue lived the Smith boys, and at the other end of the block, just back of us on White Oak Street, lived the Chiles family with two boys, Henry and Morton, just the ages of Vivian and me. At the corner of Delaware and Waldo, east of us, were the Sawyers, the Wallaces, and the Thomases. Lock Sawyer was older than we were, and the Wallaces were a year or two younger. Bess, Frank, and George Wallace all belonged to the Waldo Avenue gang. Across the street at Woodland College were Paul and Helen Bryant. Paul and Vivian were great friends and raised pigeons and game chickens in partnership.

We had wonderful times in that neighborhood from 1896 to 1902. Our house soon became headquarters for all the boys and girls around. We had a large front yard, and our back yard was surrounded by a high board fence to keep the stock safely off the street. Usually there were goats, calves, two or three cows, my pony, and my father's horses to be taken care of. The cows had to be milked and the horses curried, watered, and fed every morning and evening. In the summertime the cows had to be taken to pasture a mile or so away after morning milking and returned the same evening. The goats and calves had to be taken to the big public spring at Blue Avenue and River, two blocks south of our house, for water. There was a wonderful barn with stalls for horses and cows, a corncrib and a hayloft in which all the kids met and cooked up plans for all sorts of adventures, such as trips to Idlewild, a sort of wilderness two blocks north, and pigtail baseball games which I umpired because I couldn't see well enough to bat.

It was a very happy time, not fully appreciated until a long time afterward. There was a woodpile on which my brother and I had to work after old Rube, a good old colored man with a limp, had sawed the cord wood into the proper length for the cooking stove. The wood had to be split and carried to the wood box in the kitchen for "Aunt" Caroline's use in making cookies, corn bread, and all sorts of good things to eat.

Like us, Jim Wright and the McCarrolls were interested in raising pigeons. We had fantails, pouters, and many kinds of common everyday pigeons. We carried on quite a trading business in pigeons, chickens, cats, and pups. My mother was very patient with us and our pals and always came to our defense when we went a little too far and the various fathers decided to

take a hand. We also had a garden, which had to be weeded in season and a yard to be mowed and raked too. Somehow we managed to get most of the chores done which had been laid out by my father and still have time to play and enjoy the company of our pals too.

After a while we began to grow up. The gang scattered here and there, and shortly the serious business of education, jobs, and girls began to take all our time.

Education progressed, and we learned geometry, music, rhetoric, logic, and a smattering of astronomy. History and biography were my favorites. The lives of great men and famous women intrigued me, and I read all I could find about them. We had an excellent history teacher, Miss Maggie Phelps, and an English teacher, Miss Tillie Brown, who was a genius at making us appreciate good literature. She also made us want to read it. Our science teacher was Professor W. L. C. Palmer, who became principal of the high school and afterward superintendent of all the schools. He married our mathematics and Latin teacher, Miss Adelia Hardin. I do not remember a bad teacher in all my experience. They were all different, of course, but they were the salt of the earth. They gave us our high ideals, and they hardly ever received more than forty dollars a month for it.

My debt to history is one which cannot be calculated. I know of no other motivation which so accounts for my awakening interest as a young lad in the principles of leadership and government. Whether that early interest stemmed partly from some hereditary trait in my natural make-up is something for the psychologists to decide. But I know that the one great external influence which, more than anything else, nourished and sustained that interest in government and public service was the endless reading of history which I began as a boy and which I have kept up ever since. In school, history was taught by paragraphs. Each great event in history was written up in one paragraph. I made it my business to look up the background of these events and to find out who brought them about. In the process, I became very interested in the men who made world history. The lives of the great administrators of past ages intrigued me, and I soon learned that the really successful ones were few and far between. I wanted to know what caused the successes or the failures of all the famous leaders of history.

The only way to find the answers was to read. I pored over Plutarch's *Lives* time and time again and spent as much time reading Abbott's biographies of famous men. I read the standard histories of ancient Egypt, the Mesopotamian cultures, Greece and Rome, the exploits of Genghis Khan and the stories of oriental civilizations, the accounts of the development of every

modern country, and particularly the history of America. Reading history, to me, was far more than a romantic adventure. It was solid instruction and wise teaching which I somehow felt that I wanted and needed. Even as a youth I felt that I ought to know the facts about the system of government under which I was living, and how it came to be. It seemed to me that if I could understand the true facts about the growth and development of the United States government and could know the details of the lives of its presidents and political leaders I would be getting for myself a valuable part of the total education which I hoped to have someday. I know of no surer way to get a solid foundation in political science and public administration than to study the histories of past administrations of the world's most successful system of government.

While I was still a boy I could see that history had some extremely valuable lessons to teach. I learned from it that a leader is a man who has the ability to get other people to do what they don't want to do, and like it. It takes a leader to put economic, military, and government forces to work so they will operate. I learned that in those periods of history when there was no leadership, society usually groped through dark ages of one degree or another. I saw that it takes men to make history, or there would be no history. History does not make the man. . . .

Especially in reading the history of American presidents did I become aware of the value of knowing what has gone before. I learned that the idea of universal military training, which was being hotly debated when I was in my teens, had first been recommended by President Washington in 1790. I learned of General McClellan, who traded his leadership for demagoguery and eventually defied his commander in chief, and was interested to learn how President Lincoln dealt with an insubordinate general. These lessons were to stand me in good stead years later, when I was to be confronted with similar problems. There were countless other lessons which history taught that would prove valuable to me. . . .

My first paying job was opening up a drugstore in Independence for Mr. Jim Clinton at 6:30 in the morning, mopping the floors, sweeping the sidewalk, and having everything shipshape when Mr. Clinton came in. When everything was in order, there were bottles to wipe off and shelves to dust. There must have been a thousand bottles to dust and yards and yards of patent medicine cases and shelves to clean. At least it seemed that way, because I never finished the bottles and shelves by school time and had to start the next morning where I'd left off the day before. By the time I got around them all, it was time to start over. How I hated Latin-covered prescription

bottles and patent-medicine shelves! The drugstore had plate-glass windows in front with a big glass jar like an enlarged Greek vase in each window. Each vase was filled with colored water and oil in layers. How they kept those colors from mixing I don't know. Then the vases were surrounded by displays of patent medicine that had to be cleaned and dusted, and once a week the windows had to be washed and redecorated.

You walked through a front door onto a tile floor with showcases on each side and a soda fountain on one side in front. Behind the cases on one side were interminable rows and rows of bottles with those Latin abbreviations on them. One in particular I remember, because Mr. Clinton told me to be careful not to break it. He said no more Icy Toed Feet were to be obtained. The mark on the bottle was *Ici. Toed. Foet.* I never found out what it was.

After the bottles and the patent medicine cases had been cleaned, then the prescription case had to be dusted very, very carefully. In a little closet under the prescription case, which faced the front and shut off the view of the back end of the store, was an assortment of whiskey bottles. Early in the morning, sometimes before Mr. Clinton arrived, the good church members and Anti-Saloon Leaguers would come in for their early morning drink behind the prescription case at ten cents an ounce. They would wipe their mouths, peep through the observation hole in the front of the case, and depart. This procedure gave a fourteen-year-old boy quite a viewpoint on the public front of leading citizens and "amen-corner-praying" churchmen. There were saloons aplenty around the square in Independence, and many leading men in town made no bones about going into them and buying a drink. I learned to think more highly of them than I did of the prescription counter drinkers.

I'll never forget my first week's wages—three big silver dollars. It was the biggest thing that had happened to me, and my father told me to save it for myself when I tried to give it to him on coming home that Saturday night. After a few months at this morning and night work, my high school studies became rather heavy, and my father suggested that I quit my job and study harder, which I did.

I began going to my aunt Ella Noland's house to study Latin and algebra with Cousin Nellie and Cousin Ethel and, incidentally, my beautiful young lady with the blue eyes and golden hair. This happened about twice a week, and on two other nights Fielding Houchens and I would go out to Miss Maggie Phelps's house and take special courses in history and geography. We were hoping to obtain appointments either to West Point or to Annapolis. I was anxious for a higher education, and because my father was having

financial troubles about this time, I knew he would not be able to send me to college two years hence when I finished high school. Unfortunately, my poor eyesight kept me from getting an appointment [to one of the military academies].

My high school experience is one that I will never forget. In my last year, we organized a magazine for publication by the senior class and called it the *Gleam*, after Tennyson's poem, "Merlin and the Gleam." It has been published ever since by each senior class. The editors were Charlie Ross, Tasker Taylor, Howard Morrison, and myself, and I really think we got out a good magazine.

I was graduated in 1901, a short time after my seventeenth birthday. Bess Wallace, who afterward became Mrs. Truman, was graduated in the same class, as was Charlie Ross, who was to be my press secretary in the White House.

Year of Decisions, 112–123

The paragraph beginning "In 1896, my" is moved down by one paragraph from its position in the original text.

Banker, Farmer, Soldier, Haberdasher

1901–1922

Hobos—the bank—back to the farm—pleasing people—the National Guard—the Masons—oil business—World War I—under fire in France—armistice and the journey home—Bess and I are married—Truman and Jacobson

I spent part of the summer [after graduating from high school] on the [Grandview] farm, and during that [same] summer I paid a visit to my aunt Ada in Murphysboro, Illinois. She was my mother's youngest sister and a favorite of all of us. I spent a month there and had a grand time with my cousins, whom I had never seen before. Aunt Ada had no children, but [another of my mother's sisters, Aunt Sally, had a] . . . married daughter [who] lived with Aunt Ada and had four children. Two of them were about my age. . . . On the way home I stopped in St. Louis to see my mother's aunt, Hettie Powell. She used to visit us on the farm when I was very small, and I liked her very much. I saw my first professional horse races in St. Louis at that time. My cousin, Aunt Hettie's son, took me to the races, and I had a fine time.



In the fall of 1901 I got a job as timekeeper on the Santa Fe Railroad, working for a contractor named L. J. Smith. I kept that job until the contract was finished, living in hobo camps along the Missouri River where the Santa Fe Railroad ran. I became very familiar with hobos and their viewpoints. I learned what it meant to work ten hours a day for \$1.50, or fifteen cents an hour. The contractor paid thirty cents an hour for a wagon, team of horses, and a driver.

These old hobos were characters in their own right. It was my duty to pay them off on Saturday nights if they wanted to be paid. The pay-off took place in a saloon either in Sheffield or Independence. The object in paying the men in a saloon was to give them a chance to spend all their money right there and guarantee their being back to work on Monday morning. The checks were time checks and were signed by me as timekeeper. If I made a mistake in favor of the hobos, I lost the money; but if the mistake favored the contractor, he kept it. . . . My salary was thirty-five dollars a month and board, but I received a very down-to-earth education in the handling of men.

The contract was finished along in May or June of 1902, and my father and I took a trip to southern Missouri. He had forty acres of land in Oregon County. . . . We . . . hired a buggy and a team of horses and drove up the Eleven Point River for quite a distance. . . . In making this drive we crossed the river thirteen times in eight miles. It was at flood stage, and the water came up to the bed of the buggy each time we crossed it. We visited the forty acres that my father owned and found it more perpendicular than horizontal. It ran straight up the side of a mountain and certainly was not worth much. We had a grand trip, however, and returned home very much more familiar with southern Missouri land than when we left.

When we came back I took a job in the mailing room of the *Kansas City Star* at \$7 a week.

My father sold the house on Waldo Avenue and bought another at 903 North Liberty Street, where we stayed a few months, and then [he] bought a house in Kansas City at 2108 Park Avenue.

Vivian and I went to work at the National Bank of Commerce at \$35 a month. We worked in that part of the bank call the "zoo," which handled the transit checks that came through the bank as through a clearinghouse. The bank had more than twelve hundred correspondents in Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma, and it was our duty to list these checks, charge them against the account of the bank on which they were drawn, and give credit to the bank from which they came. A short time after we started, Vivian left to go to work for the First National Bank, and I was promoted to personal filing clerk for the president and cashier of the bank. My salary was increased from thirty-five to forty dollars a month.

My father traded the house at 2108 Park Avenue for eighty acres of land in Henry County and moved to Clinton. I changed jobs and went to work at the Union National Bank, where I was paid \$60 a month as a bookkeeper. Vivian and I stayed on in Kansas City and boarded with a good old lady at

1314 Troost Avenue, where we paid \$5 a week for room and board, which included breakfast and dinner. We usually bought a ten-cent box lunch and spent the noon hour eating it in a five-cent picture show. We would go home weekends to be with the family in Clinton. I remember that my father had put in a big crop of corn that year, and when the Grand River flooded, it washed the whole crop away.

In 1904 . . . [my family] moved back to the farm at Grandview. My old bachelor uncle, Harrison Young, had been living with my grandmother on the farm, and he decided he wanted to quit. So . . . [my family] moved in with my grandmother and ran the farm for the next ten or twelve years.

When I was growing up it occurred to me to watch the people around me to find out what they thought and what pleased them most. My father and mother were sentimentalists. My father had been raised by a religious man, Grandfather Truman, who set the women of his family on a pedestal and kept them there. No one could make remarks about my aunts or my mother in my father's presence without getting into serious trouble. My sister Mary Jane, named for his mother, was my father's favorite, and he made my brother and me look after her to see that she was properly protected in play and at school. We were a closely knit family and exceedingly fond of each other. My mother was partial to the boys, both in the family and in the neighborhood. I used to watch my father and mother closely to learn what I could do to please them, just as I did with my schoolteachers and playmates. Because of my efforts to get along with my associates I usually was able to get what I wanted. It was successful on the farm, in school, in the Army, and particularly in the Senate.

Whenever I entered a new schoolroom I would watch the teacher and her attitude toward the pupils, study hard, and try to know my lesson better than anyone else. I followed a similar program in my bank jobs. In this way, I gained a reputation in the bank of always finishing the task that was set before me and of helping the others get theirs done as well. Once in a while I would take the chief clerk of the Union National Bank, the bookkeeper, and the paying teller to the farm for a chicken dinner. My mother was great on fried chicken, baked ham, hot biscuits, and custard pie. We would have a grand time, walk over the farm, look at the livestock, take horseback rides, and then go back to town for more work at the bank.

In 1905, Battery B of the National Guard of Kansas City was organized by George R. Collins, who became captain of the organization. . . . There were about sixty men in the organization, and most of them were very fine fellows who worked in banks and stores around town and who would go out

to a rented armory once a week and pay a quarter for the privilege of drilling. I joined the battery the year it was organized. And when I attended my first National Guard camp at Cape Girardeau, Missouri, I was a private in the rear ranks and acted as the No. 2 man on the old three-inch gun, which was the U.S. Army's light artillery equipment. I learned many things, including how to handle Army horses.

In 1906, I quit the bank and went back to the farm, where I stayed until . . . [World War I] came along.

One day in late 1908 a cousin of my mother came to the farm to look at some stock. I noticed a Masonic pin on his coat and told him I had always wanted to be a member. A few days later he brought me an application for membership in Belton Lodge No. 450 at Belton, Missouri. On February 9, 1909, I received my first degree. Frank Blair . . . , [the] cashier of the Bank of Belton, where we did our banking, and W. B. Garrison . . . , the assistant cashier, [were] both . . . enthusiastic Masons. Frank was deputy grand master and district lecturer for the 34th Masonic District of Missouri, and Billy Garrison was master of Belton Lodge. These two men very patiently taught me the lectures and the ritual for the various degrees. I received my third degree on March 9, 1909. Shortly after that the grand lecturer of Missouri, James R. McLachlan of Kahoka, came to Belton for a three-day stay. I attended every meeting for the three days and then followed the grand lecturer to Holden and to St. Joseph. I became letter perfect in all three degrees and accompanied Frank Blair on his official visits in the 34th District. There were nine or ten lodges in the district, and during the winter months all of them were visited.

At the next lodge election, I was elected junior warden and served during 1910. In 1911, I organized a lodge at Grandview, No. 618, and was made master U. D. [under dispensation] along in May or June. I went to the Grand Lodge meeting in St. Louis, obtained a charter for Grandview, and became a regular attendant at the yearly meetings of the Grand Lodge.

Grandma Young, who lived to be ninety-one, died in 1909, leaving the six hundred acre . . . farm [in Grandview] to my mother and Uncle Harrison. Other members of the family contested the will, but the matter was settled out of court, and in 1916, when Uncle Harrison died, he left his share of the farm to my mother, my brother, my sister, and me.

The great mid-continental oil fields were being opened at about this time, and test drilling was extensive in Missouri and adjoining states. Interest was very widespread, and I decided to try my fortune in this mushrooming new industry. The resulting experience was one which taught me a good deal about finance and human nature as well.

It all started when Jerry C. Culbertson, a Kansas City attorney who had known our family for years and who had once handled an investment for us in a zinc mine near Joplin, called me into his office one day. He introduced me to a man named David H. Morgan, who had just moved to town from Tulsa, Oklahoma. Morgan, I soon learned, was a businessman with a degree in law and with extensive experience in the oil industry. He was also a fine gentleman who was to become a lifelong friend of mine. Culbertson had just completed an agreement with Morgan for the organization and promotion of an oil company, and he invited me to come in as a one-third partner. I decided to make the suggested investment, and after I had executed five \$1,000 notes endorsed by my mother, the contract was drawn up on September 25, 1916, making Morgan president of the new firm, Culbertson secretary, and myself treasurer. . . . Morgan, who was the practical oil man of the organization, was in the field, inspecting and leasing thousands of acres of oil properties for the company in Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and Louisiana. On some of these properties, test wells were drilled to completion, but these, unfortunately, proved to be dry holes. On others, drilling was in progress when the entry of the United States into World War I suddenly put an end to the company's activities.

I have always wondered how things would have turned out in my life if the war had not come along just when it did. Morgan & Company had just begun drilling on a huge block of leases we owned in the northwest corner of Greenwood County, Kansas, when the war-created manpower shortage forced us to dispose of all our leases. In fact, I was already in France when drilling stopped at a depth of 1500 feet in that particular well. Other companies and operators who bought our interests in Greenwood County continued drilling, and later in the year 1917 they struck the Teter Oil Pool, one of the largest ever opened up in the state of Kansas.

When the United States entered World War I in the spring of 1917, the Missouri National Guard decided to expand Battery B in Kansas City and Battery C in Independence into a regiment. I helped in that expansion, and we raised six batteries as well as a supply and headquarters company in Kansas City and Independence, and also a battery for the 1st Missouri Field Artillery in St. Louis. The regiment was organized, and all the officers were elected by the members of the organization. The batteries elected their officers, and officers elected the staff. I was elected first lieutenant in Battery F when it was organized on May 22, 1917. I had hoped that I might be a section sergeant, a post for which I was well qualified. I had not hoped for a commission, and when I found myself a lieutenant, I had a tremendous amount of work to do in order to become familiar with my job. At that

time, light artillery batteries had two first lieutenants, a senior and a junior, and I was the junior lieutenant of Battery F in the 2nd Missouri Field Artillery. We trained and drilled in Kansas City at Convention Hall and on the streets, and on August 5, 1917, we were sworn in as part of the federal service and became the 129th Field Artillery of the 35th Division. On September 26, 1917, we entrained for Camp Doniphan at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

The colonel appointed me regimental canteen officer, and I asked Eddie Jacobson, a member of Battery F and a man with merchandising experience to help me. We collected two dollars per man from each battery and from each headquarters and supply company. This gave us \$2,200, whereupon Eddie and I set up a store, a barbershop, and a tailor shop. We went to Oklahoma City and stocked up our store with things that would not ordinarily be issued by the government—cigarettes, paper, pens, ink, and other items the men would want to buy. Each battery and company was ordered to furnish a clerk for the store. Eddie and I sewed up their pockets, and I deposited our sales intake every day. After operating the canteen for six months, we paid the \$2,200 back, plus \$15,000 dollars in dividends. Many other canteens of the 35th Division were failures, and some of the men who ran them were sent home, but after our arrival in France I was promoted, largely because of the work Eddie Jacobson and I had done.

In addition to my duties as canteen officer, I performed all the regular duties of a battery officer. I took my turn as officer of the day, equitation officer, and firing instruction officer for the battery. I attended the Fort Sill School of Fire and did foot drill as well as whatever else needed to be done. When it came time for my captain to make an efficiency report on his lieutenants, he made such a good one on me that the C. O. sent it back with the comment "No man can be that good."

I was examined for promotion in February 1918 and was picked for Overseas School Detail. I left Camp Doniphan by train on March 20, 1918, and arrived about four o'clock the next morning at Rosedale, Kansas (now part of Kansas City, Kansas). I asked a switchman if I could call my fiancée in Independence. "Call her," he said. "The phone's yours. But if she doesn't break the engagement at four o'clock in the morning, she really loves you." I called her at once, and she didn't scold me. I also called my mother and sister. They all wept a little, but all of them, I think, were glad to know an overseas lieutenant.

I went on to New York and spent a few days at Camp Merritt at Tenafly, New Jersey. It was my first opportunity to see New York City, and my first visit there came when I was given a 24-hour leave, which also gave me a

chance to purchase some extra spectacles. I was very nearly blind without glasses and felt that I had better get three extra pairs. The man who gave me the examination and made the glasses for me would not allow me to pay for them. He said I was paying him by going overseas in the service of the country.

On March 30, 1918, we sailed for France on the *George Washington*, and we arrived at Brest on the morning of April 13. Ashore, we were put up at the Continental Hotel, where we stayed for a week or two before being sent to the 2nd Corps Field Artillery School at Montigny-sur-Aube. . . . I spent five weeks at this school and then rejoined the regiment. I was made battalion adjutant of the 2nd Battalion under Major Melvin and then we were sent down to Angers for more training at one of Napoleon's old artillery camps, Coëtquidan. We arrived there on July 4, and on July 11 I was put in command of Battery D of the 129th Field Artillery. Then, after a stay at Angers, we were moved up to the Vosges Mountains, where we went into position.

We fired our first barrage on the night of September 6. We were occupying an old French position which probably was fairly well known to the Germans, and as soon as we had finished the barrage they returned the compliment. My battery became panic stricken, and all except five or six [of the men] scattered like partridges. Finally, I got them back together without losing any men, although we had six horses killed.

We moved from the Vosges to the St. Mihiel drive, then from September 12 to 16 we occupied positions on the 35th Division's front for the Meuse-Argonne drive, which started on September 26. My battery fired three thousand rounds . . . from 4 a.m. to 8 a.m. on the morning the drive began. I had slept in the edge of a wood to the right of my battery position the night before, and if I had not awakened and got up early that morning, I would not be here, for the Germans fired a barrage right on the spot where I had been sleeping.

At eight o'clock we finished firing and pulled out for the front. As we marched on the road under an embankment, a French . . . battery fired over our heads. As a result of that, I still have trouble hearing what goes on when there is a noise. I went back and told the French captain what I thought of him, but he could not understand me, so it made no difference.

We came to the front line at a little town, or what was left of it, called Bourevilles. I stopped the battery and went forward with my executive officer and the battalion commander, Major Gates. We located a battery of the enemy and sat in a ditch while they fired machine guns over us. We finally

went back, and I spent the rest of the night getting my battery across no man's land.

At 5 a.m. on September 27 the operations officer of the regiment, Major Patterson, came to my sleeping place under a bush and told me to fire a barrage in ten minutes. I told him to go to hell, that I could not figure a barrage in ten minutes but I'd try! We moved on up behind the infantry and went into position on a road between Varennes and Chepy about 10 p.m. on September 28. In going into position, I rode my horse under a tree, and a low-hanging branch scraped my glasses off. In desperation I turned around, hoping to see where they could have fallen and there they were, on the horse's back, right behind the saddle. I put the battery in position and the next day we moved into an orchard a half mile ahead. We fired on three German batteries, destroying one and putting the other two out of action. Then the regimental colonel threatened me with court martial for firing out of the 35th Division sector! But I had saved some men in the 28th Division to our left, and I believe some of them showed their gratitude in 1948.

One of my lieutenants was acting as communications officer that afternoon and was wearing a headphone. He looked up, saw a German plane, and remarked to the battery executive that the "so and so" German was dropping something. The bomb exploded, cut the phone from his head but left him unhurt. A little later I was up in front of the infantry without a weapon of any kind, observing the enemy fire from every direction. An infantry sergeant came up and told me that my support had moved back 200 yards and that I'd do well to come back too. I did.

In October notice caught up with me that I was a captain. I had been in command of Battery D since July 11, and as far back as May I had seen in the *New York Times* that I was a captain. During all that time I wore the bars and did a captain's duty, but I was never paid for it because the official notice did not reach me until October. My claim for back pay was turned down because I had not "accepted" the commission earlier.

We supported the 35th Division and the 1st Division until October 3, when we were moved in front of Verdun in the Sommedieu sector. On October 27, 1918, we were moving along from one front line zone to another when the French edition of the *New York Herald* was distributed long the line. Headlines in block letters informed us that an armistice was on. Just then a German . . . shell burst to the right of the road and another to the left. "Captain," one of the sergeants remarked, "those blankety blank Germans haven't seen this paper." Some ten days later Roy Howard, of the Scripps-McCrae papers, also sent a message to the United States proclaiming an

armistice. Such false newspaper reports are terrible things, and the people responsible for them are no better than criminals.

We went into new positions on November 6 and prepared barrages for the next day's drive on Metz. The 129th Field Artillery was then supporting the 81st (Wild Cat) Division, and five days later, at five o'clock in the morning, Major Patterson, the regimental operations officer, called me and told me that there would be a cease-fire order at eleven o'clock. I fired the battery on orders until 10:45 a.m., when I fired my last shot at a little village northeast of Verdun.

Firing stopped all along the line at . . . 11 a.m. on November 11, 1918, and the silence that followed almost made one's head ache. We stayed at our positions all day and then crawled into our pup tents to sleep. That night, however, the men of the French battery just behind our position got their hands on a load of wine which had come up on the ammunition narrow gauge, and every single one of them had to march by my bed, saluting and yelling, "*Vive President Wilson! Vive le capitaine d'artillerie américaine!*" No sleep that night. The infantry sent up all the flares they could lay their hands on, fired Very pistols and rifles and whatever else would make a noise all night long.

The next day we were ordered to leave our guns in line and fall back to the echelon. After that we spent our evenings playing poker and wishing we were home.

On December 7, a number of officers were given a leave, and I was one. We went to Paris, where we spent three happy days. I attended a performance of *Manon* at the Paris Opéra, went to the Opéra-Comique to hear *Carmen*, and then to the Folies Bergère, which turned out to be a disgusting performance.

We went on to Nice, stayed at the Hotel Méditerranée, and saw the American Bar in the Hotel Negresco. We visited the Casino in Monte Carlo but could not play because we were in uniform. They did give us each a five franc chip, and that was all we had from the famous gambling hell. We had lunch one day in the Casino de Paris, about seven or eight of us sitting at a big round table in the rear of the place, when all of a sudden every waiter there rushed to the front and began bowing and scraping. We were informed that Madame la Princesse de Monaco had come in. Our lieutenant colonel was facing the front and could see the performance. He watched very closely and pretty soon he reported, "Oh hell, she's taking beer! Can you imagine a princess drinking beer?" It was quite a disappointment for all us common folk.

We went back to the regiment, which was moved a couple of times and finally sent to Brest. On April 9, 1919, we embarked on the German passenger ship *Zeppelin* and arrived in New York City on April 20, a beautiful

Easter Sunday morning. I had been gone from that city just a year and twenty days. We were sent to Camp Mills and then ordered to Camp Funsten, Kansas, where we were discharged on May 6, 1919. It was from there that I went home to the . . . [Grandview] farm.

I returned to civilian life on May 6, 1919. I was thirty-five years old.

Bess Wallace and I decided to go ahead with our plans for marriage, and we set the day, June 28, 1919, less than eight weeks after I was discharged from the Army. We were married in the Trinity Episcopal Church in Independence. After a wedding trip to Chicago and Port Huron, Michigan, we returned to live at 219 North Delaware Street in Independence.

In the meantime, Eddie Jacobson and I made plans to open a men's furnishing goods store in Kansas City. Eddie Jacobson is as fine a man as ever walked. He had worked with me in the successful operation of the canteen at Camp Doniphan, and because that had been such a profitable experience on limited capital, we felt that we might do well in a business partnership. The idea of a haberdashery was Eddie's, and it was agreed that he would be the buyer and that I would act as salesman. We pooled our savings and raised the additional capital required to lease a building on Twelfth Street near the Muehlebach Hotel and lay in a stock of merchandise. I had a sale of equipment and stock on the farm that netted me over \$15,000, which I immediately invested in the store. We bought \$35,000 worth of merchandise and by fall we were open for business.

This was a period of general prosperity. During the first year of operation we sold over \$70,000 worth of merchandise and had a good return on our investment. Our second year began well too. In 1921, however, after the Republicans took over the U.S. Government under the presidency of Warren G. Harding, Andrew Mellon was made secretary of the treasury. He immediately started a "wringing-out" process which put farm prices down to an all time low, raised interest rates, and "put labor in its place."

On January 1, 1921, Jacobson and I had a \$35,000 inventory at cost. And this figure was sound. We actually had a chance to sell out at inventory price about this time, but we refused. Before the year was out, values had fallen so greatly that on January 1, 1922, the value of that inventory had shrunk to less than \$10,000. Our creditors and the banks we owed began to press us, and when we closed out later in 1922 we were hopelessly in debt.

Much of our stock of goods had been purchased from Kansas City concerns, and both Eddie and I wanted every creditor to receive every possible dollar. In fact, we intended to pay every creditor in full as soon as we were

able, notwithstanding any settlement that might be made with them. We consulted an attorney . . . who after investigating the condition of the business advised settlement with our creditors.

Our attorney then wrote to each merchandise creditor, stating the financial condition of the partnership and explaining that existing economic conditions were causing our business to suffer losses. He also notified them, at our direction, that both Jacobson and I wished to avoid further losses to creditors and wished also to avoid all expense incident to liquidation so as to give our creditors all that remained in the business without deductions of any kind. Without exception, the merchants in whose debt we were agreed to this settlement. The stock of the store was closed out, and payments were made on the various accounts in accordance with the agreement. Jacobson and I, however, continued thereafter to make payments on the various accounts from time to time until all of them were settled in full.

There were other debts too. We were committed at the time for bank loans which we had negotiated in the operation of our business. We were committed also for the balance of the rental for the store, which we had originally leased for five years. The bank loans were not included in the settlement with the merchandise creditors because it was agreed that these loans should be repaid dollar for dollar, whereas the merchandise creditors had already made profits from previous sales to our firm.

The Security State Bank and the Twelfth Street Bank . . . had made the loans, and they held notes signed by both Jacobson and me. We owed the Twelfth Street Bank \$2,500 . . . [and] the Security State Bank . . . more than \$5,000. . . . This latter was secured by a deed to a 160-acre farm in Johnson County, Kansas. I had purchased this farm sometime before for the equivalent of \$13,800, but I valued it at considerably more than that figure. I had paid \$5,000 for it in the form of property which I had owned in Kansas City and had assumed a mortgage of \$8,800 which was on the farm at the time of my purchase. After our store closed in 1922, I, along with Jacobson, gave a note to the Security State Bank for \$6,800, with the farm listed as security to cover the principal and interest then due.

Neither Jacobson nor I wished to go into bankruptcy, as so many were doing during that period. We both wanted to pay all the indebtedness in full. Still, we did not find that easy, for our incomes were not large. Mine, in fact, was very limited, for it was in the fall of that year that I entered local politics, and Jacobson's was not large, although he had been able to obtain employment as a salesman. From time to time we made such payments as

we could on these accounts. It was a struggle for both of us during the next several years, and in February 1925 Jacobson finally found himself unable to withstand the pressure. He was forced to file a petition in bankruptcy. Among his debts, he listed the [Security State Bank] note, which at that time stood at \$5,600. As a result of this development there were those who tried to force me into bankruptcy at the same time. I resisted, however, and continued to make such payments as I could.

In the meantime, the whole affair became complicated by the fact that the Security State Bank, which had made the loan originally, had itself run into financial difficulties. Its assets were taken over by the Continental National Bank, and our note was included among these transferred assets. In December 1923, a suit was filed on behalf of the bank to recover on the note, although it was not until April 30, 1929, that judgment for \$8,944.78 in principal and interest was recorded in favor of the Security State Bank against both Jacobson and myself.

Matters became more involved when the Continental National Bank got itself into trouble financially, and its liquidation was in progress for several years. During this period certain of the assets, including notes, securities, and other property, were sold by the receiver for various small sums at the order of the court. Among these was our note, which by court order was sold for \$1,000. My brother Vivian purchased it at that price. Meanwhile the 160-acre farm which I had deeded to the bank as security had been taken over.

Our other lender, the Twelfth Street . . . Bank, had made us a \$2,500 loan in January 1922. Complete records of this loan and of the subsequent payments and renewals have been preserved in the bank's files, and they show that during 1922, 1923, and 1924, long after the close of the haberdashery store, we reduced the indebtedness by numerous payments, some as small as \$25, until, with a final payment of \$200 in December 1924, we discharged that obligation in full.

One of the obligations not included in the settlement with the merchandise creditors when we closed out our business was for store rental under the lease which we had originally signed with [the] . . . owner of the [store] property [on] . . . Twelfth Street. This lease was for a five-year period, and it had some time to run after the store closed, Settlement of the account was made later, and the property then became available to the owner for other purposes. . . .

This was a hard experience for me, at the age of 38, to fail in a business venture in which I had invested a considerable amount of money and time.

I have since come to realize that thousands of others went through similar experiences during those postwar years, although my difficulties came to be more widely publicized and distorted because I later became president of the United States.


Year of Decisions, 123–136

County Judge

1922–1934

A new start in politics—Mike Pendergast, Tom Pendergast—the only election I ever lost—my friends and supporters—presiding judge—roads, courthouses, and a hospital—showdown over contracts

There has been quite a bit of talk about my start in politics in Jackson County. It was in 1921, while the store was still doing very well, that I was asked if I would consider the nomination for judge of the county court for the eastern district. In the store, Eddie Jacobson and I used to meet many of the men with whom we served in France. One of our customers was Jim Pendergast, who had been a lieutenant in the 129th and who had later gone into the 130th Field Artillery, where he commanded a battery on the front. When the time came for the Pendergast organization to endorse someone as candidate for eastern judge in 1922, a meeting was held at 26th and Prospect streets, with representatives from every township in the county. Jim's father, Mike Pendergast, informed the gentlemen there that he thought it would be a good thing for them to support me as that candidate. He said I was a returned soldier, a captain "whose men didn't want to shoot him"!



The judges of these Missouri county courts are not judges in the usual sense, since the court is an administrative, not a judicial, body. It levies taxes. Expenditures for roads, for homes for the aged, and for schools for delinquent children are supported by orders of this court on the county treasurer,

and the court also orders such payments as are necessary to state institutions for the support of the insane. The only really judicial act the court performs is to make a finding of insanity when that has been recommended by two reputable physicians. Each county in the state has a county court made up of three judges, two of whom represent districts, while the third is elected at large for the whole county.

For years my father and other members of our family had been interested in county affairs. My father had been road overseer in Washington Township, where the farm is located, from 1910 until the time of his death in 1915, and I had succeeded him. I had also been postmaster of Grandview before World War I, and at every election from 1906 on I had been Democratic clerk. I was familiar with local politics, and Mike Pendergast's suggestion appealed to me. I told him that I would like to run.

The failure of our business followed, and when the time came in 1922, I filed for eastern judge. Even with Mike Pendergast's backing it was far from certain that I could win the nomination. The primary campaign was a very bitter fight. There were five candidates: a banker named Emmett Montgomery . . . who had the support of the [boss Joseph B.] Shannon faction, known as the "Rabbits"; a road overseer by the name of Tom Parent, who had the support of the [judge Miles J. "Little Czar"] Bulger faction; James Compton, who had been eastern judge by appointment once and who had been trying to be elected ever since; George Shaw, a road contractor, who was honest (very unusual for a contractor of county business in Jackson County at that time) and who had been broken by the Bulger court; and myself, who had the support of the "Goats," or Pendergast faction. . . .

I had an old Dodge roadster which was a very rough rider. I kept two bags of cement in the back of it so it would not throw me through the windshield while driving on our terrible county roads. I went into every township—there were seven of them—and into every precinct in the county in the eastern district. . . . When the votes were counted, I had a plurality of five hundred. Mr. Shannon said the voters preferred a busted merchant to a prosperous banker. Most people were broke, and they sympathized with a man in politics who admitted his financial condition.

The election that followed was a walkaway. All the Democrats on the ticket won in the county, although we three judges of the county court promptly began a factional fight among ourselves. The presiding judge was a member of the Shannon faction—the "Rabbits." The other district judge and I were "Goats," and we promptly took all the jobs. We ran the county, but we ran it carefully and on an economy basis.

. . . I spent a great amount of time with the county counselor learning county procedure under state laws. I also became completely familiar with every road and bridge in the county. About that time, the State Highway Commission had begun the construction of a Missouri road system by getting right of ways across the county for the state, and I soon became acquainted with the state system and what the commission had in view for the western end of the state. I visited every state institution in which the county had patients. This included the state asylums in St. Joseph, Nevada, Fulton, and Farmington, where the insane patients were sent. Jackson County had an institution of its own . . . to take care of the indigent aged. This institution had usually five or six hundred patients, both men and women, in the winter and about four hundred in the summer. The county had no hospital, but it maintained a county physician whose business it was to visit the county home . . . once or twice a week and who cared for those indigent people who could not pay doctors' bills.

In 1924, I ran for reelection as eastern judge. The Democratic Party in the county split over the fact that the Shannon faction thought it had not obtained a fair division of the jobs, and I was defeated by 867 votes. I was defeated by the old harness maker, Henry Rummel, who had made the beautiful set of harnesses for my brother and me when we were children. This was the only defeat I ever suffered in an election. . . .

Our daughter Margaret had been born on February 17, 1924. And now, only a little over two years since Eddie Jacobson and I had lost our business, I was out of a job again. But I had many friends, and in January 1925 I was able to make a connection with the Automobile Club of Kansas City, where I spent about a year and a half adding to its membership. It gave me a substantial income. [My special interest in transportation] resulted in my being made president of the National Old Trails Road Association [in 1924]. In that capacity, I made a number of talks on the historical importance of roadways and channels of communication, including an address before the Congress of the Daughters of the American Revolution in Washington.

In 1926, when the election machinery was being oiled up by the party leaders, I was slated to run for presiding judge of the county court.

I was always interested in civic, fraternal, and public affairs, and because these widened my acquaintance and kept me in contact with many people, they no doubt played some part in my political fortunes.

When I was discharged from the Army I continued in the reserve. In 1921, after I had attended camp at Fort Leavenworth as a major of the Field Artillery Reserve, I decided to try to get all the local Army, Navy, and

Marine Corps reserve officers in the greater Kansas City area together in the interest of national defense. A meeting was called in 1921, and I was made president of Reserve Officers Association Chapter No. 1. When the organization was expanded on a statewide basis, I became president of the state association. I never held any of these offices, however, except during the organization period. I always trained a successor in every organization in which I had a leading part.

I was active in the 22nd Masonic district. This covered Jackson County as a whole, but as it grew it was split into two districts, and in 1924, on the death of the deputy grand master for the new 59th District, I was appointed district deputy grand master and lecturer.

Because of these and other activities, as well as the fact that I had been a very active district judge from 1922 to 1924, I entered the 1926 campaign with reasonably good prospects of success. Mike Pendergast had suggested that I run for county collector of Jackson County, and I was in a willing frame of mind to do this because it was a good public office with a substantial income. Mike and I went to see his brother Tom and discussed the matter with him. He said he had already promised to support someone else for that job, but he thought, because of my experience as eastern judge, I ought to be a candidate for presiding judge. That was my first meeting with Tom Pendergast.

I was elected that fall with a majority of 16,000 votes. I immediately went to work to set up a system of roads, to construct new public buildings, and to try to get the county on a sound financial basis. The county court previous to the one to which I had been elected in 1922 had run the county into debt. . . . The roads were in terrible shape in the county, and the public buildings were all run down. Some were on the verge of falling down. . . . At this time, Kansas City . . . was calling a bond issue for a great many improvements, and I got the political bosses to agree to let the county propose an issue of road bonds for \$6.5 million. The political bosses and the *Kansas City Star* did not think the county bonds would be approved by the voters, but they were, and a second issue was later approved for \$3.5 million more in road bonds and \$5 million for a new courthouse in Kansas City, for the rehabilitation of the courthouse in Independence, and for the construction of a hospital at the county home. . . . I had told the taxpayers just how I would handle the bond money, and they believed me.

All these projects were successfully carried out, and without one breath of scandal, while I was presiding judge. I was responsible for the spending of \$60 million in tax funds and bond issues. I succeeded in getting thirty-five

or forty more miles of roads built from the \$10 million bond issue than the engineers had anticipated, and the public buildings were constructed without any difficulty whatever. In fact, when this work was completed, there was money left in the bond fund which was turned into the sinking fund, with the exception of \$36,000, which was used for the Andrew Jackson statues at the courthouses in Independence and Kansas City.

After visiting Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Cincinnati, I organized the Greater Kansas City Regional Planning Association. This organization was expanded eventually into a state organization and made many contributions to the improvement of the county and the state. As presiding judge in Jackson County I . . . worked hard and long for a Kansas City regional plan which . . . would make a complete study of transportation and communication needs for the entire six-county area.

In 1930 I was reelected presiding judge by a majority of 58,000 votes, and I continued my policies and my program. . . . When I . . . [finished my second term in 1934 and left] the county its finances were in first-rate shape. By that time, too, it had one of the best road systems in the United States and had a fine new set of public buildings as well. . . .

Although I was to become very well acquainted with Tom Pendergast, I barely knew him when I was first elected presiding judge of the Jackson County Court. He was a power in local politics, of course, and when the bond issues for Kansas City were up for consideration I went to see him. I told him I would like very much to issue bonds for the rehabilitation of our roads in the county and for some new public buildings. . . . Pendergast replied by saying that there was no possibility of the county supporting such a bond issue—that the same idea had been turned down on two previous occasions in the last ten years. I argued, however, that if I could tell the taxpayers just how I would handle their money I felt sure it would carry. My confidence was justified, too. The bonds for the county were carried with a three-fourths majority. . . .

When the first contracts were to be let, I got a telephone call from Tom Pendergast saying that he and some of his friends were very anxious to see me about those contracts. I knew very well what was in the wind, but I went to their meeting. I told them that I expected to let the contracts to the lowest bidders, just as I had promised the taxpayers I would do, and that I was setting up a bipartisan board of engineers to see that specifications were carried out according to contract, or else the public would not pay for them. Pendergast turned to the contractors and said, "I told you he's the contrariest man in the state of Missouri." When the contractors had left, he said, "You

carry out the agreement you made with the people of Jackson County." And I never heard anything from him again.

Year of Decisions, 136–141, 147

Material from page 147 is added to the paragraphs beginning "Our daughter Margaret" and "After visiting Chicago."

Senator

1934–1944

An unexpected turn in my political life—reception of a new senator—"a New Dealer from the start"—the bills I supported—a hard campaign—hasty preparations for war—a 30,000-mile investigation—the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program—"there is no substitute for a fact"—hearings, inspections, reports, recommendations—camp construction, aluminum, shipbuilding, defense worker housing, ordinance plants, metals and rubber, engines and bombers—\$15 billion saved

In 1934, when I had been presiding judge of Jackson County for eight years, I expected to run for Congress. Two years earlier new congressional districts had been set up for the state of Missouri, with the fourth district in eastern Jackson County, with two or three eastern wards of Kansas City added. This was the district I hoped to represent in Congress, and if I had been permitted to run, I feel confident that I could have been its representative. I was maneuvered out of this and finally ended up by running for the U.S. Senate.

Two fine and very experienced congressmen opposed me for the nomination for senator.

They were John J. Cochran of St. Louis and Jacob L. Milligan of Richmond, Missouri. Each of them had already been in Congress for many years and they had wonderful reputations. Fortunately for my prospects, however, I had become acquainted with all the county judges and county clerks in the



state of Missouri and was very familiar with the operations of the so-called "courthouse gangs" in all the country counties. I had their support when I went into sixty of Missouri's 114 counties, where I made from six to sixteen speeches a day. I made my campaign on the basis of support for President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and when the votes were counted, I came out with a plurality of 44,000 in the primary. I carried Jackson County by 130,000 votes. In the fall elections, when I opposed Senator Roscoe C. Patterson of Springfield, the Republican incumbent, I won with a majority of over a quarter of a million votes.

It was a great day for me on January 3, 1935, when I entered the chamber of the United States Senate to take my seat for the first time. I had always thought of the Senate as one of the world's greatest deliberative bodies, and I was aware of the honor and responsibility that had been given to me by the people of my state. Although I was nearly fifty-one years old at the time, I was as timid as a country boy arriving on the campus of a great university for his first year. There was much to learn about the traditions of the Senate, and I can honestly say that I went there to learn all I could about my new role in the federal government. I realized that the more I knew about it the better I could perform my duties as a senator. Even before I had left Kansas City for Washington I had read the biographies of every member of the Senate and had studied every piece of information I could find on our chief lawmaking body. I was to learn later that the estimates of the various members which I formed in advance were not always accurate. I soon found that, among my ninety-five colleagues, the real business of the Senate was carried on by unassuming and conscientious men, not by those who managed to get the most publicity.

I very distinctly remember taking the oath as a senator. As an officer in the Army and as a county official, I had probably taken the same oath a dozen times, but now it seemed far more impressive than at any other time until I took the oath of office as president in 1945. My colleague [from Missouri], Senator Bennett Clark, escorted me to the vice president and in turn escorted me back to my seat. As I walked back to my seat from the desk of the vice president I had a prayer in my heart for wisdom to serve the people acceptably. And it was not only the people of Missouri I had in mind, but the people of every part of the United States, for I felt myself to be a representative of all Americans.

The first meeting of the Senate, which had convened at noon, was over in a very short time. At two o'clock it was called back into session for an announcement. The House of Representatives, we were told, had a quorum present, had elected its officers, and was prepared to meet jointly with the

Senate on the following day to hear the annual message to the Congress by the president of the United States. With that announcement made, the Senate adjourned. My first day as senator was officially over, and I looked forward with eager anticipation to the next.

It was after the Senate had adjourned the following day that I began to have the conviction that I was now where I really belonged. I had been pleased by President Roosevelt's address calling for basic reforms to replace the emergency relief measures of his administration. I knew that the program he was enunciating for the welfare and security of all classes of Americans was a program that I could support wholeheartedly. In fact, it was one which I had already put into effect on a local level.

From the long list of bills and resolutions introduced in the Senate during the afternoon session which followed the joint meeting with the House I could see that I was going to be busier than I had ever been in Jackson County if I expected to keep up with all that was going on. The desk in my office, which was at first in Suite 248 in the Senate Office Building, was already piled high with documents and correspondence calling for my attention. That night I returned to my new residence at Tilden Gardens, just west of Connecticut Avenue in the northwest section of Washington, with an armload of papers to read and study. I did not realize it then, but that was a practice I was going to keep up for the next eighteen years. . . .

My ten years in the Senate had now begun—years which were to be filled with hard work but which were also to be the happiest ten years of my life. I will always remember the cordial reception which Burton K. Wheeler, J. Hamilton Lewis, and Carl Hayden gave me at the beginning of my experience in the Senate. They did not have the attitude of some of the liberals in that august body—like George Norris of Nebraska, for example, and Bronson Cutting of New Mexico—who looked upon me as a sort of hick politician who did not know what he was supposed to do. This attitude did not bother me, however. I knew it would change in time. Ham Lewis, on the other hand, came over and sat down by me during one of the first sessions. He was from Illinois and was the whip in the Senate at that time. “Don’t start out,” he told me, “with an inferiority complex. For the first six months you’ll wonder how you got here, and after that you’ll wonder how the rest of us got here.”

Carl Hayden of Arizona was extremely helpful to me in matters of Senate procedure. He took the trouble to explain some of the technicalities and customs of the Senate which appear pretty confusing to the newcomer. More than most of the men I was to know in Washington, Hayden knew how to get the necessary action on any job that needed to be done. In every contact I

had with him I came to respect him as one of the hardest working and ablest men in the Senate.

Burton Wheeler was chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee, and he welcomed me when I later asked him if it would be permissible for me to sit with him when the committee began holding its railroad finance hearings. As a result of this I eventually became a member of one of the subcommittees and finally vice-chairman. I wouldn't have been able to obtain this valuable experience if it had not been for Wheeler. There were others, too, who were always considerate and helpful. Vice President [John Nance] Garner was very kind to me and became one of the best friends I had in the Senate.

On the day on which I was sworn in there were twelve other freshman senators from the Democratic side. The thirteen of us were always close together, and we came to be known as the "Young Turks." The group included Lew Schwellenbach of Washington, who was later to become my secretary of labor, and Sherman Minton of Indiana, an able senator who is now an efficient and intelligent justice of the Supreme Court. I was closely associated also with some Republican senators, and Charles McNary of Oregon was one of whom I became very fond. He and I used to discuss at great length the matters that were pending in the Appropriations Committee. I became well acquainted with William Borah of Idaho as well. He was very able in committee and thoroughly understood legal language. He could analyze a bill as well as any man in the Senate.

Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan was another Republican for whom I soon came to have the greatest respect, and I believe it was mutual. One time I happened to enter the chamber when a heated argument was going on. Vandenberg saw me come in and called on me to speak. I happened to have the information that was needed to settle the argument completely. "When the senator from Missouri makes a statement like that," Vandenberg said when I had finished, "we can take it for the truth." That was a remark I never forgot.

Two of the Senate's most expert storytellers sat on either side of me. Nate Bachman, the junior senator from Tennessee, was one of them, and Joe Guffey of Pennsylvania was the other. My association with both these men was most enjoyable. Bachman could get any controversy on the Senate floor settled by stepping out of the chamber and asking someone to say to the troublemaking senator, "Nate Bachman wants to see you in the secretary's office." Nate would then call in another senator or two, tell a few stories, and harmony would be restored.

When I later became chairman of the [Senate Special] Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, many of its members became my very good personal friends—Mon Wallgren, Harley Kilgore, Owen Brewster, Homer Ferguson, Tom Connally, and Harold Burton. Senator Warren Austin of Vermont also became a very close friend of mine. . . .

I have named a few, but it would not be possible for me to single out all the members of the Senate whose acquaintance I cherished. Among them were some of the finest men I have ever known. The percentage of “no-goods” was small. In the makeup of society in general the “no-goods” form a small percentage, but it was smaller still in the Senate. I recall only two senators with whom I would rather not associate and whose word I did not trust.

It was fascinating to study these men and to observe their public performances. One of the most sensational performers of that time . . . was Huey Long of Louisiana. He had been elected to the Senate in 1930 but was not sworn in until 1932 because he wanted to finish out his term as governor. When he arrived, however, he soon began to establish new records for filibustering, reading from the *Baltimore Sun* and *The New York Times*, then from the Bible. Nobody else could talk while the filibuster was running. I was in the chair the last time Senator Long spoke. All the senators had left the chamber, for that was the usual procedure whenever Long took the floor, and afterward I walked across the street with him. “What did you think of my speech?” he asked. “I had to listen to you,” I told him, “because I was in the chair and couldn’t walk out.” He never spoke to me after that.

It was customary for Long to attack some connection of a senator. He once attacked Pendergast long before Pendergast ever got into trouble. Then he came around to me afterward and said he didn’t mean anything personal—it was just for the effect in Louisiana. He did the same thing to Senator Carter Glass. “You’re the orneriest man in this Senate,” Glass told him, “and I’d just as soon get my knife and cut your heart out.” He actually started after Long, but Senator Joe Robinson stopped him. “Carter,” Robinson remarked, “you can’t catch him. You’d better sit down.” “All right,” Glass replied, “but Long had better leave me alone.” Glass later referred on the Senate floor to the horse the ancient Romans had elected to the Senate, and remarked that they had done better than the state of Louisiana—at least the Romans had sent the whole horse.

There were some of the keenest minds in the country in the Senate, and it was a mistake to tangle with them. I never did unless I had all my facts before I spoke.

There was a lot of fun to be had in the Senate, but there was more work to do than ninety-six men could ever keep up with. I was not a good attendant

at social affairs in Washington. I usually got to my office at seven o'clock in the morning and got home for dinner at 7 p.m. Out of the entire enrollment of the Senate, when I was there, there were thirty or forty who worked like Trojans; there were fifteen or twenty who worked pretty well, and the rest did comparatively little. Ever since my experience as a member of that body I have wanted to write a monograph on "The Working Senator" and his contributions in the public interest. Most of the senators who really apply themselves never get much attention in the headlines. They have a hard grind and have no time to make personal attacks on other senators or people outside the Senate. On that account, they do not always make good news copy.

It was customary in my day to put each freshman senator on two major committees and also on a number of minor ones, and four days after becoming a member of the Senate I was assigned to the committees which were to keep me occupied throughout my first term. It was my good fortune to be made a member of two of the Senate's most important committees, each of which was in a field of legislation of particular interest to me. One was the Appropriations Committee, and the other was the Interstate Commerce Committee.

The Appropriations Committee, composed of twenty-four members, was the largest of all the Senate committees. . . . I never missed a meeting, for this committee examined in detail every federal expenditure and worked out the budget. By way of these meetings I became thoroughly acquainted with the fiscal aspects of the national administration and gained an insight into the workings of federal finance that was of inestimable value to me in later years.

. . . When I became a member [of the Interstate Commerce Committee] in 1935, I brought with me a special interest in transportation and communication systems that dated back to my youth. One of my early hobbies had been investigating the part which open avenues of communication had played in the shaping of history. . . .

There were actually only two other committees in the Senate of equal or superior rank to the two major committees on which I served. These were the Finance Committee, which passes on all tax matters, and the Foreign Relations Committee. Long service in the Senate is generally a prerequisite for membership on either of them. I believe, however, that the committees to which I had been appointed were the ones most useful to my own training and development.

During my early days in the Senate, I seldom participated in the speech making and arguments on the floor. I was content most of the time to have

my vote recorded on the issues that came up and was almost never absent during my first term. . . . The real work of a senator is done in committee rather than on the floor of the Senate. Some committee projects require years of study, research, correspondence, and hearings, and these activities are never published in the *Congressional Record*. I made it my business to master all of the details of any project confronting a committee of which I was a member. Most of my early career as a senator was devoted almost exclusively to committee work. The work itself was useful, but I was more concerned about equipping myself with facts and schooling myself in those disciplines which would enable me to get the business of the Senate done efficiently than I was in making myself heard in debate. My time for speaking was to come later.

Though I was engrossed in the work of the various committees during my first term in the Senate, I was also an active participant when legislation was dealt with on the floor. My votes were cast in support of all those important measures of the Roosevelt program which were written into the statute books at so rapid a pace between 1935 and 1940. I was a New Dealer from the start. In fact, I had been a New Dealer back in Jackson County, and there was no need for me to change. I believed in the program from the time it was first proposed. . . .

Truman lists, year by year, the bills for which he voted or intended to vote, and in one instance he lists a treaty which President Franklin D. Roosevelt had sent to the Senate for ratification. His comments on some of the bills are included in the list below.

1935:

- *The Wagner Labor Relations Act.* . . . A law to give the working people equality at the bargaining table was a necessity.
- *The Social Security Act of 1935.* I thought it was a move in the right direction, although it lacked health insurance for hospitals and doctor bills. I tried to remedy this lack when I became President.
- *A treaty by which the United States would become a member of the World Court.* I had been a supporter of President Wilson and the League of Nations and knew that this was a great thing and another step in the right direction. *The Senate failed to ratify the treaty.*
- *A bill which would strengthen the Tennessee Valley Authority.*
- *Guffey-Snyder Coal Act.* [This bill] saved the coal industry from ruin.

- *The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.* . . . Its purpose was to destroy the cartels through which the power trusts were able to maintain exorbitant rates and which permitted them to juggle securities involving the welfare of millions of people without any control by either the public or the government. *When lobbyists from the public utilities approached Truman and asked him to vote against the bill, he responded:* I told them that I was personally opposed to the monopolistic practices which were squeezing the consumer to death and that I would vote in favor of the bill. *The public utilities lobby organized a campaign in Missouri to get people to write to Truman to ask him to vote against the bill.* I was swamped with letters and telegrams urging me to vote against the bill. I did not let these messages alter my own convictions because I knew that the “wrecking crew” of Wall Street was at work behind the scenes and that it was responsible for the thirty thousand requests which eventually piled up on my desk. I burned them all. . . . *Although Truman was away from the Senate when the vote on the measure was taken, he was attacked in a Kansas City paper for the stand he had taken.* I paid no attention to the incident, knowing that I would be the target for many more similar attacks by special interests if I continued to ignore their demands and did what I knew to be right for the majority of the people. I never considered any other course.

1936:

- *The Soil Conservation Act of 1936.*
- *A bill creating the Commodity Exchange Commission.*
- *A bill providing for federal financing of flood control.*
- *A bill that returned control of relief programs to the states.* I always acted on the theory that whatever could be adequately handled on the local, or state, levels should not be under the control of the federal government unless emergency conditions prevailed, as had been the case during the early 1930s.

1937:

- *The Fair Labor Standards Act and the Walsh-Healy Act.* [These two pieces of legislation] were fundamental New Deal measures and were intended to help the little people in labor who had no lobby and no influence.

- *A bill which condemned the sit-down strike as an unfair tactic.*
- *The Neutrality Act of 1937.* I voted in favor of the much-disputed Neutrality Act of 1937 because I thought it would help to keep us out of involvement in the civil war then going on in Spain. *Truman was also influenced when voting for the measure by the allegations raised during hearings headed by Senator Gerald P. Nye that the United States was taken into World War I at least partly as a result of the efforts of the banks and munitions corporations which profited from the war.* I believe it was a mistake for me to support the Neutrality Act. . . .
- *A bill to extend the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, which gave the president the power to lower tariff rates without consulting Congress.* [This bill] freed the tariff issue to a large extent from its traditional entanglement in politics. . . . I had a particular interest in that subject which dated back to high school days, when I had headed a debate team supporting the idea of “Tariff for Revenue Only.” I remained a convert to the idea from that time on.
- *A bill to make the Civilian Conservation Corps permanent.* I thought . . . [this bill] might lead to a universal training program, which I advocated throughout my political career.
- *President Roosevelt’s proposal to increase the number of justices on the Supreme Court.* I saw no reason why the number of the justices could not be increased so that the nation would have, within constitutional bounds, a more forward looking approach to changing times and conditions.
- *The Bituminous Coal Act, which would increase government supervision of the soft coal industry.* As a member of the Interstate Commerce Committee, I had an opportunity to see the need for protection of three groups who were dependent upon the [coal] industry—the public, the government, and labor—from mismanagement of something in which they had common economic interests.

1938:

- *The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, which established the Civil Aeronautics Authority, later named the Civil Aeronautics Board, to regulate air commerce in order to assist its development and make it safe.*
- *President Roosevelt’s proposal to reorganize the executive branch of the government, which would give the president the power to reorganize, terminate, or create agencies as changing needs required. The measure passed in the Senate, but was defeated in the House of Representatives.*

- *A new Agricultural Adjustment Act.*
- *A resolution to limit debate, and thus break a filibuster, on an anti-lynching bill. The resolution failed.*

1939:

- As my first term drew to a close, the attention of the Congress was being diverted somewhat from domestic reform legislation by the outbreak of war in Europe and the increasing threat to our national security. Ever since my arrival in Washington I had agitated for legislation that would strengthen national defense, but such measures were slow in maturing.

1940:

- *The Transportation Act of 1940.* In 1939, I introduced the Wheeler-Truman bill, proposing changes in the interstate commerce laws regulating the financing of the railroads. This became the Transportation Act of 1940. I had worked on the problem since February 4, 1935—a problem which occupied more of my attention during my first term in the Senate than any other undertaking. . . . *Truman was appointed a member of the subcommittee of the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee which was to conduct an inquiry into the financial problems of the railroads.* I tackled my end of this assignment in the way I had long before learned to be the only sound approach to any problem. I began at once to read all of the records I could locate of earlier testimony concerning the railroads. I read past newspaper accounts of the industry's financial tangles. I ransacked the Library of Congress for every book on the subject of railroad management and history. . . . [Hearings got] underway by late 1936, and the subcommittee's eyes were being opened wide by the increasing volume of undeniable evidence of graft and corruption which lay at the root of the railroad situation. . . . I dedicated myself to pushing the inquiry until the whole truth was revealed.

Almost before I knew it my first term in the Senate was coming to a close. The years since 1935 had been the busiest and the happiest of my life, and I decided early in 1940 that I would make a fight for renomination in the August primary and for re-election in the November general elections. . . .

I had worked hard [during my first Senate term]. I had worked very hard. I felt that I had made a good record in the Senate, and I believe that I had won the respect of that body. I had been attacked and vilified by the metropolitan press in the state of Missouri, and this put me in a fighting mood. President Roosevelt had offered, in a roundabout way, to put me on the Interstate Commerce Commission. I sent him word, however, that if I received only one vote I intended to make the fight for vindication and reelection to the Senate. The president really was encouraging [Missouri governor Lloyd] Stark . . . [who had decided to try to take the nomination from me.]

At a meeting I called in St. Louis, my friends were unanimous in advising me not to run. Politically, the situation that confronted me in my home state was not an inviting one. In the first place, Tom Pendergast had been sent to prison in connection with an income tax fraud investigation, and the Jackson County organization which had supported me in the 1934 campaign had fallen into discredit as a result. Secondly, I was faced with the united opposition of the metropolitan newspapers in Missouri. Most of them had objected to my stand on New Deal measures designed to achieve a higher standard of living for the people. Republican for the most part, these newspapers naturally disapproved of the investigations in which I had participated and which shed so much light on the wrongdoings of special interest groups. . . .

I realized that attempts would be made to link my name with the misdeeds and misfortunes of [Tom] Pendergast and to make it appear that I was the product of a corrupt political machine. This did not bother me personally, because I had an unblemished record to point to. But I did not discount the influence that such propaganda might have. In addition to all this, I lacked an organization and I had no money to put into an expensive statewide campaign. . . .

. . . My opposition was formidable indeed. Two men had already announced their intentions to unseat me in the fall—Governor Lloyd C. Stark and District Attorney Maurice Milligan. I had known Lloyd Stark for many years and had helped him obtain the office of governor four years before. He was the head of a large nursery at Louisiana, Missouri, and had been very active in American Legion politics in the state. He had also had his lightning rod up for governor for some time. He was elected in 1936. Late in 1939 he came to my Washington office to tell me he did not intend to run against me for the Senate in 1940. I told my secretary, however, that Stark would be my main opposition in the 1940 primary. And he was. . . .

Maurice Milligan was the other candidate for the nomination. He was United States district attorney at Kansas City and had been the chief

prosecutor in the investigation which had sent many Pendergast workers to jail. . . . With the Jackson County organization in disrepute, Milligan was riding a wave of popularity and saying that he would take my job away from me in November.

These were unencouraging prospects; nevertheless, I was determined to run for reelection. I sent my secretary out to set up an organization of supporters, to collect funds, and to run the campaign in Missouri until I could come out in late summer [after Congress adjourned]. . . . We rented a building in Sedalia for our state headquarters and by mail and by telephone began recruiting volunteers and donors for work and money to help in the campaign. A campaign committee was made up of long time friends from various sections of the state. Harry Vaughan, . . . a friend of many years' standing, was treasurer of the committee. . . .

I knew that I could not count on a big vote in the cities, where I was opposed almost without exception by the political organizations and the press. . . . The rural papers showed less bias against me and more appreciation for the facts of my political record, and I went after the farm vote. My record of support for every New Deal measure offering relief to the oppressed farm population assured me of voting strength in Missouri's rural areas. Organized labor saw in me an advocate of their rights, too, because of my voting record in the Senate. As the time for the primary election drew near in August, the railroad labor unions pledged their support and distributed literature in my behalf among the laboring elements of the state. I also had divisions set up inside the committee to go after the veteran vote—on the basis of my service, both in and out of uniform, in behalf of the armed forces. I appealed to the minority votes on the grounds of the civil rights legislation which I had supported in the Senate. But I did not restrict my campaign to classes of society. I was running for renomination by all Missourians who were interested in honesty and efficiency in government.

I was aware that the only way to win the renomination was to go to the people with my record and my platform. I went into seventy-five counties during the hot months of July and August, speaking day and night and meeting hundreds of thousands of voters in the cities, towns, and villages. I always made it my business to speak plainly and directly to the people without indulging in high-powered oratory. The truth, I felt, is what voters need more than anything else, and when they have that, they can vote intelligently. When they cannot get the facts from other sources, an honest candidate is obligated to go out and give it to them in person.

As the weeks of campaigning rolled by, it was obvious that the race . . . had narrowed down to Governor Stark and myself. Milligan remained in the

race, but his following was small. Stark had started with a comfortable lead, but more and more of the people rallied to me. We were running about even when the time for voting came around.

In the final days of the campaign my chances were given an impetus when [Missouri] Senator Bennett Clark announced his support and made some speeches in my behalf. And the biggest break was when Bob Hannegan, [an important political operative in St. Louis] who had been working for Stark, sensed that he was backing the wrong man and switched his support to me. . . .

Right up to the day of the election it was a close fight between Stark and me, and a hard one. Both Stark and Milligan repeatedly attempted to employ "guilt by association" tactics in linking me with the Pendergast machine, which no longer existed. . . . The whirlwind finish resulted in a narrow victory for me. I won the nomination with a plurality of only about 8,300 votes. Still, that was enough, and I felt great satisfaction in the knowledge that my victory had been won by hard work and by the loyal support of those who believed in what I was trying to do.

The cost of my campaign was a little more than \$21,000. Of this, \$17,887.87 was donated to the campaign, and I had to bear the balance of \$3,685.89 myself. There had been 1,026 contributors in all.

My Republican opponent in the general election was Manvelle Davis, but my victory in the primary had virtually guaranteed reelection in November. When the votes were counted on November 5, I had received 930,775 to 886,376 for Davis.

I was still the United States senator from Missouri. . . .

When I was sworn in for the second time as senator on January 3, 1941, this country was preparing for war. We had suddenly realized that we were unprepared to face the dangers that confronted us and had begun a frantic attempt to remedy that situation. We had decided to build a two-ocean navy and to train and arm a million men a year for a period of five years. We had begun to spend money by the billion to accomplish those two purposes. We proposed to give all-out aid to Great Britain, Greece, and China and were getting ready to spend more billions to do it.

Our national defense machinery, which had never been quite adequate, suddenly had to be expanded to enormous proportions. Contracts for construction, for supplies, and for munitions were negotiated in desperate haste. Washington was full of people seeking contracts, most of them sincerely desiring to be of help to the government, some seeking only their own selfish interests. . . .

Truman became concerned that the rapid defense buildup was resulting in normal safeguards being put aside and contracts being let and decisions regarding plant locations being made for reasons of self-interest rather than the public interest, partly because of the activity of lobbyists. He also worried that greedy cliques were forming in both labor and management, and that big companies were making it impossible for small businesses to get a share of defense work.

I gave a lot of thought to this situation, and when I realized that it was growing increasingly worse, I decided to take a closer look at it. I got into my automobile and started out from Washington to make a little investigation on my own. I drove thirty thousand miles in a great circle through Maryland and from there down to Florida, across to Texas, north through Oklahoma to Nebraska, and back through Wisconsin and Michigan. I visited war camps, defense plants, and other establishments and projects which had some connection with the total war effort of the country, and did not let any of them know who I was. The trip was an eye-opener, and I came back to Washington convinced that something needed to be done fast. I had seen at first hand that grounds existed for a good many of the rumors that were prevalent in Washington concerning the letting of contracts and the concentration of defense industries in big cities.

I had decided to make a speech on the subject before the Senate in order to emphasize the need for action and call on the Senate for a committee to investigate the situation. . . . I talked over the prospects of a committee with my close friends—with [Federal Loan Administrator] John Snyder, in particular, and Senate leaders whose advice I respected—and they were interested. I explained that I was not going to do any witch hunting. I was not after publicity. I had already been reelected. Conditions were going from bad to worse so far as national defense was concerned, and my aim was to correct them. . . .

On February 10, 1941, Truman submitted a resolution calling for the creation of a special committee to investigate the national defense program. The committee was authorized and given a budget of \$15,000. It was composed of seven senators, five Democrats and two Republicans, with Truman as chairman. Hugh Fulton was named committee counsel.

The . . . [members] of the committee . . . had no preconceived notions, no partisan views to promote, no beliefs to prove. I was determined that the committee was not going to be used for either a whitewash or a smear in any matter before it but was to be used to obtain facts and suggest remedies

where necessary. The idea of the committee was to conduct the investigation of the defense effort simultaneously with the war program in order that mistakes could be remedied before irretrievable damage was done. We were interested in doing a surgeon's job to cure, not in performing an autopsy to find out why the patient died.

The members of the committee agreed at the beginning that the committee's investigations were to be thorough and complete and that it was to find the facts and to make conclusions only when they were clearly compelled by the facts. Our motto was, "There is no substitute for a fact. When the facts are known, reasonable men do not disagree with respect to them." This policy meant that the committee's work was going to be more arduous and difficult, but less sensational. We were not seeking headlines. We did not want publicity. We wanted only results. Anything we had to say we would say on the floor of the Senate only and in our formal reports. . . .

While the committee had been taking shape, I had been reading the records of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War Between the States. These historic records constitute a most interesting set of documents. That committee of the Union Congress was said by Douglas Southall Freeman, the biographer of Robert E. Lee, to have been of material assistance to the Confederacy. I became familiar with its mistakes and was determined to avoid the same errors in the conduct of my special committee. Here, as in many other instances, I found the teachings of history to be valuable in my own approach to current problems. . . .

The committee began holding hearings on April 15, 1941, and on April 23 it made its first inspection of an Army camp. Other inspections followed, and the committee found evidence of considerable waste in the construction of Army camps. The Army had not planned properly for the contingency of having to construct new camps rapidly, and in fact the construction division of the Quartermaster Corps had been conducting its business on the assumption there would never be another war. In addition, the Army was allowing contractors to set their own profit levels through cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts. Labor unions added further waste by determining who should be hired and then charging new employees high fees for work permits. The committee publicized these and other examples of waste in the Army's camp construction, and the War Department took steps to correct the problems which the committee had identified.

. . . Never before in recent decades had there been an investigation of an administration with the full cooperation of the administration. The denunciation of unnecessary waste and inefficiency by the committee made it

clear we were not pulling any punches. . . . The investigation of the camp construction program was merely the beginning. The spotlight of inquiry was to be turned elsewhere as well—on other agencies of the government, on big business, on labor, and on other segments of the economy involved in the total defense effort.

By this time, the procedure of the special committee had become well established. With the help of Hugh Fulton, the chief counsel, and an increased appropriation, I had assembled a staff of some fifteen investigators in addition to the original members of the committee. One of these young investigators was Matthew Connelly, who later became my appointment secretary in the White House.

Every morning I would meet early with Fulton, and together we would go through the dozens of letters which had been screened by the investigating staff. We would go through big stacks of reports and letters and notes which constituted leads, some of which developed into major investigations, such as shipbuilding or housing. Fulton and I would decide tentatively at these early-morning sessions whether the investigation should be ordered on a certain subject or whether the project should be pushed aside for the time being.

Once or twice a week the full committee met in private session in the small room behind my office which came to be known as the "doghouse." We often had agency heads confer with us at these private sessions, and when in 1942 manpower chief Paul V. McNutt and War Production Board Chairman Donald Nelson were appointed we continued this practice. In this way, we could get much accomplished without a great deal of publicity. Perhaps half of the committee's work was done in these unpublicized meetings.

After these informal conferences with other members of the committee I would draw up a schedule of hearings and send each member a memorandum of the next investigation coming before the group, a list of witnesses, and so forth. I also made many trips with the investigators to inspect particular situations on the spot before coming to a decision about calling a hearing.

As nearly as I could, I distributed the work so that every member of the committee found his special abilities challenged to the utmost. By giving specific assignments to each one, there were no overlapping jobs, and in this way each member was left alone to do his work without interference from me or any of the others.

As soon as the work of the committee became known, we had a steady list of callers at Room 449 in the Senate Office Building, which was committee

headquarters, and also at Room 248, which was my office. Every day there was an assortment of government officials, labor representatives, lobbyists, and occasionally plain citizens, all of whom had ideas about improving the war effort. There were manufacturers who felt that their products had been discriminated against. There were producers who complained that they could not get priorities for their products. There were industrialists who accused competitors of using their official positions as dollar-a-year men for private gain. And there were small businessmen who complained that they could not get government contracts for their services and products which would be helpful in winning the war. I made a point of listening to all of them, and whenever complaints or suggestions deserved it, I sent messages to the governmental agencies involved and got immediate action wherever possible.

There was the usual number of crackpots with ideas for ending the war quickly. I remember one man who had an idea for building an airplane for every soldier in the Army and filling each plane with a few yards of dirt. His idea was that at a given signal thousands of individually manned planes would fly over enemy capitals and completely cover them with United States soil, thus ending the war without further ado.

The hearings themselves were conducted in Washington and in dozens of other cities around the country. Members of the committee usually sat on one side of a long table, and witnesses were seated across from us. I always tried to stay in the background and to allow the questioning by the counsel and the members to elicit all of the information needed on any subject. I spoke up, however, whenever I felt that it was necessary to keep the investigation within its proper channels. I never permitted irrelevant questioning or any browbeating of witnesses. I had to call one of the senators to order at one hearing when he called [labor leader] John L. Lewis a "charlatan" to his face.

All of the hearings were public, and all of the proceedings were made public in a series of reports. These reports were written by Fulton and myself and were delivered to the Senate from time to time. Copies were made available for the press, and as the committee's position became more widely recognized, the hearings were covered by large numbers of reporters and photographers. The reports did more than simply summarize our findings. Many of them contained definite recommendations for legislation to correct abuses that had been brought to light. A number of the suggestions made in the committee reports were enacted into legislation by the Congress, but the influence of the committee was beginning to make itself felt through other than legislative channels. In many cases the mere knowledge that we

were interested in a particular subject was enough to cause everyone concerned, whether manufacturers, government officials, or labor, to clear up the problems themselves before the committee could get to them. Wrongdoers were learning to respect the "Truman Committee," and consequently many of them began to clean house hurriedly because of a fear that they might be next to come before the committee to explain their role in the national defense effort. And this was exactly what I was trying to bring about. . . . The net result was more concerted effort toward winning the war, a tightening of efficiency between civilian and military programs, and the reduction of losses in materials, time, and manpower.

On January 15, 1942, I delivered to the Senate the first annual report of the Special Committee [to] Investigat[e] . . . the National Defense Program. During 1941, the committee had held about seventy hearings and had interviewed 252 witnesses. More than three thousand pages of testimony had been gathered on such subjects as aluminum, copper, lead, zinc, steel, the automobile industry, small business, labor, the aviation program plant financing, lobbying, shipbuilding, defense housing, the ordnance plants, and government administration of the war production program in addition to information gathered at the first hearings on camp construction. . . .

In my first report to the Senate, I condemned the action of lobbyists, whose attempts to buy and sell influence were weakening the public confidence in the integrity of government officials. A direct result of their activities was the widespread belief that government officials could be influenced. This made businessmen the dupes of peddlers of influence who approached them with stories of their close connections in Washington and with promises of contracts if they were paid a commission, usually five or ten per cent of the contract price. In most instances the Washington connections were nonexistent, and the peddlers of influence were simply acting on the supposition that the businessmen in question could obtain their contracts merely by making a serious and determined effort. The practice was difficult to expose and eliminate, however, because the businessmen who were duped by it hated to admit that their greed had led them to attempt what they thought was bribery of government procurement officers. In cases where they obtained no contracts they seldom had a way of proving the extortion. I suggested legislation to alleviate the evils inherent in this kind of lobbying. . . .

In this first year, the committee conducted important investigations of the aluminum industry, the Navy's shipbuilding program, the construction of housing for defense workers, and the Army's construction of ordinance plants.

The most spectacular portion of the first annual report to the Senate was on the bungling of the Office of Production Management and its unwillingness to use the facilities at its disposal. . . . Too often [this agency] did nothing, seeking to avoid problems by refusing to admit that they existed.

The committee had found that some of the so-called dollar-a-year men and those working WOC (without compensation), who had flocked to Washington from industry and business to offer their services in the defense effort, were continuing to receive pay from their companies. . . . We had discovered that between June 1, 1940, and April 30, 1941, the Army and Navy had given contracts totaling almost \$3 billion to 66 firms whose officials had served the government at a dollar a year.

There had also been too much dissension within the Office of Production Management. This had caused uncertainty to business and had been a hindrance to increased production. In almost every case the . . . [agency] had either failed to foresee the nature and extent of problems or had tended to minimize the difficulties and to take halfhearted measures in the vain hope that the problems would solve themselves.

The committee had already recommended . . . the setting up of a War Production Board [in place of the Office of Production Management]. . . . By the time of my first report to the Senate the president had already announced his intention to create such an agency. Thus President Roosevelt received public credit for establishing the War Production Board because of his advance knowledge of the committee's report. That was all right with me. I wanted action more than credit. . . .

The real work of the special committee was only beginning, because now the nation was at war. Its record in 1941 had already proved that it could perform a very valuable function by assuring that the necessary implements of war were produced speedily and efficiently and that each dollar expended for war purposes would produce a dollar's worth of the necessary war supplies. To that end, I devoted most of my time and energy during the early years of the war.

As the committee's investigation proceeded into 1942, the evidence of waste and confusion became more shocking than ever. I saw that the war effort was bogging down because of red tape and bureaucratic waste, because of overlapping jurisdictions and the failure to delegate authority, and because of conflicts between military and civilian agencies. I was so disturbed by our findings that I wrote an article late in 1942 for *American Magazine* which revealed to the public just how chaotic the conditions really were in our war production program. . . .

The committee discovered that the government was not conducting the procurement of strategic commodities such as rubber, copper, and steel in a sensible and efficient way. The committee's disclosures of the government's shortcomings in the war production effort caused the renegotiation of a number of war contracts and the saving of a great deal of money, but problems were being discovered faster than they could be corrected.

By June 1943 the special committee had issued twenty-one reports covering an increasing variety of subjects. These included gasoline rationing and fuel oil, lumber, barges, farm machinery, food shipping losses, and many others. In its investigation into shipping losses the committee discovered that twelve million tons of American shipping had been destroyed by German U-boats during 1942. This was one million tons more than all of our shipyards were producing. The policy of the Navy had been a hush-hush attitude toward these losses, and Secretary [of the Navy Frank] Knox denied the figures which were published by the committee. He was invited to an executive session of the committee to determine what the true figures were. He reversed his original stand and admitted that the committee's figures were accurate. The result was a stepped-up offensive which wiped out the submarine domination of the shipping lanes. . . .

The committee conducted investigations into allegations that some companies were delivering defective products to the armed forces. Defective engines produced by the Curtis-Wright Corporation had caused the deaths of some of the Army's student pilots. The Glenn L. Martin Company's B-26 bomber, called by some the "widowmaker" because of its high accident rate, was determined by the committee to have wings that were too short. The committee discovered that the United States Steel Corporation was deliberately faking some of the tests conducted on finished steel plate destined for the armed forces. In every instance the committee demanded that the problems discovered be immediately corrected.

The committee also conducted investigations into and made recommendations regarding the efficient use of manpower and the conservation of rubber and development of synthetic rubber.

These and hundreds of other corrective steps grew out of the month after month probing into all areas of the defense effort by the committee. To me, the challenge seemed greater with every month of war that passed.

[During the time I was chairman of the committee] . . . I had been in the habit of seeing the president at least once a week, and more often if he

thought it necessary, about matters that came before the committee. Many of these visits were off the record, and that was also true when I had meetings with General Marshall, Secretary of War Stimson, and other leaders. In this way, I came to know all these remarkable men very well. My relations with Roosevelt were such that I considered myself his friend.

Although the work of the committee continued uninterrupted throughout the war, its name was never changed from the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. I remained its chairman until August of 1944, when I submitted the following letter to the President of the Senate:

August 3, 1944

Dear Mr. President:

I herewith submit my resignation as chairman and as a member of the Special Committee of the United States Senate Investigating the National Defense Program.

It is one of the regrets of my lifetime that this had to be done. But frankly, under the present circumstances, I am of the opinion that any statement, hearing or report for which I would be considered responsible would be considered by many to have been motivated by political considerations.

Harry S. Truman

The explanation for this action was, of course, the fact that I had been nominated for the vice presidency of the United States. Although I was requested unanimously by the other members to stay on as chairman, or at least as a member, I felt that my involvement in the campaign of 1944 might bring the committee into the firing line of politics. I had worked hard for three years to keep it strictly non-political and I wanted to see it remain that way. . . .

In all, the committee had made recommendations resulting in the estimated saving of \$15 billion to the American taxpayers. This had been accomplished at a cost of approximately four hundred thousand dollars, the amount of total appropriations granted for the committee's work. Savings in efficiency, man hours, and lives could not be calculated, of course, while the preventive influence wielded by the committee kept countless problems from ever developing.

The committee had filed a total of thirty-two reports since its creation on March 1, 1941, and there had never been a dissent to any of these. There had

been no factional disputes despite the fact that the committee had functioned through a major national election and was bipartisan in its membership.

The committee had not attempted to review the strategy of the war or to investigate or to criticize the conduct of military or naval operations. It had been directed by the Senate to conduct a complete investigation of all phases of the program for arming the nation. In accordance with that direction, the committee made a full and impartial study of every aspect of the war program in order to determine whether or not the fullest and most effective utilization was being made of our resources to the end of bringing the war to a successful and early conclusion with the lowest cost in lives.

Year of Decisions, 56, 141–162 and 164–186

The paragraph beginning “[During the time,” which follows the paragraph beginning “These and hundreds,” is from page 56.

Vice President

1944–1945

A big surprise in Chicago—"Bob, it's Truman"—a meeting at the Blackstone—the easiest campaign—a wartime inauguration—"Now you behave yourself"—eighty-two days—April 12, 1945

Early in 1944 some of my friends began to suggest to me that I become a candidate for vice president. I had never entertained such an idea, and whenever the suggestion was made I brushed it aside. I was doing the job I wanted to do; it was one that I liked, and I had no desire to interrupt my career in the Senate. As the time for the Democratic convention drew closer, however, my name was mentioned frequently as a possible candidate for the nomination. This disturbed me, for I had repeatedly given notice that I did not want to be a candidate.



In July 1944, as I was about to leave my home in Independence for the opening of the convention in Chicago, the telephone rang. It was Jimmy Byrnes calling from Washington. He told me that President Roosevelt had decided on him as the new nominee for vice president, and he asked me if I would nominate him at the convention. I told him that I would be glad to do it if the president wanted him for a running mate.

At the time Byrnes called, Henry Wallace was widely considered to be the leading candidate for the vice presidential nomination, and there was no doubt that he wanted very much to remain vice president. Still a favorite with President Roosevelt, Wallace also had the almost solid support of labor. His only real opposition was in the South, where he was looked upon by many as a dangerous radical. It was in the South that Byrnes expected to get his biggest push. Wallace, moreover, was not popular as vice president either

in the Senate or with the politicians who ran things in the party organization. Therefore, when Byrnes called to tell me that Roosevelt had decided to have him on his ticket for his fourth term, I took it for granted that all the details had been arranged.

Before I left for Chicago there was another call. It was Alben Barkley, the majority leader of the Senate, asking if I would nominate him for vice president at the convention. I told him that Byrnes had just called me with the same request and that I had already promised to place his name before the convention.

When I arrived in Chicago, I had breakfast with Sidney Hillman, who was a power in the labor faction of the convention. I asked him if he would support Byrnes. He said he would not, that there were only two men besides Henry Wallace he would support. They were William O. Douglas, justice of the Supreme Court, and Harry S. Truman, U.S. senator from Missouri. I told him that I was not a candidate and that I had agreed to nominate Byrnes because he told me the president wanted him. Then I had a meeting with Phil Murray, head of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and one with A. F. Whitney, head of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. Both expressed themselves exactly as Sidney Hillman had. The next morning William Green, head of the American Federation of Labor, asked me to breakfast at the Palmer House. He told me that the American Federation of Labor did not like Wallace and that they had decided to support me. I told him my position with Byrnes and repeated that I was not a candidate. While we were talking, Senators Millard Tydings and George Radcliffe came over to our table and asked me to come to their table to meet the Maryland delegation to the convention. I went over, thinking perhaps I could drum up some support for Byrnes. Tydings introduced me, however, as the Maryland candidate for vice president. All I could do was to explain my position and return to finish my conversation with Green.

I reported all these conversations to Byrnes in detail. Every time I gave him the information Byrnes told me just to wait, that the president would straighten everybody out in plenty of time.

On Tuesday evening of convention week . . . Bob Hannegan [the chairman of the Democratic National Committee] came to see me and told me unequivocally that President Roosevelt wanted me to run with him on the ticket. This astonished me greatly, but I was still not convinced. Even when Hannegan showed me a longhand note written on a scratch pad from the president's desk which said, "Bob, it's Truman. F.D.R." I still could not be sure that this was Roosevelt's intent, although I later learned that the

handwriting in the note was the president's own. One thing that contributed to my confusion was my knowledge of a letter which the president had written earlier in which he stated that he would be satisfied with either Wallace or Douglas. He had also made a public statement to the effect that, if he were a delegate in the convention, he would personally vote for Wallace.

Another fact, which I did not learn until sometime later, was that the president had called a meeting, far in advance of the Democratic convention, to discuss with party leaders the selection of a running mate. Among those present at the White House were Bob Hannegan, Ed Pauley, Frank Walker, George Allen, and Ed Flynn. It was at this meeting that Roosevelt told his conferees that he preferred Truman over Wallace, Douglas, or Byrnes, and jotted down the note in longhand which Hannegan was to show me at the convention. At the same meeting, he had instructed Walker to notify Byrnes of the decision. I believe, therefore, that Byrnes knew that the president had named me at the time he called me in Independence and asked me to nominate him at the convention.

Meanwhile the Missouri delegation to the convention held its first meeting, and I was named chairman. The first item of business to come up was a resolution endorsing me for vice president. In my capacity as presiding officer I ruled the resolution out of order because I was not a candidate. Then someone called me to the door to pass on the admittance of a visitor. While my attention was thus diverted, the vice chairman of the delegation . . . put the motion to a question. I was unanimously endorsed by the Missouri delegation for the nomination to the vice presidency. . . .

On Thursday afternoon, the day before the vice president was to be nominated, Hannegan called me from his room in the Blackstone Hotel and asked me to come to a meeting of the Democratic leaders. When I arrived there, they all began to put pressure on me to allow my name to be presented to the convention, but I continued to resist. Hannegan had put in a long-distance telephone call to the president, who was in San Diego at the time. When the connection was made, I sat on one of the twin beds, and Hannegan, with the phone, sat on the other. Whenever Roosevelt used the telephone he always talked in such a strong voice that it was necessary for the listener to hold the receiver away from his ear to avoid being deafened, so I found it possible to hear both ends of the conversation.

"Bob," Roosevelt said, "have you got that fellow lined up yet?"

"No," Bob replied. "He is the contrariest Missouri mule I've ever dealt with."

"Well, you tell him," I heard the president say, "if he wants to break up the Democratic Party in the middle of a war, that's his responsibility."

With that, he banged down the phone.

I was completely stunned. I sat for a minute or two and then got up and began walking around the room. All the others were watching me and not saying a word.

"Well," I said finally, "if that is the situation, I'll have to say yes, but why the hell didn't he tell me in the first place?"

... [The first thing I did] was to go over to the Stevens Hotel and report to Byrnes the president's conversation with Hannegan and my decision to do what the president wanted. At this late hour of the convention we had difficulty finding someone to nominate me. I had told all my friends that I was not a candidate, and they were now committed elsewhere. Finally, however, we persuaded Senator Bennett Clark to make the nominating speech. The following day I was chosen by the convention as its nominee for the vice presidency of the United States.

The president sent the following message:

From the White House

Washington, July 21, 1944

TELEGRAM: Honorable Harry S. Truman . . .

Stevens Hotel, Chicago, Illinois

I send you my heartiest congratulations on your victory. I am, of course, very happy to have you run with me. Let me know your plans. I shall see you soon.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

After the convention, I went to Washington for a visit with President Roosevelt. He told me that because he was so busy in the war effort I would have to do the campaigning for both of us, and we mapped out our program. I then resigned as chairman of the [Senate] Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program and made my plans to devote all my energy to the coming campaign.

The campaign of 1944 was the easiest in which I had ever participated. The Republican candidates never had a chance. As I traveled from one side of the continent to the other telling the people of the accomplishments of the Democratic administrations under President Roosevelt, I found little evidence of any inclination to change leaders during a war. In comparison

with my own Senate campaigns, the job was easy. As the Democratic Party's candidate for the vice presidency, I could sincerely pledge my continued support to the policies of the administration. My voting records during both terms in the Senate showed that I had been faithful in support of those policies in the past.

I had no thought that in making this campaign for the president I was in reality doing so as much in my own behalf as in that of Roosevelt's. At Lamar, Missouri, for instance, on August 31, 1944, I made the following, almost prophetic, statements:

It takes time for anyone to familiarize himself with a new job. This is particularly true of the presidency of the United States, the most difficult and complex job in the world. Even in peacetime it is well recognized that it takes a new president at least a year to learn the fundamentals of his job.

We cannot expect any man wholly inexperienced in national and international affairs to readily learn the views, the objectives and the inner thoughts of such divergent personalities as those dominant leaders who have guided the destinies of our courageous allies. There will be no time to learn, and mistakes once made cannot be unmade. Our president has worked with these men during these trying years. He talks their language—the language of nations. He knows the reasons which govern their decisions. Just as he respects them and their opinions, so do they respect him. At no time in our history has the president possessed such knowledge of foreign leaders and their problems. None has ever so completely won their confidence and admiration.

Without suspecting it, I was speaking of the tremendous job which, within a matter of months, was to be my own.

The rest is history. The official vote was 25,602,505, a plurality of 3,596,227 over the Republican ticket. On November 8, 1944, as vice president-elect of the United States, while resting at my home in Independence I sent the following telegram to the president:

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt

President of the United States, Hyde Park, N.Y.

I am very happy over the overwhelming endorsement which you received. Isolationism is dead. Hope to see you soon.

Harry S. Truman

On January 20, 1945, a snowy Saturday, I stood on the south portico of the White House beside President Roosevelt for the third wartime

inauguration in the history of our nation. The first had been Madison's; the second, Lincoln's. A crowd of several thousand had gathered on the White House lawn to witness the ceremony. As is the custom, I moved first to the front of the platform between the national and the presidential flags to have Henry Wallace, the retiring vice president, administer the oath of office to me. In a matter of minutes I was the new vice president of the United States. I stepped back, and President Roosevelt took his place at the front of the portico to receive the oath of office for his fourth term from Chief Justice [Harlan] Stone.

There was a post inaugural White House luncheon after the conclusion of the president's address and the ceremonies. I slipped away from the luncheon a few minutes ahead of time, hitchhiked a ride to Capitol Hill, and telephoned my mother at Grandview. She told me that she had heard the induction ceremony over the radio.

"Now you behave yourself," she warned me. . . .

I enjoyed my new position as vice president, but it took me a while to get used to the fact that I no longer had the voting privileges I had enjoyed for ten years as a senator. In the eighty-two days I served as vice president, I had only one chance to vote. That was on an amendment to limit the Lend-Lease extension bill. I broke the tie and defeated the proposal. The purpose of the amendment was to eliminate presidential power to carry out postwar Lend-Lease deliveries under contracts made during the war. . . .

Franklin D. Roosevelt renewed the practice of arranging for a vice president to sit with him in the Cabinet. . . . The presence of the vice president at Cabinet is necessarily an informal arrangement. Actually, he attends such meetings only by invitation of the president. In my eighty-two days as vice president only a few Cabinet meetings were held, for the president was abroad the greater part of the time or at Warm Springs. I attended when meetings were called, but I soon learned that little of real importance was discussed, for Franklin Roosevelt usually had conferences with individual members of the Cabinet before and after the meetings, and it was then that detailed discussions usually took place. . . . The Cabinet meetings were rather formal affairs. At the few I attended there was no exchange of views in round table fashion, and there was no "on-the-table" discussion of matters that were pending. I rarely said anything, and when I spoke at all it was only in answer to questions put to me by the president in relation to legislative matters on which he wanted help. . . .

As vice president, I also went to the White House for the president's meetings with the so-called "Big Four." These were usually arranged for

Monday mornings, but there were only a few such meetings. The "Big Four" is the term we applied to a group made up of the vice president, the Speaker of the House, the majority leader of the House, and the majority leader of the Senate, and at these meetings with the president we discussed a wide assortment of subjects. Domestic and foreign problems of many kinds came up for discussion, and the president would tell us what sort of legislation he was interested in. . . .

I was not given many other tasks. Two days after I became vice president, Roosevelt left Washington for the Yalta conference, and during the short period I served as vice president he was not actually in the capital more than thirty days. . . .

The office of vice president, according to Woodrow Wilson, is "one of anomalous insignificance and curious uncertainty." While this may have been its history, I did not feel that this was a fair description of what the office should be. "I want," I told newsmen shortly after being sworn in, "to bring the administration and Congress closer together on the methods of attaining the goal all of us have in common, and if I can create a better understanding, I feel that I can render an important public service."

The relationship between the president and the vice president is complicated . . . by the fact that the vice president is in between the legislative and the executive branches of the government without . . . being responsible to either. . . . The vice president is hardly ever seriously consulted by the Senate in legislative matters, except perhaps in cases where he has technical or special knowledge. He is almost certain to find that the majority and the minority leaders are always kind and friendly, but he is a sort of fifth wheel in the eyes of the Senate. He can push the president's policies if he is well liked by the Senate, for its members will listen to him. . . .

. . . I had no procedural problem in my first contact with the Senate as its presiding officer. The rules of the Senate were not new to me. After ten years, I knew most of its members well. I spoke their language. . . . As a moderator in debate the vice president executes only the most rudimentary of powers. He does maintain order and decorum in debate, and it is especially here that whatever tact he possesses is a decided asset. . . . Under the Constitution, the powers of the vice president are defined in only one respect: the right to vote in case of a tie. . . . In view of all this, the vice president can never exercise open influence in the Senate, but if he is respected personally and if he maintains good relations with the members of the Senate, he can have considerable power behind the scenes. Because the Senate has a president pro tempore to take the chair in his absence, the vice president does not have

to attend the sessions of the Senate continuously. Thus he may devote part of his time to private meetings, conferences, and other valuable contacts with leaders and committeemen.

[Many] . . . of the vice president's functions are social and ceremonial. Very often he acts as a substitute for the president in opening an exposition, dedicating a monument, or in cutting the ribbon to open a new bridge to traffic. Outranking foreign ambassadors, he is almost always the most important guest at a dinner or other social functions. Socially the vice president takes precedence over all other officers of the government except the president. I never cared too much for this aspect of my job as vice president. . . .

The vice president . . . may have considerable status as a party member. He is considered as the No. 2 man in the party setup, and this may—or may not—give him influence in the Senate. It depends upon the man. If the senators find him likable, he has considerable influence. . . . If he is not liked or is not familiar with politics or with the Senate approach to things, he is left on the outside.

The great importance of the office of vice president, of course, lies in the possibility of his succeeding to the presidency. . . . The Constitution provides that the powers and duties of the office of president "shall devolve upon the Vice-President" in case of the removal from office of the president, his resignation, or his inability to discharge his powers and duties. . . .

It has always been my feeling that this office, which is the second highest honor that can be bestowed by the American people, has great inherent and potential dignity that has been sadly neglected. The opportunities afforded by the vice presidency, particularly the presidency of the Senate, do not come—they are there to be seized. The man who fills the office can choose to do little or he can do much. The vice president's influence on legislation depends on his personality and his ability, and especially the respect which he commands from the senators. Here is one instance in which it is the man who makes the office, not the office the man.

Ordinarily a vice president has four years to develop these opportunities. I had less than three months. After April 12, 1945, I never again had the time even to speculate on what I might have been able to do with the office of vice president. I no longer found myself amid the familiar surroundings of Capitol Hill. I was president.

The paragraphs beginning “Franklin D. Roosevelt renewed” and “As vice president,” which follow the paragraph beginning “I enjoyed my,” are from pages 55–56. The paragraph beginning “The relationship between,” which follows the paragraph beginning “The office of,” is from page 57. The paragraph beginning “The vice president,” which follows the paragraph beginning “[Many] . . . of the,” is from page 57.

Being President

. . . Being a president is like riding a tiger. A man has to keep on riding or be swallowed. . . . A president either is constantly on top of events or, if he hesitates, events will soon be on top of him. I never felt that I could let up for a single moment.

No one who has not had the responsibility can really understand what it is like to be president, not even his closest aides or members of his immediate family. There is no end to the chain of responsibility that binds him, and he is never allowed to forget that he is president. . . .

I do not know of any easy way to be president. It is more than a full-time job, and the relaxations are few. I used the presidential yacht, as well as the Little White House at Key West, less for holiday uses than as hideaways, and they were very useful when I wanted to catch up on my work and needed an opportunity to consult with my staff without interruptions. . . .

. . . Even though I always got up early, usually was at work ahead of the staff, and would take papers home with me at night to read, there always seemed to be more than I could do. . . .

What kept me going . . . was my belief that there is far more good than evil in men and that it is the business of government to make the good prevail.

By nature not given to making snap judgments or easy decisions, I required all available facts and information before coming to a decision. But once a decision was made, I did not worry about it afterward.

I had trained myself to look back into history for precedents, because instinctively I sought perspective in the span of history for the decisions I



had to make. That is why I read and re-read history. Most of the problems a president has to face have their roots in the past. . . .

There have been men in history who have liked power and the glamour that goes with it: Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon, to name only a few. I never did. It was only the responsibility that I felt to the people who had given me this power that concerned me. I believe that the power of the president should be used in the interest of the people, and in order to do that the president must use whatever power the Constitution does not expressly deny him. . . .

In the nation's capital . . . a small well-organized group can succeed in making itself heard and heeded. The vast majority of the people have no such organized voice speaking for them. It is only the president who is responsible to all the people. He alone has no sectional, no occupational, no economic ties. If anyone is to speak for the people, it has to be the president. . . .

In government there can never be an end to study, improvement, and the evaluation of new ideas, and no one is more conscious of this than the president, for he can see how the machinery of government operates. I have been impressed by both the speed and thoroughness of the response of departments when I asked for detailed studies, even on the most difficult problems.

As president, I always insisted on as complete a picture as possible before making a decision, and I did not want fuzzy statements that concealed differences of opinions. I wanted to hear all sides when there was disagreement, but even more important, I wanted to know when disagreements existed among my advisers.

I do not believe that the president is well served if he depends upon the agreed recommendations of just a few people around him, boiled down to a brief statement submitted to him for approval. . . . In the long run the best results come from intensive study of different viewpoints and from arguments pro and con.

I have spent many hours, late at night and early in the morning, poring over papers giving all sides. Many times, I was fairly convinced in my own mind which course of action would be the right one, but I still wanted to cover every side of the situation before coming to a final decision. . . .

Under the Constitution, the president of the United States is alone responsible for the "faithful execution of the laws." Our government is fixed on the basis that the president is the only person in the executive branch who has the final authority. Everyone else in the executive branch is an agent of the president. There are some people, and sometimes members of Congress and the press, who get mixed up in their thinking about the powers of the

president. The important fact to remember is that the president is the only person in the executive branch who has final authority, and if he does not exercise it, we may be in trouble. If he exercises his authority wisely, that is good for the country. If he does not exercise it wisely, that is too bad, but it is better than not exercising it at all.

Year of Decisions, 545–546; *Years of Trial and Hope*, 1, 23–24, 305–306, 361, 473

The order of the sentences has in some instances been changed from that in the original memoirs text.

President—First Days

April 12–30, 1945

Death of a president—“I felt like the moon, the stars, and all the planets had fallen on me”—highly secret information is revealed to me—President Roosevelt’s funeral—first address to Congress, first press conference—heavy reading—ending the war in Europe—“the harassing question of Poland”—meeting with the Soviet foreign minister—Stalin—the president’s family—“the constant pressure and necessity of making immediate decisions”

During the first few weeks of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s fourth administration, I saw what the long years in the presidency had done to him. He had occupied the White House during twelve fateful years—years of awful responsibility. He had borne the burdens of the reconstruction from the Great Depression of the 1930s. He shouldered the heavier burdens of his wartime leadership. It is no wonder that the years had left their mark. The very thought that something was happening to him left me troubled and worried. This was all the more difficult for me because I could not share such feelings with anyone, not even with the members of my family. I kept saying to myself that this man had often demonstrated amazing recuperative powers. Only a few months earlier, during the closing days of the 1944 presidential campaign, he had ridden for four hours in an open car through a driving rain in New York City and had seemed none the worse for it. Knowing something of the great responsibilities he was forced to carry, I did not want to think about the possibility of his death as president. . . .



On February 20, 1945, while I was presiding over the Senate, a rumor that the president was dead swept through the corridors and across the floor. I left my place at once and headed for the office of Les Biffle, Secretary of the Senate. As I entered, I said to Biffle, "I hear the president is dead. What will we do? Let's find out what happened." Biffle called the White House and was informed that it was Major General Edwin M. Watson—"Pa" Watson, the appointment secretary to the president—who was dead. He had died at sea aboard the USS *Quincy* while returning with President Roosevelt from the Yalta conference. . . . I met with the president a week later and was shocked by his appearance. His eyes were sunken. His magnificent smile was missing from his careworn face. He seemed a spent man. I had a hollow feeling within me, for I saw that the journey to Yalta must have been a terrible ordeal.

On March 1, 1945, President Roosevelt spoke to a joint session of Congress about his meetings with Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill at Yalta. He spoke seated so he wouldn't have to wear the heavy leg braces that he needed in order to stand. Everyone listened attentively to the president's speech, but it was apparent to all that Roosevelt was tired and weary. After the speech, Truman met briefly with Roosevelt, who said he was going to leave Washington on March 30 for a rest at his retreat in Warm Springs, Georgia. Truman never saw or spoke with him after this.

April 12

Truman's presidency began in the afternoon of April 12, 1945.

Shortly before five o'clock in the afternoon of Thursday, April 12, 1945, after the Senate adjourned, I went to the office of House Speaker Sam Rayburn. I went there to get an agreement between the Speaker and the vice president on certain legislation and to discuss the domestic and world situation generally. As I entered, the Speaker told me that Steve Early, the president's press secretary, had just telephoned, requesting me to call the White House. I returned the call and was immediately connected with Early. "Please come right over," he told me in a strained voice, "and come in through the main Pennsylvania Avenue entrance." I turned to Rayburn, explaining that I had been summoned to the White House and would be back shortly. I did not know why I had been called, but I asked that no mention be made of the matter. The president, I thought, must have returned to

Washington for the funeral of his friend, Bishop Atwood, the former Epis-
copal Bishop of Arizona, and I imagined that he wanted me to go over some
matters with him before his return to Warm Springs. . . .

*Truman slipped unseen by his Secret Service agents out of the Capitol Building
and was driven alone to the White House.*

I reached the White House about 5:25 p.m. and was immediately taken in the elevator to the second floor and ushered into Mrs. Roosevelt's study. Mrs. Roosevelt herself, together with [her son-in-law and daughter] . . . John and . . . Anna Roosevelt Boettiger and [Steve] Early, were in the room as I entered, and I knew at once that something unusual had taken place. Mrs. Roosevelt seemed calm in her characteristic, graceful dignity. She stepped forward and placed her arm gently about my shoulder.

"Harry," she said quietly, "the president is dead."

For a moment, I could not bring myself to speak.

The last news we had had from Warm Springs was that [President] Roosevelt was recuperating nicely. In fact, he was apparently doing so well that no member of his immediate family, and not even his personal physician, was with him. All this flashed through my mind before I . . . [could think of what to say].

"Is there anything I can do for you?" I asked at last.

I shall never forget her deeply understanding reply.

"Is there anything *we* can do for *you*?" she asked. "For you are the one in trouble now."

The greatness and the goodness of this remarkable lady showed even in that moment of sorrow. I was fighting off tears. The overwhelming fact that faced me was hard to grasp. I had been afraid for many weeks that something might happen to this great leader, but now that the worst had happened I was unprepared for it. . . .

It seems to me that for a few minutes we stood silent, and then there was a knock on the . . . door. Secretary of State [Edward R.] Stettinius, [Jr.] entered. He was in tears, his handsome face sad and drawn. He had been among the first to be notified, for as secretary of state . . . it was his official duty to ascertain and to proclaim the passing of the president. I asked Steve Early, Secretary Stettinius, and Les Biffle, who now had also joined us, to call all the members of the Cabinet to a meeting as quickly as possible. . . . I went to the president's office at the west end of the White House. I asked Les Biffle to arrange to have a car sent for Mrs. Truman and Margaret, and I

called them on the phone myself, telling them what had happened—telling them, too, to come to the White House. I also called Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, and having given him the news, I asked him to come as soon as possible so that he might swear me in. He said that he would come at once. And that is what he did, for he arrived within hardly more than fifteen or twenty minutes. Others were arriving by now. Speaker Rayburn, House majority leader John W. McCormack, and House minority leader Joseph W. Martin were among them. I tried personally to reach Senator Alben W. Barkley, Senate majority leader, but I could not locate him. . . . Steve Early, Jonathan Daniels, and others of the president's secretarial staff were searching for a Bible for me to hold when Chief Justice Stone administered the oath of office. . . . [When finally] a Bible had been found, it was placed near where I stood at the end of the . . . [table in the Cabinet Room]. Mrs. Truman and Margaret . . . [had arrived and were standing beside me]. . . . Chief Justice Stone had taken his place before me at the end of the table. Clustered about me and behind were nine members of the Cabinet, while Speaker Rayburn and a few other members of Congress took positions behind Chief Justice Stone. . . . I picked up the Bible and held it in my left hand. Chief Justice Stone raised his right hand and gave the oath as it is written in the Constitution. With my right hand raised, I repeated it after him:

“I, Harry S. Truman, do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of president of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”

I dropped my hand. . . . [It was 7:09 p.m.] Less than two hours before, I had come to see the president of the United States, and now, having repeated that simply worded oath, I myself was president. The ceremony at which I had taken the oath of office had lasted hardly more than a minute, but a delay followed while the inevitable official photographs were taken. Then, after most of those present had gripped my hand—often without a word, so great were their pent-up emotions—and after Mrs. Truman and Margaret had left, everyone else withdrew except the members of the Cabinet.

We took our places around the table . . . and as we did so, Secretary Early entered. The press, he explained, wanted to know if the San Francisco conference on the United Nations would meet, as had been planned, on April 25. I did not hesitate a second. I told Early that the conference would be held as President Roosevelt had directed. There was no question in my mind that the conference had to take place. It was of supreme importance that we build an organization to help keep the future peace of the world. It was the first decision I made as president.

When Early had left, I spoke to the Cabinet. I told them briefly, as I had already told some of them individually, that I would be pleased if all of them would remain in their posts. It was my intention, I said, to continue both the foreign and the domestic policies of the Roosevelt administration. I made it clear, however, that I would be president in my own right and that I would assume full responsibility for such decisions as had to be made. I told them that I hoped they would not hesitate to give me their advice—that I would be glad to listen to them. I left them in no doubt that they could differ with me if they felt it necessary, but that all final policy decisions would be mine. I added that once such decisions had been made I expected them to support me. . . .

That first meeting of the Cabinet was short, and when it adjourned, the members rose and silently made their way from the room—except for Secretary [of War] Stimson. He asked to speak to me about a most urgent matter. Stimson told me that he wanted me to know about an immense project that was under way—a project looking to the development of a new explosive of almost unbelievable destructive power. That was all he felt free to say at the time, and his statement left me puzzled. It was the first bit of information that had come to me about the atomic bomb, but he gave me no details. It was not until the next day that I was told enough to give me some understanding of the almost incredible developments that were under way and the awful power that might soon be placed in our hands.

That so vast an enterprise had been successfully kept secret even from the members of Congress was a miracle. I had known, and probably others had, that something that was unusually important was brewing in our war plants. Many months before, as part of the work of the [Senate Special] Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, of which I was chairman, I had . . . investigators going into war plants all over the country. I had even sent investigators into Tennessee and the state of Washington with instructions to find out what certain enormous constructions were and what their purpose was. At that time . . . Secretary Stimson . . . phoned me to say that he wanted to have a private talk with me. I told him that I would come to his office at once, but he said he would rather come to see me. As soon as he arrived, I learned that the subject he had in mind was connected with the immense installations I had sent the committee representatives to investigate in Tennessee and . . . Washington.

“Senator,” the Secretary told me as he sat beside my desk, “I can’t tell you what it is, but it is the greatest project in the history of the world. It is most top secret. Many of the people who are actually engaged in the work have

no idea what it is, and we who do would appreciate your not going into those plants." I had long known Henry L. Stimson to be a great American patriot and statesman. "I'll take you at your word," I told him. "I'll order the investigations into those plants called off." I did so at once, and I was not to learn anything whatever as to what that secret was until . . . [Stimson] spoke to me after that first Cabinet meeting. The next day Jimmy Byrnes, who until shortly before had been Director of War Mobilization for President Roosevelt, came to see me, and even he told me few details, though with great solemnity he said that we were perfecting an explosive great enough to destroy the whole world. It was later, when Vannevar Bush, head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, came to the White House, that I was given a scientist's version of the atomic bomb. Admiral Leahy was with me when Dr. Bush told me this astonishing fact. "That is the biggest fool thing we have ever done," he observed in his sturdy, salty manner. "The bomb will never go off, and I speak as an expert in explosives."

. . . Many problems confronted me, and I was tired. Within half an hour of the time the Cabinet meeting adjourned, I left for our apartment at 4701 Connecticut Avenue. When I arrived, I found Mrs. Truman, Margaret, and Mrs. Truman's mother, Mrs. Wallace, at the apartment of General Jeff Davis, our next-door neighbor. The Davises had had a ham and turkey dinner that evening, and they gave us something to eat. I do not know when Mrs. Truman and Margaret had eaten last, but I had had nothing since noon. Shortly, we returned to our apartment, where I went to bed and to sleep.

April 13

On April 13, I began my first full day in office. I was up at six-thirty, and at nine o'clock, after a walk and breakfast, I left for the White House. . . . As I entered the White House car, I noticed Tony Vaccaro, Capitol Hill correspondent for the Associated Press, [was standing] . . . on the curb. I told him to hop in, and . . . [we] drove to the White House together. In our conversation, I remember saying that few men in history equaled the one into whose shoes I was stepping and that I silently prayed to God that I could measure up to the task.

When we reached the White House, I went at once to the . . . [Oval Office]. President Roosevelt's belongings were numerous in the room. Ship models and ship prints were especially obvious, and the desk was laden with mementos. Everywhere were signs of the man who had labored there so long. I had no wish to change the room as yet, but I was forced to use the

desk, and so I asked an aide to put away the former president's belongings. Except for the objects on the desk, I carefully avoided disturbing the late president's possessions. I even attempted, as much as possible, to keep from interfering with his personal staff, who were already overwhelmed with duties in connection with the plans for the coming funeral. . . .

My first official business was with Secretary of State . . . Stettinius . . . , who reported to me on current diplomatic matters and discussed some of the plans for the coming United Nations Conference at San Francisco. [He] informed me that at President Roosevelt's request the State Department prepared for the president each day a two-page summary of the important diplomatic developments, and he handed me the current report. He asked whether I wished to have this daily summary continued, and he informed me that an up-to-date reference book on the major points of the foreign policies of the United States was being prepared for me. I told Stettinius that I would welcome both the daily summary and the reference book, but I requested him to let me have that same day an outline of the background and the present status of the principal problems confronting this government in its relations with other countries. These written reports, along with material from other departments and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, came to me regularly from then on and were immensely helpful in filling gaps in my information. In fact, they were indispensable as aids in dealing with many issues, and from the first I studied them with the greatest care. Night after night I went over them in detail and never went to bed until I had thoroughly digested the information they contained. . . .

During the day friends and acquaintances arrived from time to time, and, as I could, I saw them. The day was not organized, of course. Official tasks were numerous, but as yet no schedule had been arranged, and there were many interruptions.

Only a little while after Secretary Stettinius left, I met with the military leaders for the first time. It was eleven o'clock when Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal came in with General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, Lieutenant General Barney M. Giles of the Air Force, and Admiral William D. Leahy, chief of staff to the president. I knew and respected all these men, and it was comforting to know that I would be advised by leaders of such ability and distinction. In their report to me they were brief and to the point. Germany, they told me, would not be finally overcome for another six months at least. Japan would not be conquered for another year and a half. Their summary covered our far-flung military operations, but there was

little detailed examination of our various positions. Everywhere, it appeared, our forces and those of our allies were doing well.

It did not take them long to give me the latest war developments and prospects, and when they had finished, I told them that I considered it urgent to send some word to our armed forces as to what they could expect from me. I added, however, that before doing so I thought I should first address Congress. As the new chief executive, I wanted the support of the legislative arm of the government, as I wished to assure our people, our armed forces, and our allies that we would continue our efforts unabated. The military leaders agreed, and as they were leaving I asked Admiral Leahy to remain with me.

Leahy had occupied a unique position in the White House under President Roosevelt. He was a man of wide experience and was well known for his directness of expression and independence of judgment. Direct in manner and blunt in expression, he typified the Navy at its best, and Roosevelt had appointed him to act in a highly confidential role as chief of staff to the commander in chief. Prior to World War II, there had been no such position in our government, but in Leahy's hands it soon proved to be immensely useful. When the others had left, I told him that I would like to have him continue in a similar capacity under me. "Are you sure you want me, Mr. President?" he asked. "I always say what's on my mind." "I want the truth," I told him, "and I want the facts at all times. I want you to stay with me and always to tell me what's on your mind. You may not always agree with my decisions, but I know you will carry them out faithfully." With Admiral Leahy in the White House, I felt that, whether they were good or bad, all the information and communications bearing on the war would reach me promptly. . . . The admiral looked at me with a warm twinkle in his eyes. "You have my pledge," he told me. "You can count on me."

When Leahy left, I reached for the telephone and called Les Biffle again. During my years as senator I had worked closely with Biffle. He was always unusually well informed on legislative matters and was a parliamentarian who intimately understood the shadings and opinions of the dominant figures on the Hill. When I had called him earlier, I had asked him to arrange a luncheon in his office that noon with the leaders of Congress. I was anxious to meet the policy making heads of both parties so that I might tell them of my earnest desire and need for the fullest cooperation between the legislative and the executive branches of the government.

I drove to the Capitol, surrounded and followed, as I was to be from that time on, by my ever-present Secret Service guards, and shortly after noon

we sat down to lunch in Biffle's office—thirteen senators, four members of the House of Representatives, Les Biffle, and the very new president of the United States. . . .

I had come, I told them, in order to ask that a joint session of the Senate and the House be arranged so that I might address them in person. It would not be fitting, of course, to call such a meeting until the funeral of Franklin Roosevelt had been held, but I suggested that they make the necessary arrangements as soon as possible thereafter—Monday, April 16, three days hence. Some of the group were opposed, and others were doubtful. Most, however, were in agreement. I asked each one for his opinion and listened carefully to what they had to say. I then outlined my reasons for considering it imperative to let the nation know through Congress that I proposed to continue the policies of the late president. I felt that it was important, too, to ask for continued bipartisan support of the conduct of the war.

The points I made appeared convincing, for those who had been doubtful now expressed their agreement. "Harry," remarked one senator with whom I had long worked closely, "you were planning to come whether we liked it or not." "You know I would have," I replied, "but I would rather do it with your full and understanding support and welcome."

As I was leaving the Senate office, a long line of white-shirted page boys gathered outside to greet me. Reporters crowded in and joined the line as well, and I shook hands with every one of them. "Boys," I said, "if you ever pray, pray for me now. I don't know whether you fellows ever had a load of hay fall on you, but when they told me yesterday what had happened, I felt like the moon, the stars, and all the planets had fallen on me. I've got the most terribly responsible job a man ever had." "Good luck, Mr. President," said one of the reporters. "I wish you didn't have to call me that," I told him.

I turned away from that long line of serious faces and entered the Senate cloakroom. I looked into the empty Senate Chamber and entered the silent vice presidential office. These were the surroundings in which I had spent ten active, happy years. In a way, this had been my political home, and here I had experienced the most exciting adventure I had ever expected to have. Less than twenty-four hours before, I had been here presiding over the Senate. But now I was president of the United States and had to return to the White House, there to take over the job in which my great predecessor had only yesterday been stricken.

It was later that day when I signed the first official document to which I added my name as president. The proclamation . . . read, in part, as follows:

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES:

It has pleased God in His infinite wisdom to take from us the immortal spirit of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the 32nd President of the United States.

The leader of his people in a great war, he lived to see the assurance of the victory but not to share it. He lived to see the first foundations of the free and peaceful world to which his life was dedicated, but not to enter on that world himself.

His fellow countrymen will sorely miss his fortitude, faith, and courage in the time to come. The peoples of the earth who love the ways of freedom and of hope will mourn for him.

But though his voice is silent, his courage is not spent, his faith is not extinguished. The courage of great men outlives them to become the courage of their people and the peoples of the world. It lives beyond them and upholds their purposes and brings their hopes to pass.

The proclamation, I believe, well expressed the feeling of the country as it surely expressed what was in my mind and heart.

Messages were coming in [to the White House] throughout the day. . . . Messages of sympathy and support arrived in great numbers. They came from sovereign heads of nations. They came from men and women in all walks of life. They came from many parts of the world. [One was from Prime Minister Winston Churchill.] One was a special message from His Holiness Pope Pius XII. Ambassador Harriman cabled from Moscow, saying that Foreign Secretary Molotov had called on him at three o'clock in the morning to express his sympathy on Roosevelt's death and to extend his respects and good wishes. Later in the day, too, a message came from Stalin. . . . From the leaders and citizens at home there was an unprecedented expression of deep mourning, and there were many tenders of support. . . .

As was to be expected, the press had a banner day. The country's newspapers largely forgot their customary partisanship. There was a good deal of speculation, and there were some doubts as to the course I would follow, especially in regard to President Roosevelt's program. Some papers carried vague reports that the troops at the fronts feared the effect that the president's death would have on the consummation of peace, and some foreign dispatches suggested that the same question was being asked by peoples and their leaders all over the world.

Some congressmen were in doubt as to whether I would continue Roosevelt's foreign policy. A few senators wanted to know whether I intended to give strong support to the proposed international organization and at the same time some of the old isolationists even imagined that I would go

further than the late president had. . . . My real concern at the moment, however, was divided between the war situation on the one hand and the problems of the coming peace on the other. We were close to victory, but the situation that would follow was not so clear. Already I was coming to be more fully informed on the most important and pressing problems in this complicated field, for I had been reading many documents and diplomatic messages that were being brought to me. I could see that there were more difficulties ahead. Already we were at odds with the Soviet government over the question of setting up a truly representative Polish government, and there were troubles in other areas. Many of these seemed to indicate an ominous trend. The next few months, I knew, could well be decisive in our effort to achieve an orderly world, reasonably secure in peace.

James F. Byrnes was at his home in Spartanburg, South Carolina, when he heard the radio announcement of Roosevelt's death. Later that evening Secretary Forrestal had called him on the phone to say that a plane was being sent for him. He came at once, and when I was told he was in Washington I invited him to the White House. His appointment was for 2:30 p.m. I had known Byrnes well for years, and I wanted to get his firsthand account of what had gone on at Yalta, and all the information he had of the meetings between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. I had heard that he had personally made shorthand notes of all the secret meetings he had attended. I greeted him as an old friend when he entered, and we talked for half an hour about everything he could recall without referring to his notes. Then I asked him to transcribe his notes for me, especially since he had indicated that there were no available stenographic or official transcripts of the Yalta meetings. It was not until some ten days later that I received from him a typed and leather bound transcript of his notes which bore as a title, "The Crimean Conference, Minutes of Meetings, prepared by James F. Byrnes." During our discussion, I had told Byrnes that I was considering asking him to become secretary of state after the San Francisco conference. . . .

The seriousness of what Truman calls the harassing question of Poland was impressed upon him by his foreign policy advisers and reinforced by his reading of the cable traffic among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. The United States and United Kingdom wanted a representative government to be formed in Poland, but the Soviet Union wanted the so-called Lublin government, which was a Soviet creation, to become the permanent government. The United States and United Kingdom had long recognized the Polish government-in-exile, headquartered in London. The Soviet Union had agreed to include representatives of this

government-in-exile and other democratic leaders in the new Polish government, but Truman had come to believe the Soviets did not intend to keep this agreement, nor the agreement that free and fair elections would be held once the new government was formed. Truman conferred by cable with Churchill about what to do about Poland. He sent Churchill a draft text of a statement regarding Poland which, he hoped, would persuade the Soviets that United States and United Kingdom had no intention of imposing on Poland a government that would be unfriendly to them, and which outlined a process which was clear and fair to all parties for forming a new Polish government which would include representatives of the London government-in-exile and other Polish groups.

As the first full day of his presidency approached its close, a weary Truman looked at all the papers piled on his desk.

My desk was piled with papers, and all through the day I had been alternately reading and conferring. I have always been a heavy reader, and it is easy for me to concentrate. Fortunately, too, my memory is retentive, and this helped me greatly as I conferred with advisers and experts or found it necessary to make decisions. Nevertheless, on that first full day as president I did more reading than I ever thought I could. I even selected some papers to take home so that I might study them before retiring and upon waking. This was the first step in a routine of nightly work that I found to be one of the most trying but also one of the necessary duties of a president.

It was now evening, and I was weary. I picked up the papers I had decided to take with me, and as I left my desk I heard a loud buzzing. It was the signal to the Secret Service, who now came through the corridors to escort me home. An automobile was waiting for me at the Executive Avenue entrance—a closed car that was followed by a long, open one which carried the Secret Service men, some of whom rode standing on the running board. Kind and considerate as the Secret Service men were in the performance of their duty, I couldn't help feeling uncomfortable. There was no escaping the fact that my privacy and personal freedom were to be greatly restricted from now on. I even began to realize, as I rode toward my apartment that evening, that our neighbors were beginning to be imposed upon. They were no longer able to come and go as they pleased. To enter their own homes, it was now necessary for them to be properly identified and cleared by the Secret Service men. They were all very nice about it, but Mrs. Truman and I felt that the sooner we could move to an official residence the easier it would be on neighbors and friends, from many of whom we hated to part. Furthermore, it was now necessary for me to be available at all times for messages and

official callers, and such business could not be adequately conducted in . . . [our] apartment house on Connecticut Avenue.

I had told Mrs. Roosevelt that Mrs. Truman and I had no intention of moving into the White House until she had had all the time necessary in which to make other arrangements. In the meantime, Blair House, which stands across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House and which serves as an official guest house for foreign dignitaries visiting Washington, was being made ready for us as our temporary official residence.

April 14

On Saturday morning, April 14, I arose at dawn. . . . The body of Franklin Roosevelt was to arrive that morning from Warm Springs, Georgia, and I was going to the Union Station to meet the funeral train. . . . I got to the White House at 8:30 a.m. . . . When I reached my desk, I found many telegrams and communications already there, and I read as many as I could before 9 a.m., when my first appointment was scheduled.

My first visitor that morning was John W. Snyder of St. Louis. He was one of my closest personal friends, and I already knew that I wanted him in my administration in a trusted capacity. There was an important post vacant—that of Federal Loan Administrator . . . and Snyder was ideally fitted for it. He was an experienced banker who had been executive assistant to Reconstruction Finance Corporation administrator Jesse Jones and the director of the Defense Plants Corporation. “I don’t think you ought to appoint me to that job,” he told me when I had explained what I had in mind. “I’m not sure I am the right man.” “I think you are the right man for the place,” I replied. “I’m sending your name to the Senate.”

Later I telephoned Jesse Jones and said “the president” had appointed Snyder as Federal Loan Administrator. “Did he make that appointment before he died?” asked Jones. No,” I answered. “He made it just now.” Everyone, including myself, still continued to think of Roosevelt as “the president.”

When Snyder left, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau came in for a brief conference. He was with me only a few minutes, and I asked him to submit to me as soon as possible a comprehensive report on the state of the nation’s finances. Secretary of Commerce [Henry Wallace] and . . . [James F.] Byrnes then joined me, and presently the three of us left for the Union Station. . . .

The train bearing the body of Franklin Roosevelt arrived at the Union Station at ten o’clock. I went aboard at once, accompanied by Wallace and

Byrnes, and we paid our respects to Mrs. Roosevelt, who had accompanied the body from Warm Springs. . . . The body of the late president was to lie in state during the day in the East Room of the White House, and as the funeral procession was formed I took the place that had been assigned to me. Slowly we moved through the streets that were massed with mourners all the way to the White House. I shall never forget the sight of so many grief-stricken people. Some wept without restraint. Some shed their tears in silence. Others were grim and stoic, but all were genuine in their mourning. It was impossible now to tell who had been for him and who had not. Throughout that enormous throng all of them were expressing their sense of loss and sadness at the passing of a remarkable man. I saw an old Negro woman with her apron to her eyes as she sat on the curb. She was crying as if she had lost her son, and when the cortege passed along Constitution Avenue, most of those who lined the street were in tears.

The procession reached the White House at eleven o'clock, and the flag draped casket was borne into the East Room. It was placed before a French door, banked high with lilies, roses, and other flowers. Five members of the armed forces stood guard, with an American flag on a standard at one side of the coffin and the blue presidential banner at the other. Chairs were placed before the bier for members of the immediate family, members of the Cabinet, and other state dignitaries. Again I paid my respects to Mrs. Roosevelt, and then . . . [went to the Oval Office].

I had received word that Harry Hopkins had left a sickbed in the Mayo Clinic at Rochester, Minnesota, in order to attend the funeral of his chief and friend. He had already arrived in Washington, and I had sent word that I wanted very much to see him. An appointment had been set for eleven-thirty that morning. Hopkins had been close to Roosevelt throughout his administration. He had performed many confidential tasks and, as the president's personal representative, had carried out a number of secret missions. He was a man whom Roosevelt trusted implicitly and leaned upon heavily. He was a dedicated man who never sought credit or the limelight, yet willingly bore the brunt of criticism, just or unjust. He was a rare figure in Washington officialdom and was one of my old friends. I, too, trusted him implicitly. . . . What I now wanted from . . . [him] was more firsthand information about the heads of state with whom I would have to deal, particularly Stalin. But I also wanted to go over the whole situation with . . . [him] in regard to Russia and Poland and the United Nations.

Harry Hopkins had always looked pale and cadaverous, but when he entered my office this time, he looked worse than ever before. He was ill . . .

and the death of Roosevelt had affected him profoundly. . . . “How do you feel, Harry?” I asked as we shook hands. “Terrible,” he replied, and I knew what he meant. “I hope you don’t mind my calling you in at this time,” I went on, “but I need to know everything you can tell me about our relations with the Soviet Union—all that you know about Stalin and Churchill and the conferences at Cairo, Casablanca, Teheran, and Yalta.” “One reason I’m glad to be here,” he replied, “and am glad to offer all the assistance I can is because I’m confident that you will continue to carry out the policies of Franklin Roosevelt. And I know that you know how to carry them out.”

We talked for over two hours [and] . . . did not even take time out for luncheon. Instead, I ordered a tray for each of us from the White House kitchen, and with our minds on other things we ate a bite or two there at my desk. Hopkins was a storehouse of information and was rarely at a loss for a word or a fact. Furthermore, he was usually able to describe and characterize the many important figures he had met. Certainly, he understood the leaders of the Soviet Union. “Stalin,” he told me, “is a forthright, rough, tough Russian. He is a Russian partisan through and through, thinking always first of Russia. But he can be talked to frankly.” He assured me that he would be glad to do all he could, but as he was about to leave he suddenly asked, “Did you know that I had planned to retire from the government on May 12?” I told him that I knew nothing of his plans to retire and, if his health permitted, I wanted him to stay. He left without giving me any positive reply, but he promised to give the matter serious thought. . . .

After exchanging messages with Winston Churchill about the approaching linkup of American, British and Soviet troops in Germany and some other matters, and dealing with some problems relating to the military command structure in Southeast Asia, Truman returned to the East Room for President Roosevelt’s funeral service. At 10 p.m. or a little later, he, Mrs. Truman, and Margaret Truman boarded a train for the journey to Roosevelt’s home in Hyde Park, New York, where the former president was to be buried.

April 15

The train arrived in Hyde Park at 9:30 a.m., April 15. By noon the service was over and Truman was on his way back to Washington. He spent much of the journey working on his upcoming speech to Congress.

Back in Washington that evening, I felt that an epoch had come to an end. A great president, whose deeds and words had profoundly affected our

times, was gone. Chance had chosen me to carry on his work, and in these three days I had already experienced some of the weight of its unbelievable burdens. As I went to bed that night I prayed I would be equal to the task. . . .

April 16

Truman was able to give a little more time to preparing his message to Congress during the morning of April 16, but other business soon took him away from his speech. Problems regarding Poland came to the fore again, and Truman sent a long message, jointly with Churchill, to Stalin, about the formation in Warsaw of a new government—a “Provisional Government of National Unity.”

By now the morning was gone, and I had had . . . [very little time] to give more thought to the speech I had prepared. I went over it again but made no further changes. I rose from my desk and heard the buzzing signal that called my Secret Service guard. I had not yet grown accustomed to that—was never really to grow accustomed to it, though I ultimately learned to take it in stride. Now, however, my mind was elsewhere. It was shortly after noon and time for me to leave for the Hill, where I was to give my first address to Congress.

The day was clear, and the temperature had moderated somewhat since morning, though the warmth of summer had not yet come to Washington. Tulips were blooming in the White House garden. My car was waiting, and when I entered it I was driven from the White House grounds, with the Secret Service car following behind.

A little more than forty-eight hours before, the streets had been filled with silent mourners as Franklin Roosevelt's body had been slowly carried to the White House. Now the traffic was normal. The route by which I was taken led up Pennsylvania Avenue and around the Capitol to its eastern front. There the car was driven into the narrow passage beneath the broad stairway that leads up to the formal entrance to the Capitol's southern wing. Guards were waiting at the archway before which the car stopped, and I was led inside and directly to the elevator. It, too, was waiting, and in another moment I stepped out on the floor above, where I was met and taken to . . . [Speaker Sam Rayburn's] office. . . . I was greeted by a delegation appointed by Speaker Rayburn and President Pro Tempore McKellar of the Senate, and I conferred for an hour or so with those who were gathered in the room. Then at one o'clock . . . [I was escorted] to the House floor and to the rostrum.

I entered the House chamber at 1:02 p.m. and was greeted by a standing ovation which I knew to be a tribute to the office of the president. Senators, representatives, and justices of the Supreme Court were there before me. Members of the Cabinet, high government officials, and many members of the diplomatic corps had risen to their feet. Those who filled the galleries had also risen. I looked up and caught a glimpse of Mrs. Truman and Margaret. For me it was a very stirring moment. I was so affected that I completely forgot an important bit of protocol.

"Mr. Speaker," I began. Rayburn, who was with Senator McKellar on the rostrum just behind me, interrupted me at once. "Just a minute, Harry," he whispered as he leaned toward me. "Let me introduce you." He spoke softly, but the microphones that stood before me had been turned on, and he was heard all over the chamber and all over the country over the radio networks. Then he straightened up: "The president of the United States," he said in his full voice. I had now been introduced, and so I went ahead.

I pledged myself to carry out the war and peace policies of Franklin Roosevelt, and I made it clear that I would work for the peace and security of the world. I asked for public support for a strong and lasting United Nations organization. I called upon all Americans to help me keep our nation united in defense of those ideals which had been so eloquently proclaimed by Roosevelt. I reaffirmed our demand for unconditional surrender and expressed my full confidence in the grand strategy of the United States and our allies. I expressed, as well, my confidence in the ability of Admirals Leahy, King, and Nimitz, and Generals Marshall, Arnold, Eisenhower, and MacArthur to carry out the tasks assigned to them, and left no doubt that this direction would remain unchanged and unhampered.

There were many indications of approval of what I said. I was applauded frequently, and when I reaffirmed the policy of unconditional surrender the chamber rose to its feet. "At this moment," I concluded, "I have in my heart a prayer. As I have assumed my heavy duties, I humbly pray to Almighty God in the words of King Solomon, 'Give therefore Thy servant an understanding heart to judge Thy people, that I may discern between good and bad: for who is able to judge this Thy so great a people?' I ask only to be a good and faithful servant of my Lord and my people."

I returned to the White House and . . . I tackled another batch of accumulated work. Also, I was advised that Blair House had been readied for us and that we could move in that evening. Mrs. Truman, her mother, Mrs. David W. Wallace, and Margaret were already moving out of the Connecticut Avenue apartment. Since Blair House is . . . diagonally across Pennsylvania

Avenue from the White House, I decided I would go and come on foot. . . . It was a little after five when, flanked by Secret Service men, I started for our new home. I had given no thought to the problem of getting there and was somewhat surprised when, as we reached the corner of Pennsylvania Avenue . . . , the traffic lights turned red in all directions. They remained red, too, until I had reached the front entrance to Blair House. . . . I had no knowledge at first that the lights had changed because of a request of the Secret Service. But when I did find out, I asked that the normal traffic signals be restored, for I felt that I could wait and observe the traffic regulations along with the other pedestrians. However, this didn't work well either, for the Secret Service began to worry about the crowds that waited to watch me go by. To allay the anxiety of the security people I eventually had to arrange to make four trips daily from the rear of the White House all the way around to the rear of Blair House and back. It became monotonous, and I didn't like it, but there was little else that I could do.

It was that evening, I remember, that I wrote my mother and my sister my first letter to them as president.

Dear Mamma & Mary:

Well, I have had the most momentous, and the most trying time anyone could possibly have, since Thursday, April 12th.

Maybe you'd like to know just what happened. We'd had a long, drawn out debate in the Senate and finally came to an agreement for a recess at 5 p.m. until Friday, Apr. 13th.

When I went back to my office, a call from Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House, was awaiting me. Sam wanted me to come over to the House side of the Capitol and talk to him about policy and procedure and, as Alice in Wonderland would say, "shoes and ships and sealing wax and things." . . .

But—as soon as I came into the room Sam told me that Steve Early, the president's confidential press secretary wanted to talk to me. I called the White House, and Steve told me to come to the White House "as quickly and as quietly" as I could. Well I told Sam I had to go to the White House on a special call and that he should say nothing about it.

I ran all the way to my office in the Senate by way of the unfrequented corridors in the Capitol, told my office force that I'd been summoned to the White House and to say nothing about it. . . .

I arrived at the Pennsylvania [Avenue] entrance to the most famous house in America, a couple of ushers met me . . . and then took me up to Mrs. Roosevelt's study on the second floor. . . .

Mrs. Roosevelt put her arm on my shoulder and said, "Harry, the president is dead."

It was the only time in my life, I think, that I ever felt as if I'd had a real shock. I had hurried to the White House to see the president, and when I arrived, I found I was the president. No one in the history of our country ever had it happen to him just that way.

. . . We waited for Bess and Margaret to arrive. We then had to scurry around and find a Bible for me to put my hand upon to take the oath. They finally found one. If I'd known what was afoot, I'd have used Grandpa Truman's Bible, which was in my office bookcase. . . .

This afternoon we moved to [Blair House] . . . until the Roosevelts have had time to move out of the White House. We tried staying at the apartment, but it wouldn't work. I can't move without at least ten Secret Service men and twenty policemen. People who lived in our apartment couldn't get in and out without a pass. So—we moved out with suitcases. Our furniture is still there and will be for some time. . . . But I've paid the rent for this month and will pay for another month if they don't get the old White House redecorated by that time.

My greatest trial was today when I addressed the Congress. It seemed to go over all right, from the ovation I received. Things have gone so well that I'm almost as scared as I was Thursday when Mrs. R. told me what had happened. Maybe it will come out all right.

Soon as we get settled in the White House you'll both be here to visit us. Lots of love from your very much worried son and brother.

Harry

I wrote Mamma often, and regularly each weekend would telephone her and sister Mary, who lived with her. I was deeply devoted to her, and we were very close. She was a wonderful mother. At ninety-two she was still keen and alert and saw things in their true perspective, even at a time like this. When asked by a press representative at her home in Grandview, Missouri, to comment on how she felt about her son being president, she said, "I can't really be glad he is president, because I'm sorry that President Roosevelt is dead. If he had been voted in, I'd be out waving a flag, but it doesn't seem right to be very happy or wave a flag now."

We were settled in Blair House now, at least for a time. . . . We took up residence there with some trepidation. This had nothing to do with politics. I suppose that the demands of protocol and the many things that had to do with officialdom made us uneasy about our prospects for a reasonable family life. Mrs. Truman had been happy as the wife of a senator and had fallen in love with Washington. She had many friends among congressional wives and others in official and private life. She knew, however, that these relationships would probably change now that she was the First Lady of the Land. She was entirely conscious of the importance and dignity of White House

life. She was not especially interested, however, in the formalities and pomp or the artificiality which, as we had learned from our years in Washington, inevitably surround the family of a president. In this connection, we had our daughter Margaret to think of, a schoolgirl who wanted and needed friends. Would she now be isolated from all the normal relationships that are so important in the lives of youngsters? . . .

April 17

On Monday morning, April 17, Truman met with the American delegation to the United Nations conference in San Francisco, and then he signed a bill extending Lend-Lease for another year. Then, at 10:30 a.m., he held his first press conference.

It is often helpful for a president to judge, from questions put to him by the reporters, what is going on in the minds of the people. Good reporters are always in close touch with developments and with what the people want to know. I have always made a sharp distinction between the working reporter and the editor or publisher. I always got along well with the reporters. They try to do an honest job of reporting the facts. But many of their bosses—the editors and publishers—have their own special interests, and the news is often slanted to serve those interests, which unfortunately are not always for the benefit of the public as a whole.

Important as I knew the White House press conferences to be, I felt compelled to announce that I would cut them to one a week. . . . I needed time to keep up with the mounting developments on the home front and elsewhere in the world. I decided also to continue the practice established by my predecessor of barring direct quotation of my replies and comments while permitting indirect quotation. The idea of a press conference is to find out what the president thinks about pending matters, but it must be obvious that he should not be quoted directly on every question. That could often change an answer from an expression of opinion to a final commitment. . . . In order to avoid commitment on matters still pending, the president would be reluctant to answer or even to suggest a clue that might reveal his line of thought. . . .

Truman began the press conference by reading the rules which he expected the members of the White House press corps to follow. He emphasized that these rules were the same as President Roosevelt's. "Off the record" meant that what the

president said was confidential and not to be made public. "Background" information could be made public but could not be attributed to the president. "News" information could be used and attributed to the president but not quoted. Statements made by the president could not be quoted without his permission. One of the things Truman told the press was that Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov would stop in Washington later in the month to meet with him prior to going to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco.

Later in the day, Truman went to a very important room in the White House, one he would visit many times in the next several months.

A few hours after my first press conference was held, I went for the first time to the super-secret Map Room in the White House. Very few of the White House staff had access to this carefully guarded room, and very little was ever said about it. I had first learned that it existed after I became vice president, when President Roosevelt [told me if I had an urgent message for him to send it through the Map Room]. . . .

The Map Room was planned by President Roosevelt and was located on the ground floor of the White House. . . . Every morning Roosevelt would come down in the elevator from his living quarters and go to this closely guarded room. It was lined with a map of the world and maps on larger scales of Europe and Asia on which were outlined the locations of all major military forces in the world. Detailed maps showed the battle lines everywhere, and from the center of the room it was possible to see at a glance the whole military situation. It was an immensely important intelligence center. There had been nothing like it in World War I. . . . Changes in the battle situation were immediately marked on the Map Room maps as messages came in from commanders in the field. Messages came constantly throughout the day and night, so that our military picture was always accurate up to the moment. I frequently met our top military leaders in this room and went over in detail the situation on each front. So accurate and complete was the information that was gathered together here that the Map Room became the very heart of all the military information necessary to conduct this global war. It played an important part in coordinating the decisions of the Allied forces. And certainly it helped me quickly to visualize the world situation and to grasp the basic military strategy. By a special communications system and by means of special devices set up in this room Churchill and I were able to telephone each other in complete security. . . .

I felt as if I had lived five lifetimes in my first five days as president. I was beginning to realize how little the Founding Fathers had been able to

anticipate the preparations necessary for a man to become president so suddenly. It is a mighty leap from the vice presidency to the presidency when one is forced to make it without warning. . . . It takes some time for a man to adjust himself to such an overwhelming responsibility. In my own case, it was not until nearly five months later, when I delivered my first policy message to Congress on September 6—a message in which I outlined a 21-point program for postwar recovery and readjustment—that I realized to what extent I had assumed the full responsibility of the presidency in my own right. . . .

April 18

On April 18, Truman met with the director of the Bureau of the Budget, Harold Smith. He regarded this and future meetings with his budget chief to be especially important, because, as Truman wrote, I fully intended to plunge deeply into the business of government, and the budget meetings . . . would provide a good opportunity.

The day included a meeting about a United Nations trusteeship system for certain territories, the receipt of messages from the secretary of state and the American ambassador to China about difficulties posed by the problematic condition of China, and the receipt of another message, from Winston Churchill, about the withdrawal—in Churchill's mind a reluctant withdrawal—of American and British troops from advanced positions into occupation zones which had been agreed with the Soviet Union. Churchill was also worried about the difficulty of feeding the people in the American and British zones.

Another full day was coming to a close, and I gathered together the papers I needed to take with me [for my nighttime reading]. The signal to the Secret Service guards sounded as I left the office, and with them following along I once more walked to Blair House. This time, however, the regular traffic signals operated undisturbed, and I waited my turn to cross.

I worked that evening, as usual, but before I went to bed I wrote another letter to my mother and sister.

Dear Mama & Mary,

. . . I have had a most strenuous time for the last six days. I was sworn in at 7:09 p.m. Eastern War Time Apr. 12, and it is now 9 p.m. April 18th. Six days as President of the United States! It is hardly believable.

Before I was sworn in, I had to make two decisions of world-wide import—to carry on the war and to let the Peace Conference go ahead at San Francisco.

Saturday and Sunday were spent on the last rites for the departed President. Monday, the Congress had to be told what I would do. It took all Sunday afternoon, half the night and until 11 a.m. Monday to get the job done on the speech. But I guess there was inspiration in it for it took Congress and the country by storm, apparently. Spent Monday afternoon seeing people and making all sorts of decisions, every one of which would touch millions of people. Tuesday morning all the reporters in town and a lot more came to cross question me. They gave me a pretty hefty fifteen minutes, but even that ordeal seemed to click.

Had to spend all afternoon and evening preparing a five minute speech for the radio for the fighting men and women. It was after one o'clock when I turned in. This day has been a dinger too. I'm about to go to bed, but I thought I'd better write you a note. Hope you are both well.

Lots of love,

Harry

April 19

My appointment calendar for Thursday, April 19, was crowded. Senator [Robert A.] Taft [of Ohio] was my first visitor. He called for a personal chat during which he renewed his pledge of co-operation. Then followed a number of unofficial visitors whom a president has to see because part of his duties is to receive citizens, leaders and spokesmen of representative organizations. These visits are valuable to the president, for they help him keep in touch with the cross section of American interests and opinion. I like people. I like to see them and hear what they have to say. But seeing people takes time and effort. It is more than a mere ceremonial duty, and although it is a heavy burden on the president, he cannot share it with anyone, for in the White House he is the only directly elected representative of all the people.

On this particular morning, when these visits had been completed, I met with the Big Four for the first time in my new capacity. Senator McKellar, as president pro tempore of the Senate, occupied the place in this group that had formerly, [when I was vice president], been mine, but otherwise its members remained the same and included Senate majority leader [Alben] Barkley, Speaker Sam Rayburn, and House majority leader John W. McCormack. . . .

Among Truman's meetings this morning were those with Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, about the rapidly changing European front, and with several representatives of foreign governments—the Turkish ambassador, the foreign ministers of France and China, and the president of the Philippines.

April 20

On the morning of April 20, I found that I was faced with what I was told was the longest list of scheduled callers in the memory of any member of the executive office staff. As yet the Secret Service had not succeeded in convincing me that I should permit myself to be driven in one of the big White House cars from Blair House to the executive offices, and, with my usual Secret Service guards, I had walked across the street that morning. I had made only a little dent in the work that faced me when the time for my first appointment arrived. . . .

This meeting was with Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, who had with him three of the Marines who had raised the American flag on Mount Suribachi on Iwo Jima. The photograph of this flag raising is one of the most famous in American history. Morgenthau presented to Truman a painting based on the photograph which the Treasury Department was using as a poster in a war bond campaign.

Among Truman's other meetings this day, two stand out. In one, Truman began his involvement with one of the most intricate international problems he would face during his presidency.

Shortly before noon, Dr. Stephen S. Wise, chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council, came in to talk to me about the Jewish victims of Nazi persecution and the serious problem of the resettlement, of the refugees, which led naturally to a discussion of a proposed Jewish state and homeland in Palestine. I had before me President Roosevelt's records and statements regarding Palestine. And the secretary of state had sent me a special communication two days before, expressing the attitude and the thinking of the State Department on Palestine.

[This communication read as follows:]

It is very likely . . . that efforts will be made by some of the Zionist leaders to obtain from you at an early date some commitments in favor of the Zionist program which is pressing for unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment there of a Jewish state. As you are aware, the Government and people of the United States have every sympathy for the persecuted Jews of Europe and are doing all in their power to relieve their suffering. The question of Palestine is, however, a highly complex one and involves questions which go far beyond the plight of the Jews in Europe. There is continual tenseness in the situation in the Near East . . . largely as a

result of the Palestine question, and as we have interests in that area which are vital to the United States, we feel that this whole subject is one that should be handled with the greatest care and with a view to the long-range interests of the country.

Since I was in agreement with the expressed policy of the Roosevelt administration on Palestine, I told Rabbi Wise that I would do everything possible to carry out that policy. I had carefully read the Balfour Declaration, in which Great Britain was committed to a homeland in Palestine for the Jews. I had familiarized myself with the history of the question of a Jewish homeland and the position of the British and the Arabs. I was skeptical, as I read over the whole record up to date, about some of the views and attitudes assumed by the "striped-pants boys" in the State Department. It seemed to me that they didn't care enough about what happened to the thousands of displaced persons who were involved. It was my feeling that it would be possible for us to watch out for the long-range interests of our country while at the same time helping these unfortunate victims of persecution to find a home. And before Rabbi Wise left, I believe I made this clear to him. . . .

Truman met next with Averell Harriman, the ambassador to the Soviet Union, together with the secretary of state and others from the State Department. Harriman told Truman that the Soviet Union, though it intended to cooperate with the United States and United Kingdom, also intended to control the countries on its European border. He thought that the Soviet attitude toward its wartime allies had deteriorated since the Yalta agreements had been reached. He called the spread of Soviet influence a "barbarian invasion of Europe." He encouraged Truman to abandon illusions about the Soviet Union fully sharing the principles which the United States and many other nations believed should shape the postwar world. He warned that the United States should decide what it would do if Stalin rejected Truman's and Churchill's proposals regarding the formation of a new government in Poland. Truman worried that if Stalin did this—if he refused to hold to the agreements regarding Poland made at Yalta—the Senate would not affirm United States adherence to the United Nations Charter. He was also convinced that if negotiations regarding Poland failed and the Soviet Union dropped out of the United Nations, there would be no United Nations. Truman ended the meeting by assuring Harriman and the others that he would be firm in his dealings with the Soviet Union.

April 21

When Truman went to the Map Room on Saturday morning, April 21, he learned that German resistance was collapsing. The end of the war in Europe was not far distant. He met with Secretary of State Stettinius and discussed his upcoming meetings with Soviet foreign minister Molotov, who was going to stop in Washington on his way to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. He would meet with Truman first on Sunday evening and then on Monday afternoon. To prepare for these meetings, Truman met with his foreign policy advisers, joined by British foreign minister Anthony Eden, to discuss when and how to raise the Polish issue with Molotov.

April 22

When Truman greeted Molotov Sunday at 8:30 p.m., both men emphasized the importance of continuing the good relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union which had developed during the war. When Molotov mentioned the agreements made at Yalta, Truman decided to bring up the Polish difficulty. The two men sparred gently about Poland, with Molotov saying that agreement could easily be reached if the importance which the Soviet Union gave the Polish question was given full consideration. Poland, after all, was far from the United States but bordered the Soviet Union.

April 23

The next afternoon, April 23, Truman met with his chief foreign and military policy advisers to prepare for a second meeting with Molotov later in the day. Most of the discussion was about Poland. The Soviet Union was apparently determined that Poland should have a puppet government, despite agreements made with the United States and United Kingdom at the Yalta Conference. Two of Truman's advisers expressed concern that the Soviet Union would also impose puppet governments on other Eastern European countries. Two other advisers thought the United States might be faced with a break with the Soviet Union. Truman wanted to avoid this. He said he would, in his meeting with Molotov, state the American position with respect to Poland clearly, but would not deliver an ultimatum.

Molotov was shown into the Oval Office at 5:30 p.m.

When Molotov arrived, Secretary [of State] Stettinius, Ambassador Harriman . . . [State Department official and Russian interpreter Charles]

Bohlen, and [Chief of Staff] Admiral [William D.] Leahy were with me in my office. Molotov was accompanied by Ambassador [Andre] Gromyko and interpreter [V. N.] Pavlov. Unlike the evening before, there was little protocol, and after greeting the Russian foreign minister and his associates, I went straight to the point. I was sorry to learn, I said, that no progress had been made solving the Polish problem. Mr. Molotov responded that he also regretted that fact. I told him that the proposals which were contained in the joint message from Churchill and me and which had been transmitted to Moscow on April 16 were eminently fair and reasonable. We had gone as far as we could to meet the proposals of the Soviet government as expressed in the message from Marshal Stalin on April 7. The United States Government, I pointed out, could not agree to be a party to the formation of a Polish government which was not representative of all Polish democratic elements. I said bluntly that I was deeply disappointed that the Soviet government had not held consultations with representatives of the Polish government other than the officials of the Warsaw regime. I told Molotov that the United States was determined, together with other members of the United Nations, to go ahead with plans for the world organization, no matter what difficulties or differences might arise with regard to other matters. I pointed out that the failure of the three principal allies who had borne the brunt of the war to carry out the Crimea [Yalta] decision with regard to Poland would cast serious doubt upon their unity of purpose in postwar collaboration. . . .

Molotov asked if he could make a few observations. It was his hope, he said, that he expressed the views of the Soviet government in stating that they wished to cooperate with the United States and Great Britain as before. I answered that I agreed, otherwise there would be no sense in the talk we then were having. Molotov went on to say that he had been authorized to set forth the following point of view of the Soviet government: (1) The basis of collaboration had been established, and although inevitable difficulties had arisen, the three governments had been able to find a common language and that on this basis they had been settling these differences. (2) The three governments had dealt as equal parties, and there had been no case where one or two of the three had attempted to impose their will on another and that as a basis of cooperation this was the only one acceptable to the Soviet government.

I told him that all we were asking was that the Soviet government carry out the Crimea decision on Poland. Mr. Molotov answered that as an advocate of the Crimea decisions his government stood by them and that it was a matter of honor for them. His government felt that the good basis which existed was the result of former work and that it offered even brighter

prospects for the future. The Soviet government, he added, was convinced that all difficulties could be overcome.

I replied sharply that an agreement had been reached on Poland and that there was only one thing to do, and that was for Marshal Stalin to carry out that agreement in accordance with his word.

Molotov said that Marshal Stalin, in his message of April 7, had given his views on the agreement, and added that he personally could not understand why, if the three governments could reach an agreement on the question of the composition of the Yugoslav government [which had few non-communist members], the same formula could not be applied in the case of Poland.

Replying sharply again, I said that an agreement had been reached on Poland and that it only required to be carried out by the Soviet government.

Mr. Molotov repeated that his government supported the Crimea decisions but that he could not agree that an abrogation of those decisions by others could be considered a violation by the Soviet government. He added that surely the Polish question, involving as it did a neighboring country, was of very great interest to the Soviet government.

Since Molotov insisted on avoiding the main issue, I said what I had said before—that the United States government was prepared to carry out loyally all the agreements reached at Yalta and asked only that the Soviet government do the same. I expressed once more the desire of the United States for friendship with Russia, but I wanted it clearly understood that this could be only on a basis of the mutual observation of agreements and not on the basis of a one-way street.

"I have never been talked to like that in my life," Molotov said.

I told him, "Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like that." . . .

April 24

The next day, April 24, Truman received a message from Stalin.

One of the most revealing and disquieting messages to reach me during my first days in the White House was one that arrived from Marshal Stalin on the night of April 24. It showed plainly that Churchill and I were going to have persistent, calculated resistance from Stalin in our dealings with the Russians.

This was the message from Stalin:

I have received your joint message with Prime Minister Churchill of April 18, and have also received on April 24 the message transmitted to me through V. M. Molotov.

1. From these messages it is clear that you continue to consider the Provisional Polish Government not as a kernel for the future government of national unity, but just like one of the groups equal to any other group of Poles.

Such an understanding of the position of the Polish government and such an attitude toward it is very difficult to reconcile with the decisions of the Crimea [Yalta] Conference on Poland. At the Crimea Conference all three of us, including also President Roosevelt, proceeded from the fact that the Provisional Polish Government, as the one now operating in Poland and enjoying the confidence and support of the majority of the Polish people, should be the kernel, i.e., the main part of the new reorganized government of national unity. You, evidently, do not agree to such an understanding of the matter. Declining the Yugoslav example as a pattern for Poland, you thereby confirm the Provisional Polish Government cannot be considered as a basis and kernel for the future government of national unity.

2. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that Poland borders on the Soviet Union which cannot be said of Great Britain and the United States.

The question on Poland has the same meaning for the security of the Soviet Union as the question on Belgium and Greece for the security of Great Britain.

You, apparently, do not agree that the Soviet Union has a right to make efforts that there should exist in Poland a government friendly toward the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet government cannot agree to [the] existence in Poland of a government hostile toward it. Besides everything else, this is demanded by the blood of the Soviet people abundantly shed on the fields of Poland in the name of liberation of Poland. I do not know whether there has been established in Greece a really representative government, and whether the government in Belgium is really democratic. The Soviet Union was not consulted when these governments were being established there. The Soviet Government did not lay claim to interference in these affairs as it understands the whole importance of Belgium and Greece for the security of Great Britain.

It is not clear why, while the question of Poland is discussed it is not wanted to take into consideration the interests of the Soviet Union from the point of view of its security.

3. Such conditions must be recognized [as] unusual when two governments—those of the United States and Great Britain—beforehand settle with the Polish question in which the Soviet Union is first of all and most of all interested and put the government of the USSR in an unbearable position trying to dictate to it their demands.

I have to state that such a situation cannot favor a harmonious solution of the question of Poland.

4. I am ready to fulfill your request and do everything possible to reach a harmonious solution. But you demand too much of me. In other words, you

demand that I renounce the interests of [the] security of the Soviet Union, but I cannot turn against my country.

In my opinion there is one way out of this situation; to adopt the Yugoslav example as a pattern for Poland. I believe this would allow [us] to come to a harmonious solution.

Without any attempt to hide his role in diplomatic niceties, Stalin for the first time in addressing Churchill and me used the "Big I Am." . . .

That same day, Truman received a letter from Secretary of War Henry Stimson. It read as follows:

Dear Mr. President,

I think it is very important that I should have a talk with you as soon as possible on a highly secret matter. I mentioned it to you shortly after you took office but have not urged it since on account of the pressure you have been under. It, however, has such a bearing on our present foreign relations and has such an important effect upon all my thinking in this field that I think you ought to know about it without much further delay.

I knew he was referring to our secret atomic project, and I instructed Matt Connelly, my appointment secretary, to arrange for [Stimson] to come in the next day, Wednesday, April 25. . . .

April 25

Truman met with Stimson at noon.

Stimson was one of the very few men responsible for the setting up of the atomic bomb project. He had taken a keen and active interest in every stage of its development. He said he wanted specifically to talk to me today about the effect the atomic bomb might likely have on our future foreign relations. He explained that he thought it necessary for him to share his thoughts with me about the revolutionary changes in warfare that might result from the atomic bomb and the possible effects of such a weapon on our civilization. I listened with absorbed interest, for Stimson was a man of great wisdom and foresight. He went into considerable detail in describing the nature and the power of the projected weapon. If expectations were to be realized, he told me, the atomic bomb would be certain to have a decisive influence on our relations with other countries. And if it worked, the bomb, in all probability, would shorten the war.

[James F.] Byrnes had already told me that the weapon might be so powerful as to be potentially capable of wiping out entire cities and killing people on an unprecedented scale. And he had added that in his belief the bomb might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war. Stimson, on the other hand, seemed at least as much concerned with the role of the atomic bomb in the shaping of history as in its capacity to shorten this war. As yet, of course, no one could positively know that the gigantic effort that was being made would be successful. Nevertheless, the secretary [of war] appeared confident of the outcome and told me that in all probability success would be attained within the next few months. He also suggested that I designate a committee to study and advise me of the implications of this new force.

I thanked him for his enlightening presentation of this awesome subject, and as I saw him to the door I felt how fortunate the country was to have so able and so wise a man in its service. . . .

If Truman's meeting with Stimson gave him hope that the war against Japan might be ended sooner than expected, he was reminded later in the day that the war against Germany was fast drawing to a close. After lunch, he received a telephone call from Winston Churchill about an offer from German Gestapo chief Heinrich Himmler, received through the Swedish government, to surrender German forces on the Western Front. Truman and Churchill agreed that the German surrender, when it came, must be to the three major Allied powers—the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union—and must include all German forces, and it must be unconditional. Churchill had minutes before sent a telegram to Stalin notifying him of Himmler's offer and the British position that the German surrender must be unconditional and made simultaneously on all fronts to the three major allied powers. Truman sent a similar telegram to Stalin immediately following his conversation with Churchill.

Late in the evening, Truman spoke by radio broadcast to the delegates gathered in San Francisco for the opening of the United Nations Conference. "You members of the conference are to be the architects of a better world," he said.

April 26

The next morning, April 26, Truman had a long meeting with Bureau of the Budget director Harold Smith. The ending of the war presented the government with immense problems of organization—the termination or consolidation of wartime agencies and programs—and with all the problems associated with a transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy. Truman and Smith also talked

about the reorganization of the government's intelligence services. Truman recognized the importance of intelligence, but there was something about intelligence operations that worried him. As he told Smith, "one thing was certain—this country wanted no Gestapo under any guise or for any reason."

Truman also met during the morning with a group of Pennsylvania politicians. During the course of the conversation, the mayor of Philadelphia assured Truman of his support in the 1948 election. Truman was slightly startled when he heard this. He didn't say anything at the time, but he confided to his memoirs the reason for his strong reaction to the mayor's statement. "In the position I occupied a day seemed like an eternity."

April 27

On April 27, Truman received an important cable.

It was the next day that I received the following cable from Marshal Stalin:

I have received your message of April 26. Thank you for your information of the intention of Himmler to capitulate on the Western Front. I consider your proposed reply to Himmler along the lines of unconditional surrender on all fronts, including the Soviet front, absolutely correct. I ask you to act in the spirit of your proposal, and we Russians pledge to continue our attacks against the Germans.

For your information I wish you to know that I have given a similar reply to Premier Churchill, who communicated with me on the same question.

I replied immediately.

I have today sent the following message to Minister Johnson, Stockholm:
QUOTE. Replying to your message of April 25, 3 A.M., inform Himmler's agent that the only acceptable terms of surrender by Germany are unconditional surrender on all fronts to the Soviet Government, Great Britain and the United States.

If the above stated terms of surrender are accepted the German forces should surrender on all fronts at once to the local commanders in the field.

In all theaters where resistance continues the attack of the Allies upon them will be vigorously prosecuted until complete victory is attained [sic; achieved]. UNQUOTE. . . .

Truman also received this day important news about the war in Europe.

News was flashed to me that the expected linking up of American, British, and Russian military forces had just taken place in Germany. Anglo-American forces under the command of General Courtney Hodges had finally met Marshal Ivan S. Konev's First Ukrainian Army on the Elbe River. Germany was cut in two. Events were now moving swiftly, and I issued my long-prepared statement on behalf of the United States simultaneously with the release of statements by Churchill and Stalin. . . .

Among the documents Truman took away from the office this day for his night-time reading was a State Department memorandum regarding China. This document reminded him that Asia, as well as Europe, would present many problems after the war ended. The United States wanted a strong and united China to emerge from the war and to be a stabilizing force in East Asia. But China had entered the war against Japan in a condition of civil war, and it might relapse into civil war once Japan had been defeated. On one side was the recognized government of China headed by the Nationalist Chiang Kai-shek; on the other side were the Communist Party forces headed by Mao Tse-tung. The U.S. policy was to avoid taking sides while at the same time recognizing that Chiang Kai-shek's government offered the best hope for a unified China. Despite this, the State Department felt that the U.S. should restrict military aid to Chiang until it was persuaded his government had the support of the Chinese people and could unify the country. Truman noted that this memorandum "expressed to a large degree my preliminary thinking about China."

April 28

The next day, April 28, Truman had to straighten out some confusion regarding a report of impending German surrender.

For the past two days, there had been rumors that Germany had surrendered unconditionally—rumors that were based largely on Himmler's eleventh-hour communication with Sweden attempting to avoid a surrender to the Russians by offering to give up to the Western Allies. We paid no attention to these rumors, but they gained momentum as a result of a statement by Senator [Tom] Connally, a member of our delegation at San Francisco. Senator Connally told the Associated Press that the United States was momentarily expecting Germany's unconditional surrender. Secretary of State Stettinius telephoned me asking for confirmation. I instructed Admiral Leahy to check by telephoning General Eisenhower, who informed

Leahy that there was no foundation for the report. Shortly after 9:30 that evening I called the White House correspondents into my office and informed them that I had just checked with Supreme Headquarters in Europe and that there was no truth to the report of unconditional surrender.

April 29

I was up before six on the morning of Sunday, April 29, and before breakfast I wrote Mama and Mary. It had been more than a week since my last letter, but I had found a little spare time now.

Dear Mamma & Mary:—

. . . It is [a] terrible—and I mean terrible—nuisance to be kin to the President of the United States. Reporters have been haunting every relative and purported relative I ever heard of, and they've probably made life miserable for my mother, brother and sister. I am sorry for it, but it can't be helped.

A guard has to go with Bess and Margaret everywhere they go—and they don't like it. They both spend a lot of time figuring how to beat the game, but it just can't be done. In a country as big as this one there are necessarily a lot of nuts and people with peculiar ideas. They seem to focus on the White House and the President's kin. Hope you won't get too badly upset about it.

Between the papers and the nuts they surely made life miserable for the Roosevelt family. Maybe they can have some peace now. I hope so.

I must caution both of you to take good care of your health. Don't let the pests get you down. . . .

Love to you both.

Harry

Several dispatches were delivered to me at Blair House that morning. One of them was a long cable from prime minister Churchill transmitting his message of the same day to Stalin on the subject of Poland. We were making very little headway with Stalin over the explosive Polish question. Stalin's cable to me of a few days before had left me greatly concerned, and though in my meetings with Molotov I had urged him to try to work out a solution with the British and American delegations at San Francisco, Stalin's response, which had been sent to Churchill as well as to me, had dimmed any hope of an early solution. Churchill was now addressing a fervent personal appeal to Stalin.

His message to Stalin, which lay before me, expressed distress at the misunderstanding that had grown over the Crimea agreement about Poland. Churchill said he had certainly gone to Yalta with the hope that both the

London and Lublin Polish governments would be swept away and that a new government would be formed from Poles of good will, among whom the members of . . . [the Lublin] government would be prominent. But Stalin had not liked this plan, Churchill reminded him, and the British and the Americans had agreed that there would be no sweeping away of the . . . [Lublin] government and that instead it should become a “new” government, reorganized on a broader democratic basis, with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. Churchill pointed out that the Yugoslav example which the Russians now insisted should be followed in Poland was not satisfactory. [Josip Broz] Tito [the communist leader and head of the provisional government in Yugoslavia], he said, had become a complete dictator and had proclaimed his first loyalty was to Soviet Russia, and the concessions made in Belgrade to the members of the government-in-exile were to the extent of six only, against twenty-five of Tito’s own nominees.

Churchill declared that the pledge given for a sovereign free and independent Poland, with a government adequately representing all the democratic elements among Poles, was a matter of honor and duty for us. “After all,” he went on, “we have joined with you, largely on my original initiative, early in 1944, in proclaiming the Polish-Russian frontier which you desired, namely, the Curzon Line, including Lwow [Lviv] for Russia. We think you ought to meet us with regard to the other half of the policy which you equally with us have proclaimed, namely, the sovereignty, independence, and freedom of Poland, provided it is a Poland friendly to Russia.”

Churchill climaxed this appeal to Stalin by painting a picture of what the world might be like if divided into two camps. “There is not much comfort in looking into a future where you and the countries you dominate, plus the Communist Parties in many other states, are all drawn up on one side, and those who rally to the English-speaking nations and their associates or dominions are on the other,” he said. “It is quite obvious that their quarrel would tear the world to pieces and that all of us leading men on either side who had anything to do with that would be shamed before history. Even embarking on a long period of suspicions, of abuse and counter-abuse, and of opposing policies would be a disaster hampering the great developments of world prosperity for the masses which are attainable only by our trinity. I hope there is no word or phrase in this outpouring of my heart to you which unwittingly gives offence. If so, let me know. But do not, I beg you, my friend Stalin, underrate the divergencies which are opening about matters which you may think are small to us but which are symbolic of the way the English-speaking democracies look at life.”

I heartily backed Churchill's plea to establish a free Poland and prevent a divided world. But I was afraid it would do little to change Stalin's attitude.

April 30

The following morning a message from our delegation in San Francisco reported that discussions on Poland had reached an impasse. . . .

Truman met briefly with White House counsel Samuel I. Rosenman on the morning of April 30. He asked him to be his personal representative in negotiations with the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union regarding the manner in which war criminals were to be tried. He gave him a letter in which he opposed the stated policy of the British government to dispose politically of the top-ranking Nazis and Fascists—without any trial. United States policy, he wrote to Rosenman, was that those guilty of the atrocities which have shocked the world since 1933 down to date must be brought to speedy justice and swift punishment—but their guilt must be found judicially under rules of procedure adopted by the four great powers which will admit of no delay or evasion of any kind.

Truman decided to send personal emissaries to Churchill and Stalin—Joseph E. Davies, the former ambassador to the Soviet Union, to Churchill, and President Roosevelt's close adviser Harry Hopkins to Stalin. Truman explained: I wanted personal, on-the-spot reports from men with judgment and experience, for it was necessary for me to know more than I was able to get from messages and cables or even from telephone conversations. He met with Davies immediately after Rosenman left his office, and Davies agreed to go to London. Hopkins accepted his assignment to Moscow during a meeting with Truman on May 4.

This was the last day of April 1945. Only 18 days had passed since I had become president. It is astonishing how much had happened and was crowded into those few days. I felt as if I had lived through several lifetimes. Among the many burdensome duties and responsibilities of a president, I soon experienced the constant pressure and necessity of making immediate decisions.

Year of Decisions, 1–111

The paragraphs beginning "Dear Mr. President" and "I knew he" have been moved down fifteen paragraphs from their position in the original text.

The United Nations Conference

April–June 1945

First act as president—avoiding Woodrow Wilson's experience—time and patience—changes in the agreement reached at Dumbarton Oaks—keeping the Soviets “in a negotiating mood”—the persistently troublesome question of Poland—attack on the veto power in the Security Council—Truman instructs Stettinius—the deadlock over the veto is broken—agreement on the right of free discussion in the General Assembly—“If we should falter in the future to use . . . [the United Nations Charter], millions now living will surely die”

My first act as president of the United States had been to reaffirm the American desire for a world organization to keep the peace. Within a few minutes of my taking the oath of office I announced that the United States would take part in the San Francisco conference [United Nations Conference on International Organization] with no delay in the schedule or change in the arrangements. I wanted to make it clear that I attached the greatest importance to the establishment of international machinery for the prevention of war and the maintenance of peace. I knew many of the pitfalls and stumbling blocks we could encounter in setting up such an organization, but I also knew that in a world without such machinery we would be forever doomed to the fear of destruction. It was important for us to make a start, no matter how imperfect. . . .

I had hoped that someday we could build an international organization that would eventually work on the same basis as the union of the United States. I had made a study of the “Grand Design” of King Henry IV of France. This plan called for a kind of federation of sovereign states in Europe



to act in concert to prevent wars. This, as far as I know, was the first practicable international organization ever suggested. Woodrow Wilson must have thought of it when he planned the League of Nations. . . .

I had also read carefully all of Woodrow Wilson's writings and speeches on the League of Nations. I followed closely the debates in the Senate on the Versailles treaty and saw how a small group of what Woodrow Wilson called "willful men" in the Senate had managed to prevent American participation in the League of Nations. Roosevelt had shared with me his determination to avoid the experience of Woodrow Wilson by getting in advance the participation and consent of leaders of both parties. In order to ensure acceptance by the Senate, Roosevelt and I had both insisted that the Republican as well as Democratic ranking members of the Senate and House foreign relations committees be included in the delegation to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. This procedure of having the Senate and House represented in the delegation had [also] been followed at the Dumbarton Oaks [Conference, held in Washington, DC in 1944], where the essence of the [United Nations] Charter had been worked out for submission to the San Francisco conference.

Before the American delegation left for San Francisco, I conferred with them and had numerous meetings with individual members. I told them what I had in mind and exchanged views with them on some of the basic aims. We were agreed that we ought to strive for an organization to which all nations would delegate enough powers to prevent another world war. This was not going to be easy. At the same time, we knew the charter of the proposed organization had to be acceptable to the United States Senate. We did not want to run the risk of another League of Nations tragedy, with the United States standing in isolation on the side lines. I specifically instructed Secretary of State Stettinius to consult Senators Connally and Vandenberg, [who were the ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee], on every move he made in order to get full agreement. If he could not get those men to go along, he was to call me, and I would try to resolve the issues by telephoning them personally. I asked Stettinius to keep in constant touch with me by telephone or telegram. He was to telephone me at the conclusion of each day and night session. He was not to hesitate to call me at any hour, and because of this arrangement all important matters were referred to me either for my suggestions or approval. Stettinius always conferred with the delegation before calling me, and he was consequently able to give me messages or suggestions from individual members. Furthermore, I frequently talked to Senators Connally and Vandenberg. . . . I wanted these

two key figures to have direct access to me at all times, and I wanted the benefit of their counsel and experience.

Throughout the long discussions, I was always trying to work out a way to keep Russia and Great Britain in harmony with our own aims. It was obvious that unless the United States, Great Britain, and Russia worked together within the framework of the United Nations, we could not secure the peace of the world. I opposed yielding on fundamental principles, but I was ready to compromise on minor issues if they threatened to deadlock the conference.

I always kept in mind our own history and experience in the evolution of our Constitution. It took many years and a number of amendments and compromises to make our Constitution work. It would take years for an international organization to work effectively. It would involve experience, often disagreeable and painful, in the matter of give-and-take among sovereign nations. It would take much more time and patience to work out a world constitution than it would to create . . . [one] for an individual nation. And it would try the souls of many a statesman before a workable arrangement could be achieved. But I always considered statesmen to be more expendable than soldiers.

The American delegation to San Francisco carried with it several directives unanimously agreed upon by its members and approved by me. Proposals made at [the] Dumbarton Oaks [Conference] in the fall of 1944 were to serve as a framework for the drafting of a United Nations charter, but some changes had been proposed by our delegation, [which] . . . , through the secretary of state, had submitted them to me for consideration and approval. I went over these proposed changes. They were adopted and, with my approval, constituted a directive and working guide for the conference. The changes had grown out of many meetings by the delegation and my talks with them. These talks began on my second day in office, April 13, when I received a comprehensive report from Secretary Stettinius [which described for me the process by which the proposed changes had been developed]. . . .

On April 19, Secretary of State Stettinius brought me a set of recommendations unanimously agreed to by our delegation in San Francisco. I discussed these . . . with him and then approved them . . . as a general working directive for the delegation. . . .

The American delegation proposed that the purposes of the new international organization should be explicitly stated in its charter to include acting according to the principles of justice and equity when dealing with disputes between or among

nations, and fostering the development of international law; that a statement regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms should be added to the charter; that the charter should make clear that the General Assembly has the power to discuss matters freely, and to make recommendations relating to justice, human rights, fundamental freedoms, the development of international law, and to the peaceful settlement of problems according to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and other international agreements; that a qualification to the principle that the Security Council had no authority in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states should be removed; and that a provision providing for amending the charter should be added.

I agreed that it would be best for us to reserve our final position on all questions until we learned the views of other governments. We did not want to confront our neighbor governments of Central and South America and Canada with a *fait accompli*. It was a case of giving them a chance to say, "We don't like this or that." We were particularly anxious to be sure that the Western Hemisphere nations and the British Commonwealth were in agreement. We felt that if we had that sort of backing we would get almost anything we wanted to build an international organization that would work.

I emphasized to Stettinius the importance of the point dealing with a declaration on human rights. I felt very strongly about the need for a world "bill of rights," something on the order of our own. On the question of the powers to be vested in the General Assembly, I told Stettinius that I felt that if a veto were to be used in the Security Council by some stubborn big power that wanted to block efforts toward the solution of peace, then the Assembly ought to have some way of dealing with the problem. I thought the best way to do this was in the same manner that any question can be raised in our own House of Representatives or Senate. However, the big powers were agreed on the right of any one of the five permanent members of the [Security] Council to an absolute veto, mainly on the assumption that unity on any important decision was essential between those powers. In the present world setup, sovereign powers are very jealous of their rights. We had to recognize this as a condition and to seek united action through compromise.

It has always been my hope that independent nations would sometime be able to work out a world parliamentary setup along the lines of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States. I knew, however, that this was not possible at this stage of national sovereign rivalries. We had to

find some way of pooling whatever power the nations were willing to delegate to prevent aggression and keep the peace. That is what I had in mind, and not so much the details of the final shape it had to take.

I also thought it was necessary to find a way to make amendments to the charter. Unless a constitution can be amended as conditions change, it will become obsolete and cease to be a workable instrument of government. Most of our states have had several constitutions, and all of them had revisions and amendments. The Constitution of the United States itself had twenty-one amendments added by 1945. In my discussions with our delegates, I frequently pointed to our own Constitution, not only as a model, but as a good analogy of what happens in the growth and development of a constitution and a government. In drafting the Charter of the United Nations, it was well for us to keep in mind our own history. If we could not achieve a perfect document at San Francisco, we surely could provide for such changes and amendments as time would prove necessary in making it work to keep the peace.

I have always believed that, once the sovereign nations of the world united in a world organization and gave it a reasonable chance to work, peace would become a reality.

The San Francisco conference opened on April 25, 1945. It was not possible for me to be in attendance, but Secretary of State Stettinius kept me closely informed on the proceedings. I had instructed our delegation to cast the American vote for the Russian proposal that White Russia [Belarus] and the Ukraine, two member republics of the Soviet Union, be admitted to initial membership in the . . . [United Nations]. On April 27, the steering committee of the conference agreed to admit the Ukrainian and White Russian republics as members. . . . When President Roosevelt agreed at Yalta with Churchill and Stalin to support the Russian claims of . . . [Ukraine and Belarus] to be members, he said his objective was to keep the Russians in a negotiating mood. In talking to me about his decision at Yalta, Roosevelt told me that he wanted the Russians to go along as one of the great powers to help build the United Nations. He said that when Stalin first brought up the matter of additional votes . . . , [he] wanted sixteen votes. He wanted one vote for each of the sixteen republics of the USSR Roosevelt said, "I then countered with the proposal that we have forty-eight votes, one for each of our forty-eight sovereign states. That ended it. Stalin did not bring up his proposal for sixteen votes again."

My idea was that all sovereign nations should ultimately belong to the United Nations. We were, of course, still at war with the Axis nations, but

I believed that after peace treaties had been concluded they too would be admitted in the regular way in which the charter would provide. No peace-loving nation was to be barred.

At the same session of the steering committee [as had agreed to admit Belarus and Ukraine as United Nations members], the persistently troublesome question of Poland came up . . . , and Stettinius reported that [Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav] Molotov had moved that the provisional Polish government be invited to the conference. It was the Russian position that the Yalta decision for the reorganization of the Polish government should be carried out, but that Poland should not be excluded from the conference just because implementation of this decision had been delayed. Stettinius replied that the United States government could not accept Molotov's proposal until the new Polish government was constituted in accordance with the Crimea decision. [British foreign minister Anthony] Eden made a strong statement endorsing the United States position, adding that his government had no means of knowing whether the provisional government was supported by the Polish people, since Britain had not been permitted to send representatives into Poland.

Molotov then moved that the question be referred to the executive committee for preliminary consideration, but New Zealand and Venezuelan delegates urged that the question be settled by the three interested powers—[the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union]—rather than referred to the executive committee. The United States chairman, however, pointed out that under the Yalta agreement the conference had no right to consider this question until the Polish government had been reorganized. Molotov declared that the Soviet government had a right to raise this question at the conference and wished to refer it to the executive committee.

At this stage . . . [Paul Henri] Spaak [the foreign minister of Belgium and member of the Belgian delegation] saved the situation by delivering a stirring speech expressing his dismay that even before the conference had started this most delicate and controversial question should be raised. He expressed the fear that at this rate the conference would never get down to business, and then proposed a resolution expressing the desire of the conference that Poland be represented as soon as its government had been recognized by the sponsoring powers [the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and China]. After prolonged and rather acrimonious discussion Molotov stated that he would not press for a vote on his own motion, and the motion proposed by Spaak was adopted, thirty-one nations voting in

favor and none against. The position taken by our delegation was in keeping with our policy. I felt very strongly about the [Soviet] refusal to reorganize the Polish government in keeping with the Yalta agreement, and we would oppose Poland's becoming a member of the United Nations until this was done. But Molotov would not let the matter rest.

On May 1, the admission of the two Soviet republics was approved unanimously in the executive committee and then approved by acclamation in the plenary session of the conference. On the same day, the question of Argentina's participation in the conference was raised. This was brought before the executive committee by the Mexican and Chilean delegations and the proposal was supported by the other Latin American delegations. Molotov spoke up in opposition, seeking to use the occasion to further the Polish claim to participation in the conference. He argued that Argentina had helped the enemy throughout the war and that if Argentina was invited and Poland was not it would be a blow to the prestige of the conference. Australia's foreign minister, [Herbert Vere] Evatt, recommended delay and reference to the next meeting of the committee. He felt that Argentina was pro-fascist and had opposed the United Nations in the war. Nevertheless, he recognized that the return of Argentina to the community of nations was of the first importance and . . . [it] should probably be admitted. Stettinius stated that the American republics wished to have Argentina represented at San Francisco and that the United States was in entire accord with the desire of her sister republics. Molotov wanted to refer the question to the four sponsoring powers for preliminary consideration, but Eden said that he saw no use in putting off the decision. The Mexican motion proposing participation of Argentina in the conference was then put to a vote and approved nine to three. . . . The same question was discussed at length in the steering committee later the same morning, and Molotov took the same position, making every effort to link the Argentine and the Polish questions. However, the Soviet motion that the matter be delayed was defeated seven to twenty-five, and an Ecuadorian motion that Argentina be admitted to the conference was passed twenty-nine to five. . . .

The voting procedure of the Security Council, as proposed by the sponsoring powers, was now coming under attack from practically all the smaller countries, according to a message from Stettinius on May 21. Their target was the veto right of the great powers, which was based on an agreement that had been reached at Yalta. Under this agreement the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, China, and France would have a veto in the Security Council wherever the question of military or economic sanctions

was involved. All of our experts, civil and military, favored it, and without such a veto no arrangement would have passed the Senate. There was great pressure from the small nations to amend the voting procedure adopted at Yalta, particularly with respect to peaceful settlement procedures and the ratification of amendments to the charter. On peaceful settlements, this would have meant that unanimity among the five powers, if not involved in the dispute, would not be required. Our delegation was willing to agree to this if the Soviets were prepared to accept it. On the other hand, our delegation recommended that unless the Soviets were willing to accept the change, the Yalta formula be adhered to. And, in any event, our delegates felt that there should be no change on charter amendments. . . .

After May 9, the meetings of the sponsoring powers were referred to as the Big Five, as France had joined all such discussions. The conference was making progress, having completed all of its preliminary arrangements and discussions. The main work was now in the hands of the different committees. The question of the veto power in the [Security] Council was emerging as the single outstanding issue of the conference.

The committee dealing with the General Assembly meanwhile approved the Vandenberg amendment, which had been proposed by the sponsoring powers. This empowered the [General] Assembly to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, that was likely to impair the general welfare of friendly relations among nations or that resulted from the violation of the principles and purposes of the [United Nations] Charter.

On May 22, I asked Stettinius to return to Washington to see me. I wanted to go over the major issues still before the conference and discuss the setting of an early terminating date.

Progress being made at San Francisco was very encouraging. I was assured to find that a conference involving so many nations and special interests had produced very few crises despite some tense moments of debate. Our delegation was doing an excellent job. They were greatly aided by the ground broken at Dumbarton Oaks and the preliminary discussions on the United Nations in which the key figures of the United States Senate had been consulted. The meeting at Chapultepec [the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, February–March 1945] also brought into harmony our Latin American neighbors, and they went to San Francisco ready to cooperate on a world organization.

With the secretary of state, who arrived in Washington on May 23, I examined each of the issues still pending before the conference, and I told

Stettinius that we would stand by the Yalta formula on voting in the Security Council. We were committed to this formula, and we would abide by it. On the right of withdrawal from the United Nations then being discussed, I agreed with the two senators, Vandenberg and Connally, that the right of any nation to withdraw should not be specifically prohibited, but at the same time I agreed with the delegates that an amendment to that effect at this stage would not be advisable. I disapproved the recommendation that we should insist on voluntary jurisdiction for the [International Court of Justice, also called] the World Court. I felt that if we were going to have a court it ought to be a court that would work, with compulsory jurisdiction. Consequently, Stettinius was instructed to strive for a formula that would make possible, at least eventually, [the court's] compulsory jurisdiction. . . .

One of the items then pending was the date for concluding the conference. There had been suggestions that the conference adjourn temporarily because some of the key foreign ministers—Molotov, Eden, and [T. V.] Soong [of China], for example—had had to leave for urgent duties elsewhere. I was opposed to postponement on any ground until the conference had finished its important task of framing a charter, which would then have to be submitted to the many nations for ratification. Adjournment for even a short period might imperil the smooth progress and complicate the work already achieved. I therefore instructed Stettinius to keep working for and to aim at adjournment in early June.

In the course of the conference the heads of the delegations from the four sponsoring governments—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China—and of France, had developed the practice of consulting among themselves on outstanding issues. By June 1, the number of points still to be settled had been substantially reduced, but the thorniest of them all—that of voting procedure in the Security Council—still remained. Stettinius advised me that he was certain that, once this issue was cleared away, other points, such as the procedure for electing the secretary-general and the judges of the International Court of Justice, and the establishment of a preparatory commission, would be . . . [settled] without undue difficulty.

The controversy over the voting procedure of the Security Council seemed to have reached an impasse. The real issue at stake was whether the discussion and consideration of a dispute could be stopped by the veto of any permanent member of the [Security] Council. The Russians insisted on the veto right, while we, together with the British, the Chinese, and the French, were opposed. We felt that such a use of the veto would make freedom of discussion impossible in the [Security] Council.

On the morning of June 2, Stettinius reported the situation to me by phone and . . . raised the question whether Stalin really knew what the position of his delegation involved. Stettinius observed that on previous occasions it had been found that Stalin had not always been informed of the instructions that had been issued by the Kremlin, and that on occasion it had been Molotov himself who had failed to inform his superior. Since Harry Hopkins was then in Moscow talking with Stalin, Stettinius suggested that we make a direct approach and see if the deadlock could not be broken in that way. I told Stettinius to send a message to Ambassador Harriman and Hopkins, asking them to place the matter of the voting procedure of the Security Council before . . . [Stalin.] On June 6, I heard from Hopkins that he had talked that day with Stalin about our position on the veto aspects of the voting procedure. "We . . . laid out to him," Hopkins' message read, "the impasse at San Francisco over the voting procedure. Stalin had not understood the issues. After considerable discussion in which Molotov took an active part, Stalin overruled Molotov and agreed that the American position was acceptable to him . . ." This meant the end of a deadlock that had threatened to disrupt the whole conference. The next day Stettinius reported that [Andrei] Gromyko, [who had replaced Vyacheslav Molotov as head of the Soviet delegation to the San Francisco conference], had received instructions from Moscow and that his government agreed with our position on the voting procedure. Thus, complete agreement had been reached among the four sponsoring powers and France on the voting procedure, so that no single state would be able to prevent the hearing of a dispute by the Security Council.

Now that this issue had been settled, it was agreed that every effort would be made to bring the conference to a close on Saturday, June 23. But we were to encounter another delay. Once again, the Russians blocked agreement, and we had to go over the heads of the delegation by taking up the problem with Moscow. Moscow again accepted our position. What was involved was the right of the General Assembly, in which all the member nations would be represented, to free discussion of all matters and to make recommendations to the Security Council. This had become a symbol of the share the smaller nations were to have in the United Nations.

The position of the smaller nations was expressed in a proposed amendment to the [United Nations] Charter which provided that "The General Assembly shall have the right to discuss any matter within the sphere of international relations, and [subject to specified exceptions] . . . to make recommendations to the members of the organization or to the Security

Council or both on any such matters." Stettinius informed me that there was a big majority behind this proposal. On June 4, Gromyko had announced to the heads of the delegations that Russia would insist on having this paragraph taken out. The Australian [foreign] minister, Herbert Evatt, made a strong speech in defense of the proposal and, generally, on behalf of the smaller nations. Stettinius, in reporting to me, said that support for this proposal had grown stronger because it gave a voice to the smaller nations, who felt that they were being overshadowed by the dominant position of the Security Council and especially by the veto privilege of the permanent members. The Russians objected, and I instructed Stettinius to take the matter up directly with [foreign minister] Molotov, saying that if that did not help I would talk to Stalin directly.

Stettinius sent his message to Molotov on June 18. I left Washington on June 19 for [San Francisco] . . . , as I had agreed . . . to address the United Nations Conference on its closing day. Molotov's reply . . . to me . . . suggested a small change in the position, but it was unacceptable. I instructed Stettinius to try again. Molotov finally accepted a compromise solution which provided that the General Assembly had the right to discuss any questions relating to the matters of international peace and security, unless it was already being dealt with by the Security Council, and to make recommendations to the members of the United Nations or the Security Council or both on such questions. The last road block in the path of the Charter of the United Nations had now been removed.

I arrived . . . [in San Francisco] on the afternoon of June 25. I was given a wonderful reception by . . . people . . . who turned out a million strong as I motored into the city from the airport. . . . I stayed at the Fairmont Hotel with the American delegation and held a reception that evening for the delegates of the conference.

About three o'clock the following day I went with Secretary of State Stettinius and the other members of the United States delegation to the Veterans' War Memorial Building to witness the signing of the [United Nations] Charter. We were escorted to the stage of the main auditorium of the building, where the flags of all the United Nations formed an impressive backdrop. I took my position on the right of the secretary of state, who sat down at a circular table. On it lay the books that contained the new Charter [of the United Nations] in the five official languages of the organization. When . . . Secretary [Stettinius] signed on behalf of the United States, I stepped over to shake his hand and to thank him for his good work.

Senator Tom Connally signed next, followed by the other members of the American delegation, including Cordell Hull, who [had] signed in Washington. I thanked each of them individually for their part in this historic achievement, and we then proceeded to the [War Memorial] Opera House, where I addressed the final session of the plenary conference. . . .

In his speech, Truman called the United Nations Charter a declaration of faith that war was not inevitable and that a continuing peace could be achieved. If we had had this Charter a few years ago . . . , he said, millions now dead would be alive. If we should falter in the future in our will to use it, millions now living will surely die. The Charter was proof that nations could come together, state their different views, and find common ground in their determination to find a way to end wars. He said that the world's powerful nations had a special duty to lead the way to peace. He called for a united effort to raise the standard of living of as many people as possible throughout the world—to help remove the economic and social problems that often lead to conflict. He called too for an economic bill of rights, and stated that the Charter is dedicated to the achievement and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. He referred to this new structure of peace which was rising from a strong foundation, and ended by calling upon the delegates and all the nations they represented to grasp this supreme chance to establish a world-wide rule of reason, and to create an enduring peace.

Six days later [on July 2, 1945], I stepped to the rostrum in the Senate chamber of the Capitol in Washington and presented the [United Nations] Charter to the Senate of the United States for ratification.

Year of Decisions, 271–293

The End of the War in Europe

April–May 1945

The Redoubt—occupation zones—last minute Nazi maneuvers—Soviet suspicions—surrender in Italy—collapse of German resistance—surrender announcement—“The flags of freedom fly all over Europe”—a Big Three meeting is proposed—the Morgenthau Plan—a fear of famine and the spread of communism

. . . By April 1945 the war in Europe was taking a decisive turn. German resistance had begun to crumble on all fronts by the middle of April. Until almost the end, however, there was talk of a last ditch stand by the top Nazis and the German command. It was believed that this stand would revolve about the so-called Redoubt in the mountain areas of Bavaria, Austria, and north Italy. To this region, it was expected the Nazi leaders would withdraw with what was left of the SS and other trusted troops, and there they would stage a long drawn out resistance. Allied operations for the final phase of the war made provision to head this off. It was rumored that Hitler had left Berlin on April 20 for the Redoubt, but when the American Third and Seventh Armies moved deep into this area they found the Germans had not been able to build this final fortress. . . .

As a result of the rapid advances of our armies on the central front, our operational lines began to outstrip the lines of the occupation zones that had long since been agreed upon. This raised the issue of how far east our armies should go, what lines they should hold when the fighting stopped, and the relation of all this to the occupation zones. Churchill, on political grounds,



pressed for getting a line as far to the east as possible before the fighting ended. Opposed to this policy were our military chiefs, whose arguments were based on military grounds. At this time, it was our objective to destroy all remaining resistance. This was to be achieved by a general advance eastward until our armies met the Russian armies coming westward. In all this there was nothing at all binding on how far our Western Allied armies should go eastward or what lines they should be holding when the fighting stopped. While this matter involved serious political considerations, it also posed a major problem for the military. . . .

As the war was drawing to a close we were having a great deal of difficulty with our Russian ally. Politically we would have been pleased to see our lines extend as far to the east as possible. We had already found ourselves practically shut out of countries that the Russians had occupied, and we therefore had reason to question their intentions . . . in Germany. But the specified zones in Germany had been previously agreed upon, and to these zones the British, American, and Russian armies were to withdraw at the end of the war, regardless of where they might be when the fighting stopped. . . .

The matter of occupation zones had first come to my attention in a telegram that Churchill sent me on April 18. It was one of several in which he urged that our armies should push as far to the east as they could reach and firmly hold. Churchill, in fact, had been pressing this point for some time in messages to President Roosevelt. Churchill waged his own battle over it with the military too, particularly with our military chiefs, and had clashed on this general issue with Eisenhower when the plan for the last big offensive was prepared. . . .

I made a careful study of the subject of occupation zones. As regards Germany, I found that we were clearly committed on specific zones. In the case of Austria, while we were also committed, specific zones had not yet been worked out. Harriman reported from Moscow that Stalin told him that the capture of Vienna now made it necessary to fix the zones of Allied occupation for the city, and Stalin suggested that American, British, and French representatives proceed as soon as possible to Vienna to establish zones there. . . .

The occupation zones for Germany had been negotiated over a period of more than a year, first within a European Advisory Commission, which submitted recommendations in September 1944. This draft agreement was accepted later this same month by Roosevelt and Churchill at a meeting in Quebec, Canada. The commission submitted a final draft agreement to Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin

in November. The occupation zones proposed in this draft agreement were accepted by the three Allied leaders during their meeting in Yalta in February 1945.

Our commitment on the occupation zones was thus an established fact, and our government had been proceeding on that basis ever since Yalta. Our American Chiefs and the Combined Chiefs of Staff had it in mind in planning their last great offensive, and our Chiefs were already working out plans for the administration of military government in our zone. . . . After thus examining the situation, I could see no valid reason for questioning an agreement on which we were so clearly committed, nor could I see any useful purpose in interfering with successful military operations. The only practical thing to do was to stick carefully to our agreement and to try our best to make the Russians carry out their agreements.

It was with this in mind that I replied to Churchill on April 23. This message contained a draft proposal to be sent to Stalin, if Churchill agreed, outlining the procedure to be followed by the armed forces in occupying the various zones. On the next day, I received a reply from Churchill. He was agreeable to most of the text of my proposed message to Stalin but was unhappy over the opening part, in which I proposed that the troops withdraw to their respective zones as soon as the military situation permitted. This meant, he said, that the American troops would have to fall back some 150 miles in the center and give up considerable territory to the Russians at a time when other questions remained unsettled. . . .

Churchill was constantly pressing us to keep the greatest possible military strength in Europe. He wanted as large a force as possible on the continent to counteract the vast Russian armies there. We, however, had to keep in mind that after the defeat of Germany there still remained Japan. To bring Japan to her knees would require the transfer of many troops from Europe to the Pacific. To be sure, I agreed with Churchill that it would be desirable to hold the great cities of Berlin, Prague, and Vienna, but the fact was that, like the countries of eastern Europe, these cities were under Russian control or about to fall under her control. The Russians were in a strong position, and they knew it. On the other hand, if they were firm in their way, we could be firm in ours. And our way was to stick to our agreements and keep insisting that they do the same. . . .

During the last days of April came the linking up of the American and Russian armies, the surrender of the German forces in Italy, and finally the total collapse of German resistance. As our military plans continued to develop with unrivaled speed, frightened Nazi leaders began seeking deals

with the Western Allies. The thought of falling into Russian hands drove them into a panic. As the lesser of two evils, they turned to us. One of these attempts at a separate deal had already made some trouble for us with the Russians. In March, General Karl Wolff, the chief SS officer of the German forces in Italy, had started parleys with the American Office of Strategic Services agents in Switzerland with a view toward the possible surrender of Kesselring's German army in Italy. Nothing ever came of these parleys except to make the Russians highly suspicious of our motives. Molotov wrote to Ambassador Harriman in Moscow demanding that the negotiations with the Germans be broken off. President Roosevelt cabled Stalin that the Russians were misinformed. He explained that there was no reason why we should not listen to offers by the enemy to surrender to Allied commanders in the field, and that he could not agree to suspend efforts of this sort because Molotov objected. This did not satisfy Stalin, who answered that the Germans had tricked the Allies and had profited by moving three divisions from the Italian front to the Russian front. Actually, those three divisions went to the western front, against us. It was not a good situation. Any break with the Russians at this time would have interfered with our advances in Germany.

The Russians were always suspicious of everything and everybody, and Wolff's approach to the Americans and British made them suspect that we were trying to get the German forces in the west to surrender to us while they still continued to fight on the Russian front. The Russians also appeared to be afraid that we would occupy all Germany and leave them on the other side of the Polish border.

At the time this incident occurred the Germans still had a powerful fighting force in Italy, made up of twenty-five German divisions and five Italian Fascist divisions. They were holding strong positions south of the Po, on a line stretching from the west coast near Pisa to the Adriatic near Lake Comacchio, and a surrender at that moment would have been important to us. The purpose of listening to any German offers by our military command in Italy was not to negotiate but to facilitate an unconditional surrender. But the Germans were hesitant about accepting the terms of surrender upon which we insisted. At Churchill's urging, in order to avoid further friction with the Russians, the Allied commander in Italy, Field Marshal Alexander, was instructed by our Chiefs of Staff to cease contact with the Germans. We then informed the Russians of our action.

It was not long after this that the Allied forces in Italy jumped off on their final offensive. On April 21, they captured the city of Bologna. On [April

23], American units crossed the Po. Soon thereafter the Germans ceased to be an effective force, and Alexander asked for permission to communicate with German officers who would have authority to surrender. This time arrangements were made for the Russians to have a representative on hand. The end came quickly. On April 28, the terms of surrender were handed to the Germans at Allied headquarters in Italy. These terms were agreed to that same day and signed on [April 29]. [Two Soviet officers] . . . were present. The terms of surrender called for hostilities to cease at noon on May 2. The surrender was to include the Italian Fascist divisions that were part of the German command. By this time, Mussolini's puppet Italian Socialist Republic had ceased to exist. Mussolini himself was assassinated in late April by the partisans. The war in Italy was over. . . .

There was no Russian army in Italy. The German surrender there was consequently made to the Western Allies. Outside Italy the question was different. On all the main fronts the Germans were attempting to make separate surrenders to the Western Allies. There were obvious implications and complications here, for the Nazi leaders and some of their generals were playing a devious game. It was clear to us that they were trying to create trouble between the Western Allies and Russia, in a last desperate effort to save their necks and salvage as much of their regime as possible. . . . I gave little weight, however, to all these last-minute maneuvers by the Nazi leaders. We knew that there was no longer any constituted authority in Germany and that no Nazi leader could speak for the German people or for their armies. Any enemy forces who wanted to surrender could do so, as a tactical matter, to the Allied commanders in the field. Except for local surrenders, there was no question during these last days of anything less than unconditional surrender simultaneously to all three major allies, and military operations continued toward that goal. . . .

German resistance was now crumbling everywhere. On May 1 . . . German radio announced the death of Hitler. This man, who had brought such infinite misery to the world, had died in the ruins of his Chancellery. The reports I received said he was a suicide. I had expected that many high German officers would take this way out in case of defeat, but I knew that Hitler had never lived by the code of the Prussian officer, and I thought that in his fanaticism he would resist to the very end. Hitler's monstrous assault on civilization cost the lives of fifteen million people, and he and his regime left countless others maimed in body and soul. But now, at last, the strangle hold this demon of a man had held on the German people had been broken. Throughout the world men could now be certain that his death had brought

us closer to the end of fighting and nearer to the return of peace. When the German surrender came, it was through the military commanders, not through the politically defunct Nazi leaders. And now there was no issue over the terms of unconditional surrender. Germany was in ruins and its armies beaten. . . .

On May 7 Eisenhower reported that a brief instrument of unconditional military surrender had been signed at 2:41 a.m. that morning. He said that he was prepared to go to Berlin the next day for the final formal signing. . . . The Russians had serious misgivings as to whether the Germans on their front would in fact surrender, and for that reason Moscow delayed the official announcement of the surrender by one day. We had previously agreed with Stalin that the announcement would be on Tuesday, May 8, at 9 a.m. Washington time. Churchill was now pressing for a day earlier and the Russians were insisting on a day later. On May 7 Churchill sent messages by phone and cable urging that the formal announcement be made that day. I could see no way of accepting this change unless Stalin agreed. Stalin insisted, however, that the uncertain situation on the eastern front made this difficult. He still preferred May 9, and the final outcome of the several exchanges of messages was that the official announcements of the German unconditional surrender were made at the time originally agreed upon, Tuesday, May 8, at 9 a.m. Washington time. The German surrender came only a little less than four weeks after I had taken the oath of office as president. . . .

At 9 a.m. [on May 8, 1945], I broadcast an address to the nation, announcing the surrender of Germany and calling upon the people to turn their efforts to the great tasks ahead—first to win the war in the Pacific, and then to win the peace. I said:

I only wish that Franklin D. Roosevelt had lived to witness this day. General Eisenhower informs me that the forces of Germany have surrendered to the United Nations. The flags of freedom fly over all Europe . . .

We must work to bind up the wounds of a suffering world, to build an abiding peace, a peace rooted in justice and in law. We can build such a peace only by hard, toilsome, painstaking work—by understanding and working with our Allies in peace as we have in war.

The job ahead is no less important, no less urgent, no less difficult than the task which now happily is done.

I call upon every American to stick to his post until the last battle is won. Until that day, let no man abandon his post or slacken his efforts . . .

Truman had to reply to a message that Churchill had sent him two days earlier, on May 6. It had continued the argument that American forces should maintain

their forward positions, which extended by war's end into Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Truman could not agree with Churchill on this point, but he did agree with something else Churchill had said—that the time had come when the three Allied heads of government must meet to work out the problems left by the end of war in Europe. On May 9, Truman sent Churchill this message:

I am in agreement with your opinion that a meeting of the three heads of government would be desirable in order to get action on the questions of interest to the three governments upon which either a decision or a common understanding have not been reached. . . .

. . . It is my present intention to adhere to our interpretation of the Yalta agreements, and to stand firmly on our present announced attitude toward all the questions at issue.

In order to prepare for a possible tripartite meeting in the not distant future, I would be very pleased to have from you a list of the questions that you consider it necessary or desirable for us to bring up for discussion, and also suggestions as to meeting places. . . .

In regard to timing, it will be extremely difficult for me to absent myself from Washington before . . . [June 30], but I probably will be able to get away after that date . . .

As the fighting in Europe ended, Truman was quickly confronted with the question of what kind of peace would be imposed on Germany, and also with the question of what the United States must do to help the countries of Europe deal with their serious postwar problems.

On May 16, I sent for Stimson to review our plans for the campaign against Japan and for rehabilitation in Europe. I . . . expressed the fear of famine in Europe which might lead to chaos. I made it clear also that I was opposed to what was then loosely called the Morgenthau Plan—that is, the reduction of Germany to a wholly agrarian economy. I had never been for that plan even when I was in the Senate, and since reaching the White House I had come to feel even more strongly about it. I thought it was proper to disarm Germany, to dismantle her military might, to punish the war criminals, and to put her under an over-all Allied control until we could restore the peace. But I did not approve of reducing Germany to an agrarian state. Such a program could starve Germany to death. That would have been an act of revenge, and too many peace treaties had been based on that spirit. I was never for the underdog, in turn, becoming the top dog with complete power to act. When the underdog gets power, he too often turns out to be an even more brutal top dog. . . .

Concerning the rehabilitation of Europe . . . [Stimson] observed that there was a strong probability of pestilence and famine throughout central Europe during the following winter. This, he felt, was likely to be followed by political revolution and communistic infiltration. Our defenses against this situation would be the western governments of France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Italy. It was vital to keep these countries from being driven to revolution or communism by famine. It appeared likely that a food shortage would develop in most of these countries even during the summer. Fortunately, however, both Canada and the United States had very large wheat surpluses, and this more immediate problem could probably be solved. This was distinct from the problem of next winter's food supply in central Europe. This was a long-range problem and required careful long-range planning and diplomacy. Stimson opposed any plan that would deprive Germany of the means of building up ultimately a contented Germany interested in following non-militaristic methods of civilization. This, he knew, would necessarily involve some industrialization, but a solution had to be found for the future peaceful existence of the Germans. It was to the interest of the whole world that they should not be driven by stress of hardship into a non-democratic and necessarily predatory habit of life.

Year of Decisions, 199–219, 235–237

The paragraphs beginning "As a result," "As the war," "The matter of," "I made a," "Our commitment on," "It was with," and "Churchill was constantly" have been moved up several pages from their positions in the original text, to precede the paragraph beginning "During the last."

Martha Ellen Truman Visits the White House

May 1945

A few days after the war's end in Europe, a special visitor arrived at the White House.

. . . Had the pressure of events been less, I would have liked to go to Grandview, my mother's home, for Mother's Day. . . . [Since I couldn't leave Washington, I] . . . sent the presidential plane, the *Sacred Cow*, to bring [my mother to me] . . . This was Mama's first airplane trip. The plane that brought her was the one that took President Roosevelt to [his meeting with Churchill and Stalin at Teheran, Iran in 1944]. . . . It had a specially built in elevator to help lift him in and out of the plane. Mama got a great kick out of the trip. The only thing she did not like was her experience with the elevator. When the plane landed and she was being taken down, the elevator stuck. It had to be pulled back to get her out. She turned to . . . the pilot and said: "I am going to tell Harry that this plane is no good and I could walk just as easily as I could ride." By this time, a regular passenger stairway had been rolled up to the plane, and I escorted her down myself. When she saw all the reporters and photographers, she turned to me. "Oh fiddlesticks," she said. "Why didn't you tell me there was going to be all this fuss, and I wouldn't have come."



My mother, who was an unreconstructed rebel, had come to Washington a little concerned about the bed she was going to sleep in, because my brother Vivian had told her several days before she left that the only room available for her at the White House was the Lincoln Room. Vivian told her she would have to sleep in the bed where Lincoln had slept. My mother said

to Vivian, "You tell Harry, if he puts me in the room with Lincoln's bed in it I'll sleep on the floor." . . . But by the time we reached the White House she had been reassured. She was to sleep in the Rose Room, one of the principal guest rooms. This is the room in which all the queens who had ever visited the White House had slept. But my mother took one look at the bed and started walking around the room. This was not for her. The bed was too high and too big, and the surroundings were too fussy, she said. Then she saw the adjoining room, a much smaller room, which was used by ladies in waiting to the queens who were guests at the White House. It was cozier and had a single bed in it. "This is where I'm going to sleep," she decided, and that was her room throughout her stay. . . .

Mama made herself at home very quickly. She got along well with the household help. They fell in love with her and felt at ease with her. She never presumed on the position she had as my mother, and everyone liked her frankness. Mama explored all of the White House. The first day she fell down the stairway at the end of the hall in the East Wing. She was alone at the time and she told no one about it. The following day—Sunday, May 13—was Mother's Day, and we were to attend religious services in the chapel of the Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, Maryland. Mama said that she did not feel quite up to going to the services, but I did not know at the time that she had had an accident. She kept this a secret for two weeks.

My mother never tried to give me advice as president. She had a keen interest in politics and she knew what was going on. . . . During her stay at the White House she was interested in everything that was going on. But she did not seem to feel that there was anything special about my being in the White House or about my being president. She thought it was just the natural thing. It did not give her any ideas of grandeur. She was just the same Mama she had always been.

Preparing to Meet with Churchill and Stalin

May–August 1945

A new relationship with Churchill and Stalin—Harry Hopkins mission to Moscow—Joseph E. Davies mission to London—Churchill's fears about a sudden withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe—place and date of a Big Three meeting are set—the deadlock on Poland is broken—the Soviet Union and Japan—China and the Yalta agreements—Truman explains matters to T. V. Soong—Soong's negotiations with Stalin—China has “gone the limit to fulfill the Yalta formula”—the Soviet Union declares war on Japan

It was inevitable that Roosevelt's death would raise questions about the working relationship between the heads of government of Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. In a number of conferences and frequent meetings, a personal knowledge and estimate of each other had grown up between Roosevelt and Churchill and among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. It was natural that a new relationship would have to be established by me and that I would have to meet with Churchill and Stalin. But it was impossible for such a meeting to take place while I was under an enormous burden of work involving so many critical decisions. Apart from that, I wanted to be fully informed about the attitudes of Churchill and Stalin and what changes the death of Roosevelt may have made in their outlook. At the same time, I wanted to get word to Churchill and Stalin through a trusted representative of Roosevelt that there had been no change in the basic policies of the United States.



On May 4, I saw Hopkins again, for the first time since our return from Hyde Park and the graveside of President Roosevelt. While on the journey to and from Hyde Park, Hopkins and I had . . . talk[ed] about Russia. I suggested to Hopkins the possibility of his going on a personal mission for me to Stalin. I inquired about his health, asking whether he thought he would be strong enough to undertake the journey. Hopkins at that time said he would have to talk to his doctor and said, "Why don't you send Harriman back on a special mission since he is already our ambassador there?" . . . Since Hopkins had raised the question with me of his health, I told Harriman that I was thinking of him to take a special message to Stalin. Harriman replied that he thought that because Hopkins was very close to Roosevelt he would be in a better position to impress on Stalin that we intended to carry out the Roosevelt policies.

Now, as I shook hands with Hopkins, I saw that he was still a sick man. But Hopkins was a man of courage, and since I was disturbed at the trend of Russian developments, especially since my meeting with Molotov, I presumed again to raise the subject of his undertaking a mission to Stalin. Hopkins said he understood the urgency of the situation and that he was prepared to go. He asked me when Harriman was planning to return to Moscow. I told him I expected Harriman to return to Washington from San Francisco within a week, when I would talk over with him the Russian situation and his returning to his post. I asked Hopkins to see me the following day for further discussion of the mission. I also asked him to study with the State Department all the latest Russian developments.

This gave me the opportunity of sounding out [former Secretary of State] Cordell Hull, Jimmy Byrnes, and others not only about this particular mission by Hopkins to Moscow but about sending the former U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Joseph E. Davies, on a special mission to London. The State Department opposed the idea of sending Hopkins and so did Byrnes. Cordell Hull told me Hopkins was an excellent choice for the mission.

On May 19 Hopkins came to the White House for final instructions. I had telegraphed Stalin that day as follows:

I am sure you are as aware as I am of the difficulty of dealing by exchange of messages with the complicated and important questions with which we are faced. Pending the possibility of our meeting I am therefore sending Mr. Harry Hopkins with Ambassador Harriman to Moscow in order that they may have an opportunity of discussing personally with you these matters. Following these talks Mr. Hopkins will return immediately to Washington in order to

report personally to me. They plan to arrive in Moscow about May 26. I would appreciate your letting me know if this time is convenient for you.

I asked Hopkins to tell Stalin that I was anxious to have a fair understanding with the Russian government, that we never made commitments which we did not expect to carry out to the letter, and that we expected Stalin to carry out his agreements. I made it plain to Hopkins that in talking to Stalin he was free to use diplomatic language or a baseball bat if he thought that was the proper approach. I further instructed him to tell Stalin that I would be glad to see him personally and that I thought it was now his turn to come to the United States, as our president had been to Russia.

The following evening I saw Joseph E. Davies and told him that our plans were now definite to send Hopkins to Moscow and that therefore I wanted Davies himself to go to London. I said that Hopkins would arrive in Moscow on May 26, and I asked Davies to arrange to be in London at the same time. . . .

Stalin agreed to meet with Hopkins and Harriman beginning on May 26. Truman asked Churchill to meet with Davies at the same time Hopkins was meeting with Stalin, and Churchill agreed.

On May 23, I made public the news of the special missions of Hopkins to Moscow and Davies to London. I had asked Ambassador Harriman, who was to accompany Hopkins, to proceed in advance to London and see Churchill. I thought it best to have Harriman fill Churchill in on the nature of the Hopkins mission. Harriman dined privately with . . . [Churchill] on May 22. . . .

Harriman cabled me on May 23 from Paris, where he was to be joined by Hopkins, and reported that Churchill was pleased that Hopkins was going to Moscow. [Churchill] . . . , he said, was gravely concerned over the developments with Russia and felt that it was of the utmost importance to go through firmly with the situation in Venezia Giulia. He believed, however, that issues such as Poland could not be settled until "you and he" met with Stalin. Churchill asked Harriman to assure me that he would not take any position in regard to Russia which did not have our full support and that "he is ready to come and meet you anywhere at any time you are prepared to see him."

Ambassador Davies held his private talks with . . . Churchill from May 26 to May 29 at Chequers [Churchill's country home] and at No. 10 Downing

Street. Davies did not cable me any details of his meetings with Churchill, preferring to report to me in person. However, on May 31 I had a cable from Churchill referring to his talks with Davies, but raising a puzzling question. Churchill said that he was hoping I would soon be able to let him know the date "of the meeting of 'the three.'" [He] . . . said his talks with Davies were agreeable, as he would report to me on his return. Then Churchill made the surprising statement that he would not be prepared to attend a meeting which was a continuation of a conference between myself and Stalin and that "the three" should meet simultaneously and on equal terms.

I had at no time proposed seeing Stalin alone at any separate conference. What I was anxious to do was to get Stalin and Churchill and myself at the same table and maintain the unity we had during the war. Unity was even more necessary to keep the peace. I had even rejected the idea of meeting Churchill alone. Churchill intimated through regular channels that he would like to see me before we had a meeting with Stalin. He considered coming over to Washington and the two of us going back together. In my judgment that would have been a serious mistake at a time when we were trying to settle things with Stalin. Stalin was always fearful that the British and ourselves would gang up on him. We did not want that. We wanted world peace, and we needed the three powers working together to get it. Of course, since I was not personally acquainted with either Stalin or Churchill, I had intended that when we arrived at our meeting place I would have an opportunity to see each separately. In this way, I would become better acquainted with them and be able to size them up, and they too would get a chance to size me up.

I intended to wait to see if Davies could shed more light on this cable of Churchill's. On June 5 Davies came to report to me. . . . He had represented my position and the policy of the United States with accuracy, carrying out instructions with exceptional skill. Davies told me that he had talked with Churchill alone for approximately eight hours. . . . Davies told Churchill that I was gravely concerned over the serious deterioration in the relations of the Soviets with both Britain and the United States and that I believed that without continued unity of the Big Three there could be no reasonable prospect of peace. Davies [said] . . . my position was that every agreement made by President Roosevelt would be scrupulously supported by me and that if there were differences of opinion as to what these agreements were, I wanted them cleared up.

[Davies said the following to Churchill]:

It is the President's conviction . . . that the paramount objective now must be to conserve peace after victory. He conceives it to be the duty of the three nations which won the war to leave honorably nothing undone in an effort to solve their differences, and through continued unity make possible a just and durable peace structure.

The President has reason to believe that the situation is the more serious because of Soviet suspicion that Britain and the U.S., along with the United Nations, are now 'ganging up' on them. Such suspicion in fact is unjustified, and ought to be dispelled. That requires the establishment of confidence in the good faith and reliability of the parties, which comes only through frank discussions and the opportunity to know and estimate each other.

On that score the President is at a disadvantage in contrast to that which the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin enjoy. The Prime Minister and Mr. Eden both have had the benefit of frequent contacts and friendly association with Marshal Stalin. . . . It is the President's desire, therefore, in view of the responsibility which he must assume, to have a similar opportunity to know the Marshal and to have Marshal Stalin come to know him. . . .

The President therefore . . . desires an opportunity to meet the Marshal before the scheduled forthcoming meeting. He feels certain that the Prime Minister will appreciate the reasonableness of his position and facilitate such arrangement.

At this point I saw how Churchill might have taken this suggestion to mean that I desired to have a preliminary meeting with Stalin first. I had no such idea in mind. What Davies was to convey was that before the meeting got formally under way I planned visits with Stalin as well as with Churchill, on the spot and in private in order to get better acquainted with both of them personally. I took immediate steps to clear this point up with Churchill, advising him of my intent to discuss no business with either him or Stalin separately.

Davies then proceeded to report on Churchill's analysis of the European situation. Davies said that he was struck by the bitterness of Churchill's tone as he discussed de Gaulle, Tito, and Stalin. Davies said, "Churchill elaborated at length and with great emphasis and emotion on the grave dangers which would arise with the withdrawal of American troops from Europe. It would be a 'terrible thing' if the American army were vacated from Europe. Europe would be prostrate and at the mercy of the Red Army and of communism." At this point I interrupted Davies to say that I had no such thing in mind, that we would withdraw only the troops we could spare from Europe for our war in the Pacific. We were committed to the rehabilitation of Europe, and there was to be no abandonment this time.

Hopkins and Harriman saw Stalin and [Soviet foreign minister] Molotov on May 26. Hopkins reported that Stalin was as anxious to meet with Churchill and me as we were to meet him. A number of important conferences followed, and talks continued until June 7. Hopkins sent me a daily report by cable, keeping me completely informed. This enabled me to take up with Churchill a number of problems affecting the three governments.

One of the first results of Hopkins' mission was to set the date and place for the meeting of Stalin, Churchill, and myself. In his first report to me Hopkins cabled on May 27:

We outlined at great length the gravity of the feeling in America and expressed as forcibly as we could the point of view that you wished us to convey. The importance of the Polish business was put on the line specifically. Stalin listened with the utmost attention to our description of the present state of American public opinion and gave us the impression that he also was disturbed at the drift of events . . .

Stalin, Harriman later reported, showed that he did not fully understand the basis of the difficulties. He took the offensive in complaining "about our misdeeds and aggressively indicated that if we did not wish to deal on a friendly basis with the Soviet Union, she was strong enough to look after herself." Nevertheless, he was glad to see Hopkins and accepted unquestioningly the fact that I had sent him as an indication of my desire to work with the Russians.

On May 28, Hopkins informed me that Stalin told him he would meet me at any time I wished and that there would be adequate quarters for such a meeting in the suburbs of Berlin. In reply I instructed Hopkins to inform Stalin that I perceived no objection to meeting in the Berlin area and that about July 15 appeared to be a practicable date for me. I so informed Churchill, who in reply once again pleaded for mid-June. Stalin, in turn, agreed to July 15. Churchill argued for early July, but at last the three of us agreed that the date would be July 15 and the place Babelsberg, a suburb of Potsdam, [which was just beyond the boundaries of occupied Berlin].

"Hopkins did a first-rate job," Harriman said in a message to me, "in presenting your views to Stalin, and in explaining the most important matters—particularly Poland—which were causing us concern. I am afraid," Harriman continued, "that Stalin does not and never will fully understand our interest in a free Poland as a matter of principle. The Russian Premier is a realist in all of his actions, and it is hard for him to appreciate our faith in

abstract principles. It is difficult for him to understand why we should want to interfere with Soviet policy in a country like Poland which he considers so important to Russia's security unless we have some ulterior motive. He does, however, appreciate that he must deal with the position we have taken . . ."

Hopkins reported that Stalin was ready to talk business at once as to the names of the Poles both in [the exiled Polish government in] London and in Poland proper who were not members of the [communist provisional government in the Polish city of] Lublin . . . but who would be invited to Moscow to meet with the Polish Commission and consult about the organization of a temporary government for Poland. Hopkins therefore proposed a list of three Poles from London and five from within Poland, all of whom had previously been approved by the British and ourselves. Stalin indicated that he wanted three or four from the existing provisional government in Poland, but under no circumstances more than four. Hopkins thought that this tentative list was satisfactory and urged that I approve it. I did so in a telephone conversation with Hopkins on June 1.

In the meantime, messages were going back and forth between Washington and London. We examined the list of names in detail. We tried to reconcile the position of the Polish government-in-exile [in London], our own attitude, and Stalin's intentions. Finally, an agreement was reached, and Hopkins, in his last meeting with Stalin on June 6, was able to bring this matter to a conclusion. This did not settle the Polish problem; all that was accomplished was to break the deadlock between ourselves and the Russians over [it]. . . .

Before Hopkins left for Moscow, I had impressed upon him the need for getting as early a date as possible on Russia's entry into the war against Japan. Hopkins had been with Roosevelt at Yalta and knew of Russia's commitment there to move against Japan after the war in Europe was ended. On May 28 Hopkins and Harriman got from Stalin a very important declaration which Hopkins cabled me:

Harriman and I saw Stalin and Molotov for the third time last night. Following are the important results:

The Soviet Army will be properly deployed on the Manchurian positions by August 8th.

Stalin repeated the statement he made at Yalta that the Russian people must have a good reason for going to war and that depended on the willingness of China to agree to the Yalta proposals.

He stated for the first time that he was willing to take these proposals up directly with Soong when he comes to Moscow. He wants to see Soong not

later than July first and expects us to take matter up at the same time with Chiang Kai-shek . . .

He left no doubt in our mind that he intends to attack [Japan] during August. It is therefore important that Soong come here not later than July 1st. Stalin is ready to see him any time now.

Stalin made categorical statement that he would do everything he could to promote unification of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. He further stated that this leadership should continue after the war because no one else was strong enough. He specifically stated no communist leader was strong enough to unify China. . . .

He repeated all of his statements made at Yalta, that he wanted a unified and stable China and wanted China to control all of Manchuria as part of a United China. He stated categorically that he had no territorial claims against China and mentioned specifically Manchuria and Sinkiang and that he would respect Chinese sovereignty in all areas his troops entered to fight the Japanese.

Stalin stated that he would welcome representatives of . . . [Chiang Kai-shek] to be with his troops entering Manchuria in order to facilitate the organization of Chinese administration in Manchuria.

Stalin agreed with America's 'open door' policy and went out of his way to indicate that the United States was the only power with the resources to aid China economically *after* the war . . .

Stalin agreed that there should be a trusteeship for Korea, under China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States . . .

Truman cabled Hopkins on May 31 that he would see that T. V. Soong, the president of the Executive Yuan of the Republic of China, was informed that Stalin wished to see him in Moscow no later than July 1, and that he would inform Chiang Kai-shek about the agreements relating to China made at the Yalta Conference.

The United States had agreed at Yalta to obtain the concurrence of China, which had not participated in the conference, to the agreement reached there relating to China. This agreement provided that Japan would be deprived of the conquests it had made in East Asia since 1894, some of which it had acquired from Russia following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Chinese sovereignty in parts of its territory was involved, and the concurrence of China in the agreement was necessary if the Soviet Union was to enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies.

I was reassured to learn from Hopkins that Stalin had confirmed the understanding reached at Yalta about Russia's entry into the war against Japan. Our military experts had estimated that an invasion of Japan would cost at

least 500,000 American casualties even if the Japanese forces then in Asia were held on the Chinese mainland. Russian entry into the war against Japan was highly important to us. . . .

Truman had for several weeks been waiting for the right moment to tell Chiang Kai-shek about the agreement made at Yalta pertaining to China. On June 4, Hopkins cabled Truman from Moscow that Stalin was ready to talk with the Chinese. Truman then cabled the United States ambassador in China, Patrick J. Hurley, as follows:

You may expect in the near future instructions to endeavor to obtain approval by Chiang Kai-shek of a military-political matter of the highest importance that, if it is approved, will radically and favorably change the entire military picture in your area.

For your information, only, Soong is going to Moscow to discuss the same matter.

To avoid leakage of highly secret information, the above mentioned instructions to you will be delayed until shortly prior to Soong's arrival in Russia.

On June 9, Truman met with Soong in the Oval Office and told him the substance of the issues existing between China and the Soviet Union.

. . . Stalin, I told Soong, claimed he had no territorial demands against China and favored a unified China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. But Stalin wanted to restore to Russia her former rights in the Pacific which Japan had taken from her in [the Russo-Japanese War of] 1904 [-1905], and he wanted agreement with China in this matter before Russia would participate in the war against Japan. . . .

Following his meeting with T. V. Soong, Truman directed Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew to send the following message, which described in detail the Yalta agreement with respect to China, to Ambassador Hurley. It specified exactly when Hurley could share its contents with Chiang Kai-shek—on June 15—and when Stalin wanted to begin his talks with T. V. Soong—before July 1.

Truman's message to Hurley read as follows:

You are aware of an agreement made in February [by President Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference] that the President would take measures to obtain from Chiang Kai-shek his concurrence in the understanding of the Soviet Government stated herewith following.

Stalin wishes to discuss his proposals directly with Soong in Moscow before the first of July.

1. Stalin has made to us a categorical statement that he will do everything to promote unification under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.

2. That this leadership should continue after the war.

3. That he wants a unified stable China and wants China to control all of Manchuria as a part of a United China.

4. That he has no territorial claims against China, and that he will respect Chinese sovereignty in all areas his troops enter to fight the Japanese.

5. That he will welcome representatives of . . . [Chiang Kai-shek] to be with his troops in Manchuria in order to facilitate the organization of Chinese administration in Manchuria.

6. That he agrees with America's "open door" policy in China.

7. That he agrees to a trusteeship for Korea under China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

The conditions for Soviet participation in the war against Japan are as follows, and if these conditions are met, a Soviet attack will be made in August:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored,

(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria.

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

4. The Soviet Union is ready to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Inform Chiang Kai-shek that President Roosevelt at Yalta agreed to support these Soviet claims upon the entry of Russia in the war against Japan. I am also in agreement.

T. V. Soong has been given this information.

You are hereby directed to take up this matter with Chiang on June fifteenth and to make every effort to obtain his approval.

Truman met again with T. V. Soong on June 14, and shared with him some of the important matters which had been discussed in Moscow by Stalin and Harry Hopkins. Soong made clear that China was uncomfortable with some of what Stalin wanted—particularly a renewal of the Soviet lease of Port Arthur. The Chinese, he explained, were strongly opposed to a renewal of the old imperialistic practice of leasing ports in China.

. . . I explained to Soong, as I had done previously, that I was anxious to see the Soviet Union come into the war against Japan early enough to shorten the war and thus save countless American and Chinese lives. But while this was my chief concern at the moment, I told him I wanted him to know that I would do nothing that would harm the interests of China, our friend in the Far East. I was extremely anxious, I told him, to avoid setting up tinderboxes either in the Far East or in Europe which might cause future trouble and wars . . .

Truman sent a cable to Stalin, telling him T. V. Soong would arrive in Moscow sometime before July 1 to begin negotiating a Soviet-Chinese agreement. He said too that the American ambassador in China would inform Chiang Kai-shek on June 15 about the Soviet positions on the issues between the two countries and would try to obtain Chiang's concurrence with these positions. He would also tell Chiang that the United States supported the Yalta agreement regarding China.

Soong arrived in Moscow on June 30.

Stalin began the conversations by insisting that the Chinese recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia. Soong replied that he could not agree to the cession of territory, that it would complicate the question of Tibet, and that no government of China could last if it ceded Outer Mongolia. He later explained to Harriman that this was a matter of principle that was deeply embedded in Chinese psychology, and although they realized that they could not then exercise sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, the Chinese would be unwilling to support a government which gave up for all time Chinese claims to this territory. . . .

As the talks continued, Soong told [Ambassador Averell] Harriman, difficulties arose on the matter of ports and railroads. Stalin made demands that extended his earlier ones, and proposed that the ownership of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchuria railroads should be Russian; that they should be operated by a joint Soviet-Chinese board, but that the management should be Russian.

Harriman sent Truman a cable telling him how the discussion proceeded from this point. It began:

Soong contended that the ownership of the railroads should be Chinese, and that they should be operated by a Soviet-Chinese company with joint responsibility and a mixed management partly Chinese and partly Russian. . . . Stalin agreed that Russia should have the right to move troops only in time of war or in preparation for threat of war . . .

Harriman told Truman the two sides could not agree on how the port city of Dairen should be controlled. His cable went on to other issues:

On the question of the sovereignty of China in Manchuria Soong was reassured by Stalin's statements. Stalin agreed that representatives of the . . . National[ist] government should accompany the Red Army when it advanced into Manchuria to organize the government. . . . Stalin inquired regarding the National[ist] government's attitude towards the [Chinese] Communists, and Soong told him that . . . [Chiang Kai-shek] was prepared to bring [Chinese] Communist representation into the government but the Kuomintang should be in control. Soong says that Stalin appeared to agree in principle but there was no detailed discussion or agreement as to the understanding to be reached with the [Chinese] Communists. . . .

As to Korea, Stalin confirmed to Soong his agreement to establishing a four power trusteeship. . . . Stalin stated that there should be no foreign troops or foreign policy in Korea. . . . [Soong] is fearful that even with a four power trusteeship the Soviets will obtain domination of Korean affairs.

On July 4, I instructed Secretary of State Byrnes to inform Harriman that the United States did not want to act as interpreter on any point in the Yalta agreement during the present discussions in Moscow. . . . On July 6, Harriman was instructed to inform the Russians and the Chinese that our government, being a party to the Yalta agreement, expected to be consulted before any final agreement was concluded between the Russians and the Chinese. Further, we proposed at an appropriate time to make clear to the Soviet and Chinese governments that we would expect assurances that any arrangements made between the governments of the Soviet Union and China would cover the right of equal access by nationals of all peace-loving nations to the port facilities of Dairen and participation by them in transportation privileges on the railways, and would preclude practical denial of equality of economic opportunity, as was the case during the period of Japanese control. . . .

On July 7, Chiang Kai-shek sent Truman a message informing him of a cable which he had sent to T. V. Soong outlining what he called the "maximum concessions" which the Nationalist government could make to Stalin. Chiang summarized his instructions to Soong:

China will agree to recognize the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic [in Outer Mongolia] after the war if the Soviet [Union] agrees to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity. The Soviet [Union] would be offered the joint use of Port Arthur but not joint control. Darien will be made a free port but under Chinese administration. The two railroads will be jointly operated but remain under Chinese ownership and sovereignty. The Soviet [Union] agrees not to give any support to the Chinese Communists . . .

The negotiations between Soong and Stalin continued, and Harriman sent cables to Truman about them as Truman sailed to Europe to meet with Stalin and Churchill at Potsdam. Progress was made toward an agreement, but some issues apparently could not be resolved. Soong at one point suggested that he return to China to consult with Chiang, but Stalin persuaded him to stay in Moscow and try again to reach agreement. Stalin said he wanted to arrive at an agreement with China before he left for Potsdam so he could tell Truman during their meetings when the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan. Soong and Stalin met once again on July 12, but again failed to reach agreement. Soong returned to China, saying he would come back to Moscow any time Stalin wanted to continue their talks.

On July 20, Chiang Kai-shek, after discussing with Soong his talks with Stalin, cabled me:

Although China was not represented at the Yalta Conference, you, Mr. President, will realize that we have gone the limit to fulfill the Yalta formula. We have even gone beyond it in the case of Outer Mongolia. . . . We may have already gone beyond the limit that the Chinese people will support. I trust in your conversations with Stalin you would impress on him the eminently reasonable stand we have taken, so that he will not insist on the impossible.

On July 23, I telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek from Potsdam:

I asked that you carry out the Yalta agreement, but I had not asked that you make any concession in excess of that agreement. If you and . . . Stalin differ as to the correct interpretation of the Yalta agreement, I hope you will arrange

for Soong to return to Moscow and continue your efforts to reach complete understanding . . .

There were no negotiations between China and the Soviet Union while Stalin was away at the Potsdam Conference. Truman left Potsdam on August 2 feeling some concern about the lack of an agreement between the two sides. He had gotten a firm commitment from Stalin during the conference that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan, but he worried that China might make some concessions to the Soviet Union, particularly with respect to Soviet control of Dairen and Port Arthur, that were not in the interest of the United States.

Shortly after the Potsdam conference ended on August 2, T. V. Soong returned to Moscow and talks began once again.

I was keeping a close watch on the Russia-Chinese negotiations. It was our hope that despite the long-drawn-out negotiations our two wartime allies might reach agreement. Stalin had said that Russia would not come into the war against Japan until she had concluded an agreement with China. It was for this reason that I urged Chiang Kai-shek to continue the talks in Moscow.

Without warning, while Russia-Chinese negotiations were still far from agreement, Molotov sent for Ambassador Harriman on August 8 and announced to him that the Soviet Union would consider itself at war with Japan as of August 9. This move did not surprise us. Our dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan had forced Russia to reconsider her position in the Far East. The message from Harriman informing me of this sudden switch by the Russians reached me early in the afternoon of August 8, and I promptly called a special press conference. . . . “I have only a simple announcement to make,” [I said]. . . . “Russia has declared war on Japan. That is all.”

China and the Soviet Union finally reached agreement regarding the decisions made at the Yalta Conference on August 14, 1945. This agreement was formalized in the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

Year of Decisions, 257–270, 315–320, 423–425

The Potsdam Conference

July 6–August 3, 1945

Mental preparation—nighttime departure for TERMINAL—arrival in Europe—Babelsberg—first meeting with Churchill—a tour of Berlin—first meeting with Stalin—Cecilienhof Palace—thirteen meetings of the Big Three in 17 days—presentation of agendas—Council of Foreign Ministers—Germany—reestablishing governments in Central and Eastern Europe—Poland’s western frontier—reparations—Spain—flag raising over Berlin—Italy—Churchill’s long speeches—Stalin’s French wine—the Turkish straits—a surprising proposal regarding inland waterways—the Middle East—the British elections—rancor over puppet governments—the Potsdam Declaration—Soviet entry into the war against Japan—final communiqué and protocol—end of the conference—meeting with King George VI—going home

In preparation for the conference with Churchill and Stalin, I . . . [went] over in my mind the purposes for which I was traveling to Potsdam. . . . My immediate purpose was to get the Russians into the war against Japan as soon as possible, but my main objective was to come out with a working relationship to prevent another world catastrophe.



I was thinking of our experience at the close of World War I. At that time, President [Woodrow] Wilson tried to work out a way to prevent another world war. He was the most popular man in the history of the country at the time he went to Europe and when he came back. But unfortunately there

were men in Congress who, jealous of Wilson's popularity, began to undermine his efforts. In a way he aided his opponents, for he took none of the leaders in the Senate into his confidence. Instead, he waited until he came back with the treaty and then, with too little regard for the feeling on Capitol Hill, presented it to the Congress. It was my opinion that if President Wilson had had the leaders of the Congress in his confidence all the time and had trusted them he would not have been defeated on the League of Nations. The fact was that he did not like many of them, and very few were his close personal friends.

I had made up my mind to work in close cooperation with Congress and, in the working out of a settlement of World War II, to avoid the mistakes which had led to the disillusionment of the American people [following World War I]. There was one pitfall I intended to avoid. We did not intend to pay, under any circumstances, the reparations bill for Europe. We wanted a European recovery plan that would put Europe on its feet. We did not intend to send billions of dollars to Russia just because there was no possible way for Germany to pay vast reparations. . . . I was trying to profit by the mistakes of Woodrow Wilson as well as by those of Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln. I hoped that we would come out of this war with a going world organization for peace and, at the same time, that we could help get our friends and allies back on their economic feet. . . .

I decided to make the journey [to Germany] aboard a naval vessel, since I felt I would be better able aboard ship to study the many documents that had been assembled for my information. There would be an opportunity as well to consult with my advisers without interference by the usual White House routine. And I needed to have uninterrupted communications with Washington for transacting government business and to keep in touch with London and Moscow. Arrangements had to be closely coordinated with the preparations of the British and the Russians, and exchanges of messages were a continuing process. . . .

Potsdam, where the meetings between Truman, Churchill, and Stalin were to take place, was in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, about fifteen miles southwest of Berlin city center and just outside the American and British sectors of occupied Berlin. Stalin arranged, at Truman's request, that the American delegation be housed as the American delegation at the Yalta Conference had been—in, as Stalin described the arrangement in a cable to Truman, "its own closed territory under a regime regulated at the discretion of the head of the delegation." The three delegations were to be housed in the Babelsberg area of Potsdam; the meetings

were to be held in *Cecilienhof*, formerly a palace belonging to Crown Prince Wilhelm Hohenzollern.

I left the White House by automobile for the Union Station and boarded a train for Newport News, Virginia, where the heavy cruiser USS *Augusta* was waiting to take me to Europe. No public announcement was made of my departure for obvious security reasons. The special train which had been made up for the presidential party of fifty-three assistants, advisers, newsmen, and help arrived at the *Augusta's* berth in Newport News just before six o'clock in the morning on July 7. I went aboard at once. At my previous request, nothing more than the customary Navy honors of side boys, guard of the day, and "piping over the side" were rendered. Captain James H. Foskett, commanding officer of the *Augusta* was at the quarterdeck to meet me and showed me to the admiral's cabin in "flag country," where I was to live during the cruise.

Within an hour after we arrived at dockside, the *Augusta* was under way, and with her, as we left Hampton Roads, was the heavy cruiser *Philadelphia*. These two ships formed Task Force 68, commanded by Rear Admiral Allan R. McCann, who was charged with the mission of transporting the president of the United States and his party to Europe and back. No other escort, either ship or air, was used. The *Philadelphia* went ahead of us and made a smooth path in what otherwise would have been a rough sea, so that those of us who were not good sailors did not suffer from seasickness.

As soon as we had passed the swept channel leading through the mine field at the entrance of Chesapeake Bay and reached the open sea, the *Augusta* held an abandon ship drill. I went to my station, the No. 2 motor whaleboat on the portside of the well deck, and took part in the drill. I had always had great respect for the efficiency with which our naval vessels are operated, and as long as I was aboard ship I wanted to fit into the routine as much as it was possible. With the hostilities in the Atlantic ended, the ships of our task force were not darkened at night and, except for extra vigilant lookout watches, the passage to Europe was made under normal cruising conditions.

A part of each day was devoted to conferences with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy, shaping up the agenda for the forthcoming conference and preparing a written brief on the problems that were expected to be brought up at the meetings. Most of the afternoons on the voyage were spent in this way.

It was a wonderful crossing. The *Augusta* had a fine band which played during the dinner hour each evening. There were movies every night in

Secretary Byrnes's cabin. I was up early every morning to take some exercise on the deck and spent a good deal of time talking with the members of the crew. I also ate a meal in every mess aboard the ship, taking my place in the "chow lines" with my aluminum tray along with the men. . . .

On July 14, our eighth day under way, we entered the English Channel, where we were met by the light cruiser HMS *Birmingham* and six destroyers. They escorted us along the southern coast of England, and as we passed Dover we were so very close in shore that I got an excellent view of the famous White Cliffs. . . . As we entered the North Sea, the HMS *Birmingham* and the destroyers, which had proceeded ahead of us, reversed course and passed us to port, in column with the cruiser leading. As each ship passed the *Augusta*, the crews "cheered ship." Officers and men were in ranks along the port rail, and each ship's crew appeared to shout in unison, "Three cheers for the president of the United States."

. . . On the last night of the voyage we were forced to restrict our speed to ten knots because of mine fields in the North Sea and wreck buoys marking the location of sunken Axis and Allied ships. I was up early the next morning, which was Sunday [July 15], to watch the hundreds of wildly enthusiastic Belgians and Hollanders who thronged the little towns along the Schelde estuary and cheered our ships as we passed by. It was clear that the news of our arrival was no secret. . . . Just above Antwerp we passed an American Army camp, where we observed thousands of GI's waiting for ships to take them home. At one turn in the river there were no cheers from the persons who watched the *Augusta* standing in to shore. These were a large group of German prisoners of war, cooped up behind barbed wire in an Allied prison camp. It was difficult to realize that I was looking upon the scene of a devastating war which had just ended. Along the riverbanks, I saw very little evidence of damage caused by the war. Everything appeared peaceful and in order, and large herds of fat cattle could be seen grazing in the green meadow along our way.

. . . The *Augusta* moored at 10:04 a.m. on July 15, and the *Philadelphia* tied up astern. We had come 3,387 miles from Newport News in nine days. During the nine days, I had spent at sea I had been in constant touch with developments at home and in other parts of the world through the unique facilities which had been set up aboard ship. The office of the first lieutenant of the *Augusta* had been made over into a communications center which was complete in every detail. This was designated as the Advance Map Room, corresponding to the Map Room in the White House. Here messages were received and transmitted in virtually the same volume and with the same

dispatch as at the White House itself. For all practical purposes, the Advance Map Room was the White House during the time the *Augusta* was under way. . . .

One of the messages Truman received while at sea was from Winston Churchill, telling him that he would have to leave the Potsdam Conference on July 25 to return to London to learn the results of the recently concluded parliamentary elections. It was possible, he told Truman, that, should the elections go against his party, he would have to resign as prime minister before the conference ended.

Just before I went ashore from the . . . *Augusta*, I received a welcoming party that included [Charles W. Sawyer,] the American ambassador to Belgium . . . , General Eisenhower, Admiral [Harold R.] Stark, [commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe,] . . . and Captain Kelly Thomas, British naval officer in charge at Antwerp. A representative of the prince regent of Belgium also greeted me as I landed to begin the thirty-five-mile motor trip to the airport northwest of Brussels. The evidences of war's destruction were less marked along the road than in the city of Antwerp, but I saw many bombed out homes and factories and temporary wooden bridges. Most of the damage here, I was told, was done by V-bombs. We passed Breendonck, which was reputed to be the Germans' biggest and most feared concentration camp for Belgians during the war. The road from Antwerp to Brussels was guarded by soldiers from the 137th Infantry Regiment, 35th Division—the division in which I had served as a captain during World War I. The route was lined with spectators—mostly Belgians just recently liberated from the Germans—who came to watch our forty-car caravan.

Shortly after noon we arrived at the airfield. A military band and four hundred picked men of the 137th Infantry Regiment performed a brief honor ceremony, and then I reviewed the honor guard. . . . I talked with several of them before boarding my plane, the *Sacred Cow*. Two other C-54s were waiting to take the members of the presidential party, which split into three groups for the flight to Berlin.

. . . [We passed over Kassel and Magdeburg.] Those two cities, as viewed from the air, appeared to be completely destroyed. I could not see a single house that was left standing in either town. The German countryside, however, seemed to be under cultivation and presented a beautiful appearance. After a flight of about three hours and a half, we landed at Gatow airfield, ten miles from Babelsberg. I was greeted at the airfield by a large delegation. . . . Honors were accorded by a detachment from the 2nd Armored

"Hell on Wheels" Division, following which I inspected the honor guard. Then another automobile caravan took us to our quarters in Babelsberg, passing through a section of Potsdam on the way. A part of the road we took was guarded by American and British troops, but the greater part was patrolled by green capped Soviet frontier guardsmen, this being a Russian-controlled zone. In less than thirty minutes we had arrived at our final destination.

Babelsberg lies about twelve miles southeast of Berlin, between Berlin and Potsdam. It is in a thickly wooded area along [a winding canal and a lake]. The town was quite popular with the Germans as a summer resort and was also the seat of Germany's movie colony before the war. My quarters was a three-story stucco residence at No. 2 Kaiserstrasse which had formerly been the home of the head of the German movie colony. The building, which was promptly designated as the "Little White House," although it was painted yellow, was right on the lake and was surrounded on three sides by groves of trees and shrubbery forming a very beautiful garden that reached down to the lake. The house had been stripped of its furnishings during the war but had been refurnished by the Russians. . . . A map room and communications center had been installed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department parties also lived in Babelsberg in close proximity to the Little White House. Prime Minister Churchill lived at 23 Ringstrasse in Babelsberg, about two blocks from my residence. His was a similarly large house. . . . Stalin also resided at Babelsberg, about a mile from the Little White House, on the way to Cecilienhof, where the conference sessions were to be held.

The day had been long and strenuous, and I retired early. It was the following morning, July 16, when I met Prime Minister Churchill for the first time. He came to call on me, but I did not feel that I was meeting a stranger. I had seen him on several occasions when he had been in Washington for conferences with Roosevelt, although I had not talked to him then. We had had a number of telephone conversations since I had been president, and in that way a personal contact had already been made. I had an instant liking for this man who had done so much for his own country and for the Allied cause. There was something very open and genuine about the way he greeted me. . . . No business of the conference was discussed. I did tell him that I had an agenda which I would like to present at the meeting and asked him if he had one. He said, "No, I don't need one." Then we talked briefly about the latest news in the Pacific. Churchill and I never had a serious disagreement about anything, although we argued about a great many things. He was very grateful to the United States for what we had done, and he was a very great

admirer of Roosevelt. On the fundamentals of great principles we were in complete agreement. . . .

The arrival of Marshal Stalin was delayed because of a slight heart attack which he had suffered—this was a well kept secret. He was due to arrive on the following day. I took advantage of this unscheduled delay in the opening of the conference to make a motor tour of Berlin. Our motor convoy left Babelsberg early in the afternoon and soon turned onto the famous autobahn, heading north for what was left of the German capital. About halfway to the city we found the entire American 2nd Armored Division deployed along one side of the highway for my inspection. We stopped, honors were rendered by a band and honor guard, and I left the sedan in which I had been riding and entered an open half-track reconnaissance car. In this I passed down the long line of men and vehicles, which comprised what was at that time the largest armored division in the world. Men and tanks were arrayed down the highway in front of me as far as the eye could see. The line was so long it took twenty-two minutes to ride from the beginning to the end of it.

Our motorcade then drove to the center of Berlin and turned to drive down Wilhelmstrasse to the remains of the Reich Chancellery, where Hitler had so often harangued his Nazi followers. I never saw such destruction. "That's what happens," I said, "when a man overreaches himself." The remainder of our drive took us past the Tiergarten, the ruins of the Reichstag, the German Foreign Office, the Sports Palace, and dozens of other sites which had been world famous before the war. Now they were nothing more than piles of stone and rubble. A more depressing sight than that of the ruined buildings was the long, never ending procession of old men, women, and children wandering aimlessly along the autobahn and the country roads carrying, pushing, or pulling what was left of their belongings. In that two-hour drive I saw evidence of a great world tragedy, and I was thankful that the United States had been spared the unbelievable devastation of this war.

The next day [July 17] I met Stalin for the first time. He came to pay a visit at the Little White House shortly after his arrival at Babelsberg. . . . Stalin apologized for being late, saying that his health was not as good as it used to be. It was about 11 a.m. when he came, and I asked him to stay for lunch. He said he could not, but I insisted. "You could if you wanted to," I told him. He stayed. We continued our conversation through lunch. I was impressed by him and talked to him straight from the shoulder. He looked me in the eye when he spoke, and I felt hopeful that we could reach an agreement that would be satisfactory to the world and to ourselves. I was surprised by Stalin's stature—he was not over five feet five or six inches tall.

When we had pictures taken, he would usually stand on the step above me. Churchill would do the same thing. They were both shorter than I. I had heard that Stalin had a withered arm, but it was not noticeable. What I most especially noticed were his eyes, his face, and his expression.

I was pleased with my first visit with Stalin. He seemed to be in a good humor. He was extremely polite, and when he was ready to leave he told me that he had enjoyed the visit. He invited me to call on him, and I promised him I would.

Shortly before 5 p.m. . . . I arrived at Cecilienhof Palace in Potsdam for the opening session of the conference. Cecilienhof had been the country estate of the former Crown Prince Wilhelm. It was a two-story brownstone house of four wings with a courtyard in the center—a courtyard which was now brilliantly carpeted with a 24-foot red star of geraniums, pink roses, and hydrangeas planted by the Soviets. The flags of the three Allied nations were flying over the main entrance to the palace. Cecilienhof had been used as a hospital during the war by both the Germans and the Soviets. It had been stripped of all its furnishings, but the Russians had done an impressive job in refurbishing and refitting it for the conference. The furniture and furnishings had been brought in from Moscow. There were separate suites for . . . [Churchill, Stalin,] and myself, and each delegation had a retiring room and offices.

The place for the meetings was a big room, about forty by sixty feet, at one end of which was a balcony. Near the center of the room was a large round table twelve or fourteen feet in diameter, around which were chairs for the principal delegates from each of the three governments. I had a place on one side of the table with Byrnes, former Ambassador [to the Soviet Union] Joseph E. Davies, and Leahy, and my interpreter, [Charles E.] Bohlen, sat next to me. Immediately behind me were other members of my staff. Stalin sat part way around the table to my right with Molotov, Vishinsky, and his interpreter. Behind him were members of his military and civilian staffs. Churchill was similarly placed to my left, where he sat with [Foreign Secretary Anthony] Eden, Clement Attlee, and several others of his staff. . . .

July 17—First Meeting

At 5:10 p.m. the Potsdam conference was officially called to order. . . . Stalin opened the meeting by suggesting that I be asked to serve as the presiding officer. Churchill seconded the motion. I thanked them both for this courtesy.

The general purpose of this first meeting was to draw up the agenda of items which would be discussed in detail at subsequent meetings. I thereupon stated that I had some concrete proposals to lay before the conference. My first proposal was to establish a Council of Foreign Ministers. I said that we should not repeat the mistakes that we made in the peace settlements of World War I. "One of the most urgent problems in the field of foreign relations facing us today," I pointed out, "is the establishment of some procedure and machinery for the development of peace negotiations and territorial settlements without which the existing confusion, political and economic stagnation will continue to the serious detriment of Europe and the world. The experience at Versailles following the last war does not encourage the hope that a full formal peace conference can succeed without preliminary preparation." I proposed that the council be made up of the foreign ministers of Great Britain, Russia, China, France, and the United States. These countries were the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. I suggested that this council meet as soon as possible after our meeting. Churchill suggested that the proposal be referred to Foreign Secretaries Byrnes, Eden, and Molotov for study. Stalin agreed with that procedure but said he was not clear about the inclusion of China in a Council of Foreign Ministers to deal with the European peace. I told Stalin that his question could be discussed by the foreign ministers and then referred back to us.

I then placed my second proposal before the conference. This dealt with the control of Germany during the initial period. I explained that the United States believed that the [Allied] Control Council should begin to function at once. I submitted a statement of proposed political and economic principles under which Germany would be controlled. This document, copies of which I passed to Stalin and Churchill, outlined the basic principles that should guide the Control Council: [1] Complete disarmament of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. [2] The German people should be made to feel that they had suffered a total military defeat and that they could not escape responsibility for what they had brought upon themselves. [3] The National Socialist party and all Nazi institutions should be destroyed, and all Nazi officials removed. [4] Preparations should be made for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany. [5] Nazi laws of the Hitler regime which established discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion should be abolished. [6] War criminals and those who had participated in planning or carrying on Nazi enterprises involving or

resulting in atrocities or war crimes should be arrested and brought to judgment. [7] Economic controls should be imposed only in so far as they were necessary to the accomplishment of these ends. Germany, I stressed, should be treated as a single economic unit.

This proposal was not discussed but was referred to the foreign secretaries with instructions to report back to us the following day.

I then submitted the following statement, which I read:

In the Yalta Declaration of Liberated Europe signed February 11, 1945, the three governments assumed certain obligations in regard to the liberated peoples of Europe and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states. Since the Yalta Conference, the obligations assumed under this declaration have not been carried out. In the opinion of the United States Government the continued failure to implement these obligations would be regarded throughout the world as evidence of lack of unity between the three great powers, and would undermine confidence in the sincerity of their declared aims.

The United States Government proposes, therefore, that the following steps to carry out the obligations of the Declaration be agreed upon at this meeting:

1. The three Allied Governments should agree on [the] necessity of the immediate reorganization of the present governments in Rumania and Bulgaria, in conformity with Clause (C) of the third paragraph of the Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe.

2. That there be immediate consultation to work out any procedures which may be necessary for the reorganization of these governments to include representatives of all significant democratic elements. Diplomatic recognition shall be accorded and peace treaties concluded with those countries as soon as such reorganization has taken place.

3. That in conformity with the obligations contained in Clause (D) of the third paragraph of the Declaration on liberated Europe, the three governments consider how best to assist any interim governments in the holding of free and unfettered elections. Such assistance is immediately required in the case of Greece, and will in due course undoubtedly be required in Rumania and Bulgaria, and possibly other countries.

Churchill then spoke up. He said he wanted time to read and study the document and probably he generally concurred in it. . . .

Truman's last agenda item proposed that it should be the objective of the three Allies that Italy regain its independence and economic prosperity as soon as possible, and that its people have the right to choose their new form of government.

Churchill then proposed that we go ahead with the simple question of the agenda and either deal with the items or refer them to the foreign

ministers. The British, Churchill said, wished to add the Polish problem to the agenda.

Stalin spoke next. He set forth the questions Russia wished to discuss. These dealt with (1) the division of the German merchant fleet and navy; (2) reparations; (3) trusteeships for Russia under the United Nations Charter; (4) relations with the Axis satellite states; (5) the Franco regime in Spain. At this point in the outline of his proposals Stalin digressed to declare that the Spanish regime did not originate in Spain but was imported and forced on the Spanish people by Germany and Italy. It was a danger to the United Nations, he said, and he thought it would be well to create conditions that would enable the Spanish people to establish the regime they wanted. . . . Stalin continued his list with (6) the question of Tangier; (7) the problem of Syria and Lebanon; and (8) the Polish question, involving the determination of Poland's western frontier and the liquidation of the London government-in-exile.

Churchill agreed that all aspects of the Polish question should be taken up. He stated that he was sure Stalin and I would realize that Britain had been the home of the Polish government and the base from which the Polish armies were maintained and paid. He said that, although all three of us might have the same objectives, the British would have a harder task than the other two powers because they would have the details to handle. They did not wish to release large numbers of soldiers in their midst without making proper provision for them, he added. He observed that it was important to continue to carry out the Yalta agreement and that he attached great importance to the Polish elections in order that the will of the Polish people would be reflected. He added that the British delegation were submitting their proposed agenda in writing, and suggested that the foreign secretaries meet that night and agree on the items we would discuss the following day. Stalin and I agreed. Churchill remarked, "The foreign ministers can prepare a menu for us better than we could at this table, so tomorrow we will have prepared for us the points which are most agreeable—or, perhaps I should say, the least disagreeable."

Stalin rejoined that all the same we would not escape the disagreeable ones. . . .

There was some disagreement about the composition of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Truman felt that since China was one of the five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations, it should be included. Stalin disagreed, as did Churchill, who doubted China could provide much help in solving

the tangled problems of Europe which must necessarily be addressed by the foreign ministers. An agreement on this question emerged from a discussion of the purpose of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was to draw up treaties of peace with Germany's allies—Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, to settle outstanding territorial questions, and to prepare a peace settlement for Germany. China, which was still fighting the war against Japan, would be excluded from the Council of Foreign Ministers until the war against Japan ended, during which interval the Council would conclude its work on European issues.

I told Stalin and Churchill that we should discuss the next day some of those points on which we could come to a conclusion. Churchill replied that the secretaries should give us three or four points—enough to keep us busy. I said I did not want just to discuss. I wanted to decide. Churchill asked if I wanted something in the bag each day. He was as right as he could be. I was there to get something accomplished, and if we could not do that, I meant to go back home. I proposed that we meet at four o'clock instead of five in order to get more done during the time we would be meeting. The others agreed to this. I then proposed we adjourn.

Stalin agreed to the adjournment but said there was one question he would like to raise first: Why did Churchill refuse to give Russia her share of the German fleet? Churchill explained that he thought the fleet should be destroyed or shared, saying that weapons of war are horrible things and that the captured vessels should be sunk. Whereupon Stalin said, "Let us divide it," adding, "If Mr. Churchill wishes, he can sink his share."

With that, the first meeting of the Potsdam conference adjourned.

After that first meeting with Churchill and Stalin, I returned to my temporary home at Babelsberg with some confidence. I hoped that Stalin was a man who would keep his agreements. We had much to learn on this subject. Because the Russians had made immense sacrifices in men and materials—over five million men killed in action, more millions slain and starved wantonly by Hitler in his invasion of the Ukraine—we hoped that Russia would join wholeheartedly in a plan for world peace. I did not underestimate the difficulties before us. . . . I knew that Stalin and Churchill each would have special interests that might clash and distract us. Stalin, I knew, wanted the Black Sea straits for Russia, as had all the czars before him. Churchill was determined that Britain should keep and even strengthen her control of the Mediterranean. I knew that I was dealing with two men of entirely different temperaments, attitudes, and backgrounds. Churchill was great in argument. His command of the spoken word is hard to equal. Stalin was not given to

long speeches. He would reduce arguments quickly to the question of power and had little patience with any other kind of approach. . . .

Following the adjournment of the first meeting, we were invited into a large banquet room in Cecilienhof Palace, where the Russians entertained at a lavish buffet dinner spread on a tremendous table about twenty feet wide and thirty long. The table was set with everything you could think of—goose liver, caviar, all sorts of meats, cheeses, chicken, turkey, duck, wines, and spirits. . . .

On our way back to Babelsberg, it was necessary for us to drive through various parts of the Russian zone. Admiral Leahy and Secretary Byrnes were with me, and at one of the crossings our car was stopped by a Russian lieutenant. The delay was no more than a matter of minutes, for we were quickly identified by other Russian officers arriving on the scene. These officers proceeded to scare the life out of the lieutenant for making such a blunder. Leahy turned to me and said, "I'll bet that lieutenant is shot in the morning."

. . . On the morning of July 18, after a conference with my advisers, I walked to Churchill's residence for a return visit. Later I went to Stalin's quarters to return his call, and by 4:00 p.m. I arrived at Cecilienhof Palace for the second meeting of the conference.

July 18—Second Meeting

Churchill opened the second meeting of the conference by raising a question of the relation of the press to the conference. At Teheran, he said, it was difficult for the press to have access to the conference, while at Yalta it had been impossible. But here, he complained, there were many representatives of the press outside the well guarded fortress in which the conference was taking place, and they were raising a great cry in the world press regarding the inadequacy of their access to information.

"Who let them in?" Stalin shouted in a loud voice.

Churchill told Stalin that the press was being kept outside the compound. If his colleagues agreed, Churchill said he was willing to have a talk with the press, not to explain the work of the meeting, but rather why the press must be excluded. I saw no need for this. I pointed out that each delegation had a press representative here and suggested that it be left to them to handle. We were still at war in the Pacific, and many delicate problems remained to be settled in Europe, and we therefore could not open the proceedings to the press. Churchill agreed, saying "I only offered myself as the lamb and, in any event, I would only go if Stalin agreed to rescue me." I think Churchill

enjoyed the reaction of his colleagues to the dramatic suggestion of his acting as spokesman in a situation such as this one.

At this second meeting, I placed on the agenda three topics submitted to the conference by the foreign ministers. The first dealt with a redraft of the American proposal for setting up a Council of Foreign Ministers. It provided that the council be made up of those countries which had already signed terms of surrender with the enemy. This left the door open for China to participate in the council later at the close of the war with Japan. Therefore, this proposal was acceptable to us. The makeup of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the procedure for peace settlements were agreed to unanimously.

In the discussion on the submission of all treaties to the United Nations, Stalin observed that this made no difference, as "the three powers would represent the interests of all." That was Stalin's viewpoint all the way. His viewpoint was that Russia, Britain, and the United States would settle world affairs and that it was nobody else's business. I felt very strongly that participation of all nations, small and large, was just as important to world peace as that of the Big Three. It was my policy and purpose to make the United Nations a going and vital organization. . . .

When Truman asked Secretary Byrnes to read the foreign ministers report on the American proposal for policy toward Germany, a discussion started about the meaning of "Germany." Truman proposed that "Germany" should mean the country as it was in 1937—as it had been following the Treaty of Versailles and before it began annexing or occupying other countries. Churchill and Stalin accepted this definition.

We now turned to a discussion of the Polish question. Stalin introduced a Russian draft proposal on Poland. The substance of this was that the conference should call upon all member governments of the United Nations to withdraw recognition from the Polish government-in-exile in London and that all assets of that government would be transferred to the provisional government in Warsaw. The Russian draft proposed placing all Polish armed forces under the control of the Warsaw government and left it up to that government to dispose of them. What the Russians wanted to accomplish with this proposal was plain: They wished to get all the property and equipment of the 150,000 men in the Polish army for the Warsaw regime, although this equipment had originally been supplied by Great Britain and the United States.

Churchill immediately pointed out that the burden of this proposal would fall most heavily on Britain. The United Kingdom had received the Poles when they were driven out by the Germans. He did not remind Stalin that Russian connivance had made this possible. There was no property of any kind or extent belonging to the old Polish government, he added. There were twenty million pounds of gold in London and Canada which was frozen and was the ultimate property of the Polish national state. There was a Polish embassy vacated by the old ambassador, he said, which was available to the ambassador of the new government as soon as they sent one, and "the sooner the better."

Churchill talked at length about the contribution the Polish forces had made to the Allied victory over the Axis, and added that Britain had pledged her honor to these men. He told us that he had said in Parliament that if there were Polish soldiers who had fought with the Allies and did not wish to return to Poland, Great Britain would receive them as British subjects. "We cannot cast adrift men who have been brothers in arms," he declared. He hoped that most of them would want to go back to their own country, but he felt that there should be reassurances that they would be safe there in the pursuit of their livelihoods. Subject to these reservations, he said, he was in agreement with the Russian proposal and would be pleased to have it passed on to the foreign secretaries for study.

Stalin said that he appreciated the difficulties of the British and that there was no intention on the part of Russia to make the British position more complicated. He merely wished to put an end to the former Polish government in London. Stalin offered to withdraw any part of the Russian draft which Churchill felt would complicate the British position.

I said I wanted an agreement on the Polish question, but what I was particularly interested in was free elections for Poland, as assured by the Yalta agreement. Stalin replied that the Polish government had never refused to hold elections. He suggested that the question be referred to the foreign secretaries, and Churchill and I agreed.

That was all of the agenda for the second meeting, and the session adjourned at six o'clock, after meeting only an hour and forty-five minutes. I felt that some progress had been made, but I was beginning to grow impatient for more action and fewer words. . . .

July 19—Third Meeting

At the third session, on July 19, I asked [British Foreign Secretary] Anthony Eden to present the agenda prepared by the foreign ministers for

our discussion. . . . [It] included the disposition of the German naval and merchant fleet; [the regime of Francisco] Franco [in] Spain; the situation in Yugoslavia; and the removal of oil equipment from Romania.

On the question of the disposition of the German fleet, I said that we had to make a distinction between what was reparations and what was war booty. The merchant fleet, I said, should be classified as reparations, and the matter therefore would eventually be referred to the Reparations Commission. Our interest in the merchant fleet, I declared, was to make use of it in the Japanese war zone.

Stalin said that war material taken by armies in the course of a war is booty. Armies that laid down their arms and surrendered, he said, turned in their arms as booty. He applied the same thing to the German navy; when the fleet was surrendered to the three powers, it therefore became booty. It was possible, however, Stalin continued, to discuss the question whether the merchant fleet was booty or reparations. Regarding the navy, he said, there was no question about the matter. . . .

Stalin wanted for the Soviet Union a one third share in the German naval and merchant fleet, and he wanted the Soviet Union to have the right to inspect the German fleet, most of which was in British custody. Truman and Churchill agreed to the division by thirds in principle, and Churchill was willing to agree to allow the Soviets access to the fleet, but he wanted the Soviets to allow the British to inspect the U-boats which were in Soviet custody. "All we want is reciprocity," Churchill said. Truman agreed that reciprocity was important, and not only with respect to the German fleet.

I said that so far as the United States zone in Germany was concerned, the Russians were at liberty to see anything they wanted to see but that we, too, would expect reciprocity. I was trying to pave the way for the Reparations Commission to see everything that had been captured by the Russians in the territory they had taken over. I had already had a glimpse of what was happening to materials that had been captured from Germany by the Russians. In the Russian zone of Berlin, which was the industrial zone of the city, I had seen where the Soviets had torn the plants up and taken everything out of them. They had loaded the industrial facilities on flatcars, and in many instances the cars were standing on a sidetrack. The material was rusting and disintegrating. Very soon it would be of no use to anybody.

I suggested we move on the question of Spain. Churchill said that his government had a strong distaste for [Spanish dictator] General [Francisco] Franco and his government . . . [but that] he saw some difficulty in Stalin's proposal, particularly in regard to the breaking off of all relations with Franco Spain. He said that he was against interfering in the affairs of a country which had not molested the Allies and believed it was a dangerous principle to break off relations because of Spain's internal conduct. . . .

I made it clear that I had no love for Franco. . . . I said that I would be happy to recognize another government in Spain but that I thought Spain itself must settle that question.

Stalin said that this was no internal affair, because the Franco regime had been imposed on the Spanish people by Hitler and Mussolini. . . . If breaking relations was too severe a demonstration, he asked if there were not some other more flexible means by which the Big Three could let the Spanish people know that the three governments were in sympathy with the people of Spain and not Franco. He said it was presumed that the Big Three could settle such questions and that we could not pass by this cancer in Europe. If we remained silent, he warned, it might be considered that we sanctioned Franco.

Churchill reiterated his opposition to breaking relations. He referred to the valuable trade relations which Britain maintained with Spain. . . . He fully understood the feeling of . . . Stalin, he said, when Franco had had the audacity to send a Spanish Blue Division [División Española de Voluntarios, which served in the German army on the Eastern Front from 1941 to 1943] to Russia. Russia was in a different position, he admitted, because she had been molested. He pointed out that the Spaniards had refrained from taking action against the British at a time when such intervention could have been disastrous. . . .

Stalin suggested that the foreign secretaries try to find some means of making it clear that the heads of the three governments were not in favor of the Franco regime. I agreed with this suggestion, but Churchill wanted the matter settled by the heads of government. . . .

Stalin and Churchill could not agree on this issue. Truman suggested that they pass on to the next agenda item, Yugoslavia. Stalin immediately objected, saying they could not discuss Yugoslavia without representatives of that country, which was an ally. Churchill and Stalin exchanged testy words about political developments in Yugoslavia since the Yalta conference, and Truman became impatient.

I felt that I had heard enough of this. I told Churchill and Stalin that I had come to the conference as a representative of the United States to discuss world affairs. I did not come there to hold a police court hearing on something that was already settled or which would eventually be settled by the United Nations. If we started that, I said, we would become involved in trying to settle every political difficulty and would have to hold hearings for a succession of representatives [of different countries]. . . . I told them frankly that I did not wish to waste time listening to grievances but wanted to deal with the problems which the three heads of government had come to settle. I said that if they did not get to the main issues I was going to pack up and go home. I meant just that. Stalin laughed heartily and said he did not blame the president for wanting to go home; he wanted to go home too. . . .

Truman suggested that discussion of Yugoslavia be postponed.

Our final topic on the agenda for the day had to do with British and American oil equipment in Romania. Churchill said that the British had submitted a paper on this subject which they thought the foreign ministers could agree upon, and suggested that since it was a rather detailed question it be referred to them first. Stalin said he thought this was a trifling matter which could be settled through diplomatic channels without raising it at this conference. Since it had been brought up, however, he wished to rectify one misstatement, he said. No British property had been taken by the Soviet Union in Romania, he declared. The property of some of these oil companies had been obtained in Germany, but the Germans had captured it and had used it against the Allies. The Russians, Stalin admitted, removed some quantity of this type of equipment because the Germans had destroyed the Soviet oil industry. He repeated that this was a trifling matter with which the conference should not be troubled.

The reason Stalin insisted that this was a "trifling matter" was that he had obtained possession of equipment that belonged to the United States and Great Britain. It was funny to watch him. Every time there was something like this, where the Russians had stolen the coffin and disposed of the body, he was always very careful to insist that it be settled through diplomatic channels. But where it was a matter of . . . Spain and Yugoslavia, [where the Soviets hoped to achieve important foreign policy objectives], he was very anxious that the matter be put on the table and settled. I saw what was going on, and that is why I made my "police court" statement when I did.

Churchill stated that the disposition of British and American oil

equipment was not a trifling matter. It was true, he agreed, that the Germans had stolen pipe from the British, but it was pipe which the British had bought and paid for. If the Soviet Union took some of this pipe . . . and was considering it as reparations, then Romania should reimburse the British for it. I observed that the United States was involved in a similar situation with regard to American oil companies. Stalin had nothing more to say on this subject. It was agreed that the matter would be referred to the foreign ministers, and this concluded the third meeting.

On the evening following the third afternoon session, I entertained at a state dinner held in the Little White House. . . .

Truman learned prior to the conference that Stalin liked the music of Frédéric Chopin, so he included some pieces by Chopin in a dinner concert. Stalin was delighted, offered a toast to the pianist, and requested encores.

This was the first of several informal gatherings among the heads of the three governments. These social occasions helped to promote a friendly atmosphere among the men who had come to Berlin to settle problems which demanded the utmost in cooperation if they were to be solved.

The following day, July 20, I drove to the United States Group Control Council headquarters in Berlin to participate in the official raising of the Stars and Stripes over Berlin. The ceremonies were held in the courtyard of the buildings which had formerly been the home of the German Air Defense Command for Berlin. . . . As the flag was officially raised over the U.S. controlled section of Berlin—the same flag, incidentally, which had flown over the United States Capitol in Washington when war was declared against Germany and which had been taken to Rome after that city's capture—I made the following remarks:

. . . This is an historic occasion. We have conclusively proved that a free people can successfully look after the affairs of the world. We are here today to raise the flag of victory over the capital of our greatest adversary. In doing this, we must remember that in raising this flag we are raising it in the name of the people of the United States who are looking forward to a better world, a peaceful world, a world in which all the people will have an opportunity to enjoy the good things in life and not just a few at the top. Let's not forget that we are fighting for peace and for the welfare of mankind. We are not fighting for conquest. There is not one piece of territory or one thing of a monetary nature that we want out of this war. We want peace and prosperity for the world as a whole. We want to see the time come when we can do the things in peace that

we have been able to do in war. If we can put this tremendous machine of ours, which has made this victory possible, to work for peace, we could look forward to the greatest age in the history of mankind. That is what we propose to do.

I left the scene of the flag raising immediately after the ceremony and proceeded to Cecilienhof Palace, where I called the fourth meeting of the Potsdam conference to order at 4:05 p.m. . . .

July 20—Fourth Meeting

Three subjects were discussed during the fourth meeting—the supervision of elections in Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece; the terms of the Italian surrender; and the occupation of Austria, with particular reference to Vienna. Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov, in presenting the agenda, reported that the foreign ministers had not been able to agree on how to supervise elections in Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece. Truman and Churchill both said they did not want the elections in these countries to be supervised by their respective countries, they only wanted to know that the elections were being held. The discussion turned to the terms of the Italian surrender. Truman wanted the terms changed to spare Italy some of the consequences of an occupation in the interval between the end of the war and the preparation of a peace treaty. Stalin agreed to this, as long as the same policy could be extended to Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Churchill spoke at length about his concerns regarding Truman's proposal, and concluded that he did not want to agree to anything besides the preparation of a peace treaty. Truman noted that Churchill would often make long speeches when vital British interests were involved in a subject. He would eventually agree to whatever was being proposed, but the long speeches were apparently made for the record, to be referred to later, when the peace treaties formally ending the war were being negotiated. Truman saw that Stalin enjoyed to tease Churchill about these speeches.

On several occasions when Churchill was discussing something at length, Stalin would lean on his elbow, pull on his mustache, and say, "Why don't you agree? The Americans agree, and we agree. You will agree eventually, so why don't you do it now?" Then the argument would stop. Churchill in the end would agree, but he had to make a speech about it first. . . .

Stalin spoke at length about Truman's proposal, enlarged by himself to include all of the so called German satellite countries. He argued that the important thing was to separate these countries from any lingering association with Germany. The

satellite countries must be weaned away from Germany by policies that did not rely on force alone and was not motivated by revenge, but rather by what he called "the calculation of forces." Truman listened to Stalin's speech with some cynicism.

While Stalin was capable of making speeches about the German satellites—Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary—he always had his iron heel on those satellites which his army had occupied so they could not turn around. His iron heel policy had been extended to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. . . .

Stalin continued to speak for a considerable time. It was about the longest speech he was to make in the whole conference. He never used notes, although he might turn to Molotov . . . once in a while. He would talk for about five minutes, then [his translator] would translate. Stalin knew exactly what he wanted to say and what he wanted to obtain. He spoke in a quiet, inoffensive way. . . .

I thought that agreement could be reached on all of these satellite countries. The United States policy in this matter, I explained, was for bringing about a feeling of peace in the world, and this did not have to wait a final peace conference for the world as a whole. My country, I said, was faced with a situation where it must spend enormous sums of money because of conditions in the countries of Europe. With reference to the question of reparations from Italy, I reminded [Stalin and Churchill] that the United States was spending from \$750 million to \$1 billion to feed Italy this winter. The United States was rich, I conceded, but it could not forever pour out its resources for the help of others without getting some results toward peace for its efforts. Unless we were able to help get these governments on a self-supporting basis, I warned, the United States would not be able to continue to maintain them indefinitely when they should be able to help themselves. The Big Three, I said, must try at this meeting to prepare conditions that would bring about a situation in which these countries could help themselves.

Our discussion of Italian policy followed the course of most subjects we had touched on so far: It was referred to the foreign secretaries for study and was then to be reported back to us. . . .

The next agenda item was the occupation of Austria. Churchill complained that the British had not been allowed by the Soviets to enter their zone of occupation in Vienna. Stalin replied that an agreement regarding the zones had been reached the day before, and that British, French, and American occupation forces could begin entering Vienna immediately.

The fourth meeting ended, and Truman returned to the Little White House in Babelsberg.

July 21—Fifth Meeting

The fifth meeting opened with a report from Secretary of State Byrnes that the foreign ministers had been unable to reach agreement on questions referred to them relating to Poland, and that they wished to refer the questions back to the heads of government. After reaching quick agreement on two minor matters relating to Poland, Truman, Churchill, and Stalin spent the rest of the meeting talking at length about its western border.

The next important question on the agenda was that of the Polish western frontier. I began by saying that I wanted to make a general statement regarding the Polish frontiers. I said it had been decided at Yalta that Germany would be occupied by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, and that the Polish frontiers would be favorably considered by the four governments but that final settlement of the frontiers would be effected at the peace conference. I reminded Churchill and Stalin that at our first meeting we had agreed to use the 1937 boundaries of Germany as a point of departure. I pointed out that the three governments had decided upon zones of occupation in Germany. The boundaries of these zones had been set, and the Americans and the British had already gone into the areas assigned to them. It now appeared, I said, as if another occupying government was being assigned a zone in Germany. This was being done without consultation, I charged, and if the Poles were actually to occupy this zone, an agreement on it should have been reached. I added that I failed to see how reparations or other questions could be decided if Germany were carved up. I made it clear that I was very friendly toward the Polish provisional government, and I felt that full agreement could probably be reached on what the Soviet government desired, but I wanted to be consulted.

Stalin replied that the Yalta decision was that the eastern frontiers of Poland should follow the Curzon Line [a border between Poland and the Soviet Union, proposed in 1918, which was considerably to the west of the border which was eventually established in 1921]. In regard to the western frontiers, it had been decided at Yalta that Poland should receive cessions of territory in the north and west. He said it had also been decided that a new Polish government should consult at the appropriate time on the final settlement of the western frontiers. I agreed that this was a correct statement of

the Yalta decision but that it was not correct to assign a zone of occupation to the Poles. Stalin declared that it was not accurate to say that the Russians had given the Poles a zone of occupation without agreement. What had happened, he explained, was that the German population in these areas had followed the German army to the west, and the Poles had remained. The Red Army, he said, had needed local administration in this territory. It could not clear out enemy agents and fight a war and set up an administration at the same time, and he was unable to see what harm had been done by the establishment of a Polish administration where only Poles remained.

I replied that I had no objection to an expression of opinion regarding the western frontier, but I wanted it distinctly understood that the zones of occupation would be exactly as established by previous agreement at Yalta. Any other course, I warned, would make reparations very difficult, particularly if part of the German territory was gone before agreement was reached on what reparations should be. Stalin boasted that the Soviet Union was not afraid of the reparations questions and would, if necessary, renounce reparations entirely. In response to this, I observed that however this matter was handled the United States would get no reparations—that what we were trying to do was to keep from paying the reparations bill from the U.S. Treasury, as we had done after World War I.

Stalin then said that no frontiers had been ceded at Yalta except for the provision that Poland would receive territory. The western frontier question was open, and the Soviet Union was not bound. I turned to Stalin. "You are not?" I asked. "No," replied Stalin. Churchill remarked that he had a good deal to say about the actual line, but gathered that it was not yet the time for saying it. I agreed that it was not possible for the heads of government to settle this question. It was a matter for the peace conference.

Stalin expressed the opinion that it would be very difficult to restore a German administration in this area of East Prussia. He said that he wanted me to understand the Russian conception, to which the Russians had adhered both in war and during the occupation. According to this view, an army fights in war and cares only for its efforts to win the war. To enable an army to win and advance, it must have a quiet rear. It fights well if the rear is quiet, and better if the rear is friendly. Even if the Germans had not fled, he went on, it would have been very difficult to set up a German administration in this area because the majority of the population was Polish. The Poles who were there, he contended, had received the Soviet army enthusiastically, and it was only natural that the Soviet government should have set up an administration of friends, especially since [the Soviet Union] was still fighting

to win the war. He insisted there was no other way out. Soviet action, he said, did not imply that the Russians had settled the question themselves. Perhaps, he suggested, the whole question should be suspended.

Churchill raised a doubt as to whether the question could be suspended and added that there was also the question of supply. This was very urgent because the region under discussion was a very important source of food from which Germany was to be fed. Stalin asked who would work to produce the grain and who would plow the fields. I pointed out that the question was not one of who occupied an area but a question of the occupation of Germany. We should occupy our zone, the British theirs, the French theirs, and the Russians should occupy theirs. There was no objection, I said, to discussing the western frontiers of Poland, and I added that I did not believe we were far apart on this matter.

Stalin insisted that on paper these areas constituted German territory, but for all practical purposes they were actually Polish territories since there was no German population. I took issue with that by remarking that nine million Germans seemed like a big population to me. Stalin maintained, however, that all the Germans had fled westward. Churchill observed that if this were true, consideration should be given to the means of feeding them in the regions to which they had fled. The produce of the land they had left, he added, was not yet available to nourish Germany. He . . . [said] that it was his understanding that under the full Polish plan put forward by the Soviet government one quarter of the total arable land of 1937 Germany would be alienated from the German area on which food and reparations were based. This was tremendous. It appeared, he continued, that three to four million people would be moved, but the prewar population of that territory had been 8,250,000. It was a serious matter, he concluded, to effect wholesale transfers of German populations and burden the remainder of Germany with their care if their food supply had been alienated.

I interjected to ask where we would be if we should give France the Saar and the Ruhr. Stalin replied that the Soviet government had not made a decision in regard to French claims, but it had done so in regard to the western frontier of Poland. He added that he fully appreciated the difficulties that would arise in transferring this territory from the Germans to the Poles, but that the German people were principally to blame for these difficulties. Churchill, he said, had quoted the figure of 8,250,000 as the population of this area. It should be remembered, Stalin said, that there had been several "call-ups" during the war and that the rest of the population had left before the Soviet army arrived. He emphasized that no single German remained in the territory to be given Poland.

"Of course not," Admiral Leahy whispered to me. "The Boolshies have killed all of them!"

Stalin went on to say that between the Oder [River] and the Vistula [River] the Germans had quitted their fields, which were now being cultivated by the Poles. It was unlikely, he said, that the Poles would agree to the return of these Germans. Of course, I knew that Stalin was misrepresenting the facts. The Soviets had taken the Polish territory east of the Curzon Line, and they were now trying to compensate Poland at the expense of the other three occupying powers. I would not stand for it, nor would Churchill. I was of the opinion that the Russians had killed the German population or had chased them into our zones.

I was getting tired of sitting and listening to endless debate on matters that could not be settled at this conference yet took up precious time. I was anxious also to avoid any sharpening of the verbal clashes in view of the more immediate and urgent questions that needed to be settled. I was becoming very impatient, and on a number of occasions I felt like blowing the roof off the palace.

When Stalin concluded, I said that I wanted to declare again that the occupation zones in Germany should be occupied as agreed upon. The question of whether the Poles should have part of Germany, I said, could not be settled here. The argument continued between Stalin and Churchill. At last I intervened to say that it seemed to be an accomplished fact that a large piece of Germany had been given to the Poles. The Silesian coal mines, I pointed out, were a part of Germany for reparations and feeding purposes, and these were now in Polish hands. We could talk about boundaries and reparations and feeding problems, but the Poles, I emphasized, had no right to take this territory and remove it from the German economy. Simply stated, I said, the case was this: Were the zones valid until peace terms had been signed, or were we going to give Germany away piecemeal?

Stalin recapitulated his claims for Polish control of the arable lands and the coal mines of Silesia, saying that his policy was to make things difficult for the Germans so that German power would not rise again. It was better to make difficulties for the Germans, he reasoned, than for the Poles. I replied that it was bad to create difficulties for the Allies. Stalin asserted that the less industry there was in Germany the greater would be the market for American and British goods. Germany was a dangerous business rival, he said, unless we kept her on her knees. Churchill remarked that we did not wish to be confronted by a mass of starving people. Stalin assured him, "There will be none."

. . . It seemed to me that nothing remained to be said except to repeat in all frankness where I stood: I could not agree to the separation of the eastern part of Germany. Stalin, too, apparently had decided there was nothing to be gained by continuing this discussion. "Are we through?" he asked abruptly. Churchill suggested that we were hardly through but that we should turn now to more agreeable things. I announced that the conference had apparently reached an impasse on this matter and that the session was adjourned.

That evening Stalin gave a state dinner. It was quite an occasion. . . . I was seated next to Stalin, and I noticed that he drank from a tiny glass that held about a thimbleful. He emptied it frequently and replenished it from a bottle he kept handy. I assumed that it was vodka, which everybody else was being served, and I began to wonder how Stalin could drink so much of that powerful beverage. Finally, I asked him, and he looked at me and grinned. Then he leaned over to his interpreter and said, "Tell the President it is French wine, because since my heart attack I can't drink the way I used to."

July 22 was Sunday, but we had decided to continue the daily conferences without interruption. . . . I . . . called to order the sixth meeting of the conference at 5 p.m.

July 22—Sixth Meeting

Our discussion was resumed where it had left off the day before, with the question of Poland's western frontier and . . . Churchill restating his reasons for refusing to accept Stalin's proposal to cede the eastern territory of Germany to Poland. Stalin, in turn, challenged [Churchill's] reasoning with the same arguments he had previously advanced. I then read a portion of the Yalta Declaration [of Liberated Europe] concerning Poland's western frontier and reminded them that this agreement had been reached by President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill. I added that I was in complete accord with it and wished to make the point clear that Poland now had been assigned a zone of occupation in Germany without any consultation among the three powers. While I did not object to Poland being assigned a zone, I did not like the manner in which it had been done. Our main problem here, I repeated, was that of the occupation of Germany by the four authorized powers. That, I said, was my position yesterday, that was my position today, and that would be my position tomorrow.

Stalin said that if we were not bored with the question of frontiers he would like to point out that the exact character of the Yalta decision was that

we were bound to receive the opinion of the Polish government on the question of its western frontiers. As we were not in agreement with the Polish proposal, we should hear the representatives of the new Polish government. If the heads of government did not wish to hear them, then the foreign ministers should hear them. Stalin said that he wished to remind Mr. Churchill, as well as others who had been at the Crimea conference, that the view held by the president and Mr. Churchill with regard to the western frontier and with which he did not agree was that the line should begin from the estuary of the Oder and follow the Oder to where it is joined by the Eastern Neisse. He had insisted on the line of the Western Neisse. The plan proposed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, said Stalin, left the town of Stettin on the German side, as well as Breslau and the region west of Breslau. At this point, Stalin walked around the table and showed me this line on a map. Stalin said the question to be settled was that of the frontier and not that of a temporary line. We could settle the matter, and we could put it off, but we could not ignore it.

Churchill agreed that the matter could not be settled without the Poles, unless, of course, we accepted the Polish proposal. Stalin then turned to me and said that in regard to my observation that a fifth country was now occupying Germany, he wished to state that if anyone was to blame, it was not just the Poles—circumstances and the Russians were to blame. I replied that that was exactly what I had been talking about. I then agreed that the Polish representatives could come to Potsdam and be heard by the foreign ministers, who would report to us.

It was now agreed that as presiding officer I should issue an invitation to the Poles to send representatives to the foreign ministers' meeting at Potsdam in an effort to reach some kind of practical solution to the problem of boundaries which could last until the matter was finally settled at the peace conference.

Next followed a brief discussion of the establishment of trusteeships for former colonies, particularly those of Italy. The Soviet Union put forward a trusteeship proposal, which was referred to the foreign ministers.

The next subject on the agenda was Turkey.

Churchill said there was an admitted need to modify the old Montreux Convention [Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, 1936, which gave Turkey control over the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea and restricted the passage of naval vessels, including Soviet naval vessels, through the straits], and he had frequently expressed

his readiness to welcome an arrangement for the free movement of Russian ships through the Black Sea and back. But he wished to impress on Stalin the importance of not alarming Turkey. Turkey was very much alarmed, he said, by a strong concentration of Bulgarian and Soviet troops in Bulgaria, by continuous attacks in the Soviet press, and by the conversations between the Turkish ambassador and Mr. Molotov in which modifications of Turkey's eastern frontier were mentioned, as well as a Soviet base in the straits. . . . Churchill challenged the right of the Russians to consider the matter of the Black Sea straits as one in which no one had a voice except themselves and Turkey. Molotov replied that similar treaties had existed between Russia and Turkey in the past, and he cited the treaties of 1805 and 1833. Churchill said he would have to ask his staff to look up these ancient treaties. He said that the British were not prepared to push Turkey to accept such proposals from the Russia.

I said that I was not ready to express an opinion and suggested that we defer consideration of the question until necessary study could be given to it. This was agreed to. After an exchange between Churchill and Molotov on the question of the treatment of Russian prisoners in Italy, I adjourned the meeting.

July 23—Seventh Meeting

We met the following day, July 23, for the seventh meeting of the conference. The agenda for that day involved four controversial territories: Turkey, Königsberg, Syria and Lebanon, and Iran. Other questions which had been passed over or referred to the foreign ministers were in the drafting stage or still under study by heads of state, the secretaries, and boards of experts assembled at Potsdam. Military talks were going on between the Chiefs of Staff. The sessions of the Big Three were only a part of the continuous round of discussions and consultations which were going on at all hours in the area of the conference.

Churchill spoke first, reaffirming his position that he could not consent to the establishment of a Russian base in the straits, adding that he did not think Turkey would agree to that proposal. Stalin declared that Churchill had been mistaken in saying that the Russians had frightened the Turks by concentrating too many troops in Bulgaria. Russia had fewer troops in Bulgaria, he said, than the British had in Greece. Churchill inquired how many Stalin thought the British had in Greece. Stalin replied, "Five divisions." Churchill said there were only two. Stalin inquired about armored units and

asked how strong the British divisions were. Churchill said they had about 40,000 troops altogether in Greece. Stalin replied that they had only about 30,000 in Bulgaria. . . . The Turks, with 23 divisions of their own, had nothing to fear from the Russians, he said. He explained that . . . perhaps it was the possible restoration of the prewar frontiers that had existed under the czar that had frightened the Turks. He said that he had in mind [areas, now in Turkey, which had formerly been in Armenia and Georgia], and asserted that rectification of the frontier would not have been brought up at all if the Turks had not suggested an alliance with Russia. An alliance meant that both countries would defend mutually the frontiers between them and, in the Russian opinion, the frontiers in the area mention were incorrect, and they told the Turks that these would have to be rectified in the event of an alliance. If this was not agreeable to the Turks, he said, the question of an alliance would be dropped. He would like to know what there was to be afraid of.

With regard to the Black Sea straits, Stalin said Russia regarded the Montreux Convention as inimical. Under this treaty, he complained, Turkey had the right to block the straits not only if Turkey were at war but if it seemed to Turkey that there was a threat of war. The result was . . . that a small state supported by Great Britain held a great state by the throat and gave it no outlet. He could imagine what commotion there would be in England if a similar regime existed in Gibraltar or in the Suez Canal. Or what a commotion there would be in the United States if such a regime existed with regard to the Panama Canal. The point at issue, he concluded, was to give Soviet shipping the possibility to pass to and from the Black Sea freely. As Turkey was too weak to guarantee the possibility of free passage in case complications arose, the Soviet Union would like to see the straits defended by force.

I said that the attitude of the American government was that the Montreux Convention should be revised. I thought, however, that the straits should be a free waterway open to the whole world and that they should be guaranteed by all of us. I had come to the conclusion, I said, after a long study of history, that all the wars of the last two hundred years had originated in the area from the Black Sea to the Baltic and from the eastern frontier of France to the western frontier of Russia. In the last two instances the peace of the whole world had been overturned—by Austria in World War I and by Germany in [World War II]. I thought it should be the business of this conference and of the coming peace conference to see that this did not happen again. I announced that I was presenting a paper proposing free access to all the seas of the world by Russia and by all other

countries. I was offering as a solution of the straits problem the suggestion that the Kiel Canal in Germany, the Rhine-Danube waterway from the North Sea to the Black Sea, the Black Sea straits, the Suez Canal, and the Panama Canal be made free waterways for the passage of freight and passengers of all countries, except for the fees for their necessary operation and maintenance. [I said] . . . that we did not want the world to engage in another war in twenty-five years over the straits or the Danube, [and] that our only ambition was to have a Europe that was sound economically and that could support itself. I wanted to see a Europe that would make Russia, England, France, and all other countries in it secure, prosperous, and happy, and with which the United States could trade and be happy as well as prosperous. I felt that my proposal was a step in that direction. I said that the question of territorial concessions was a Turkish and Russian dispute which they would have to settle themselves and which [Stalin] had said he was willing to do. But the question of the Black Sea straits, I pointed out, concerned the United States and the rest of the world.

Churchill expressed agreement with Stalin's proposal for revision of the Montreux Convention to give Russia freedom of navigation in the straits by merchant and warships alike in peace and war. He said he also agreed with my proposal that this should be guaranteed by all of us. A guarantee by the great powers and the powers interested would certainly be effective. He earnestly hoped that [Stalin] would accept this alternative in contrast to that of a base in the straits in close proximity to Constantinople [Istanbul]. With regard to the other waterways, the British were in full accord with the general line that I had taken in my statement. Churchill thought that the Kiel Canal should certainly be free and open and guaranteed by all the great powers. He attached great importance to the free navigation of the Danube and the Rhine. He felt that there was a great measure of agreement among the three powers on this subject.

I said there was no doubt concerning agreement on the question of revising the Montreux Convention. Stalin said he wished to withhold any statement of opinion regarding my proposal, since he would want to read it attentively before discussing it.

Stalin next brought up the question of the city of Königsberg, pointing out that this question had been discussed at the Teheran conference. The Russians complained that all their seaports in the Baltic froze over for a period each year and that they felt it necessary to have at least one ice free port at the expense of Germany. Stalin added that the Russians had suffered so much at the hands of Germany that they were anxious to have some piece

of German territory as some small satisfaction to tens of millions of Soviet citizens. This had been agreed to, he said, by Roosevelt and Churchill at Teheran, and he was anxious to see this agreement approved at this conference. I said that I was ready to agree in principle, although it would be necessary to study the population affected and other related questions. Churchill also agreed to the concession of an ice-free port to Russia. The only question, he said, was that of the legal occasion to transfer. The Soviet draft on this subject, he pointed out, would require each of us to admit that East Prussia did not exist and also to admit that the Königsberg area was not under the authority of the Allied Control Council in Germany. The draft . . . would [also] commit us to the recognition of the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union. He [said] that all these matters really belonged to the final peace settlement, but he wished to assure [Stalin] of his continued support of the Russian position in that part of the world. Stalin agreed that the matter would be settled at the peace conference and added that Russia was satisfied that the British and American governments approved.

Molotov then announced that the Russian delegation wished to submit a paper on the question of Syria and Lebanon and proposed that the situation in these two countries be considered by a four-power conference of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and France, with the consent of France to be first obtained.

Churchill said that the burden of defending Syria and Lebanon had fallen upon the shoulders of the British. At the time they entered Syria and Lebanon to throw out the Germans and the troops of Vichy, he said, they had made an arrangement with the French in which they both recognized Syria and Lebanon. The British, he pointed out, had told General de Gaulle that the moment he made a satisfactory treaty with Syria and Lebanon the British would withdraw their troops. He explained that if the British would withdraw their troops now, it would lead to the massacre of the French civilians and the small number of troops there. This, he warned, would cause a great outbreak of turbulence and warfare in the Arab world which might affect Egypt too, and thus seriously endanger communication lines through the Suez Canal which were now being used by the Allies in the war against Japan. He expressed confidence that an agreement could be reached with the French in which de Gaulle should guarantee the independence of Syria and Lebanon and which would reserve for the French some of their cultural and commercial interests in this territory. He summed up his remarks by stating that the British would not welcome a proposal for a four-power conference on this question, which concerned only Britain, France, and the areas of

Syria and Lebanon. The whole burden had been borne by the British, except for diplomatic approval of the United States which they had enjoyed. The British would not welcome the whole matter being reviewed by a body of this kind. Of course, if the United States wanted to take their place, that would be a different matter.

I replied, "No, thanks." I pointed out that when this controversy arose there had been an exchange of correspondence between [Churchill] and myself. [Churchill] had offered to keep British troops in that region to stop the outbreak of war, I explained, and I had asked him to do so immediately in order to protect our line of communication to the Far East through the Suez Canal. I thought, however, that no country should have a special privilege such as that being considered for France. The French, I said, did not deserve a special position after the way they had stirred up all this trouble. All countries should have equal rights, I stated.

Stalin replied by noting our reluctance to have the matter discussed by a four-power group and then withdrew the Russian proposal. . . .

Churchill proposed that, since the war against Germany was ended, the Allies withdraw their troops from Iran. Stalin said that the agreement among the Allies was that their troops would be withdrawn from Iran within six months after the end of the war against Japan. He said he would think about the British proposal but felt there was plenty of time to withdraw troops from Iran. Truman said the United States was withdrawing its troops from Iran because they were needed in the Far East. Stalin responded to Truman, "So as to rid the United States of any worries, we promise you that no action will be taken by us against Iran." The three leaders agreed that their troops should be withdrawn from Iran's capital city, Teheran, and Churchill suggested the Council of Foreign Ministers consider the withdrawal of troops from all of Iran.

Churchill and Truman expressed concern about their ability to feed the people in the British and American zones of occupation in Vienna—about 500,000 and 375,000 respectively. Churchill pointed out that food usually came to Vienna from areas to the east, now occupied by the Soviet Union, and Truman said that the American transport system was fully occupied in supplying troops in the Far East and troops and civilians in Europe. Stalin said the Soviet Union was already supplying some food to Austria and that he would see what more the Soviet Union could do to feed the people of Vienna.

Churchill informed Truman and Stalin that he and Clement Attlee would go to London on Thursday, July 26, to learn the results of the recent parliamentary

elections. The British delegation, with or without Churchill himself, would return to Potsdam for the scheduled evening meeting on Friday, July 27.

The meeting adjourned. Churchill hosted a state dinner at his residence.

The next morning, July 24, Truman, Churchill, and their military advisers met to consider military strategy for the war against Japan. The British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff put before Truman and Churchill a draft report describing a strategy whose main objective was the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible moment. Truman and Churchill approved the report. Later in the day, the Combined Chiefs met with Soviet military leaders to coordinate strategy in the Far East, on the assumption that the Soviet Union would soon enter the war against Japan.

July 24—Eighth Meeting

At the eighth session of the heads of government, on July 24, we were again dealing with the question of peace treaties and interim arrangements with Italy and the other [German] satellites. I had agreed to include the eastern satellites in a redraft of my original proposal, and this new version was now placed before us by Secretary Byrnes.

The bitterest debate of the conference now developed, the point at issue being that Stalin wanted us to recognize the puppet governments he had installed in the satellite countries overrun by the Russian armies. Stalin said an abnormal distinction was being drawn between Italy and the other satellite states, as if Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland belonged in the category of leprosy states. In such a distinction he saw a danger that attempts would be made to discredit the Soviet Union and asked whether the Italian government was any more democratic or responsible than the governments of the other countries. No democratic elections had been held in Italy, he said.

I replied to Stalin that everybody had free access to Italy—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and other nations—but we had not been able to have free access to Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and had not been able to get information concerning them. When Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary were set up on a basis giving us free access to them, I declared, then we would recognize them, but not sooner. I said I was asking for the reorganization of the other satellite governments along democratic lines, as had been agreed upon at Yalta.

Stalin objected to the words “responsible and democratic governments” in the draft, saying that they should be deleted, since they served to discredit

these countries. I pointed out that this language was necessary to show that the only way in which they could obtain our support for entry into the United Nations was for them to have democratic governments. Stalin said that these were not fascist governments. There was a far less democratic government in Argentina, he pointed out, which in spite of this had been admitted to the United Nations. Churchill said he would like to put in a plea for Italy. He said he had considerable sympathy for Italy because there was no censorship there, there had been a considerable growth of freedom, and now the north was going to have democratic elections. He did not see why the Big Three should not discuss peace with them. With regard to Romania, and particularly to Bulgaria, he added, the British knew nothing. Their mission in Bucharest, he asserted, had been penned up with a closeness approaching internment.

Stalin broke in to ask if it were really possible for Churchill to cite such facts that had not been verified. Churchill said that the British knew this by their representatives there. Stalin would be very much astonished, he stated, to read a long catalogue of difficulties encountered by their mission there. An iron fence, he charged, had come down around them. Stalin interrupted to exclaim, "All fairy tales." Churchill rejoined that statesmen could call one another's statements fairy tales if they wished. He expressed complete confidence in his representatives in Bucharest and said that the conditions in the British mission there had caused him the greatest distress. I stated that, in the case of the United States, we had been much concerned about the many difficulties encountered by our missions in Romania and Bulgaria.

The exchange continued sharp and lengthy, and I suggested that the question again be referred to the foreign ministers for redrafting.

Next on the agenda was a renewal of the discussion regarding the Black Sea straits. I inquired if my paper on inland waterways had been considered. Stalin remarked that this paper did not deal with the question of Turkey and the straits, but [rather] dealt with the Danube and the Rhine. The Soviet delegation, he said, would like to receive a reply to their proposal of a Russo-Turkish treaty regarding the Black Sea straits. I replied that it was my wish that the two questions be considered together. Stalin said he was afraid that we would not be able to reach an agreement in regard to the straits, since our views differed so widely. He suggested that we postpone the question and take up the next one. Churchill said he understood that it was agreed that freedom in the Black Sea straits should be approved and guaranteed by the Big Three and other powers. He observed that my proposal to join in an organization to free the waterways of the world was, to his mind, a remarkable

and important fact. I stated that [Churchill] had clearly presented the position of the United States in this matter and agreed with him that this would be a big step. Churchill said he hoped that the guarantee proposed by the president would be considered by Stalin as more than a substitute for fortification of the straits. Molotov asked if the Suez Canal was operated under such a principle. Churchill rejoined that it was open in war and in peace to all. Molotov asked whether the Suez Canal were under the same international control as was proposed for the Black Sea straits. Churchill observed that this question had not been raised. Molotov retorted, "I'm raising it." If it was such a good rule, he said, why not apply it to the Suez [Canal]? Churchill explained that the British had an arrangement with which they were satisfied and under which they had operated for some seventy years without complaints. Molotov charged that there had been a lot of complaints. "You should ask Egypt," he said. Eden intervened to point out that Egypt had signed the treaty with England. Molotov said that the British had asserted that international control was better.

Molotov did a lot of talking at Potsdam. He and Stalin, along with Trotsky and Lenin, were among the old Bolsheviks of the 1917 revolution. Molotov would take the bit in his teeth and talk as if he were the Russian state, until Stalin would smile and say a few words to him in Russian, and he would change his tune. I often felt that Molotov kept some facts from Stalin or that he would not give him all the facts until he had to. It was always harder to get agreement out of Molotov than out of Stalin. Where Stalin could smile and relax at times, Molotov always gave the impression that he was constantly pressing.

Churchill said that the suggestion of international control of the inland waterways had been made to meet the Russian position that Russia should be able to move freely in and out of the Black Sea, and that his government was prepared to join in a guarantee with other nations and was prepared to press it on Turkey. Freedom of the seas could be attained in this way without trouble to Turkey, he said. He agreed that the question must be put off, but he hoped that the "tremendous fact that they had heard at this meeting" should not be underestimated by their Russian friends. I said I wished to make clear my understanding of an international guarantee of the freedom of the straits; it meant that any nation had free ingress for any purpose whatever. I did not contemplate any fortifications of any kind, I added. We agreed that each of us would study the problem of the straits.

Before proceeding with any further business, I pointed out that the conference would have to be wound up in not more than a week or ten days and

that a communiqué would have to be prepared. I proposed that a committee be appointed to start working on it and suggested that the foreign ministers make a proposal to us on the following day. I stated that I was anxious to do as much work as possible, because when there was nothing more upon which we could agree I was returning home. I had a great deal of business waiting for me in Washington, I added. . . .

I had come to Potsdam with a draft of an ultimatum calling upon the Japanese to surrender which I intended to discuss with Churchill. This was to be a joint declaration by the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. I waited until the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reached an agreement on our military strategy before I gave him a copy of the draft of July 24. Churchill was as anxious as I was for the Russians to come into the Japanese war. He felt, as did our military leaders, that Russia's entry would hasten Japanese defeat. At the same time, Churchill agreed quickly to the principle of the proposed declaration and said he would take the copy with him for further study of the text.

Stalin could not, of course, be a party to the proclamation itself since he was still at peace with Japan, but I considered it desirable to advise him of the move we intended to make. I spoke to him privately about this in the course of the conference meeting.

Churchill and I agreed that Chiang Kai-shek should be asked to join in the issuance of the document and that China should be listed as one of the sponsoring governments. Accordingly, I sent the text of the proposed document to Ambassador Hurley at Chungking with instructions to obtain [Chiang's] concurrence without delay. The message went through naval channels and also through the Army's signal setup. But for more than twenty-four hours there was neither reply nor acknowledgment. Churchill was about to return to London to learn the results of the elections, but before he left he transmitted his approval of the wording of the proclamation and agreed to have me issue the document at my discretion.

July 25 was the day Winston Churchill would have to leave the conference, and Stalin and I, to accommodate him, had agreed to meet in the morning. Before we went into this, the ninth meeting of the conference, Churchill, Stalin, and I posed in the palace garden for the first formal photographs of the conference.

July 25—Ninth Meeting

The ninth session got under way with a discussion of the now familiar topic of Poland's western frontier. Churchill said that he had had a talk

with . . . [Bolesław] Bierut, [a Polish communist leader, the head of the pro-Soviet Provisional National Council] and that Mr. Eden had seen the Polish delegation for two hours last evening. The Poles were all in agreement, he reported, that about 1,500,000 Germans were left in the area in the west which was under discussion. I observed that this was true. I added that the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, had talked with the Poles and expected to have more talks with them.

Churchill said that he thought the question of transfer of populations from Germany and Czechoslovakia and Poland should be discussed. He pointed out that the Poles were evacuating Germans from an occupational zone. This was part of the Russian zone, and Poles were driving the Germans out. He felt that this ought not to be done without consideration being given to the question of food supply, reparations, and other matters which had not yet been decided. The result was that the Poles had little food and fuel, he said, and that the British had a mass of population thrown on them.

Stalin remarked that we should appreciate the position in which the Poles found themselves. They were taking revenge on the Germans, he said, for the injuries the Germans had caused them in the course of centuries. Churchill pointed out that their revenge took the form of throwing the Germans into the American and British zones to be fed.

I expressed full agreement with [Churchill] that this should not be tolerated. If the Poles were to have a zone, I repeated, this matter should be considered very carefully. The occupying powers of Germany were Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and the United States. If the Poles were in a zone, they were responsible to the Soviet Union for it. I stated that I wanted to be as helpful as I could, and the position I had taken was that the frontier should be fixed at the peace conference. . . .

Stalin took the position that, in the discussion of German supplies and production, coal and steel were much more important than food. Stalin, I could see, saw his opportunity here to bargain for access to the resources of the Ruhr basin. And now he argued that the yield of this German industrial area should be made available to all of Germany, as Churchill argued that East German food supplies should be. Churchill replied that the British themselves were short of coal because they were exporting to Holland, France, and Belgium. They were denying themselves to supply these countries; the coming winter would be the most nearly fireless one of the war for the people of England. Stalin replied that Russia's situation was still worse than that of the British. Russia had lost more than five million men in this war and were short of coal and other things. He was afraid, he said, that if he started describing the situation in Russia he would make Churchill burst

into tears. Churchill insisted that he was still eager to barter coal from the Ruhr in exchange for food for the German population, and Stalin agreed that this question must be discussed. Churchill replied that he did not expect a decision today but he hoped for one soon. Furthermore, he did not think we should consider that we had yet solved the major problems. So far as he was concerned we had only exchanged views.

A few more interchanges followed, and Churchill, referring to his departure the following day for the British elections, announced that he had finished.

"What a pity," Stalin quipped.

"I hope to be back," Churchill replied.

Stalin remarked in reply that, judging from the expression on Mr. Attlee's face, he did not think Mr. Attlee was looking forward to taking over Churchill's authority.

With the end of the ninth meeting the conference was adjourned until the return of the British delegation from England. . . .

At about the same time that the British left for London to learn the outcome of the British elections, Truman received a message from the American ambassador to the Republic of China saying that Chiang Kai-shek had approved the draft of the proclamation to the Japanese people which was to be issued prior to the use of atomic bombs against Japan. Truman issued this "Potsdam Declaration" from Berlin at 9:20 p.m., July 26.

I directed the Office of War Information in Washington to begin immediately to get this message to the Japanese people in every possible way. Here is the proclamation:

**PROCLAMATION BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS,
UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND CHINA**

(1) We—the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree the Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably

greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, *will* mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established *and* until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

. . . On the following day, July 27, there was again no meeting of the conference, since the British delegation had not yet returned to Babelsberg. . . . On the afternoon of July 28, the heads of the British delegation returned, although Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden were no longer among them. Their party had suffered a decisive defeat in the elections, and as a result the Conservative Cabinet had resigned. The new prime minister was Clement Attlee, and with him, as foreign minister, came Ernest Bevin. The two . . . called on me at the Little White House shortly after they arrived from London. The main purpose of their visit was to introduce Bevin. . . . The new prime minister had been present at the conference from the beginning and I had come to know him well. Attlee had a deep understanding of the world's problems, and I knew there would be no interruption in our common efforts. Bevin appeared to me to be a tough person to deal with, but after I became better acquainted with him I found that he was a reasonable man with a good mind and a clear head. He was anxious to do all he could for the peace of the world and to maintain friendship and understanding between Great Britain and the United States.

July 28—Tenth Meeting

As Attlee and Bevin took their chairs at the round table for the tenth meeting of the conference, it was a dramatic demonstration of the stable and peaceful way in which a democracy changes its government. Two days had passed without meetings between the heads of government, and because the new prime minister and his associates had arrived so late from London, we decided to hold our first night meeting, convening at 10:15 p.m. at Cecilienhof. . . .

Truman was eagerly awaiting a response from the Japanese government to the Potsdam Declaration, which had been sent through neutral diplomatic channels to Japan and was being continuously broadcast by radio. At the time his meeting with Stalin and Attlee began, no official response had been received, though Radio Tokyo had broadcast a statement reaffirming the government's determination to continue fighting the war and dismissing the Potsdam Declaration using words which indicated it was not worthy of consideration.

I . . . opened the meeting for business, stating that the Soviet delegation had two questions to discuss. . . . [The first question] involved the drafting of the agreement on the recognition of Italy and the eastern satellites, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. The three foreign secretaries found that they

could not agree among themselves on just what it was that the heads of government had agreed to. The Russians said it was one thing, the British said it was another, and Jimmy Byrnes could only report that "the United States has unfortunately found that if it agrees with the Soviet delegation, the British delegation does not agree, and if it agrees with the British, then the Soviet [delegation] disagrees." It was decided, after the British and Russian views had been restated, to pass over the question of recognition of Italy and the satellite states. . . .

Truman next raised the question of reparations which the Soviet Union wanted from Italy. He worried that such reparations would in fact be paid by the United States and the United Kingdom, since they were paying together \$500 million for the feeding and rehabilitation of Italy. Stalin insisted that Italy, which had participated in the attack on the Soviet Union during the war, must pay reparations, but said that he would be willing to accept equipment, and specifically military equipment, as reparations. Truman, still worried, said, "What I wanted to protect . . . was the help we were giving to Italy, and . . . I did not intend that help to be drained away for reparations" to the Soviet Union. Stalin agreed, but said he wanted Italy to pay at least a small part of the damage it had caused to the Soviet Union.

Following the meeting, Truman learned that back in Washington the Senate had ratified the United Nations Charter by a vote of 89 to 2.

There was no meeting on Sunday, July 29. Stalin had caught a cold and stayed at his residence for the day. Soviet foreign minister Molotov met with Truman and Byrnes to discuss two questions that had proved especially difficult during the meeting of the three leaders—the western boundary of Poland and German reparations. Truman and Byrnes offered proposals regarding both issues, but Molotov would not accept either one. Molotov brought up the expected Soviet entry into the war against Japan, proposing that the United States, the United Kingdom, and their allies make a formal request to the Soviet government to enter the war. Truman promised to give the proposal careful consideration.

Stalin was still ill the next day, July 30, and again there was no meeting of the three leaders.

Truman conferred with his advisers and with Attlee about the Soviet proposal regarding a formal request to the Soviet government to enter the war against Japan.

I did not like this proposal for one important reason. I saw in it a cynical diplomatic move to make Russia's entry at this time appear to be the

decisive factor to bring about victory. At Yalta, Russia had agreed, and here at Potsdam she reaffirmed her commitment, to enter the war against Japan three months after V-E Day, provided that Russia and China had previously concluded a treaty of mutual assistance. There were no other conditions, and certainly none obliging the United States and the Allies to provide Russia with a reason for breaking with Japan. Our military advisers had strongly urged that Russia should be brought into the war in order to neutralize the large Japanese forces on the China mainland and thus save thousands of American and Allied lives. But I was not willing to let Russia reap the fruits of a long and bitter and gallant effort in which she had had no part . . .

Truman decided to offer to Stalin to send him a letter which cited the Soviet Union's obligation under the provisions of a declaration which it had signed in 1943 and also under the provisions of the United Nations Charter—not yet ratified, but which representatives of the Soviet Union had signed—to consult and cooperate with the United States, the United Kingdom, and other allies engaged in the war against Japan. He sent a letter to Stalin making this offer on July 31.

July 31—Eleventh Meeting

The Potsdam conference was now drawing to a close. The eleventh meeting was held on July 31, and on August 1, which turned out to be the last day of the conference, we held two sessions. We were now trying to get agreement on questions on which there had been sharp differences of opinion.

Our delegation sponsored a proposal to combine three of the major issues: reparations, Poland's western frontier, and satellite membership in the United Nations.

Stalin at once protested, saying that these questions were not connected and dealt with different subjects. Secretary of State Byrnes said that of course they were different subjects, but they had been before the conference for weeks without agreement having been reached. They were now being linked together because, he said, the American delegation was no longer willing to consider the one without the others in order to speed action on all three. Stalin said the most debatable question was that of reparations from Germany. He said he was ready to accept the American position that no definite figure be set for reparations and that each country exact reparations

form its own zone. Stalin also agreed that a determination was to be made within six months as to the share of equipment Russia was to get from the western zones. But Stalin and Molotov were persistently difficult about fixing the exact percentage of the reparations the Russians would get from the British, French, and American zones. . . [Stalin and British foreign minister Bevin argued about what the percentage should be, finally reaching agreement.] With the formula finally agreed upon, I appointed a committee composed of two representatives from each of the three governments to draw up a text.

I announced that the next question on the agenda was the second of the three proposals submitted in the United States paper—that of the western frontier of Poland. Byrnes read the United States proposal, which provided that the Poles were to have provisional administration of the area bounded by the Oder and the Western Neisse. Bevin stated that his instructions were to hold out for the Eastern Neisse. He wanted to know if the zone would be handed over to the Poles entirely and if Soviet troops would be completely withdrawn. Bevin added that, according to the United States proposal, the territory would be under the Polish state and not part of the Soviet zone of occupation or responsibility.

I interrupted to say that cession of territory was subject to the peace treaty and that the American plan concerned only the temporary administration of this area. Bevin said it was his understanding then that the area would still technically remain under Allied military control. Otherwise, he said, we would be transferring territory before the peace conference. If it were a question of outright transfer, he said, he would first have to get the approval of the French. Stalin replied that this concerned the Russian zone and that the French had nothing to do with it. Bevin asked if the British could give away pieces of their zone without approval from the other governments. Stalin replied that in the case of Poland it could be done, because we were dealing with a state which had no western border. This was the only such situation in the world, he asserted. Bevin pointed out that the authority of the Control Council was to extend over the whole of Germany with its 1937 boundaries. He questioned whether any transfer could be made without consulting the Control Council.

Byrnes stated that we all understood that the cession of territory was left to the peace conference. Here was a situation, he said, where Poland was administering with Soviet consent a good part of this territory. Under the United States proposal, he explained, the three powers would agree to the administration in the interim by Poland in order that there would be no

further dispute between them in regard to the administration of the area by the Polish provisional government. He added that it was not necessary that the Poles have a representative on the Control Council.

After another exchange of views, I declared that we were all agreed on the Polish question. Stalin said, "Stettin is in the Polish territory." Bevin said, "Yes, we should inform the French." And it was agreed to inform the French.

I then asked Byrnes to speak on the third United States proposal. Our terms of admission of states to the United Nations were quickly adopted with two minor changes in the wording as requested by the Soviet delegation.

The next topic on the agenda was that of economic principles for the control of Germany. Bevin proposed that we pass over this question until we had decided the question of political principles. This was agreed upon. Molotov pointed out that the Soviets had circulated a paper on the Ruhr, in which the Ruhr was contemplated as a part of Germany. I stated that there was no doubt in my mind that the Ruhr was a part of Germany. Bevin inquired why the matter was raised. Stalin replied that it was brought up because at Teheran the point had been raised that the Ruhr region should be separated from Germany under the control of the great powers. Several months afterward, he said, he had discussed the question with the British on the occasion of Churchill's visit to Moscow, and it had been said then that perhaps it would be a good thing to establish the Ruhr under an international control. This discussion was a consequence of the consideration of the general dismemberment of Germany. Since that time, Stalin continued, the views of the great powers had changed, and dismemberment of Germany was considered inadvisable. The Russian delegation would like to know, he asked, if it was agreed that the Ruhr should not be detached. I repeated that the Ruhr was a part of Germany, and it would be under the administration of the Control Council. Stalin said the Soviets agreed but thought it should be mentioned somewhere. He asked if the British delegation agreed. Bevin said he could not agree on the question without further consideration. The internationalization of the Ruhr to reduce the war potential of Germany had been discussed, he was aware, but he felt that the region should remain under the administration of the Control Council until it should be disposed of otherwise. He wanted to discuss the matter with his government and was willing that it should be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. This was agreed upon.

August 1—Twelfth Meeting

The twelfth meeting of the Potsdam conference convened at four o'clock in the afternoon on August 1, my last day at Potsdam. . . .

The first agenda item was the Soviet Union's claim to gold which the United States and United Kingdom had discovered in Germany, and to German assets in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Stalin proposed that the Soviet Union would give up its claim to the gold that the United States and the United Kingdom had discovered in Germany. With respect to German assets in Central and Eastern Europe, a line would be drawn between the Soviet zone of occupation and those of the other Allies, and that the Soviet Union would receive German assets east of the line, and the other Allies would receive German assets west of the line. This proposal was accepted by Truman and Attlee.

We were not misled by Stalin's concessions on minor and sometimes only procedural points. When pressed on basic issues, he would resort to diversionary tactics, and on one occasion he said, "What can I do if I am not ready to make a decision?"

Secretary Byrnes next reported that the charter for the war crimes trials—the International Military Tribunal—had been completed except that a listing of the names of the people to be tried had not yet been developed. He suggested that be left to the prosecutor. Stalin insisted that the names be included, that people wanted to know who would be tried. Truman said that the chief U.S. prosecutor had told him that it would be a problem if the persons to be tried were named too soon. Truman said he believed the list of names would be ready within thirty days. Stalin and Attlee agreed that the three leaders would announce that the first list of people to be tried as war criminals would be released within a month.

The leaders approved several agreements which had been reached in committee. The only unfinished business was the drafting of the final communiqué and protocol. After some discussion of what should be included in the two documents, the meeting adjourned.

August 1–2—Thirteenth Meeting

. . . The final meeting . . . was scheduled to convene at 9 p.m. that evening, but it was delayed until 10:40 p.m. to permit the various delegations

more time to complete drafts of the two major documents growing out of the conference—the protocol and the communiqué. A protocol is a formal record of understandings reached by the parties to a conference. At the Potsdam meeting there were no secrets. I had made up my mind from the beginning that I would enter into no secret agreements, and there were none.

In this final meeting, much time was taken up by changes in wording and minor amendments to the texts of both the protocol and the communiqué. . . . Prolonged and petty bickering continued on the final wording of the protocol. I was getting very impatient, as I had many times before in these sessions, with all the repetition and beating around the bush, but I restrained myself because I saw that we were very slowly making progress in the right direction. I did not see why [Stalin and Attlee] could not come right to the point and get it over with instead of doing so much talking.

At last the protocol was agreed to by the heads of the three governments, and the remaining business of this final session was the communiqué. Here, however, Stalin took the position that, after listing the big decisions, the small ones would spoil the communiqué. He said we need not keep our decisions secret, but he just did not want the minor decisions in the communiqué. . . . The draft of the communiqué was finally approved, but now the Soviet delegation raised the question of who should sign first. At the previous two conferences of the Big Three, they pointed out, the prime minister or the president had been first to sign the communiqué. According to the procedure of rotation, Stalin said he felt that his signature should come first on the Potsdam document.

"You can sign any time you want to," I said. "I don't care who signs first."

. . . Release time for the communiqué was agreed for 9:30 Greenwich Mean Time the following day, August 2. This was 5:30 p.m. Washington time. It would . . . be released simultaneously in London and Moscow.

I then stated that there was no further business and that the conference was now ready to adjourn. I expressed the hope that our next meeting together might be in Washington.

Someone said, "God willing." It was Stalin.

It was 3 a.m. when the Potsdam conference formally adjourned. The delegates from the three nations spent some time in saying goodbyes, and at 4 a.m. I left Cecilienhof with my party and returned to the Little White House. Shortly thereafter I left Babelsberg for the airport at Gatow on the first leg of my journey home. . . .

En route home I wrote a report to the people to be given by radio on my return. In this statement, I summarized the principal achievements of the conference. Among these was the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers as a consultative body of the five principal governments. Another important agreement was the adoption of the formula for reparations. We were not making the mistake again of exacting reparations and then lending the money to pay for them. We intended to make it possible for Germany to develop into a decent nation and to take her place in the civilized world. We had agreed on a compromise on the frontiers of Poland, which was the best we were able to get, but we had accepted it only subject to a final determination by the peace conference.

There were many reasons for my going to Potsdam, but the most urgent, to my mind, was to get from Stalin a personal reaffirmation of Russia's entry into the war against Japan, a matter which our military chiefs were most anxious to clinch. This I was able to get from Stalin in the very first days of the conference. We were at war, and all military arrangements had to be kept secret, and for this reason it was omitted from the official communiqué at the end of the conference. This was the only secret agreement made at Potsdam.

But the personal meeting with Stalin and the Russians had more significance for me, because it enabled me to see at first hand what we and the West had to face in the future. At Potsdam, the Russians had pledged their signature on a document that promised cooperation and peaceful development in Europe. I had already seen that the Russians were relentless bargainers, forever pressing for every advantage for themselves. It did not seem possible that only a few miles from the war shattered seat of Nazi power the head of any government would not bend every effort to attain a real peace. Yet I was not altogether disillusioned to find now that the Russians were not in earnest about peace. It was clear that the Russian foreign policy was based on the conclusion that we were heading for a major depression, and they were already planning to take advantage of our setback.

Anxious as we were to have Russia in the war against Japan, the experience at Potsdam now made me determined that I would not allow the Russians any part in the control of Japan. Our experience with them in Germany and in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Poland was such that I decided to take no chances in a joint setup with the Russians. As I reflected on the situation during my trip home, I made up my mind that General MacArthur would be given complete command and control after victory in Japan. We were

not going to be disturbed by Russian tactics in the Pacific. Force is the only thing the Russians understand. And while I was hopeful that Russia might someday be persuaded to work in cooperation for peace, I knew that the Russians should not be allowed to get into any control of Japan.

The persistent way in which Stalin blocked one of the war preventative measures I had proposed showed how his mind worked and what he was after. I had proposed the internationalization of all the principal waterways. Stalin did not want this. What Stalin wanted was control of the Black Sea straits and the Danube. The Russians were planning world conquest.

In a physical sense, I found the conference to be exacting. Churchill and Stalin were given to late hours, while I was an early riser. This made my days extra long, and they were filled, in addition to the formal sessions, with long rounds of preparatory conferences with my advisers, with the study of documents pertaining to the meetings, and with work that was required on many state papers sent on from Washington. A president of the United States takes his office with him wherever he goes, and the number of details that require his attention never ends. I was glad to be on my way home.

Arrangements had been made for me to fly [on August 2] to England, where I would board the *Augusta* in Plymouth Harbor and where I would have a brief meeting with King George VI. . . . Shortly after noon [that day] I left the *Augusta* . . . for the HMS *Renown*, which was anchored nearby. King George VI had come down from London by train during the morning and was aboard the *Renown*, waiting to welcome me to England. The British ship accorded the customary high honors as I arrived, and I was greeted personally by the king, who extended his hand to me and said, "Welcome to my country." I was impressed with the king as a good man. In the course of my visit with him I found him to be well informed on all that was taking place, and he gave me the impression of a man with great common sense.

After lunching with the king, I returned to the *Augusta* and within a few minutes the British monarch came aboard with his royal party to return my visit. He inspected the marine guard and made a brief tour of inspection of personnel on the weather decks forward. We then retired to my quarters, where we had a very pleasant visit for about thirty minutes. The king and his party then left, accompanied by full honors, and the USS *Augusta* immediately got under way. . . .

On the second day out, I had the following message sent to Washington:

3 August 1945

Please have a telegraph office send following telegram to Mrs. Truman:

"I left Plymouth yesterday afternoon and am now well out on the Atlantic
enjoying good weather and smooth seas. Will advise you tomorrow of our
date of arrival."

Harry

Year of Decisions, 322–323, 332–414

Ending the War Against Japan

May–September 1945

"The most secret and the most daring enterprise"—invasion plans—preparing to use the atomic bomb—Japan continues to fight—"Big Bomb dropped on Hiroshima"—the Soviet Union enters the war—Nagasaki—the question of the emperor—unconditional surrender—"We had won the war . . . the guns were silenced"—General Order No. 1—the occupation of Japan—the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers—formal surrender in Tokyo Bay

We were now, [following the end of the war in Europe], rushing plans to concentrate the preponderance of our military might and energy in the final drive to end the war in the Pacific. . . .

The war in the Pacific had been hard and costly in the years since December 7, 1941. We had come a long way back from Pearl

Harbor and Bataan. From Australia and New Caledonia in the south and island bases on Hawaii in the eastern Pacific, our forces had fought their way back to the Philippines and to the last island chain before the Japanese home islands. Okinawa and Iwo Jima had been defended fiercely by the enemy, and our loss of lives had been very heavy. But we now had bases from which direct attacks could be launched on Japan. We also knew that the closer we came to the home islands the more determined and fanatical would be the [Japanese] resistance. There were still more than four million men in the Japanese armed forces to defend the main Japanese islands, Korea, Manchuria, and North China. The Japanese were also building up a "National Volunteer Army" at home for a last-ditch stand. The Chiefs of



Staff were grim in their estimates of the cost in casualties we would have to pay to invade the Japanese mainland.

As our forces in the Pacific were pushing ahead, paying a heavy toll in lives, the urgency of getting Russia into the war became more compelling. Russia's entry into the war would mean the saving of hundreds of thousands of American casualties. . . . There was no way for us to get troops into China to drive the Japanese from the Chinese mainland. Our hope always was to get enough Russian troops to Manchuria to push the Japanese out. That was the only way it could be done at this time. . . . That was one of the compelling reasons that would take me out of the country to a meeting with Stalin and Churchill. . . .

While Truman was at Potsdam, preparing to meet the first time in formal session with Churchill and Stalin, he received some dramatic news from Washington.

The historic message of the first explosion of an atomic bomb was flashed to me in a message from Secretary of War Stimson on the morning of July 16, [1945]. The most secret and the most daring enterprise of the war had succeeded. We were now in possession of a weapon that would not only revolutionize war but could alter the course of history and civilization. This news reached me at Potsdam the day after I had arrived for the conference of the Big Three.

Preparations were being rushed for the test atomic explosion at Alamogordo, New Mexico, at the time I had to leave for Europe, and on the voyage over I had been anxiously awaiting word on the results. I had been told of many predictions by the scientists, but no one was certain of the outcome of this full scale atomic explosion. As I read the message from Stimson, I realized that the test not only met the most optimistic expectation of the scientists but that the United States had in its possession an explosive force of unparalleled power.

Stimson flew to Potsdam the next day to see me and brought with him the full details of the test. I received him at once and called in Secretary of State Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, General Arnold, and Admiral King to join us at my office at the Little White House. We reviewed our military strategy in the light of this revolutionary development. We were not ready to make use of this weapon against the Japanese, although we did not know as yet what effect the new weapon might have, physically or psychologically, when used against the enemy. For that reason, the military advised that we go ahead with the existing military plans for the invasion of the Japanese home islands.

At Potsdam, as elsewhere, the secret of the atomic bomb was kept closely guarded. We did not extend the very small circle of Americans who knew about it. Churchill naturally knew about the atomic bomb project from its very beginning, because it had involved the pooling of British and American technical skill. On July 24 I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. He showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make "good use of it against the Japanese."

A month before the test explosion of the atomic bomb the service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had laid their detailed plans for the defeat of Japan before me for approval. There had apparently been some differences of opinion as to the best route to be followed, but these had evidently been reconciled, for when General Marshall had presented his plan for a two-phase invasion of Japan, Admiral King and General Arnold had supported the proposal heartily. The Army plan envisaged an amphibious landing in the fall of 1945 on the island of Kyushu, the southernmost of the Japanese home islands. . . . The first landing would then be followed approximately four months later by a second great invasion . . . which would go ashore in the Kanto plains area near Tokyo. In all, it had been estimated that it would require until the late fall of 1946 to bring Japan to her knees.

This was a formidable conception, and all of us realized fully that the fighting would be fierce and the losses heavy. But it was hoped that some of Japan's forces would continue to be preoccupied in China and others would be prevented from reinforcing the home islands if Russia were to enter the war. There was, of course, always the possibility that the Japanese might choose to surrender sooner. Our air and fleet units had begun to inflict heavy damage on industrial and urban sites in Japan proper. Except in China, the [Japanese] armies . . . had been pushed back everywhere in relentless successions of defeats.

Acting Secretary of State Grew had spoken to me in late May about issuing a proclamation that would urge the Japanese to surrender but would assure them that we would permit the emperor to remain as head of the state. Grew backed this with arguments taken from his ten years experience as our ambassador in Japan, and I told him that I had already given thought to this matter myself and that it seemed to me a sound idea. Grew had a draft of a proclamation with him, and I instructed him to send it by the customary channels to the Joint Chiefs and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in order that we might get the opinions of all concerned before I made my decision. On June 18, Grew reported that the proposal had met

with the approval of his Cabinet colleagues and of the Joint Chiefs. The military leaders also discussed the subject with me when they reported the same day. Grew, however, favored issuing the proclamation at once, to coincide with the closing of the campaign on Okinawa, while the service chiefs were of the opinion that we should wait until we were ready to follow a Japanese refusal with the actual assault of our invasion forces.

It was my decision then that the proclamation to Japan should be issued from the forthcoming conference at Potsdam. This, I believed, would clearly demonstrate to Japan and to the world that the Allies were united in their purpose. By that time, also, we might know more about two matters of significance for our future effort: the participation of the Soviet Union and the atomic bomb. We knew that the bomb would receive its first test in mid-July. If the test of the bomb was successful, I wanted to afford Japan a clear chance to end the fighting before we made use of this newly gained power. If the test should fail, then it would be even more important to us to bring about a surrender before we had to make a physical conquest of Japan. General Marshall told me that it might cost half a million American lives to force the enemy's surrender on his home grounds.

But the test was now successful. The entire development of the atomic bomb had been dictated by military considerations. The idea of the atomic bomb had been suggested to President Roosevelt by the famous and brilliant Dr. Albert Einstein, and its development turned out to be a vast undertaking. It was the achievement of the combined efforts of science, industry, labor, and the military, and it had no parallel in history. The men in charge and their staffs worked under extremely high pressure, and the whole enormous task required the services of more than one hundred thousand men and immense quantities of material. It required over two and half years and necessitated the expenditure of \$2.5 billion.

Only a handful of the thousands of men who worked in these plants knew what they were producing. So strict was the secrecy imposed that even some of the highest ranking officials in Washington had not the slightest idea of what was going on. I did not. . . . In 1942, we learned that the Germans were at work on a method to harness atomic energy for use as a weapon of war. . . . Now a race was on to make the atomic bomb. . . . American and British scientists joined in the race against the Germans. We in America . . . could provide the tremendous industrial and economic resources required . . . without injury to our war production program. Furthermore, our plants were far removed from the reach of enemy bombing. Britain . . . was constantly exposed to enemy bombing and, when she started the atomic

research, also faced the possibility of invasion. For these reasons, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to pool the research and concentrate all of the work on the development of the project within the United States. . . . We could hope for a miracle, but the daily tragedy of a bitter war crowded in on us. We labored to construct a weapon of such overpowering force that the enemy could be forced to yield swiftly once we could resort to it. This was the primary aim of our secret and vast effort. But we also had to carry out the enormous effort of our basic and traditional military plans.

The task of creating the atomic bomb had been entrusted to a special unit of the Army Corps of Engineers, the so-called Manhattan District, headed by Major General Leslie R. Groves. The primary effort, however, had come from British and American scientists working in laboratories and offices scattered throughout the nation. Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the distinguished physicist from the University of California, had set up the key establishment in the whole process at Los Alamos, New Mexico. More than any other one man, Oppenheimer is to be credited with the achievement of the completed bomb.

My own knowledge of these developments had come about only after I became president, when Secretary Stimson had given me the full story. He had told me at that time that the project was nearing completion and that a bomb could be expected within another four months. It was at his suggestion, too, that I had then set up a committee of top men and had asked them to study with great care the implications the new weapon might have for us. . . . The committee was assisted by a group of scientists . . . [headed by Dr. Oppenheimer]. The conclusions reached . . . [by the committee and its scientific advisers] were brought to me by Secretary Stimson on June 1.

It was their recommendation that the bomb be used against the enemy as soon as it could be done. They recommended further that it should be used without specific warning and against a target that would clearly show its devastating strength. I had realized, of course, that an atomic bomb explosion would inflict damage and casualties beyond imagination. On the other hand, the scientific advisers of the committee reported, "We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use." It was their conclusion that no technical demonstration they might propose, such as over a deserted island, would be likely to bring the war to an end. It had to be used against an enemy target.

The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me. Let there be no mistake about it. I regarded the bomb as a military

weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used. [My] top military advisers . . . recommended its use, and when I talked to Churchill he unhesitatingly told me that he favored the use of the atomic bomb if it might aid to end the war. In deciding to use this bomb I wanted to make sure that it would be used as a weapon of war in the manner prescribed by the laws of war. That meant that I wanted it dropped on a military target. I had told Stimson that the bomb should be dropped as nearly as possible upon a war production center of prime military importance. Stimson's staff had prepared a list of cities in Japan that might serve as targets. Kyoto, though favored by General Arnold as a center of military activity, was eliminated when Secretary Stimson pointed out that it was a cultural and religious shrine of the Japanese. Four cities were finally recommended as targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki. They were listed in that order as targets for the first attack. The order of selection was in accordance with the military importance of these cities, but allowance would be given for weather conditions at the time of the bombing. Before the selected targets were approved as proper for military purposes, I personally went over them in detail with Stimson, Marshall, and Arnold, and we discussed the matter of timing and the final choice of the first target.

General [Carl A.] Spaatz, who commanded the Strategic Air Forces, which would deliver the bomb on the target, was given some latitude as to when and on which of the four targets the bomb would be dropped. That was necessary because of weather and other operational considerations. In order to get preparations under way, the War Department was given orders to instruct General Spaatz that the first bomb would be dropped as soon after August 3 as weather would permit. The order to General Spaatz read as follows:

July 24, 1945

To: General Carl Spaatz
Commanding General
United States Army Strategic Air Forces

1. The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki. To carry military and civilian scientific personnel from the War Department to observe and record the effects of the explosion of the bomb, additional aircraft will accompany the airplane carrying the bomb. The observing planes will stay several miles distant from the point of impact of the bomb.

2. Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff. Further instructions will be issued concerning targets other than those listed above.

3. Dissemination of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States. No communique on the subject or release of information will be issued by Commanders in the field without specific prior authority. Any news stories will be sent to the War Department for special clearance.

4. The foregoing directive is issued to you by direction and with the approval of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, U.S.A. [United States Army]. It is desired that you personally deliver one copy of this directive to General MacArthur and one copy to Admiral Nimitz for their information.

/s/ [signed] Thos. T. Handy

General, GSC

Acting Chief of Staff

With this order, the wheels were set in motion for the first use of an atomic weapon against a military target. I had made the decision. I also instructed Stimson that the order would stand unless I notified him that the Japanese reply to our ultimatum was acceptable. A specialized B-29 unit, known as the 509th Composite Group, had been selected for the task, and seven of the modified B-29's, with pilots and crews, were ready and waiting for orders. Meanwhile ships and planes were rushing the materials for the bomb and specialists to assemble them to the Pacific island of Tinian in the Marianas.

On July 28 Radio Tokyo announced that the Japanese government would continue to fight. There was no formal reply to the joint ultimatum of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. There was no alternative now. The bomb was scheduled to be dropped after August 3 unless Japan surrendered before that day.

On August 6, the fourth day of the journey home from Potsdam, came the historic news that shook the world. I was eating lunch with members of the *Augusta*'s crew when . . . [the] White House Map Room watch officer handed me the following message:

TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Big Bomb dropped on Hiroshima August 5 at 7:15 p.m. Washington time. First reports indicate complete success which was even more conspicuous than earlier test.

I was greatly moved. I telephoned Byrnes aboard ship to give him the news and then said to the group of sailors around me, "This is the greatest thing in history. It's time for us to get home."

A few minutes later a second message was handed to me. It read as follows:

Following info regarding Manhattan received. "Hiroshima bombed visually with only one tenth cover at 052315A. There was no fighter opposition and no flak. Parsons reports 15 minutes after drop as follows: 'Results clear cut successful in all respects. Visible effects greater than in any test. Conditions normal in airplane following delivery.'"

When I had read this, I signaled to the crew in the mess hall that I wished to say something. I then told them of the dropping of a powerful new bomb which used an explosive twenty thousand times as powerful as a ton of TNT. I went to the wardroom, where I told the officers, who were at lunch, what had happened. I could not keep back my expectation that the Pacific war might now be brought to a speedy end. . . .

A short while later a statement about the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima was released by the White House. After celebrating the great achievement of science, engineering, management, and skilled labor which the atomic bomb represented, the statement turned to the grim reality which faced Japan if it did not promptly surrender:

We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war.

It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will follow sea and land forces in such numbers and power as they have not yet seen and with the fighting skill of which they are already well aware. . . .

Still Japan did not surrender.

The Augusta docked at Newport News, Virginia, on the afternoon of August 7 and Truman boarded a train for Washington. He arrived at the White House late that night. Two days later, on August 9, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan

and its forces moved into northern China. Truman received a message the same day from the American ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, who reported on a meeting he had had with Stalin. The Soviet leader, Harriman wrote, had shared some of his thoughts about the atomic bomb:

. . . [Stalin] said that he thought the Japanese were looking for a pretext to set up a government that would surrender and he thought that the atomic bomb might give this pretext. He showed great interest in in the atomic bomb and said that it could mean the end of war and aggression but that the secret would have to be well kept. He said that they had found in Berlin laboratories in which the Germans were working on the breaking of the atom but that he did not find that they had come to any results. Soviet scientists had also been working on the problem but had not been able to solve it.

On August 9, the second atomic bomb was dropped, this time on Nagasaki. We gave the Japanese three days in which to make up their minds to surrender, and the bombing would have been held off another two days had weather permitted. During those three days, we indicated that we meant business. On August 7, the 20th Air Force sent out a bomber force of some 130 B-29s, and on the eighth it reported 420 B-29s in day and night attacks. The choice of targets for the second atom bomb was first Kokura, with Nagasaki second. The third city on the list, Niigata, had been ruled out as too distant. By the time Kokura was reached the weather had closed in, and after three runs over the spot without a glimpse of the target, with gas running short, a try was made for the second choice, Nagasaki. There, too, the weather had closed in, but an opening in the clouds gave the bombardier his chance, and Nagasaki was successfully bombed.

This second demonstration of the power of the atomic bomb apparently threw Tokyo into a panic, for the next morning brought the first indication that the Japanese Empire was ready to surrender. On August 10, at 7:33 a.m., our radio monitors heard this news item being given out over Radio Tokyo:

The Japanese Government today addressed the following communication to the Swiss and Swedish Governments respectively for transmission to the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union: . . .

"The Japanese Government is ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam, July 26, 1945, by the Heads of Government of the United States, Great Britain, and China, and later subscribed to by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that said

declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.

"The Japanese Government hopes sincerely that this understanding is warranted and desires keenly that an explicit indication to that effect will be speedily forthcoming."

This was not an official communication, but it was enough notice of Japanese intention to permit us to discuss what our reply should be. I asked Admiral Leahy to have Secretaries Byrnes, Stimson, and Forrestal come to my office at 9:00 a.m. to confer on the next step to be taken. When the four had arrived, I turned to each in turn and asked his opinion on these questions: Were we to treat this message from Tokyo as an acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration? There had been many in this country who felt that the emperor was an integral part of that Japanese system which we were pledged to destroy. Could we continue the emperor and yet expect to eliminate the warlike spirit in Japan? Could we even consider a message with so large a "but" as the kind of unconditional surrender we had fought for?

Secretary Stimson had always expressed the opinion that it would be to our advantage to retain the emperor. He urged the same point now. We needed, as he saw it, to keep the only symbol of authority which all Japanese acknowledged. Admiral Leahy also recommended that we accept the Japanese proposal if for no other reason than that we would be able to use the emperor in effecting the surrender. Secretary Byrnes was less certain that we should accept anything short of an unequivocal declaration of surrender. He argued that in the present position it should be the United States and not Japan that should state conditions. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal offered the suggestion that we might in our reply indicate willingness to accept [the Japanese proposal], yet define the terms of surrender in such a manner that the intents and purposes of the Potsdam Declaration would be clearly accomplished. I asked Byrnes to draft a reply that might convey such an understanding. . . .

Shortly before noon Secretary Byrnes . . . [brought me] the official communication from the Japanese government which had just been received from the Swiss legation. It was identical with the earlier radio transmission, except for an added paragraph that informed us that the same request had also been forwarded, through neutral intermediaries, to the governments of China, Great Britain, and the USSR Byrnes also submitted for my approval a draft of a proposed reply to be sent to Japan. . . .

. . . I summoned a Cabinet meeting for two o'clock. . . . [When the Cabinet convened], I read them the text of the Japanese note. Then Byrnes

presented the proposed reply and indicated by what procedure we would seek the approval of our allies. We dispatched identical messages to London, Moscow, and Chungking, and in each of these we instructed our ambassador to make immediate delivery of the message to impress upon the recipients that speed was of the essence. The message we enclosed read, in part, as follows:

With regard to the Japanese Government's message accepting the terms of the Potsdam proclamation but containing the statement "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler"—our position is as follows:

From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.

The Emperor and the Japanese High Command will be required to sign the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, to issue orders to all the armed forces of Japan to cease hostilities and to surrender their arms, and to issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms.

Immediately upon the surrender the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, as directed, where they can be quickly placed aboard allied transports.

The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

The armed forces of the Allied Powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Declaration are achieved.

The United Kingdom agreed with the draft response to the Japanese government, but recommended that the emperor not himself be required to sign the surrender instrument. This recommendation was accepted by the American government. The government of Chiang Kai-shek in China agreed with the draft response. The Soviet government, in a statement handed to Ambassador Averell Harriman by Soviet foreign minister Molotov, also agreed, but not without trying to introduce a stipulation that it would have a veto of the selection of the person to serve as Allied High Command, to which Japan would surrender. This raised the prospect that the Soviet Union might insinuate itself into the occupation government of Japan. Harriman knew that Truman would never accept this, and he immediately objected to the offending language in the Soviet statement. Molotov went to

Stalin, who ordered that the wording of the statement be changed to be in accord with the American position.

. . . Harriman was, of course, expressing our set policy. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee had some time ago formulated our position on the postwar control of Japan, and I had approved it. We wanted Japan controlled by an American commander, acting on behalf of the Allies, who might coordinate their desires through a conference or council which we proposed to call the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. I was determined that the Japanese occupation should not follow in the footsteps of our German experience. I did not want divided control or separate zones. I did not want to give the Russians any opportunity to behave as they had in Germany and Austria. I wanted the country administered in such a manner that it could be restored to its place in the society of nations. I had impressed these thoughts strongly on all our officials at Potsdam. Thus Harriman, who was there, was able to speak up at once when Molotov tried to change the basic policy for Japan.

With the concurrence of the three governments received, we were now ready to dispatch a formal reply to the Japanese. . . . The completed message, dated August 11, was handed to . . . the Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland by Secretary Byrnes, to be transmitted to Tokyo by way of Berne. . . .

The war against Japan wasn't yet over, and American planes dropped leaflets over Japanese cities to let the people know the status of the peace negotiations.

Meanwhile in Washington a message was prepared to inform our allies of the selection of Douglas MacArthur to be the supreme commander in Japan. In the same message, I proposed that the new supreme commander should instruct the Japanese to surrender their forces in Southeast Asia to Admiral Lord Lewis Mountbatten, the supreme commander in that area; those forces facing the Russians, to the Soviet High Commander in the Far East; and all other forces in China, to Chiang Kai-shek. Steps were also taken to disseminate the acceptance of our terms by the Japanese as quickly as possible. The State Department prepared identical messages to go to the Soviet, British, and Chinese governments that would require nothing but the insertion of the time and date the reply was received. With these steps completed, there remained nothing to do but to await that reply.

The next day—August 12—was a Sunday, but I spent nearly the entire day in my office, frequently joined by the secretary of state and the heads of

the armed forces. The place was beleaguered by press and radio people, and large crowds gathered outside the White House and in Lafayette Park. A report that the Japanese had accepted was circulated early in the evening, but it turned out to be false. . . .

August 12 was Truman's sister's birthday, and he wrote her a letter. It seems things are going all right, he wrote. Nearly every crisis seems to be the worst one, but after it's over, it isn't so bad.

Truman received messages from his reparations ambassador, Edwin W. Pauley, and his ambassadors to the Soviet Union and China, Averell Harriman and Patrick J. Hurley, warning that the Soviet and Communist Chinese forces would take advantage of the surrender of Japanese forces in China and Korea to advance communism in those countries.

These messages . . . did not, of course, raise new issues. The preceding months had shown us that Stalin and his colleagues did not view matters in the same light we did. The delicate balance in China between the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and those of the Chinese Communists had been the subject of many discussions among our policy experts. But the opportunity of the moment was to put an end to the years of war. A dictator can use his soldiers as soulless pawns, but in a government like ours the voice of the people must be heeded; and the American people wanted nothing more in that summer of 1945 than to end the fighting and bring the boys back home. . . .

Truman waited for some indication that Japan had accepted the Allies' surrender terms. Finally, in the late afternoon of August 14, he received the news he was waiting for.

At 3 p.m. [Secretary] Byrnes informed me that he had just learned that a code message was then being received in Berne from Tokyo. At five minutes after four he put through a call to [the American minister in Berne], who gave him the answer we wanted: Japan had surrendered! Byrnes now . . . arranged for the news to be announced at the same time, 7 p.m. Washington time, in the . . . [capitals of the four Allies].

At 6 p.m. the Swiss Chargé d'Affaires in Washington delivered the formal reply to Byrnes, who brought it at once to the White House. Here are the words that ended the war:

August 14, 1945

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to your note of August 11, in which you requested me to transmit to my Government the reply of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China to the message from the Japanese Government which was communicated in my note of August 10.

At 20:10 today (Swiss time) the Japanese Minister to Switzerland conveyed the following written statement to the Swiss Government for transmission to the Allied Governments:

'Communication of the Japanese Government of August 14, 1945, addressed to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China:

'With reference to the Japanese Government's note of August 10 regarding their acceptance of the provisions of the Potsdam declaration and the reply of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China sent by American Secretary of State Byrnes under the date of August 11, the Japanese Government have the honor to communicate to the Governments of the four powers as follows:

'1. His Majesty the Emperor has issued an Imperial rescript regarding Japanese acceptance of the provisions of the Potsdam declaration.

'2. His Majesty the Emperor is prepared to authorize and ensure the signature by his Government and the Imperial General Headquarters of the necessary terms for carrying out the provisions of the Potsdam declaration. His Majesty is also prepared to issue his commands to all the military, naval, and air authorities of Japan and all the forces under their control wherever located to cease active operations, to surrender arms and to issue such other orders as may be required by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces for the execution of the above-mentioned terms.

'Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

'/s/ Grassli

Chargé d'Affaires ad

Interim of Switzerland'

At 7 p.m. the White House correspondents gathered in my office. Mrs. Truman was with me, and most of the members of the Cabinet were present. . . . When everybody was in, I stood behind my desk and read this statement:

I have received this afternoon a message from the Japanese Government in reply to the message forwarded to that Government by the Secretary of

State on August eleventh. I deem this reply a full acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration which specifies the unconditional surrender of Japan. In the reply there is no qualification.

Arrangements are now being made for the formal signing of the surrender terms at the earliest possible moment.

General Douglas MacArthur has been appointed the Supreme Allied Commander to receive the Japanese surrender. Great Britain, Russia and China will be represented by high-ranking officers.

Meantime, the Allied armed forces have been ordered to suspend offensive action.

The proclamation of V-J Day must wait upon the formal signing of the surrender terms by Japan. . . .

. . . The correspondents shouted congratulations as they rushed out the doors to flash the word to their papers. Mrs. Truman and I went out to the fountain on the north lawn. A vast crowd had assembled outside the gates, and when I made a V sign in the manner of Churchill, a great cheer went up. . . . Around 8 p.m. the crowds outside were still growing, and I went out on the north portico and spoke a few words through a loudspeaker that had been set up there. This was a most significant and dramatic moment, and I felt deeply moved by the excitement, perhaps as much as were the crowds that were celebrating in cities and towns all over the nation.

We had won the war. It was my hope now that the people of Germany and Japan could be rehabilitated under the occupation. The United States, as I had stated at Berlin, wanted no territory, no reparations. Peace and happiness for all countries were the goals toward which we would work and for which we had fought. No nation in the history of the world had taken such a position in complete victory. No nation with the military power of the United States of America had been so generous to its enemies and so helpful to its friends. Maybe the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount could be put into effect.

The guns were silenced. The war was over. I was thinking of President Roosevelt, who had not lived to see this day. He would have rejoiced in the fulfillment of the pledge he had given the nation when war was forced upon us in December 1941. I reached for the telephone and called Mrs. Roosevelt. I told her that in this hour of triumph I wished that it had been President Roosevelt, and not I, who had given the message to our people. . . .

Truman circulated to Attlee, Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek a draft directive, designated General Order No. 1, which MacArthur was to require the Japanese

Imperial General Headquarters to issue following Japan's formal surrender. This order would tell Japanese commanders throughout the different areas of the Japanese empire which of the Allies they should surrender to.

Stalin suggested several changes—he called them “corrections” and “modest suggestions” in his message to Truman—in the order. Most importantly, he wanted Japanese forces in the northern part of the northernmost of Japan’s Home Islands—Hokkaido—to surrender to Soviet rather than American forces. Japan had occupied part of the eastern Soviet Union following the Bolshevik revolution, Stalin argued, and Soviet public opinion would be offended if the Soviet Union were not allowed an occupation zone in the Japanese Home Islands. Stalin’s “modest suggestions” reminded Truman of the problems the United States was having with the Soviets in Europe. Without replying directly to Stalin’s suggestions, Truman asserted that it was his intention that Japanese forces in the Home Islands should surrender to General MacArthur, and said arrangements to bring this about had already been made. Stalin tried other means of increasing the Soviet Union’s role in the occupation government, but Truman frustrated all of them. The United States, Truman was determined, would occupy Japan on its terms.

In Korea, the 38th parallel divided the peninsula into two occupation zones. North of that line, Japanese forces surrendered to the Soviets; south of the line they surrendered to the Americans. In China, the Japanese surrender intensified the conflict between the Nationalists and Communists. The Nationalist government was internationally recognized, but the Communists held areas in the north of China near areas held by Japan during the war. The Communists felt the Japanese forces in these areas should surrender to them, and that they should occupy the surrendered territory. Manchuria, in the far north of China, was especially problematic for the Nationalist government. The Soviet Union had invaded and occupied Manchuria in the war’s last days and were in position to accept the surrender of Japanese forces in the area.

Far to the south, the Nationalist government faced another challenge to its sovereignty. Chiang Kai-shek regarded Hong Kong as part of China and was determined that Japanese forces there should surrender to the Nationalists. But the British regarded Hong Kong as part of their empire, and General Order No. 1 instructed Japanese forces there to surrender to British forces. Chiang appealed to Truman, who was sympathetic to his position, but United States policy was to recognize the United Kingdom’s established rights in Hong Kong, and Truman would not force the United Kingdom to accede to Chiang’s demand that the Japanese in Hong Kong surrender to his representative. Chiang’s forces were still far away when a British naval unit sailed into Hong Kong harbor and received the Japanese surrender.

While London, Moscow, Chungking, and Washington were busy with agreements and disagreements that arose in connection with the Japanese surrender, a steady stream of messages from Guam and Manila reported the progress of our forces toward the occupation of the Japanese mainland and the formal surrender that was to be accepted there. As soon as the first word had been received that the Japanese were ready to accept the Potsdam terms, Admiral Leahy and General Marshall had asked me where I thought the formal surrender should take place. I suggested, without hesitation, that the official act of surrender should take place in Tokyo Bay, aboard a naval vessel, and that ship to be the USS *Missouri*. I thought it wise to hold the ceremony within view of the Japanese capital in order to impress the fact of defeat on the Japanese people, but it also seemed desirable to remain offshore until we could be assured that there would be no last-minute outbursts of fanaticism. My choice of the *Missouri* was an obvious one. She was one of the newest and most powerful battleships in our fleet; she had been named after my own state; my daughter Margaret had christened her, and I had spoken on that occasion. . . .

On August 18, I approved a memorandum establishing . . . [the United States'] basic policy with regard to the military occupation of Japan. The key point of this policy was that the actual control of occupied Japan should be under our direction. We recognized that others of the United Nations, [that is, the Allies—the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China]—had taken part in the war against Japan and were entitled to take part in the determination of policies, but just as we were expected to furnish the major share of the occupation forces, so did we also want to reserve for ourselves the controlling voice in the occupation. We were determined that the occupation should be run on a centralized control basis and that there should be no division of the Japanese nation into zones.

There were many touchy areas among our allies in connection with the procedures of the formal surrender. In the initial instructions to MacArthur it was specified that, besides himself as supreme commander, the surrender document would be signed by the other three representatives of the four powers that had joined in the Potsdam Declaration. The British, however, were anxious to satisfy the demands for participation that came from their dominions, especially Australia. . . . On August 18, therefore, I sent word to MacArthur that, in addition to representatives of the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union, representatives of Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, and the Netherlands had been invited to be present at the acceptance of the Japanese surrender and for him to make the necessary arrangements. . . .

Shortly after Japan surrendered, it sent a message, through Swiss diplomatic channels, to the Allies which sought to negotiate some of the terms of the surrender of Japanese forces and occupation of Japan. It asked for advanced notification of the activities of Allied forces in Japan and then made four numbered requests: (1) That areas of occupation and numbers of occupying troops be minimized, and that Tokyo not be occupied. (2) That Japanese forces be allowed to disarm themselves and surrender their arms of their own accord, and that the honor of Japanese soldiers be respected. (3) That since some Japanese forces were located in remote places difficult to communicate with, a reasonable time be allowed to fully terminate hostilities. (4) That the Allies provide food and medical supplies to Japanese forces on distant islands, and transport wounded soldiers from those islands back to Japan.

Some of the things the Japanese were asking . . . we would of course do. They were just matters of common decency in dealing with a defeated enemy. But we could not begin the occupation by bargaining over its terms. We were the victors. The Japanese were the losers. They had to know that "unconditional surrender" was not a matter for negotiations. On my instructions, Secretary Byrnes sent a coldly formal reply:

Such information as the Japanese Government requires to carry out the surrender arrangements will be communicated by the Supreme Commander at appropriate times determined by him. The four Allied Powers have subscribed to the Potsdam Declaration which assures the return to the homeland to peaceful occupations of all Japanese Armed Forces who surrender to . . . [the Allies]. This return will be arranged through the Supreme Commander and will take place after the Japanese Armed Forces have been disarmed by the Allied commanders to whom they surrender and when Japanese and other transportation can be made available.

In order to make clear to the Japanese as well as to General MacArthur what the scope of the Supreme Commander's authority was to be, I sat down with Admiral Leahy and General Marshall, and together we drafted a statement that was forwarded to MacArthur shortly after he arrived in Japan . . . :

6 September 1945

TO MACARTHUR FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The following exposition of your authority as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has been approved by the President:

1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You

will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.

2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force.

3. The statement of intentions contained in the Potsdam Declaration will be given full effect. It will not be given effect, however, because we consider ourselves bound in a contractual relationship with Japan as a result of that document. It will be respected and given effect because the Potsdam Declaration forms a part of our policy stated in good faith with relation to Japan and with relation to peace and security in the Far East.

Truman decided he would give a radio address in connection with the surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay. A number of messages passed between Washington and MacArthur's headquarters to coordinate the timing of Truman's address with that of the ceremony.

. . . On the evening of September 1 (September 2 Tokyo time), I, like millions of my fellow citizens, listened to the description of the proceedings aboard the *Missouri*. I was thinking of the history of previous occasions when dictators and absolute rulers had brought disaster to their people and their countries. There had been Philip II of Spain and his armada, the destruction of which was the beginning of the end for Spain as a world power. Then there was Louis XIV and the Battle of Blenheim; Napoleon and Waterloo; the Kaiser; Hitler; and—now—the war lords of Japan. This second surrender of World War II marked the ignominious defeat and downfall of the second of the world's cruellest dictatorial governments. I was wondering that night if the world, and particularly ourselves, had learned anything—whether we would profit from our terrible mistakes of World War I or would we repeat them. I was in the midst of these thoughts when the announcer in Tokyo Bay switched the broadcast to the White House, and I spoke to the nation.

My fellow Americans . . . the thoughts and hopes of all Americans—indeed of all the civilized world—are centered tonight on the battleship *Missouri*. There on that small piece of American soil anchored in Tokyo Harbor the Japanese have just officially laid down their arms. They have signed terms of unconditional surrender.

Four years ago the thoughts and fears of the whole civilized world were centered on another piece of American soil—Pearl Harbor. The mighty threat to civilization which began there is now laid to rest. It was a long road to Tokyo—and a bloody one.

We shall not forget Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese militarists will not forget the U.S.S. *Missouri*. . . .

Our first thoughts, of course—thoughts of gratefulness and deep obligation—go out to those of our loved ones who have been killed or maimed in this terrible war. On land and sea and in the air, American men and women have given their lives so that this day of ultimate victory might come and assure the survival of a civilized world. No victory can make good their loss. . . .

Only the knowledge that the victory, which these sacrifices made possible, will be wisely used can give them any comfort. It is our responsibility—ours, the living—to see to it that this victory shall be a monument worthy of the dead who died to win it. . . .

Truman spoke of all the Americans—military, civilian, government civil servants, defense industry workers, others—who made the victory over the dictators and war lords possible, and he expressed gratitude to America's allies, both those nations which fought beside the United States and those nations which fell to the dictators and war lords, but whose people continued to resist the enemy. Then he continued:

But back of it all [America's victory] were the will and spirit and determination of a free people—who know what freedom is, and who know that it is worth whatever price they had to pay to preserve it.

It was the spirit of liberty which gave us our armed strength and which made our men invincible in battle. We now know that that spirit of liberty, the freedom of the individual, and the personal dignity of man are the strongest and toughest and most enduring forces in the world.

And so on V-J Day, we take renewed faith and pride in our own way of life. We have had our day of rejoicing over this victory. We have had our day of prayer and devotion. Now let us set aside V-J Day as one of renewed consecration to the principles which have made us the strongest nation on earth and which, in this war, we have striven so mightily to preserve. . . .

Truman said Americans faced the future with confidence that, together with its Allies, it could build a world of peace founded on justice and fair dealing and tolerance. Then he concluded his speech:

As President of the United States, I proclaim Sunday, September second, 1945, to be V-J Day—the day of formal surrender by Japan. It is not yet the

day for the formal proclamation of the end of the war or of the cessation of hostilities. But it is a day which we Americans shall always remember as a day of retribution—as we remember that other day, the day of infamy [when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor].

From this day we move forward. We move toward a new era of security at home. With the other United Nations [the Allies] we move toward a new and better world of peace and international goodwill and cooperation.

God's help has brought us to this day of victory. With His help we will attain that peace and prosperity for ourselves and all the world in the years ahead.

Year of Decisions, 314–315, 415–463

The last sentence, beginning “This was one,” of the third paragraph has been moved down one paragraph from its position in the original text.

International Challenges at War's End

April–October 1945

A new trusteeship system—"I had always been opposed to colonialism"—Philippine independence—nationalisms, little wars, and little Caesars—de Gaulle and Tito—Romania, Bulgaria and Poland—the Yalta agreements—"Mr. President, in these next two months the gravest matters in the world will be decided"—the occupation of Germany and Austria—withdrawing to zones of occupation—Churchill warns of an "iron curtain"—Truman wants a united Germany—transit rights to Berlin and Vienna—reparations—displaced persons—punishing war crimes—difficult relations with the Soviet Union—the Council of Foreign Ministers—Japan—Korea—Greece—Iran

During the first several months of his presidency, Truman faced a number of problems resulting from the collapse of German and Japanese rule in the parts of the world the two countries had controlled, and the presence of a newly expansionist power in the heart of Eurasia.

The end of the Japanese empire required the Allies to create a new status for the hundreds of Pacific Islands which Japan had once controlled. Truman's belief that the people of these islands should determine their own future forms of government had importance also for the status of the Philippines.

It had been agreed at Yalta that the United States, Britain, Russia, China, and France [—which were to become the five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations—] would draw up a new



trusteeship system to replace the mandate system of the League of Nations. This trusteeship machinery would be made a part of the [United Nations] Charter. But no specific territories to be placed under trusteeships were to be discussed at . . . [the United Nations Conference in] San Francisco, since they were to be dealt with as part of the peace settlements. Because of the importance of certain strategic areas in the Pacific to our future security, a question had arisen as to the wisdom of discussing the subject at all at this time. This matter, Stettinius said, had been referred to President Roosevelt a few days before his death with the recommendation that he review the matter with the secretaries of state, war, and Navy on his return from Warm Springs, and he had agreed to do this.

The trusteeship problem was one of long standing. It had become more pressing as the end of the war approached. President Roosevelt and those responsible for the security and defense of America faced a twofold problem: first, the future of dependent peoples everywhere, but specifically in areas freed from the enemy; and, second, the disposition of the islands in the Pacific used by the Japanese as military and naval bases during the war. These were the Marshalls, the Marianas, and the Carolines, together including some hundreds of islands and clusters containing a native population of about 50,000. Their total area was small—roughly 850 square miles—but they stretched over a great area of the western Pacific. In the hands of a hostile power they could again be used to shut us out of that area and block us off from the Philippines and Guam, as well as from the British and Dutch possessions in that portion of the world. They could also be used to threaten our lines of communication with New Zealand and Australia. These islands had come under Japanese control at the end of World War I, and promptly thereafter they had been fortified and closed to non-Japanese. As bases for Japanese operations, they made much trouble for us during the war, and we were consequently interested in them not only as trusteeships but, in the case of some, as special strategic areas within a trusteeship system. With victory in the Pacific now assured as American forces drove the Japanese from one after another of their island strongholds, peacetime control of these islands assumed growing importance in the development of American post-war policies.

In earlier meetings with Cabinet members on the question of trusteeships, I found that the State Department held views that differed from those of the war and Navy Departments. I listened carefully to both points of view. In the end, I sustained the Army and Navy chiefs on the major issue of the security of the bases. But I also saw the validity of the ideal for which the

State Department was contending—that the United Nations should not be barred from the local territories beyond the bases, if at any time the United Nations should want to look into the social and economic conditions on these islands. The United States would never emulate the policy of Japan in the areas that were given her under mandate by the League of Nations. We thus assured full protection to our nation against a future Pacific aggressor and, at the same time, laid the foundation for future self-government of the island people. My attitude was always that while it was necessary for us to control certain islands in the Pacific until peace was established, these territories should not be closed to the rest of the world. I believed we should set up civil governments as soon as possible to replace the military governments. Some of the military objected, but while I remained president, I intended to try to get as near to self-government as we could wherever we had the responsibility. We had done this in Cuba. We were about to do it in the Philippines, and this was also to be our aim in Puerto Rico.

I had always been opposed to colonialism. Whatever justification may be cited at any stage, colonialism in any form is hateful to Americans. America fought her own war of liberation against colonialism, and we shall always regard with sympathy and understanding the desire of people everywhere to be free of colonial bondage. The intention of President Roosevelt and the Congress to give early freedom to the Philippines was an expression of this policy as well as of the will of the American people, and I was determined to carry it through to speedy fulfillment. I wanted to see the brave Filipinos back on their feet and thriving as citizens of a free and successful republic. I hoped that by making the Philippines as free as we had made Cuba, it would have an effect on British, Dutch, and French policy in their Far Eastern affairs.

I still believed in Woodrow Wilson's philosophy of "self-determination."

There was some opposition to taking up the question of Philippine independence at this time. There were those who felt that this was one of many questions in the Pacific that had better wait for solution after the war. Special interests also were heard from. They wanted time to get control of certain resources for their own exploitation. . . .

I had seen . . . [the president of the Philippines, Sergio] Osmeña on April 19. A second appointment with him was set for May 4, and I intended to express to him my determination to carry out our announced policy. President Osmeña had been one of the last official visitors received by Roosevelt at Warm Springs. He was there on April 5 when Roosevelt held a press conference, during which he told of talks he had had with Osmeña. "We are

absolutely unchanged," Roosevelt had said at that time, "in our policy of two years ago for immediate Filipino independence."

. . . When I received President Osmeña at noon on May 4, we quickly got down to business. I again stated my intention of carrying out all of our promises and pledges and added that I was in favor of the earliest possible independence date. . . . The following day I issued a statement on the Philippines . . . [which read in part]:

As a result of the discussions I have had with the President of the Philippines, I am prepared to endorse and carry through to their conclusion the policies laid down by President Roosevelt respecting the Islands and the independence of the Filipino people.

The date of independence will be advanced as soon as practicable in pursuance of the policy outlined by Congress. . . . The Filipino people, whose heroic and loyal stand in this war has won the affection and admiration of the American people, will be fully assisted by the United States in the great problem of rehabilitation and reconstruction which lies ahead. . . .

President Osmeña came to see me again on May 14 to sign an agreement to permit the United States to have military and naval bases in the islands. The Philippine Islands are a vital strategic center in the Pacific, and we were anxious that a military agreement with the Philippines be concluded in order that we might in the future continue to protect them against outside attack. The Filipinos themselves were equally anxious to have this protection, because without it the republic we were helping to establish might sometime find itself helpless.

The end of the war in Europe left some borders contested and some countries in the control of occupying powers. Border problems sometimes involved emergent leaders who were reluctant to back down from their territorial ambitions; occupied countries had in one way or another to form new governments under the supervision of their occupying powers, and one of those powers, the Soviet Union, did not share Truman's belief that countries should be free to choose their own form of government.

One of the tragic aftermaths of a world war is the harvest of little Caesars and their acts of aggression. When the great powers are in conflict, pent-up fanatical nationalisms began to stir everywhere. This poses a constant threat to peace, for these little acts of belligerency or aggression—these "little wars"—are frequently fought in the name of liberation. They arise from the

natural desire of all people to gain full freedom—a desire that cannot long be suppressed or denied by a mere show of force by major powers. We need patience and understanding in our dealings with people who have suffered foreign domination or occupation. Unfortunately, the wrong leaders too often undertake the role of liberators. Too many of them turn out to be men who either lust for power or who are just plain vain or unstable.

. . . Even before the end of . . . [World War II], the most violent and destructive war in history, we were facing a variety of belligerent activities in the name of lost territories, or needed frontier changes, and of national liberations, and along with these activities came a new crop of little Caesars. There were even some nations prepared to risk immediate war in disputes over mere bits of territory. They invoked national honor, national dignity, and every demagogic appeal, even if the quarrel might lead to their own destruction. This unreasoning urge to resort to force rather than submit to the orderly procedure of negotiations created a most trying situation for the Allies. These outbreaks were not isolated situations. Frictions developed in Europe and even involved certain of our allies. Violent resistance movements were developing in North Africa, the Middle East, and the redeemed areas of Asia, all in the name of liberation. They sought immediate freedom from the established colonial powers, who were, of course, our allies. . . .

[Americans] . . . have always accepted and encouraged the undeniable right of a people to determine its own political destiny. It is our own faith and the foundation of our own political freedom. If this is valid for us, it must be equally valid for other people. There could be no "ifs" attached to this right, unless we were to backslide on our political creed. But the real problem, as I saw it in its application to immediate events, was not one of principle. . . . The real problem was that of procedure and method. Amid the shambles of a world breaking down, we were desperately in need of machinery not only to deal with international disputes but also to provide assistance and encouragement to peoples in their peaceful aspirations. I was thinking primarily of a world organized for peace and of our plans for the United Nations. The difficulties we faced at this time illustrated the need we had for firm and orderly procedure.

There was, for example, the case of General [Charles] de Gaulle and his territorial demands for France. De Gaulle was a man of dedicated courage who had rendered important services to France in 1940 at a time when French morale had hit bottom. The desire of the French people to regain something of their lost power and prestige was understandable and Americans found it easy to sympathize with them. De Gaulle's methods of

championing French national causes, however, were not always along peaceful lines, and his tendency to use force in pressing national claims made for difficult situations. There was the incident at Stuttgart, for instance, which made little sense except that de Gaulle was determined to force our hand by staking out an occupation zone on his own.

By April 21, the American and French forces . . . had approached Stuttgart in their rapid advance to the east. From here, the American forces were to turn southeast and head toward the Danube. According to plan, the French were to take Stuttgart and then move to the south while an American unit took over the city. This was agreed to by . . . [the American and French commanders]. Having taken the city, however, the French refused to move out, in spite of the agreement. On April 27 . . . [the American commander] ordered the French to evacuate, but the local French commander replied that he was under orders from General de Gaulle to remain. General Eisenhower's intervention did not move de Gaulle, nor did a message I sent him on May 4. I thereupon ordered our supplies to the French troops cut, and Stuttgart was finally evacuated.

De Gaulle gained nothing by this show of force. Discussions were already under way on the matter of a French zone in Germany, and land-grabbing was out of order. De Gaulle's explanation was not impressive. "Such incidents," he told . . . [the American ambassador to France, Jefferson Caffery], "could be avoided if the allies of France would only recognize that questions so closely touching France as the occupation of German territory should be discussed and decided with her." Actually, the matter of a French zone had been under consideration ever since Yalta, and this zone was to be formed from German territory that was originally regarded as part of our zone. Both the British and we were working to restore France as a power, and discussions were then under way in Paris through our embassies.

A more troublesome incident, however, was the unilateral French attempt to occupy parts of the Aosta Valley in northwest Italy. We were just then denying [Yugoslav leader Josip Broz] Tito the right to take over Venezia Giulia by force, and now de Gaulle seized the Italian valley as a national right. Nor did he withdraw his troops until I had threatened, as in the Stuttgart incident, to stop our supplies to the French armies.

The affair started when French troops crossed over into Italy in the last phase of the war and occupied areas which de Gaulle wanted to appropriate as being necessary for what he called "minor frontier adjustments." The French troops were under the Supreme Allied Command and, after V-E Day, Eisenhower ordered their withdrawal to France. The French

commander, however, replied that he could not comply without instructions from his government. In the meantime, more French troops were coming into the area. French occupation, in fact, was being established, and annexation propaganda was being carried out.

On May 5, the Allied commander in Italy, [Field] Marshal [Harold] Alexander, asked Eisenhower whether he could not get the French to comply with the order he had already issued, as the activities of the French troops were troublesome for the local population. Alexander pointed out that there were bound to be clashes and that this would have a serious effect on the Italian government's position. [Ambassador] Caffery . . . was instructed to make representations to de Gaulle. On May 6, [he] . . . cabled that he had talked with de Gaulle and that the general had said that France had no territorial ambitions in the region other than minor frontier adjustments which he hoped to take up with the Italians amicably at a later date. Reports came to me, however, that the number of French troops in the Aosta Valley was still increasing; that food, already scarce, was being requisitioned; that Italian flags were being taken down; and that notices were being posted asking the Italian population to declare for France and ordering the acceptance of French currency.

I received word from the military that United States troops were advancing to the French-Italian frontier control but that this advance was being impeded by passive French resistance, including road blocks. Our forces were instructed to halt for further orders if hostilities threatened. Ambassador Caffery was instructed to deliver to the French Foreign Office a strong memorandum on the matter, and the British government informed the French government of its concern over the continued presence of French troops in Italian territory.

De Gaulle's attitude in reply was one of injured dignity. France, he said, was asking only what was her due. About the same time, he began to hint that if another Big Three conference was held he should be invited to take part as an equal of Stalin, Churchill, and myself. To prove this claim to the status of a great power, he demanded that French troops should be included in the forces that would deliver the final blow to the empire of Japan. Their weapons and equipment, of course, were to be furnished by us. And as to the movement of French troops, de Gaulle told General Eisenhower that with the end of the war with Germany this had become a wholly French matter.

Official relations with France were becoming seriously strained, and my own feelings about General de Gaulle were less and less friendly when, on

May 18, and at de Gaulle's request, I received the French foreign minister, Georges Bidault. I was happy to see him because he was a French patriot who would understand our concern about Allied-French tension. . . . I told him that I had always been interested in France and that almost every American had a high regard for the French people. I said we wanted to do everything we possibly could to see France get back on her feet and become a great power. I told him that the United States was moved by the strongest ties of friendship dating back to the foundation of this nation. A strong France would represent a gain to the world. I told Bidault the people of the United States had accepted a reduction in their requirements of essential food items in order to permit increased shipments to the liberated countries of Europe, including France. I informed him that the United States was reaffirming its readiness to relinquish to France part of the American zone of occupation in Germany and that only details remained to be worked out.

[Bidault] . . . raised the question of French military participation in the war against Japan. He was very anxious to have me commit myself on help in transporting French troops to the Pacific. I told him the matter of transportation would depend entirely on the strategic disposition of troops under the American general in command and our ability to find facilities and supplies for the shipping of troops. I wanted Bidault to understand clearly that if French troops were used we would have to have prior agreement from the French that they would be under our command. I added that I would insist on the condition that the French troops obey the orders of our commanding general. We were now going through an unhappy experience in the European Theater, and I had no wish to see it repeated. I told Bidault I did not like what was happening and that I would lay all the cards on the table: Unless France carried out her commitments, I explained, and unless French troops were instructed to obey the order of the general under whom they were serving, we could not possibly furnish transportation, equipment, planes, and other materiel for them to use.

This was a difficult session and one that I did not enjoy, but it served to clear up our position. Without impairing our warm regard for the French people, I wanted de Gaulle to know that we did not like what he was doing and that all French forces in northwest Italy should be withdrawn. . . . Bidault understood my attitude, and he expressed the opinion that the matter could be straightened out. But Ambassador Caffery reported on June 4 that . . . [de Gaulle] was in no mood to reason and that all he would talk about to [him] . . . when he saw him were the "humiliations" to which he said

the French were being subjected. He said that all he wanted on the Italian border was a minor rectification of the boundary, but when Caffery asked him why he did not take his troops out of the area he said, "There would be another humiliation for us." Caffery was instructed to stress our traditional friendship. We had no intention to humiliate France. But at a time when we were lecturing the Soviet Union on keeping her agreements, and telling Tito how to behave in territorial matters, the unilateral French tactics were embarrassing as well as potentially dangerous.

However, there was no improvement in the Franco-Italian situation. French troops were actively obstructing the Allied military government in the area. Administrative officers who had been installed by the Allied Military Government—that is, by the British and ourselves—were actually ordered expelled by . . . [de Gaulle], and Allied posters and proclamations were being torn down by French soldiers.

On June 5, I took the situation up with the Chiefs of Staff and with the State Department. After the meeting, I ordered that further issues of munitions and equipment to the French troops be stopped. I also sent a message to General de Gaulle in which I expressed my surprise at the language used by [one of] his commander[s] . . . to [one of ours]. . . . The French commander had actually threatened to have his troops fight the American troops who had come into the area under orders from the Supreme Command.

I notified de Gaulle that no more supplies would be issued to the French Army until its withdrawal from Aosta Valley. I prepared a public statement for release to the American press, declaring that I was stopping shipment of supplies to the French because of their threat to use these munitions against American soldiers. I forwarded this statement to Churchill for his concurrence. Churchill agreed. However, I decided to hold up publication of the statement in view of the extreme sensitivity of the French at the time and to see what de Gaulle would do in response to my direct message to him.

Commenting on my action to withhold publication of my statement to the press, Churchill cabled on June 6 that "the publication of your message would have led to the overthrow of de Gaulle, who after five long years of experience I am convinced is the worst enemy of France in her troubles." Churchill said he considered de Gaulle "one of the greatest dangers to European peace. No one has more need than Britain of French friendship, but I am sure that in the long run no understanding will be reached with General de Gaulle."

My message to de Gaulle brought results. The general agreed to withdraw French troops from Aosta.

Meanwhile new problems involving de Gaulle had developed in the Near East, where the French had formerly held Syria and Lebanon as League of Nations mandates. In the course of World War II the Allies recognized Syria and Lebanon as independent countries. They were now members of the United Nations and had their representatives [at the United Nations Conference] in San Francisco. In the spring of 1945, de Gaulle began to press these two nations for special concessions of a political, cultural, and military nature which would put them under French domination. French troops landed in both Syria and Lebanon to back up de Gaulle's demands. By late May violence had broken out, including the shelling of Damascus and other communities in Syria.

The United States cabled a protest to the de Gaulle government asking that [it deal with Syria and Lebanon] . . . as fully sovereign and independent members of the family of nations. [The president] . . . of Syria made a strong appeal to me for help, saying French bombs had been dropped on unarmed cities because, he said, "we refused to grant special privileges to France."

In trying to restore French colonial interests in the Levant, de Gaulle had come up against a hornets' nest and did not know how to get out of it without losing face. Once de Gaulle got involved, the question of prestige kept him there until he was forced out.

Secretary [of State Edward R.] Stettinius, [Jr.] . . . advised me that the Levant situation was threatening to disrupt the San Francisco conference because of the anger of the representatives of the Arab countries and most of the other small countries which were united in opposition to the French tactics. The small countries, Stettinius said, saw the affair as a preview of what might happen if the veto power were granted to the five major countries. The representatives of the small states felt that if the United Nations were now functioning and France had the veto power she could stop any action on behalf of independent Syria and Lebanon.

Prime Minister Churchill cabled me on May 30 that severe fighting threatened the security of the whole Middle East and our communications for the war against Japan. [He] . . . asked my approval for the British to intervene with troops in order to stop the fighting and restore order. I cabled . . . that his proposed plan for action to end the conflict had my approval. The British government then instructed its commanding officer in the Middle East . . . to restore order. [The British commander then] . . . asked the French commander to issue a cease-fire order, and the French commander gave the order to end the fighting. . . . Order returned to the two countries when the British guaranteed the governments of Syria and Lebanon against

the new pressures from the French and in a matter of weeks our minister in Damascus reported that withdrawal of all foreign troops was recommended.

We had another explosive situation on our hands that could become serious, and that was in the Trieste area. This was brought on by the nationalistic ambitions of the partisan leader, [Josip Broz] Tito. Allied and Russian support had enabled Tito to campaign successfully against the Germans and to establish himself as the head of the Yugoslav National Provisional Government. Tito was a communist, but he combined with his communism an appeal to the ardent nationalism of the Yugoslav peoples. In the name of Yugoslav nationalism, he was laying claim to the important seaport of Trieste and the surrounding area of Venezia Giulia. In this area populations and language groups are intermingled. The City of Trieste is overwhelmingly Italian in population, while the surrounding countryside is inhabited primarily by Slovenes, one of the nationalities that compose Yugoslavia. Slovene and Croat settlements are also to be found in the border sections of the Austrian provinces of Styria and Carinthia, and Tito was moving troops into these sections with the idea of obtaining them for Yugoslavia. Trieste was particularly important because it is a major port forming an outlet into the Adriatic for the entire surrounding region, as well as for landlocked Austria and other portions of the Danube River basin. The Allied plan called for all these contested areas to be occupied by [Allied] forces. . . .

Churchill sent a cable to Truman on April 27, 1945, asking him to make a decision quickly regarding Allied occupation of Trieste. The great thing is to be there before Tito's guerillas are in occupation, Churchill's cable read. Therefore it does not seem to me there is a minute to lose. Truman made the decision Churchill wanted, and Field Marshal Alexander was instructed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to establish Allied military government in Venezia Giulia and in nearby areas if military necessity required this action before the United States and the United Kingdom had negotiated Soviet cooperation with the plan and Yugoslav acquiescence.

On April 30, Churchill cabled Truman about his decision. The military part, he said, seems to me very good but it is surely a delusion to suppose the Yugoslav government, with the Soviet government behind them, would agree to our entering or taking control of Venezia Giulia. . . . They will undoubtedly try to overrun all this territory . . . , and once they get there I do not think they will go. Churchill was less concerned than Truman to get Soviet and Yugoslav agreement to the movement of Field Marshal Alexander's forces into Trieste. We are as much entitled to move freely into Trieste, if we can get

there, *Churchill said*, as were the Russians to win their way into Vienna. *If it was militarily possible, in Churchill's view, Field Marshal Alexander's forces should take possession of Trieste before informing the Soviets or Yugoslavs. Truman cabled Churchill his concurrence that Alexander's forces could take possession of Trieste without obtaining prior Soviet consent, but he wanted Alexander to inform Tito prior to sending his forces into Venezia Giulia and warn him that if any of his forces remain in that area they will come under Alexander's command. . . . I wish, Truman told Churchill, to avoid having American forces used to fight Yugoslavs or . . . used in combat in the Balkan political arena.*

I was trying to be extremely careful not to get us mixed up in a Balkan turmoil. The Balkans had long been a source of trouble and war. I believed that if the political situation in the Balkans could be adjusted so that Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria, as well as Poland and Austria, could all have governments of their own people's choosing, with no outside interference, this would help us in our plans for peace. I did not want to become involved in the Balkans in a way that could lead us into another world conflict. In any case, I was anxious to get the Russians into the war against Japan as soon as possible, thus saving the lives of countless Americans. Churchill, on the other hand, was always anxious to do what he could to save British control of the eastern Mediterranean area in order to maintain Great Britain's influence in Greece, Egypt, and the Middle East. I could not blame Churchill for the position he took. Had I been in his place, I might probably have been inclined to do as he wanted to do. [But I believed] . . . that if we were to win the peace after winning the war, we had to have Russian help. I was trying to get Churchill in a frame of mind to forget the old power politics and get a United Nations organization to work.

It had long been evident that the northern frontiers of Italy would be in dispute. In September 1944, at the Quebec conference, President Roosevelt had approved a plan that would leave the final disposition of disputed areas on Italy's borders to a final peace settlement. Meanwhile, however, Allied military government was to be established in Italy with her 1939 frontiers under Allied control, and it was on this basis that the directive of April 20 had been sent to Field Marshal Alexander to maintain Allied and military government in areas along the Italian northern frontier likely to be disputed, including Venezia Giulia.

Alexander had discussed the Allied occupation plans with Tito in Belgrade in February 1945. Tito had accepted this plan, which provided that

local authorities, whatever their nationalities, would come under Allied military government. Russia had been informed of the British-American position on Venezia Giulia on March 19. The Russians had not dissented. Now, however, Tito claimed that because conditions had changed since the time he made the agreement with Alexander he would no longer observe it. He informed Alexander that he intended to occupy Venezia Giulia up to the Austrian border, but that he would allow the Allies the use of the port of Trieste and of the railway to Austria. But when Alexander's troops reached the cities of Trieste, Monfalcone and Gorizia, they found that Tito's forces were ahead of them and that Tito was continuing to pour Yugoslav troops into the entire area east of the Isonzo River. Furthermore, he persisted in his claim that this area was his exclusive operational theater. His forces were also setting up the administration of the area, and Alexander's forces were unable to establish an Allied military government, even in the portion of the three cities they had entered. And finally, the formation of a Slovene government at Trieste was actually announced [by the communists].

The Italian government became increasingly alarmed, fearing that Tito's action would play into the hands of subversive groups in Italy. On May 7, our Ambassador in Rome, Alexander Kirk, reported that east of the Isonzo River a Yugoslav military government was in full control. All public buildings had been occupied and Yugoslav flags were flying over them. Italian names of towns had even been replaced by Yugoslav names. A large number of persons . . . had been arrested and removed.

Two days later Ambassador Kirk reported growing tension in Italy and [the Italian premier] . . . complained that the Italian communists were claiming Tito's action had the approval of the Allies. The American government never for a moment considered that Trieste should go to Yugoslavia. . . . Tito was plainly determined to use force to gain his territorial objective instead of waiting for a peace conference to settle all boundary claims. I therefore called the Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the State Department to a special conference at the White House. I then cabled Churchill on May 11 and issued a directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . . .

Truman's cable to Churchill expressed his increasing concern about Tito's actions in Venezia Giulia. I have come to the conclusion, Truman said, that we must decide now whether we should uphold the fundamental principles of territorial settlement by orderly process against force, intimidation or blackmail. If Tito were allowed to get away with what he was doing in Venezia

Giulia, Truman felt, he might act similarly in parts of Austria, Hungary, and Greece. The problem, *Truman argued to Churchill*, is essentially one of deciding whether our two countries are going to permit our Allies to engage in uncontrolled land-grabbing or tactics which are all too reminiscent of those of Hitler and Japan. *Truman suggested that the United States and United Kingdom inform Tito that territorial problems such as those posed by Venezia Giulia would be solved as part of a general peace settlement, and that the doctrine of solution by conquest and by unilateral proclamation of sovereignty through occupation . . . has been definitely and solemnly repudiated by the Allied Governments participating in this war. . . . The United States and United Kingdom expected the Yugoslav government to agree immediately to the control of Venezia Giulia and its cities by Field Marshal Alexander's forces.*

Churchill replied that he agreed with every word in Truman's cable and would work with all his strength to achieve the program he described. If it is handled firmly . . . , *Churchill said*, Europe may be saved from another blood-bath. Otherwise the whole fruits of our victory may be cast away and none of the purposes of World Organization [the United Nations] to prevent territorial aggression and future wars will be attained.

Churchill asked Truman not to withdraw any American troops from Alexander's command. Truman could not make any such commitment. The continuing war against Japan required that troops be moved from Europe to the Pacific theater, and, in addition, Americans were increasingly demanding that, with the war winding down, the government bring the troops back home. Unless Tito's forces should attack, *Truman cabled Churchill*, it is impossible for me to involve this country in another war.

On . . . May 13, Churchill cabled again, proposing that I join him in a message to Stalin with regard to the Trieste situation. I agreed, and in a joint message we set out in full the background of the controversy and informed Stalin of the sharp note that had been sent to Belgrade. . . .

The Yugoslavs continued to push their occupation attempts. On May 17, Field Marshal Alexander sent a message to General Eisenhower saying that the situation had seriously deteriorated and that the Yugoslav activities could not be controlled without the use of force.

Several days before, I had called in the Chiefs of Staff. I wanted to know what forces were available in the immediate area in case it became necessary for us to make a show of strength. I believed that all that it was necessary for us to do to impress Tito was to show such overpowering strength that he would back down before undertaking anything foolhardy. Through General

Marshall I asked General Eisenhower if he could send three divisions to the Brenner Pass or above Trieste. I asked Admiral King whether he could send some units of the Mediterranean fleet to the Adriatic and how long it would take to get there. I told him to alert the necessary ships. I asked Arnold what air squadrons he could move, and asked him to alert them. General Marshall reported that Eisenhower was prepared to dispatch General [George S.] Patton with up to five armored divisions to the Brenner Pass and, if necessary, into Italy. Admiral King reported that units of the Mediterranean fleet had been alerted to steam into the Adriatic, and General Arnold told me that several Air Force squadrons were ready to move at a moment's notice.

Truman sent a cable to Stalin on May 20, telling him of the serious problems being caused by Tito's attitude toward Venezia Giulia. We cannot consider this [difference between the Allied command in Italy and Tito] simply in the light of an Italian-Yugoslav boundary dispute, Truman said, but must regard it as a question of principle involving the pacific settlement of territorial disputes and the foundation of a lasting peace in Europe. Truman asked Stalin to assist in bringing about Tito's agreement with the settlement terms proposed by the United States and United Kingdom with respect to Venezia Giulia.

Stalin, in his reply to Truman's message, sided with Tito. Most of the people who live in Venezia Giulia are Yugoslav, not Italian, he argued, and it was Tito and his Yugoslav troops who drove the Germans out of the region. . . . It would not be fair and would be an undeserved insult for the Yugoslav Army and the Yugoslav people to refuse Yugoslavia the right to occupy the territory retaken from the enemy. . . . He said that the Yugoslav troops should be allowed to remain in Venezia Giulia as should be the Yugoslav administration operating there. Tito and Field Marshal Alexander should then agree on a line of demarcation between the areas controlled by their respective sides. This, Stalin concluded, would be the correct solution to the problem.

Field Marshal Alexander showed a great deal of patience throughout the crisis. But on the one occasion when he spoke his mind, he compared Tito to Hitler and Mussolini. The Yugoslavs and the Russians alike raised storms of indignant protest over this incident.

Later in May, Tito advised us that he would agree to Allied control of Trieste and Venezia Giulia if Yugoslav military units could remain in the Allied occupied area, if Yugoslav representatives could participate in Allied military government, and if our military administration would act through the civil authorities Tito had already set up in the area. This counterproposal

was unworkable, as well as unacceptable from a military standpoint to Field Marshal Alexander, but it kept the door open to further negotiations. That was what I wanted, and talks continued despite irritating local incidents. Then on May 29 . . . the Yugoslav foreign minister called on me, accompanied by the Yugoslav ambassador. [The foreign minister] . . . had been at the San Francisco conference and was on his way back to Belgrade. He was a leader in the Croatian Peasant Party, had been prime minister in the government-in-exile, and now represented the fusion element in the new Tito government. He made a fine impression on me. I talked very plainly to him and to the ambassador. The Allies, I told them, intended to extend an impartial military administration to some of the disputed territory of Venezia Giulia without prejudice to the final disposition of the area, and we expected the Yugoslav government to cooperate, as a member of the United Nations. Tito, I pointed out, had already violated the Yalta agreement by setting up a totalitarian regime and was now trying to extend it to Venezia Giulia by force. If Tito persisted in this, we would meet him with overwhelming force, and the time had come for a decision. I let [the foreign minister] know that we had completed a draft agreement and would soon present it to Tito, expecting him to cooperate without further obstructionist tactics.

On June 9, an agreement was finally signed making two military occupation zones out of Venezia Giulia. The western zone, known as Zone A and including the city of Trieste, was placed under Anglo-American occupation, and the eastern zone, known as Zone B, was to be under Yugoslav occupation. The line of demarcation had been worked out by . . . Alexander's chief of staff in agreement with the Yugoslavs. . . . Yugoslav troops were to be withdrawn to their own zone, and the Allied commander was to decide on the use of all civil authorities in our zone. Both zones were to be considered as temporary occupation areas and as not affecting the ultimate territorial settlement.

Getting supplementary agreement needed to implement military and technical details of this agreement met with further difficulties. Now, on June 21, Stalin took up Tito's case. "The tone," he said, "of the ultimatum of the declaration which was presented to the Yugoslav Government by Anglo-American representatives [was] . . . unexpected for the Soviet Government. How is it possible to believe that such methods will provide strong positive results? . . . I, as before, hope that in respect to [Venezia Giulia] . . . the just Yugoslav interests will be satisfied."

I cabled Stalin on June 25, explaining the course of the negotiations in detail and assuring him that any still unexplained questions could be discussed at our [meeting in July at Potsdam]. . . . [Venezia Giulia] was one of many problems that would have to be taken up . . . [during the Potsdam Conference].

Throughout May and June many difficulties developed between the Russians and ourselves and the British. At Yalta, President Roosevelt had agreed to a policy for the reestablishment of free governments for the liberated countries of Europe under inter-Allied supervision. But in Bulgaria and Romania, with the advancing Soviet armies, communist governments were imposed by the Russian military commanders.

I received a firsthand report of conditions in these two countries on May 2, when Acting Secretary of State [Joseph C.] Grew brought our representatives on the two respective Allied Control Commissions to my office. . . . In Romania . . . the Russians were running the Allied Control Commission without consulting the British and American members. The government was a minority government dominated by the Communist Party, which . . . represented less than 10% of the Romanian population. The vast majority of the Romanian people . . . did not want either the government they had or any other form of communism. The Communist Party, however, was using every means possible to gain full control of the governmental machinery, and the opposition groups under young King Michael and the leaders of the majority parties were becoming ineffectual. Economically Romania was being tied closely to the Russian state through reparations payments, through the transfer of property said by the Russians to have been German-owned, and through the surrender of industrial equipment as "war trophies." Furthermore, Romania was being kept almost entirely cut off from trade relations with other nations, and this made her increasingly dependent on Russia for exports and imports alike.

In Bulgaria . . . the situation was as bad [as in Romania]. The American representatives there were treated almost as if they were captives. No American was allowed outside the capital city of Sofia without a Russian going with him, and usually such escorts could not be found unless the American was of the highest rank. Every ounce of supplies or mail brought in for the American mission required Russian permission and was subject to Russian inspection on arrival. As far as the Allied Control Commission was concerned, the American member was not only without a voice but was unable even to get copies of the directives that were being issued in the name of

the commission of which he was a member. Since September 1944, when the Russians had entered the country, the government of Bulgaria had been totally dominated by the communists, who had gained complete control of the police and of the Army and had succeeded in suppressing all opposition sentiment in the press by labeling it "Fascist."

From Churchill I learned that the representatives of the British had painted a similar, disturbing picture to him. On the other hand, Winston Churchill himself revealed that in October 1944 he had proposed to Stalin that Romania and Bulgaria be considered as lying within the Russian sphere of influence, and Russian dominance in these two countries had thus been recognized [by the British government].

On the basis of [the] . . . information [I had received regarding the situation in Romania and Bulgaria], I instructed the State Department to remind the Russian government of its obligation under the Yalta agreement and to ask that restrictions of movement on American representatives of the Allied Control Commissions be removed.

In Poland, the situation was different. Negotiations there were still going on about the composition of the provisional government. I considered it essential that agreement be reached on the Polish provisional government before we could grant diplomatic recognition to Poland and agree to her appearance at the San Francisco conference. . . .

Truman sent a cable to Stalin on May 4 in which he said he believed that a satisfactory resolution of the problem of organizing a Polish government that was based on the agreements reached at the Yalta Conference was essential and should be achieved as soon as possible. The United States government could not recognize the provisional government which had been established in Warsaw as representative of Poland. To do so, Truman told Stalin, would be tantamount to the abandonment of the Yalta agreement.

Stalin replied both to Truman's message and to an earlier one from Churchill on May 6. He argued that the provisional government in Warsaw had the support and confidence of the majority of the Polish people. He also insisted that because Poland was a close neighbor, the Soviet Union had a right to require that only persons who were friendly toward the Soviet Union and were prepared to co-operate with it should be involved in forming the Polish government. He said that the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom with respect to the government of Poland were so completely contrary to his that agreement seemed impossible.

Churchill was very pleased with the performance of the new president of the United States during this encounter with Stalin over the future of the liberated

areas of Europe. I rejoice, Churchill cabled Truman on May 11, that your present intention is to adhere to our rightful interpretation of the Yalta agreements and to stand firmly on our present announced attitude towards all the questions at issue. *Looking forward to the anticipated meeting of the Big Three, Churchill said solemnly to Truman,* Mr. President, in these next two months the gravest matters in the world will be decided.

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, a commission had been established to consult with both members of the provisional government which had been set up in Soviet occupied Poland and democratic leaders in Poland and in exile abroad regarding the organization of a new provisional government which included, besides the communists in the existing provisional government, some democratic members. Soviet delaying tactics prevented the commission—which was composed of the Soviet foreign minister and the American and British ambassadors to the Soviet Union—from meeting until mid-June. Despite this, and despite the Soviet Union's announcing that it was putting sixteen Polish democratic leaders on trial, the commission was able to reach agreement regarding the broadening of the provisional government to include democratic members.

Their agreement, however, was only a beginning. Both Ambassadors Harriman and [Archibald] Clark Kerr, speaking for their governments, made it clear that the formation of the Provisional Government of National Unity was only the first step in carrying out the Yalta agreement. This, they pointed out, would not be fulfilled until truly free elections were held in Poland. Harriman asked and received a pledge from the principal parties to maintain the basic agreement until free elections were held. He also asked for assurances that freedom of assembly and discussion would be granted prior to elections and that amnesty would be given persons accused of political offenses. . . .

I directed . . . Secretary of State [Byrnes] to inform the Polish foreign minister that the United States would recognize the new government as soon as there was an official announcement that it was functioning in Poland. On June 30, Acting Secretary of State Grew informed me that the prime minister of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity had addressed a message to me stating that the new government had been formed on June 28 in conformity with the . . . [decisions made at the Yalta Conference], and that he requested in the name of the new government that we establish diplomatic relations between our two countries and exchange ambassadors. Ambassador Harriman also reported that in his opinion the new government had in fact been formed in conformity with the . . . [decisions made at the Yalta Conference] . . . and that we should therefore carry

out our obligation to recognize it. I decided that no useful purpose would be served by further delay. . . .

Churchill concurred in Truman's decision, and on July 5, 1945, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom announced that diplomatic relations had been established with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

Germany and Austria were unique in being occupied by four of the victorious Allies. The relations among the occupying powers were from the beginning difficult, with the Soviet Union on one side of a growing divide, and the United States, United Kingdom, and France on the other.

The end of war and the effort by the Allies to restore order in Europe brought on many unexpected difficulties. The early stages of the occupation of Germany and Austria resulted in new tensions. Under the terms of the unconditional surrender of Germany, the Allies had absolute authority and complete control. But the major problem was how to work out occupational arrangements that would be satisfactory to each of the Allies. There was no German government except for a group at Flensburg under Admiral [Karl] Doenitz, who claimed to be the acting authority of the Reich. We paid no attention to Doenitz, although our Army kept a vigilant eye on him. In Austria, we faced a Russian occupation with their usual "provisional government" setup which was completely under Russian control and which claimed to represent all of Austria. We protested to the Soviet government that the provisional government in Vienna had been formed without consultation with the Americans, the British, and the French. . . . Both in Germany and in Austria the major task facing us was to set up control machinery and to arrange for the withdrawal of the Allied troops to their respective zones. In Austria, none of this work had been done. In Germany, however, the preparatory work on occupation and control had already been completed by the European Advisory Commission. Only Soviet approval was needed before the details of organization in each zone could be made public.

It was our plan, to which the British had agreed, to dissolve the combined headquarters of General Eisenhower (SHAEF) as soon as the zones of occupation were established. Eisenhower would then be placed in charge of the American zone, Montgomery would take over the zone allocated to the British, and a French general would be in command of that portion of the original American sector which was to become a French zone. These three

Allied officers, together with the commander of the Russian zone, would form the Allied Control Council for Germany.

On May 10 General Eisenhower recommended that the dissolution of SHAEF take place as soon as the American, British, and French forces had occupied their respective zones. On May 11 Churchill cabled me urging that our forces be kept on the farthest advanced lines they had reached. In spite of the fact that he agreed to the occupation zones, he asserted that the Allies ought not withdraw from the positions they had reached until we had been satisfied about Poland and other problems we had with the Russians. Churchill followed this note with other messages on the subject of the withdrawal of our troops. He said he was disturbed by our plans for redeployment to the Pacific and asked for a standstill order on the movement of American forces. But we were still in the midst of a major war in the Pacific, and our troops were needed there. Furthermore, there was public clamor at home for the return of troops not going to the Pacific. I had already indicated to Churchill my intention to live up to the commitments we had entered into with regard to the zones of occupation, and we had no intention of extending ourselves beyond those zones. I took this position after consultations with our military chiefs. Russian tactics and aims were, of course, of much concern to us, and I agree with Churchill on the seriousness of the situation. But I could not agree to going back on our commitments. Apart from that, there were powerful military considerations which we could not and should not disregard. . . .

Establishing zones of occupation in Vienna was complicated by the Soviet refusal to allow American, British, and French officials to travel there. Truman wrote to Stalin on May 16 about this problem, and Stalin agreed to allow the officials to enter Vienna for the limited purposes, as Stalin put it in his message to Truman of May 17, of acquainting themselves on the spot with the situation of the city and for preparing proposals regarding the zones of occupation in Vienna.

Our problem in Germany now was to get the Allied Control Council into operation. Germany was in effect being run by local military commanders. There was the danger of complete economic and social collapse of the country. Therefore, it was imperative that there be established at the earliest possible moment a council to make policy for Germany as a whole and to direct the administration of Greater Berlin. On May 22 the United States, Britain, Russia, and France approved the formal declaration of defeat of

Germany drawn up by the European Advisory Commission. The four military commanders would meet in Berlin early in June to sign this document and would remain there to work out the details of [Allied] Control Council machinery. In approving these plans, it was my purpose that Germany would be treated as one country, eventually to be placed under one government that would be subject to checks by the Allied Control Council in order to prevent a re-emergence of Nazism and Prussian militarism. At this time, Admiral Doenitz was placed under arrest as one of the top Nazi leaders listed by the War Crimes Commission. . . .

On June 2, Eisenhower cabled the Combined Chiefs of Staff to ask when he should withdraw the U.S. forces back from advanced eastern positions westward into the American zone of occupation agreed upon among the Allies. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, with Truman's approval, told Eisenhower that the timing of the withdrawal of forces into the agreed zone should be based primarily on military considerations, including the ability of American forces to achieve the withdrawal and the ability of British and Soviet forces to move into and take control of the areas of their zones held by American forces.

Churchill was deeply troubled by the impending withdrawal of American forces from their advanced positions. Such an action, he argued, would bring the Soviet army into the heart of Western Europe and the descent of an iron curtain between us and everything to the eastward. Churchill told Truman he hoped that this retreat, if it has to be made, would be accompanied by the settlement of many great things which would be the true foundation of world peace. Nothing really important has been settled yet, and you and I will have to bear great responsibility for the future.

Truman's advisers, including Eisenhower, told Truman that the Soviets would not agree to organize the Allied Control Council until U.S. forces had withdrawn into the American zone from their positions in the Soviet zone. Truman decided to begin the withdrawal beginning June 21, and he informed Churchill of his decision. He sent Churchill his draft of a message to Stalin telling him of the U.S. readiness to begin withdrawal of its forces from the Soviet zone in Germany on June 21, and also suggesting a method for establishing zones of occupation in Austria and Vienna. Churchill replied, Obviously we are obliged to conform to your decision. He suggested changes in the part of Truman's message that related to Austria, which Truman accepted. Shortly after Truman sent his message to Stalin, Churchill told Truman he had sent a message to Stalin endorsing the content of Truman's message and saying that the British government would also withdraw its forces from the Soviet zone beginning on June 21.

Stalin requested a slight delay, to July 1, in the date when the armed forces of the Allied nations would begin moving toward their respective zones of occupation in Germany and Austria. Truman agreed to the new date and told General Marshall to begin moving U.S. forces into the American occupation zones on July 1.

With the date for evacuation set for July 1, the movement of our troops and the final details were now matters for the commanding general to carry out. The agreement among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin on how they would handle Germany was being kept. My intention was always to carry out to the letter all agreements entered into by Roosevelt with our allies. The main purpose was to set up a joint government of Germany consisting of the three powers and France. My aim was a unified Germany with a centralized government in Berlin. In the case of Austria, I hoped for a unified country with its own government in Vienna. It was my own opinion that it would be silly if these arrangements were to lead to an isolated Berlin and Vienna to which we would have no access. I asked Stalin, with Churchill's backing, in my cable of June 14 for free access by air, road, and rail to Berlin and to Vienna as part of the withdrawal of troops previously agreed to by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. At my forthcoming meeting with Churchill and Stalin, I intended to call for the setting up of a centralized Allied-controlled government. I was opposed to the breaking up of Germany into several Allied segments. It was our plan that transportation, communications, and finance would be administered on a national basis for all of Germany under Allied control. At no time did I believe that Germany should be split into several rival territorial divisions or that its capital should become an island shut off from the rest of the country. . . .

The Soviets agreed to provide access to the Allies to their occupation zones in Berlin by rail, road, and air corridor.

With the redistribution of forces into the occupation areas, clearing the way to establish Allied control over Germany, we could now consider the principles by which we would deal with the defeated enemy. There had been considerable discussion in this country about whether we should make a "hard" or a "soft" peace with Germany. Most of us agreed that Germany should be deprived of the capacity ever to commit aggression again, and in that sense we wanted the peace to be "hard." At the same time, we remembered that after 1919 Germany was so enfeebled that only American money made it possible to pay the reparations that had been imposed.

The subject of reparations was . . . one of the most critical aspects of this entire question. At [the] Yalta [Conference] it became apparent that the Russians did not share the views that we and the British held with regard to reparations. . . . The Soviets had asked [at Yalta] that a flat \$20 billion be extracted from the German economy to compensate the nations on the Allied side for their losses, and that 50% of this amount be allocated to the USSR. Neither the United States nor Great Britain had been willing to fix a monetary value [on German reparations] or to agree to this Russian formula for allocation. In the end, it was agreed that the entire problem of "compensation for damages," as President Roosevelt preferred to call it, would be referred to an Allied commission on reparations. This group was to meet in Moscow in time to prepare proposals for the next meeting of the heads of state.

To lay the groundwork for American participation in the work of this commission, an interdepartmental committee, under Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton, had been at work since February. Dr. Isador Lubin had been designated as our representative on the Allied Reparations Commission, and he had begun to assemble a small staff. Their planning was well under way.

Lubin was an able public servant of high intelligence. But in the light of the difficulties that had arisen with the Soviets over the application of the Yalta agreement on Poland, I felt that the position required a tough bargainer, someone who could be as tough as Molotov. For this reason, I asked Edwin W. Pauley to become my personal representative in reparations matters, while Dr. Lubin agreed to assist him as associate representative of the United States on the Allied Reparations Commission. Pauley was well prepared for the job not only by reason of a long career in business but as a student of economics, and he understood my attitude on the reparations question. I was deeply concerned that the peace to be written should not carry within it the kind of self-defeating provisions that would enable another Hitler to rise to power. I wanted to work out a peace settlement that would be lasting.

It was already becoming apparent that we would be called upon to give aid, on a large scale, to many of the war-devastated areas. . . . [Samuel] Rosenman had just returned from an extensive inspection of the economic and, especially, the food situation in western Europe. His comprehensive report to me made it plain that help was badly needed and that it would have to come from us. In England, France, Belgium, and Norway the prospects appeared equally bleak. Food supplies were critical; on the continent, the return of acreage to agricultural use was hindered by the widespread presence

of mines and explosives in the fields: everywhere fuel, transportation and industrial plants were far below minimum needs. Added to this was the presence on the continent of several million persons displaced by the war, and in England and on the continent alike an alarming lack of shelter. As our armies had advanced into Germany, it had become evident that the situation there was desperate. It seemed unlikely that much could be extracted from Germany beyond war machinery proper without reducing the country to the reliefee's role. Germany would have to be fed, and I was determined to see that it would not once again be charity altogether from us that fed her.

These considerations were reflected in the instructions Pauley was given. This document had been worked out by Clayton's committee and I approved it on May 18. "It is and has been fundamental United States policy," it read in part, "that Germany's war potential be destroyed, and its resurgence as far as possible prevented, by removal or destruction of German plants, equipment and other property." But we also instructed our delegation to oppose "any reparations plan based on the assumption that the United States or any other country will finance directly or indirectly any reconstruction in Germany or reparation by Germany."

Since the Soviets would be occupying eastern Germany, the source of most of Germany's food, while we and the British would hold the area in which most of the industrial strength was to be found, we instructed Pauley to see that the burden of reparations would, as far as possible be divided equally among the several zones of occupation. Our delegation was further directed to press for the principle that, to the maximum extent possible, reparations should be taken from the national wealth of Germany existing at the time of the collapse, with primary emphasis upon removal of industrial machinery, equipment, and plants. The German people were to be deprived of the ability to make war but should be left with sufficient means to provide a minimum subsistence level without sustained outside (which could only mean American) relief. . . . Pauley was also directed to seek agreement on the scope of war booty, reimbursement for occupation costs, and restitution. Since the definition of these terms would have an important effect on the amount of materials available for reparations purposes, agreement on these points was essential.

The food situation in Europe gave me increasing cause for concern. The Department of Agriculture's experts came up with an estimate that continental Europe alone, not including the British Isles, would need twelve million tons of food during the next year to prevent large-scale starvation. Production for 1946, they calculated, would be five to ten percent below

that for 1945, the lowest since prewar days. Our own farm yields were less promising for this year than they had been since the war began. I thought it might be desirable and useful to consult former President Herbert Hoover on this situation. I invited him to visit with me and give me the benefit of his rich experience in the field of food relief. When he came, I had a most pleasant and satisfactory meeting with him. He helped me to review the world food-distribution problem, which he knew from one end to the other. The former president was pleased to be able to make a personal contribution to the settlement of the aftermath of the war.

Meanwhile the Pauley mission had proceeded to Moscow for meetings of the Allied Reparations Commission. . . . It was not until June 21 that the commission met. After our delegation presented a statement of eight principles embodying our position, the Soviet representative presented the plan of his government. This called for withdrawals to be made from the existing national wealth of Germany for two years. Thereafter, annual deliveries from current production would continue over a ten-year period and, in addition, there would be wide utilization of German labor. Furthermore, there would be a fixed sum total for all reparations in the amount of \$20 billion, exclusive of labor. The Russians proposed that the commission proceed first to plan for the withdrawal of national wealth and then pass to the other items on the Soviet agenda. Our delegation asked for data that would support the \$20 billion figure, a request that had originally been made at Yalta, but none was forthcoming. In fact, the Russians, unwilling to make any concessions, prevented, by delaying tactics, any further meetings of the full commission. . . .

Pauley's discussions in Moscow, on which he kept me constantly advised, took place while there were increasing reports that wholesale removals of plants and equipment were under way in the Soviet zone of Germany. The Russians chose to interpret the words "war booty" in a manner that included any plant or equipment ever used to supply the armed forces of the defeated enemy. Under modern war conditions that made the definition nearly all-inclusive.

Meanwhile at Moscow, any attempt to agree on a definition was frustrated by Russian refusal to consider anything until the plan for the initial withdrawal from [Germany's] national wealth had been worked out. When we thought of withdrawals from the national wealth of Germany, we naturally thought of a Germany of pre-World War II dimensions. With this in mind we had asked, and had received, Russian agreement to the basic proposition that, for purposes of reparations, Germany would be treated as an economic

whole. Even while this principle was being agreed to at Moscow, however, a sizeable portion of German territory had been placed under the administration of Poland and had thus been withdrawn from the area from which reparations might be taken. Since this portion of Germany, along with the zone occupied by the Russians, had contributed the bulk of prewar Germany's food supply, the effect this change would have on the German economy was bound to be drastic. . . . It became apparent, because of Russian non-cooperation, that each occupying power would have to look to its own zone for reparations claims.

Pauley was to join the staff at [the] Potsdam [Conference], both as my representative for reparations and as economic adviser. The progress report Pauley submitted to me before the Potsdam discussions began was a well-prepared document. It was a clear analysis of the Moscow talks and stated the issues that had to be resolved. One of these was the basic difference in attitude between us and the Russians on the question of forced labor. [My] . . . instructions to Pauley affirmed our refusal to accept any reparations for ourselves in the form of labor. In addition, we took the position that compulsory labor should not be imposed by any of the victors except upon individuals judicially convicted as war criminals.

Two other issues relating to Germany greatly concerned Truman. One was the displaced persons problem. Millions of people had been displaced from their homes, and often from their countries, by the devastation of war and the political and territorial changes that occurred in Eastern Europe at the war's end. The presence of many of these displaced persons in camps in Germany and Austria aggravated the problems faced by the western Allies in administering their occupation zones. With Truman's approval, the State Department sent a mission, headed by former immigration commissioner Earl G. Harrison, to Europe to look into the problems and needs of displaced persons. Truman wrote Harrison that the restoration of peace and order in Europe required that the United States develop plans for meeting the needs of those who . . . could not return to their countries of former residence.

The other issue was the conduct of war crimes trials. President Roosevelt had as early as 1942 expressed the determination of the United States to punish German war criminals, and discussions had taken place among the Allies concerning the procedures the prosecutions would follow. President Roosevelt sent Samuel I. Rosenman to London to meet with the British government about the prosecution of war criminals. Rosenman later told Truman what had occurred during these talks.

After I became president, Rosenman told me that . . . it had been tentatively agreed that where any war criminal could be clearly identified he should be sent back to the country in which his crime had been committed, to be tried and punished by that country. The six or more top criminals (the original list had included Hitler, Mussolini, Goering, Goebbels, Himmler, and von Ribbentrop) were to be given a special trial before a mixed military tribunal. This tribunal was to consist of four officers—one each from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France (with perhaps an additional three representing all of the other smaller United Nations). The trial would consist of filing against . . . [the accused war criminals] a bill of arraignment in which the crimes against humanity which these men had committed would be set out in documentary form—such as the formal Nazi decrees against minorities; excerpts from *Mein Kampf*; photographs of concentration camps, torture chambers, crematories, etc. The bill of arraignment would be so fully documented that oral evidence would be practically unnecessary. The criminals would be given a copy of these charges and an opportunity to be heard in their own defense. . . . The vast number of other war criminals whose identity could not be established by competent proof, or against whom evidence would not be attainable, would be reached by trials of the organizations to which they had belonged—the Gestapo, for example, as well as the SS and other organizations. The British War Cabinet, Rosenman informed me, held a special meeting on this subject the same day . . . [President Roosevelt died], but before the news of his death had been received. Rosenman left London immediately upon learning the news but had been advised by the Lord Chancellor that the British War Cabinet was generally in approval with the tentative agreement but had unanimously disapproved of the trial of the six top criminals. Their view was that these criminals should not be given a trial but should be dealt with politically by agreement of the four major powers and shot forthwith. Furthermore . . . Churchill had told Rosenman that he personally held this same opinion and that he had so stated to . . . Stalin at the time of the Moscow Declaration [on Atrocities—which was signed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin on October 30, 1943—but that Stalin had insisted on a trial.

I told Rosenman that I did not believe in a political disposition of these top criminals but believed that some kind of trial should be accorded them. I then asked . . . Rosenman to go to San Francisco, [where the United Nations Conference was taking place,] and take the matter up with [the

Soviet and British foreign ministers], [Vyacheslav] Molotov and [Anthony] Eden. In San Francisco, Rosenman told Eden and Molotov that we proposed an international military tribunal to try the Nazi leaders, as well as such organizations as the Gestapo and the SS, on the charge of engaging in a criminal conspiracy. He also informed them that we opposed the political punishment of the top Nazi leaders as had been suggested by the British. Eden stated that the British War Cabinet had recently changed its position, because many of the top Nazis had already committed suicide or had been killed, and no doubt many more would follow before any trial could be held. While the War Cabinet still saw no objection to a formal state trial, they were prepared to agree to a judicial trial if the Soviet Union and the United States favored that method. To this Molotov made no comment. On May 6 . . . Rosenman wired me: "We are making progress. The representatives of France, Russia and Britain now seem to be generally agreed with us on setting up an international military tribunal of one representative of each; a trial rather than political disposition of the major criminals; and a committee of four chiefs of counsel, one from each of the powers."

On May 2, 1945, Truman had appointed Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson to be the United States chief prosecutor at the German war crimes trials. On June 6, Jackson sent a report to Truman which expressed principles and determinations which had been decided upon in meetings Truman had with Rosenman and Jackson. Truman later said this report set the keynote for our policy with respect to the German war crimes trials. The defendants, Jackson said in his report, would receive fair hearings; heads of state would not be immune from legal liability; the idea that legal responsibility was least where power was greatest was rejected; the accused would include a large number of people from positions in government, the military establishment (including the Gestapo and the SS), and the financial, industrial, and economic life of Germany, as well as in some voluntary organizations. The United States case would be, in Jackson's words, factually authentic and constitute a well-documented history of what we are convinced was a grand, concerted pattern to incite and commit the aggressions and barbarities which have shocked the world. . . . We must establish incredible events by credible evidence. . . . Punishments would be determined according to American traditions of fairness and internationally accepted standards of conduct. I think also, Jackson wrote, that through these trials we should be able to establish that a process of retribution by law awaits those who in the future similarly attack civilization.

Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union began deteriorating almost immediately following war's end.

. . . Many differences among the Allies had been subordinated during the war, but now that the common enemy was defeated, the problems of peace had brought these differences to the surface. We had already discovered how difficult the Russians could be, but in the months that immediately followed the war this was revealed even further.

Secretary [of State] Byrnes went to London in September to attend the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers set up by the Potsdam Conference, and at this meeting Molotov proved to be much more difficult than he had ever been. On September 22, eleven days after the opening of the conference, Byrnes felt compelled to ask me to intervene personally with Stalin to prevent a breakup of the meeting. . . .

Molotov threatened to end the meeting for reasons Byrnes felt were disingenuous, and that the real reason was that the United States and the United Kingdom would not recognize the Soviet imposed regime in Bulgaria. Truman sent two messages to Stalin, imploring him not to permit Molotov to leave the Council meeting. Such a disruption, he said, would delay progress toward peace and better understanding. Stalin was unrelenting, and the meeting ended on October 2. Truman understood the episode to mean that the Soviets were going to be a difficult partner to do business with.

Russia was proving herself equally difficult in the Pacific. The British had raised no objections to the manner in which we handled the occupation in Japan and Korea. But Russia had, up to now, declined to take any part in the meetings of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, which had been convened in Washington in the fall. We had been unable to arrive at any formula to bring about Russian cooperation in the occupation of Japan. . . .

Truman learned that General MacArthur, who headed the occupation government in Tokyo, was concerned that the Soviet Union would conduct what he called underground Communist agitation in Japan. MacArthur was also increasingly concerned about developments in Korea, where the 38th parallel, originally intended as a temporary dividing line to facilitate the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea, had become a rigid boundary, north of which the Soviet Union worked its will without allowing the United States or the United Kingdom entry to learn what was going on. Truman worried that developments in Korea were carrying

it, not toward freedom and independence, but toward division into two nations. He was also concerned that in Korea and in Manchuria, the Soviet Union was stripping away factory machinery and shipping it back home.

On the other side of the world trouble was beginning to brew in Greece. That country had been occupied by the Germans after a truly heroic resistance. It had suffered badly during the war, and its recovery was dangerously slow. . . . Greece occupied a highly sensitive position. To the north, all its neighbors had fallen under the sway of the communists, and even within Greece there was evidence that the communists were ready to take over, with help from communists abroad, whenever the situation degenerated from instability to chaos. . . . The British, after V-E Day, had assumed the principal responsibility for aid to Greece, but it became evident that our help would be needed. . . .

In the Middle East, the situation in Iran had suddenly taken a turn for the worse. That country had served as a vital connecting link between us and the Russians during the war, especially in the earlier years, when it was important to reinforce Russian resistance against Hitler with Lend-Lease supplies. To secure the supply line, Russian troops had been stationed in northern Iran, and British and American forces were garrisoned in the southern part of the country. Early in September [1945], I had received the first reports of Russian actions that appeared to be undue interference in Iran's internal affairs. Russian army units were apparently stopping Iranian police from moving into areas where the Tudeh party, the local version of the communists, was making trouble. Later that month, I was informed by the State Department that the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, which adjoins Soviet territory, was torn by unrest. A movement for autonomy seemed under way which was encouraged, if not actually inspired, by the Russians.

Agreement had been reached at the London conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Iran not later than March 2, 1946. But reports reaching me in October told of additional Russian troops being sent in. It all seemed to add up to a planned move on the part of the Russians to get at least northern Iran under their control. Together with the threat of a communist coup in Greece, this began to look like a giant pincers movement against the oil-rich areas of the Near East and the warm water ports of the Mediterranean. These were ominous signs which called for every effort we could make through the United Nations to compel the Russians to carry out the London agreement and get out of Iran.

While these tensions were building up in Europe and in Asia, our policy was to act swiftly and decisively wherever trouble developed.

Year of Decisions, 237–256, 273–277, 283–284, 297–313, 320–322, 516–523
(order of presentation: 273–277, 237–256, 321–322, 297–312, 283–284,
313, 516–523)

The information and brief quotation relating to displaced persons was moved down two paragraphs from its position in the original text.

The Cabinet

1945–1946

"A Cabinet of his own choosing"—resignations and replacements—the last four Roosevelt Cabinet members—presidents and their Cabinets—a president must keep his hands on the reins—differences with the president cannot be aired in public—Byrnes's illusion of power—Ickes's resignation is accepted effective the following day—Henry Wallace speaks out on foreign policy—"the most peculiar fellow I ever came in contact with"

Every president must have a Cabinet of his own choosing. But in time of national emergency continuity of government is of paramount importance. Such continuity helps a succeeding administration to maintain the existing contacts with Congress. That is why, at my first meeting with the Roosevelt Cabinet, I asked all the members to stay on. Eventually there had to be changes. I needed time to get to know each member who had agreed to stay on. I also needed time to familiarize myself with all the urgent business confronting the government. I knew that several members of the Cabinet had planned to leave even prior to death of Roosevelt. I knew others would prefer to leave now that Roosevelt was gone, because of the special relationship they had established with him.

When I took office, these were the members of the Cabinet:

- secretary of state—Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
- secretary of the treasury—Henry Morgenthau, Jr.



- secretary of war—Henry L. Stimson
- attorney general—Francis Biddle
- secretary of the Navy—James Forrestal
- postmaster general—Frank C. Walker
- secretary of agriculture—Claude R. Wickard
- secretary of the interior—Harold L. Ickes
- secretary of commerce—Henry A. Wallace
- secretary of labor—Frances Perkins

The first Cabinet member whose resignation I accepted was Frank C. Walker, the postmaster general. I announced his retirement, to be effective June 30, and appointed Robert E. Hannegan, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, his successor. . . . On May 23, I announced three additional changes in the . . . Cabinet—the resignation of Francis Biddle as attorney general and the appointment of Tom C. Clark to succeed him; the resignation of Frances Perkins as secretary of labor and the appointment of Lewis Schwellenbach to succeed her; and the resignation of Claude R. Wickard as secretary of agriculture and the appointment of his successor, Clinton P. Anderson. Like Walker's, these resignations would take effect on June 30.

Miss Perkins was among the first to come and tell me that she no longer wanted to stay in the Cabinet. She said that she needed a rest. I told her that I would be happy to have her remain in the Cabinet. She was a very able administrator. I always thought she made a good secretary. She was liked very much and trusted by labor, and she was also well thought of by many of the industrialists.

Lewis Schwellenbach was a federal judge in the state of Washington when I asked him to head up the Department of Labor. He had been a senator from 1935 to 1940, and at the time of his appointment as secretary of labor he seemed to me to be the best man for that office. I told him that I wanted to make a real Labor Department and that he was going to have plenty of work and trouble to deal with. A great many of the Labor Department functions had been absorbed during the war, and I was anxious to restore it to the place for which it was originally intended. Schwellenbach was in agreement with me on this. He was an able lawyer and federal judge, a good senator, and a real, honest-to-goodness liberal. We saw right down the same alley on public policy.

Francis Biddle had been a good attorney general, and there was no ill feeling between us. I did not ask him to quit. He quit voluntarily. I do not

believe that he was as well satisfied with me as a liberal president as he had been with my predecessor. This was his right. . . . I asked Biddle whom he would recommend to take his place, and he suggested Tom Clark, who, of course, was strongly endorsed by the whole Texas delegation, including Sam Rayburn and Tom Connally. . . . When I conferred with Clark regarding his appointment, I expressed to him my ideas of how I wanted him to run the Department of Justice. I emphasized to him the need to be vigilant to maintain the rights of individuals under the provisions of the Bill of Rights. I asked him to call a meeting of the district attorneys of the United States. I told them, when we met, that while they were enforcement officers of the government it was their duty to see also that rights of the citizens were protected. I pointed out the danger of prosecuting officers becoming persecuting officers. They are there not only for the purpose of enforcing the law in the interest of the government of the United States, but also to be sure that the rights of individuals under the Constitution are fully protected. I emphasized this so much that Tom Clark thought I was "hipped" on the subject—and I was. Particularly in time of war, there is danger of encroachments on the civil rights of the people. There are always some officials who will take advantage of war powers and do things they could not possibly do in time of peace.

The appointment of a new secretary of agriculture became necessary when I appointed Claude Wickard to be head of the Rural Electrification Administration. He had told me he would like to be head of the REA and did not want to remain any longer as secretary of agriculture. I was very much surprised that he asked for the new office, and I gave it to him because I knew he was well fitted for it. Clinton Anderson was on the special committee of the House of Representatives to investigate food shortages and had been instrumental in the passage of a great deal of legislation in the House. I invited him to breakfast at the White House one morning and asked him if he would consider being secretary of agriculture, and he accepted. . . .

Two more important changes, the fifth and sixth in the Cabinet following my accession to the presidency, came about at the end of June and during the first days of July. These were the appointments of James F. Byrnes to succeed Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., as secretary of state, and the appointment of Fred M. Vinson to replace Henry Morgenthau, Jr., as secretary of the treasury.

Stettinius had submitted his resignation at the close of the San Francisco conference, and I had persuaded him to become the United States member of the Security Council of the United Nations. I announced the appointment of Byrnes as secretary of state on June 30. Byrnes took the oath of

office three days later in my office at the White House. After I took office as president, Byrnes had immediately come to Washington and offered his services. I decided upon his appointment as secretary of state at that time and offered him the appointment as we were returning from Roosevelt's funeral at Hyde Park. It was agreed that out of consideration for Stettinius no announcement would be made until the close of the United Nations meeting in San Francisco.

Secretary Morgenthau called upon me at the White House on July 5 to submit his resignation. His letter of resignation and my reply were made public later that day at a press and radio conference. The previous fall he had attended the Quebec meeting of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Mackenzie King and had worked on a plan to eliminate the industrial potential of Germany by making Germany strictly a pastoral and agricultural community. This is what became known as the Morgenthau Plan. Those of us who looked into it did not think much of this plan. I did not like it. When he found out I was going to Potsdam in July, Secretary Morgenthau came in to ask if he could go with me. I told him I thought the secretary of the treasury was badly needed in the United States—much more so than in Potsdam. He replied that it was necessary for him to go and that if he could not he would have to quit. "All right," I replied, "if that is the way you feel, I'll accept your resignation right now." And I did. That was the end of the conversation and the end of the Morgenthau Plan.

Although Morgenthau and I were personally friendly, it would be difficult for me to evaluate him as secretary of the treasury because I had too few contacts with him. I always had the impression that Mr. Roosevelt was his own secretary of the treasury.

No announcement of a successor to Morgenthau was made immediately, as it was intended that this should be withheld until my return from the Potsdam Conference, for which I was to leave Washington the following night. I decided, however, to make the announcement shortly before leaving the White House on the night of July 6 that Fred Vinson, the Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, would be nominated upon my return from Europe.

A . . . letter from Morgenthau was later transmitted to me at Potsdam by wireless. In that letter, Morgenthau urged that the appointment of Vinson be made without delay. As a result, I ordered the nomination of Vinson sent to the Senate on July 16. It was confirmed the next day, and the new secretary was commissioned on July 18. He took the oath of office and entered upon his duties on July 23.

I had not been very closely associated with Vinson until after he became an assistant to President Roosevelt as head of OWMR. He had been chairman of the tax subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee in the House of Representatives and had been instrumental in implementing the tax policy of the administration. I knew Vinson socially, but after I went down to the White House and became better acquainted with him I became highly appreciative of his capacity as an administrator and of his ability to see clearly through a situation as it arose. I valued his judgment and advice very highly, and until he was appointed to the Supreme Court he was in on nearly every conference on every subject.

By mid-July all that remained of the Cabinet which had served under President Roosevelt were four men: Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. At this time, my Cabinet was made up of men who had had government experience and most of whom had had political experience along with it. I consider political experience absolutely necessary, because a man who understands politics understands free government. Our government is by the consent of the people, and you have to convince a majority of the people that what you are trying to do is right and in their interest. If you are not a politician, you cannot do it.

I had previously outlined to the members of the Cabinet my views as to the position I believed they should occupy in the administration of the executive branch of the government. I explained that, in my opinion, the Cabinet was like a board of directors appointed by the president to help him carry out policies of the government; that in many instances the Cabinet could be of great help to the president by offering advice, whether he liked it or not. [To make clear, though, where the ultimate responsibility for decision-making resided, I once told my Cabinet] . . . a story about President Lincoln and his Cabinet. In a discussion of the Emancipation Proclamation, all of the members of Lincoln's Cabinet opposed the issuance of the proclamation. Lincoln put the question to the entire Cabinet, and they voted "No." Lincoln told them that was all very well, but the president voted "Aye," and that was the way it was going to be.

I had some very definite ideas on the status of the Cabinet and what it was intended to be. . . . The secretaries of the president's Cabinet are the civilian heads of the executive branch of the government. They are responsible to the president for carrying out the directions and the policies of the executive branch, as the law provides.

Lincoln had a great deal of trouble with his Cabinet because some of them got it into their heads that they, and not the president, were the policy-makers. James K. Polk had the same difficulty with his Cabinet. Franklin Roosevelt never had any difficulty with his Cabinet for the simple reason that he himself, in my opinion, spent too much time doing the work that should have been delegated to the Cabinet. He was his own secretary of state nearly all the time he was president. He was his secretary of the treasury. And when it came to the operation of military affairs, he was his own secretary of war and secretary of the Navy.

Roosevelt had his own way of working with his Cabinet. All presidents have. Roosevelt liked to meet with individual members before a full Cabinet meeting. He frequently discussed the same matters with two or more Cabinet members individually even though they were not responsible personally. This was his way of obtaining different views, but it often engendered rivalry and conflict within the Cabinet. I believed that the best way to obtain different views, without encouraging rivalries among individual members, was to have complete airings in the open at full Cabinet meetings. When difficulties arose among members of the Cabinet, I had those difficulties brought out frankly and settled. . . . I believed that members of the Cabinet were there for a purpose and that when the president outlined his policies to the Cabinet it was their business to carry out his directions. I initiated that plan, and it worked reasonably well.

When a Cabinet member speaks publicly, he usually speaks on authorization of the president, in which case he speaks for the president. If he takes it upon himself to announce a policy that is contrary to the policy the president wants carried out, he can cause a great deal of trouble. I was always careful to discuss all matters of policy in open Cabinet meetings where all members were present, but when it was necessary to elaborate on anything special, they had access to me at any time. However, once a policy is established, it is the policy of the president of the United States and nobody else. That is the way it has to be if the operation of government is going to be orderly. The president is elected for that purpose; his office is a constitutional one. He is the chief executive of the Republic and commander in chief of the armed forces. Cabinet positions, on the other hand, are created by law at the request of the president to help him carry out his duties as chief executive under the Constitution. It is a very satisfactory arrangement if the president keeps his hands on the reins and knows exactly what goes on in each department. That he has to do if he is to be successful. . . .

The Cabinet presents the principal medium through which the president controls his administration. I made it a point always to listen to Cabinet officers at length and with care, especially when their points of view differed from mine. I never allowed myself to forget that the final responsibility was mine. I would ask the Cabinet to share their counsel with me, even encouraging disagreement and argument to sharpen up the different points of view. On major issues, I would frequently ask them to vote, and I expected the Cabinet officers to be frank and candid in expressing their opinions to me. At the same time, I insisted that they keep me informed of the major activities of their departments in order to make certain that they supported the policy once I had made a decision.

If a Cabinet member could not support the policy I had laid down, I tried to work out an understanding with him. But I could not permit, any more than any president can, such difference of opinion to be aired in public by a dissenting member of the Cabinet. In late 1945 and during 1946 there were three occasions when I found myself faced with a problem of this kind. The first of these involved . . . Secretary of State [James F. Byrnes].

. . . Byrnes could look back upon a career of almost unequaled experience in government. As a senator, he had been a leader of the administration forces. He had seen service on the highest court of the nation. From there, President Roosevelt had called him to the executive branch, making him, in effect, the assistant president in charge of domestic economy. In political circles, it was known that Byrnes had hoped to be chosen as Roosevelt's running mate in 1944. In his executive position during the war years, Byrnes had enjoyed unprecedented freedom of action. President Roosevelt had delegated to him whatever necessary powers could be marshaled to keep the nation's economy behind the war effort. This arrangement had left President Roosevelt free to devote his time and energies mainly to the conduct of the war and to foreign relations. But this delegation of presidential powers had an extraordinary influence on Byrnes. It caused him to believe that, as an official of the executive branch of the government, he could have a completely free hand within his own sphere of duty. In fact, he came to think that his judgment was better than the president's.

More and more during the fall of 1945, I came to feel that in his role as secretary of state, Byrnes was beginning to think of himself as an assistant president in full charge of foreign policy. Apparently, he failed to realize that, under the Constitution, the president is required to assume all responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. The president cannot abdicate that

responsibility, and he cannot turn it over to anyone else. A secretary of state should never have the illusion that he is president of the United States. Some secretaries of state have had such illusions, but they would never admit it. There have been some presidents . . . who acted as if they were secretaries of state. They are not and cannot be, and they will get into trouble if they try. The function of the secretary of state is to be the president's personal adviser on foreign affairs. He has to run a department which should have skilled and experienced men to get the best information possible on any subject or problem that affects the relations with other governments. The secretary of state obtains, if he can, the very best advice from people who live with the problems of foreign affairs so that he may present it to the president. The president then must make the basic decisions, but he must be kept constantly informed of all major developments. A president cannot tolerate a secretary of state who keeps important matters away from him until five minutes before a decision has to be made. Certainly, a president cannot permit a secretary of state to make policy decisions for him.

The conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December 1945 produced a situation that made it necessary for me to make it plain to Byrnes that he was not carrying out the foreign policy I had laid down and that, in effect, he was assuming the responsibilities of the president. Hardly had Byrnes left on his trip to . . . [Moscow] when, on December 14, I was asked by Senator Tom Connally if I could see him and the other members of the Senate Atomic Energy Committee. Byrnes, it appeared, had met with a number of senators the day before and had informed them that it was his plan to secure Russian concurrence at the forthcoming conference to the proposal of setting up an Atomic Energy Commission under the United Nations—the plan on which Attlee, Mackenzie King, and I had agreed the previous month. The Senate committee members were greatly disturbed by . . . [what Byrnes told them]. They said they had received the impression from him that he would discuss, and perhaps agree to, the turnover of certain atomic energy information even before there had been any agreement on safeguards and inspections against the abuse of such information. Senator Vandenberg told me that he feared Byrnes might make such an agreement because the directive under which he traveled—and which had been drawn up on Byrnes's own instructions in the state department—made it possible for him to discuss any portion of the proposal independently of other sections.

I immediately informed the senators that there was no intention by the administration to disclose any scientific information during the Moscow

conference, nor would there be any final commitment there on the turnover of such information. I made it clear that I had no thought of releasing any information regarding the bomb itself until the American people could be assured that there were adequate arrangements for inspection and safeguards. . . .

Truman instructed the State Department to send a cable to Byrnes telling him what Truman had told the members of the Senate Atomic Energy Committee. Byrnes sent a very terse reply on December 17, and then a longer message a week later which briefly summarized his conversations with Stalin and concluded that the situation is encouraging and I hope that today we can reach final agreement on the questions outstanding and wind up our work tomorrow. Truman was dissatisfied with this message.

This message told me very little that the newspaper correspondents had not already reported from Moscow. This was not what I considered a proper account by a Cabinet member to the president. It was more like one partner in a business telling the other that his business trip was progressing well and not to worry.

I was in Independence, Missouri, on December 27 when the next word from Byrnes reached me. Charles Ross, my press secretary, informed me from Washington that . . . Byrnes[’s message] . . . asked that the White House arrange for him to address the American people over all the networks so that he might report on the results of the conference. What those results were I did not yet know. A little after 10 p.m. that night the text of the State Department’s communiqué on the Moscow conference was brought to me. It had been released in Washington, by Byrnes’s orders, an hour earlier. I did not like what I read. There was not a word about Iran or any other place where the Soviets were on the march. We had gained only an empty promise of further talks.

I returned to Washington from Independence the next day, December 28. Almost immediately upon my arrival Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, the ranking Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee, who had previously telephoned me at Independence about the Byrnes communiqué, came to see me. Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson . . . was present . . . [at this meeting]. Vandenberg’s main concern was with the section in the communiqué in which the three foreign ministers agreed to take up, “in stages,” the question of international control of atomic energy. The communiqué listed four points that would deserve consideration, the last point

being the provision of inspections and safeguards against abuse of atomic power information. The senator read this to mean that we might discuss, or consent to, the sharing of atomic information before any safeguards might have been agreed on to protect the nation's interests. I assured him that as long as I was president no production secrets of the bomb would be given away until there was international agreement on a system of inspection.

Acheson and Vandenberg helped me draft a statement for release to the press. In this statement, I wanted to clear up the meaning of the Moscow agreement as it related to atomic energy. I thought that it was most urgent that there be no misunderstanding about our determination to ensure proper safeguards. Once this was done, I went directly to the presidential yacht *Williamsburg* for a cruise. . . . We were anchored at Quantico, Virginia, the next day when [my] press secretary, Charles Ross, received a telephone call from Byrnes. [He] . . . had just arrived in Washington and wanted to know if everything was set up for the four-network broadcast he had requested. I was sitting next to Ross as he took this call. "Who's on the phone?" I asked. "Byrnes," he replied. I told him what to say in reply, and he turned back to the telephone. "The president asks me to tell you," he said, "that you had better come down here posthaste and make your report to the president before you do anything else."

By 5 p.m. that afternoon Byrnes had reached Quantico and the *Williamsburg*. We went into my stateroom when he arrived, and I closed the door behind us. I told him that I did not like the way in which I had been left in the dark about the Moscow conference. I told him that, as president, I intended to know what progress we were making and what we were doing in foreign negotiations. I said that it was shocking that a communiqué should be issued in Washington announcing a foreign policy development of major importance that I had never heard of. I said I would not tolerate a repetition of such conduct. Byrnes sought to put the blame mostly on his subordinates. He said that he had expected them to keep me informed. But he now admitted that he should have attended to it personally.

Byrnes left a collection of documents on the conference with me, and I agreed to study them at once. As I went through these papers it became abundantly clear to me that the successes of the Moscow conference were unreal. I could see that the Russians had given us no more than a general promise that they would be willing to sit down to talk again about the control of atomic energy. There was not a word in the communiqué to suggest that the Russians might be willing to change their ways in Iran—where the situation was rapidly becoming very serious—or anywhere else. Byrnes,

I concluded after studying the entire record, had taken it upon himself to move the foreign policy of the United States in a direction to which I could not, and would not, agree. Moreover, he had undertaken this on his own initiative without consulting or informing the president.

I knew that it was time to make things perfectly clear between the secretary of state and myself. I wanted to do it without delay, without publicity, and in writing. So I wrote out in longhand a letter to Byrnes, and when he came to the White House on January 5 I read it to him as he sat at my desk in the Oval Room:

My Dear Jim:

I have been considering some of our difficulties. As you know, I would like to pursue a policy of delegating authority to the members of the Cabinet in their various fields and then back them up in the results. But in doing that and in carrying out that policy I do not intend to turn over the complete authority of the President nor to forgo the President's prerogative to make the final decision.

Therefore it is absolutely necessary that the President should be kept fully informed on what is taking place. . . .

I received no communication from you directly while you were in Moscow. . . .

The protocol was not submitted to me, nor was the communiqué. I was completely in the dark on the whole conference until I requested you to come to the Williamsburg and inform me. The communiqué was released before I ever saw it.

Now I have infinite confidence in you and in your ability but there should be a complete understanding between us on procedure. Hence this memorandum. . . .

Truman went on to review problems with Soviet behavior relating to Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Iran, and other countries. . . . A high-handed outrage, Truman says of some Soviet actions in Eastern Europe. He also expresses worry about Soviet intentions in Turkey and the Black Sea straits. He completes his letter to Byrnes with some very strong statements about the direction United States policy toward the Soviet Union must take.

Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. . . .

I do not think we should play compromise any longer. . . .

I'm tired of babying the Soviets.

Byrnes accepted my decision. He did not ask to be relieved or express a desire to quit. It was not until some months later that he came to me and suggested that his health would not allow him to stay on. He agreed to remain through the negotiations of the peace treaties that were to grow out of his Moscow commitments. Throughout the remainder of 1946, however, it was understood between him and me that he would quit whenever I could designate his successor. I knew all that time whom I wanted for the job. It was General Marshall. But the general was on a vital assignment in China that had to run its course before the change in the State Department could be carried out.

My memorandum to Byrnes not only clarified the Secretary's position, but it was the point of departure of our policy. "I'm tired of babying the Soviets," I had said to Byrnes, and I meant it. . . .

In all subsequent relations, until he finally left office, Secretary Byrnes took great pains to keep me posted on what was going on. He would call daily if telephone connections were available, and his dispatches to the State Department would be placed before me regularly. It was therefore with a clear conscience that I could parry questions at press conferences during the year concerning rumors that he was about to resign or had resigned.

When General Eisenhower, whom I had appointed chief of staff of the Army to succeed General Marshall, went on an inspection trip to the Far East later that year, I told him that I had a message I wanted him to give to Marshall when he saw him in China. I said that I wanted him to tell Marshall that my secretary of state had stomach trouble and wanted to retire from office and that I wanted to know if Marshall would take the job when it became vacant. When Eisenhower returned, he reported that he had delivered the message and that Marshall's answer had been "Yes." When Marshall's mission to China came to an end, I announced his appointment without asking him again.

Byrnes and I exchanged a number of friendly and personal letters after he left Washington. It was not until the civil rights issue made him bitter and distant that our contacts diminished.

My second problem in the Cabinet arose when I named Ed[win D.] Pauley to be Under Secretary of the Navy in January 1946—an appointment which President Roosevelt had intended to make. Indeed, Roosevelt and [Secretary of the Navy James V.] Forrestal had agreed that Pauley would be named Under Secretary and that he would then succeed Forrestal as head of the department. I wanted Pauley in my official family. His record in the reparations program had only confirmed my high opinion of his administrative

abilities. Forrestal thought very highly of him [and] urged him strongly on me as his choice of a successor. . . .

When Pauley's appointment to the job of Under Secretary was announced in January, some Republicans in the Senate indicated they might want to look "closely" into the nomination. This was not unusual, and, since the Democratic majority was ample, there was nothing to worry about. Then on January 30, after . . . [a] Cabinet meeting, Harold Ickes, the secretary of the interior, told me he had been asked to appear before the Senate Naval Affairs Committee in connection with the Pauley appointment. I did not ask Ickes why he had been called or what he intended to say. I merely said, "Tell 'em the truth and be gentle to Ed." When Ickes went before the committee he testified under oath that Pauley had once told him that it might be possible to raise several hundred thousand dollars for the campaign fund of the Democratic Party in California if the Justice Department would drop the plan to bring suit to have the tidelands oil deposits declared in the federal domain. Ickes made it sound as if Pauley had asked him to exert his influence with President Roosevelt to have the suit dropped in order that he might raise these funds. Pauley, on the other hand—and also under oath—said that Ickes was mistaken when he put it that way.

I had known Pauley for a number of years, and it did not sound like him to have made what Ickes called, a few days later and before the same committee, the "rawest proposition ever made to me." I knew Ickes had a reputation for picking fights. He was not given to tact and was not likely to admit that he might be wrong, or even mistaken. . . . [At a] press conference on February 7, [I said] that I was behind Pauley and that Ickes might be mistaken. A few days later—on February 13—I received a lengthy letter from Ickes. It was his resignation as secretary of the interior. It was not a courteous letter. It was the kind of letter sent by a man who is sure that he can have his way if he threatens to quit. But I was not going to be threatened. Ickes had written at great length that he felt I should have known—though he never had told me—what he was going to say about Pauley, and that my remark at the press conference was, in effect, a declaration of no confidence. Of course, Ickes suggested that there were so many things that only he would know how to attend to that he was willing to delay his departure from the government for another six weeks. I wrote a brief note in reply. His resignation, I said, was accepted as of the following day. I assumed, I added, that he had intended to resign not only as secretary of the interior but from his other government positions as well. He retorted with an arrogant note and went on the air that night to defend his conduct.

Pauley, however, although I backed him to the end, finally asked me to withdraw his nomination.

Ickes, in later years, began to write to me again, at first about race discrimination and tidelands oil, but later quite generally and in a friendly vein. I still think he was mistaken. [He] . . . had been an able administrator in the Interior Department, and as secretary of the interior he was a protector of the public interest for the benefit of all the people. When I was chairman of the special Senate committee, Ickes complained to me that President Roosevelt had not asked him to the White House for six months because of a quarrel. Ickes said he thought Roosevelt would be better off taking his advice rather than that of some other members of the Cabinet, Hopkins in particular. I realized then he was a troublemaker and difficult to get along with. In a sense, I was fond of him, especially because he was not a special-interests man. Although he was a scold and a gossip and everything that implies, I never had a personal clash with him, but when he got too big for his breeches and opposed me openly on my appointment of Pauley, I could not, as president, tolerate that.

My third Cabinet problem of the year involved Henry Wallace. Wallace had served eight years as President Roosevelt's secretary of agriculture. He had been vice president of the United States in Roosevelt's third term and had made a strong bid for renomination in 1944, which failed because it did not have the support of President Roosevelt. In January 1945, however, Roosevelt had appointed him secretary of commerce, although it had taken my own tie-breaking vote as vice president to make his confirmation come through.

Wallace had a vision of the "Century of the Common Man" about which he was eloquent and persistent. He was certain that the "Century of the Common Man" would start just as soon as the war ended and believed that good will would bring peace. He began to devote much of his energy to the problem of our relations with Russia and to spend much time away from his duties as secretary of commerce. When I named General Walter Bedell Smith to be our ambassador to Moscow in March 1946, Wallace spoke to me about what he called a "new approach" to Russia and followed this up with the following memorandum:

March 14, 1946

Dear Mr. President:

. . . In the course of our talk on Tuesday I suggested that we would have a better chance to improve our relations with the Soviets if, in addition to our

new diplomatic effort, we also made a new approach along economic and trade lines. I am hopeful, as I know you are, that General Bedell Smith will succeed in breaking the present diplomatic deadlock in U.S.-Soviet relations and that he will find a way of persuading the Soviet Government of the advantages of cooperating with the U.S.A. and with the U.N.O. [United Nations] in settling outstanding international issues.

I am deeply convinced that General Bedell Smith's task would be made easier and his success more lasting if we could also at the same time discuss with the Russians in a friendly way their long range economic problems and the future of our cooperation in matters of trade. We know that much of the recent Soviet behavior which has caused us concern has been the result of their dire economic needs and of their disturbed sense of security. The events of the past few months have thrown the Soviets back to their pre-1939 fears of "capitalist encirclement" and to their erroneous belief that the Western World, including the U.S.A., is invariably and unanimously hostile.

I think we can disabuse the Soviet mind and strengthen the faith of the Soviets in our sincere devotion to the cause of peace by proving to them that we want to trade with them and to cement our economic relations with them. . . .

. . . My suggestion is that you authorize a group to visit Moscow for the talks which I suggested above. If you concur in this proposal, I am ready to make suggestions regarding the composition of this mission.

Sincerely yours,
Henry A. Wallace
Secretary of Commerce

I ignored this letter of Wallace's. I had expressed my policy to Bedell Smith and had suggested the approach he should take to the Kremlin. I could see little to be gained from the Wallace proposal.

On July 23 Wallace wrote another letter on our relations with Russia—a letter which later burst into the headlines. In twelve pages of single-spaced typing he analyzed the problem as he saw it and listed a number of things that he believed we should do. He contrasted what he said our actions were with what he thought should be our ideas in the field of international relations. He recited the size of our defense budget, the testing of atomic bombs in the Pacific, the production of long range bombers, the proposed coordination of armaments with the Latin American countries, and our efforts to obtain air bases abroad. These actions, he wrote, "must make it look to the rest of the world as if we were only paying lip service to peace at the conference table. These facts rather make it appear either (1) that we are preparing ourselves to win the war which we regard as inevitable or (2) that we are trying hard to build up a preponderance of force to intimidate the rest of mankind."

He then addressed himself to the arguments of those who, he said, would put their faith in force and argued that the atomic age had made dependence on military solutions outdated. Our attempt to bring international control to atomic energy he thought defective because, in his eyes, "we are telling the Russians that if they are 'good boys' we may eventually turn over our knowledge of atomic energy to them and to the other nations."

Altogether, Wallace could see every reason why the Soviets would or should distrust us and no reason why our policy might bear fruit. His conclusion, therefore, was that we should change our policy in order to "allay any reasonable Russian grounds for fear, suspicion and distrust." But he had no specific proposals how this might be accomplished without surrendering to them on every count.

I read this letter and, although I could not agree with his approach, I let him know that I appreciated the time he had taken to put himself on record. I also sent a copy of the letter to Secretary Byrnes.

No Cabinet meetings were held between August 2 and September 6, and because Wallace was away from Washington for several weeks, he did not come to the September 6 session. On September 10, he had a 15-minute appointment with me, most of which was taken up with discussions of problems of his department and matters relating to the world food board. Just before he left, however, Wallace mentioned that he would deliver a speech in New York on September 12. He said that he intended to say that we ought to look at the world through American eyes rather than through the eyes of a pro-British or rabidly anti-Russian press. I told him that I was glad he was going to help the Democrats in New York by his appearance. There was . . . no time for me to read the speech, even in part.

I had a press conference on the morning of the twelfth, and one of the reporters asked me if Mr. Wallace's speech that night had my approval. I said yes, it did. Of course I should have said, "He's told me he is going to make a speech," because everyone promptly took my answer to mean that I had read the speech and approved every part of its content. To make things worse, when Wallace delivered the speech, which was an all-out attack on our foreign policy, he said at the most critical point in the speech that he had talked to me in this vein and that I had approved of what he was saying.

The White House correspondents queried me again. I told them that my earlier statement was never intended to convey such a meaning. I added that regardless of Wallace's speech there would be no change in the foreign policy of the United States. But when Wallace returned to Washington from New York on September 16 he made a public statement that he intended to

go on fighting for what he conceived to be the right way toward peace. The following day he released to the press the text of his July 23 letter to me. The release of this letter was never approved by me, but by the time I learned that Wallace had spoken to Charlie Ross about it and that the two had agreed on its release before its threatened publication by a columnist, it was too late to stop it. The reaction abroad, both to Wallace's speech and the release of the letter, was an even stronger echo of the furor in our own press. Our diplomats reported from the world's capitals that they were being besieged with questions: Was the United States about to change directions?

I called Wallace to the White House. The date was September 18, and it was 3:30 in the afternoon when Charlie Ross came in with Wallace and closed the doors behind him. Only the three of us were present during the nearly 2½ hour session that followed. I showed Wallace copies of the cables from our representatives abroad. I told him that he would always be free to speak his mind to me but that when he turned to the American public to criticize the American foreign policy he was hitting at the president. Wallace proceeded to develop his ideas then at great length. He talked about the beauty of peace and how he knew that the people of all nations had no desire but to have peace. He said he felt sure that Russia wanted peace but was afraid of our intentions.

I have never doubted Henry Wallace's sincerity or honesty of purpose, but after this conversation I was afraid that, knowingly or not, he would lend himself to the more sinister ends of the Reds and those who served them. Wallace had a following. I realized that his appeal had some effect. If I could keep him in the Cabinet I might be able to put some check on his activities. I explained to him the delicate nature of the negotiations Secretary [of State] Byrnes was just then carrying on in Paris. Wallace agreed that it would be better at such a time if public criticism of the State Department and the national foreign policy were withheld. He also agreed to make no further speeches or statements until after the adjournment of the Paris conference, and he wrote out a brief penciled statement which I authorized him to read to the press when he left the White House. It was agreed, too, that except for this announcement he would make no statement at all. But when he met representatives of the press on his way from my office he added to the statement, and when he returned to the Department of Commerce he called in a number of his assistants and told them in detail what had taken place in my office.

Meanwhile, at my direction, the secretary of war and the secretary of the Navy wrote me a joint letter proving how groundless one of Wallace's

allegations was—a statement in his July 23 letter that there were some military men in the country who favored a “preventive war”—and this joint letter, on my order, was released for publication. . . .

Secretary of State Byrnes, still in Paris, sent a lengthy message to Truman regarding Wallace's statements on foreign policy.

. . . Byrnes said . . . it was very difficult for him to maintain his position as the representative of the United States at an international gathering if other Cabinet officers made speeches advocating a change in policy, especially if it was made to appear that such speeches were not only tolerated but were also approved. Byrnes reminded me that he had submitted his resignation earlier in the year and had agreed to stay on only until the satellite peace treaties were completed. “If it is not possible,” he added, “for you, for any reason, to keep Mr. Wallace . . . from speaking on foreign affairs, it would be a grave mistake from every point of view for me to continue in office, even temporarily.”

. . . I understood Byrnes’s irritation, and I had already reached my decision before hearing from him. . . . I replied that I had made it abundantly clear to Wallace that I stood squarely behind Secretary Byrnes in carrying out our established foreign policy. I pointed out that I had made no commitment that Wallace would be free to resume his criticism after a given date. And I assured him that I would reaffirm my confidence in Byrnes when I met the press the following day. I said I wanted him and the delegation to stay on the job and finish it. I told Byrnes he was doing an excellent job and that I would continue to support him.

Shortly before 10 in the morning on September 20, I called Wallace at his office and came directly to the point. “Henry,” I said, “I am sorry, but I have reached the conclusion that it will be best that I ask for your resignation.” His reply was very calm. “If that is the way you want it, Mr. President,” he said, “I will be happy to comply.”

I called the reporters in at 10:30 and announced my decision.

Henry Wallace continued his speechmaking and eventually used foreign platforms in his attack on the foreign policy of his own country. It must have been difficult for him in later years to acknowledge the aggressive character of the communists, but he had the good grace to express his full support of my policy when in 1950 I decided to support South Korea against the Red attack. . . .

Later during the day that Truman fired Henry Wallace, he wrote a letter to his mother and sister in Missouri. Henry is the most peculiar fellow I ever came in contact with, he wrote. He told how Wallace had agreed to say nothing more about foreign policy until Secretary of State Byrnes returned from Paris, and then told his Commerce Department staff about his meeting with Truman, with the result that the entire story was in the newspapers the next morning. So—this morning I called Henry and told him he better get out . . . , Truman told his mother and sister. Well, now he's out, and the crackpots are having conniption fits. I'm glad they are. It convinces me I'm right. . . .

To fill the post of secretary of commerce, I decided on W. Averell Harriman, who had been ambassador to Russia and was now ambassador to Great Britain. I called him in London by transatlantic telephone and offered him the secretaryship. He accepted, and I was glad to have him in the Cabinet.

Year of Decisions, 323–329, 546–560

Demobilization and Universal Military Training

May–October 1945

A headlong eagerness to return to civilian life—the point system—all was being done that could be done—25,000 discharges a day—"it was disintegration of our armed forces"—a universal training program—the General Reserve

Americans hate war. But once they are provoked to defend themselves against those who threaten their security, they mobilize with unparalleled swiftness and energy. While the battle is on there is no sacrifice of men or treasure too great for them to make. Once hostilities are over, Americans are as spontaneous and as headlong in their eagerness to return to civilian life. No people in history have been known to disengage themselves so quickly from the ways of war. . . .



The fighting in Europe had hardly ended when pressure began to build up for the release of men in the armed forces. With the end of hostilities in the Pacific, the public demand for the discharge of the millions of men in the service became insistent. A "point" system for determining eligibility for discharge on the basis of length of service, combat duty, time overseas, and parenthood credit was put into effect shortly after V-E Day, and on the eve of the Japanese surrender General Marshall sent me a memorandum setting forth the problem and how he proposed to handle it. The War Department was confronted with the question of the morale of the soldiers

who had undergone the longest and most difficult service, Marshall pointed out, and therefore they should be the first to be demobilized and have the first chance at civilian jobs. If this policy was to be put into effect, there were many service units with "low scores" that had already returned home from Europe that ought to be sent to the Pacific. . . . Marshall told me [that] many of these low-point units would have to be held in service for some time as a reserve pending the development of events, and other low-point men already returned to the United States would be substituted in the Army administrative establishment in order to release for demobilization the high-point men still in service there. The Army's plan was to stop at once the flow of low-point units from Europe. Instead, high-point units in Europe would be sent home for demobilization. If this plan was followed, Marshall reported, there would be no cause for criticizing the policy of demobilization in so far as the men in Europe were concerned. While the Pacific Theater would still have a huge operational job to complete, the flow of high-point men home from there would continue, and low-point replacements would be sent out as they were needed. The soldiers who had fought so long in the Pacific would, in this way, have the same opportunities as those who had fought in Europe.

Nevertheless, the criticisms came. On August 23, only nine days after the capitulation of Japan, I took occasion to point out at a press conference that there had already been considerable criticism of the demobilization program. I explained . . . that I had conferred with the secretaries of war and Navy, Chief of Staff . . . Marshall, and Chief of Naval Operations . . . King, and that I was convinced that they were doing everything possible to expedite the undertaking.

At the August 31 meeting of the Cabinet, I asked [the] Under Secretary of War . . . to express his views on the movement of military personnel from foreign theaters. He stated that all that could be done to get men home as soon as possible was being done. The Army, he said, had plans for the movement of 5½ million men back to the United States by July 1, 1946. [The] Under Secretary of the Navy . . . reported at the same meeting that the Navy would be demobilizing at the rate of 260,000 per month after the program got under way.

Nevertheless, the demand for speedier demobilization continued to increase. On September 18, I issued a statement assuring the American people that the return of servicemen from the fighting fronts of the world to their homes was proceeding as fast as the circumstances permitted. In less than

one month after the day of Japan's surrender, the number of men discharged each day from the Army had risen from 4,200 to more than 15,200. Our soldiers were being returned to civilian life at a rate in excess of 650 per hour. This rate, I announced, would be steadily increased to more than 25,000 discharges per day by January 1946. Only those who were in a position to understand the over-all operation could realize what an enormous task confronted the government in demobilizing and redeploying almost twelve million men within a period of a few months. . . .

The progress of our own demobilization program was reviewed at a Cabinet meeting on October 26. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and Secretary of War Patterson outlined the program and expressed the warning that its acceleration threatened to jeopardize our strategic position in the midst of the postwar tensions that were building up around the world. I agreed entirely with this view and stated at that meeting that, so far as I was concerned, the program we were following was no longer demobilization—it was disintegration of our armed forces.

Despite the dangerous speed with which the program was being carried out, public pressure on me and on the heads of the services for even faster demobilization continued to mount. Many letters from parents and appeals from organizations came to me pleading for the release of various groups. Members of the Congress were reminding me that their constituencies were bombarding them with telegrams and letters. On January 8, 1946, I issued a statement in which I said that, while I recognized the anxiety and impatience of families, it was just not possible to discharge every member of the armed forces promptly. I pointed out that the Army had already released more than 4½ million men and women since the European fighting had stopped. The Navy, out of a peak strength of 3½ million, had returned almost a 1¼ million persons to civilian life. From the Marine Corps, which totaled nearly 486,000 at the end of the war, more than 183,000 had been discharged. The Coast Guard had demobilized over 74,000 of its 180,000 men.

I sympathized with parents still waiting for their sons, and with the wives and children longing to see their husbands and fathers again. I knew that many young men were eager to continue their education or return to their jobs. But my overriding responsibility as president of the United States was the security and welfare of the nation as a whole. We had an obligation as a leading nation to build a firm foundation for the future peace of the world. The future of the country was as much at stake as it had been in the days of the war.

On April 17, 1946, at a press conference in the White House, I called attention to the fact that discharges in the Army had reached nearly seven million. I termed this "the most remarkable demobilization in the history of the world, or 'disintegration,' if you want to call it that." Our frenzied demobilization, in fact, grew out of our antagonism toward maintaining a large standing army.

There was only one alternative [to maintaining a large standing army], in my opinion, and that was [creating and maintaining] a prepared soldier-citizenry. I have held this view for thirty years—ever since World War I. From the beginning of my administration in 1945, I had publicly favored a program of military training for boys and young men. At a press conference on August 16, I was asked if I would propose peacetime conscription. I replied that I would ask the Congress to enact a program of universal training for American youth. At a Cabinet meeting on August 31, I presented a detailed preliminary plan for national military security which included universal training. I asked for the views and recommendations of each member of the Cabinet, and the general reaction was favorable. I have always believed that military preparedness is necessary to national security. History has proved that many times. President Washington instituted the first military policy of the United States when he recommended a universal draft as a guarantee of basic minimum military protection for the Republic against aggressors. Washington's policy was not implemented until 1917, when President Wilson authorized the first compulsory draft. During the . . . [Civil War], the lack of a firm military policy resulted in disgraceful draft riots and mob actions and in the corrupt practice of selling draft exemptions to individuals who could raise the required sum. I told the Cabinet that the time had come to initiate a new military policy. If we were to maintain leadership among other nations, we must continue to be strong in a military way.

. . . On October 22, I sent to . . . [Congress] my recommendations concerning one aspect of . . . [my long-range program on national military security]—universal training. What I was proposing . . . was a system of universal training during peacetime which would provide this country with a well-trained and effectively organized citizen reserve to reinforce the professional armed forces in times of danger. . . . I pointed out that the latent strength of our untrained citizenry was no longer sufficient protection and that if attack should come again, as it did at Pearl Harbor, we could never again count on the luxury of time with which to arm ourselves and strike back. Our geographic security was forever gone—gone with the advent of

the atomic bomb, the rocket, and modern airborne armies. I recommended that we create a postwar military organization that would contain three basic elements: (1) a comparatively small Army, Navy, and Marine Corps; (2) a greatly strengthened National Guard and organized reserve for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps; and (3) a general reserve composed of all the male citizens of the United States who had received training. This general reserve would be provided by adoption of a plan for universal military training, but members would have no obligation to serve at home or abroad unless called to the service by an act of the Congress.

The plan was thoroughly democratic and was not intended to take the place of the Selective Service System. Young men who received training under the plan would not be members of the armed services, but civilians who could be mobilized into the armed services in time of danger only to augment the strength of the regular and reserve forces. I suggested a period of training for one year for eighteen-year-olds, with no exemptions except for total physical disqualification. After one year of training, the trainee would become a member of the general reserve for six years and, subsequently, would be placed in a secondary reserve status.

This was not a military training program in the conventional sense. The military phase was incidental to what I had in mind. While the training was to offer every qualified young man a chance to perfect himself for the service of his country in some military capacity, I envisioned a program that would at the same time provide ample opportunity for self-improvement. Part of the training was calculated to develop skills that could be used in civilian life, to raise the physical standards of the nation's manpower, to lower the illiteracy rate, to develop citizenship responsibilities, and to foster the moral and spiritual welfare of our young people. These were not theoretical goals. This was what was unique about the plan I contemplated—it was a universal training program, not just a military program. The educational and special training benefits were strong arguments in themselves for immediate legislation setting up the universal training program. But the basic reason for my proposed plan was still to guarantee the safety and freedom of the United States against any potential aggressor.

I am certain that if we had had a training program for American youth we would not have had a rejection of thirty-four percent of our young men because of physical defects. That is what we had among those drafted and those who volunteered during World War II. I am sure that a large part of that thirty-four percent could have been made physically fit and self-supporting

with the right sort of treatment. At the same time, under this plan we could teach citizenship to teenagers and help show them how to get along with their fellow men and still stick to their own individual beliefs.

I am morally certain that if Congress had gone into the program thoroughly in 1945, when I first recommended it, we would have had a pool of basically trained men which would have made the Soviets hesitate in their program of expansion in certain strategic parts of the world.

Year of Decisions, 506–512

The Budget

Managing the budget—budget seminars—"one of my more serious hobbies"—the Treasury—three phases of budget policy—tax policy and Congress—the Federal Reserve Board—transition—"go ahead and do the right thing"

President Roosevelt had removed the budget operation from the Treasury Department during his administration and had moved it into the Executive Office of the President, under the supervision of a director of the Bureau of the Budget. Before I began to work on my first budget, however, I decided to make a change, and with this in mind I called in Budget Director Harold Smith. "I want this to be a tripod," I told him, "with the secretary of the treasury assisting you and me in building up the budget." And that is the way it was done in all eight budgets I made out as president. . . .



The budget director would come to my office at least twice every week during the formative period [of my presidency]. I gave instructions that he was to have free access to me at all times. I put in twice as much time on the preparation of the budget as any former president ever did, constantly seeking the proper relation between the long-range integrity of our debt management, the basic and pressing economic and social needs of the people of the United States, and the needs of our allies. In all this there was comparatively little friction between departments, because they all felt that they were having a fair hearing in the consideration of their requirements. Now and again all-day sessions in my office made it possible to get at the real needs.

After these discussions, I gave positive directives to the departments. . . . I did what I conscientiously thought was right, and then stuck to it. . . .

It was my feeling that not only the [president] . . . needed to understand the technicalities of the budget but also that everyone who had anything to do with it should have a clear understanding of it. I was especially anxious for the newspaper reporters to have simple, straightforward explanations of the operations of the budget so that they would be qualified to write on the subject with accuracy and understanding, thus conveying a clear picture to the people all over the country. For that reason, it was my practice to hold special press conferences, known as "budget seminars," once a year in the White House. These were conducted for the sole purpose of going over the entire budget in detail to answer clearly any questions the newsmen might have. Each correspondent was provided with a complete copy of the document, and when they had assembled I went over it page by page with them, very much like a teacher in a classroom. The secretary of the treasury and the budget director drew up special charts and graphs for use at these meetings, and we called into the seminars any government officials who were in a position to assist me in explaining to the press whatever they wanted to know about the budget or whatever I thought they ought to understand more clearly. . . . These . . . meetings . . . were by far the longest of the press conferences. They sometimes lasted between two and three hours, and of all the 324 press and radio conferences that were held during my years in the White House, these seminars pleased me most.

The federal budget was one of my more serious hobbies, but it was also much more than that. In fact, I regarded it as one of the most serious of the responsibilities of the president—a responsibility that never failed to prove thoroughly fascinating. . . .

The treasury is the business end of the government. Every dime spent in the government has to flow through the treasury. There is not a thing that happens in the government that does not affect the treasury, and there must be a stable, sound credit base or else the rest of the government would crack up. The treasury and the budget are the mechanisms that enable the government to operate; they represent the practical operation of the government. . . . I was able to bring about some long-needed reforms in the Treasury Department. One of the big accomplishments was a complete revision of the government accounting system. Working with a team made up of the Budget Bureau, the Treasury [Department], and the Government Accounting Office, we were able to set up a uniform accounting procedure throughout the whole government. Where it formerly took from three to six

months to get a composite financial statement, [by the time I left office, it required] . . . from three to six weeks only. . . .

Truman broke down his management of the federal budget into three time periods:

1. From April 12, 1945, to June 30, 1946, we were completing the financing of World War II and, at the same time, grappling with the tremendous problems of reconversion. . . .

2. The second period, from a financial point of view, extended from July 1, 1946, until the Korean conflict in 1950. Readjustment was being made without upsetting the economy. During these four fiscal years, we were in a period of generally high employment and rising national income. We had completed our reconversion, the wartime armed forces had been largely demobilized, and most of the war contracts had been liquidated. Toward the close of this period, however, the danger of new aggression recurred, and rearmament once again became an expenditure factor with which we had to reckon. . . . I recommended frequently during this period that our surpluses be larger and our debt reduction greater, but the untimely and unfair tax reduction of 1948, passed by the 80th Congress over my veto, prevented this.

3. Beginning with the fiscal year 1951, we entered the period that followed the communist aggression in Korea. Our defense expenditures were sharply increased, and the Congress increased taxes markedly, but not as much as I recommended. During the first two fiscal years following the invasion of Korea we came very close to following the pay-as-you-go policy I recommended. For the two fiscal years 1951 and 1952 we had a net budget deficit of about one half billion dollars, and the public debt rose less than two billion dollars. . . . After June 1952, as defense expenditures continued to rise, we began to depart seriously from the pay-as-you-go policy. . . .

The national debt can represent either investment by the government for the welfare of the people or it may be war expenditures forced upon us, which is a total human and economic waste. The first is a justifiable obligation which should be borne by the government. It stands for something tangible in terms of high living standards, good health, military security, national progress and prosperity. War expenditures, on the other hand, destroy and exhaust and consume the resources of manpower and materials which make up the wealth of the nation. In the eight budgets I made out as president, I have felt that the only real waste ever recorded was that for war expenditures thrust upon us.

I think that the virtues of a "balanced budget" can at times be exaggerated. Andrew Jackson paid off the national debt entirely, and the budget was

balanced when the unprecedented Panic of 1837 struck. Even the depression following the crash of 1929 overtook a government which was operating in the black. . . .

Tax policy was crucial to Truman's management of the budget.

In the fiscal year 1947, I had a balanced budget, and this after a devastating world war and a war economy. We had a surplus in the Treasury in 1947, and we had a surplus in 1948 and again in the fiscal year 1951. For the whole six years from July 1, 1946, to June 30, 1952, we took in more money than we paid out. There was no deficit financing while I was president until after June 30, 1952, and there would not have been any then if the Congress had approved my tax program. . . .

The Roosevelt administration, in order to meet the cost of reconstruction and the needs for World War II, had to seek revenues wherever they could be found. As a result, the tax structure which I inherited was a bulky, patch-work affair. It was my hope that the Congress would cooperate with me in working out a tax system that would yield us adequate revenues and yet be free of inequities.

As county judge, senator, and president, I consistently kept in mind the same sort of tax philosophy. It was a pay-as-you-go program, except in emergency conditions involving the welfare of the people, at which times I considered it the responsibility of government to act quickly in raising funds for the necessary relief. There is nothing sacred about the pay-as-you-go idea so far as I am concerned, except that it represents the soundest principle of financing that I know.

Taxation, in my opinion, should be used for revenue purposes only. While I fought for a more equal distribution of the nation's prosperity among all its citizens, I never advocated taxing the rich to pay the poor. The rate of taxation, to be fair, must be based upon ability to pay. Every social reform which I sponsored was presented in the form of specific legislation, and never in the guise of taxation. . . .

My chief obstacle was getting the Congress to vote for tax levies to finance the total government program on a pay-as-you-go basis. I do not believe there is any safer way to finance private or public affairs than to make provision for keeping receipts even with expenditures. The Congress would vote in favor of a certain appropriation but then would sometimes refuse to pass legislation that would pay for the new expenditures through additional tax revenues. I had no patience with such practices by Congress, because if

a measure deserves an appropriation it is obviously worth the levy to pay for it. Too many congressmen during my administration heeded the traditional slogan of cynical politics: "Never vote against an appropriation, and never vote for a tax increase." It might be one way to get re-elected, but it is also a sure way of getting the country into financial difficulties.

If it had not been for the Republican 80th Congress, my program for ironing out the inequities in the tax system could have gone through without any impediment. However, eager to please the special interests which its majority represented, the 80th Congress voted across-the-board tax cuts which were entirely unjustified at that time of high-level incomes and almost full employment. Just half of that amount of tax cut would have permitted my administration to eliminate many of the inequities of the tax structure.

As we got the tax program better in hand, we could have realized practically every goal set up in our original fiscal plan if Korea had not erupted at the time it did. The exemptions could have been raised and broader incentives offered while still keeping the level of production and consumption on an unprecedently high plane. . . .

[During my presidency] I . . . reduced the public debt by \$28 billion from the postwar peak. My goal was to bring the total down to \$200 billion, but the Congress did not want the political risk of levying sufficient taxes to accomplish this. . . .

The Federal Reserve Board, an independent agency and not subject to the president's authority as head of the executive branch, has considerable powers to set the level of interest rates, and this can be a problem for a president who is attempting to control the budget in difficult times. Truman expected the Federal Reserve Board's monetary policy to be supportive of his fiscal policy.

One of the problems that arose in the monetary field at the outset of the Korean action involved the Federal Reserve Board. It was my position that until we could determine the extent of the defense requirements that might result we should maintain a stable position in reference to money rates that affected the management of the public debt. Under the statutes, the fixing of money rates (discount and interest) is handled by the Federal Reserve Board, which is not part of any of the departments of the government. Therefore, the treasury could not directly control the money rates that would apply to its debt obligations. It did not seem appropriate to me that we should enter into a period of deficit financing on a rising money-rate pattern. I also felt strongly that in the moment of impending crisis

we should not take deliberate steps that could possibly disturb public confidence in the nation's financing. As the head of the government I felt I had a duty as well as a right to use every available resource to make sure of the success of the defense program. For that reason, I invited the members of the Federal Reserve Board to visit with me. At this conference, I asked them to give the treasury their full support for its financing program, just as they had done during World War II. The treasury, of course, did not have to have Federal Reserve approval of its security issues, but the practice was to have full consultation with and to expect full cooperation by the Board. I was given assurance at this meeting that the Federal Reserve Board would support the treasury's plans for the financing of the action in Korea. This assurance was given entirely voluntarily. At no time during the conference did I attempt to dictate to the Board or tell them what specific steps they ought to take. I explained to them the problems that faced me as chief executive, and when they left I firmly believed that I had their agreement to cooperate in our financing program. I was taken by surprise when subsequently they failed to support the program. Eventually an agreement was reached, but not until the differences of opinion between the treasury and the Board had caused considerable worry to the president and much added expense to the taxpayers. These problems of discount rates and bond issues are not matters that are likely to make the headlines . . . yet on their settlement can depend the financial soundness of the government and the prosperity of countless individuals.

My approach to all these financial questions always was that it was my duty to keep the financial capital of the United States in Washington. This is where it belongs—but to keep it there is not always an easy task. . . .

As his presidency approached its end, Truman gave careful thought to the best way of handing over the fiscal affairs of the government to the new administration.

Toward the end of the administration, I was faced with two courses to follow in the few months in office remaining after the 1952 election. One was a policy which would drain the treasury's cash position to rock bottom. We could apply the balance toward a reduction of the debt and leave a lot better picture as to the size of the debt when we went out of office. Or we could do what was best for the country by leaving a comfortable balance in the treasury and arranging it so that there would be no necessity for the new administration to do any new financing for at least six months, which would give it a chance to get on its feet. Of course, we could have walked out

in January and let the new administration shift for itself. That would have been the cold political approach. But the public interest, and not political considerations, was paramount in my mind, and I therefore instructed all departments to work out a briefing program so that the financing and management of the entire government would move along smoothly.

"Go ahead and do the right thing," I told Secretary [of the Treasury] Snyder.

"You mean by the right thing that you want the incoming administration to have a smooth transition?" Snyder asked.

"That's exactly what I mean," I replied.

We invited . . . [our] successors [in office in the Treasury Department] to come in in advance, and we gave them office space in the treasury so there would be no interruption in the management of the monetary program of the government.

Years of Trial and Hope, 33–45

The order of paragraphs in this chapter has in several instances been changed from that of the original text.

Postwar Economic Problems

1945–1948

Turbulent labor conditions—a Washington conference of labor and industry leaders—the railroad unions strike—"You are not going to tie up the country"—a dramatic scene in Congress—the coal miners strike twice—an injunction—a declaration of war against inflation—special interest tactics—extension of wartime controls—Congress passes an unworkable price control law—meat shortage—removal of wage and price controls—Truman calls Congress into special session twice—failure to enact an effective anti-inflation program

Labor unrest is inevitable in a free economy; it is part of the struggle for adjustment to shifting economic conditions. The labor unrest that developed during the closing months of the war and mushroomed into violence during the early period of my administration presented one of the most difficult and persistent of all the domestic problems I faced as president of the United States.



My attitude toward labor had consistently been one of sympathy and support. This is evident in my voting record in the Senate over a period of ten years. And later, as vice president and then as . . . [president], I was deeply aware of the serious problems that were certain to confront labor when the war came to an end and during the period of industrial reconversion that followed.

With the return of millions of servicemen to the ranks of labor, the workers in industry and business were faced with redeployment of manpower, with reduction in overtime pay, curtailment of wartime production,

and the consequent threat of competition for jobs. Questions of seniority rights came to be involved with the rights of veterans returning to their jobs. And under these new conditions many disputes arose—many of them legitimate—regarding wage increases commensurate with increased profits and with rising costs of living in the postwar period. These were real problems, affecting one of the largest segments of our population. I always favored pay increases and other benefits where they could be effected without raising prices and encouraging inflation. I worked to restore to labor the free collective bargaining process of which it had been deprived during the war years. But it was also my responsibility as . . . [president] to see that the public was not injured by private fights between labor and management or among the unions themselves. I intervened in these disputes only when it became apparent that the economic welfare or security of the nation as a whole was jeopardized.

Such action on my part was first made necessary just eighteen days after I took the oath of office as president, when on April 30, 1945, John L. Lewis ordered 72,000 anthracite coal miners out on strike after efforts to obtain a satisfactory contract with the mine operators had failed. As commander in chief, I viewed any stoppages in any of the basic industries as direct threats to the war effort and the national security. On May 3, I issued an executive order placing the affected mines under the temporary possession and control of the Department of the Interior.

The coal strike in May of 1945 was only the beginning. Even though Lewis accepted a compromise agreement from the operators for a daily wage increase of \$1.37½ for the anthracite miners, work stoppages persisted in the form of absenteeism and repeated wildcat strikes. By the middle of summer, we lost more than twelve million tons of coal. . . . By . . . autumn . . . , the labor situation in the United States was assuming serious proportions. Strikes were spreading once more through the coal mines, until 28,000 miners were idle. The issue this time involved union demands for recognition as collective bargaining agents for supervisory employees. Walkouts in the oil and lumber industries were crippling the reconversion program. In the Detroit area, labor disturbances were halting automobile production in one plant after another, culminating in the United Automobile Workers' strike against General Motors. This was the first strike of such magnitude following the war and involved 175,000 workers and plants in nineteen states. Strikes were also threatening the steel industry and the railroads. In scores of smaller industries in various parts of the country strikes were widespread and occasionally violent during the latter half of 1945.

While I realized that these turbulent conditions were largely a manifestation of labor's readjustment from [a] wartime to [a] peacetime economy, it was also clear to me that the time had come for action on the part of the government. I had decided long before becoming president that the country needed a national wage policy, effective mediation machinery, and other remedial legislation which would protect the rightful interests of labor, of management, and of the public. . . .

The increasing labor difficulties of the postwar period were the subject of many discussions with the Cabinet in meetings during October and November 1945. I decided to invite the leaders of labor and management to meet in Washington to work out a new approach toward solving the industrial crisis. I sent letters to [the heads of] . . . the American Federation of Labor, . . . the National Association of Manufacturers, . . . the Congress of Industrial Organizations, . . . and the United States Chamber of Commerce. Thirty-six delegates were appointed to represent the interests both labor and management, and a conference got under way in the Labor Department auditorium on November 5. I opened the conference with an appeal to the delegates to set up among themselves a definite policy in the field of labor relations. I recommended that such a policy be based on four fundamentals: (1) genuine collective bargaining; (2) use of impartial machinery for reaching decisions where bargaining fails; (3) peaceful negotiation of contracts and methods of peaceful adjustment of disputes arising under these agreements; and (4) a substitute for inter-union jurisdictional strikes. Emphasizing that this was not a government conference but a conference of representatives of labor and management chosen by their own leaders, I warned that failure to produce any workable recommendations on how to avoid work stoppages would mean legislation by the Congress.

After three weeks of deliberations, the conference adjourned without making any recommendations, and I went before the Congress on December 3 with a request for immediate legislation. The plan I recommended called for the establishment of fact-finding boards which would be directed to make a thorough investigation of all the facts involved in each dispute. They would be empowered to subpoena all records which the boards should deem relevant to the case. A cooling-off period of thirty days, during which strikes would be outlawed, would be required while the fact-finding boards were being named and the investigations made. In order to avoid delay in the settlement of the automobile, oil, and meat-pack strikes, and to cope with the threatened steel strike before Congress would have a chance to pass such legislation, I set up such fact-finding boards by executive order. While

these did not have the statutory power I hoped the Congress would soon authorize, I felt that the American people would expect the employer and the employees in each case to cooperate with the boards as fully as if appropriate legislation had already been passed.

The unions—particularly the United Mine Workers—reacted violently to the plan as a restriction of the right to strike and as compulsory arbitration. It was . . . neither of these. It was simply an attempt at peaceful mediation of labor-management disputes by eliminating the harmful effects on the public and on the national economy of prolonged work stoppages. With 265,000 workers idle in the United States at the time I made the proposal, the need for such action was obvious. Furthermore, the value of the fact-finding boards in bringing the truth before the public was proved many times. In the steel strike of January and February 1946, the findings of the board were instrumental in bringing about a settlement even though the board's recommendations were not adhered to. Following the steel agreement, the 113-day-old United Automobile Workers' strike against General Motors was concluded without the need for a meeting at the White House.

It was evident, however, that statutory authority was needed to enforce the recommendations of fact-finding boards and to forbid striking during the mediation period. In repeated messages to the Congress, I asked for the quick passage of such legislation. Instead, the trend in the House was toward harsh, restrictive anti-labor measures that would do more harm than good.

In the spring of 1946, two crises in labor developed which eclipsed preceding ones in their direct effect on the public. One of these involved the railroad industry and the other the coal industry. On May 23, 1946, the railroad unions called out on strike 300,000 members from most of the major lines across the country. I had been conferring with the twenty unions involved as far back as February in order that every effort be made to avert a rail strike, and when it became evident that the railroad operators and the union representatives were unable to agree, I submitted a compromise proposition to the parties concerned. Eighteen of the unions in the dispute accepted my proposed settlement, as did the operators. It was an offer of an increase of 18½ cents per hour in wages plus certain changes in rules by the arbitration and emergency boards. Two men, however—[the] . . . president of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and [the] . . . president of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen—rejected my compromise offer and refused to arbitrate the matter for their unions. After three conferences in the White House with these men . . . , I saw that this was no contest between labor and management but one between a small group of men and their

government. [Both these men to whom I had made my appeals] . . . said . . . that they were determined to strike. "You are not going to tie up the country," I told them. "If this is the way you want it, we'll stop you."

On May 24, the day following the start of the strike, I went before the American people in a nationwide radio broadcast and related the facts. I announced that unless operation of the railroads was resumed at once, I would call upon the Army to assist the Office of Defense Transportation in operating the trains, and I added that I would appear before the Congress on the next day with a message on the subject. In a joint session of the Congress on May 25, I requested strong emergency legislation that would authorize the institution of injunctive or mandatory proceedings against any union leader, forbidding him from encouraging or inciting members to leave their work or to refuse to return to work, that would deprive workers of their seniority rights who without good cause persisted in striking against the government, that would provide criminal penalties against employers and union leaders who violated the provisions of the act, and that would authorize the president to draft into the armed forces all workers who were on strike against their government.

These were drastic measures. They were against the principles I believed in, and I proposed them only as a desperate resort in an extreme emergency where leaders defiantly called the workers out in a strike against the government.

Halfway through my message to the Congress I was interrupted by Leslie Biffle, secretary of the Senate, who handed me a note announcing that the railroad strike had been settled on the terms of the compromise proposal previously accepted by all except these two unions.

I was relieved and I was glad that a quick end was thus brought to the railroad strike. But even more satisfying was the fact that the settlement was in conformity with the National Railway Labor Act. Under this act, the recommendations of the emergency board are enforceable, and it was upon these recommendations that I had based my compromise proposal to both sides. I knew from the beginning of the difficulty with the railroad unions that an attempt was being made by some of the unions to circumvent the Railway Labor Act. That is another reason why I felt justified in asking for the emergency strike legislation. Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon declared at the time that I had fixed the whole thing in advance, and he accused me from the floor of the Senate of putting on a "ham act." Later, however, when he learned the facts, he apologized for his statement and requested that his apology be printed in the Congressional Record. . . .

Meanwhile, on the coal scene, John L. Lewis was negotiating once more for a new contract—this time for the bituminous coal miners. As early as March 1946, the parleys between Lewis and the operators showed that no agreement was in prospect. Lewis was demanding a welfare fund, to come from a royalty on coal, of which he was to have exclusive control. It was a new grab for more power on the part of the miners' boss; the miners at this time were not asking for wage increases. When negotiations bogged down, Lewis ordered 400,000 coal miners to walk out of the bituminous fields on April 1. The country was once more faced with an emergency situation.

I called Lewis to the White House six times from March to May, along with Charles O'Neill, spokesman for the coal operators, in an effort to bring the two factions together. At the May 10 Cabinet meeting, I stated that Lewis had promised that the strike would not last more than a few days. But Lewis failed to keep his word. . . .

The coal strike showed once more the desperate need for legislation to safeguard the nation against precipitous strikes. But I also feared the danger that in such legislation there would be ill-considered punitive measures against labor. Six months earlier I had, for that reason, recommended fact-finding boards as a legal instrument. The Congress had not acted on my proposal. . . .

During this soft-coal strike of 1946 the mines had been shut down for forty-five days at a cost of ninety million tons of coal. At this point the government stepped in to take over operations in May. However, we continued negotiating with Lewis until we reached an agreement on joint control of the welfare fund and other issues in dispute. Five months passed without serious incident, when Lewis began to find fault with his contract. He demanded that the agreement be reopened, implying that the miners would go on strike again if negotiations were refused.

On November 14, the government delivered to Lewis a written proposal containing the details of a plan under which the operators and miners could negotiate their differences without interrupting the operation of the mines. I did not feel that the federal government could replace private management as a bargaining agent without interfering with true collective bargaining between labor and management. The government had taken over the bituminous mines in May only after it became clearly evident that this was the only available means of averting an economic disaster to the country. I was eager that the mines be returned as early as possible to private operation, and the owners stated that they, too, were eager to regain control of their properties. Lewis, however, held out for a new contract and encouraged his

miners to lay down their tools. On November 20, the country was once again plunged into a general coal strike—this time against the government of the United States.

I had instructed the Justice Department to seek a temporary injunction restraining Lewis's action in calling the strike. [A] federal judge . . . issued the injunction against the United Mine Workers' chief, ordering him to cancel notice of the termination of the contract. When Lewis refused to comply with the injunction, he was summoned before [the] judge . . . to show cause for his failure to obey the court injunction. On December 4, Lewis was found guilty of civil and criminal contempt of court. His personal fine was fixed at \$10,000, and the United Mine Workers Union was fined a total of \$3,500,000. Seventeen days after he had called the costliest strike in his career, Lewis ordered the miners to return to work. . . .

The day the miners' strike ended, the president of one of the railroad workers' unions wrote a letter to President Truman condemning the government's use of the malevolent and illegal process of injunction in a labor dispute. Not only was such practice illegal, the writer said, it was a despoliation of the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. What the government had done, the writer went on, would give impetus and momentum to the program now being spawned by reactionary capitalism to deprive labor of gains hard won over the years. . . .

Truman responded that he felt sorrow because of the action he had to take. But the manner in which John L. Lewis attempted to defy the government, he said, should make all labor leaders feel shame in their hearts. Truman believed he had acted as he had to in the interest of the government and the nation. We used the weapons that we had at hand in order to fight a rebellion against the Government, he wrote, and I am here to tell you that I expect to use whatever powers the President and the Government have when the law and the Government are defied by an arbitrary dictator, such as Lewis.

Lewis had failed in an attempt to bluff the government. It was, as I saw it, a challenge by the head of the United Mine Workers against the authority of the United States. As a political maneuver, the strategy employed by Lewis was successful to a degree. By calling for a strike just five days before the congressional elections of 1946, he may have contributed to the turnover in the Congress which he was anxious to bring about. But instead of helping to elect a sympathetic Congress, Lewis soon learned that he was faced with a

reactionary-controlled group in the 80th Congress, which soon was to produce the Taft-Hartley Act, to which the mine leader was bitterly opposed. His political victory in 1946 proved to be a Pyrrhic one.

While there were some continuing disturbances between labor and management following the railroad and coal strikes of 1946 . . . , there was a general slackening of major disputes during the closing months of 1946 and the first half of 1947. . . .

Besides labor unrest, inflation also threatened the stability of the economy in the early postwar period.

Four days after the surrender of Japan, I had issued what amounted to a declaration of war against . . . [inflation]. In an executive order on August 18, 1945, I set forth the guiding policies of the administration for stabilizing the economy during the . . . period . . . [when the country was converting its economy from wartime to peacetime]. The order . . . called upon the Office of Price Administration and the secretary of agriculture to work with the director of economic stabilization to take all the steps necessary to keep the cost of living and the general level of prices from going up. I proposed several specific measures for combating both inflationary and deflationary influences.

The fact was that the administration was not seeking more government controls, but fewer. In a radio address on October 30, I made the statement that we should drop as quickly as practicable wartime government controls and that we must get back to the free operation of our competitive system. I made it clear that the only workable alternative to government price controls was the wholehearted cooperation of business, labor, industry, agriculture, the Congress, and the American public. We were ready to go along with a concerted voluntary program to fight inflation rather than resort to the use of controls. Inflationary pressures were still great, and danger signals were pointing to a further building up through the winter and spring.

By December it was obvious that decontrol of prices would not work, at least until the emergency was less threatening. When the Second War Powers Act was extended for six months by the Congress during the last week of December, this brief extension would not meet the full needs. The economy was certain to be plagued by war-born shortages for a considerable time, and I urged further legislation to cover the period after June 30, 1946.

Despite the promises that had been made for the cooperation and teamwork of all parties involved in holding the line against inflation, I had to

report to the Congress in my radio talk to the people on January 3, 1946, that not all these promises had been kept. It would be necessary to extend price and rent controls before their expiration date, June 30. In that message, I sounded the warning that pressure groups were at work in the Congress and outside, constantly pushing, lobbying, and arguing for the end of price controls regardless of the consequences.

Realizing that price control adjustments would be necessary in certain cases where the . . . [head of the Office of Price Administration] should find that an industry was in a position of real hardship as a consequence of an approved increase in wages or salaries, I issued an executive order on February 14 that permitted such temporary adjustments. It was my desire to be fair to all sides, and the purpose of this order was to allow producers to increase prices in those instances where an increase was justifiable. . . .

The obstructionist tactics of special privilege groups continued to impede our natural reconversion to stable prices. I understood their methods and their objectives from the beginning and tried to expose them at every opportunity. In an address . . . which I made . . . on March 6, I said, "If certain interests were not so greedy for gold, there would be less pressure and lobbying to induce the Congress to allow the Price Control Act to expire, or to keep down minimum wages, or to permit further concentration of economic power." These were strong words, but they were true.

As the date of expiration of the law drew nearer, I made another appeal in a public statement on April 3 for early extension of price control and for stabilization laws, which were desperately needed. Without them, I warned, our progress would be turned into economic chaos. However, the bill which Congress was then writing would not work. It would, in fact, throw the doors wide open to inflation. Nevertheless, the House passed it, and it seemed destined for Senate approval as well. Chester Bowles, the head of the Office of Economic Stabilization, who had supported me in my opposition to this "amended" price control legislation, flatly charged that under the new bill effective control of prices and rents would be impossible. He submitted his resignation . . . on June 28, stating, as one of his reasons, "Clearly I could not remain here . . . to administer the inflationary bill which the Congress is about to present for your signature." "In accepting your resignation," I replied in part, "I want to assure you, and at the same time every American, that this administration will never give up the fight. We shall continue the battle against inflation with every weapon at our disposal, and shall not rest until this country has reached permanent high levels of production, prosperity and employment."

On June 29, I vetoed House Resolution 6042 amending the price control laws and extending them for another year. I did so because under this bill it was not a choice between continued price stability and inflation, but a choice between inflation with a statute and inflation without one. My fundamental objection to the bill was to the numerous amendments that would raise the price of essential cost-of-living commodities. The most damaging of these was the price raising amendment for manufacturers introduced by Senator [Robert A.] Taft and operating in conjunction with the revised price raising amendment for distributors introduced by Senator [Kenneth S.] Wherry. While giving the delusion of protection, the bill would permit prices to pyramid spectacularly, thus providing a sure formula for inflation.

Reminding the Congress that since September 6, 1945, I had continued to request an extension of price control legislation without crippling amendments, I now asked on behalf of the American people [for] a resolution . . . continuing the current controls for the short period of time necessary to write a workable bill. I also explained to the nation by radio my reasons for considering this bill inadequate. I announced that I had submitted to the Congress a plan for price control legislation which . . . [I] regarded as fair and effective. I called upon every business, every producer, and every landlord to adhere to existing regulations even though for a short period they might not have the effect of law. I also requested every employee of the Office of Price Administration to stay at his battle station and continue the effort to make price control a success until the Congress adopted the kind of bill that could be made to work. . . .

I was asked at a press conference held on July 17 . . . if I thought that the figures of rising prices since July 1 had borne out the predictions I had made in my veto speech. I replied that, according to the figures in the New York Journal of Commerce, . . . [my predictions were] very conclusively proven. I stated that I was sure that prices were going higher unless we got an Office of Price Administration bill soon. [In fact,] . . . a report to me from the Bureau of Labor Statistics [showed that] as a result of the price spurt following the failure of the Congress to renew the Price Control Act, . . . the index of prices had risen twenty-five percent during the first sixteen days of July. . . .

On July 25, I signed a new act which extended the price control law for another year, but I sent a message to the Congress explaining that I was approving the bill with reluctance. While it corrected some of the graver abuses of the Taft-Wherry amendments, it still fell far short of giving the government the necessary machinery for assuring the stability of prices. It was, nevertheless, a better bill than the one I had vetoed.

The threat of inflation not only presented one of the biggest domestic problems during the reconversion period, but it also created other economic conditions which caused me a great deal of concern. I was especially anxious about the effect which the attitude of several business groups toward price and rent control might have on production and employment. I knew that full production would be our greatest weapon against inflation. But if manufacturers and producers chose to hold back goods and products in anticipation of higher prices, which inevitably prevail in postwar periods, they would slow down production and create needless unemployment. . . .

. . . The price control law which Congress had passed in July 1946 did not protect the interests of the consumer. In commodities where there was no control, prices began to climb. The . . . [law] contained a provision for the dropping of price controls on meat and stipulating that controls could not be restored before August 20. In the first day of free trade at the Chicago stockyards, prime beef, which had been under an Office of Price Administration ceiling of \$18 per hundredweight, jumped to \$22, and hogs . . . [rose too], from the controlled price of \$14.85 to \$18.50. During July and August, prices of the relatively short supply of livestock went to unprecedented heights and resulted in a crisis in the fall of 1946 which was called a meat shortage. . . . On August 20, the Price Decontrol Board, set up by the law, restored controls on meat after a hearing showing the necessity for price ceilings. But almost two months had gone by in which meat had remained free from all price regulation. During this period unfattened cattle had been rushed to the slaughterhouses in order to make high profits. If, as I recommended, price control had not been allowed to lapse by Congress, this wasteful slaughter of unfattened cattle would not have taken place. The real blame lay at the door of a reckless group of selfish men—some of them inside the Congress, some outside—who were encouraging sellers to gamble on the destruction of price control.

The meat situation became so acute that I addressed the American people in a nationwide radio talk on October 14, pointing out that a brief price control holiday had been considered but that in the long run it would be bad for the country because a famine in meat would surely follow the temporary feast. Another proposed remedy was to order a further price increase on livestock, but that this would be ineffective because the livestock would still be held back in the expectation of the lifting of controls and even higher prices. Many people had suggested that the government seize the packing houses, but this was no real solution because the seizing of empty packing houses would avail us nothing without the livestock. Some had even suggested that

the government adopt the drastic measure of going out on the farms and ranges and seizing the cattle for slaughter, but I rejected this use of extreme wartime emergency power of government. Importation of meat was not the answer because of the unavailability of foreign meat in the amounts that would supply our needs. Besides, the people of other countries were depending upon exportable dressed meat for their own survival.

I announced, therefore, that there was nothing else to be done but to lift controls on meat and that I was directing the secretary of agriculture and the [head of the Office of Price Administration] . . . to remove all price controls on livestock and livestock products. Controls had already been lifted on thousands of smaller items where that could be done without great risk. I warned that restraint and common sense would have to be exercised, not only in the meat industry but in all others, if inflation was to be avoided and adequate production achieved. Black marketeering, hoarding, unlawful strikes, and other such selfish tactics would be an invitation to disaster, I said, and could be avoided only if labor, industry, government, and the people used the same kind of teamwork that had always carried us through all our problems. . . .

With the speeding up of price decontrol on basic commodities during the fall of 1946, it soon became apparent that the time had come when it could serve no useful purpose to continue the remaining controls. I never believed in controls for their own sake and felt that the general control of both prices and wages was justifiable only so long as it was an effective instrument against inflation. On November 9, 1946, I removed by executive order all controls on wages and prices and stated that the larger problem was now the withholding of goods from the market. This was becoming so serious as to threaten key segments of the economy with paralysis, and the blame lay largely on the unworkable price control law which the Congress had passed. . . .

Despite his action substantially ending wage and price controls, Truman believed that a few controls were still necessary and in early 1947 he asked Congress to pass an extension of some wartime controls. At about the same time, he told the Congress that he intended to ask for the repeal during the coming year of some of the emergency wartime statutes, but he warned of the danger to the economy that inflation posed. Congress responded to his request for the extension of some wartime controls with two decontrol acts, one in March and one in July. When signing the second one, Truman issued a statement which said he wished it was not necessary to continue the controls, but that commodity shortages and the threat of

excessive inflation still existed. He said the government would use the remaining controls sparingly and would dispense with them as soon as possible.

The relaxing of controls in an orderly and cautious manner was effectuated further by a congressional resolution repealing many of the temporary emergency and war statutes, which I approved on July 25. In a statement accompanying this action, I said that this was part of a sound and systematic program for removing all emergency powers. I explained, however, that the emergencies declared by President Roosevelt on September 8, 1939, and May 27, 1941, and the state of war continued to exist, and it was not possible at that time to provide for the termination of all war and emergency powers.

Unfortunately, Congress did not act on other recommendations for legislation relating to the control powers and for the prevention of inflation. So it was necessary to convene a special session of the Congress on November 17, 1947. [My] . . . message on the opening day of the session pointed out how prices had been rising and called attention to the effects on the economy resulting from price inflation.

I urged specific legislation to prevent excessive speculation on the commodity exchanges; to authorize the allocation of scarce commodities and extend authority to allocate transportation services; [to provide for the] continuation and strengthening of export controls; and [to give the president] authority to impose price ceilings on vital commodities in short supply that basically affected the cost of living. I also recommended extension and strengthening of rent control. The joint resolution of Congress, approved December 28, 1946, was supposed to embody these recommendations. In fact, it failed to include the key measures essential to an effective anti-inflation program, and I said on signing it that it would not reduce the high cost of living and would not keep prices from going even higher.

The issue between the Congress and the president was now completely clear, and on July 15, 1948, in accepting the nomination for president at the Democratic convention in Philadelphia, I strongly criticized [the Congress] . . . for its failure to enact the program recommended to the special session in November 1947, particularly its failure to provide standby controls. The Republican convention, held before the Democratic convention, had adopted a platform calling for some of the measures [I had asked for]. . . . So . . . [in my speech to the Democratic convention, I said I would call a special session of Congress to begin on July 26, and] I suggested that they show good faith and implement their platform! I told the Congress that the people were demanding legislative action by their government to check inflation and the

rising cost of living and to help in meeting the acute housing shortage. I said that it would be reckless folly if we failed to act against inflation.

[I followed this up with] . . . a public statement on August 5 once more challenging the . . . Congress to take further action, as it had failed so far to discharge the tasks for which it had been called into special session. Again, the only response was a feeble measure which was a far cry from the strong, positive action needed to relieve the country from the hardships of exorbitant prices. The . . . Congress, instead of occupying itself with consideration of active measures for coping with the situation, contented itself with following a course which served the ends of special privilege rather than the welfare of the whole nation.

Year of Decisions, 487–491, 495–505; *Years of Trial and Hope*, 24–29

Atomic Energy after Hiroshima and Nagasaki

A need for control, the necessity of secrecy—Stimson's memorandum—an important Cabinet meeting—the conundrums of secrecy—domestic and international control—a meeting with Attlee and King—civilian or military control?—the Acheson-Lilienthal report—Bernard Baruch—the British problem—the Atomic Energy Act—putting the atomic energy program on an even keel—the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy—uranium—the “super”—the Soviet bomb—the big “If”—NSC-68—the Nevada test site—atoms for peace

Ever since Hiroshima I had never stopped thinking about the frightful implications of the atomic bomb. We knew that this revolutionary scientific creation could destroy civilization unless put under control and placed at the service of mankind. . . . We now had to find some way to control this new force. The destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was lesson enough to me. The world could not afford to risk war with atomic weapons. But until a practical and foolproof method of control could be found, it was important to retain the advantage which possession of the bomb had given us. In other words, it was now more than ever necessary to guard and maintain the secrecy of the bomb. . . .

On August 15, 1945, Truman sent a memorandum to his top foreign policy, defense, and military advisers, directing them to take all necessary steps to

prevent the release of any information in regard to the development, design or production of the atomic bomb; or in regard to its employment in military or naval warfare. . . .

Vigilance at the various installations of the Manhattan District was intensified. The basic facts about nuclear reactions—long known to world scientists—were made public in the Smyth report [*A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes*, August 12, 1945]. But our possession of the secret of harnessing atomic energy already had far-reaching effects on our relations with other nations. On September 11, Secretary Stimson sent me a memorandum setting forth his views on the atomic bomb and our relations with the Russians. Secretary Stimson had given a great deal of thought to this subject, since he had played an important role in the development of atomic energy. He proposed that the United States make a direct approach to Russia with a view of reaching some agreement about the future use of atomic bombs. . . .

Stimson suggested to Truman that the United States propose to the Soviets and the British that all three countries agree to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war and so far as possible . . . direct and encourage the development of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purpose. He also suggested that the United States could offer to impound its existing atomic bombs if the British and Soviets would agree that in no event will they or we use a bomb as an instrument of war unless all three governments agree to that use. The agreement could also provide for what Stimson called an exchange of benefits derived from future developments in the use of atomic energy for peaceful and humanitarian purposes.

Stimson did not propose that we “turn the bomb over” to Russia. As far as I was concerned, this was not a matter for discussion. I had decided that the secret of the manufacture of the weapon would remain a secret with us.

At the weekly Cabinet luncheon on September 18, I started a discussion of atomic energy, as a result of which I decided that there would be one item only on the agenda of the next formal Cabinet meeting on September 21, and that was atomic energy. This was Secretary Stimson’s last Cabinet meeting. His resignation was already in my hands, and immediately after the meeting ended, he left Washington, thus ending one of the most distinguished careers of public service to this nation. I was sorry to see him go. Stimson was an honest man. As was said of Enoch, he was a just man.

He had the ability to express his views in plain language. I respected and trusted him.

I opened the meeting [on September 21] by calling on Stimson to present his views to the Cabinet. In his statement, he pointed out that the future of atomic energy would fall into two major areas: the further pursuit of scientific investigation, and the application of the newly won knowledge to industrial uses. It was his opinion that the scientific secrets were in fact not secrets—not in the sense in which the ordnance or weapon developments could be kept secret. The problem, Stimson said, was how to treat these secrets in order to assure the safety of the world, and he thereupon put forward the proposal [he had already suggested to me]. . . .

Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, sitting in for Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who was in London, expressed general agreement with Stimson. He said safeguards were needed in any mutual sharing of scientific knowledge. American scientists would have to be fully informed of Soviet developments so that there would be no one-sided exchange in which we gave information and received none in return. He said the United Nations could not function in the atomic energy field without agreement among the United States, Great Britain, and Russia.

Secretary of the Treasury Fred M. Vinson took strong issue with Stimson. Why, he asked, if we wanted to share any part of our knowledge of atomic energy, would we not also want to share all the military secrets? He was opposed to that, and he expressed fear that an exchange of information would be a one-sided affair, with our receiving little or nothing in return. Attorney General Tom Clark agreed with Vinson. He said he saw no reason, with the world situation as it was, for sharing our secrets.

I interrupted to point out that we were not discussing the question of giving the secret of the bomb itself to the Russians or to anyone else, but the best methods of controlling bomb warfare and the exchange only of scientific information.

Postmaster General Bob Hannegan expressed his respect for Stimson's judgment and supported his position. Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal declared that the problem had a military as well as a civilian aspect and that both needed to be considered. He said that no precipitate action should be taken before further study. . . . Secretary of Agriculture Anderson [said] . . . he was strongly opposed to revealing any scientific or commercial secrets any more than we should reveal the military secret of atomic energy. He added that he did not trust the Russians or their willingness to reciprocate in any arrangement. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace said he wanted

to know whether we were to follow the line of bitterness, as he put it, or the line of peace. He said that scientific progress could not be held down by man-made laws. . . .

Three other advisers at the meeting agreed, some with qualifications, with Stimson's point of view. Three others said any decisions regarding atomic energy should be delayed for about six months to allow time for calm thought.

The discussion had been lively, and it was this kind of interchange of opinion that I liked to see at Cabinet meetings. This Cabinet showed that honest men can honestly disagree, and a frank and open argument of this kind is the best form of free expression in which a president can get all points of view needed for him to make decisions. The decisions had to be mine to make.

I had asked also for a memorandum from Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and one from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Bush said he believed a proposal to Russia for exchange of scientific information would open the door to international collaboration in the field of atomic energy and eventually to effective control, the alternative being an atomic bomb race. "The move does not involve 'giving away the secret of the atomic bomb,'" wrote Dr. Bush. "That secret resides principally in the details of construction of the bombs themselves, and in the manufacturing processes. What is given and what is received is scientific knowledge. . . ." [Dr. Bush added:] "We have a problem before us. . . . Can we work with Russia and trust Russia? To some extent this move [exchanging scientific information with the Soviet Union] would enable us to find out. But the general advantage is that this move, when it became known, would announce to the world that we wish to proceed down the path of international good will and understanding."

. . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the United States retain all existing secrets with respect to the atomic weapons. Although the principles of nuclear physics underlying atomic explosives are widely known throughout the world, they said, many of the technical procedures and manufacturing processes used for atomic weapons were still secret. And in the absence of agreement among the great powers on fundamental international political problems, they said, they felt the release of information on atomic weapons would speed up an atomic armament race and expose the United States to greater danger. The Chiefs of Staff urged that steps of "political nature should be promptly and vigorously pressed during the probably limited period of American monopoly" to bring about international control for

restricting or outlawing the use of atomic weapons. "The possibility," they concluded, "that other nations may succeed in developing atomic weapons in the not too distant future suggests that the question of political controls is a matter of immediate importance."

The news that I had held a Cabinet meeting to discuss atomic energy quickly led to false reports alleging there had been a sharp division in the Cabinet on the question of "giving the bomb to the Russians." Following the Cabinet meeting . . . I was asked by a White House correspondent if I had approved or disapproved the "Wallace proposal." Some stories were published that Henry Wallace had led off the Cabinet discussion by calling for the surrender of the bomb's secret. I replied that Wallace had made no such proposal, adding that whatever was done with the bomb was a matter on which I, and I alone, would make the decision.

As a matter of fact, I had already decided that atomic energy would require drastic controls, both at home and internationally. On September 19, I had asked Senators Connally, Vandenberg, and Lucas to come to my office, and I outlined for them, in general terms, what I had in mind. I told them that I wanted atomic energy developments at home to be under the control of a government agency. This was too important a development to be made the subject of profit seeking. Most of all, further progress and development would require capital expenditures which, outside of government, could be found only under monopolistic conditions, and I was firmly opposed to any private monopoly in the field of atomic energy. I also told the senators that I hoped to start talks with our British and Canadian partners in this venture, looking toward some plan for international control. I was anxious to keep partisanship out of the discussion of the area of atomic energy policy, just as I always sought to keep foreign policy bipartisan. . . .

On October 3, 1945, Truman sent to Congress a special message on atomic energy in which he outlined a two-phase program which would allow the United States to lead the way toward assuring that the great potential of atomic energy was used for purposes of peace rather than war. The first phase, which required Congressional action, was the creation of an agency—the Atomic Energy Commission—that would develop policy for the control and use of atomic energy within the United States. The second phase related to the international control and use of atomic energy. The hope of civilization, Truman said, lies in international arrangements looking . . . to the renunciation of the use and development of the atomic bomb, and directing and encouraging the use of atomic energy and all future scientific information toward peaceful and humanitarian ends.

If such arrangements could not be achieved, Truman feared, the alternative might be an arms race. On October 4, a bill was introduced in Congress intended to put Truman's program into effect.

At a press conference a week later I made another statement on atomic policy. . . . The first question asked ran something like this: "Mr. President, you made a statement, as near as I can remember in . . . [the speech you gave yesterday] that when the nations of the world learn to put total world progress ahead of individual national gain, then we could put this great discovery of the release of atomic energy to work and make the world a better place to live in. Would it be correct to interpret your position there as meaning that the atomic secret would not be shared unless and until we had positive assurance that the world has progressed to that point?" To this I answered: "No, that would not be true, for this reason. The scientific knowledge that resulted in the atomic bomb is already world-wide knowledge. It is only the know-how of putting that knowledge practically to work that is our secret. . . . So far as the scientific knowledge is concerned, all the scientists know the answer, but how to put it to work—that is our secret. . . . If they catch up with us on that, they will have to get it on their own hook, just as we did." The reporter: "You mean, then, that we will not share that knowledge with our allies?" I replied: "Just the same as we haven't shared any of our engineering secrets. But so far as the scientific knowledge is concerned, they all know that, anyway." The reporter kept on: "But so far as the bomb secret is concerned we will not share that?" I answered: "Not the know-how of putting it together, let's put it that way."

Truman was eager to begin discussions with the leaders of the United States' partners in the development of the atomic bomb, the United Kingdom and Canada. He invited the prime ministers of the two countries, Clement Attlee and Mackenzie King, to meet with him in Washington in November 1945. They accepted Truman's invitation, and their discussions began on about November 10. Truman gives two dates for his first meetings with Attlee and King—November 10 and 11, but his calendar does not corroborate either date and doesn't list meetings until November 13.

. . . At my conference with Attlee and Mackenzie King a foundation was drafted for a sound plan of international control of atomic energy. . . . I told the two prime ministers that . . . I believed that a free exchange of scientific knowledge would be essential to the peace of the world. I explained that

what I meant by "free exchange of scientific information" was that scientists of all countries should be allowed to visit freely with one another and that free inspection of the plans for atomic energy's use in peacetime pursuits should be the policy of every country. But I stressed that this would not necessarily mean that the engineering and production know-how should be made freely available, any more than we would make freely available any of our trade secrets.

I informed the two prime ministers that legislation was then pending in the Congress of the United States for the domestic control of atomic energy for peacetime purposes. It was my view, I said, that the control of atomic energy for destructive purposes should be lodged in the United Nations when we had become absolutely sure that the confidence of each nation in the good faith of the other was well founded. This, I suggested, might make it necessary to abandon the veto power in the Security Council.

Both Attlee and Mackenzie King then gave their views, and I was pleased that they were essentially in agreement with me.

This first conference was held with only the three of us present, but we met again in the afternoon of the same day, November 10, with our principal advisers. I had Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy with me, and Attlee was accompanied by Lord Halifax and Sir John Anderson. Lester Pearson, the Canadian ambassador in Washington, was with Mr. King. . . . All present were of the opinion that there should be free interchange of scientific knowledge and free inspection of industrial plants devoted to the manufacture of atomic energy for peacetime uses, but also that there should be agreement on these matters before any exchanges were made. . . .

Truman does not give any further account of his discussions with Attlee and King with respect to the control and use of atomic energy. Instead, he presents in their entirety the remarks which he and Clement Attlee exchanged at a state dinner on November 10 to indicate what he calls the spirit of their discussions. Truman, in his remarks, stressed the need to realize a world order and a world peace, and to complete the work of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt of creating an international organization—the United Nations—that would implement a program of world peace. Attlee said the world needed a universal foreign policy . . . that is conceived in the interest of all the people of the world.

When our discussions were concluded on November 15, I called the press and radio correspondents into my office and, in the presence of Attlee and King, read them the declaration we had agreed on. . . .

The declaration called for international action to prevent the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes and to promote the use of advances in scientific knowledge for peaceful and humanitarian ends. The declaration expressed the willingness of the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada to exchange fundamental scientific information relating to atomic energy with other nations, but drew back from extending such exchange to specialized information regarding the practical application of atomic energy, before it is possible to devise effective, reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards acceptable to all nations. The three nations advocated setting up a commission within the United Nations which would prepare recommendations regarding the elimination of atomic weapons and the control of atomic energy to assure that it was used only for peaceful purposes, as well as the development of effective safeguards, including inspections, that would protect against violations and evasions of international agreements relating to atomic energy.

The declaration concluded with this:

Faced with the terrible realities of the application of science to destruction, every nation will realize more urgently than before the overwhelming need to maintain the rule of law among nations and to banish the scourge of war from the earth. This can only be brought about by giving wholehearted support to the United Nations Organization, and by consolidating and extending its authority, thus creating conditions of mutual trust in which all peoples will be free to devote themselves to the arts of peace. It is our firm resolve to work without reservation to achieve these ends.

In addition to the declaration, Truman, Attlee, and King also signed a brief memorandum which stated their desire that the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada should continue to work together, as they had done during World War II, in the field of atomic energy.

. . . I gave the Cabinet a detailed account of my conversations with the two prime ministers at the Cabinet meeting on November 16 and asked for their comments. All the members present thought that this agreement was a step in the right direction. Secretary Wallace expressed some doubts about the device of a United Nations commission. Vinson and Clark, in line with the position they had taken at our earlier discussion of atomic energy, wanted to be assured that there was no intention on my part to reveal any of the "know-how." Forrestal thought that this agreement would "make the U.N.O. [United Nations Organization] a living thing." All agreed, however, that to refer the problem of atomic energy to the United Nations would give that organization a chance to prove itself. . . .

As Truman was addressing the international component of his atomic energy program, the Congress was working to develop a bill which would create a government agency to control atomic energy domestically.

A bill for the control of atomic energy was before the Congress. This bill was the May-Johnson bill, which had been drawn up in the early days after V-J Day, and its approach was military. Its aim was to set up a kind of permanent "Manhattan District" under military control. In the message I had sent to Congress on October 3, I strongly emphasized the peacetime uses of atomic energy, and for that reason I felt that it should not be controlled by the military. During the fall months of 1945 legislative action had been delayed by a wrangle among Senate committees as to which should properly handle bills affecting atomic power. Behind this dispute was the basic disagreement on whether the new force was primarily a military weapon or a potential source for peaceful civilian development.

The legislative dispute was finally resolved when the Senate set up a Special Committee on Atomic Energy. The chairman of this committee was Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut, a devoted and talented public servant who deserves a great deal of credit for his legislative leadership in the shaping of the atomic program. On November 30, I sent a memorandum to certain officials on the handling of the atomic program, stating that I thought the May-Johnson bill should be amended to provide for civilian supremacy, and at the same time raised with Senator McMahon the necessity for establishing civilian control. The senator agreed to seek amendment of the bill. Within a few days, however, he requested an appointment, suggesting that the secretaries of war and of the Navy also be present. The military services felt very strongly that the control of atomic development should be under their auspices, if not under their immediate jurisdiction, and they were making strong representations to that effect to the Congress.

The meeting took place in my office on December 4. In addition to Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, and Senator McMahon, General Leslie R. Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, was present, along with Dr. Edward U. Condon, Director of the Bureau of Standards, and James R. Newman, counsel of the [Senate] Atomic Energy Committee. I asked each member of the group to state his position. Then I stated mine, that the entire program and operation should be under civilian control and that the government should have a monopoly of materials, facilities, and processes.

On December 20 Senator McMahon introduced S. 1717, which, in substance, contained this approach to the subject. On December 27 Secretary

Patterson submitted a memorandum giving his views and those of some of his advisers in opposition to the McMahon bill. After the most careful study I replied to the secretaries of war and of the Navy on January 23 with [a] . . . memorandum, in which I insisted upon civilian control. . . .

Truman's memorandum instructed Patterson and Forrestal that, when appearing before Congressional committees or speaking with members of Congress, they should present views consistent with the points made in his memorandum of November 30, including his contention that the commission which was proposed for the control of atomic energy should be composed exclusively of civilians. This is in accord with established American tradition, Truman wrote. He also stated his belief that an absolute Government monopoly of ownership, production and processing of all fissionable materials [such as U235 and plutonium] appears to me imperative. Such a monopoly, he believed, was the only way to assure both the material safety and the maximum utilization of atomic energy for the public welfare.

Civilian control of atomic energy faced many obstacles. Proponents of military control had many friends in the Congress, and Senator McMahon had a difficult time gathering support for his measure. On February 1, he spent nearly two hours with me at the White House discussing his difficulties. In order to support the McMahon bill publicly, I gave the senator . . . [a] letter and had it released for publication. . . .

Truman's letter was dated February 1, 1946. In it, he presented the same arguments for civilian control of atomic energy and a government monopoly of the ownership, production, and processing of fissionable materials that he had addressed in his January 23 memorandum to Patterson and Forrestal. Truman said he believed that legislation providing for domestic control of atomic energy according to the principles he outlined would contribute materially to the achievement of a safe, effective international arrangement making possible the ultimate use of atomic energy for exclusively peaceful and humanitarian ends. . . . I feel, Truman concluded his letter to McMahon, that it is a matter of urgency that sound domestic legislation on atomic energy be enacted with utmost speed. Domestic and international issues of the first importance wait upon this action. . . .

Truman's program for the international control of atomic energy was moving forward as he waited for Congressional action on his domestic program. He instructed the United States delegation to the United Nations—the General

Assembly was meeting for the first time in London in January 1946—to work for the establishment of a United Nations commission on atomic energy.

The plan for such a commission was put before the General Assembly by the British as the host country, was fully supported by our delegation, and was adopted on January 24. It was agreed that the first meeting of the new commission should be held in New York on June 14, 1946.

While the United Nations deliberated on the establishment of an agency for the discussion of atomic energy controls, a committee appointed by the secretary of state worked out a plan for such controls which might be placed before the United Nations commission when it convened. This committee consisted of five members. The Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was designated as chairman, and with him served John J. McCloy, former assistant secretary of war, and three men most directly connected with the development of the bomb, Dr. Vannevar Bush, Dr. James B. Conant, and Major General Leslie R. Groves. Working with and for the committee was a board of consultants whose job it was to analyze and appraise all facts pertinent to the problem of international control and to formulate proposals. David E. Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, was the chairman of this group. . . . This board . . . examined every aspect of the problem thoroughly and conscientiously. Its report was unanimously endorsed by the parent committee. It is usually referred to as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and is a great state paper.

I received the report from Secretary Byrnes on March 21, [1946]. By that time, a number of other developments had taken place that had a bearing on the problem of atomic energy control.

On March 8 Senator McMahon had come to the White House to report that new difficulties were in the offing for the atomic energy bill that he had introduced. Senator Vandenberg was sponsoring an amendment to the bill that would set up a Military Liaison Board which, in effect, would duplicate the proposed Atomic Energy Commission. It would have access to all matters before the commission, would have the right to insist on consultation with the commission whenever it desired, and would have the right to appeal to the president any action of the commission which it believed would "affect the National Defense." On March 12, the Senate Atomic Energy Committee had approved this amendment, McMahon being the only senator to vote against it. The following day a slightly changed version was adopted by the same margin, again McMahon casting the sole negative vote. This amendment would have had the effect of defeating the principle of civilian

supremacy, and under it the commission's work would have been subject to the veto of the military. The argument for this military veto was based on the premise that the preservation of the national security is primarily the responsibility of the armed forces. But this is a wrong assumption. The preservation of the nation's safety and defense is an organic and sweeping responsibility that extends to all branches and departments of the government; and only one of its many phases is assigned to the military departments.

I put it in these words to a press conference on March 14:

I don't think there is a clear understanding by the public, or even in Congress, on what is meant by civilian control of that board. I have tried to make that perfectly clear in my letter of February 2nd. The idea is that the military, of course, has an important part to play and should be consulted, but it is a mistake to believe that only the military can guard the national security. The full responsibility for a balanced and forceful development of atomic energy, looking toward the national economic good, national security, and a firm, clear position toward other nations and world peace, should rest with the civilian group directly responsible to the President. Now the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the first place; and the civilian board under him would in no way hamper the military in their proper function.

On March 16, I conferred with Secretary of State Byrnes on the possibility that Congress might pass an atomic energy law that would undercut our efforts to bring about international cooperation in the field of atomic power. We had to be in a position where we could put our plan for international control before the United Nations without being handicapped by a domestic law that would have made it impossible for us to participate. Byrnes advised me that the committee was ready to report any day. He suggested that we appoint a spokesman who would command respect both at home and abroad. Bernard M. Baruch seemed to me to be the logical man, and for several reasons. Not the least important of these was that Baruch enjoyed considerable esteem in the Senate. His association with the administration's plan for the control of atomic energy might help remove some of the opposition to the McMahon bill in Congress. Baruch had also succeeded, over the years, in forming many friendships abroad, including that of Winston Churchill, and during a long life he had acquired the prestige of an "elder statesman." I called on him in the expectation that he would also add weight to the proposal we were about to put before the world.

The Baruch appointment was announced on March 18 and was received very favorably by the press. On the same day, my regular weekly conference

with the "Big Four" leaders of Congress was devoted exclusively to the McMahon bill. I explained the reasons for the bill as originally drafted and said that I would not accept a law without civilian control.

When Byrnes brought me a final draft of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, I sat down at once to study it. By some unauthorized means, however, this report fell into the hands of the press. This upset Baruch, and he asked to see me. When he came, he handed me a letter:

March 26, 1946

My dear Mr. President:

. . . As I understand my duties and authority, they consist presently solely of the obligation of representing United States policy on atomic energy, as communicated to me by you directly or through the Secretary of State, before the United Nations Organization. I see nowhere any duty or responsibility on me to participate in the formation of that policy.

This situation has been brought very forcibly to my attention by the press announcements of the report rendered by Mr. Acheson's Committee. . . . While I have not had an opportunity to examine the report with care and cannot state my own definite views with respect to it, the letter from Secretary Byrnes to me transmitting the report states that it was unanimously recommended by a Committee headed by the Under Secretary of State. This brings the report pretty close to the category of the United States Government policy.

I have no doubt that the public feels that I am going to have an important relation to the determination of our atomic energy policy. There is no legal basis for this view and now that the Under Secretary of State's Committee Report has been published, the determination of policy will be greatly affected by the contents of this report. Even the superficial and incomplete examination of the subject that I have been able to make in the last few days convinces me that this report is likely to be the subject of considerable and rather violent differences of opinion. Its publication, which I understand to have been unauthorized, does not render the situation any less difficult.

These are the things that have been bothering me, and I wanted to talk them over with you before coming to a final conclusion myself as to whether, in the circumstances, I can be useful to you. I will need a little more time to reflect. As it presently stands, I think that embarrassment all around would be avoided if you would ask Chairman Connally of the Foreign Relations Committee to postpone any action on confirmation of my appointment until I have had a little more time to think things over.

Respectfully yours,

Bernard M. Baruch

I explained to Mr. Baruch that, in the first place, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report was very plainly marked as a working paper and not as an approved policy document. I also informed him that whatever policy he would be asked to represent before the United Nations would have to be a policy approved by me. I pointed out that, under the law, all representatives of the United States at the United Nations were under the supervision of the secretary of state. Of course, I told him, the secretary of state would probably request his aid in the preparation of a policy proposal for my approval, but I had no intention of placing him in a role different from other delegates to the United Nations. Baruch then went to see Secretary Byrnes, and Byrnes later informed me that he had given Baruch a letter outlining his duties. . . .

Byrnes's letter assured Baruch that he, the secretary of state, would listen to his views with respect to United States policy and would have them in mind when advising President Truman. He also said that the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, while very important, did not state decided policy, and that he would give careful consideration to Baruch's views regarding the report. The decision as to policy is the President's, *Byrnes wrote*. You and I will advise him just as I advise him on many other matters. *When Truman had decided what policy would be, then Baruch would announce it to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.* I do not believe that you will have any difficulty about these matters, *Byrnes assured Baruch.*

Baruch, who is usually referred to as an "adviser to presidents," had, of course, full knowledge of the president's responsibility for national policy. His concern, in my opinion, was really whether he would receive public recognition. He had always seen to it that his suggestions and recommendations, not always requested by the president, would be given publicity. Most presidents have received more advice than they can possibly use. But Baruch is the only man to my knowledge who has built a reputation on a self-assumed unofficial status as "adviser." I had asked him to help his government in a capacity of my choosing. I had no intention of having him tell me what his job should be. I made that clear to him, in a very polite way, and so did Byrnes, as his letter indicates.

Baruch's principal contribution to the atomic energy program was that he transformed the Acheson-Lilienthal Report from a working paper into a formal, systematic proposal and that he added a section that called for sanctions against any nation violating the rules. The American plan was put before the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission by Baruch on June

14. Within a matter of hours, it became evident that the USSR had a proposal of its own, and one that was sharply in conflict with the American suggestion. In the month that followed, Baruch and his associates . . . presented details of the American proposals to the several committees set up by the United Nations commission. Russian and Polish opposition was evident. In substance, what the Russians wanted was a plan that would provide for an agreement not to use atomic weapons, for the cessation of bomb production, and for the destruction of all stockpiles. This amounted to a demand that we destroy our atomic bombs and, if we agreed to all this, then the Russians would be willing to discuss arrangements for the exchange of scientific information and the formation of international controls. Our plan provided for the setting up of immediate controls over raw materials out of which fissionable materials could be made. Only when such controls were established would we consider disposing of our stockpile of bombs. If we accepted the Russian position, we would be deprived of everything except their promise to agree to controls. Then, if the Russians should launch an atomic armament race, our present advantage and security gained by our discovery and initiative would be wiped out. As I wrote to Baruch on July 10, "We should not under any circumstances throw away our gun until we are sure the rest of the world can't arm against us."

The United Nations commission eventually adopted, over the objections of Poland and Russia, what was substantially the American plan. The commission's report was sent to the Security Council. There, backed by the use of the veto, Russia was able to block all further action. The possibility that Russia would not cooperate in an international control scheme had been anticipated by us. We were prepared, in any event, to safeguard our own national interest.

At the time the British expressed concern over the McMahon bill. They said that this bill would deprive them of the opportunity to share our knowledge and "know-how" and the advantages derived from the years of wartime collaboration with us on the bomb project. Our ambassador to London, Averell Harriman, reported to me that Prime Minister Attlee felt that if the McMahon bill passed, Britain would be forced to undertake the development of atomic energy production on her own. Attlee said he feared the McMahon bill would prohibit the disclosure or sharing of atomic secrets with any foreign power, including the British. The British government took the position that, until such a time as United Nations control might become effective, the British should either have atomic weapons made available to them or at least be supplied with the data necessary to start their own production.

The Combined Policy Committee, which was the British-American body that handled such questions, came to a complete deadlock on April 15, and on the following day Attlee sent me a long message in which he sought to justify the British stand. The agreed declaration of November 15, 1945, he said, stated that it was our desire that there should be "full and effective cooperation in the field of atomic energy between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada." This, he thought, could not mean less than full interchange of information and a fair division of the material. The declaration, Attlee said, contained nothing about the sharing of information among ourselves and the clear indication was that this was already provided for. The wartime arrangements under which the major share of the development work and the construction and operation of full-scale plants were carried out in the United States had naturally meant that technological and engineering information had accumulated in our hands. Now, if there was to be full and effective cooperation between us, Attlee declared, it was essential that this information be shared. He proposed that the Combined Policy Committee should make a further study of the question. . . .

Truman responded to Attlee on April 20. He said he had learned from Secretary of State Byrnes that the British request for information that would allow the United Kingdom to build an atomic energy plant was based on a memorandum the two of them had signed, with Mackenzie King, on November 16, 1945, the day following their release of the November 15, 1945 declaration. Truman disputed Attlee's understanding of this memorandum. I must say, Truman wrote, using blunt language, that no one at any time informed me that the memorandum was proposed with the intention of having the United States obligate itself to furnish the engineering and operational assistance necessary for the construction of another atomic energy plant. Had that been done I would not have signed the memorandum. Truman reminded Attlee that their declaration of November 15, 1945, announced the intention of the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada to ask the United Nations to establish a commission to control atomic energy so as to prevent its use for military purposes. How would it look to the world, Truman asked, if the day after this declaration was announced, the United States and the United Kingdom should enter into a new agreement which would result in the construction of a new atomic energy plant in the United Kingdom? The goal toward which they were working, Truman reminded Attlee, was the international control of atomic energy.

Attlee's response, delayed until June 7 by his decision to discuss the matters at issue with Canadian prime minister Mackenzie King, continued his argument

that the agreements between the three partners regarding atomic energy, including the declaration of November 15, 1945, called for a continuing cooperation and exchange of information among the partners. Such an exchange, Attlee wrote, will give us, with all proper precautions in regard to security, that full information to which we believe that we are entitled, both by the documents and by the history of our common efforts in the past.

Truman felt he couldn't reply to Attlee until Congress acted on his domestic atomic energy plan, and he felt certain he would not be able to give Attlee what he wanted.

In view of developments in Congress, I was unable to send an immediate reply to Attlee's message. There was no certainty that the McMahon bill would gain final approval or whether some version of the original May-Johnson proposal would pass. It was not possible for me to make any statement on policy to Great Britain until the Congress had acted. But, in any case, it was already apparent that, whatever bill the Congress passed, it would seriously hamper and restrict our cooperation with the British in the atomic field.

Congress finally passed the McMahon bill [more formally known as the Atomic Energy Act of 1946], in amended form, and I signed it on August 1, 1946. The Atomic Energy Commission, which was established by this bill, took up its duties on January 1, 1947. As its first chairman, I selected David E. Lilienthal, who had done such an outstanding job as chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Lilienthal had already acquired knowledge of the problems of atomic energy through his work as chairman of the board of consultants to the Acheson Committee. The United States was now ready to embark on a program of planned development of atomic energy, for the security of the nation until international control became fact, and for the general benefit of all mankind. . . .

Now that the Atomic Energy Commission was in place, and in the absence of an agreement on the international control of atomic energy, Truman was anxious that the Los Alamos laboratory and the other important nuclear research and development facilities that had been created during World War II should continue their work of research and development.

America's security and the security of the free world depend to a large degree on our leadership in the field of nuclear energy. We owe a great debt of gratitude to a small group of scientists who have made this possible. The

peace of the world, in a large measure, was in the hands of a few dedicated men, who in 1945 and 1946 ignored the postwar stampede to private life, men who resisted or turned down tempting offers from industry and universities and stayed on at Los Alamos to continue research on atomic development. They knew that atomic development had just begun, and they wanted to stay with it because other nations would surely do what they could to overcome our lead. They were certain that unless we continued with research along many lines that had been developed at Los Alamos and in other American laboratories our position and our safety would be threatened.

We were on the threshold of important discoveries, and I was anxious for us to advance our work in nuclear development so that we might produce whatever new weapons were needed to safeguard our military position and thereby strengthen our hand in efforts to secure the peace. I wanted to do everything possible to encourage those scientists to stay with the government and to build our great laboratories—laboratories in which the thermonuclear knowledge was developed which was soon to enable us to produce the super bomb—the H-bomb.

On midnight on December 31, 1946, a civilian agency—the Atomic Energy Commission—took over top management of atomic research and production in the United States. This commission consists of five members appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. The president designates one of the members as chairman of the commission. . . . The commission has broad powers and full control over its own operations. It is responsible for the conduct of all research, development, and production in the field of atomic energy. Only the president, however, can authorize the use of an atomic bomb. Only the president can decide the nature of the weapons to be made. Only the president can decide whether a weapon can be detonated for test purposes. Only the president can approve where and when the weapons may be shipped or stored. In fact, the president even sets the annual goal of the number of bombs and the quantity of material to be produced.

But the president is no less concerned with the development and uses of atomic power for peaceful purposes. Through his control of the budget he is able to provide guidance and stimulation to the Atomic Energy Commission. To assist the commission in the exercise of its powers, the law established the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, composed of nine senators and nine representatives, and the Atomic Energy Commission is required to keep the congressional committee fully and currently informed with respect to the commission's activities. The law also provides

for a Military Liaison Committee, which is appointed by the secretary of defense and consists of two representatives from each of the three armed services, plus a chairman, who may be either a military man or a civilian. The liaison committee keeps the Atomic Energy Commission "fully informed of all atomic energy activities" of the Defense Department, and the commission, in turn, must keep the committee informed about all of its activities in the military field. The Military Liaison Committee has "authority to make written recommendations to the commission on matters relating to military application." In cases where a difference of opinion might arise between the Military Liaison Committee and the Atomic Energy Commission there is a provision in the law whereby the committee may carry the matter through the secretary of defense to the president. The president's decision is final. As a final step, the law provides for a General Advisory Committee of nine members to be appointed by the president "from civilian life." This advisory committee supplies scientific and technical advice to the Atomic Energy Commission and also to the Military Liaison Committee. . . .

In choosing the members of the commission I paid no attention to their politics. As a matter of fact, as it turned out, not a single member of the original Atomic Energy Commission was a member of the Democratic Party. Lilienthal always called himself an independent in politics. The four others were Republicans. I have always followed the principle that politics and the atom do not mix.

The newly established commission had a tremendous job ahead of it. It had to convert a gigantic enterprise from a temporary wartime operation to permanent operation of much greater scope. The Manhattan District was a wartime project set up to produce the atomic bomb to shorten the war. This was its only purpose. And up to the time of the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission, the government operated the atomic production facilities behind a veil of total military secrecy. Now, however, the project would come under the scrutiny of Congress, in addition to the authority of the president. Henceforth, the commission would have to justify its work to congressional committees.

Congress quickly demonstrated its keen interest in embarking upon an extensive debate before confirming the nominees to the commission. The Senate took three months before taking final vote, in which they confirmed all five. But even while awaiting confirmation, the commission took full charge of the atomic program. The first thing they did was to analyze and survey the existing situation, and three months later they made a report to me. In this, their first report, I was advised that there were serious weaknesses

in the operation from the standpoint of national defense and security. The number of bombs was disappointing, and . . . [the bombs] we had were not assembled. The highly skilled civilians who had been trained to do the assembling had scattered to better paying jobs in private employment. The training of military personnel to perform the assembly operations was not yet completed. While there had been some test explosions at Bikini during 1946 for strategic purposes, the more advanced type of bomb on hand had yet to be tested. Furthermore, there were serious questions about the supply of raw uranium. Most of it at that time came from the Belgian Congo, and the demand exceeded the supply.

The first task, therefore, was to bring the entire production program on an even keel. This meant shutting down some facilities and pushing the work of others. Of course the reasons for these actions were not only highly technical, they were also reasons which the Russians would have given much to know. Senators and representatives were expressing concern about production, and some of them seemed to think that any kind of expansion of the atomic program, especially the weapons program, was worthwhile. Actually . . . in order to build a sound program for the future, it was more prudent, as the scientists and the military were advising, not to go all out in any one direction. The atomic program, furthermore, had to be geared to the needs of our foreign policy as well as of our national defense, and it was my responsibility as president to maintain a balance between these and other factors all the time.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had been set up by the Congress to keep a constant vigil on the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission. Senator Brien McMahon and Senator Bourke Hickenlooper, the Democratic and Republican senior members on this body, soon made themselves into specialists and, to a degree, special pleaders. I spent considerable time with Brien McMahon in late 1945 and 1946 while the work on atomic energy legislation was going on, and I was impressed by his grasp and understanding of the problems of atomic power. Then, when Senator Hickenlooper became chairman of the Joint Committee in January 1947, he and I held a number of constructive meetings in connection with his new duties.

It was not easy for some members of Congress to realize just how complex a thing they were dealing with. On one occasion, for instance, Senator Hickenlooper called the White House and said his committee urgently needed a certain highly classified document. He was quite sure they could not proceed unless they had it. I invited him to come over to see me, and when he came in I took him to the Cabinet Room, gave him the document,

and asked him to read it. The document was a long one, and about an hour and a half later the senator came back into my office. He was visibly shaken. "I now wish you hadn't given me this thing to read," he said. "I'd rather not have known anything about it." I said, "Now you see why this should not properly be brought before your committee."

The important point, however, is this: Regardless of who was chairman of the Joint Committee, McMahon or Hickenlooper, I dealt with him in the same open and frank manner. Party politics, so far as I was concerned, had no business in the atomic picture. I was glad to see that the members of the Joint Committee were most careful about observing strict atomic security. Still, there was always the risk that a public row would result in vital secrets getting out.

The Joint Committee was primarily concerned with atomic developments as such, and it was always pushing for more production. Some of its members tended to oversimplify the problem and took the position that all that was necessary to the program was for the military to tell the Atomic Energy Commission, "We want so many bombs," and then it would be up to the commission to deliver. But in addition to the fact that it was unwise to let the military have control in this way, it was impossible to schedule production on a military requisition basis. There was not enough raw material in sight to satisfy our needs. The bulk of the uranium available to us came then from the Belgian Congo. However, in 1944 we had made an agreement with the British that called for a combined effort to acquire as much uranium (and some other scarce materials) as possible. While the war was on we had no difficulties with the allocation of these materials. The entire nuclear program was then centered in the United States, and, except for negligible amounts, all uranium available to the British-American-Canadian combination was allocated to the United States. But after the war, arrangements had to be changed. The visiting scientists and technicians, who had now returned to their home countries, had set up facilities of their own, and they needed uranium for their experiments. In the meantime, our own needs had greatly increased.

After a period of negotiations with the British we reached a temporary agreement in July 1946 for an approximately equal division of all the uranium produced from the Belgian Congo between ourselves and the United Kingdom. By this division, however, the British were now getting more than they could put to any practical use, while we were left short. In order to correct this difficulty and in order to get a more proportionate distribution of this uranium, we reopened negotiations in late 1947, and the discussions

which followed were held in Washington. On January 7, 1948, the two countries reached a new agreement for a revised, but still temporary, allocation. This modus vivendi, as it was always referred to in later negotiations, now provided that all uranium produced in the Belgian Congo during 1948-49 should go to the United States. In addition to this, we were given an option on a portion of the British stockpile. In exchange for this major concession we agreed to disclose to the British nuclear data in nine specified areas of information, an agreement which was in keeping with the provisions and the spirit of the Atomic Energy Act. Information about atomic weapons was specifically excluded, and both countries promised that they would not pass any information on to any other country. A very minor exception was made for New Zealand because of the work done by New Zealand scientists on British atomic energy installations. . . .

At the end of the Atomic Energy Commission's first year of operation—on December 31, 1947—J. Robert Oppenheimer, chairman of the commission's General Advisory Committee, sent Truman a letter reporting on the commission's first year of work.

Here is Dr. Oppenheimer's letter reporting on their first year's work. . . .

My dear Mr. President:

. . . Our activity during this year reflects not only the sense of great importance which we attach to successful development of this field; it also reflects the difficulties with which the commission was faced in assuming its responsibilities, and the unsatisfactory state of its inheritance. We very soon learned that in none of the technical areas vital to the common defense and security, nor in those looking toward the beneficial applications of atomic energy, was the state of development adequate. Important questions of technical policy were undecided, and in many cases unformulated. Giant installations and laboratories were operating with confused purposes and with inadequate understanding of the importance and relevance of the technical problems before them. Our atomic armament was inadequate, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the tempo of progress was throughout dangerously slow. This state of affairs can in large measure be attributed to the long delays in setting up an atomic energy authority, and to the inevitable confusions of policy and of purpose which followed the termination of the war. The difficulties were increased by the fact that the wartime installations and laboratories, which served so well their primary function of developing atomic weapons for early military use, were in most cases not suited to continue the work as the nature of the technical problems altered, and as the transition from wartime

to peacetime operation changed the conditions under which rapid progress might be possible.

It has thus been our function to assist the Commission in formulating technical programs, both for the short and for the somewhat longer term. These programs are aimed in the main at three objectives:

- (1) The development, improvement and increase of atomic armament.
- (2) The development of reactors for a variety of purposes.
- (3) The support of the physical and biological sciences which in one way or another touch on the field of atomic energy.

As to the improvement of our situation with regard to atomic weapons, we are glad to report that the year has seen great progress, and that we anticipate further progress in the near future. From the beginning, we shared with the Commission an understanding of how dangerous complacency could be with regard to our work in this field. We have been much gratified at the establishment of Pacific proving grounds, where the performance of altered and improved weapons can be put to the test of actual proof and measurement. While much yet remains to be done, and while the long term program of atomic armament is only in its earliest beginning, we nevertheless believe that steps already taken to improve our situation, and others which will follow as time makes them appropriate, have gone very far toward establishing this activity on a sound basis.

Atomic reactors have many purposes. . . . This variety of purpose, the novelty of the field, and the relatively small number of men trained to work in it, makes substantial progress in the development of atomic reactors difficult to realize. Many steps have been taken by the Commission during the past year to encourage work in this field, to invite the participation of industry, to promote the completion and construction of promising specific designs, and to enlist the participation of qualified experts. Yet, it is the opinion of the Advisory Committee that much yet remains to be done, that new personnel and new talent must come to contribute, and that many years will elapse before our work in this field has the robustness and vigor which its importance justifies. . . .

In the support of basic science, we have welcomed the broad interpretation of its responsibilities which the Atomic Energy Commission has maintained. We studied in detail the proposals recently adopted for making certain radioactive isotopes available, primarily for biological and medical research, not only within this country, but abroad. We see in this a prudent but inspiring example of the extension to others of the benefits resulting from the release of atomic energy, an extension sure to enrich our knowledge and our control over the forces of nature. . . .

During the last year . . . we have been forced to recognize . . . how adverse the effect of secrecy, and of the inevitable misunderstanding and error which accompany it, have been on progress, and thus on the common defense and security. . . . Even in the fields of technology, in industrial applications, in

military problems, the fruits of secrecy are misapprehension, ignorance and apathy. It will be a continuing problem for the Government of the United States to reevaluate the risks of unwise disclosure, and weigh them against the undoubted dangers of maintaining secrecy at the cost of error and stagnation. Only by such reevaluation can the development of atomic energy make its maximum contribution to the securing of the peace, and to the perpetuation and growth of the values of our civilization.

We are, my dear Mr. President

Very sincerely yours [names of committee members] . . .

J.R. Oppenheimer, for the Committee

This was a most informative and provocative letter, and it raised, among other interesting points, the question of secrecy. My position on secrecy in connection with the military application of atomic power has always been the same. I have been uncompromisingly opposed to sharing or yielding atomic military secrets to any other government.

The Atomic Energy Commission was meticulous in providing me with information. Some of it was highly technical, so that I had to do considerable studying to come to grips with it. And of course I would never presume to pass judgment on technical opinions. But I always asked for all points of view, even on technical questions, before giving approval to any major decision. Under the law, I had to fix each year the amount of fissionable materials that should be produced in the following year. To reach a decision, I would have before me a joint recommendation from the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission. This was always highly secret, and exceptional precautions were taken to keep it secret. For example, in no document in my office, in the AEC, or anywhere in government, could anyone find the exact figure of the number of bombs in stockpile, or the number of bombs to be produced, or the amount of material scheduled for production. If anyone should happen to run across a document dealing with atomic weapons production, he will find either a cipher or a blank in the space where the actual figure should appear. The figure in question would be recorded on separate and detached pieces of paper safeguarded in a special way and of which only a bare minimum of copies exists.

While there were many problems of adjustment in those days among the several agencies interested in our atomic energy policies, they had no effect upon the continuity and perseverance in the research laboratories. One of the broad areas of research on which the laboratories had been working

from the very beginning was the hydrogen atom. When the atomic program first got under way during World War II, the scientists concentrated their immediate efforts on the "heavy elements"—especially uranium. During 1947 and 1948 we combined our emphasis on uranium and plutonium as sources of atomic power, but research on the "light elements," of which hydrogen is the most important, was carried on at the same time without letup or interruption.

It was in the year 1949 that many developments in the atomic nuclear field demanded our attention and many important decisions had to be made. By early 1949 the Atomic Energy Commission had succeeded in getting most of the "kinks" out of the atomic program, and we were moving forward in the whole area of atomic energy.

To aid me in resolving major questions of fact and policy, I called on a special committee of the National Security Council. This consisted of the secretary of state, Dean Acheson; the secretary of defense, Louis Johnson; and David Lilienthal, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. The first study I assigned to this committee had to do with our atomic energy relations with Great Britain, Canada, and other friendly nations. On February 10, 1949, when I gave the committee this assignment, we faced the problem of continuing cooperation with Great Britain despite the fact that the agreement under which we were operating would expire at the end of 1949. The special committee reported to me on March 2, 1949, with a recommendation that we make a new approach so as to bring as much atomic material and production as possible to the North American continent. This, the committee said, would mean that the three countries—the United States, Great Britain, and Canada—would draw together as closely as they had been joined in their wartime collaboration. I approved the recommendation that we try to reach such an arrangement, and also expressed to the committee my desire that before we undertook any negotiations with the British and Canadians we fully inform the key members of Congress of both parties about our intentions. . . .

Truman convened a meeting of key advisers and members of Congress at Blair House, across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House, on July 14, 1949.

. . . I proposed that we conclude a new agreement based on full partnership, subject to the terms of the Atomic Energy Act; this, I thought, could be done by having all available uranium brought to this country for

processing and storage. The British and Canadian scientists could then join their American colleagues to work with them. To overcome any complaints the British might have that they were being excluded from the atomic weapons field, we could arrange to have a number of our unassembled bombs placed in the British Isles. . . .

As was my custom, I adjourned the meeting without announcing a decision. I had listened to as many sides as possible, and now I had to draw my own conclusion. It seemed to me more important to maintain bipartisan support for the atomic program than to insist on a program which was opposed by strong elements in Congress, and I therefore instructed our delegation to the exploratory talks to be held in September to work for an arrangement that would not include the sharing of weapons data.

By the spring of 1949 we had [to] think of atomic weapons on a different scale. We now had a stockpile, but I wanted to know whether the weapons we had on hand and those that were planned were adequate in number and whether we were keeping up with technological progress. In July, I again called in the special committee of the National Security Council, telling them now to assess the rate of progress being made in our atomic program. There were many questions that needed study, and one of these was how we were now to distribute our defense dollar. Both the special committee of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considering how best to prepare ourselves militarily so as to keep our strength in balance and avoid weakness by overemphasizing one category of defense at the expense of another. As a result of my request, the special committee brought this important conclusion to me: that production of atomic weapons should be stepped up. At the same time, they recommended that the newly developed B-36 bomber be given a priority second only to atomic weapons, for the B-36 was designed as a long-range plane capable of delivering our new-type A-bomb on any target in the world. . . .

As far as the atomic program was concerned, I talked to the Atomic Energy Commission commissioners both individually and as a group. I talked to scientists and to military advisers. I called in foreign policy experts and heard their views. They were not always in accord, of course, but in my mind I was firmly committed to the proposition that, as long as international agreement for the control of atomic energy could not be reached, our country had to be ahead of any possible competitor. It was my belief that, as long as we had the lead in atomic developments, that great force would help us keep the peace. In all my dealings with the Atomic Energy Commission, I made it a practice

to conclude each discussion with the admonition that we must keep ahead. But our monopoly came to an end sooner than the experts had predicted. An atomic explosion took place in Russia in August 1949.

The intelligence experts had different opinions about it, but in general none of them had looked for the Russians to detonate any atomic device before 1952. Fortunately, the long-range detection system of the Air Force had become fully developed in early 1949, and it was through this network that we were able to learn, in surprising detail, that an atomic explosion, not under our control, had taken place. On September 3, 1949, one of the [Air Force] planes . . . collected an air sample that was decidedly radioactive, and the entire detection machinery at once went into high gear. The cloud containing the suspicious matter was tracked . . . from the North Pacific to the vicinity of the British Isles, where it was also picked up by the Royal Air Force, and from the first these developments were reported to me by the Central Intelligence Agency as rapidly as they became known.

Then the scientists went to work and analyzed the data. The Air Force specialists, the Atomic Energy Commission's experts, and consultants called in from universities went over the available information. Then a special committee [of scientists] . . . reviewed the findings. There was no room for doubt. Between August 26 and 29 an atomic explosion had been set off somewhere on the Asiatic mainland. General Hoyt Vandenberg, who as chief of staff of the Air Force responsible for the long-range detection program, reported these facts to me on September 21. I was surprised, of course, that the Russians had made progress at a more rapid rate than was anticipated. . . . The government of the United States was not unprepared for the Russian atomic explosion. There was no panic, and there was no need for emergency decisions. This was a situation that we had been expecting to happen sooner or later. To be sure, it came sooner than the experts had estimated, but it did not require us to alter the direction of our program. . . .

Truman summoned the chairman of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Senator Brien McMahon, and the ranking Republican member, Senator Bourke Hickenlooper, to the White House. Hickenlooper was out of town, so McMahon met alone with Truman, on September 22, 1949, and learned about the Soviet atomic bomb explosion. The next morning, September 23, Truman issued a public statement about the explosion. We have evidence, the statement read, that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the USSR. The explosion, the statement went on, emphasizes . . . the necessity for that

truly effective enforceable international control of atomic energy which this government and the large majority of the United Nations support.

One of the positive effects of this development was to spur our laboratories and our great scientists to make haste on hydrogen bomb research. By the early fall of 1949, development of the "super"—the thermonuclear or hydrogen—bomb had progressed to the point where we were almost ready to put our theories into practice. I believed that anything that would assure us the lead in the field of atomic energy development for defense had to be tried out, but a most complicated and baffling problem had arisen, and the alternatives were a long way from clear-cut.

The first problem was to decide how much of the Atomic Energy Commission's energies and resources should be devoted to an early test that might show us whether or not the H-bomb would work. In order to do this, uranium now going into A-bomb production would have to be diverted. But how far could a program now working so successfully (the uranium-plutonium process) be cut back for tests on a method that might fail? Everything pertaining to the hydrogen bomb was at this time still in the realm of the uncertain. It was all theory and assumption. Even the scientists and the commission were divided. And, in addition, the questions with which we were concerned related not only to matters of scientific knowledge but also to our defense strategy and our foreign policy. All of these had to be weighed. . . .

Truman discovered that the members of the Atomic Energy Commission were divided on the question whether to proceed with the development of the hydrogen bomb, and he asked the National Security Council special committee on atomic energy that he had set up in 1949 to advise him.

On January 31, 1950, at 12:30 p.m., the [members of the] special committee came to the White House with their report. It was a unanimous recommendation signed by all three members—Dean Acheson, Louis Johnson, and David Lilienthal, and the gist of their recommendation was this: that I should direct the Atomic Energy Commission to take whatever steps were necessary to determine whether we could make and set off a hydrogen weapon. Concurrently with this, the special committee recommended a reexamination of our foreign policy and our strategic plans, both diplomatic and military. I approved these recommendations and issued a public statement:

. . . I have directed the Atomic Energy Commission to continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or super-bomb.

Like all other work in the field of atomic weapons, it is being and will be carried forward on a basis consistent with the overall objectives of our program for peace and security.

This we shall continue to do until a satisfactory plan for international control of atomic energy is achieved. . . .

On February 24, about a month later, the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a recommendation to step up our program sharply by "immediate implementation of all-out development of hydrogen bombs and means for their production and delivery." The military chiefs were going on the assumption that the test of the H-bomb would be successful and that for this reason they recommended authorization to plan for full-scale production of facilities, equipment, and appropriate carriers.

I referred this proposal for examination to the special committee of the National Security Council, which made a thorough study of all phases of the situation and on March 9 brought me a detailed report. In this I was informed that, according to my directive of January 31 (to the Atomic Energy Commission), the scientists at Los Alamos had turned their maximum efforts to a research and development program that would enable us to test a thermonuclear weapon as soon as possible, and that they were now of the opinion that a test of the first step in the process could take place sometime in 1951. If the first test succeeded, then the entire process might be ready for testing by late 1952. The special committee reported that after a careful examination of all the facts it had been concluded that "there are no known additional steps which might be taken for further acceleration of the test program."

With these conclusions reached, it was now necessary to decide whether the Atomic Energy Commission should proceed with its plans for the production of materials needed for thermonuclear weapons on the assumption that the tests would be successful. There were many considerations involved, including the expense. The tests would cost an estimated \$95 million, and the diversion of parts of the U-235 bomb program would cost considerably more. The plants for the production [of] the main substance needed for the hydrogen bomb would take, even on a modest scale, \$200 million as a start. There would also be about \$100 million involved in development programs that were less directly related to the making of the bomb. It is obvious that a great many facts had to be studied in order to make a decision like this.

Still, it is the president's responsibility to draw all ideas and all the obtainable facts together and balance them. He cannot allow himself to be swayed in any one direction. He must balance the military with the foreign policy, and both with the nation's economy. Studying the report of the special committee, I had noted that the production facilities for one of the components could also be used for our current atomic program and in other fields of defense production. Thus there would not be a total loss even if it turned out that the process failed to work. This, however, was still the big "IF."

Later in 1950 and in early 1951, [the lead scientists on the hydrogen bomb project] . . . at Los Alamos made new discoveries that changed the picture. But in March 1950 it was still to be proved that the fusing of a light atom like hydrogen could be achieved. These were the circumstances at the time. Nevertheless, on March 10 additional emphasis was given to the H-bomb research by my declaring it to be "of the highest urgency," and I directed the commission to plan at once for quantity production. Then, once we knew that the H-bomb was feasible, production on it should get under way as soon as possible. As a result of this decision, the huge Savannah River project of the Atomic Energy Commission was started, and other expansions were made in the commission's plant facilities.

Meanwhile, the State Department policy planners and the planners in the Defense Department had been hard at work on the reevaluation of our objectives which I had asked them to make in the directive of January 31, and I received from the two departments a first draft of their conclusions on April 7.

The report [called NSC-68 and titled "United States Programs and Objectives for National Security] began with an analysis of the world situation. It pointed out that within the past thirty-five years the world had gone through two world wars, had seen two major revolutions, in Russia and in China, had witnessed the passing of five empires and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the French and the British. These events had basically altered the historical distribution of power until now there were only two major centers of power remaining, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The United States, the report continued, had its fundamental purpose clearly defined. The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States lists the aims of the American people in simple words that cannot be misunderstood: ". . . to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In short,

our fundamental aim was and is to assure the integrity and vitality of the free society we live in, a society that is based upon the dignity and worth of the individual.

The fundamental design of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is a world dominated by the will of the Kremlin. Whether we like it or not, this makes the United States the principal target of the Kremlin—the enemy that must be destroyed or subverted before the Soviets can achieve their goal. The danger spots in the situation were discussed, and close attention was given to the effect of Russian atomic strength, as it was likely to develop over the next few years. . . .

The power of the atom is of key importance in a search for a peaceful world. With its vast potentialities for power development, the atom can bring welfare and prosperity to a world at peace. On the other hand, in a world that is close to the brink of war as ours has been for the past few years, the atom's power in the wrong hands can spell disaster. In the right hands, however, it can be used as an overriding influence against aggression and reckless war, and for that reason I have always insisted that, within the resources of a balanced security system and a balanced economy, we stay ahead of all the world in atomic affairs.

The development of the hydrogen bomb was one direction in which we held our commanding lead. But we were also able to adapt the A-bomb to new uses, even to the point where it became possible to build atomic cannons, to put atomic warheads on guided missiles and atomic-powered units into submarines. As we were putting the atomic principle to new uses, however, we found it difficult to do the necessary testing at such remote places as Bikini and Eniwetok. In the summer of 1952, Gordon Dean, who had succeeded Lilienthal as Atomic Energy Commission chairman, came to me with a proposal that we set up a test site in the continental United States. He recommended a location in Nevada, some seventy miles north of Las Vegas, but he also told me that the few top government officials with whom this had been discussed had been most doubtful about the proposal. One of them told him flatly: "The people of the United States will never stand for shooting off A-bombs in this country." "Gordon," I asked, "if we set up this testing ground, will it really help our weapons program from the standpoint of time?" Dean assured me that it would. "Can this be done in such a way that nobody will get hurt?" I asked. Dean said that every precaution would be taken. I told him to go ahead. I suggested, however, that it might be well to do it without fanfare, and very quietly to advise the key officials in the area of the plans we had for the testing area.

By the end of 1952 twenty separate atomic detonations had been set off at the Nevada testing grounds on Yucca Flats, and a great number of different devices had been tested. Troops had been brought in to test defensive equipment and tactics, and several battalions of the Army were already equipped with new-type cannon capable of firing atomic shells. Furthermore, another important milestone in the development of the use of atomic power took place on June 14, 1952, when we laid the keel of the USS *Nautilus*, the first submarine and the first seagoing vessel of any kind to be operated by atomic power.

Meanwhile, the field of atomic energy for peacetime uses received continuous attention. On every occasion when Lilienthal, or later Gordon Dean, conferred with me, I asked for a report on research and industrial development efforts. Atomic energy can and should be turned into a power of vast benefit to humanity—unless, of course, men are foolish enough to let that power be turned to destruction. Among the peaceful developments of the period was the building of a reactor at Arco, Idaho, that could turn out more fissionable material than was put into it. That this experiment was successful should prove of the greatest importance for the future development of atomic power for peaceful uses. It means that the way had been cleared for uses of atomic power that will be economically feasible; it meant that “atoms for peace” could now be talked about as something real and not merely a hope.

Thermonuclear power developments were moving on, in spite of unavoidable delays by material shortages. A crucial test came off successfully in March 1951 at Eniwetok. This was a tremendously important event, for it proved that the scientific calculations were correct, and with that knowledge in hand it now became possible to make further definite plans. Major progress was made shortly thereafter at a planning conference at Princeton, New Jersey, in June 1951, where the most important idea that was presented had to do with a novel plan for producing the hydrogen bomb in quantity. On June 12 Gordon Dean brought me a full report of this meeting and of the program that was agreed upon. He said that if I approved this program now, we could expect our first full-scale thermonuclear test by early fall of 1952, and I took Dean's report with me for further study. A week later he got my approval to go ahead.

One complication with this H-bomb test that we did not anticipate at the time was the combination of weather and American politics. When the fall of 1952 rolled around and preparations seemed near completion, the Atomic Energy Commission called for a weather forecast for the Eniwetok test site so that they could fix the exact date for the test. The weather in that part of

the Pacific is such that in the fall only one or two days each month will give ideal conditions, and the best date for the test, it turned out, was November 1, only three days before the election. Gordon Dean came to me and said that he and some of the other Atomic Energy Commission commissioners felt that it might perhaps not be desirable to set off the first full-scale H-bomb test so near to the election date. They were of the opinion that the explosion would surely not remain a secret and that it might be judged a political maneuver. I asked Dean if he knew of any other suitable date and what it would cost to postpone the test shot. He told me. I then instructed him to forget politics and hold the test on whatever date weather conditions would be most favorable. I think he knew what my answer was going to be before he came, for more than once he had heard me say that political considerations should never be tolerated in the nation's atomic program.

The first test of a hydrogen bomb, which was set off on November 1, 1952, was a dramatic success. So powerful was the explosion that an entire island was blown away and a huge crater left in the coral. It was an awesome demonstration of the new power, and I felt that it was important that the newly elected president should be fully informed about it. And on the day after the election I requested the Atomic Energy Commission to arrange to brief President-elect Eisenhower on the results of the test as well as on our entire nuclear program.

At the time the new administration took over, the nation had been through nearly seven and a half years of the atomic age. We had invested \$7 billion in research and development in nuclear energy. By 1953 the nation had a stockpile of atomic bombs, together with the means for delivering these bombs to the target. It also had a growing arsenal of tactical weapons using atomic warheads, a submarine under construction powered by atomic energy, and a successfully tested hydrogen bomb and facilities for its production. By 1953 atomic energy had been applied successfully in the fields of medicine and biology, and research was being pushed still further for economically feasible peacetime uses. Furthermore, we had taken the leadership in proposing United Nations control of atomic power. In the interest of peace, we kept pressing for international control in the face of obstructive resistance of the Russians. . . .

In this list of atomic developments, I have put the peaceful uses and the military uses side by side. It is a matter of practical necessity in the kind of world in which we live today that we gave priority to security, but I have always had the profound hope that atomic energy would one day soon serve

its rightful purpose—the benefit of all mankind. I would have been more than happy if our plan for international control had been carried out and if all efforts of the world's scientists could have been bent toward finding ways and means to make the atom serve man's wants and needs. It will always remain my prayer that the world will come to look upon the atom as a source of useful energy and a source of important healing power, and that there will never again be any need to invoke the terrible destructive powers that lie hidden in the elements.

Year of Decisions, 523–544; *Years of Trial and Hope*, 2–16, 294–315

Foreign Aid

Lend-Lease, the British Loan, Food Aid, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, Point Four

Lend-Lease—postwar rehabilitation of Europe—a loan for the United Kingdom—food aid—the Famine Emergency Committee—“the warm heart of America”—the Truman Doctrine—the Turkish straits—communist insurgency in Greece—the British note—“I believe that we must assist free peoples”—the Marshall Plan—no time to lose—a policy directed “against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos”—the European Recovery Act—Point Four—“trying to figure out ways to make peace in the world”—helping underdeveloped nations to help themselves—the Technical Cooperation Administration—the strongest antidote to communism

On April 26, 1945—two weeks after he became president—Truman met with the director of the Bureau of the Budget, Harold Smith, to discuss appropriations for the Lend-Lease program.

We . . . took up the proposed Lend-Lease appropriations concerning which I had already had a talk with Leo Crowley, administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration. The amount suggested by Smith was slightly below that of the previous year, one reason being that resistance to Lend-Lease was growing in Congress. This was fostered by the isolationist bloc, which grew bolder as victory in Europe approached. The country was being flooded with isolationist propaganda under various guises, and many of us were apprehensive lest the isolationist spirit again become an important political factor.



Lend-Lease was intended to provide our allies with the weapons of war and the material necessary to supplement their own war production. Under broad interpretations of what constituted material, however, some supplies were diverted to civilian use and industrial rehabilitation, and this became one of the targets at which the critics aimed.

The original Lend-Lease Act was introduced in the House of Representatives and Senate on January 10, 1941. After hearings and debate, it was passed by both branches and signed by President Roosevelt on March 11, 1941. Thereafter it was extended twice, and on April 17, five days after I had become president, I signed the third extension. . . . Smith recalled that a Republican-sponsored amendment which would have prohibited the president from contracting for use of the Lend-Lease program for postwar relief, rehabilitation, or reconstruction had resulted in a 39–39 vote, and that I, as vice president, had cast the deciding vote which defeated the amendment. . . .

I understood that if we were to use Lend-Lease funds for rehabilitation purposes we would open ourselves to a lot of trouble with the Senate. However, Leo Crowley also recognized this fact and had suggested that a better way to handle rehabilitation would be to enlarge the Export-Import Bank so as to make funds available for that purpose and also to encourage more use of the International Bank. I explained Crowley's suggestion to Smith, with whom I then discussed the problem of making unilateral loans to foreign countries. Such loans . . . would lead to repercussions at home and might cause Allied suspicion of our moves. They might even provide Russia with an excuse, if she needed one, to undertake unilateral arrangements of her own. For these reasons, I was opposed to unilateral action in any field. Loans to some countries, however, were so essential to their survival that I felt it necessary to make them even at some risk that they would not be fully repaid. . . .

When the war in Europe came to an end on May 8, 1945, the administrators of Lend-Lease considered how to end this wartime measure.

Leo Crowley . . . and [Acting Secretary of State] Joseph C. Grew . . . came into my office . . . on May 8 and said that they had an important order in connection with Lend-Lease which President Roosevelt had approved but not signed. It was an order authorizing the Foreign Economic Administration and the State Department to take joint action to cut back the volume of Lend-Lease supplies when Germany surrendered. What they told me made good sense to me; with Germany out of the war, Lend-Lease should be

reduced. They asked me to sign it. I reached for my pen and, without reading the document, I signed it.

The storm broke almost at once. The manner in which the order was executed was unfortunate. Crowley interpreted the order literally and placed an embargo on all shipments to Russia and to other European nations, even to the extent of having some of the ships turned around and brought back to American ports for unloading. The British were hardest hit, but the Russians interpreted the move as especially aimed at them. Because we were furnishing Russia with immense quantities of food, clothing, arms, and ammunition, this sudden and abrupt interruption of Lend-Lease aid naturally stirred up a hornets' nest in that country. The Russians complained about our unfriendly attitude. We had unwittingly given Stalin a point of contention which he would undoubtedly bring up every chance he had. Other European governments complained about being cut off too abruptly. The result was that I rescinded the order. . . . It was perfectly proper and right . . . to plan for the eventual cutting off of Lend-Lease to Russia and to other countries, but it should have been done on a gradual basis which would not have made it appear as if somebody had been deliberately snubbed. . . .

With this situation in mind, I clarified the government's attitude. In a press and radio conference on May 23, I explained that the order behind Crowley's action was intended to be not so much a cancellation of shipments as a gradual readjustment to conditions following the collapse of Germany. I also made it clear that all allocations provided for by treaty or protocol would be delivered and that every commitment would be filled. . . .

The Russians were always inclined to be suspicious of every action taken by either Great Britain or the United States. . . . The sudden stoppage of Lend-Lease gave the Russians another chance to accuse the United States of trying to interfere with a three-power approach to peace at their expense. . . . The British also showed immediate signs of anxiety over the prospect of diminishing assistance from the United States after V-E Day. The chief point in the British arguments for continuation of Lend-Lease was based on a conversation between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt at their Quebec meeting on September 14, 1944. At that meeting, although President Roosevelt generalized on the willingness of the United States to give all possible aid to the British after Germany was overcome, he made no specific commitments other than those contained in the Lend-Lease Act. He and Churchill agreed, however, to set up an American committee . . . to consult with a British committee on the international financial position of Great Britain and the Lend-Lease arrangements for the empire. . . .

The British addressed an appeal to this committee, arguing that projected Lend-Lease appropriations would not cover the United Kingdom's needs. In addition to this appeal, Churchill on May 28 sent a telegram to Truman in which he asked that his agreement with President Roosevelt be honored and that the United Kingdom's needs be met.

Three days after he received Churchill's message, Truman got a letter from five congressmen asking that Lend-Lease policy be clarified. Truman responded that Lend-Lease would be used to make the United States' allies effective partners in the war against Japan, and that the need for Lend-Lease funds would be reviewed from time to time in view of changing war conditions. Lend-Lease, Truman assured the congressmen, would be used only for these war related purposes. For financing the postwar needs of countries needing assistance, he pointed to the Export-Import Bank. "I am, of course," he wrote, "in full agreement with you that the Lend-Lease Act does not authorize aid for purposes of postwar relief, postwar rehabilitation, or postwar reconstruction. . . ."

Since Truman believed the Export-Import Bank had an important role to play in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of war-damaged countries, he recommended that Congress expand its lending authority.

... I recommended an expansion of the Export-Import Bank. I suggested an increase of the bank's lending power to \$3.5 billion, which would make available an additional \$2.8 billion that could be loaned during the coming year. This amount, I believed, was sufficient for the needs that could reasonably be met during that period. Once we had some experience in lending this money in postwar Europe, I felt that we would be in a much better position to make an intelligent presentation to the Congress as to the needs of various European countries for financial aid. It was my plan to go to Congress with a request for funds that would be necessary to meet each year's needs rather than to make long-term commitments that would involve this country in obligations to finance a foreign country by making disbursements over a long period of time. . . . I felt that it was imperative, in dealing with the postwar requirements of Europe, that the United States develop a well-rounded coordinated policy rather than attempt to do an un-integrated job through a misuse of Lend-Lease. . . . I thought at the time that . . . [a European recovery program] could be handled on the basis of the information which could be sent to the Congress and reviewed year by year as economic conditions improved.

The story of Lend-Lease is a monument to the genius of Franklin Roosevelt. A president could no more get the Congress to make an outright loan

of \$42 billion to foreign countries, even to win a war, than he could fly to the moon, but Roosevelt accomplished the same thing through the idea of Lend-Lease. The money spent for Lend-Lease unquestionably meant the saving of a great many American lives. Every soldier of Russia, England, and Australia who had been equipped by Lend-Lease means to go into that war reduced by that much the dangers that faced our young men in the winning of it. We may never get the money back, but the lives we saved are right here in America. . . .

The United Kingdom's economy, dependent in large measure on trade within an extensive empire, was greatly weakened by World War II. This made the United Kingdom especially worried about the anticipated loss of Lend-Lease aid when the war ended, and its leaders were anxious to negotiate with the United States a program of financial assistance that would help them transition into a much-changed postwar international economy.

The British economy was seriously hurt by the loss of her foreign markets, on which she had always depended. We used Lend-Lease in part to offset Britain's economic plight. When the temporary arrangement of Lend-Lease was terminated at the end of the war—since it was a war measure—the country's economic difficulties became critical. . . . [Prime Minister Clement Attlee] and I exchanged letters dealing with postwar financial problems. Attlee was fully informed of the discussions I had had with Churchill [about the need to negotiate a postwar economic arrangement between the United States and United Kingdom following the ending of Lend-Lease]; nevertheless, it apparently came as a shock to the British government when on August 21 I directed that Lend-Lease should be closed out.

With the collapse of Japan on August 14 and the end of hostilities in the Pacific Theater, the purpose for which Lend-Lease had been adopted was at an end. Accordingly, on August 21, I announced that I had directed the Foreign Economic Administration to take steps immediately to discontinue all Lend-Lease operations and to notify the foreign governments receiving Lend-Lease of this action. The direction also ordered the cancellation of all outstanding contracts for Lend-Lease except where Allied governments were willing to agree to take them over or where it was in the interest of the United States to complete them.

Two days after the announcement, I held a press and radio conference at which questions were asked as to the reasons for the action in view of some published statements that it was a direct blow at the British government.

"That is not true at all," I said. "The reason is that the bill passed by Congress defined Lend-Lease as a weapon of war, and after we ceased to be at war it is no longer necessary. . . ." The next day, August 24, Attlee told the House of Commons that the termination of Lend-Lease had placed Great Britain in a "very serious financial position." He announced that the Earl of Halifax, Lord Keynes, and other British government experts were leaving for Washington to discuss the matter with United States officials. . . . [This] . . . same day Foreign Economic Administrator [Leo] Crowley emphasized that the discontinuance of Lend-Lease was not a matter of discretion with the president . . . and that the British . . . knew it had to end with the close of the war. . . .

From its inception in 1941 to the end of 1945, total Lend-Lease aid from this country to the Allies amounted to [just over] \$46 billion. . . . Tangible goods and services accounted for [slightly under] \$44 billion of the total, while the remainder was for use of production facilities in the United States, for transfer to federal agencies, and for other charges and expenses. . . . Great Britain and Russia together received ninety-four percent of all Lend-Lease aid, with Great Britain getting by far the larger share—sixty-nine percent. . . .

I had planned to discuss with the Russians at Potsdam some method of adjusting this huge account, but there was no opportunity except for some preliminary talks about it. The British, however, had all along been most anxious to discuss postwar financial matters, and at Potsdam Churchill proposed that such talks be held. I had agreed to this, and Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton went to London to help lay the ground work for such a conference. These discussions with Clayton were informal and preliminary to actual negotiations. . . . [John Maynard] Keynes, for the British, emphasized the handling of the accumulated balances of British currency frozen in various countries and the continuing problem of deficits after V-J Day. He explained that the balances were an obstacle to new borrowing and said the British believed that current sterling balances had to be made fully convertible through an adequate loan from the United States. Clayton told the British officials that American public opinion would probably support a line of credit of \$3 billion on liberal terms if a satisfactory over-all commercial policy agreement could be reached. Such an agreement, he said, would have to include elimination of the dollar pool and cover tariffs, cartels, quotas, discrimination, and other details. The State Department strongly supported Clayton's insistence at the outset on tying financial and commercial policy discussions together. We believed that international finance and trade were

inextricably meshed and that the only chance of making a really satisfactory credit arrangement was to provide financial assistance for two or three years of transition and agree upon trade arrangements that would make for the sort of economic world in which the British and other nations would be able to service their borrowings. Our delegation at the London discussions made it clear that the British should not expect to obtain financial assistance in the form of free grants, but that the United States was prepared to extend liberal credits on moderate terms.

The so-called "United States-United Kingdom Economic Negotiations" were initiated in Washington on September 11. . . . From the beginning . . . there was general agreement that the United States must furnish substantial aid to Great Britain in order to enable the latter nation to base its foreign economic policy on a multilateral basis rather than upon a sterling bloc arrangement. There was no agreement, however, on (1) the facts of the British position, (2) the amount of the line of credit which the United States should offer in order to improve this position, (3) the terms of repayment on which the line of credit should be offered, and (4) the other terms that should be tied to the credit. . . .

Over two months of negotiations, conducted largely at the committee level, followed the opening sessions of the conference. The two sides could not agree on the degree of seriousness of the United Kingdom's financial position, and they could not agree either on the amount of the loan which the United States would extend to the United Kingdom. The British side insisted on a loan of at least \$5 billion, the American side was not willing to go that high.

After protracted negotiations the American delegation agreed on a figure of \$3.5 billion as a fair minimum and \$4 billion as a maximum to be offered. It was in the final stages of the conference that I decided upon a figure half-way between these two positions—\$3.75 billion. Although Lord Keynes had written Secretary [of the Treasury] Vinson that the United Kingdom "could not successfully implement the clauses" most desired by the United States in the final agreements with less than \$4 billion, the British delegation accepted \$3.75 billion when it became apparent that we would go no higher. . . .

At the close of the Anglo-American financial talks there was some misgiving expressed on both sides of the Atlantic. There was criticism that the loan was insufficient and criticism that it was extravagant, and Uncle Sam was cartooned both as Santa Claus and as Shylock. It was a transaction that

called for a good deal of understanding of all the factors involved, and it represented a crucial stage in British-American relations, particularly in so far as public opinion on both sides was concerned.

The significance of these financial agreements, as I mentioned in my State of the Union message to the Congress on January 21, 1946, was that they would contribute to easing the transition problems of one of our major partners in the war. My view was that, in the long run, our economic prosperity and the prosperity of the whole world were best served by the elimination of artificial barriers to international trade, whether in the form of unreasonable tariffs or tariff preferences or commercial quotas or embargoes on the restrictive practices of cartels.

On January 30, in a special message to the Congress, I urged prompt passage of the required legislation to make available the funds necessary to extend the line of credit to Great Britain. I defined the position of the financial agreement as one more achievement in carrying out the spirit of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, which the 79th Congress had passed and which President Roosevelt had called "the cornerstone for international economic co-operation."

The British loan bill reached my desk on July 15, 1946. I signed it into law on that date, with the statement that "the loan serves our immediate and long-range interests by helping to restore world trade. At the same time, it enables Great Britain to cooperate in creating a pattern of mutually beneficial economic relations among the nations of the world." I made it clear that this agreement between the United States and Great Britain was in no way directed against any other country. The system of trade we sought was open on the same fair terms to all the United Nations.

One of the most serious challenges facing the United States in the aftermath of World War II was helping the countries of Europe and Asia whose ability to produce and import food had been impaired by the war.

... Our position of world leadership brought with it new responsibilities and staggering obligations, and it was up to us to manage our affairs at home so that our foreign policy could be conducted on the broad scope required to help shape the future peace of the world.

Among the many things that demanded urgent attention was the world's great need for food. It was this problem that I had in mind when I reported by radio to the American people on conditions abroad. "Europe today is hungry," I said. . . . "As the winter comes on, the distress will increase. Unless

we do what we can to help, we may lose next winter what we won at such terrible costs last spring. Desperate men are liable to destroy the structure of their society to find in the wreckage some substitute for hope. If we let Europe go cold and hungry, we may lose some of the foundations of order on which the hope for worldwide peace must rest."

That was the literal truth. It had been apparent since early spring that growing needs for food by the people in the ruined countries of Europe, the growing consumption by the armed forces, and a threatened shortage in the crops at home would call for drastic action.

One of the first steps I had taken in an effort to coordinate all activities of the various government agencies affecting the food supply produced or conserved in the homes of America was to appoint a director of Home Food Supply. . . . To bolster the work of this new office, I had appealed directly to the American people on June 2, [1945,] for greater home production and for greater conservation of food so that we could allocate more to help feed the hungry millions of Europe. I had also combined the War Food Administration with the department of agriculture in order to make more effective the use of existing machinery in carrying out the food program. In order to get as many facts as possible, I had called upon the services of experts to study the problem of feeding Europe and to make recommendations. Foremost among these was former President Herbert Hoover, who had done such a remarkable job in food relief after World War I. I invited President Hoover to visit the White House, his first call there since 1932 [1933], and in a pleasant meeting on May 28 he gave me some very constructive ideas. . . .

Evidence of an impending food crisis in Europe had been coming to me in reports from our own people abroad, and in messages—many tragically urgent—from the leaders of other countries. England, Belgium, and other countries that had for many years depended largely on imports to feed their crowded populations were now in worse straits than they had ever been before. Much of their agricultural production had been either destroyed or made idle by the war. They had lost much of the shipping which, in former years, had enabled them to bring food products from abroad, and their foreign exchange balances had been depleted by military requirements and the enormous reduction in their exports. . . .

The meat situation in our own country had become so tight in the spring of 1945 that the amounts available to civilians in our urban areas had actually dropped below the British per capita consumption. Nevertheless, in order to supply the most urgent needs of France and Belgium, I arranged to have fifty million pounds of meat shipped to them. . . .

It would have been better for all concerned if the problem could have been entrusted to a world-wide organization. But the United Nations Organization was only then being fashioned, and in this formative stage it could not be expected to assume that responsibility.

The role of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration—UNRRA—was negligibly small in Western Europe, although it was doing a big job in Greece. A major difficulty was that when UNRRA had been established . . . in 1943 its purpose was not clearly defined. While it was organized to meet the needs of countries unable to provide their own relief and rehabilitation, there was no fixed limit of the field of rehabilitation into which UNRRA was entitled to go. And there was no clear distinction as to the scope and functions of its combined food boards. In addition to this, congressional appropriations for use by UNRRA were delayed and, with the United States being the largest financial supporter of the organization, its operations were obviously limited until funds could be made available.

On October 16, 1945, . . . an organization specifically designed to cope with the international food problem [was established]. This was the Food and Agriculture Organization, which was set up to gather and evaluate information on the known needs of people for food and to link that with the means for satisfying those needs. Basically, however, its function was an educative one, and the burden of doing something concrete about the starving populations of Europe still rested on the United States. . . .

Despite the preparations that the United States made in 1945 in an effort to avert a world food crisis, the threat of famine became almost global during the ensuing winter. More people faced starvation and even death for want of food during the year following the war than during all the war years combined. America enjoyed a near record production of food and a record crop of wheat, but the wheat crops of Europe and North Africa and the rice crops of the Far East proved to be much shorter than anticipated. Not only the disruption of war but also extreme droughts in many parts of the world created a food crisis that gave promise of being the worst in modern times.

Information we had showed that, while Americans were living on a diet of about 3,300 calories per person per day, more than 125 million Europeans were subsisting on less than 2,000 a day, and in some parts of Europe large groups were sometimes able to obtain no more than 1,000 calories. World food production per capita was about twelve percent below prewar production. In Europe, however, it was about twenty-five percent below normal, and in Japan only fractionally better.

In many parts of . . . [Asia] the situation was even more critical than in the worst areas of Europe. In the Philippines production declined even more than in Japan. We were actually shipping sugar to the Philippines, which normally exports large quantities of it. In India and the Far East, where ninety-five percent of the world's rice is normally produced, production was fifteen percent below normal because of drought and the cumulative effects of war. The greatest reduction was in Burma, Siam, and in Indochina, the world's largest exporter of rice. . . .

On January 4, 1946, British Prime Minister Attlee cabled Truman that unless wheat-producing countries exported to needy countries in Europe and Asia the maximum quantities of wheat that could be spared, there was danger of widespread famine. A month later, Attlee sent Truman a long message in which he presented a very grim picture of the hardships the British people were facing because of the dearth of food in the coming year and beyond. He also warned that India might suffer famine. He thanked Truman for all the United States was doing to help his country, but asked if still more could be done to help the United Kingdom, India, and many other needy countries. The world will pass through a period of great strain and hardship before we see the next harvest, Attlee wrote. I fear that thousands may die of starvation and many more thousands may suffer severely from hunger. . . .

On February 6, Truman announced a nine-point emergency program intended to prevent mass starvation. The program included measures to reduce American consumption of wheat and other grains, to facilitate the shipment of wheat and other essential foods to destinations where they were most needed, and to increase the export of meat, dairy products, and fats and oil.

Attlee sent Truman a message expressing his and his country's gratitude shortly after Truman announced his emergency program, but a few weeks later he wrote Truman that the cereal situation had become worse, and that the shortage of rice was as serious as that of wheat. He asked that the United States increase production of rice and reduce consumption.

In the light of . . . [Attlee's] appeal, I decided to ask a number of distinguished citizens to serve on a Famine Emergency Committee, and I was glad when former President Herbert Hoover consented to act as honorary chairman of the group. Along with twelve other members of the newly organized committee, Hoover met with me at the White House on March 1, [1946,] to discuss the food situation. . . . I told the group that I thought it was the most important meeting we had held in the White House since

I had been president. Mr. Hoover said that famine had always been the inevitable aftermath of war. The last great reservoir from which starvation could be halted, he pointed out, was in the United States, and he expressed confidence that the American people would respond to this great obligation again, as they had done after World War I. I asked . . . [him] if he could arrange to go at once to make a detailed study of conditions in the famine areas of the world, and he said he could.

The most immediate need was for wheat to be shipped to Western Europe to tide those countries over until their own harvests began to come in. On April 9, the Famine Emergency Committee advised me that the crisis was more severe than when the committee had first met with me. Loadings of wheat in the first quarter of the year had fallen 313,000 tons below the goal of three million tons which had been set. Another report from the secretary of agriculture informed me that bread consumption in the United States was continuing at a high rate. Another fact was that, while feeding of wheat to livestock showed some reduction, it still continued at a considerable rate in spite of efforts made thus far to cut it to a minimum. It was clear that, unless effective measures were taken promptly to get wheat moving off the farms and to check its domestic consumption for bread and for feed, the United States would fall lamentably short of its goal for helping to feed the famine countries.

Additional difficulties in coping with the food problem were posed by the development of black markets. But I was certain that if we could get all the facts to the American people so that they would understand how buying from the black market was taking food from the starving, they would end such operations of their own volition. Strikes in industries which affected the production and transportation of food supplies also complicated the famine relief program, and here again I felt that an educational program on the part of the government would go far in persuading labor and management to make extraordinary efforts to compose their differences.

While I approved the enforcement of stricter measures to increase the availability of food exports, I put the greatest emphasis on the importance of the personal responsibility of every citizen for food conservation and for cooperation on the part of the people of the United States in overcoming the famine situation around the world. . . .

. . . I felt that a nationwide radio appeal was necessary, and I decided to make it on April 19. . . . I said in part:

It is my duty to join my voice with the voices of humanity everywhere in behalf of the starving millions of human beings all over the world. We have a high responsibility, as Americans, to go to their rescue.

I appointed the Famine Emergency Committee to make sure that we do all we can to help starving people. . . . We cannot doubt that at this moment many people in the famine stricken homes of Europe and Asia are dying of hunger.

America is faced with a solemn obligation. Long ago we promised to do our full part. Now we cannot ignore the cry of hungry children. Surely we will not turn our backs on the millions of human beings begging for just a crust of bread. The warm heart of America will respond to the greatest threat of mass starvation in the history of mankind.

Truman put several measures intended to increase the production of wheat and reduce its domestic consumption into immediate effect. He also announced that the government would purchase oats and oatmeal and export them.

. . . On May 13, Mr. Hoover returned from his 35,000-mile trip around the world with his report on the food needs of twenty-two famine-ridden countries. The dominant need of the world, his report showed, was still cereals, particularly wheat and rice. The world grain deficit, he was able to report, had been reduced from the eleven million tons which had been the estimate at the beginning of his tour to 3.6 million tons, but the survey showed that only constant effort could prevent mass starvation. Hoover's report outlined a country-by-country, month-by-month minimum program of required cereal imports to the deficit and famine areas from May 1 to September 30, 1946, which was invaluable to me in planning the measures that had to be taken for the months ahead. And, too, Mr. Hoover accepted my proposal that he round out his worldwide survey by going to South America as our "food ambassador" to enlist the support of the Latin republics in the universal emergency.

These combined efforts on the part of government administrators, transportation companies, food producers and handlers, and American consumers paid off. By June 27, I was able to announce to the public that in six months the United States had shipped over 5.5 million tons of bread grains to help feed the hungry people of other lands. Three weeks later we met our half year goal of six million tons. There had been no mass starvation, but I felt compelled to warn the nation that the crisis was not past by any means. Europe was facing another winter, and it was not expected that her harvests would have much effect on the general food situation. The chief hope for survival there still seemed to depend upon America's ability and willingness

to produce enough for the people of every country not yet recovered from the aftermath of war. . . .

In late 1945 and early 1946, President Truman became aware of apparent Soviet designs on parts of the world which had for a long time been regarded as in the British area of interest. Trouble first appeared in Iran, a country which had served as a supply route to the Soviet Union during the war. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union had all had troops in Iran during the war. Just after the war ended, in September 1945, the foreign ministers of the three countries agreed at their meeting in London that all foreign troops would be withdrawn from Iran by six months following the war's end—that is, by March 2, 1946. But as the months went by, the Soviet Union increasingly appeared intent on keeping some troops in Iran indefinitely, and it was encouraging a separatist movement in the north of the country. Truman asked Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to send to Moscow a note which would, as Truman describes it in his memoirs, make it very plain that we did not like the way Russia was behaving in Iran. . . . Moscow did not respond, and Truman's worries about Soviet designs on Iran's oil fields and on one of Iran's neighbors, Turkey, grew, as did his concern that Soviet behavior might undermine the creation of a regime of international cooperation and international law which Truman felt was essential to the maintenance of peace. Finally, on March 24, the Soviet Union announced that all its troops would be withdrawn from Iran at once.

Truman's attention turned to Turkey and Greece, informed by his growing doubt about the intentions of the Soviet Union with respect to those two countries.

The Russians would press wherever weakness showed—and we would have to meet that pressure wherever it occurred, in a manner that Russia and the world would understand. When communist pressure began to endanger Greece and Turkey, I moved to make this policy clear and firm. . . . [These two countries] had become subjected to heavy pressures from the Russian bloc. Each of them had valiantly sought to repel these pressures, but now their strength was waning and they were in need of aid.

Turkey was, of course, an age-old objective of Russian ambitions. The communists were only continuing what the czars had practiced when they tried to gain control of the area that blocked Russian exit into the Mediterranean Sea. Stalin had brought up the subject of the Dardanelles at the Potsdam conference. But [British Prime Minister Clement] Attlee and I had stuck firmly by the principle that had been laid down in the Montreux Convention, that the straits should be open to the commercial shipping of

all nations. For that reason, nothing more was done about this subject at Potsdam, except to agree that each of the powers might discuss the subject directly with Turkey. This was entirely appropriate since the . . . [Montreux Convention], by its terms, was up for review in 1946.

Our ideas on the revision of these terms were transmitted to the Turkish government in a note on November 2, 1945. We informed the Turks that we would wish any revision to conform to three principles: (1) The straits to be open to the merchant vessels of all nations at all times; (2) the straits to be open to the transit of warships of the Black Sea powers at all times; (3) save for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace, passage through the straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times, except with the specific consent of the Black Sea powers or except when acting under the authority of the United Nations. Copies of this note were sent to the Soviets—who made no reply—and to the British, who followed with a similar statement to the Turkish government.

The Soviet Union had quite different ideas regarding the revision of the treaty.

. . . In July 1946, Moscow sent a note to Ankara proposing a new regime for the Dardanelles that would have excluded all nations except the Black Sea powers. In other words, both we and the British would have been eliminated from any future agreement, and Turkey would have been faced by a combination of three communist states: Russia, Romania, and Bulgaria. The second and far more ominous part of the Soviet proposal was that the straits should be put under joint Turkish-Russian defense. This was indeed an open bid to obtain control of Turkey. If Russian troops entered Turkey with the ostensible purpose of enforcing joint control of the straits, it would only be a short time before these troops would be used for the control of all of Turkey. We had learned from the experience of the past two years that Soviet intervention inevitably meant Soviet occupation and control. To allow Russia to set up bases in the Dardanelles or to bring troops into Turkey, ostensibly for the defense of the straits, would, in the natural course of events, result in Greece and the whole Near and Middle East falling under Soviet control. . . .

The Turkish government sought the advice of the American government. Truman put the matter before his defense and foreign policy advisers, who recommended that the United States take a strong position, and Truman approved this recommendation. The United States coordinated its position with the British and French, and all three governments conveyed their views and their strong support

to Turkey, which subsequently rejected the Soviet demands. Truman and his advisers knew, though, that the Soviet Union would renew its attempt to encroach on Turkey's sovereignty. They believed too that Turkey's economy and military were both too weak to allow it to stand up for long to a determined attempt by the Soviet Union to have its way. The United States ambassador to the Soviet Union, Walter Bedell Smith, advised Truman that unless the United States and the United Kingdom provided aid to Turkey, it could not survive.

Turkey's neighbor to the west, Greece, was also in jeopardy. During the war, two main resistance groups had fought against German and Italian invasion and occupation. One, the National Liberation Front (EAM), was dominated by the Greek Communist Party; the other was composed of centrist and rightist groups and was supported by the United Kingdom. When Greece was liberated in September 1944, the government-in-exile returned to power with British support. EAM forces were largely defeated in battle in December 1944, but some of the communist forces escaped to the northern hills and their strength grew until they were able, by 1946, to wage war against the Greek government. The country, barely emerged from world war, lapsed into civil war.

The communists . . . thrived on the continuing conditions of misery, starvation, and economic ruin. Moscow and the Balkan satellite countries were now rendering open support to the EAM. Intelligence reports which I received stated that many of the insurgents had been trained, indoctrinated, armed, and equipped at various camps beyond the Greek borders. Under Soviet direction, the reports said, Greece's northern neighbors—Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania—were conducting a drive to establish a communist Greece.

What little stability and order could be found in Greece was due primarily to the presence there of forty thousand British troops and to the counsel and support given to the Greek government by the British. But as early as the fall of 1945 the British had suggested to us that they would like our assistance in Greece, especially financial help to the Greek government. I had authorized the State Department to enter into discussions with the British on terms of economic aid to Greece, but we were also anxious to assure that conditions in Greece would justify any loans which might be granted. . . .

Conditions in Greece did not improve and the United Kingdom's financial position deteriorated. Truman soon found himself confronted with a crisis in an extremely important area of the world.

On February 3, [1947,] a cable to the State Department from Ambassador [Lincoln] MacVeagh in Athens reported rumors that the British

would withdraw their troops from Greece, or at least a sizable part of them. On February 12, Secretary of State Marshall brought me a dispatch from MacVeagh urging that we give immediate consideration to supplying aid to Greece. The British, the ambassador reported, were not able to keep up even the little they were doing. . . . On February 20, our embassy in London reported that the British Treasury was opposing any further aid to Greece because of the precarious financial condition in which Britain found herself.

But the crisis came sooner than we expected. In the late afternoon on Friday, February 21, the British ambassador asked to see . . . [Secretary of State] Marshall. However, he was out of town. . . . An appointment was made for Monday, and the state department obtained from the British Embassy a copy of the official note which the ambassador would deliver to Marshall. The note informed us that Britain would have to pull out of Greece no later than April 1. [Acting Secretary of State Dean] Acheson telephoned me immediately about the contents of the note, and I asked him to go to work on a study of the situation with which we were faced. Acheson alerted the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, and over the weekend they prepared a memorandum of recommendations of what ought to be done.

On Monday, February 24, . . . Marshall brought me the official copy of the note which he had received formally that morning from the British ambassador. This note set forth the difficulties confronting the United Kingdom in the fulfillment of her overseas commitments and advised us that as of March 30, 1947, it would be necessary for the United Kingdom to withdraw all support to Greece. Marshall and I discussed the impending crisis with . . . [Secretary of the Navy] James V. Forrestal and [Secretary of War Robert P.] Patterson, and the three departments pressed their study of all aspects of the situation. In his talk with the British ambassador, . . . Marshall learned that the British were planning to take their troops out of Greece as soon as this could be conveniently done.

The urgency of the situation was emphasized by dispatches from our representatives in Athens and Moscow. . . . [Ambassador] Smith recorded his belief that only the presence of British troops had so far saved Greece from being swallowed into the Soviet orbit. From Athens, Ambassador MacVeagh sent a picture of deep depression and even resignation among Greek leaders; their feeling seemed to be that only aid given at once would be of use. Time, MacVeagh urged, was of the essence. . . .

Truman received the formal advice of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 26. It confirmed the views

that Truman had formed himself as he had read the messages and reports regarding Greece that had come across his desk in recent days.

Greece needed aid, and needed it quickly and in substantial amounts. The alternative was the loss of Greece and the extension of the iron curtain across the eastern Mediterranean. If Greece was lost, Turkey would become an untenable outpost in a sea of communism. Similarly, if Turkey yielded to Soviet demands, the position of Greece would be extremely endangered. But the situation had even wider implications. Poland, Romania, and the other satellite nations of Eastern Europe had been turned into communist camps because, in the course of the war, they had been occupied by the Russian Army. We had tried, vainly, to persuade the Soviets to permit political freedom in these countries, but we had no means to compel them to relinquish their control, unless we were prepared to wage war. Greece and Turkey were still free countries being challenged by communist threats both from within and without. These free peoples were now engaged in a valiant struggle to preserve their liberties and their independence. America could not, and should not, let these free countries stand unaided. To do so would carry the clearest implications in the Middle East and in Italy, Germany, and France. The ideals and the traditions of our nation demanded that we come to the aid of Greece and Turkey and that we put the world on notice that it would be our policy to support the cause of freedom wherever it was threatened. The risks which such a course might entail were risks which a great nation had to take if it cherished freedom at all. The studies which Marshall and Acheson brought to me and which we examined together made it plain that serious risks would be involved. But the alternative would be disastrous to our security and to the security of free nations everywhere.

What course the free world should take in the face of the threat of Russian totalitarianism was a subject I had discussed with my foreign policy advisers on many occasions in the year just passed. . . . A president has little enough time to meditate, but whenever such moments occurred I was more than likely to turn my thoughts toward this key problem that confronted our nation. We had fought a long and costly war to crush the totalitarianism of Hitler, the insolence of Mussolini, and the arrogance of the warlords of Japan. Yet the new menace facing us seemed every bit as grave as Nazi Germany and her allies had been.

I could never quite forget the strong hold which isolationism had gained over our country after World War I. Throughout my years in the Senate I

listened each year as one of the senators would read Washington's Farewell Address. It served little purpose to point out to the isolationists that Washington had advised a method suitable under the conditions of his day to achieve the great end of preserving the nation, and that although conditions and our international position had changed, the objectives of our policy—peace and security—were still the same. For the isolationists this address was like a biblical text. . . . I had a very good picture of what a revival of American isolationism would mean for the world. After World War II it was clear that without American participation there was no power capable of meeting Russia as an equal. If we were to turn our back on the world, areas such as Greece, weakened and divided as a result of the war, would fall into the Soviet orbit without much effort on the part of the Russians. The success of Russia in such areas and our avowed lack of interest would lead to the growth of domestic communist parties in such European countries as France and Italy, where they were already significant threats. Inaction, withdrawal, "Fortress America" notions could only result in handing to the Russians vast areas of the globe now denied to them.

This was the time to align the United States of America clearly on the side . . . of the free world. I knew that George Washington's spirit would be invoked against me, and Henry Clay's, and all the other patron saints of the isolationists. But I was convinced that the policy I was about to proclaim was indeed as much required by the conditions of my day as was Washington's by the situation in his era and Monroe's doctrine by the circumstances which he then faced. . . .

The vital decision that I was about to make was complicated by the fact that Congress was no longer controlled by the Democratic Party. While expecting the help of such fine supporters of the idea of bipartisanship in foreign affairs as Senator Vandenberg and Congressman Eaton of New Jersey, I realized the situation was more precarious than it would have been with a preponderantly Democratic Congress. It seemed desirable, therefore, to advise the congressional leadership as soon as possible of the gravity of the situation and of the nature of the decision which I had to make. I asked Marshall and Acheson to return the following day at ten, when I would have the congressional leaders present.

At ten o'clock on the morning of February 27, Senators [Styles] Bridges, [Arthur H.] Vandenberg, [Alben] Barkley, and [Tom] Connally, Speaker [Joseph] Martin, and Representatives [Charles A.] Eaton, [Sol] Bloom, and [Sam] Rayburn took their seats in my office. . . . I explained to them the

position in which the British note on Greece had placed us. The decision of the British Cabinet to withdraw from Greece had not yet been made public, and none of the legislators knew, therefore, how serious a crisis we were suddenly facing. I told the group that I had decided to extend aid to Greece and Turkey and that I hoped Congress would provide the means to make this aid timely and sufficient. Marshall then reviewed the diplomatic exchanges and the details of the situation. He made it quite plain that our choice was either to act or to lose by default, and I expressed my emphatic agreement to this. I answered congressional questions and finally explained to them what course we had to take.

The congressional leaders appeared deeply impressed. Some in the group were men who would have preferred to avoid spending funds on any aid program abroad. Some had, not so long ago, been outspoken isolationists. But at this meeting in my office there was no voice of dissent when I stated the position which I was convinced our country had to take.

During the days that followed, state department experts busied themselves with different aspects of the situation. The economic offices sought to estimate how much aid the Greek economy would need and could effectively use. The political officers were engaging in consultations with British, Greek, and Turkish representatives. The legal officers were preparing drafts of the necessary legislation. Other departments, too, were giving top-level attention to the Greek problem. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, in particular, participated actively and had several lengthy conversations with Dean Acheson. It was the latter, however, as Under Secretary of State, who co-ordinated the planning being done. General Marshall was due to leave for Moscow shortly and was concentrating on plans for the foreign ministers' conference there.

I had to absent myself from Washington for several days on a state visit. . . . On my return to the capital in the late hours of March 6, I received a full report of all developments, including those affecting the Greek situation. The Greek government had formally asked for American aid. . . . [I decided to] go before Congress at the earliest moment to ask for the aid which Greece—and Turkey—so desperately needed.

There was much to be done and little time to do it. One of the first things was to place the matter before the Cabinet. A meeting was scheduled for March 7, and the greater part of it I devoted to a review of the Greek situation. I told the Cabinet of the decision to send aid to Greece and asked their advice on the best way to do it. Acheson outlined the problem that confronted us. He reviewed the role the British had played and what their

withdrawal would mean. He informed the Cabinet, however, that the British had agreed to continue some support of the Greek government for another three months. I explained the proposed request to Congress for the sum of \$250 million for Greece and \$150 million for Turkey but that I realized that this would be only the beginning. There was general agreement. Secretary of Labor [Lewis B.] Schwellenbach had some misgivings of a political nature: He suspected that anti-British elements at home might charge that we were "again" pulling British chestnuts out of the fire. Several members of the Cabinet stressed the need for governmental reform in Greece. There was considerable discussion on the best method to apprise the American people of the issues involved. On this last point, I asked Secretary of the Treasury [John W.] Snyder to head a committee to make recommendations to me. This group . . . met the next day. . . . [It] recommended that, in order to emphasize the gravity of the situation, I appear in person before a joint session of the Congress.

I had already invited a group of [fourteen] congressional leaders to meet in my office on March 10. . . . Dean Acheson was also present, and for two hours he and I discussed the Greek situation with the lawmakers. Vandenberg expressed his complete agreement with me. I answered questions by the congressmen similar to those asked at the first meeting. There was no opposition to what had to be done.

The drafting of the actual message which I would deliver to the Congress had meanwhile been started in the State Department. The first version was not at all to my liking. The writers had filled the speech with all sorts of background data and statistical figures about Greece and made the whole thing sound like an investment prospectus. I returned this draft to Acheson with a note asking for more emphasis on a declaration of general policy. The department's draftsmen then rewrote the speech to include a general policy statement, but it seemed to me half-hearted. The key sentence, for instance, read, "I believe that it should be the policy of the United States. . . ." I took my pencil, scratched out "should" and wrote in "must." In several other places I did the same thing. I wanted no hedging in this speech. This was America's answer to the surge of expansion of communist tyranny. It had to be clear and free of hesitation or double talk.

On Wednesday, March 12, 1947, at one o'clock in the afternoon, I stepped to the rostrum in the hall of the House of Representatives and addressed a joint session of the Congress. I had asked the senators and representatives to meet together so that I might place before them what I believed was an extremely critical situation. To cope with this situation, I recommended

immediate action by the Congress. But I also wished to state, for all the world to know, what the position of the United States was in the face of the new totalitarian challenge. This declaration of policy soon began to be referred to as the "Truman Doctrine." This was, I believe, the turning point in America's foreign policy, which now declared that wherever aggression, direct or indirect, threatened the peace, the security of the United States was involved.

...[This is what] I said to the Congress and to a nationwide radio audience:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

After I delivered the speech, the world reaction to it proved that this approach had been the right one. All over the world, voices of approval made themselves heard, while communists and their fellow travelers struck out at me savagely. The line had been drawn sharply. In my address, I had said that every nation was now faced with a choice between alternative ways of life:

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died.

We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

When I ended my address, the congressmen rose as one man and applauded. Vito Marcantonio, the American Labor party representative from

New York, was the only person in the hall who remained seated. Congress began the following day to work on legislation to put the program into effect. Meanwhile, members of my official family were busy rushing such aid and encouragement to Greece as I could provide without special congressional approval. Secretary [of the Navy] Forrestal, on my instructions, dispatched the aircraft carrier Leyte and nine other vessels on a visit to Greece as a token of our intention, hoping to persuade the British to stay on, at least until our aid to Greece became effective. . . .

Meanwhile, Congress debated the aid-to-Greece bill thoroughly and conscientiously. My hope that it would be passed before March 31 was not realized, but the Senate approved the legislation on April 22, and the House voted for it, 287 to 107, on May 9. On May 22, 1947, I signed the bill. With this enactment by Congress of aid to Greece and Turkey, America had served notice that the march of communism would not be allowed to succeed by default. . . .

The Greek communist rebels tried to gain victory before American aid could strengthen the Greek government forces, and they achieved considerable gains. The government position weakened and its prospects appeared gloomy. Truman contemplated sending a sizable naval force to Greek ports. American aid administrators in Greece discovered that the Greek government wanted to use American aid primarily to strengthen its military and was not interested in building up the country's economy or in making itself more attractive to the Greek people. Truman came to feel that the most serious task his administration faced in Greece—and in Europe generally—was how to bring people to perceive the problems they faced in a broad context, rather than in narrowly nationalistic or partisan political ones.

. . . By the time this problem came to beset us in Greece, General Marshall had already made his famous Harvard speech, out of which grew the Marshall Plan.

Never before in history has one nation faced so vast an undertaking as that confronting the United States of repairing and salvaging the victors as well as the vanquished. The complete surrender of the Axis powers did not bring any relaxation or rest for our people. They had to face and were ready to make whatever new sacrifices were necessary to insure the peace. [World War II] . . . was the most destructive of all wars. There were no battle fronts, and civilian populations were, unhappily, military targets as much as were the armed forces, because they were part of the industrial and economic centers involved in a total war. Attacks on industrial communities, the bombing

of transportation, utilities, and other facilities strained to the breaking point the economic life already drained by the voracious needs of the armed forces. Nations, if not continents, had to be raised from the wreckage. Unless the economic life of these nations could be restored, peace in the world could not be reestablished.

In the first two years that followed V-J Day the United States provided more than \$15 billion in loans and grants for the relief of the victims of war. We did everything humanly possible to prevent starvation, disease, and suffering. We provided substantial aid to help restore transportation and communications, and we helped rebuild wrecked economic systems in one major country after another. For the first time in the history of the world a victor was willing to restore the vanquished as well as to help its allies. This was the attitude of the United States. But one of our allies took the conqueror's approach to victory.

The Russians wanted \$20 billion in reparations, and I told them at Potsdam that we did not intend to pay the reparations bill as we had so largely done after World War I. That was the only way they could collect these reparations now, because the vanquished were prostrate. We would rather make grants for rehabilitation to our allies and even to former enemies. In contrast, the Russians, wherever they could, stripped the countries they occupied, whether friends or enemies, of everything that could be carried off. Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia are shining examples of the rewards that come for helping the ungrateful Russians. The assistance we gave, which averted stark tragedy and started progress toward recovery in many areas of the world, was in keeping both with the American character and with America's new historic responsibility. To help peoples in distress was not only a tradition of our country but was also essential to our security. By rebuilding Europe and Asia, we would help to establish that healthy economic balance which is essential to the peace of the world.

By 1947, however, after two years of substantial, though piecemeal, emergency assistance, it was apparent that an even larger and more comprehensive program was needed to achieve the rebuilding of the economy of Europe. Speed was essential, because the West now faced the increasing pressure of communist imperialism. And at the same time, I felt that no amount of American aid would lead Europe to lasting recovery unless the nations of Europe themselves could also help cure some of their own chronic economic ills. With this thought in mind, I was looking for some method that would encourage the peoples of Europe to embark upon some joint undertaking that would eventually lead to effective self help. . . . It seemed to me now

that our experience with the Greek-Turkish aid program gave us a basis for an approach to a plan of economic assistance to our ailing allies.

On March 12, 1947, I made a policy speech in which I sought to outline the position the United States would take wherever there were active threats to the independence and stability of free nations. A few days earlier, at Baylor University in Waco, Texas, I had expressed my belief that free world trade was an inseparable part of the peaceful world. I said, "Our foreign relations, political and economic, are indivisible. We cannot say that we are willing to cooperate in the one field and are unwilling to cooperate in the other." I cited the economic war of the 1930s, when nations strangled normal trade, depositors lost their savings, and farmers lost their lands. The lesson in history, I said, was plain: Freedom of international trade would provide the atmosphere necessary to the preservation of peace. My advisers were already at work seeking further practical ways to strengthen international cooperation in economic matters. We had sent food to Europe, but millions there still did not have enough to eat. We had made loans to the countries of Europe, but the war had so disrupted the patterns of trade and industry there that the amounts we loaned were far less effective than we had hoped. I was disturbed because the loan to Britain had failed to accomplish what we thought it would.

Detailed reports came to my office daily from our government agencies about conditions abroad. A steady stream of appeals poured in from representative leaders of many foreign nations, virtually all of whom expressed the gravest concern over the economic situation and over the gains which communism might score if there were no improvement. On April 26, when Secretary [of State] Marshall returned from the Moscow conference of foreign ministers, he arrived in a pessimistic mood. He had gone to Moscow with the hope that he could persuade the Russians that the United States was working for peace. The Russians, however, were interested only in their own plans and were coldly determined to exploit the helpless condition of Europe to further communism rather than cooperate with the rest of the world.

Marshall's report confirmed my conviction that there was no time to lose in finding a method for the revival of Europe. . . . [George] Marshall is one of the most astute and profound men I have ever known. Whenever any problem was brought before him, he seemed to be able to put his finger at once on the very basic approach that later would usually be proposed by the staff as the best solution. He talked very little but listened carefully to everything that was said. Sometimes he would sit for an hour with little or no expression on his face, but when he had heard enough, he would come

up with a statement of his own that invariably cut to the very bone of the matter under discussion. . . . When the debates between members of his staff seemed destined to go on interminably and he could stand it no longer, he would say, "Gentlemen, don't fight the problem; decide it." Dean Acheson told me a characteristic story about Marshall when he first took over as secretary of state. Marshall had asked . . . [him] to stay on as Under Secretary and said, "I want the most complete and blunt truths from you, particularly about myself." Acheson replied, "Do you, General?" "Yes," Marshall said. "I have no feelings except a few which I reserve for Mrs. Marshall."

What Marshall perceived in the plans which his State Department staff laid before him was the importance of the economic unity of Europe. If the nations of Europe could be induced to develop their own solution of Europe's economic problems, viewed as a whole and tackled co-operatively rather than as separate national problems, United States aid would be more effective and the strength of a recovered Europe would be better sustained. This was precisely the approach I had in mind. Marshall and I were in perfect agreement. It was my feeling that, beyond economic considerations, the idea of co-operation would stimulate new hope and confidence among the nations of Europe and thus provide a realistic argument against the communists' counsel of despair.

This idea, as an approach to the European problem, was first expressed in public at Cleveland, Mississippi, on May 8, 1947, when Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered what might be called the prologue to the Marshall Plan. Originally, it had been planned for me to speak at this meeting, but I had other commitments and asked Acheson to fill the engagement. The Acheson speech contained the basic elements of the proposal which was given full development and expression a month later by Marshall. The key point . . . [was Acheson's] emphasis that the reconstruction of Europe would have to be dealt with as one problem. He stressed the interrelation of food and freedom. "The war," he said, "will not be over until the people of the world can again feed and clothe themselves and face the future with some degree of confidence." He then went on to offer a balance sheet of our past relief efforts and pointed out that further, more comprehensive financing would be necessary. Such use of our economic and financial resources would help preserve our own freedoms and democratic institutions because it would contribute to the security of our nation to widen the economic margins on which human dignity and free institutions abroad were struggling to survive. Acheson's speech did not receive the attention it deserved at the time, although it contained the beginning of the proposal later made at Harvard by Secretary [of State] Marshall.

On June 5, 1947, Marshall outlined to a commencement audience a course of action for the United States in dealing with the European crisis. This was a speech that was typical of the man. It was matter-of-fact and without oratorical flourishes, compact and to the point, and Marshall began it with a brief review of the economic condition of Europe. Then he went on to set out a course of action:

It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation . . . on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

Then came the key section of the plan:

It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirement of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by the government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so.

This was our proposal, that the countries of Europe agree on a cooperative plan in order to utilize the full productive resources of the continent, supported by whatever material assistance we could render to make the plan successful.

I had referred to the idea as the "Marshall Plan" when it was discussed in staff meetings, because I wanted General Marshall to get full credit for

his brilliant contributions to the measure which he helped formulate. And it was Marshall who had envisioned the full scope of this approach. He had perceived the inspirational as well as the economic value of the proposal. History, rightly, will always associate his name with this program, which helped save Europe from economic disaster and lifted it from the shadow of enslavement by Russian communism. Almost immediately following his enunciation of the idea in his Harvard speech, the term "Marshall Plan" became commonplace in the press and radio of the United States and other countries around the world, and I was glad to see his name identified with the plan. I believe the fact that a man of Marshall's world standing made the proposal of this policy helped greatly in its eventual adoption. . . . Both as military strategist and diplomat, he was known and respected abroad as few men have been in the history of the United States. And at home he enjoyed the confidence and esteem of the average citizen regardless of political preferences, as well as the admiration of congressional leaders. Marshall's entire personality inspired confidence. . . .

The response to Marshall's speech was immediate, electrifying the free world. Ernest Bevin, Great Britain's foreign secretary, assuming the lead and quickly followed by French foreign minister Georges Bidault, informed Secretary Marshall that they were ready to take the kind of initiative he had suggested. Invitations went out from London and Paris to every European nation except Spain for a conference to attempt to draw up a comprehensive recovery program.

Russia's reaction was also immediate. For a short while it appeared as if Marshall's proposal might not only result in economic reconstruction but also in a lifting of the iron curtain. A little surprisingly . . . [Soviet foreign minister] Molotov agreed to come to a preliminary meeting at which Bevin and Bidault proposed to lay out the agenda and procedure for the plenary meeting of the conference. However, . . . [the American ambassador in Moscow] correctly advised us . . . that Molotov had no intention of taking part in any constructive undertaking. What he was trying to do was to exploit the situation for Russia's own propaganda purposes. He sought to have Bevin and Bidault ask the United States for a dollar-and-cents figure of the total aid that Europe might expect. Of course, the state department would have been compelled to reply that we could not make a commitment in such a form, and the Soviets could have proclaimed to the world that we were hedging on our proposal. As a French diplomatic observer put it, "The Soviets want to put the United States in a position where it must either shell out dollars before there is a real plan or refuse outright to advance any credits." French Foreign Minister Bidault told our ambassador [in Paris] that

"Molotov clearly does not wish this business to succeed, but on the other hand his hungry satellites are smacking their lips in expectation of getting some of your money. He is obviously embarrassed." Indeed, Czechoslovakia accepted the invitation to the conference and Poland was also evidently eager to participate. In a dramatic move, however, the Kremlin ordered them to withdraw their acceptances, and Molotov departed from Paris with a blast against capitalism and the United States.

Sixteen nations were represented in Paris for the opening of this conference on July 12, 1947: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. And although Western Germany was not formally represented, its requirements as well as its ability to contribute to any general plan were considered by the conference. The report of this conference was transmitted to Secretary [of State] Marshall on September 22, and two days later . . . he placed it, and a number of related papers, on my desk for study. The report described the economic situation of Europe and the extent to which the participating countries thought they could solve their problems by individual or joint efforts. After taking into account these recovery efforts, the report then estimated the extent to which the sixteen countries would be able to pay for the imports they had to have. . . .

Truman met with members of his administration and of Congress to work out the amount of aid the European countries participating in the Marshall Plan would need during the several months before the Marshall Plan could be funded by Congress. He asked Congressional leaders to pass enabling legislation as quickly as possible. On December 19, 1947, he sent a message to Congress in which he explained the Marshall Plan's approach to helping Europe and asked for the appropriation by April 1, 1948 of \$6.8 billion to fund the Marshall Plan during its first critical 15 months, through June 30, 1949. He also said he would ask Congress for a total of \$17 billion for the program over four years.

Seventeen billion dollars sounded like a huge sum, and of course it was. But compared to the financial cost alone of World War II, it seemed small. The money to be invested in the rebuilding of decent standards of living in Europe would amount to only five per cent of the sums we had expended to defeat the Axis. It would represent less than three per cent of our total national income during the time that the program would be in effect. The estimates of the experts showed that it was well within the capacity of the American people to undertake. . . .

Congress acted quickly on Truman's request for Marshall Plan funding, though it provided less than Truman had requested. On April 3, 1948, Truman signed the European Recovery Act. Congress appropriated a total of about \$13 billion for Marshall Plan programs over the next four years.

The Marshall Plan will go down in history as one of America's greatest contributions to the peace of the world. I think the world now realizes that without the Marshall Plan it would have been difficult for Western Europe to remain free from the tyranny of communism.

Truman's inaugural address, given January 20, 1949, defined four major courses of action which the United States would follow as part of what Truman called "our program for peace and freedom." The first three courses of action continued policies which already existed—support for the United Nations, support for the Marshall Plan programs and related trade initiatives, and the strengthening of mutual security agreements, most importantly those with the countries in the North Atlantic area. The fourth course of action that Truman recommended was new, and he spoke three times as long about this fourth point as about the other three combined. This is what he said about the program that came to be known as "Point Four":

More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.

For the first time in history humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people.

The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. . . .

I believe that we should make available to peace-loving people the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development.

Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.

We invite other countries to pool their technological resources in this undertaking. Their contributions will be warmly welcomed. This should be a co-operative enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies wherever practicable. It must be a worldwide effort for the achievement of peace, plenty, and freedom. . . .

Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.

Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people. . . .

In due time, as our stability becomes manifest, as more and more nations come to know the benefits of democracy and to participate in growing abundance, I believe that those countries which now oppose us will abandon their delusions and join with the free nations of the world in a just settlement of internal differences.

Events have brought our American democracy to new influence and new responsibilities. They will test our courage, our devotion to duty, and our concept of liberty. . . .

. . . The American people have always been traditionally altruistic, and the spirit of neighborliness has been a characteristic of our society since the earliest days, even when there was not a great deal to share with each other but hardship and privation. It is, of course, easy to be generous in the midst of plenty. I knew that Americans would respond to Point Four, as they respond to all realistic calls for help. The program was thoroughly practical because it would open up new opportunities for development and prosperity to all nations. . . . Thus was launched what came to be universally known, within a matter of months, as the "Point Four program. . . ." To call the undertaking a "bold new program" was no exaggeration. It was an adventurous idea such as had never before been proposed by any country in the history of the world. Its announcement on January 20, 1949, created a great deal of interest and excitement, and my answers at a press conference six days later re-emphasized both the novelty and the boldness of the plan:

Mr. President, can you give us any background on the origin of Point Four?

The origin of Point Four has been in my mind and in the minds of the government, for the past two or three years, ever since the Marshall Plan was inaugurated. It originated with the Greece and Turkey proposition. Been studying it ever since. I spend most of my time going over to that globe back there, trying to figure out ways to make peace in the world.

Can you tell us how you are going to implement it?"

It's a policy of the Administration over the next four years and it's something that will have to be implemented generally. I have asked the Secretary of State to get together with the heads of the departments of the government, and try

to work out preliminary plans for an approach to it. I can't tell you just what is going to take place, where it is going to take place, or how it is going to take place. I know what I want to do."

. . . It seemed to me that if we could encourage stabilized governments in underdeveloped countries in Africa, South America, and Asia, we could encourage the use for the development of those areas some of the capital which had accumulated in the United States. If the investment of capital from the United States could be protected and not confiscated, and if we could persuade the capitalists that they were not working in foreign countries to exploit them but to develop them, it would be to the mutual benefit of everybody concerned.

The Point Four idea . . . originated at about the same time as the Marshall Plan concept. It was never intended, however, to have any connection with the Marshall Plan, which was purely for postwar rehabilitation in the countries of Western Europe whose production and economy were ruined by the war. Point Four was conceived as a worldwide, continuing program of helping underdeveloped nations to help themselves through the sharing of technical information already tested and proved in the United States. I was thinking in terms of a foreign policy for a nation that was the free-world leader. During the administrations of [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and myself it had been proved that the way to build a successful economy in which the most people enjoyed high standards of living was to keep the national resources out of the hands of special interests and in the possession of the people themselves. This was our program domestically, and I wanted to make it a permanent part of our foreign policy.

Point Four was aimed at enabling millions of people in underdeveloped areas to raise themselves from the level of colonialism to self support and ultimate prosperity. All of the reports which I had received from such areas of the world indicated that a great many people were still living in an age almost a thousand years behind the times. In many places this was the result of long exploitation for the benefit of foreign countries, of developments for foreign benefit rather than for the interest of the native peoples. This was the curse of colonialism, and I, for one, have always hoped to see it disappear. What I hoped Point Four would accomplish was to provide technical assistance so that these peoples themselves, with a very small capital investment from us, would be able to develop their own resources. The principal item of expenditure would be the skill of our technicians teaching these people how to help themselves. In this country, we had both the capital and the technical

"know how." I did not see how we could follow any other course but to put these two great assets to work in the underdeveloped areas in order to help them elevate their own standards of living and thus move in the direction of worldwide prosperity and peace. The alternative, as I saw it, was to continue to allow those vast areas to drift toward poverty, despair, fear, and the other miseries of mankind which breed unending wars.

The Point Four program was a practical expression of our attitude toward the countries threatened by communist domination. It was consistent with our policies of preventing the expansion of communism in the free world by helping to insure the proper development of those countries with adequate food, clothing, and living facilities. It was an effort to bring to such people, not the idealism of democracy alone, but the tangible benefits of better living through intelligent cooperation. Thus the plan was realistic as well as idealistic. Common sense told me that the development of these countries would keep our own industrial plant in business for untold generations. The resources of such areas as Mesopotamia, Iran, India, North Africa, and huge sections of South America have hardly been touched, and their development would be as beneficial to American trade as to the areas themselves. It would enable the peoples of many areas to subsist on trade and not aid.

This, then, was the idea which I broached at the outset of my second term. It was generally recognized and accepted as a good idea. The next problem was to make it work. I immediately instituted a series of conferences on the subject of how best to implement the Point Four program and ordered the secretary of state to direct the planning necessary to translate the program into action. . . . In developing the program, I made it clear that all existing private and governmental activities would be utilized. American business enterprises overseas and private nonprofit organizations such as the Rockefeller Institute or the Institute of International Education could furnish much valuable information and assistance in making technical services available to underdeveloped countries. Governmental . . . [agencies], in addition to the United Nations specialized agencies, that were utilized included the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the Export-Import Bank.

On June 24, 1949, I sent a special message to Congress recommending an appropriation of not . . . [less] than \$45 million to inaugurate the program. . . . I called for legislation that would authorize an expanded program of technical assistance for the underdeveloped areas of the world and an experimental program to encourage the investment of private funds for the

economic development of these areas. Such development would strengthen the United Nations and help toward world peace. The development of these areas had become one of the major elements of our foreign policy.

On September 27, legislation was introduced in the Congress to carry out the program, but no action was taken before adjournment in October. Meanwhile, I utilized every opportunity to point out the possibilities of the plan. Talking informally to a businessmen's dinner forum on October 20, 1949, I said that in the Mesopotamian Valley alone there could be a revival of the Garden of Eden that would take care of thirty million people and feed all the Near East if it were properly developed. I explained in detail how the Zambezi River Valley in Africa and a similar area in southern Brazil could also be converted into sections comparable to the Tennessee Valley in our own country if the people of those regions only had access to the "know how" which we possessed.

The State of the Union message on January 4, 1950, urged the Congress to adopt the legislation then before it to provide for an increase in the flow of technical assistance and capital to the underdeveloped regions. It was more essential than ever "if the ideas of freedom and representative government are to prevail in these areas, and particularly in the Far East, that their people experience in their own lives the benefits of scientific and economic advances." The message pointed out that this program would require the movement of large amounts of capital from the industrial nations, particularly from the United States, to productive uses in the backward areas, [and] that recent world events made prompt action imperative. "This program," I said, "is in the interest of all peoples—and it has nothing in common with either the old imperialism of the last century or the new imperialism of the Communists."

. . . It was not until June 5, 1950, . . . that Point Four became a reality. On that date, I signed the act to provide foreign economic assistance which was passed by the second session of the 81st Congress. Point Four was embodied in this act as Title IV, the "Act for International Development." . . . The sum [of \$34.5 million] appropriated for technical assistance was small in comparison with the need and was \$10.5 million dollars less than the minimum requested. But it was a beginning, and already Point Four had become a symbol of hope to those nations which were being fed communist propaganda that the free nations were incapable of providing a decent standard of living for the millions of people in the underdeveloped areas of the earth. This money, together with the contributions of other countries, would have a cumulative effect in promoting the well being of such people. . . .

Truman by executive order issued on September 8, 1950, delegated responsibility for the technical assistance program to the State Department, which organized the Technical Cooperation Administration to run the program.

Thus, within two years after the inaugural address, the minimum machinery for setting the Point Four program under way was put together and ready to go into operation. We lost no time. In March 1951, barely six months after the first Point Four budget was approved by the Congress, about 350 technicians were at work on more than a hundred technical cooperation projects in 27 countries. Thirty-five governments in Latin America, Africa, and Asia had asked the United States government for specific help in solving their problems through the Point Four program. Also by March of 1951 there were 236 Point Four trainees from thirty-four countries in the United States for advanced study, and plans were under way to bring in many more during the next six months. By the end of March the United States had concluded Point Four general agreements with twenty-two countries in the less developed areas of the world. Primary emphasis was put on food supply, since food is a key to all productivity. Other projects contributing to food supply, such as prevention of disease, basic and vocational education, transportation, [and] development of fibers and insecticides, were given an important place in the Point Four program.

By the end of 1951, Point Four had been extended to thirty-three countries, and the State of the Union message of January 9, 1952, summarized the progress of the program, pointing out that during the year the United States had made available millions of bushels of wheat to relieve the famine in India. But far more important in the long run, I said, was the work which Americans were doing in India to help the farmers themselves raise more grain.

This is our Point Four program at work. It is working, not only in India, but in Iran and Paraguay and Liberia—in thirty-three countries around the globe. Our technical missionaries are out there. We need more of them. We need more funds to speed their efforts, because there is nothing of greater importance in all our foreign policy. There is nothing that shows more clearly what we stand for and what we want to achieve.

As the value of the plan became clearer to the Congress, subsequent laws were passed authorizing and providing funds for its operations. For the fiscal year 1952, the budget was expanded from the original appropriation of \$34.5 million to \$147.9 million, and for the fiscal year 1953 this amount

was increased to \$155.6 million. . . . At the time I left the presidency in January 1953, the Point Four program had been in operation less than 30 months. During that short period, the program had relieved famine measurably in many portions of the world, had reduced the incidence of diseases that keep many areas poverty stricken, and had set many nations on the path of rising living standards by their own efforts and by the work of their own nationals.

For example, Chimbote, Peru, a pesthole of malaria for generations, was virtually free of it. The incidence of malaria in the Shan States of Myanmar [Burma] was cut from fifty per cent to ten per cent. A typhus epidemic in Bukan, Iran, was checked and the disease stamped out. Entire school systems emphasizing vocational and technical training went into operation in various countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. A monetary, fiscal, and banking system was introduced in Saudi Arabia. Schools of medicine, public health, and nursing were set up in several countries. A 75,000-acre irrigation project in the Artibonite Valley of Haiti got under way. A great multi-purpose hydroelectric plant was constructed in the Mexican state of Michoacán. Irrigation projects in Jordan were started to create 120,000 acres of arable land providing homes and 6½ acre tracts for 21,000 families consisting of 105,000 individuals. Demonstrations of improved seed achieved high yields in Iran. . . . Egyptian farmers were supplied with tractors to aid in converting three million acres of desert, which had resulted from overgrazing, into arable land. In India fifty-five rural development projects were launched to raise food production, provide potable water, foster irrigation, introduce fertilizer, teach reading and writing, devise better tools, improve village workshops, and better the forms of land ownership.

Some 2,445 United States technicians in thirty-five countries were putting such programs as these into effect. Thirty-four of those countries sent 2,862 of their most promising young specialists abroad, mostly to this country, as trainees for postgraduate training in their specialties. They, and the technicians they train in turn, release the American technical missionaries for pioneer work in other fields. We found that even in countries which were anti-American the relations between United States technicians and their local counterparts were excellent. The program in action had the effect of disarming hostile propagandists and in discouraging the advance of both communism and extreme nationalism.

There were . . . some great difficulties encountered in the implementation of the program. Chief among these was the attempt, both at home and

abroad, by selfish interests to change the character of the program by shifting the emphasis from technical assistance to financial aid. Point Four was not conceived as a lending program or as a giveaway plan. Its basic aim is to spread knowledge that will aid others to improve themselves.

The American taxpayers, who approved the Point Four program showed their general support of the plan from the beginning. There was little or no opposition in the press to this effort of the government to help other countries to help themselves. The only dangerous threat to the continued success of the plan, as I saw it, was that which might come from the reactionaries and isolationists. [Point Four] is a program which requires vision. It has been estimated that an improvement of only two per cent in the living standards of Asia and Africa would keep the industrial plants of the United States, Great Britain, and France going at full tilt for a century just to keep up with the increased demand for goods and services.

Only America could undertake such a unique approach to world affairs. Our population, unlike that of other great nations, is made up of strains from every population around the world, and when we became the most powerful nation in the world, we tried to put into effect the ideals of all races and nationalities which we had written into the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.

The American approach to world affairs was best demonstrated by the manner in which we treated conquered nations after the first and second world wars. We set up the means to feed and clothe and take care of the physical needs of the people. We rehabilitated the conquered nations instead of attempting to keep them conquered and prostrate. We asked for no reparations. This was something new in the history of nations. The traditional practice had always been for the conqueror to strip the defeated countries and to make off with whatever spoils were available. Our idea has been to restore the conquered nations of Germany, Italy, and Japan to prosperity in the hope that they would understand the futility of aggression as a means of expansion and progress. We had to refute the historic claim that a nation must use aggression and military means to gain markets.

The satellite countries of Russia are the unhappiest places in the world, so far as we can find out from the information that comes from behind the iron curtain. This is in sharpest contrast with the situation that exists in Cuba, Canada, Mexico, and other nations that lie in the portion of the world of which we are a part. No neighbor of ours is afraid of us, and they like to do business with us because we accept their competition instead of demanding their subjection.

The technical assistance program was not an anti-communist measure. We would have included Russia in the program if she had been willing. As early as Potsdam, in July and August of 1945, I was prepared to offer the Russians aid for war recovery. Without cooperation . . . we could not help them to help themselves. The Point Four program . . . was not against communism or against anything else. It was a positive plan of self help for any country that wanted it. It recognized the historic fact that colonialism had run its course and could no longer be made to work for a few favored nations. In its immediate and long range effects, however, Point Four provided the strongest antidote to communism that has so far been put into practice. It was created and designed to operate on a continuing basis to point the way to better living for more and more of the world's people—and thus the way to a more lasting peace. Thus it stands as a vitally important development in the search for peace, which lies at the very heart of America's foreign policy.

Year of Decisions, 97–98, 227–234, 464–480; *Years of Trial and Hope*, 93–119, 226–239

Reorganizing for National Security

1945–1949

An antiquated defense setup—unification of the armed forces—“coordination of the entire military, economic, and political aspects of security and defense”—the Army and the Navy disagree—Truman intervenes—compromise—the National Security Act—the Navy revolts—the National Security Act amendments—a universal training program—Congress won’t act—the Central Intelligence Agency—Truman’s first call to the day—the National Security Council—the president makes the final decision

One of the strongest convictions which I brought to the office of president was that the antiquated defense setup of the United States had to be reorganized quickly as a step toward insuring our future safety and preserving world peace. From the beginning of my administration I began to push hard for unification of the military establishment into a single department of the armed forces. The idea of unifying and integrating the Army and Navy into a single department of national defense evolved slowly and against powerful opposition. I had been vitally interested in our military organization since World War I and had studied every plan that had been suggested through the years for its improvement.



In my younger days, having been something of a student of military history, I decided to join the “militia” referred to in Washington’s message of 1790. The militia had become the National Guard of the United States. The experience I had in the National Guard and as a colonel in the Reserve

Corps after the war gave me some very definite ideas on what the military department of a republic like ours should be. My experience in the volunteer forces and later on in the Senate was very helpful when I became commander in chief.

It had been evident to me, from the record of the Pearl Harbor hearings, that the tragedy was as much the result of the inadequate military system which provided for no unified command, either in the field or in Washington, as it was any personal failure of Army or Navy commanders. I had not fully realized the extent of the waste and inefficiency existing as a result of the operation of two separate and uncoordinated military departments until I became chairman of the special Senate committee created in 1941 to check up on the national defense program. I had long believed that a coordinated defense organization was an absolute necessity. The duplications of time, material, and manpower resulting from independent Army and Navy operations which were paraded before my committee intensified this conviction.

As a member of the appropriations and military affairs committees of the Senate and as chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, I was certain that unless something could be done to coordinate the activities of the Army and the Navy we would finally end up with two departments of defense and eventually three when the Air Force succeeded in obtaining its special committee in the House and Senate.

The chairmen of the military and naval affairs committees, especially in the House . . . tended to become secretaries of war and Navy. There were a couple of House members, chairmen of the Military Appropriations Subcommittee and Naval Affairs Committee, who had to have seventeen-gun salutes, parades, etc., as often as they could find excuses to visit Army posts and naval bases. These gentlemen were the principal stumbling blocks to unification. This was particularly true of the Naval Affairs [Committee] chairman in the House.

In my various investigations, I ran into numerous unnecessary duplications by the Army and the Navy. For example, I found immense air installations located side by side at various points in this country and Panama where the Navy could not land on the Army's airfield, and vice versa. A silly procedure, if I ever saw one. At Pearl Harbor the air bases were as far apart as if they had been on different continents—yet they were practically side by side. Then the Navy had its own "little army that talks Navy" and is known as the Marine Corps. It also had an air force of its own, and the Army, in turn, had its own little navy, both fresh water and salt.

It was my opinion that the commander in chief ought to have a coordinated and cooperative defense department that would work in peace and in war. Most field commanders who had experience in World War II, whether in the Army or the Navy, were for a unified defense department, and less than a year before I assumed the presidency an article of mine openly advocating the consolidation of the Army and Navy was published in a magazine. Listing examples of appalling waste which had been uncovered by the Truman Committee, I urged a new defense organization in which every element of the nation's defense would be unified in one department under one authoritative head. In the plan I outlined, procurement of personnel and supplies would be centralized, and the land, sea, and air forces would plan and operate together as one team instead of three. Direct control would be by a General Staff, and not a Joint Chiefs of Staff such as had existed on an improvised, non-statutory basis during World War II to coordinate strategy and operations.

My first opportunity to begin work, as president, on the reorganization of the military structure came in the summer of 1945 when Secretary of the Navy [James V.] Forrestal suggested legislation increasing the permanent strength of the regular Navy and Marine Corps. The time had come to put an end to piecemeal legislation and separate planning for the services. I wrote Admiral Leahy on August 21 requesting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff review the Navy's proposed legislation from the stand point of the combined requirements of the armed forces. I suggested that this review should consider our international commitments for the postwar world, the development of new weapons, and the relative position of the services in connection with these factors. As a result of this action, the Joint Chiefs undertook a study of the postwar manpower requirements of the Army and Navy. The Army was directed to produce estimates of its own postwar needs, and the War Department appointed a committee . . . to make this study.

The . . . committee reported in September that because of the absence of high-level guidance on political considerations, and pending a decision on Army-Navy coordination, it was impossible to estimate manpower needs accurately. It recommended approval by the Joint Chiefs of the report of its special committee, which had recommended, by a vote of three to one, unification of the Army and Navy in a single department. . . . The Joint Chiefs, however, [could not agree on the recommendation for unification, and they forwarded the report to me on October 16] . . . together with the views of General Marshall, General Arnold, Admiral King, and Admiral Leahy. . . . The two generals, [Marshall and Arnold], supported unification, and the two admirals, [King and Leahy], opposed it. Thus I was faced with a direct

split of opinion between the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff on the fundamental principle of a unified military establishment.

In the meantime, the Navy had been preparing its own plan for postwar national security. This program, which was submitted to me on October 18, continued to oppose unification with the Army but suggested that the admittedly serious defects in coordination be cured by more effective joint committees. The principal thesis of the Navy's proposal was that military policy must be tied in with national policy through the establishment of high-level agencies. I endorsed fully the Navy's emphasis on the need for some means of more effectively meshing military planning with our foreign policy and agreed also that we needed to provide long-range plans for industrial mobilization consistent with the civilian economy. In other words, it was clear to me that a national defense program involved not just reorganization of the armed forces but actual coordination of the entire military, economic, and political aspects of security and defense.

. . . Two unification bills [were] . . . introduced in the Congress [at about this same time]—one by Senator Lister Hill of Alabama and another by Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado. Hearings were opened by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on October 17, and these dragged along until December 17 without any agreement being reached between Army and Navy representatives.

Seeing the need for presidential intervention, I sent to the Congress on December 19, 1945, a message recommending a reorganization of the armed services into a single department along the following broad lines: 1. There should be a single Department of National Defense charged with . . . full responsibility for armed national security. 2. The head of this department should be a civilian, a member of the president's Cabinet, to be designated as the secretary of national defense. Under him there should be a civilian under secretary and several civilian assistant secretaries. 3. There should be three coordinated branches of the Department of National Defense: one for the land forces, one for the naval forces, and one for the air forces, each under an assistant secretary. The Navy should retain its own carrier- or water-based aviation, and the Marine Corps should be continued as an integral part of the Navy. 4. The president and the secretary [of national defense] should be provided with authority to establish central coordinating and service organizations, both military and civilian, where these were found to be necessary. 5. There should be a chief of staff of the Department of National Defense, and a commander for each of the three component branches—Army, Navy, and Air. 6. The chief of staff and the commanders of the three branches

should constitute an advisory body to the secretary [of national defense] and to the president.

In addition to these points, I also cautioned that the key staff positions in the new department should be filled with officers drawn from all the services, and the post of chief of staff should be rotated among the several services in order that the thinking of the department would not be dominated by any one or two of the services.

I stated that the unification plan which I offered would provide for: an integrated military program and budget; greater economies through unified control of supply and service functions; improved coordination between the military and the rest of the government; the strongest means for civilian control of the military; creation of a parity for air power; systematic allocation of the limited resources for scientific research and development; and consistent and equitable personnel policies.

The Senate Military Affairs Committee appointed a subcommittee late in December to carry on the effort to obtain a unification bill acceptable to both the Army and the Navy. After eight drafts had been rejected, the Thomas-Hill-Austin bill was introduced in the 79th Congress on April 8, 1946. The subcommittee had worked hard to achieve a workable bill and still meet the requirements of my message to the Congress, but the final product was unanimously opposed by all Navy witnesses at the subsequent hearings on the bill.

On May 13, 1946, I called Secretary of War [Robert P.] Patterson and Secretary of the Navy [James V.] Forrestal to a conference at the White House. At this conference, I urged the necessity of the Army and Navy getting together on the problem of unification. I knew it would work out better if I did not order the two branches of the service to reach an agreement, and I therefore suggested that they sit down together and work out their points of agreement and disagreement and submit the list to me. On May 31, the two secretaries submitted a joint letter outlining areas of agreement and disagreement. They were not able to agree on four vital points: a single military establishment; setting up of three coordinate branches of the service; control of aviation; and administration of the Marine Corps.

These four points were the basic issues which had always been the cause of conflict between the Army and the Navy. I was deeply disappointed that no substantial progress had been made toward resolving this traditional conflict, and I decided then that the only way in which unification could move forward was for me to settle personally each of the four points of difference between the services. On June 15, after long and deliberate study, I . . . [communicated by letter my decision to the secretary of war and the

secretary of the Navy] and to the heads of the congressional committees dealing with naval and military matters. In this decision, I supported the War Department's view that a single Department of National Defense was necessary to effective unification. I also supported the War Department's opinion that a separate Air Force should be established, and that the Air Force should take over all land-based aviation, including naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine patrol, and protection of shipping. It seemed to me that no one could give a valid reason for continuing the expensive duplication of land-based air services then existing. I took the Navy's view that the function of the Marine Corps should continue undisturbed. I felt that if a Marine Corps were necessary, efforts to draw a hard and fast line as to the extent of its participation in amphibious operations and land fighting would be futile. I saw much justification in the Navy's position that the Marine Corps should be permitted to do those things essential to the success of a particular naval campaign.

In addition to the foregoing decisions, I approved the establishment of a Council of Common Defense, a National Security Resources Board, a Central Intelligence Agency, a Procurement and Supply Agency, a Research Agency, a Military Education and Training Agency, and the statutory establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I urged passage of legislation which would make possible a unification of the services at the earliest possible date, and continued my efforts to get the Army and Navy to agree on the form of such legislation.

Despite the Navy's distaste for some of the basic features of my unification decision, Secretary [of the Navy] Forrestal worked hard to attempt to iron out the existing differences. On January 16, 1947, he and Secretary [of War] Patterson advised me by a joint letter that a compromise unification plan had been worked out which they both could support. I was extremely gratified, as it represented a step in the right direction. Unification depended as much upon individual cooperation as upon legislation. . . . I issued a public statement in which a proposed executive order set forth in full the responsibilities of each branch of the service under the desired legislation and, on the following day, informed the Congress that a unification bill was being drafted for its consideration.

This development marked the culmination of the long, hard battle to bring the services together. All that remained was to work out the details of the bill. I had appealed to the 80th Congress, in my State of the Union message, to give wise and careful consideration to the forthcoming legislation as the one certain way by which we could cut costs and at the same time enhance our national security.

On February 26, 1947, I was able to transmit to the Speaker of the House and Senator Vandenberg a bill which, upon amendment and passage, was to become the National Security Act of 1947. The bill, as finally passed on July 25, was not as strong as the original proposal sent to Congress since it included concessions on both sides for the sake of bringing together the Army and the Navy. But it put an end to the long and costly arguments over the principle of unification, and for the first time in the history of the nation an over-all military establishment was created.

The new "National Military Establishment" consisted of a secretary of defense, to be assisted by three civilian special assistants. His authority over other civilian personnel was restricted to those in his own department, and he had no authority over civilian personnel of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The act established executive departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, with secretaries provided for each. For the first time the existence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was recognized by law. Within the [National] Military Establishment the act created a Munitions Board to coordinate procurement, production, and distribution plans of the services and to plan the military aspects of industrial mobilization; and a Research and Development Board to coordinate scientific research relating to the whole national security. The act also provided for a National Security Council composed of the president and the heads of [the Departments of] State,... [the] Army, [the] Navy, [the] Air [Force, the National Military Establishment, the] Munitions Board, [the] Research and Development Board, and [the] National Security Resources Board. The council was charged with appraising the national security of the United States and dealing with national security problems of common interest to all segments of the government. The other valuable agencies created by the act were a Central Intelligence Agency under the [National] Security Council, to correlate and evaluate intelligence activities and data, and a National Security Resources Board to coordinate military, civilian, and industrial agencies. . . .

Getting the idea of unification legally approved was only part of the fight for a consolidated military program. Making it work efficiently during the early months occupied a good deal of my time and attention. [The first secretary of defense, James V. Forrestal] . . . labored unceasingly to overcome the long-standing rivalries that could not be swept away by an act of Congress. His chief problem was that of defining specific roles and missions of each branch of the service and in determining budgetary allocations to carry out those functions. After a series of conferences within the Defense Department, he submitted a new definition of functions to me and recommended that the new statement be substituted for the executive order which

I had issued at the time the law was enacted. After studying his recommendations, I rescinded my original order and approved on March 27, 1948, the promulgation of the new statement of functions with minor modifications.

During the first year of operation of the National Military Establishment it became apparent to me that the secretary of defense needed additional authority to meet his responsibilities. It was clear that the act should be amended to define and strengthen the authority of the secretary; to authorize an under secretary of defense; to provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a chairman; to remove the service secretaries from the National Security Council, leaving the secretary of defense the sole representative of the military; and to correct numerous administrative inefficiencies that a year's experience had revealed.

I sent a message to the Congress on March 5, 1949, proposing these revisions in the National Security Act. On the whole, the recommendations I made progressed smoothly through the processes of legislation, but in the weeks that followed a wide-open battle developed in the press between elements of the Navy and the Air Force.

The conflict resulted from an action by the new secretary of defense, Louis A. Johnson, who had succeeded Secretary Forrestal in March. Secretary Johnson canceled the construction of the Navy's new super carrier. Dispute also arose over anonymous charges alleging irregularities in the Air Force's procurement of the B-36 [strategic bomber] and the questioning of its combat effectiveness. Some newspapers and the radio were used to level insinuations of improper conduct against almost everyone who favored unification policies that in any way restricted the Navy.

The battle took on the aspects of a revolt of the entire Navy. Secretary [of the Navy] John L. Sullivan . . . resigned in protest of Johnson's cancellation of the carrier contract, and it finally became necessary for me to replace Admiral Louis E. Denfeld as Chief of Naval Operations in a move to restore discipline. Finally, agreement was reached on the necessary revisions, and on August 10, 1949, I signed into law the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, thus moving a step nearer true unification of the armed forces. To me, the passage of the National Security Act and its strengthening amendments represented one of the outstanding achievements of my administration.

Truman believed that an integrated program of national security required, besides a unified military force, a training program that would include all young men eligible for military service.

To my regret, Congress did not take the other basic step in the field of military legislation which I have always considered of paramount importance to our security. And that was legislation aimed at providing a fair and adequate universal training program. I had asked for this first in the fall of 1945, but no action was forthcoming.

In December 1946, however, I appointed an Advisory Commission on Universal Military Training to study the basic needs as well as the various plans for universal training in relation to over-all planning for national security.

I asked the committee to meet with me on December 20, and I took occasion at that time to tell them what my thoughts were on the subject. "I don't like to think of it," I said, "as a universal military training program. I want it to be a universal training program, giving our young people a background in the disciplinary approach of getting along with one another, informing them of their physical make-up, and what it means to take care of this temple which God gave us. If we get that instilled into them, and then instill into them a responsibility which begins in the township, in the city ward, the first thing you know we will have sold our Republic to the coming generations as Madison and Hamilton and Jefferson sold it in the first place."

After nearly six months of intensive study and a series of hearings in which more than two hundred witnesses were interviewed, the commission reported its findings to me in June 1947. The members, as a result of their investigations, had arrived at the unanimous conclusion that universal training was an essential element in an integrated program of national security designed to safeguard the United States and to enable it to fulfill its responsibilities to the cause of world peace and the success of the United Nations. . . .

The commission recommended the adoption of universal training for every qualified male citizen for a period of not less than six months. Every feature of the program was carefully detailed as to the military, educational, physical, moral, and spiritual training needed. The plan submitted by the commission in its report was a thoroughly studied elaboration of the views which I had expressed to my Cabinet almost two years before. I had hoped that publication of this report by a group of distinguished and representative Americans would move Congress to action, but again I was to be disappointed. Three years after the commission submitted its report I was still trying to get Congress to pass universal training legislation. One of the compelling reasons that kept me urging a training program was the need to do something about the thirty-four percent of our young men who had been

rejected as draftees and volunteers on the grounds of physical defects. I was sure that a large number of that thirty-four percent could be made physically fit and self-supporting citizens if they had the right sort of treatment.

I am morally certain that if Congress had enacted this program in 1945, when I first recommended it, we would have had a pool of basically trained men, which would have caused the Soviets to hesitate and perhaps not bring on the Berlin crisis or the Korean aggression.

Time was when the United States could be content with a small force of professional soldiers. Unfortunately, that day is past. Military strength is now a vital factor in political policy, and both diplomatic and strategic considerations must be blended with care if the nation's policy is to be effective in maintaining the peace.

The National Security Act created a new agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, to provide the president all the information he needed to make foreign and defense policy decisions. But Truman had understood even before he became president, and well before the National Security Act created the Central Intelligence Agency, that an agency was needed to coordinate the work of the many originators of intelligence information in the federal government.

A president has to know what is going on all around the world in order to be ready to act when action is needed. The president must have all the facts that may affect the foreign policy or the military policy of the United States. . . . Before 1946, such information as the president needed was being collected in several different places in the government. The War Department had an Intelligence Division—G-2—and the Navy had an intelligence setup of its own—the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Department of State, on the one hand, got its information through diplomatic channels, while the Treasury [Department] and the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture each had channels for gathering information from different parts of the world—on monetary, economic, and agricultural matters. During World War II, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had some operations abroad, and in addition the Office of Strategic Services, which was set up by President Roosevelt during the war . . . , operated abroad to gather information.

This scattered method of getting information for the various departments of the government first struck me as being badly organized when I was in the Senate. Our Senate committees, hearing witnesses from the executive departments, were often struck by the fact that different agencies of the

government came up with different and conflicting facts on similar subjects. It was not at first apparent that this was due to the uncoordinated methods of obtaining information. Since then, however, I have often thought that if there had been something like coordination of information in the government it would have been more difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. In those days, the military did not know everything the State Department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew. The Army and the Navy, in fact, had only a very informal arrangement to keep each other informed as to their plans. In other words, there had never been much attention paid to any centralized intelligence organization in our government. Apparently, the United States saw no need for a really comprehensive system of foreign intelligence until World War II placed American fighting men on the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa and on the islands of the Atlantic and the Pacific.

The war taught us this lesson—that we had to collect intelligence in a manner that would make the information available where it was needed and when it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form. . . .

On becoming president, I found that the needed intelligence information was not coordinated at any one place. Reports came across my desk on the same subject at different times from the various departments, and these reports often conflicted. Consequently, I asked Admiral [William D.] Leahy, [my chief of staff], if anything was being done to improve the system. Leahy told me that in 1944, at President Roosevelt's direction, he had referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a plan for centralized intelligence work prepared by . . . [the head of the Office of Strategic Services]. This plan, so Leahy told me, provided for an organization directly under the president and responsible only to him. The Navy, however, had worked out a counterproposal under which there would be a central agency to serve as an over-all intelligence organization, but with each of the departments responsible for national security having a stake in it. . . .

Sometime later I asked Secretary of State Byrnes to submit his recommendations for a way to coordinate intelligence services among the departments, explaining that I had already asked Leahy to look into the subject but that I wanted the State Department's recommendations since the State Department would need to play an important role in the operation. Secretary Byrnes took the position that such an organization should be responsible to the secretary of state and advised me that he should be in control of all intelligence. The Army and the Navy . . . strongly objected [to this argument]. They maintained that every department required its own intelligence

but that there was a great need for a central organization to gather together all information that had to do with over-all national policy. Under such an organization there would be a pool of information, and each agency would contribute to it. This pool would make it possible for those who were responsible for establishing policies in foreign political and military fields to draw on authoritative intelligence for their guidance.

In January 1946, I held a series of meetings in my office to examine the various plans suggested for a centralized intelligence authority. My inclination was to favor the plan worked out by the Army and the Navy . . . , and I was ready to put it into effect. . . .

It was only natural that there were some minor disagreements. The Justice Department, for instance, raised certain objections on behalf of Director J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI, but there were no major differences of opinion, and substantial agreement was soon reached.

On January 20, 1946, I issued an executive order setting up the Central Intelligence Group. I placed it under the supervision of a National Intelligence Authority, which was made up of the secretaries of state, war, and the Navy and my personal representative, Admiral Leahy. I also appointed a Director of Central Intelligence, naming Rear Admiral [Sidney] Souers, [who as deputy chief of naval intelligence had done much of the work on drafting the Navy's plan for a centralized intelligence agency]. . . .

Under the new intelligence arrangement, I now began to receive a daily digest and summary of the information obtained abroad. I also was given all information sent abroad by the State Department to our ambassadors, as well as that sent by the Navy and War Departments to their forces, whenever these messages might have influence on our foreign policy. Here, at last, a coordinated method had been worked out, and a practical way had been found for keeping the president informed as to what was known and what was going on.

The director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as the Central Intelligence Group was renamed [by the National Security Act] in 1947, became, usually, my first caller of the day. As long as Admiral Leahy continued to be the chief of staff to the commander in chief, he would join the director in the conference with me, and upon Leahy's retirement I brought Admiral Souers to the White House in the new capacity of special assistant to the president for intelligence . . . [and] he, too, sat in with me every morning when the director of central intelligence came in with the daily digest.

The National Security Act created what was in some ways the final element in the new national security establishment—the National Security Council, a White House office which brought together the president's chief civilian foreign and defense policy advisers and coordinated their advice and recommendations and presented them to the president in a formally organized way.

. . . [During the] Potsdam [Conference], I had been impressed with the cooperation between our State, Army, and Navy Departments. Through a coordinating committee they had worked out a way of tackling common problems without the usual jurisdictional conflicts. When I assigned a problem, I received prompt and clear-cut answers combining their best judgments. This proved very helpful, and before leaving Potsdam I informed the three departments that I liked this system and requested them to continue to cooperate on all common problems through this committee.

I had the success of this method in mind when, as plans were being drawn up for the unification of the military services, I insisted that policy unification be provided at the same time. I wanted one top-level permanent setup in the government to concern itself with advising the president on high policy decisions concerning the security of the nation. And such a setup was provided by the National Security Act of 1947, which created the National Security Council and also renamed the Central Intelligence Group the Central Intelligence Agency, placing it under the supervision of the National Security Council. The creation of the National Security Council added a badly needed new facility to the government. This was now the place in the government where military, diplomatic, and resources problems could be studied and continually appraised. This new organization gave us a running balance and a perpetual inventory of where we stood and where we were going on all strategic questions affecting the national security.

The National Security Council originally was set up with seven members. Besides the president, there were the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the secretary of the Army, the secretary of the Navy, the secretary of the Air Force, and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board. . . . In 1949 I asked the Congress to make a change in the membership of the Council, and it has since been composed of the president, the vice president (added to the list by the Senate), the secretaries of state and defense, [and] the chairman of the . . . [National Security Resources Board]. . . . The president has now statutory authority to add such other heads of executive departments as he may want there. . . .

I was gratified that Congress acted on my recommendation to provide a central place in the executive department for the study of policy problems. I used the National Security Council only as a place for recommendations to be worked out. Like the Cabinet, the council does not make decisions. The policy itself has to come down from the president, as all final decisions have to be made by him. A "vote" in the National Security Council is merely a procedural step. It never decides policy. That can be done only with the president's approval and expression of approval to make it an official policy of the United States. Even when the president sits as chairman in a meeting of the National Security Council and indicates agreement, nothing is final until the council formally submits a document to the president. The document states that the council met and recommended such-and-such an action, "which met with your approval." When the president signs this document, the recommendation then becomes a part of the policy of the government.

The National Security Council built a small but highly competent permanent staff which was selected for its objectivity and lack of political ties. It was our plan that the staff should serve as a continuing organization regardless of what administration was in power, for it is vitally important to the national security program that the staff working on the program should be continuous.

Tied in with the National Security Council staff, as an adjunct, is the Central Intelligence Agency, which operates in this way: Each time the council is about to consider a certain policy—let us say a policy having to do with Southeast Asia—it immediately calls upon the Central Intelligence Agency to present an estimate of the effects such a policy is likely to have. The director of the Central Intelligence Agency sits with the staff of the National Security Council and continually informs as they go along. The estimates he submits represent the judgment of the Central Intelligence Agency and a cross section of the judgments of all the advisory councils of the agency. These are G-2, A-2, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the director of intelligence of the . . . [Atomic Energy Commission]. The secretary of state then makes the final recommendation of policy, and the president makes the final decision. . . .

NATO

1948–1952

Communist advances in Central Europe—the Brussels Pact—the Vandenberg Resolution—the United States and the Brussels Pact nations—meetings in Washington—the North Atlantic Treaty—an offensive-defensive alliance to maintain peace in the North Atlantic area”—August 24, 1949—a NATO defense plan—the problem of Germany—a European defense force—Supreme Commander for Allied Powers in Europe—passing the NATO project to a new president

On April 4, 1949, I stood by Secretary of State Dean Acheson as he signed his name, on behalf of the United States, to a treaty which was the first peacetime military alliance concluded by the United States since the adoption of the Constitution. Earlier in our history (before the Constitution was written), the colonies had signed a military alliance with France. The document Acheson signed was the North Atlantic Treaty, and the occasion was the closing ceremonial event of a historic meeting, held in the auditorium of the Department of Labor in Washington, D.C.



The North Atlantic Treaty was one more step in the evolution of our foreign policy, along with the United Nations Charter, the Greek-Turkish aid program, and the Marshall Plan. Because of the Marshall Plan, the economy of Western Europe began, within a short time, to show evidence of recovery. But the problems of Europe were not only economic. There was fear of aggression and, therefore, lack of confidence in the future. A large volume of European capital had been transferred abroad before and during World War II, and this was now needed in Western Europe to rebuild its cities and its

industries. Capital, however, was not likely to flow to countries threatened by communist conquest.

In 1947 and 1948 the communists were pushing hard in Europe. Even as the Marshall Plan was being launched, they captured the government of Hungary. This was the first seizure of a government by communists which was openly supported by Russia since the fighting had stopped in Europe. The following month the Kremlin ordered Czechoslovakia and Poland to call off their participation in the Marshall Plan.

In early 1948, still another series of events jarred the free world. In Czechoslovakia, which had so long been the stronghold of democracy in Central Europe, a ruthless communist leadership, backed by the Russian Army at the border, demanded the full powers of government. President Eduard Beneš, the able successor to the great [Tomáš] Masaryk, held out for four days before yielding to the pressure. On February 25, 1948, however, democratic Czechoslovakia, for the second time in less than nine years, fell under the heel of totalitarianism. Two weeks later, Jan Masaryk, son of the founder of the Czech republic and a close friend and associate of many statesmen in the countries of Western Europe, died in Prague under mysterious circumstances that suggested foul play. His death was a dramatic symbol of the tragic end of freedom in his nation. In Poland, where Russian armies had set up a communist government at the end of the war, the Russians now dropped all pretext of Polish sovereignty. A Russian Red Army marshal was sent to take over the Polish Army. At about the same time, Stalin "invited" little Finland to sign a "pact of friendship" with the Soviet Union. There were threats of what would happen if the "invitation" was not accepted. To the people in Europe, who were just beginning to take courage from the Marshall Plan, these communist moves looked like the beginning of a Russian "big push."

Communism seemed to be advancing so quickly in Europe, that Truman felt he had to tell Congress in person—at a joint session of Congress, convened on March 17, 1948—what was happening and urge the members to pass legislation to enable Marshall Plan aid to begin to flow to Western Europe. He also told them about the meetings among five Western European nations in which a mutual security agreement, called the Brussels Pact, had been agreed upon. This action . . . is a notable step in the direction of unity in Europe for protection and preservation of its civilization . . . Truman told the joint session. I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to protect

themselves. *Truman understood that the Brussels Pact was only a first step toward security in Europe.*

. . . Even as the Brussels Pact was signed, it was clear that it would take a far more important political act to dispel the fears and to restore full confidence among the Western European nations. The State Department had already made some extensive studies and drawn up lists of possible courses of action. In my own mind, there was no doubt that much more would have to be done in order to bolster Europe's will to resist and to recover.

But I always kept in mind the lesson of [Woodrow] Wilson's failure in 1920 [to gain Senate approval of United States participation in the League of Nations]. I meant to have legislative co-operation [with respect to NATO]. Our European friends apparently remembered the League of Nations too; they were most anxious to have not only a presidential declaration of policy but also a congressional expression confirming it.

Under Secretary of State [Robert] Lovett and the Republican foreign policy spokesman, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, went to work on a congressional declaration of policy which put the Senate on record as favoring regional arrangements "based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." This was Senate Resolution 239, which Senator Vandenberg skillfully steered through the Senate to overwhelming approval by that body. On the final roll call, on June 11, 1948, only four senators voted against it. . . . Senator Vandenberg was thoroughly familiar with the workings of the Senate and knew how to get results. He could take ideas conceived by others—many in this case came from the State Department—and then include an element or two that would add his legislative trademark without changing anything basic. From then on, he would fight for the ideas without letting up. . . .

Meanwhile, the State Department was working out the details for our support of [the] Western Union, which was the name given to the Brussels Pact arrangements. The plan was sent to the National Security Council for further study, and at the council meeting on April 22, 1948, Lovett announced that the plan was being rewritten in order more closely to approach the language used in the Senate resolution that he and Vandenberg were then preparing.

On April 23 Lovett came to see me with a top secret telegram from the British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, in which were outlined the possible risks involved in a formal treaty association by the nations of the North Atlantic area. He said that he had discussed these risks in the greatest secrecy

with Prime Minister Attlee and a few of his closest colleagues, and they had agreed that the summoning of a conference by the United States government to discuss defense arrangements for the North Atlantic area would be the best guarantee of peace at the present moment. I instructed the State Department to circulate this message to the members of the National Security Council for their immediate information. . . .

At the meeting of the National Security Council on May 20, 1948, Lovett explained that the Vandenberg Resolution, if passed by the Senate, would put us in a stronger position to discuss with the countries of Western Europe measures to strengthen our national security as well as theirs. He pointed out that there were two basic factors in our planning: First, we wanted to get away from the one-way arrangements in which we did something for foreign countries without receiving anything in return; second, we did not want any automatic, unlimited engagements under our constitutional system. We could not agree upon anything amounting to a guarantee. But we had to give assurances sufficient enough to inspire the confidence and bolster the faith of the countries of Europe who felt themselves under constant and heavy Soviet pressure. Secretary of State Marshall then informed the National Security Council that he had that morning received a message from Bevin declaring that evidence was needed that the United States was willing to assume certain obligations, and that Bevin also felt that negotiations should be initiated from Washington. The military point of view was represented by Secretary of the Army [Kenneth] Royall, who reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt we should not commit ourselves to any defense arrangement[s] until we knew what they were. . . . Secretary of Defense Forrestal pointed out that the French seemed to think that the first item on any regional security program should be the re-equipping of twenty-five French divisions. Our Chiefs of Staff, however, were of the opinion that our own strength should be bolstered first. . . . Lovett observed that it was virtually impossible to get Congress to approve substantial shipments of military equipment to other powers except for an emergency. . . . The National Security Council then recommended to me that the line of action proposed by the State Department should generally be followed, though with proper weight given both to the comments of the Joint Chief of Staff and to any changes that might be made in the Vandenberg Resolution during Senate debate.

On July 2, I approved a policy statement which said that the Vandenberg Resolution should be implemented to the fullest extent possible and that the Department of State should now go ahead with the preliminary conversations which the Brussels Pact powers had suggested. It was decided also that

United States military representatives should go to London to take part in the five-power military discussions there, although on a non-membership basis, and that we should seek to convince the Brussels Pact nations to proceed with military talks at once, even though the United States commitment was not to be made formal until later. Furthermore, the Department of State was to explore the possibility of including Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and perhaps Portugal and Sweden in the proposed arrangement and suggest for later adherence of Spain, Germany, and Austria, or the western zones of the last two countries. If Canada was willing to participate, the Department of State was to arrange for Canadian attendance at the London military talks.

If, as a result of the diplomatic talks with the Brussels Pact nations, we became convinced that some further political commitment from us was necessary at this time in order to bolster public morale and confidence in Western Europe, then we should undertake to discuss such an association with those countries. This was the cornerstone of the defense program, but no United States commitment should be entered into without the fullest bipartisan clearance here.

. . . The National Security Council proposed certain recommendations which I approved and which later became the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The two proposals—Mutual Defense Assistance Program and association with the Brussels Pact powers—supplemented each other, and yet they were independent of one another. The Congress had on several occasions authorized the giving of aid in the nature of military supplies and technical advice to certain nations. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program was intended to replace this piecemeal approach by a comprehensive program which would permit us to aid in the defense of those countries whose strategic location made them most important to the security of the United States in such amounts and at such times as a broad military and political view of the situation might demand. The program was a long-range proposition and not a stopgap measure. It should not jeopardize the minimum needs of our own armed forces, as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It should be tied in with the European Recovery Program in such a way that the total of the two programs would not endanger the stability of our domestic economy. . . .

This was the summer of 1948. Berlin was blockaded, and it was not yet at all certain that the airlift would succeed. Free men in Europe and in Asia, eager to resist aggression, could not wait for the future delivery of arms, which might come too late. Indeed, the main purpose of this aid proposal

was to make sure that we did not have another tragic instance of "too little and too late"—the kind of thing that had helped Hitler subjugate Europe. The State Department wasted little time getting the talks with the Brussels Pact powers under way. The first session of these talks was held [in Washington] on July 6, with Under Secretary Lovett heading the American delegation, and the ambassadors . . . of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada representing their respective countries (the Belgian [ambassador also represented] . . . Luxembourg). . . .

Because of the crucial importance of these meetings I wanted to make sure that I had all the information. Under Secretary of State Lovett called on me regularly, bringing the minutes of each meeting with him. The sessions were marked by a completely frank exchange of views, sometimes to the point of bluntness. Rarely has a group of diplomats representing six different nations, sat around one table and spoken with such complete frankness. . . .

These Washington meetings reached agreement and a statement was prepared and submitted to the represented governments.

The first section discussed the situation in Europe as it affected security. Here it was clearly recognized that the Soviet advance was a direct result of the war, which had created a vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe where German power had once prevailed. The Soviets' actions were described as part of an avowed drive for maximum extension of power and influence. At this stage, the Soviet Union was capable of extending her domination over the continent of Europe by force. The conferees noted that while there was no evidence that the Soviets had a timetable for armed aggression there was a constant danger of incidents developing from the international tension, and it was part of Soviet technique to apply pressure wherever an advantage might be gained. Furthermore, the extension of a minor incident could easily result in war and in the Soviet conquest of the continent of Europe.

This was the key point: The Marshall Plan had brought some relief, but the constant threat of unpredictable Soviet moves resulted in an atmosphere of insecurity and fear among the peoples of Western Europe. Something more needed to be done to counteract the fear of the peoples of Europe that their countries would be overrun by the Soviet Army before effective help could arrive. Only an inclusive security system could dispel these fears.

The next question was what countries should be associated in such a system. It was pointed out that enemy occupation of the territories of Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, and Portugal (with their dependent territories

in the Atlantic area, such as Greenland and the Azores) would represent a threat to the security of Western Europe. The conference took note of the fact that all of these nations might not be willing or prepared to assume the commitments of such an association. It was suggested, therefore, that there might be different classes of association, with varying degrees of obligation. It was agreed that there might be countries which, while not "Atlantic" in geography, might have such significance to Atlantic defense plans that they should be associated with the Atlantic nations. The case of Italy was especially in point, and the agreed statement recorded the fact that the United States delegation had particularly insisted that Italy should, in some manner, be brought into any proposed arrangement. The problems of Spain and western Germany, it was decided, would eventually have to be determined, but it was too early to attempt it at this particular moment. An outline of proposed provisions for a North Atlantic security arrangement was attached to the conference report.

The Brussels Pact nations wanted the North Atlantic pact to state that, if a member was attacked, the other members would supply all the military and other aid and assistance in their power. This, of course, implied going to war. Our delegation was instructed to take the position that this was an obligation which, in view of our Constitution, we were not prepared to assume. Canada proposed a compromise. This provided that in case of attack on a member state the other members should consider this an attack on themselves. But instead of becoming immediately involved in war, the compromise provided that each nation would be expected to lend aid to the victim in accordance with its own constitutional processes. In plain language, this means there is an obligation to give all aid possible, but subject to the constitutional procedures of each country. When the treaty was later given its final form, this compromise became, in substance, Article V—the key provision of the treaty.

On October 13 Canada notified the State Department that she was ready to enter into a treaty along the general lines suggested by the agreed statement. . . . Two weeks later word was received that the Brussels Pact nations had agreed in principle to the negotiation of such a North Atlantic security pact. When the negotiators came together again . . . it took little time to produce a draft treaty. . . .

In working out the North Atlantic Treaty we had made a truly momentous decision. As I described it to the National Security Council, it could be called "an offensive-defensive alliance to maintain the peace in the North Atlantic area but without automatic provision for war." With the North

Atlantic Treaty and the corresponding western Hemisphere arrangement concluded at Rio de Janeiro, we gave proof of our determination to stand by the free countries to resist armed aggression from any quarter. I considered this so basic to our position in the world that I included the North Atlantic Treaty, along with adherence to the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, and the Point Four [foreign aid] program among the foundations of our foreign policy in my inaugural address on January 20, 1949.

By that time, the diplomats had nearly completed their work on the treaty text. Dean Acheson, who was now secretary of state, spent considerable time with key members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in order to familiarize them with the document and the issues behind it. The formal signing of the treaty took place in Washington on April 4, 1949, and in my remarks on that occasion I said that this treaty was indeed an act of neighborliness, and compared the twelve nations to a group of householders who decide that they have so much in common that it would be to their mutual advantage to associate themselves more formally. The treaty itself, I observed, was simple and straightforward. We hoped that it would serve to prevent World War III. Surely, if something like it had existed in 1914 and in 1939, the acts of aggression that had pushed the world into two disastrous wars would not have happened.

The treaty was a reaffirmation of our dedication to the cause of peace, to the ideal of peaceful settlement of disputes that was represented by the organization of the United Nations. The pact was a shield against aggression and against the fear of aggression—a bulwark that would permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the task of achieving a fuller and happier life for all our citizens.

On April 12, I sent the treaty to the Senate with a message asking for its ratification. It was, I told the senators, a long step on the road to peace. We would need to work continuously in the advancement of peace by taking those practical and necessary steps that events would call for. But no better foundation could be found for the future of peace in the world than the step which we had taken by allying ourselves with the nations of the North Atlantic area for our mutual defense. The Senate gave the North Atlantic Treaty as thorough an examination as only that great deliberative body can give. The critics had the fullest opportunity to be heard, and every conceivable objection was discussed and answered. The debate ended on July 21, when eighty-two senators voted to ratify the treaty, far more than were needed under the constitutional requirements for a two-thirds vote for the ratification of treaties. . . .

On July 25, I affixed my signature to the treaty ratification and thus completed American accession to the pact. On August 24, 1949, a sufficient number of ratifications had been deposited to bring the treaty into effect. This, officially, is the day on which NATO became a reality.

We realized, of course, that much still remained to be done if the new arrangement was to prove effective. As soon as the treaty had been ratified, I asked the Congress to provide approximately \$1,400,000,000 for a military assistance program, both for the NATO countries and others, such as Greece, Turkey, and the Philippines. There were three different types of assistance planned under this program. . . .

Administrative machinery under the treaty organization was set up without delay. A North Atlantic Council was formed on September 17, 1949, with the foreign ministers of the participating nations as members. The cabinet officers in charge of defense in the several member nations formed a Defense Committee and under that body a Military Committee of top-ranking generals and admirals from all twelve nations went to work at once.

The first major task was to reach an agreement on how to work out the defense of the NATO area. Up to this time each country had its own defense plans, but now it became necessary to think of the area as one. This did not involve specific national defense positions but, instead, the over-all strategic approach. This plan was worked out without delay, and the NATO Council gave its approval on January 6, 1950.

Secretary Acheson brought the plan to me and I examined it at length, with the assistance of my diplomatic, military, and economic advisers. I thought it was a good plan and one that would serve the interest of the United States well. On January 27, 1950, I formally approved this proposal for the strategy that would control a major part of our defenses and occupy a major share of our defense efforts. . . .

In Congress, there were demands for proof that the Europeans would carry an appropriate share of the burden of common defense. In Europe, just as understandably, there was reluctance to extend risks and expenses until America's participation was clearly evident. In addition, there were Europe's internal tensions that complicated the job. France was unwilling to give up any part of its preoccupation with the defense against Germany. The Benelux countries wanted to make sure that Britain as well as France shared in the actual defense arrangements in their part of Europe. The Scandinavians felt they were out on a flank and dangerously exposed on their end of the strategic arc. England tried to preserve her strength for the preservation of the remnants of her empire. And this is just the beginning of the list.

Through a series of conferences, Secretary [of State] Acheson worked with great patience and skill to drive home the point that NATO would have no meaning at all unless a really joint effort was made at common defense and mutual aid, and his arguments won the day. There would have been no NATO without Dean Acheson.

The major problem in these discussions soon proved to be the question of German participation in the defense of Europe. The German people, divided between East and West, were still under occupation following the defeat and destruction of Hitler. But the land they inhabit is the very core of Europe, and the people who live in it have proved over the centuries that they have the will and the ability to defend it. Without Germany, the defense of Europe was a rear-guard action on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. With Germany, there could be a defense in depth, powerful enough to offer effective resistance to aggression from the East. The logic behind this situation is very plain. Any map will show it, and a little arithmetic will prove what the addition of German manpower means to the strength of the joint defense of Europe. To bring the Germans into the defense arrangements of Europe and to spur the Europeans on to great efforts themselves were the two main efforts required in making NATO work. The Germans wanted restoration of their full sovereignty before they assumed their place in the scheme of defense, but the French kept insisting that Germany had to be kept under controls. In conference after conference it seemed impossible to break this deadlock.

When Dean Acheson went to these conferences, he would send me a daily cable with a full summary of the day's events. This was not the same as the report which the delegation secretary would compile for the use of the State Department. It was an entirely personal account, dictated by . . . [Acheson] himself and intended for me alone. In this manner, I would know from day to day what was going on behind the closed doors of the conference. Acheson always kept me fully informed about every move he intended to make.

One of the most important of this series of NATO conferences was the one held in New York in September 1950. . . .

The meetings in New York, which convened on September 12, 1950, included Dean Acheson, French foreign minister Robert Schuman, and British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin. The central problem addressed by the meetings was the defense of Europe. Acheson provided Truman a very full account of an especially important meeting which included, besides Schuman and Bevin, the American, British,

and French members of the High Commission for Germany. Acheson pointed out during the meeting the extraordinary steps the United States had taken to involve itself in the defense of Europe, all of which were based on the expectation that the Europeans would take similarly extraordinary steps in their own defense. This defense, Acheson argued, must begin as far to the east as possible, which required German participation in the European defense force. But the United Kingdom and France, Acheson pointed out, had refused to face the question of German participation. Schuman had been instructed by his government to oppose the creation of a new German army, and Bevin's instructions did not allow him to agree to a German army. Acheson discovered that neither Schuman nor Bevin had any discretion to negotiate this matter. But, he told Truman, the discussion was useful and cleared away several arguments which hindered consideration of the German issue. It was quite clear, Acheson reported, that the British and French were quite prepared to accept what we offered but they were not prepared to accept what we asked. Acheson told Truman there was no reason for him to worry. I feel reasonably sure that we can work this out; that it may be a question of whose nerve lasts longer, but that it just must come out in the right way.

Following this meeting, Bevin was instructed by his government to work with Acheson for a European defense force with German participation.

. . . As a result of Acheson's efforts, all member countries except France accepted the idea of a united force, though the countries on the outer rim of the alliance, such as Norway and Portugal, were not as enthusiastic about it as the Benelux countries. But in principle, only French objections remained in the path of erecting an effective defense for Western Europe.

The talks with the French and British were continued. . . . The defense ministers of the three countries joined the foreign ministers at the conference table. . . . In the candid talks to these men it became very plain that the French knew just as well as we or the British that they would need German manpower if Europe was to be successfully defended. They were convinced that the French parliament would never agree to any proposal that would permit Germans to be armed before there was a European defense force actually in being. . . .

The main thing, we all thought, was to get the project of a unified force started. It had been understood by all concerned that the supreme commander to be designated would be an American. As a matter of fact, in our planning of the program I had always had . . . Eisenhower in mind as the logical man for this unique job. As the Allied commander in Europe during World War II . . . Eisenhower had shown remarkable ability in leadership

in heading up a combined headquarters for the forces of several nations. He was very popular in Europe, and at the head of a European defense headquarters would demonstrate our determination and our desire to make the joint effort a success.

On October 19, [1950], I added this handwritten postscript to a letter to Eisenhower: "First time you are in town, I wish you'd come in and see me. If I send for you, we'll start the 'speculators' to work."

Eisenhower called on me at the White House on October 28. I told him what I had in mind for him to do. He heard me out in silence and then said he would accept the assignment. Eisenhower told me that he would take it because he was a soldier and this was a call to duty. But it was the kind of duty, he told me, that he accepted gladly because it was a job that very badly needed to be done. He believed firmly, he said, in the importance of bringing the nations of Europe together and doing it speedily.

Two days later I received the defense ministers and defense chiefs of the NATO countries and was able to tell them in confidence that a top-ranking general would be available for the NATO high command and that I had already conferred with him about it. The appointment itself was not made until December 18. The procedure was for the North Atlantic Council to pass a resolution in which they asked me to designate an American officer as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Europe. At the same time, Dean Acheson sent me a message from the council meeting in Brussels in which he reported that the Council members had unanimously expressed the hope that I would appoint . . . Eisenhower. I replied at once that . . . Eisenhower had been so designated.

The new supreme commander left for Europe in January 1951 for a quick survey of the situation. He returned then to Washington and made a full report to me, and I suggested that he also report on the European situation to the Congress, and by radio to the nation. I think these reports were effective because they were made with utmost candor and sincerity.

Eisenhower reported to me, and later at a Cabinet meeting, that while he had found general agreement on the principles of a unified defense for Europe, and general agreement also that such a defense could be successfully organized, he found it much tougher trying to reach an understanding with each country as to its contribution. He said that at each stop on his recent survey trip he would ask, "What are you going to do? You have to tell me exactly what you are going to do so that I can report back to the United States government." The answers to this question, Eisenhower said, all tripped over one hard, tough fact. This fact was the poverty of Western Europe. . . .

Eisenhower said he had found that this poverty meant that no one yard stick could be used to measure the contributions of the various countries. We could not, for example, expect the Western Europeans to spend the same percentage of their budget on defense that we were going to spend. They were so desperately poor that some of them could not spend any more than they were already doing. The main thing, Eisenhower said when he spoke at the Cabinet meeting, was for us to get this "combined spiral of strength going up." "These people," he said, "believe in the cause. Now, they have got to believe in themselves. They have got to have confidence that they can do the job. The way we can give them that confidence is by sending equipment and by sending American units over there to help morale."

Eisenhower was fully in accord with my policy in Europe. He worked for it diligently and devotedly from the day of his appointment as supreme commander until he returned to the United States in 1952 to enter the political arena. Throughout his stay in Europe he frequently wrote to me directly or through Averell Harriman, and he was always assured of my full support in everything he was doing in Europe.

Near the end of his first year in Europe, in early January 1952, Eisenhower wrote me a long, detailed letter reporting on the first year's work. He reviewed the progress that had been made in the direction of a European army and discussed some of the major things that still remained to be done. He took the position that those countries of the alliance on the continent of Europe would have to work toward economic and political consolidation. Britain could not easily be fitted into such a picture, and he agreed with the British that they should be associated with the proposed European Defense Community but not directly take part in it. But there was some hope, in Eisenhower's opinion, that the return of Winston Churchill to the government in England would mean more emphasis on political union. Eisenhower urged me to persuade Churchill, in his forthcoming visit to Washington, to make "a ringing statement that would minimize British non-participation and emphasize British moral, political, and military support for the European Army."

. . . The approach of the 1952 presidential election caused a great deal of anxiety in friendly capitals. Everywhere the same doubts and fears began to spring up again that had been so dominant before the treaty was signed and . . . Eisenhower sent over to organize the defense. We found that statesmen of other nations were holding back because they wanted to be sure that the commitments they might make would not be made to an American who voted for an isolationist administration. They were relieved, therefore,

so our diplomats reported, to know that the nominees of both parties were men who believed in the basic need for NATO and European defense. But it is one of the facts of American foreign policy, and one that those in responsibility must bear in mind, that an impending change in administration in Washington makes our friends abroad anxious and our enemies hopeful. They all remember what happened when [Warren] Harding replaced [Woodrow] Wilson [as president in 1921], and what calamity it meant for the world.

When the time came for me to turn over the reins of the government to . . . Eisenhower, NATO was one of the projects that I could pass on to him in the full knowledge that he would understand my motives and share them. He had, after all, played a most important part in it.

The treaties with Germany and the European Defense Community Treaty still awaited completion [when I left office]. We had hoped that these treaties would be ratified toward the end of 1952, but both in France and, to a lesser degree, in Germany resistance to the proposed arrangements had flared up sharply in November [1952], and further delay was likely, though this was delay over matters of timing and emphasis, not over principles.

The structure of Western European defense had been built—built largely because we were ready to break with tradition and enter into a peacetime military alliance; because we had been ready to assume not only our share but the leadership in the forging of joint forces; because we had recognized that the peace of the world would best be served by a Europe that was strong and united, and that therefore European unity and European strength were the best guarantees for the prevention of another major war.

Years of Trial and Hope, 240–261

The Berlin Airlift

1948–1949

Failure of joint control—Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan—currency reform—"technical difficulties"—blockade—a precarious position—General Clay's advice—expanding the airlift—an interview with Stalin—negotiating with Molotov—the Allies turn to the United Nations—the airlift's success—the German people turn toward the West—Stalin indicates a change in policy—the blockade is lifted

. . . Under the provisions of the agreement between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin [made during their meeting in the Soviet city of Yalta in February 1945], the military government to rule Germany was to be jointly directed from Berlin [through an organization called the Allied Control Council]. . . . For the first year after the war, the British and Americans made every effort to make a joint control succeed. The Russians, however, with a good assist from the French, defeated these efforts. The French were fearful of Germany. Of course, three German invasions in seventy years had given them ample grounds to fear the Germans. But their desire to see Germany dismembered led them to obstruct a number of joint-control measures at a time when such cooperation might still have been possible. The Russians, on their part, seemed determined to treat their zone of Germany virtually as if it were Soviet conquered territory. They sealed off all contacts between their part of Germany and the



areas occupied by us, the British, and the French, and this left little choice to the officials of the three governments in the western part of Germany. Arrangements had to be made for some restoration of normal economic activity, and in order to facilitate it, "bi-zonal" machinery was set up to cover both the British and American zones. Later the French joined in the arrangements. . . .

With assistance from the United States and the United Kingdom and with the increased economic activity facilitated by the joining of the American, British, and French zones of occupation, Germany began to revive. The Marshall Plan, announced by Secretary of State George Marshall in June 1947 and formally created by the European Recovery Act of April 1948, promised to restore economic health to all of Western Europe.

Russia was caught off guard by the Marshall Plan. Moscow quickly realized that when the Marshall Plan began to function, the opportunity to communize Western Europe by exploiting her economic miseries would be lost. Failing to prevent allied cooperation for European recovery, Russia sought to retaliate by two moves. The first move was to set up a counterpart of a Marshall Plan under Russian auspices for her satellites. This was designed to cut off whatever flow of trade and commerce had been resumed between Eastern and Western Europe. This would also retard the restoration of the normal, prewar flow of commerce so essential to these countries in Europe. The second and even more provocative move was to risk a military incident in Berlin designated to test our firmness and our patience. The British, French, and American forces were in close quarters with the Russians in Berlin. Each occupied separate zones in the former capital, which was surrounded entirely by German territory held by the Russians, and all movement of American, British, and French personnel and supplies to our areas in Berlin was through a narrow corridor controlled by the Russians. . . .

The Russians . . . became less and less tractable, and on March 20, 1948, their representative finally walked out of the Allied Control Council. For most of Germany, this act merely formalized what had been an obvious fact for some time; namely, that the four-power control machinery had become unworkable. For the city of Berlin, however, this was the curtain-raiser for a major crisis.

On March 31, [1948], the deputy military governor of the Soviet Union . . . notified our military government in Berlin that in two days, beginning April 1, the Russians would check all United States personnel passing

through their zone for identification and would inspect all freight shipments and all except personal baggage. Our military government authorities rejected these conditions. They pointed out that we had been assured free access to Berlin at the time our troops withdrew [from positions in what became the Soviet occupation zone of Germany] . . . into their own zones [at the end of the war in Europe]. The Russians claimed that no such agreement had been made. They declared that they had the full right to control all traffic in their zone. They began to stop our trains at the zonal border and turn them back when the train commanders, under orders, refused to submit to inspection. Between April 1 and July 1, Russian orders sealed off all highway, rail, and river traffic into and out of Berlin. "Technical difficulties" was given as the reason by the Russians.

The nature of these "difficulties" soon became apparent. On June 18 the British, French, and Americans announced that the three western zones would immediately set up a new type of currency. The Russians had plates of the currency in use at the beginning of the occupation and had been able to flood the western zone with money printed in the east zone, thus deliberately adding to the inflation which threatened to block Germany's effort at recovery. In due course we changed the plates, but Russia continued to manipulate the east mark. Our currency reform was designed to give Germany a sound mark to use in the west. And of course the good western currency was preferred by all Germans. The Russians opposed our currency reform because it exposed the basic unsoundness of their own currency. And it became one of the major points of contention during the discussions on the Berlin blockade. The importance the Russians attached to our move was soon obvious: They offered to reopen the approaches to the city of Berlin if the Western powers would call off the currency change-over. What the Russians were trying to do was to get us out of Berlin. At first, they took the position that we never had a legal right to be in Berlin. Later they said we had had the right but that we had forfeited it.

The entire setup of the four powers in Berlin, involving our withdrawal from areas intended for Russian occupation, had been negotiated as a military matter by the generals in the field. General Lucius Clay later blamed himself for not having insisted on a confirmation of the agreement in writing. It is my opinion that it would have made very little difference to the Russians whether or not there was an agreement in writing. What was at stake in Berlin was not a contest over legal rights, although our position was entirely sound in international law, but a struggle over Germany and, in a larger sense, over Europe. In the face of our launching of the Marshall Plan,

the Kremlin tried to mislead the people of Europe into believing that our interest and support would not extend beyond economic matters and that we would back away from any military risks.

I brought up the situation at the Cabinet meeting of June 25. Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall maintained constant touch with General Clay in Germany and reported that a serious situation was developing. I asked Royall to inquire from General Clay whether the situation was serious enough to consider the removal of the families of our personnel in Berlin. Clay thought it unwise to do so for the psychological effect the move might have. Clay was forced to make emergency arrangements to have essential supplies flown into the city, since Berlin, by now, was effectively blockaded by the Russians both by land and by water.

On June 26, the day after I discussed the Berlin crisis with the Cabinet, I directed that this improvised "airlift" be put on a full-scale organized basis and that every plane available to our European Command be impressed into service. In this way, we hoped that we might be able to feed Berlin until the diplomatic deadlock could be broken.

Negotiations had been transferred to Moscow, where on July 6 the representatives of the three Western powers, with our ambassador, W. Bedell Smith, acting as spokesman, put their case before the Russians. The Soviet reply, given on July 14, dropped all pretenses of "technical difficulties" and made it abundantly clear that the blockading of Berlin by the Russians was a major political and propaganda move. The Soviets refused, at this time, to talk about Berlin except as part of discussions covering the entire subject of Germany. They rejected our condition that the blockade be lifted before any talks could start. . . . The Russians were obviously determined to force us out of Berlin. They had suffered setbacks recently in Italy, in France, and in Finland. Their strongest satellite, Yugoslavia, had suddenly developed a taste for independent action, and the European Recovery Program [the Marshall Plan] was beginning to succeed. The blockade of Berlin was international communism's counterattack. The Kremlin had chosen perhaps the most sensitive objective in Europe—Berlin, the old capital of Germany, which was and is a symbol to the Germans. If we failed to maintain our position there, communism would gain great strength among the Germans. Our position in Berlin was precarious. If we wished to remain there, we would have to make a show of strength. But there was always the risk that Russian reaction might lead to war. We had to face the possibility that Russia might deliberately choose to make Berlin the pretext for war, but a more immediate danger was the risk that a trigger-happy Russian pilot or

hotheaded communist tank commander might create an incident that could ignite the power keg.

General Clay came to the White House on July 22, 1948, to attend the meeting that day of the National Security Council, and I asked him to report on the situation in Germany. Here, in substance, is what he said: The abandonment of Berlin would have a disastrous effect upon our plans for Western Germany. It would also slow down European recovery, the success of which depended upon more production, particularly from Western Germany. The Germans in general were more concerned than the Allies about the possibility of our leaving Berlin. We should be prepared to go to any lengths to find a peaceful solution to the situation, but we had to remain in Berlin. The attitude of the German people, Clay added, was in some respects unbelievable. The party leaders in Berlin who made up the City Magistrate, with headquarters in the Soviet zone, had absolutely refused to accept Soviet control. The people of Berlin were determined to stand firm even if it required undergoing additional hardships.

He reported that the airlift had been averaging about 2400 to 2500 tons per day, which was more than enough to handle food requirements but was inadequate to include the necessary amounts of coal. The minimum required to sustain Berlin without extreme hardship was estimated to be 4500 tons per day. For the summer, 3500 tons per day might suffice, but additional tonnage would be required during the winter. At the moment, the airlift operation involved fifty-two C-54s and eighty C-47s. Two round trips were made each day, involving more than 250 landings. Seventy-five additional C-47 planes would enable us to bring in 3500 tons daily. I asked . . . Air Force Chief of Staff [Hoyt Vandenberg] what problems would be involved in making these additional planes available and was told . . . that if we put more planes on the Berlin airlift the Military Air Transport Service would become disrupted. We would also find that we would need at least one more major airfield inside Berlin to handle the traffic and at least one major maintenance depot at the other end. . . .

I then asked General Clay what risks would be involved if we tried to supply Berlin by means of armed convoys. The general said he thought the initial reaction of the Russians would be to set up road blocks. Our engineers would be able to clear such obstacles, provided there was no Russian interference, but the next step the Russians would take, General Clay thought, would be to meet the convoys with armed force. [Under Secretary of State] Robert Lovett, who was in attendance with Secretary Marshall, asked Clay if he thought the Russians might try to block our airplanes with fighter

patrols or by other methods. General Clay said he felt that the Russians would not attack our planes unless they had made the decision to go to war. I asked General Clay if there were any indications known to him that the Russians would go to war. He said he did not think so. What they seemed to be aiming at was to score a major victory by forcing us out of Berlin, either now or after fall and winter weather forced us to curtail the airlift, without, however, extending the conflict.

We discussed the kind of assistance that we might expect from our allies if the conflict became more intense. I stated it as my judgment that if we moved out of Berlin we would be losing everything we were fighting for. The main question was: How could we remain in Berlin without risking all-out war? General Vandenberg said . . . that he felt the concentration of aircraft necessary to provide Berlin with all its supplies by air would mean reducing our air strength elsewhere, both in planes and in personnel. An emergency would find us more exposed than we might be able to afford.

I did not agree with Vandenberg. I asked him if he would prefer to have us attempt to supply Berlin by ground convoy. Then, if the Russians resisted that effort and plunged the world into war, would not the Air Force have to contribute its share to the defense of the nation? I answered my own question: The airlift involved less risks than armed road convoys. Therefore, I directed the Air Force to furnish the fullest support possible to the problem of supplying Berlin.

Vandenberg interjected that that would not be possible unless additional airfield facilities were constructed in Berlin. General Clay pointed out that he had already selected a site for an additional field and that construction, using German manpower, could begin at once. General Vandenberg then assured me that the Air Force would devote its entire energy to the carrying out of my order.

I was compelled to leave the meeting at this point, but the council continued to discuss various phases of the problem, such as the number of planes that could be put on the airlift at once and the number of dependents to be retained in Berlin. We had to be prepared to expand the airlift to a maximum while continuing talks with the Russians to see if the blockade could not be removed by agreement. On July 30, Ambassador Smith and his French and British colleagues handed the Russian foreign ministry the Allied reply to the Russian note of July 14. We declared that the Russian reply had offered no constructive suggestion. The situation was full of dangers to world peace, and for that reason the three ambassadors requested a conference with Stalin and Molotov.

This interview with Stalin and Molotov took place on August 2 at nine o'clock in the evening. Stalin, as was so often the case, appeared more open to argument than his subordinates had been, and the meeting resulted in a more relaxed atmosphere. Stalin indicated that he was willing to have the transport restrictions lifted, provided arrangements were made to have both the eastern and western types of German currency circulate in all of Berlin. He no longer insisted that there had to be a conference on all-German problems before the blockade was lifted, but he wished it recorded that it was the "insistent wish" of the Soviet government that the Allies postpone the next steps planned in the integration of the western zones.

However, when Ambassador Smith and his colleagues sat down with Molotov to put this understanding into a formal statement, the Russian position once again turned uncompromising and hard. Four lengthy meetings produced no agreement. Our representatives objected to the inclusion in the Russian draft of a sentence that, in substance, would have had us admit that we were being readmitted to Berlin by sufferance only. Molotov rejected the Western draft because it asserted that we were in Berlin as a matter of established right. The Russian version said that transportation restrictions imposed after the date of the currency reform would be lifted, but since the currency reform did not come into effect until late in June, such an undertaking would not have included a great many of the prior restrictions. What was more important, if we signed this statement, we would have agreed to the Russian contention that the blockade was a "defense" against our currency measure. In addition, the Russian draft would have vested the control of both currencies in use in Berlin in one bank, completely controlled by them, and would have given a Russian-controlled agency supervision over all of Berlin's external trade.

These drafting sessions with Molotov proved so futile that we instructed Smith to ask for another personal conference with . . . Stalin. This meeting took place on August 23, and again Stalin appeared much more interested in reaching a basis for understanding than Molotov had been. On the matter of how far back the lifting of restrictions should extend, Molotov again insisted that the statement should promise only the lifting of those restrictions that had been imposed after June 18. Stalin, however, thought it would be better to have the statement read "the restrictions lately imposed" and to have it understood that if any restrictions had been imposed prior to June 18 they would also be lifted. Stalin also agreed that the Soviet bank that was to control the two Berlin currencies would, in turn, be under four-power control. But Molotov again proved difficult when the diplomats sat down to draw

up a communiqué and a set of instructions for the four military governors in Berlin who, it had been agreed, should work out the details. In the end, in fact, it was impossible to issue even an interim communiqué to inform the public that technical questions had been referred to Berlin, because Molotov refused to agree to any text except in his terms.

The discussions among the four military governors never got out of the stage of frustration. Marshal [Vasily] Sokolovsky, the Russian representative, at once took a position diametrically opposed to the explicit assurances which Stalin had given the ambassadors, declaring that he would not even consider the removal of any of the restrictions imposed before June 18. Indeed, he tried to put new restrictions in, this time on air traffic. He also stated categorically that control by the four powers of the bank issuing the currency certificates was out of the question. The week of technical discussions in Berlin proved even more futile than the month of negotiations in Moscow.

The airlift, meanwhile, steadily expanded. On August 20, Secretary of the Army Royall reported to the National Security Council that the combined British-American lift had averaged 3,300 tons daily and that the maximum for any day's lift had now reached 4,575 tons. Of this tonnage, the British, using everything they had available by way of transport planes, had flown in about one third. The stockpiles in Berlin were slowly growing; there was now a twenty-five-day reserve of coal and a thirty-day reserve of food in that city. On September 9, Secretary of the Air Force [Stuart] Symington informed the National Security Council that since early August the daily average lift had been increased to 4,000 tons and that it was likely that 5,000 tons a day could be reached if additional cargo planes were allocated.

At this September 9 meeting of the NSC we discussed at length the implications of the apparent failure of the negotiations with the Russians. Marshall and Lovett reviewed the diplomatic events of the past month and concluded that apparently we would have no alternative but to put the case before the United Nations. . . . Lovett called attention to the fact that the Soviets had announced that they would hold air maneuvers in a general area that included the air lanes used by our airlift. We informed the Russians that we would not halt our air operations. Secretary Marshall pointed out that time was on the side of the Soviets. We could continue and even step up the airlift, but even though it had been more successful than had been expected, the Russians could try our patience by ever-new methods. Just recently, for instance, there had been communist-led riots in the western zones of Berlin, and the situation was so dangerous that the slightest element added might be the fuse to spark a general conflagration.

Some voices were raised in America calling for a break with the Russians. These people did not understand that our choice was only between negotiations and war. There was no third way. As long as the Russians were willing to continue talks—however futile—there would be no shooting.

Ambassador Smith was directed to hand Molotov an aide-mémoire which listed the specific causes of the failure of the Berlin talks and stated our position in the plainest language possible. Molotov's reply was the same old story. All the blame was on our side, and nothing much could be done until we accepted the Soviet position in its entirety. The foreign ministers of France, Britain, and the United States, who were at that moment conferring in Paris, issued a statement on September 26, 1948, calling the Soviet reply "unsatisfactory" and announcing that the case would now be placed before the United Nations. . . .

The American complaint against Russia was formally submitted to the United Nations in a note which Ambassador Warren Austin handed to Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on September 29. The note drew attention to the "serious situation which has arisen as a result of the unilateral imposition by the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of restrictions on transport and communications between the western zones of occupation in Germany and Berlin," and charged that the action was a threat to the peace under Chapter VII of the [United Nations] Charter. The note also made it clear that the United States regarded the Soviet action as a pressure device to secure political objectives. The Soviet government took the position that there would have been no blockade if the Western powers had acceded to the Russian position. Furthermore, so . . . [Soviet deputy foreign minister Andrey] Vishinsky argued in the Security Council of the United Nations, there was no blockade in the sense of traditional international law and, therefore, there could be no real threat to peace. The Soviet Union, Vishinsky said, would not take part in any discussion of the blockade before the Security Council.

Our spokesman before the Security Council throughout this dispute was Philip Jessup . . . [a] leading authorit[y] . . . on international law [who] . . . gained the respect of the world for the statesmanlike manner in which he represented the case for the Western powers before the United Nations.

The battle of diplomacy was overshadowed, however, by the drama of the aerial convoys that day after day winged their way into Berlin. By mid-October General Clay could state as a proven conclusion that the airlift was no longer an experiment. Even adverse weather could not keep our supply planes from making their runs from the western zones into the blockaded

former capital of Germany. General Clay made this report at another meeting of the National Security Council on October 22, 1948, when he placed before us an account not only of the technical achievement of the airlift but also of the effect our action in Berlin had had on the German people. They had closed ranks and applied themselves to the tasks of reconstruction with new vigor. It had turned them sharply against communism. Germany, which had been waiting passively to see where it should cast its lot for the future, was veering toward the cause of the Western nations.

The Soviet leaders made further attempts toward the end of the year to induce the Berliners to weaken in their determination to stick with the West. On November 30, Soviet intrigues led to the splitting up of the Berlin city council, and the city was thus, for all practical purposes, split in two. The Russians also introduced a new identification system that made contacts between the eastern and western portions of the city almost impossible, and they changed the system of distribution for electric power, virtually disrupting the transport setup.

Meanwhile, the Security Council of the United Nations had a . . . committee working on recommendations for a solution of the currency deadlock. Our reaction to these proposals was that our experience with the Russians impelled us to reject any plan that provided for a four-power operation. We had learned that the Russians would usually agree in principle but would rarely perform in practice. We wanted a settlement, but we could not accept a settlement that would put the people of Berlin at the mercy of the Soviets and their German communist hirelings.

This is where things stood as 1948 ended and 1949 began. We had fought off the Russian attempt to force us out of Berlin. The longer the blockade continued, the more the technical efficiency of the airlift improved, and the more the people of Germany looked toward the West to strengthen them in their determination to remain free. Berlin had become a symbol of America's—and the West's—dedication to the cause of freedom.

The Kremlin began to see that its effort to force us out was doomed. Russia's toughness and truculence in the Berlin matter had led many Europeans to realize the need for closer military assistance ties among the Western nations, and this led to discussions which eventually resulted in the establishment of NATO. Berlin had been a lesson to all.

Late in January 1949 the Kremlin released a series of answers given by . . . Stalin to questions submitted by an American correspondent. Stalin had used this device—and correspondents—on other occasions to indicate changes in attitude or policy. At this time, he answered a question with

regard to the Berlin blockade, saying that there would be no obstacle to the lifting of the traffic restrictions if restrictions imposed by the three Western powers and by the Russians were lifted at the same time. Dean Acheson, whom I had appointed secretary of state after my election in 1948, made his regular call at the White House after this Stalin interview was published. We went over . . . Stalin's answers with great care. We noticed that for the first time since June 1948 the Berlin blockade was not tied to the currency matter in the Russian statement. Acheson suggested, and I approved, that we instruct Jessup to find out from the Russian delegation at the United Nations if this had been intentional. On February 15, 1949 . . . Jessup found an informal opportunity to pass a few words with . . . [Yakov] Malik, the Soviet representative at the United Nations, while the delegates were in their lounge. Jessup observed to Malik that Stalin's answer made no reference to the currency problem in the Berlin matter. Was this omission of any significance? Mr. Malik said he did not know but that he would ask. Exactly one month later he had an answer: The omission was "not accidental." . . . The Russians were still insistent that we call off our actions to create a West German government. But they were no longer insistent that this had to be done first before they would call off the blockade. They were now willing to agree that all restrictions on traffic in and out of Berlin imposed by either side after March 1, 1948, would be lifted, and that then the Council of Foreign Ministers should be convened to discuss "matters arising out of the situation in Berlin, and matters affecting Germany as a whole." Thus the Russians were ready to retreat. On May 4, a communiqué announced that the four governments concerned—the United States, Great Britain, France, and the USSR—had agreed: The blockade of Berlin would end on May 12.

More than fourteen months had passed since the first restrictions had been imposed by the Russians. A little over a year had elapsed during which Berlin had been supplied by means of the airlift. This achievement by the Air Force deserves much praise. Technically, it was an extremely difficult job—so difficult that even the Air Force chiefs themselves at first had serious doubts that it could be done. It proved a beacon light of hope for the peoples of Europe. When we refused to be forced out of the city of Berlin, we demonstrated to the people of Europe that with their cooperation we would act, and act resolutely, when their freedom was threatened. Politically it brought the peoples of western Europe . . . [closer] to us.

The Berlin blockade was a move to test our capacity and will to resist. This action and the previous attempts to take over Greece and Turkey were part

of a Russian plan to probe for soft spots in the Western allies' positions all around their own perimeter.

Years of Trial and Hope, 120–131

The paragraph beginning “Russia was caught” and part of the paragraph beginning “The second and” have been moved down three paragraphs from their position in the original text. The chapter now begins with the last sentence of the paragraph beginning “The second and.”

Israel

Palestine—Jews and Arabs—"non-repatriables"—the Harrison report—100,000 immigrants—the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry—British intransigence—terrorism in Palestine—the British reject the committee's recommendations—the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine—Truman's dreams for the Middle East—partition—"pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House"—Jews and Arabs prepare for war—Eddie Jacobson and Chaim Weizmann—disagreement among Truman's advisers—end of the British mandate in Palestine—recognition

The fate of the Jewish victims of Hitlerism was a matter of deep personal concern to me. I have always been disturbed by the tragedy of people who have been made victims of intolerance and fanaticism because of their race, color, or religion. These things should not be possible in a civilized society. Russia and Poland, in recent history, had been terrible persecutors of the Jews, and east of the Rhine, ghettos were the rule, some of them going back to the Middle Ages. But the organized brutality of the Nazis against the Jews in Germany was one of the most shocking crimes of all times. The plight of the victims who had survived the mad genocide of Hitler's Germany was a challenge to Western civilization, and as president I undertook to do something about it. One of the solutions being proposed was a national Jewish home.



The question of Palestine as a Jewish homeland goes back to the solemn promise that had been made to them by the British in the Balfour Declaration of 1917—a promise which had stirred the hopes and the dreams of

these oppressed people. This promise, I felt, should be kept, just as all promises made by responsible, civilized governments should be kept.

My first official contact with the problem took place within a few days of the time I became president, when Secretary [of State] Stettinius had sent me a letter offering to "brief" me on Palestine before I might be approached by any interested parties. It was likely, he said, that efforts would soon be made by some of the Zionist leaders to obtain from me some commitments in favor of the Zionist program, which was aimed at unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment there of a Jewish state. Stettinius said, "There is continual tenseness in the situation in the Near East largely as a result of the Palestine question, and as we have interests in that area which are vital to the United States, we feel that this whole subject is one that should be handled with the greatest care and with a view to the long-range interests of this country."

Two weeks later Joseph C. Grew, who in Stettinius' absence was the acting secretary of state, sent me a further memorandum on the subject, informing me . . . [as follows]:

Although President Roosevelt at times gave expression to views sympathetic to certain Zionist aims, he also gave certain assurances to the Arabs which they regard as definite commitments on our part. On a number of occasions within the past few years, he authorized the [State] Department to assure the heads of the different Near Eastern Governments in his behalf that "in the view of this Government there should be no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews." In his meeting with King Ibn Saud early in 1945, Mr. Roosevelt promised the king that as regards Palestine he would make no move hostile to the Arab people and would not assist the Jews as against the Arabs.

I am attaching a copy of a memorandum summarizing the conversation between Ibn Saud and Mr. Roosevelt, of which the original is presumably with Mr. Roosevelt's papers. After the meeting, this memorandum was approved by both the president and the king, so that it may be regarded as completely authentic. On April 5, only a week before his death, the president signed a letter to Ibn Saud in which he repeated the assurances which he had made to the king during the meeting. A copy of this letter is also attached.

The Arabs, not only in Palestine but throughout the whole Near East, have made no secret of their hostility to Zionism and their Governments say that it would be impossible to restrain them from rallying with arms, in defense of what they consider to be an Arab country. We know that President Roosevelt understood this clearly, for as recently as March 3, after his trip to the Near East, he told an officer of the [State] Department that, in his opinion, a Jewish state in Palestine (the ultimate Zionist aim) could be established and maintained only by military force. . . .

I was fully aware of the Arabs' hostility to Jewish settlement in Palestine, but, like many Americans, I was troubled by the plight of the Jewish people in Europe. The Balfour Declaration, promising the Jews the opportunity to reestablish a homeland in Palestine, had always seemed to me to go hand in hand with the noble policies of Woodrow Wilson, especially the principle of self-determination. When I was in the Senate, I had told my colleagues, Senator Wagner of New York and Senator Taft of Ohio, that I would go along on a resolution putting the Senate on record in favor of the speedy achievement of the Jewish homeland.

But the State Department's concern was mainly with the question of how the Arabs would react and that this was the wrong time to raise the Palestine question. In another memorandum, on June 16, 1945, . . . Acting Secretary of State [Grew] said the State Department's view was that Palestine was one of the problems which should come up for settlement after the war through the United Nations Organization, and that in any event no decision regarding it should be taken without full consultation with both the Arabs and Jews. The memorandum closed with this well-intended advice on the subject of the likely call on me by Zionist leaders: "It does not seem, therefore, that you need go any further, unless you care to do so, than to thank the Zionist leaders for any materials which they may give you and to assure them their views will be given your careful consideration."

The Arab states presented their reasons for opposing a Jewish state and increased immigration to Palestine in letters to the state department. The Egyptian prime minister . . . wrote me directly:

. . . It is greatly to be regretted that persecutions of the Jews in certain European countries during the past half century and more, and especially their greatly intensified sufferings since the rise of Nazism, should have been seized upon by certain political elements to advance the politico-racial theories of Zionism and to appeal to the world at large for the support of their program. Unfortunately, the brunt of their effort has concentrated on Palestine where the Arabs, who, throughout their history, have shown great tolerance and even hospitality toward the Jews, are the innocent victims of propagandas, pressures and deprivations which they are quite unable to bear. Why, from a perfectly objective point of view, one small nation of one million people living in a very small territory should be forced to accept in twenty-five years immigrants of an alien race up to nearly fifty percent of their own number is hard to understand. The difficulties of absorbing such large numbers of aliens have been so great that the Arabs are firmly resolved to oppose any further increase in immigration. This principle has already been approved by a British White Paper. But this has not been the most serious aspect. Now, the guests at the Arab's table are declaring that in any case they are going to bring in large numbers of their

kinsmen, take over all of his lands, and rule to suit themselves. It is this program of setting up a Jewish State in which the Arabs will be either reduced to the inferior status of a minority or else have to leave their homes that arouses their firm determination to resist at all costs.

This was my reply to the Egyptian prime minister:

. . . I wish to assure you that the views set forth in the memorandum have received my careful attention. I am fully aware of the deep interest of the Arab countries in reaching an equitable solution of the Palestine question, and I wish to renew the assurances which your Government has previously received to the effect that in the view of the Government of the United States no decision should be taken regarding the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. . . .

Similar replies were given to the heads of government of other Arab states who wrote in the same vein. It was my position that the principle of self-determination required that Arabs as well as Jews be consulted. To assure the Arabs that they would be consulted was by no means inconsistent with my generally sympathetic attitude toward Jewish aspirations. It was my belief that world peace would, in the long run, be best served by a solution that would accord justice to the needs and the wants of the Jewish people who had so long been persecuted. The acts of extremists in Palestine, whether Jewish or Arab, I condemned and deplored, but I also felt that it was important that some encouragement be given to the Jews who wanted to further their cause by accepted democratic methods. . . .

Truman planned to discuss Palestine with Winston Churchill while they were together at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, but before the discussion could take place, Churchill's government was defeated and Clement Attlee replaced him as prime minister. Truman and Attlee discussed Palestine in the brief time available to them at Potsdam, and shortly before the conference ended, Attlee sent Truman a note promising that Palestine would be given attention at some future time.

When I returned from Potsdam and held my first press conference, a reporter asked me what position the government of the United States had taken at Berlin with regard to Palestine. Of course, there had been no official discussion of Palestine at the conference, but there were private talks. I stated my position to the press in these words:

The American view on Palestine is that we want to let as many of the Jews into Palestine as it is possible to let into that country. Then the matter will have to be worked out diplomatically with the British and the Arabs, so that if a state can be set up there they may be able to set it up on a peaceful basis. I have no desire to send 500,000 American soldiers there to make peace in Palestine.

The State Department continued to feel that we should stay out of any activity that might offend the Arabs, and the department . . . prepared a memorandum on the subject in September 1945. The memorandum dealt only with the question of further immigration into Palestine. In 1939, the British had issued a White Paper that sought to strike a medium between the Zionists' desire to have the country opened for Jewish immigrant[s] and the Arab resistance to any addition to the Jewish element of Palestine. The White Paper had promised a stated number of immigration "certificates" to the Jews but had also promised that no more than that number would be issued. With the end of the fighting in Europe, the demand for certificates increased sharply, and it immediately became clear that the early fall of 1945 would see the limit reached. Unless the Arabs agreed, there would be no further Jewish immigration. Since it was hardly conceivable, the memorandum said, that formal Arab acquiescence could be secured, the British would be faced with a difficult decision: whether to abide by the White Paper policy and thus, in effect, terminate Jewish immigration into Palestine, or to establish a new interim policy whereby Jewish immigration would continue, at least for the time being, until the Palestine mandate was revised and brought under the United Nations. The memorandum added that Zionists were demanding that one million Jews be admitted into Palestine as rapidly as possible.

The memorandum went on to say:

No government should advocate a policy of mass immigration unless it is prepared to assist in making available the necessary security forces, shipping, housing, unemployment guarantees. . . . In view of the foregoing, the United States should refrain from supporting a policy of large scale immigration into Palestine during the interim period. The United States could support a Palestine immigration policy during the interim period which would carry restrictions as to numbers and categories, taking into account humanitarian considerations, the economic welfare of Palestine and political conditions therein. The British Government, as the mandatory power, should accept primary responsibility for the policy and be responsible for carrying it out.

As I studied these conclusions, however, it did not seem to me that such an approach would solve the basic human problem. The fate of the thousands of Jews in Europe—really only a fraction of the millions whom Hitler had doomed to death—was a primary concern. Among the millions who had been displaced by the war, they had suffered more and longer than any other group, yet their condition had barely improved since the fighting had ended.

In June 1945, I had sent Earl G. Garrison, the dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, on a mission to Europe to investigate the conditions of those displaced persons called “non-repatriables” and his report was submitted in late August. It showed that these people—and a great many of them were Jews—were still housed in camps, still without hope for their future. And it also pointed out that very few among the Jews wished to return to the countries from which they had come originally.

[Harrison's report said this:]

If there is any genuine sympathy for what these survivors have endured, some reasonable extension or modification of the British White Paper of 1939 ought to be possible without too serious repercussions. For some of the European Jews, there is no acceptable or even decent solution for their future other than Palestine. This is said on a purely humanitarian basis with no reference to ideological or political considerations so far as Palestine is concerned.

It is my understanding, based upon reliable information, that certificates for immigration to Palestine will be practically exhausted by the end of the current month [August 1945]. What is the future to be? To anyone who has visited the concentration camps and who has talked with the despairing survivors, it is nothing short of calamitous to contemplate that the gates of Palestine should be soon closed.

The Jewish Agency of Palestine has submitted to the British Government a petition that one hundred thousand additional immigration certificates be made available. A memorandum accompanying the petition makes a persuasive showing with respect to the immediate absorptive capacity of Palestine and the current, actual man-power shortages there.

While there may be room for difference of opinion as to the precise number of such certificates which might under the circumstances be considerable reasonable, there is no question but that the request thus made would, if granted, contribute much to the sound solution for the future of Jews still in Germany and Austria and even other displaced Jews, who do not wish either to remain there or to return to their countries of nationality.

No other single matter is, therefore, so important from the viewpoint of Jews in Germany and Austria and those elsewhere who have known the horrors of concentration camps as is the disposition of the Palestine question.

The Harrison report was a moving document. The misery it depicted could not be allowed to continue. . . .

Truman wrote to British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, advocating the evacuation to Palestine of as many nonrepatriable Jews as possible who wished to go there. Attlee responded that the immediate issuing of 100,000 immigration certificates, as the Jews wanted, would have a dramatic effect on the situation in the Middle East, and that both the United Kingdom and the United States had promised to consult with the Arabs before taking any serious action with respect to Jewish immigration to Palestine. He urged that nothing be done until the United Nations had taken charge of Palestine.

. . . The British were enforcing their laws and cracking down hard on efforts to bring unauthorized immigrants into Palestine. People who were still wearing their concentration camp uniforms were being turned back as they tried to land in Palestine without certificates. The Zionists, on the other hand, were impatiently making my immediate objective more difficult to obtain. They wanted more than just easier immigration practices. They wanted the American government to support their aim of a Jewish state in Palestine.

It was my attitude that America could not stand by while the victims of Hitler's racial madness were denied the opportunities to build new lives. Neither, however, did I want to see a political structure imposed on the Near East that would result in conflict. My basic approach was that the long-range fate of Palestine was the kind of problem we had the United Nations for. For the immediate future, however, some aid was needed for the Jews in Europe to find a place to live in decency.

The State Department continued to be more concerned about the Arab reaction than the sufferings of the Jews. Early in October, Secretary Byrnes began to suggest to me that we ought to publish the letter President Roosevelt had sent to King Ibn Saud just before his death, thinking that that would make it plain to the American public that we would not endorse the Zionist program. In fact, he prepared a statement for me to make that would reaffirm what Roosevelt had said, and he wanted me to release it from the White House along with Roosevelt's letter of April 5. I decided that it would be well for the American people to understand that we wished to maintain friendship with the Arabs as well as with the Jews, so I authorized Byrnes to release the letter in question from the State Department. I saw no reason, however, why I, by a public statement, should take a position on a matter which I thought the United Nations ought to settle.

A message from Attlee, which I received on October 2, indicated that serious efforts were being made by the British to come up with an answer to the Palestine problem. Attlee advised me that he and his Cabinet were giving deep thought to means of helping the Jews in Europe and to the question of Palestine. He also pointed out that the two problems were not necessarily the same and that both were bristling with difficulties. Then, on October 19, the British presented a formal proposal to the secretary of state for a joint Anglo-American inquiry into the problems of Palestine. This document gave a good insight into the difficulties the British faced and their desire to avoid any immediate decision. The message said that the British government considered it of great importance "that Jews should be enabled to play an active part in building up the life of the countries from which they came, in common with other nationals of these countries." The British proposed that a joint Anglo-American "Committee of Enquiry" should, as a matter of urgency, be set up at once . . . to examine the position of the Jews in British and American occupied Europe; to make an estimate of the number of such Jews whom it might prove impossible to resettle in the country from which they originated; to examine the possibility of relieving the position in Europe by immigration into other countries outside Europe; and to consider other available means of meeting the needs of the immediate situation. The British plan was that the committee should in the first place visit British and American occupied Europe in order to inform themselves of the character and magnitude of the problem created by the war. Having done so, it was to turn its attention to countries that might be in a position to accept them. In the light of the committee's investigations it would then make recommendations to the two governments for dealing with the problem in the interim until such time as a permanent solution could be submitted to the United Nations.

The question of Jewish immigration into Palestine would be only one of a number of things to be considered by the committee. The British note went on to say that the terms of the mandate required them to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage settlement by Jews on the land, while insuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population were not prejudiced thereby. This dual obligation, to the Jews on the one side and to the Arabs on the other, the note said, had been the main cause of the trouble which had been experienced in Palestine during the past twenty-six years. Every effort, it added, had been made by the British to devise some arrangement that would enable Arabs and Jews to live together in peace and cooperate for the welfare of the country, but all such efforts had been unavailing.

Any arrangement acceptable to one party had been rejected as unacceptable to the other. "The fact has to be faced," the British note read, "that there is no common ground between the Arabs and the Jews. They differ in religion and in language; their cultural and social life, the ways of thought and conduct, are as difficult to reconcile as are their national aspirations. These last are the greatest bar to peace. Both communities lay claim to Palestine; the one on the ground of a millennium of occupation, the other on the ground of historic association and of an undertaking given to it during the first World War. The antithesis is thus complete. . . ."

The British suggested that the committee would . . . make an examination on the spot of the political, economic, and agricultural conditions which were at that time held to restrict immigration into Palestine. The British expected to deal with the Palestine issue in three stages. First, they would consult the Arabs with a view to an arrangement that might insure that for the time being there would be no interruption of Jewish immigration at the then current monthly rate. Then they would explore . . . the possibility of devising other temporary arrangements for dealing with the Palestine problem until a permanent solution of it could be reached. And, third, they would prepare a permanent solution for submission to the United Nations. For the immediate future, however, the British government had decided that the only practicable course was to maintain the present arrangement for immigration. They feared, they said, that "any violent departures decided upon in the face of Arab opposition would not only afford ground for a charge of breach of faith against His Majesty's government but would probably cause serious disturbances throughout the Middle East, involving a large military commitment, and would arouse widespread anxiety in India."

I instructed Secretary [of State] Byrnes to prepare a reply which would indicate that we were willing to take part in the proposed committee inquiry but that we wanted to concentrate on speedy results. Furthermore, I suggested that Palestine should be the focus of the inquiry and not just one of many points. I wanted it made plain that I was not going to retreat from the position which I had taken in my letter to Attlee on August 31. I did not want the United States to become a party to any dilatory tactics. The British were none too happy with our reaction. [Foreign Secretary] Bevin wrote to Byrnes, insisting that the inquiry should extend to places other than Palestine as potential settlement areas for European Jews. We held to our point of view, however, lest the inquiry result in drawing things out interminably, and . . . this point of view prevailed. . . .

One of our main problems was that Palestine was not ours to dispose of. It had been legally entrusted to the British by action of the League of Nations . . . and the British were, in fact, in possession of Palestine.

In my own mind, the aims and goals of the Zionists at this stage to set up a Jewish state were secondary to the more immediate problem of finding means to relieve the human misery of the displaced persons.

Attlee traveled to Washington in mid-November to try to settle the continuing disagreement between the British and Americans regarding the place of Palestine in the proposed Anglo-American inquiry. Truman held to his position that the inquiry must focus exclusively on Palestine. Attlee finally agreed, and Truman announced the agreement on November 13. On December 10, he announced the names of the American members of the committee of inquiry.

. . . The committee began its work with public hearings in Washington on January 4, 1946, and then traveled to Europe and the Near East to study the situation on the spot. Its report was presented to me on April 22, 1946. . . . The committee recommended unanimously that 100,000 certificates be issued for immigration into Palestine and that actual immigration be pushed forward as rapidly as possible. As for Palestine, the committee urged that it be made into a land in which neither Jew nor Arab would dominate. They suggested the adoption of these three principles:

I. That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine.

II. That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state.

III. That the form of government ultimately to be established shall, under international guarantees, fully protect and preserve the interests in the Holy Land of Christendom and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths.

The committee concluded, however, that the relations of Jews and Arabs were at the present so strained that any attempt to establish independence or nationhood would only result in civil strife. For that reason, they recommended that the mandate be continued, that eventually there should be a trusteeship agreement with the United Nations, and that the terms of the trusteeship agreement should aim at bringing Arabs and Jews closer together. The recommendations of the committee included the proposal that full Jewish immigration be made possible and the land laws protecting the Arabs without giving equality of protection to the Jews be repealed or changed.

The committee's report was careful and complete . . . and I felt that the committee was pointing in the right direction. On April 30, I issued a statement in which I expressed my agreement with the substance of their proposal. However, it remained now to persuade the British to take action on the report. . . .

Truman sent a message to Attlee saying that the committee's report laid the basis for consultations with the Jews and Arabs regarding the future of Palestine, and that the report should be provided to the Jews and Arabs as soon as possible. They should, Truman argued, be asked to make their views known to the British and American governments within two weeks of their receipt of the report. Truman was especially anxious that the committee's recommendation that 100,000 Jews be admitted to Palestine be approved quickly and undertaken and concluded satisfactorily. Attlee asked for a delay of about two weeks before the report should be given to the Jews and Arabs, and a longer period—he suggested a month—given for the Jews and Arabs to prepare their responses. Truman reluctantly agreed to Attlee's timetable.

Meanwhile, we had heard from the Arab countries. In a body, the diplomatic representatives of the Arab states in Washington called on Acting Secretary of State Acheson to voice their protest against the committee's recommendations. . . .

Truman sent messages to the heads of those Arab states who had sent him telegrams assuring them that no decision regarding the recommendations made in the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry would be made without consultation with the governments of the Arab countries.

The official reaction in England to the report of the . . . committee was not encouraging. As soon as it was published . . . Attlee told the House of Commons that, before taking any action on the report, his government would ask the United States to share the additional military and financial responsibilities that he thought would arise. He also said that large scale immigration into Palestine would not be resumed until the illegal Jewish armed units were eliminated. The British press, in the weeks to follow, set a tone that was decidedly unfriendly. Many of the newspapers said or implied what Ernest Bevin, the foreign secretary, later said in a speech on June 12—that our interest in helping the Jews enter Palestine was due to our desire not to have them in the United States.

I realized that it would be difficult to get action from the British, but while there was much clamor in the United States that something be done, the country was neither disposed nor prepared to assume risks and obligations that might require us to use military force. Nevertheless, I wanted to have a full appraisal of the military factors involved. . . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that no United States armed forces be involved in carrying out the committee's findings. They recommended that in implementing the report the guiding principle should be that no action should be taken that would cause repercussions in Palestine which would be beyond the capabilities of British troops to control. The [Joint] Chiefs . . . also noted that if the question of using any United States forces should arise, only very limited forces could be spared from tasks in which we were already engaged. Such forces might be of a size to help pacify the situation *in Palestine*, but they believed that the political shock attending the reappearance of United States armed forces in the Middle East would unnecessarily risk serious disturbances throughout the area far out of proportion to any local Palestine difficulties.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were also of the opinion that carrying out the findings of the report by force would prejudice British and United States interests in much of the Middle East. And if this were to happen, they suggested that the USSR might replace the United States and Britain in influence and power through the Middle East. To this they added that control of oil in the Middle East was a very serious consideration, and they concluded, therefore, that no action should be taken that would commit United States armed forces or turn the peoples of the Middle East away from Western powers, since we had a vital security interest there. This report put our military leaders on record. They were primarily concerned about Middle East oil and in long-range terms about the danger that the Arabs, antagonized by Western action in Palestine, would make common cause with Russia. The second argument in particular was one that I had not lost sight of at any time. The pressure against Turkey and the incidents in Iran all pointed only too clearly to the fact that the Russians would be ready to welcome the Arabs into their camp.

Attlee cabled me on May 27, sending me a catalog of subjects which he thought should be taken up when the experts of our two governments sat down together. Out of the ten recommendations of the committee, the British had built up no less than forty-three "subjects" which they felt needed discussion by the experts. My reaction was that this procedure would only serve to postpone any relief for the hundred thousand homeless Jews we still

wanted to see admitted into Palestine. I replied, therefore, that the problem should be taken up without delay, even before the experts might be ready to go into the other subjects listed by the British. I offered the assistance of the United States with transportation and temporary housing for these immigrants, and I repeated that it was my primary concern to relieve suffering by the admission of these hundred thousand to the land they wanted to make their home.

Attlee's reply to my proposal was negative. The British did not want to discuss the matter of the 100,000 immigrants without talking about all aspects of the Palestine problem. In my answer, I told Attlee that I could appreciate his point of view but that I saw no reason why it should not be possible to make all arrangements for the admission of the hundred thousand at once so that there would be no further delay once the experts had reached agreement on the more general questions. . . .

My efforts to persuade the British to relax immigration restrictions in Palestine might have fallen on more receptive ears if it had not been for the increasing acts of terrorism that were being committed in Palestine. There were armed groups of extremists who were guilty of numerous outrages. On June 16 eight bridges were blown up near the Trans-Jordan border, and two other explosions were set off in Haifa. The following day there was a pitched battle between Jews and British troops in Haifa, after explosions had started a fire and caused great damage in the rail yards there. British officers were kidnapped. Others were shot at from passing automobiles. Explosions took place in ever increasing numbers, and the British uncovered a plot by one extremist group to kidnap the British commander in chief in Palestine.

The British government then decided to take drastic action, and Attlee advised me of the plans in advance in a personal message on June 28. He said that the High Commissioner had been authorized to take such steps as he thought necessary to break up illegal organizations, including the arrest of any individual against whom there was clear evidence of responsibility for the current campaign of violence. He regretted, he wrote, that such action should have become necessary while we were engaged in discussing the report of the Anglo-American Committee, but his government had been forced to conclude that they "could no longer, without abdication of our responsibility as the Mandatory Government, tolerate such open defiance and that, while discussions regarding the future of Palestine are proceeding, law and order must be maintained."

On June 11, 1946, Truman appointed a committee composed of the secretaries of state, war, and the treasury to deal with the British about Palestine. The Cabinet secretaries immediately appointed alternates. The secretary of state's alternate, Henry F. Grady, chaired the Cabinet committee, which immediately began preparing for talks with its British counterpart.

In late June, Attlee told Truman the British were ready to begin the joint talks. Truman sent Grady and his two colleagues to London about a week earlier than had been planned. They arrived on July 10 and meetings got quickly underway. They were held in secret, but the committee's recommendations were leaked and published in the American press on July 25.

. . . The plan proposed by the committee was the creation in Palestine of something resembling a federal system of two autonomous states but with a very strong central government. Approximately 1,500 square miles (of a total of 45,000) were to become a Jewish state. The central government would retain control of the cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, as well as of the southernmost section of Palestine, the Negev. The remainder of Palestine would become an Arab state. Of most importance, however, the plan provided that the central government would have reserved powers of such extent that the two states to be set up would have very little control over anything except wholly local matters. Included among subjects under central government control would be immigration. The government of the provinces would consist of elected assemblies but the speakers of these assemblies would be appointed by the British, and no bill would become law without the assent of these appointed officials. The executive would also be appointed by the British, in the form of a council of ministers.

Neither the Jews nor the Arabs welcomed this plan. It satisfied nobody. The Arabs even objected to the proposal in the report that, in order to help the transition, there should be an outright grant of \$50 million from the United States to aid the Palestinian Arabs.

The situation was not improving. Only a few days before, Jewish terrorists had blown up the King David Hotel in Jerusalem with considerable loss of lives. Some solution had to be found, both to the problem of Jews in need of a home and to the rising tide of unrest in the Near East. I studied the proposed plan with care. But I was unable to see that anything could come out of it except more unrest. The plan made the admission of the 100,000 [Jews] conditional on its being accepted by the Arabs, so no relief was offered in that direction either. Nor was this the kind of plan that I had hoped would result. It seemed a retreat from the fine recommendations that had been

made by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry earlier in the year. I therefore felt compelled to inform Attlee that the government of the United States could not go along.

[My message to Attlee, sent on August 12, said this:]

After further study of recommendations of American and British groups, and after detailed discussion in which members of my cabinet and other advisers participated, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that I can not give formal support to the plan in its present form as a joint Anglo-American plan.

The opposition in this country to the plan has become so intense that it is now clear it would be impossible to rally in favor of it sufficient public opinion to enable this government to give it effective support.

In view of the critical situation in Palestine and of the desperate plight of homeless Jews in Europe I believe the search for a solution to this difficult problem should continue. . . .

Attlee acknowledged my message and then sent a more detailed reply on August 18, observing that it was a great disappointment to him that we were unable to give support to the plan recommended by the expert delegations. He expressed the hope that out of the coming conference with the Arabs and the Jews "some solution will emerge which, even if not fully accepted by either Arabs or Jews, may be possible of implementation without too gravely endangering the peace of Palestine or of the Middle East as a whole."

But by the fall of 1946 the situation looked, as I wrote to a friend, "insoluble." As I said in this letter, "not only are the British highly successful in muddling the situation as completely as it could possibly be muddled, but the Jews themselves are making it almost impossible to do anything for them."

The Jewish Agency for Palestine, the official spokesmen for the Zionists, had just declared that it would not even sit down with the British to discuss their proposals. Meanwhile, the Jewish extremists in Palestine were continuing their terrorist activities. And top Jewish leaders in the United States were putting all sorts of pressure on me to commit American power and forces on behalf of the Jewish aspirations in Palestine.

I understood the position of the British government. They found themselves hard pressed throughout the empire, unable to muster either the funds or the forces to take care of all their responsibilities, and yet anxious to relinquish as little of their standing as a world power as possible. They had spent many years and millions of pounds cultivating the friendship of the Arab world, both to secure the life line of the empire through the Suez Canal and

to gain access to the oil resources of the Middle East. They were, understandably, most reluctant to antagonize the Arabs.

The Arabs were as uncompromising as the Jews. They made an appearance at the roundtable talks which the British convened late in January 1947, but they would not yield an inch from their position that Palestine was Arab country and should be kept Arab. The talks collapsed, therefore, on February 4, 1947, and the British then decided to put the whole matte before the United Nations. This decision was announced in London on February 14. There was . . . a good deal of criticism, especially of Foreign Secretary Bevin's handling of the situation. Certainly he did not help matters when he told a Labor party caucus that American Zionists were to blame and later when he stated in the House of Commons that all would have been well if only I had not spoiled his plans by sticking to the idea that 100,000 Jews should be given a home in Palestine. . . .

On April 2, 1947, the British formally requested that the United Nations address the Palestine problem. On May 15, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was formed. The committee decided that the British mandate in Palestine should end, and that two separate and independent states should be formed there, one Jewish and one Arab. The Jews saw in this plan an opportunity to realize the dream of a Jewish state in their spiritual homeland; the Arabs did not like the plan at all and vowed to fight it. Truman instructed the State Department to support the partition plan.

I was of the opinion that the proposed partition of Palestine could open the way for peaceful collaboration between the Arabs and the Jews. Although it was difficult under the present circumstances to bring the Arabs and the Jews together, I could foresee that under the proposed plan of the United Nations, calling for an economic union of the partitioned areas, the Jews and the Arabs might eventually work side by side as neighbors.

For many years, I have been interested in the history of that great region. I knew that it had once been the seat of great world powers and had supported many millions of people. The empires of Nebuchadnezzar and Darius the Great, like the kingdom of Rameses II in the valley of the Nile, had made full use of the riches of the area. But after those great empires had gone their way, there had been divisions and internal warfare and a general decline. Except for a short period, the Arabs had never brought the area back to the position of influence and power it had once had, although certain potentials were still there. I felt that a development program could be worked

out so that a great industrial system could be set up under the Jews, and the productive potential of this region could be used to the mutual benefit of the Jews and Arabs. The whole region waits to be developed, and if it were handled the way we developed the Tennessee River basin, it could support from twenty to thirty million people more. To open the door to this kind of future would indeed be a constructive and humanitarian thing to do, and it would also redeem the pledges that were given [to the Jews] at the time of World War I.

These were the thoughts I had about the future of the area, and the partition proposal impressed me as the most practicable way to make progress in that direction. It was always my hope that a solution could be worked out without bloodshed. Certainly, little could be said for a solution that would destroy a hundred thousand lives so that another hundred thousand could be saved. My purpose was then and later to help bring about the redemption of the pledge of the Balfour Declaration and the rescue of at least some of the victims of Nazism. I was not committed to any particular formula of statehood in Palestine or to any particular time schedule for its accomplishment. The American policy was designed to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of the promised Jewish homeland and easy access to it for the displaced Jews of Europe. Many Jews, however, chose to believe that our Palestine policy was the same as the Zionist program for the State of Israel. Whenever . . . [the American plan] failed to conform [to the Zionist program], they would charge that we had turned pro-Arab. The Arabs, of course, looked at our attitude in an even more partisan and hostile light. The simple fact is that our policy was an American policy rather than an Arab or Jewish policy. It was American because it aimed at the peaceful solution of a world trouble spot. It was American because it was based on the desire to see promises kept and human misery relieved.

But the issue was embroiled in politics, not only with us but abroad too. The Jews were for partition—but not all the Jews. The Arabs were against partition—but could not agree how completely they were against it. The British, at least, seemed of one mind: They were determined to wash their hands of the whole matter. It was a discouraging prospect indeed. As I wrote to one of my assistants, “I surely wish God Almighty would give the Children of Israel an Isaiah, the Christians a St. Paul, and the Sons of Ishmael a peep at the Golden Rule.” But the matter had been placed in the hands of the United Nations, and, true to my conviction that the United Nations had to be made to work, I had confidence that a solution would be found there. This was my reply to all who appealed to me in those days. The General

Assembly of the United Nations was debating the matter, and its decision would reflect the will of the nations of the world. . . .

. . . Not only were there pressure movements around the United Nations unlike anything that had been seen there before but . . . the White House, too, was subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders—actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats—disturbed and annoyed me. Some were even suggesting that we pressure sovereign nations into favorable votes in the General Assembly [of the United Nations]. I have never approved of the practice of the strong imposing their will on the weak, whether among men or among nations. . . . It is basic to the way of life of democratic peoples that they respect the opinion of others—whether they happen to be weak or strong, rich or poor. The kind of “direct approach” some of my correspondents had been making could never gain my approval.

The General Assembly passed the partition plan on November 29, 1947, although it did not actually put partition into effect. Instead, it merely gave its approval to the majority recommendations of the [United Nations] Special Committee [on Palestine] . . . and asked the Security Council to see that they were carried out. Consequently, a committee was set up to channel the change-over in peaceful ways. The General Assembly, however, did not prescribe a detailed procedure for the carrying out of the recommendations. I point this out because the impression was spread by many of our newspapers that the General Assembly had approved a specific blueprint, whereas it had merely accepted a principle. The way in which this principle might be translated into action had yet to be found. It was my constant hope that it would be a peaceful way. The hopes for an adjustment without bloodshed, however, were very slim. The British, who had said all along that they would “accept” the United Nations decision but would enforce it only if both Jews and Arabs agreed, now announced, on December 3, that they would consider their mandate at an end as of May 15, 1948. The Arabs, on the same day, served notice on the world that they would defend their “rights.”

Every day now brought reports of new violence in the Holy Land. On January 15, 1948, the Jewish Agency advised the United Nations that an international police force would be required to put partition into effect. But no such police force existed, and to set up one would require more agreement than existed among the powers at the time. The United Nations [Palestine] Commission . . . , [which was created by the United Nations on November 29, 1947, and given responsibility for implementing the United Nations

partition plan for Palestine and for acting as the provisional government for Palestine after the United Kingdom withdrew from its mandate], agreed, however, that a police force would be needed, and Trygve Lie, the secretary-general of the United Nations, began laborious discussions to get one started. The Jews, realizing that there was little chance to get international enforcement, announced that they would establish a Jewish militia force. The British said they would not permit this as long as they were in Control. The Arabs, meanwhile, were making plans for a national administration for all of Palestine, and the military forces of the Arab states that adjoin Palestine more and more openly began to enter that country. On February 13, it was reported to me from our diplomatic missions in the area that the Arabs were expected to start full scale military operations in late March. I published an appeal to the Arab leaders to preserve the peace and practice moderation. They rejected it flatly, charging that the United States had contributed to the unrest in the Near East by supporting the Zionist cause. That was on February 17, 1948. I gave my approval to a State Department proposal that the full conciliatory powers of the Security Council be invoked. A serious threat to the world's peace was developing in Palestine, with neither side willing to be swayed. We wanted a peaceful settlement and were trying hopefully to get it.

The Jewish pressure on the White House did not diminish in the days following the partition vote in the United Nations. Individuals and groups asked me, usually in rather quarrelsome and emotional ways, to stop the Arabs, to keep the British from supporting the Arabs, to furnish American soldiers, to do this, that, and the other. I think I can say that I kept my faith in the rightness of my policy in spite of some of the Jews. When I say "the Jews," I mean, of course, the extreme Zionists. I know that most Americans of Jewish faith, while they hoped for the restoration of [a] Jewish homeland, are and always have been Americans first and foremost.

As the pressure mounted, I found it necessary to give instructions that I did not want to be approached by any more spokesmen for the extreme Zionist cause. I was even so disturbed that I put off seeing Chaim Weizmann, who had returned to the United States and had asked for an interview with me. My old friend, Eddie Jacobson, called on me at the White House and urged me to receive Weizmann at the earliest possible moment. Eddie, who had been with me through the hard days of World War I, had never been a Zionist. In all my years in Washington he had never asked me for anything for himself. He was of the Jewish faith and was deeply moved by the sufferings of the Jewish people abroad. He had spoken to me on occasion, both before and after I became president, about some specific hardship cases that

he happened to know about, but he did this rarely. On March 13, he called at the White House.

I was always glad to see him. Not only had we shared so much in the past, but I have always had the warmest feelings toward him. It would be hard to find a truer friend. Eddie said that he wanted to talk about Palestine. I told him that I would rather he did not and that I wanted to let the matter run its course in the United Nations. I do not believe that in all our thirty years of friendship a sharp word had ever passed between Eddie and me, and I was sorry that Eddie had brought up the subject. Eddie was becoming self-conscious, but he kept on talking. He asked me to bear in mind that some of the pro-Zionists who had approached me were only individuals and did not speak for any responsible leadership. I told him that I respected Weizmann, but if I saw him, it would only result in more wrong interpretations. Eddie waved toward a small replica of an Andrew Jackson statue that was in my office. "He's been your hero all your life, hasn't he?" he said. "You have probably read every book there is on Andrew Jackson. I remember when we had the store that you were always reading books and pamphlets and a lot of them were about Jackson. You put this statue in front of the Jackson County Courthouse in Kansas City when you built it." I did not know what he was leading up to, but he went on. "I have never met the man who has been my hero all my life," he continued. "But I have studied his past as you have studied Jackson's. He is the greatest Jew alive, perhaps the greatest Jew who ever lived. You yourself have told me that he is a great statesman and a fine gentleman. I am talking about Chaim Weizmann. He is an old man and a very sick man. He has traveled thousands of miles to see you, and now you are putting off seeing him. That isn't like you."

When Eddie left, I gave instructions to have Weizmann come to the White House as soon as it could be arranged. However, the visit was to be entirely off the record. Weizmann, by my specific instructions, was to be brought in through the East Gate. There was to be no press coverage of his visit and no public announcement.

Weizmann came on March 18, and we talked for almost three quarters of an hour. He talked about the possibilities of development in Palestine, about the scientific work that he and his assistants had done that would someday be translated into industrial activity in the Jewish state that he envisaged. He spoke of the need for land if the future immigrants were to be cared for, and he impressed on me the importance of the Negev area in the south to any future Jewish state. Weizmann was a man of remarkable achievements and personality. His life had been dedicated to two ideals, that of science and

that of the Zionist movement. He was past seventy now and in ill health. He had known many disappointments and had grown patient and wise in them. I told him, as plainly as I could, why I had at first put off seeing him. He understood. I explained to him what the basis of my interest in the Jewish problem was and that my primary concern was to see justice done without bloodshed. And when he left my office I felt that he had reached a full understanding of my policy and that I knew what it was he wanted.

That this was so was shown the following day. That day our representative in the United Nations, Ambassador Austin, announced to the Security Council that the United States government would favor a temporary trusteeship for Palestine pending a decision on Palestine's permanent status. Some Zionist spokesmen branded this as a reversal of American policy. Weizmann, however, was one of the few prominent Zionists who did not choose this opportunity to castigate American policy. He knew, I am sure, what the direction of American policy really was. The following morning . . . [my former White House counsel Samuel] Rosenman called to see me on another matter. As he was leaving, I asked him to see Weizmann and tell him that there was not and would not be any change in the long policy he and I had talked about.

I was always aware of the fact that not all my advisers looked at the Palestine problem in the same manner I did. . . . In the Palestine situation, the military kept talking about two things: our inability to send troops to Palestine if trouble should break out there and, secondly, the oil resources of the Middle East. Secretary [of Defense] Forrestal spoke to me repeatedly about the danger that hostile Arabs might deny us access to the petroleum treasures of their countries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on several occasions, submitted memoranda to show that we could not afford to send more than a token force to the area. The Department of State's specialists on the Near East were, almost without exception, unfriendly to the idea of a Jewish state. Their thinking went along this line: Great Britain has maintained her position in the area by cultivating the Arabs; now that she seems no longer able to hold this position, the United States must take over, and it must be done by exactly the same formula; if the Arabs are antagonized, they will go over into the Soviet camp.

I was never convinced by these arguments of the diplomats. I want to say, however, that in these differences of opinion between the White House and the State Department on the business of Palestine there was never any question as to who made the decisions and whose policy would be followed. Where some of our diplomats, and especially the gentlemen on the Near

Eastern desks, differed was on the speed with which we should progress, not on the direction of the movement.

I had agreed in February that efforts should be made to have the United Nations restore peaceful conditions in Palestine. Accordingly, our delegation . . . proposed on February 25 that conversations be held among the five permanent members of the Security Council to determine how serious a threat to world peace we faced in Palestine. The British remained aloof from these discussions, but the other four delegations conferred and noted that the day of British withdrawal—May 15—would find Palestine without effective authority and the United Nations unprepared to step into the gap. In effect, it seemed difficult, if not impossible, to find any basis for reconciliation between the parties: The Jews fervently wanted partition; the Arabs opposed it hotly; and the British were determined to free themselves of the entire entanglement. Under these conditions, and faced with the evidence of mounting violence inside Palestine, the Security Council was to decide whether or not it would accept the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, as the basis for a Palestine solution. That is the reason that our State Department proposed, on March 19, 1948, that unless a peaceful transition to the partitioned status could be found . . . [Palestine] should be placed under the United Nations Trusteeship Council. This was not a rejection of partition but rather an effort to postpone its effective date until proper conditions for the establishment of self-government in the two parts might be established.

My policy with regard to Palestine was not a commitment to any set of dates or circumstances; it was dedication to the twin ideals of international obligations and the relieving of human misery. In this sense, the State Department's trusteeship proposal was not contrary to my policy. On the other hand, anybody in the State Department should have known—and I am sure that some individual officials actually expected—that the Jews would read this proposal as a complete abandonment of the partition plan on which they so heavily counted and that the Arabs would also believe that, like them, we had come to oppose the solution approved by the General Assembly. In this sense, the trusteeship idea was at odds with my attitude and the policy I had laid down.

There were . . . some tactical advantages to a shift of the debate from the Security Council with its veto to the Trusteeship Council, where decisions were made by majority vote. In addition, it was only a matter of weeks before the British would leave Palestine and thus change the entire situation. There was always a chance that the United Nations might find a solution

to forestall the inevitable outbreak of violence, so it seemed worthwhile to allow that proposal to be discussed in the meanwhile. The suggestion that the mandate be continued as a trusteeship under the United Nations was not a bad idea at the time. However, there were strong suspicions voiced by many that the diplomats thought of it as a way to prevent partition and the establishment of the Jewish homeland. There were some men in the State Department who held the view that the Balfour Declaration could not be carried out without offense to the Arabs. Like most of the British diplomats, some of our diplomats also thought that the Arabs, on account of their numbers and because of the fact that they controlled such immense oil resources, should be appeased. I am sorry to say that there were some among them who were also inclined to be anti-Semitic. . . .

On May 14, I was informed that the provisional government of Israel was planning to proclaim a Jewish state at midnight that day, Palestine time, which was when the British mandate came to an end. I had often talked with my advisers about the course of action we would take once partition had come about, and it was always understood that eventually we would recognize any responsible government the Jews might set up. Partition was not taking place in exactly the peaceful manner I had hoped, to be sure, but the fact was that the Jews were controlling the area in which their people lived and that they were ready to administer and to defend it. On the other hand, I was well aware that some of the State Department "experts" would want to block recognition of a Jewish state.

Now that the Jews were ready to proclaim the State of Israel, however, I decided to move at once and give American recognition to the new nation. I instructed a member of my staff to communicate my decision to the State Department and . . . to Ambassador Austin at the United Nations. . . . About thirty minutes later, exactly eleven minutes after Israel had been proclaimed a state, Charlie Ross, my press secretary, handed the press the announcement of the de facto recognition by the United States of the provisional government of Israel. . . . The new State of Israel at once began to organize its machinery of government, and on January 25, 1949, held its first democratic elections. Following this, the United States on January 31, 1949, extended de jure recognition.

The United States, under Truman's leadership, gave firm support to Israel during the difficult early months of its existence. Truman watched carefully over the State Department to be sure officials there were supporting his policy. He believed strongly that the promise made in the Balfour Declaration that the Jews

would have a homeland in Palestine should be kept, and that the United Nations partition resolution of November defined what that homeland was to be. He saw that his position with respect to Israel was included in the Democratic Party platform in the summer of 1948. When Thomas Dewey, Truman's Republican opponent in the 1948 presidential campaign, made a speech in which he implied that he was failing to support Israel, Truman issued a statement in which he said, ". . . It is my desire to help build in Palestine a strong, prosperous, free and independent democratic state. It must be large enough, free enough, and strong enough to make its people self-supporting and secure." Later in the year, on November 29, Truman wrote a letter to Chaim Weizmann in which he said there were those who thought the Israel plank in the Democratic Party platform would be forgotten after the election. These people were wrong, Truman told Weizmann. "I have interpreted my re-election as a mandate from the American people to carry out the Democratic platform—including . . . the plank on Israel. I intend to do so."


Years of Trial and Hope, 132–169

Civil War in China

1945–1949

A colossal challenge—Nationalists and Communists—a fragile agreement—the threat of civil war—George C. Marshall's mission to China—an optimistic beginning—the “festering situation” in Manchuria—Marshall becomes discouraged—another truce and more fighting—Truman is troubled—the Nationalists adopt a policy of force—“the stalemate seemed complete”—the final breach—Marshall's advice is rejected—Truman orders Marshall home—Truman's retrospective

The fall of 1945 had brought the United States face to face with the serious complications which had been building up in China over the years. Few realized the depth of the split within China, the tenuous hold of the National Government over outlying areas, and the lack of popular participation in the country's government.



We in America always think of China as a nation. But the truth is that in 1945 China was only a geographical expression. Not since the Manchu Empire broke up in 1911 had there been in China a central government with authority over all the land. This was the state of China when V-J Day came. Chiang Kai-shek's authority was confined to the southwest corner, with the rest of South China and East China occupied by the Japanese. North China was controlled by the Communists and Manchuria by the Russians. There had been no roots of any kind of central Chinese government north of the Yangtze River.

The task of creating a new nation was colossal. President Roosevelt had built up the idea that China was a great power because he looked to the future and wanted to encourage the Chinese people. In reality it would be only with the greatest difficulty that Chiang Kai-shek could even reoccupy South China [after the war ended]. To get to North China he would need an agreement with the Communists, and he could never move into Manchuria without an agreement with the Communists and the Russians. It was impossible for Chiang to occupy northeast China and south central China with the Communists in between the rail lines. It was perfectly clear to us that if we told the Japanese to lay down their arms immediately and march to the seaboard the entire country would be taken over by the Communists. We therefore had to take the step of using the enemy as a garrison until we could airlift Chinese National troops to south China and send marines to guard the seaports. So the Japanese were instructed to hold their places and maintain order. In due course Chinese troops under Chiang Kai-shek would appear, the Japanese would surrender to them, march to the seaports, and we would send them back to Japan. This operation of using the Japanese to hold off the Communists was a joint decision of the State and Defense Departments which I approved. . . .

The problem of communism in China differed considerably from political problems elsewhere. Chiang Kai-shek was not confronted by a militant political minority scattered throughout the population but by a rival government that controlled a definite portion of the territory, with about one fourth of the total population.

. . . [The position of the United States with respect to China was a difficult one.] We could not simply wash our hands of the situation. There were still nearly three million Japanese in China, over one million of them military. Unless we made certain that this force was eliminated, the Japanese, even in defeat, might gain control of China simply by their ability to tip the scales in the contest for power. . . . [But we could also not] throw into China unlimited resources and large armies of American soldiers to defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese from the mainland, and compel Russian withdrawal from Manchuria by force. The American people would never stand for such an undertaking. [I] . . . decided, therefore, that the only course of action open to us was to assist in every way in the preservation of peace in China, to support Chiang Kai-shek politically, economically, and, within limits, militarily. But we could not become involved in a fratricidal war in China. . . .

Shortly after Japan surrendered, United States Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley traveled to Washington to discuss United States policy in East Asia with Truman. During their meeting, on October 13, 1945, Truman made clear to him that it would be our policy to support Chiang Kai-shek, but that we would not be drawn into fighting . . . [his] battles for him. Hurley told Truman he was hopeful about the situation in China. He thought American aid had put China in a very favorable economic position, and he believed the political situation was very promising.

. . . Hurley had just succeeded in bringing the Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, to Chungking for direct discussion with the National Government leaders. Out of these discussions there came an agreement between the Chinese leaders which was published on October 11, [1945], just two days before Hurley first called at the White House. At that moment, there was reason to hope that China's problems might be solved. Hurley had witnessed the preliminary signing of this agreement, and he told me that it promised to lead to true peace in China. The agreement called for a constitutional convention, a national assembly that would write a new constitution, and included provisions that would enable all political parties to take part. Chiang Kai-shek, apparently, would have the strongest voice in this convention since more of his followers would be seated than Communists. . . . This was a good agreement . . . [but it] never bore results.

Chiang Kai-shek's forces were moving into areas held by the Japanese, with a large part of his troops being ferried north by our Air Force transports. We had also landed fifty thousand of our marines at several important ports so that, through these ports, the removal of the Japanese could be carried on. The Communists wanted the National Government to stop these troop movements, for they believed that Chiang was taking advantage of the situation to strengthen his positions against them. Nor were they passive about it. They cut the rail lines wherever they could, and the Chungking government soon began receiving reports that the Chinese Communists, contrary to the agreement, were moving into Manchuria. Resentment was rising on both sides as the charges and countercharges increased. On November 4, our embassy in Chungking reported that civil war seemed to be threatening, and the [constitutional convention, called] the Political Consultative Conference, which was scheduled to convene November 20, failed to meet. On November 25 Chou En-lai, the principal representative of the Communists in Chungking, left for Yenan, and the next day his first deputy followed him. By now there were reports of armed clashes. I discussed the

seriousness of the situation with Hurley at the White House on November 27, and we agreed that it would be best if he returned to Chungking without delay. . . .

This conversation took place about 11:30 a.m., but less than two hours later, while the members of the Cabinet were with me for the weekly Cabinet luncheon, I was called to the telephone. One of the White House correspondents called from the National Press Club and, to my astonishment, told me that Ambassador Hurley, in a talk with newspapermen, had attacked the administration, the State Department, our foreign policy, and me personally. To me, this was an utterly inexplicable about-face, and what had caused it I cannot imagine even yet. I realized . . . that Hurley would have to go, and the Cabinet concurred. The same day I learned to my surprise that [he had given] a "letter of resignation" . . . to the press; but he would have been out, with or without that letter. . . .

China appeared now to be headed for more trouble. We could not send in the kind of military force that could assure that Chiang Kai-shek would prevail. The only thing we could do was to exert whatever influence we might have to prevent civil war. The man for this job would have to possess unique qualifications and rare skill. At the Cabinet luncheon on the day of Hurley's Press Club speech, the name of . . . [George] Marshall was brought up. He had just turned over his duties as Chief of Staff of the Army to General [Dwight D.] Eisenhower. No man probably had more fully deserved an honorable and restful retirement than Marshall. Yet I could think of no one who would be better qualified for a difficult mission to China.

I went to the telephone in the Red Room of the White House and called Marshall at his home in Leesburg, [Virginia]. Without any preparation, I told him: "General, I want you to go to China for me." Marshall said only, "Yes, Mr. President," and hung up abruptly. When Marshall came to the White House two days later to discuss his mission with Secretary of State Byrnes and me, I asked him why he had hung up on me without asking any questions. The reason, he explained to me, was that Mrs. Marshall and he had just driven up to the house, and he had been in the process of unloading some of their belongings when the phone rang. He had not wanted Mrs. Marshall, who was concerned about his health, to know how short-lived their retirement would be, and so he had hung up before she might hear any part of the conversation. He expected to break the news to her gradually, but when he turned on the radio a few minutes later, the very first thing she heard was the news flash announcing . . . [her husband's] mission. "There was the devil to pay," he confessed.

I went over the Chinese situation with Marshall and Byrnes at great length that afternoon. At Marshall's request, I told him to go ahead and work out with the State Department a set of instructions based on our discussions that would constitute my directive to him on his mission. . . . On December 11, I reviewed them in detail in another conference with Byrnes and Marshall . . . [and on December 15, I presented them to Marshall in the form of a letter:]

. . . My dear General Marshall:

On the eve of your departure for China I want to repeat to you my appreciation of your willingness to undertake this difficult mission.

. . . To guide you in so far as you may find it helpful, I will give you some of the thoughts, ideas and objectives which Secretary Byrnes and I have in mind with regard to your mission. . . .

The fact that I have asked you to go to China is the clearest evidence of my very real concern with regard to the situation there. Secretary Byrnes and I are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible. It is my desire that you, as my Special Representative, bring to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States to this end.

Specifically, I desire that you endeavor to persuade the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in North China. . . .

Upon the success of your efforts, as outlined above, will depend largely, of course, the success of our plans for evacuating Japanese troops from China, particularly North China, and for the subsequent withdrawal of our own armed forces from China. I am particularly desirous that both be accomplished as soon as possible.

In your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders you are authorized to speak with the utmost frankness. Particularly, you may state, in connection with the Chinese desire for credits, technical assistance in the economic field, and military assistance . . . that a China disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as a proper place for American assistance along the lines enumerated.

I am anxious that you keep Secretary Byrnes and me currently informed of the progress of your negotiations and of obstacles you may encounter. You will have our full support and we shall endeavor at all times to be as helpful to you as possible.

Truman's letter included three enclosures. One was a report titled U.S. Policy Toward China, which included these points:

. . . A China disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife, is an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future. . . .

The Government of the U.S. believes it essential:

(1) that a cessation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the National Government and the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective Chinese control. . . .

(2) . . . The U.S. and the other United Nations have recognized the present National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal government in China. It is the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China. . . .

The existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist army is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China. With the institution of a broadly representative government, autonomous armies should be eliminated as such and all armed forces in China integrated effectively into the Chinese National Army. . . .

. . . The U.S. Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate. . . .

Marshall left Washington the next day, December 15, by air. He arrived in China on December 20 and began at once to study the situation. His messages, sent to me through War Department facilities, unfolded a story that, although told in simple words, had all the elements of the historic drama of Chinese history.

Marshall . . . spent several days merely listening to people. He talked at length to Chiang Kai-shek, who had little to say about the Communists but showed much concern over the continued presence of the Russians in Manchuria. Marshall also interviewed party leaders of all shadings, including Communists, spoke to numerous officials of Chiang Kai-shek's government, our own embassy people, correspondents, and other Americans on the spot. He found everyone favoring a united China but no one with practical answers as to how this ideal might be attained. . . .

Marshall was able to get the two sides talking to one another. Proposals were made and discussed, and Marshall felt optimistic enough to make plans for organizing teams with representatives from both sides, and including an American observer, which would be capable of enforcing a cease-fire.

By January 8, 1946, negotiations between representatives of the National[ist] government and the Communist Party had progressed to the point where an agreement was almost reached. However, the National[ist] government insisted that they should be permitted to continue their troops movements into [two provinces in North China] . . . to occupy places vacated or to be vacated by Soviet troops. The Communists, on the other hand, claimed that the key points had already been taken over by them.

The cease-fire order was scheduled to be read at the opening of the Political Consultative . . . [Conference] at ten o'clock on the morning of January 10. The preceding evening Marshall had been able to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to issue an order without reference to [the two contested provinces in North China], although the final agreement was not reached until the morning of . . . January 10, a matter of minutes before the time set for the announcement.

As soon as the cease-fire order was issued, Marshall set into motion the plans for the so-called executive headquarters, which was to be located in Peiping [Beijing]. . . . [The teams which were to enforce the cease-fire] proved workable when called into action during these initial days. Marshall now began to work on the next step, the consolidation of the armed forces in China. Again a tripartite committee setup was agreed on, with Marshall in the role of the adviser. Throughout these events, Marshall did everything he could to avoid any semblance of pressure or dictation. He always waited for the Chinese (of both sides) to ask him to join their talks; otherwise, he talked to them only as one individual to another. This, of course, was a drawn-out process, full of frustrations. . . .

Marshall decided wisely at this point to remain aloof from the political discussions even though he might officially be asked by both sides to act as mediator. His correct view of his mission was that he was to bring the fighting to an end, if possible. He took pains to avoid matters that were wholly political in nature.

In the military field, however, he took a most active part. He acted as chairman of the Committee of Three to supervise the cease-fire, and he acted as adviser to the committee working on the reorganization of the armies in China.

In the early stages the Communist representatives appeared more tractable to Marshall than the leaders of the . . . National[ist] government, and it was his impression that the Communists felt that they could win their battle on political grounds more easily than on tactical fighting grounds because

they had a more tightly held organization, whereas on the Nationalist side there were many contentious elements. And it was also his impression that the Communists were more ready to take their chances in a struggle conducted in the political arena than were the Nationalists. The Nationalists, so it seemed to Marshall, appeared to be determined to pursue a policy of force which he believed would be their undoing.

On February 4, Marshall could report to me that "affairs are progressing rather favorably." The Political Consultative . . . [Conference] appeared on the way to adopting a path toward democratic reform, and agreement on the reorganization of these armies appeared imminent.

At least once a week and sometimes two and three times a week Marshall would send me a long cable report. . . . Marshall['s] messages from China enabled me to follow every step as the story unfolded. The general wrote coldly factual reports that included every detail. I could not have asked for a closer view without being a participant myself.

Early in February 1946, Russia began to make trouble in Manchuria. It was apparent, according to reports reaching me, that the Russians intended to use their promised withdrawal from Manchuria as a lever to gain sweeping privileges in that strategic area. The treaty of mutual defense concluded between Russia and China in August 1945 had recognized that Manchuria was properly part of China, with the reservation of some rights, such as rail transit, to the Russians. All of Manchuria had been occupied by Russian forces after Russia's entry into the war against Japan. The Russians, in a later agreement with the Chinese government, had promised to withdraw their troops, setting February 1, 1946, as the latest date of withdrawal.

On February 9, 1946, Marshall wrote me that Manchuria was a "festering situation," and he went on to report that he told the Chinese foreign minister, "China must proceed with her projected unification at the fastest possible pace so as to eliminate her present vulnerability to Soviet undercover attack, which exists so long as there remains a separate Communist government and a separate Communist army in China. Secondly," Marshall continued, "I told him that I believed he should make no commitment, formal or informal, with the Soviet [Union] which would recognize her claims that war booty consisted of the kind of economic concessions she is demanding. . . . I told . . . [the foreign minister] it was my belief that time was running against the Soviet [Union], since the longer her troops remain in Manchuria the more clearly she becomes a deliberate treaty violator in the eyes of the world. . . ." Marshall told me that he was reporting to me in great detail "because I feel that it [his discussion with the Chinese foreign minister] not only involved

me in matters beyond my mission but is perhaps more dangerous to world accord than any other present issue. . . . I believe that our Government must shortly do more for China in this matter than give advice. . . ."

Marshall advised Truman that the United States must withdraw its forces from China as quickly as possible in order to avoid Soviet recriminations and that it must create a military advisory group to assist China to itself take control of Manchuria. He also advised that China should announce her intention to send troops to participate in the Allied occupation of Japan. If China was able to make progress toward establishing control of Manchuria, and if it were to indicate its intention of participating in the occupation of Japan, Marshall believed, it could present the Manchuria issue to the Far Eastern Commission (an Allied body charged with overseeing occupation policy in Japan).

Truman responded to Marshall on February 12. I approve the tentative course of action you outline, he wrote. He expressed doubt that American forces would be able to be withdrawn from China as quickly as he and Marshall would like. He had been advised that it would probably take about seven months to move Chinese troops to Manchuria, and that North China, which was controlled by Communist forces, would remain a problem if Marshall was unable to achieve an agreement between the Nationalists and Communists. Truman said he believed the Far Eastern Commission could be helpful in Manchuria only with respect to Japanese reparations.

I had hoped, as did Marshall, that the tripartite committees he set up would quickly put an end to the civil war in China. These committees were cease-fire teams and were each made of one Nationalist officer, one Communist officer, and one American officer from Marshall's executive headquarters. To lend the strength of his influence to the cease-fire agreement between the two Chinese armies, Marshall undertook a 3,000-mile flight through northern China all the way to the borders of Inner Mongolia. He talked to all the principal commanders in the field and reported to me that he had been able to promote a general understanding throughout the region of the purposes of the cease-fire and of the machinery that had been set up to enforce it. While in Yenan he talked with Mao Tse-tung.

Difficulties had been numerous, and many still existed. Nevertheless, Marshall now felt that the first stage of his work had been completed. The two Chinese parties had been brought to a cease-fire agreement, and there was a slight lessening of mutual suspicion in the atmosphere. Marshall now asked to return to Washington for personal consultation with me and to

work out a program of help to China with the various departments of government. I was anxious to see him and approved his suggestion.

In advance of his return he had sent me a detailed report on the situation as he saw it and after his arrival in Washington on March 15, I had several long talks with him. He told me that, just before . . . [Chiang Kai-shek] left China, . . . [he] had at last consented to the entry of cease-fire teams into Manchuria, which he had previously opposed. . . . After Marshall's departure from China, however, Chiang Kai-shek had put such severe restrictions on the powers of the cease-fire teams that were to go into Manchuria that they were unable to function. As a result, fighting had broken out again in several areas of Manchuria and had spread from there. On April 6, for instance . . . Marshall's deputy reported that the government authorities were detaining Communist cease-fire team members at Mukden and had arrested others in Beijing. Furthermore, Chinese air force planes had "buzzed" the Communist center of Yenan. The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, occupied key localities in Manchuria just as the Russians departed. In some instances, where [Nationalist] . . . forces were already on the ground, Communist forces attacked them and forced them out.

Marshall devoted his brief stay in Washington to talks with government officials regarding loans for China and aid in the form of shipping and surplus property. He was able to reach agreements to facilitate the transfer of surplus-property stocks then in China and to assure China of some small coastwise and river shipping. I instructed the Treasury Department to cooperate with him in every way, and an agreement was reached for an immediate loan to China of \$500 million. Unfortunately, when nothing but the Chinese signature was lacking on this document, Chiang Kai-shek's representative, the Chinese ambassador in Washington, insisted on changes before he would sign. And to complicate the matter further, Chiang Kai-shek on that same day made a speech in China that was in effect a call to arms. It is no wonder that the Treasury [Department] experts felt that it would not be in line with our policy to make a loan if political settlement was not forthcoming in China. They were correct.

Marshall returned to China on April 18, and almost as soon as he arrived he was confronted with a Communist charge that American planes had strafed [some of] their units. . . . Marshall's headquarters was able to prove that the plane involved, though of American make, belonged to the National[ist] Government.

I kept receiving reports of Communist successes in Manchuria during April and May. They captured Changchun, the capital city, after tense

fighting, and occupied Harbin, an industrial center of northern Manchuria, without opposition from the government garrison. Chiang Kai-shek rejected an offer of the Communists for a truce in Manchuria in spite of the fact that he was obviously unable to contain them. Hostilities spread into China proper. . . .

Marshall's truce teams were rushed out into areas of conflagration to stem the tide, and cease-fire orders were put into effect in some important provinces. In fact, the situation improved until Marshall found it possible to cable me in the latter part of May that there were signs that the promise of peace in China could be revived. Chiang Kai-shek seemed to accept Communist occupation of most of Manchuria at this stage. He was no longer insisting on the recapture of the cities that had been lost, and he seemed to consider, as a possible compromise, the idea of letting Changchun be managed by a tripartite team from Marshall's executive headquarters. The Communists . . . were reluctant to give up that key city, even to a neutral agency.

This apparent change in policy was only momentary, however; after Chiang Kai-shek consulted his generals in Mukden and other key locations, he returned to his earlier formula. He wanted the Communists to show their good faith first by restoring communications in North China, which they had cut in many places. He also raised the question of whether Marshall, as an individual, was prepared to guarantee the good faith of the Communists.

For the first time Marshall sounded a discouraging note. "I am working against time," he cabled, "otherwise I would be quite hopeful. As it is, success depends on the developments in the field more than on the problems of negotiation." It was only through Marshall's insistence that some basis for peaceful settlement had to be found that at last a temporary cease-fire was arranged for Manchuria. On June 7, both parties consented to a fifteen-day truce, and a small team, headed by Marshall's chief of staff, . . . went to Changchun to supervise the cessation of hostilities. Marshall had written me that it was his hope that, during the temporary truce, agreement might be reached on a more permanent settlement. But both sides seemed most unwilling to commit themselves. The [Nationalist] . . . commander in Manchuria announced repeatedly that he was ready to resume his advance on the Communist position as soon as the fifteen days had ended. The Communists, on the other hand, rejected the [Nationalists'] . . . plans as entirely too demanding. Unfortunately one of Chiang's proposals was that the American members of truce teams should be given the deciding voice whenever the two Chinese were unable to agree. The Communists . . . saw in this move merely a corroboration of their charge that America was taking the . . . [Nationalist]

side, and they would not hear of the plan. The Communists also objected to the [Nationalists'] demand that, in addition to Manchuria, the Communists should withdraw from certain areas in North China. When the government announced that it was sending two new armies into those areas, Marshall concluded that "at the present moment we have reached an impasse."

There were then a number of [Nationalist] . . . leaders who felt confident that the Communists could be defeated in battle, an estimate that Marshall . . . considered highly erroneous. He believed that not only would it be impossible for Chiang Kai-shek's forces to win a quick victory but also that, failing such immediate success, they would find themselves confronted by a Communist force backed and supported by the Soviets. In the long run, this could mean only defeat for Chiang—or American full-scale intervention.

But Marshall's patient persistence brought Communist acceptance of the [Nationalist] . . . proposal to give the deciding vote on truce teams to the American member, and, with this obstacle out of the way, negotiations once again appeared to take a more promising turn. The temporary truce was extended eight days to allow more time for talks. . . .

Marshall's work was made harder by the Congress in Washington, which showed itself willing to provide assistance to Chiang Kai-shek's government without regard to Marshall's attempt to negotiate an agreement between the Nationalists and the Communists. Pro-Chiang speeches and proposals in the Congress gave strength and confidence to those in Chiang's government who opposed reaching an agreement with the Communists.

In China, anti-American propaganda, mass meetings, and demonstrations were increasing. They were instigated alike by the Communists and by the extremists in the Kuomintang. . . .

. . . July . . . brought the outbreak of intense and widespread fighting. As Marshall reported it, "The Nationalists blamed the Communists for starting fighting in [some areas] . . . while the Communists blamed the Nationalists in [other areas]. . . ." At the same time, the [Nationalists] began a sharp drive against liberal elements of the population. The secret police put many of them under close surveillance, and in Kunming two professors who were members of the Democratic League were assassinated.

Chiang's reaction was one of counseling patience. He told Marshall, in effect, that all would end well. The Communists, however, were unwilling to resume talks as long as fighting continued. . . .

The turn of events in China troubled me. The anti-American demonstrations by the Nationalist student groups in such places as Nanking [Nanjing], the new policy of harshness against the liberals, Chiang's insistence on freedom of action in the military field—all these seemed to indicate that the [Nationalist] . . . government was turning its back on my effort to preserve the peace in China. As I interpreted Marshall's reports, there were elements on both sides, among the Kuomintang and among the Communists, who were willing to work together on a peaceful solution. But on each side there were also extremists who wanted no part of negotiations and were determined to settle the fate of their country by force. Chiang Kai-shek himself seemed to take a position between these two groups. In the spring, the influence of the moderates around him must have prevailed, and he agreed to concessions, although with a show of reluctance. Now, however, it appeared that the extreme military cliques had won out and that he was no longer willing to listen to Marshall's counsel. . . .

Truman decided to appeal to Chiang to draw back from the resort to force which he and the Kuomintang had apparently decided upon. During recent months, Truman wrote in his letter to Chiang of August 10, 1946, the rapidly deteriorating political situation in China has been a cause of grave concern to the American people. Truman went on to say that he continued to hope that Chiang would lead China toward democracy and peace, but that recent developments—including Chiang's failure to implement the agreements reached by the Political Consultative Committee and his government's oppression of freedom of the press and of the expression of liberal views among intellectuals—caused him to conclude that the selfish interests of extremist elements, equally in the Guomindang as in the Communist Party, are hindering the aspirations of the Chinese people. Truman warned that there was an increasing feeling among the American people that United States policy toward China must be reconsidered in view of the apparent attempt being made in China to settle major social issues by resort to force, military or secret police, rather than by democratic processes. Truman said that the United States wanted to help China achieve peace and a stable economy under a democratic government. But there was a growing feeling that militarists and reactionaries were obstructing advancement toward the general good of the Chinese people. Truman concluded with a threat: Unless convincing proof is shortly forthcoming that genuine progress is made toward a peaceful settlement of China's internal problems, it must be expected that American opinion will not continue in its generous attitude towards your nation.

When Chiang received this message, he asked Marshall to join him at his summer residence. There, without mentioning my letter, he told the general that he was convinced that the Communists had decided to embark upon a policy of violence. He denied that there had been anything in the conduct of the [Nationalist] government that would suggest that its policy was one of force. . . . [Following his meeting with Chiang,] Marshall reported that "at the present moment . . . [Chiang Kai-shek] seems clearly inclined to a policy of force as the only acceptable solution." He also said that he had again urged on Chiang the importance of stopping the fighting to clear the air for political negotiations. Only the Communists, Marshall pointed out, would gain if a general conflagration were allowed to develop. . . .

After his meeting with Marshall, Chiang responded to Truman's letter. He put all blame on the Communists for the growing violence. . . . The desire for peace has to be mutual, he told Truman, and for the Communists, it must mean that they give up their policy to use armed force to seize political power, to overthrow the [Nationalist] Government and to install a totalitarian regime. . . . The abandonment of such a policy is the minimum requirement for the preservation of peace in our country. Truman, in reply to Chiang's message, expressed hope that the violence in China would cease and that the United States could continue its efforts to assist China.

Chiang Kai-shek did, in fact, consent to another effort at political settlement. However, contrary to Marshall's judgment, he wanted to see a political agreement concluded before he would agree to a termination of the fighting. The Communists, in the meanwhile, had issued a manifesto for the mobilizing of all available manpower in their areas. According to the Communists, this was a defense measure. According to Chiang, it was clear evidence of the Communists' aggressive intentions. The stalemate seemed complete. Each side accused the other of having started the fighting, and neither would agree to a cessation until the other had given up any and all advantages gained in the interim.

Marshall now asked the two sides to sit down with [the United States Ambassador to China, John Leighton] Stuart in an attempt to break the stalemate. The aim was to bring about the creation of the State Council of forty members, which would be the next step forward on the road to political integration. Chiang set a number of conditions which, he said, the Communists would have to meet before he would agree to a cessation of

hostilities, and, in Marshall's opinion, the [Nationalist] . . . forces were in a position to score some immediate successes that might impel the Communists to accept these demands. Marshall believed that the Communists realized this and therefore were trying to get whatever advantages they could gain from local successes.

"There are leading military participants on both sides," he reported to me on August 30, "who confidentially take a somewhat Chinese view that several months of fighting will be a necessary procedure looking to an acceptable adjustment. What happens in the meantime to the hundreds of millions of oppressed people is ignored. Also what happens in the way of Soviet intervention overt or covert is also ignored or not mentioned."

Chiang Kai-shek appeared to believe that fighting would continue for at least another several weeks, into early October.

. . . On September 13, Marshall reported that "Dr. Stuart and I are stymied." Their only hope seemed to be that Chou En-lai and the Communists might decide that the fighting was running against them and that they might therefore best yield to . . . [Chiang Kai-shek's] . . . demands. . . . On October 2, [however,] Marshall sent three messages, the substance of which was that he considered his mission at a complete impasse. He had in vain pleaded with Chou En-lai to return from his self-imposed exile in Shanghai. He had no success in getting any concessions from Chiang Kai-shek, who had now openly announced that he would seek to occupy the city of Kalgan. The Communists responded with a declaration that an attack on Kalgan would be taken as a symbol of the government's intention to launch unrestricted civil war. Kalgan had been one of the sites which the [Nationalist] government had in June agreed to leave in Communist hands.

Marshall reported to me that he had found it necessary to submit a plain-spoken memorandum to Chiang. In this he had stated clearly that he was in disagreement with both the Communists and the Nationalists. Furthermore, he enumerated the points on which he disagreed with each and had then concluded by advising Chiang that, unless some basis for agreement on the termination of hostilities could be reached without delay, he would request that his mission in China be ended. Earlier, Marshall had informed the Communists with equal bluntness that he would withdraw from the task of mediation unless they ceased the personal attacks on him in their press and in their propaganda.

At this stage I was prepared to ask Marshall to come home.

Chiang Kai-shek was persuaded to make a proposal to the Communists, although it was not what we hoped it might be. Indeed, it was rather plain that Chiang was willing to take this step merely in an effort to prevent Marshall from openly proclaiming the collapse of the mediation efforts. The Communists, however, would not hear of any of Chiang's plans until they received assurances that the advance on Kalgan would be called off, and they also wanted assurances that the relative military position would be restored as it had existed at the time of the original cease-fire agreement in January. This, of course, would have meant the giving up by the Nationalists of all advantages they had gained in the interval, a condition Chiang would not accept.

Marshall now wrote me that he had concluded that the government of the United States could not be involved in a controversy in which the parties were dealing with each other at the point of a gun, and he insisted again that no talks could promise success unless there was first an end to the fighting. On October 5, he reported that in his view his usefulness in China had ceased and that his recall was therefore appropriate.

When Chiang learned that Marshall had recommended the end of the mediation mission, he came forward with the suggestion of a ten-day truce in the operations against Kalgan while discussions on the political and military problems were brought under way. Marshall, always anxious to pass up no opportunity that might lead to a cessation of hostilities, agreed to pass this proposal on to the Communists. The Communists' reply was that they would agree to a truce, provided it had no time limit, and that they would agree to a conference, provided there was no prior limitation of the subjects to be discussed. . . .

On October 9, Marshall traveled to Shanghai to appeal to Chou En-lai in person, but the Communist leader was completely adamant. He was clearly unwilling to concede anything, was suspicious of anything that came from Chiang Kai-shek, and at last told Marshall that he considered American assistance to the Chinese government improper and that he thought Marshall's timing of a public release on the latest proposal was such as to distort the picture to the disadvantage of the Communists. This charge brought from Marshall the reply that since he was no longer respected as impartial he would at once withdraw from any negotiations.

The events in China now moved to a new phase in which Marshall was only an interested observer. . . .

Ambassador John Leighton Stuart attempted to bring a number of small Chinese organizations, collectively called the Third Parties group, into the mediation effort. Chou En-lai traveled to Nanking to meet with these new mediators, but continued Nationalist military operations in Manchuria undermined their efforts. At the urging of the Third Parties group, though, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to a three-day postponement of the National Assembly, which produced no good result. When the National Assembly finally convened on November 15, almost all the delegates were from the Kuomintang.

The Communists considered . . . [the convening of the National Assembly] the final breach. It was their view that the agreements concluded in January in the Political Consultative Conference made it necessary that, before the National Assembly could be convened, the State Council should be organized and the powers of government transferred to it. The determination of the . . . [Nationalist] Government to go ahead with the National Assembly consequently was taken by the Communists as the final destruction of the January agreements. Chou En-lai returned to Yenan, leaving only a rump delegation behind, but before he left, he told Marshall that he expected the Chiang government to initiate shortly a major military campaign to capture Yenan. This, Chou En-lai said to Marshall, would mean the end of all hope for peace by negotiation.

The Communists had thus turned their backs on the negotiations. Chiang Kai-shek seemed confident that his forces could subdue them. In this Marshall disagreed, and he did not hesitate to point out to Chiang that the Communists could fight a war of attrition, cutting the Nationalist supply lines and communications at will while Chiang's forces sought to maintain the occupation of cities. Marshall reminded Chiang that, if Russian aid were given to the Communists, their supply line would be much shorter than his own and much more immune from attack. By every means at his command he sought to convince Chiang Kai-shek that in a purely military conflict, however much the odds appeared in his favor at the moment, he would not be able to secure lasting control of the country.

Despite this warning, Chiang Kai-shek remained unconvinced. He was certain that the Communists had never had any intention of cooperating and that only their military defeat would settle the issue. Nor did he take other important matters into consideration. For example, he dismissed Marshall's references to China's precarious economic condition by saying, in effect, that China was accustomed to that. In spite of these open disagreements over the

prospects in view, Chiang asked Marshall to remain in China as adviser to the government, an offer Marshall declined because he thought the strong anti-American sentiment whipped up by the extremists in the Kuomintang and their predominant position in the government would make the position of any American adviser difficult.

On December 28, Marshall suggested to me that, if a next effort at negotiations which was then being planned failed, he should be recalled to Washington. It was plain from his reports, too, that this effort was doomed to failure even before it was ever undertaken. I decided not to await this event. On January 3, I instructed the secretary of state to recall Marshall for consultation on China and "other matters." The "other matters" were to consist of no less than the entire scope of State Department activities. For while Marshall was still on his way across the Pacific, I announced that he would become secretary of state.

I had sent Marshall to China to try to end the fighting and to help put into effect the agreement between the Nationalists and the Communists to form a coalition government. He set up an executive headquarters, and the fighting stopped, temporarily. The Chinese began . . . endless . . . negotiations between themselves, and only an expert chess player can follow them. This is the way it goes. Someone makes a proposal which is accepted by the other side, with three qualifications. They are then accepted by the other side with three qualifications to each of the first three qualifications. It was an old Chinese way to be sure nothing would happen. Well, fighting broke out again in 1946, and Chiang Kai-shek then decided he was going to occupy North China and Manchuria. Marshall argued against it . . . but he went ahead. We furnished him equipment, money, and a water lift to Manchuria, and he sent the best divisions he had, well trained and well armed, to Mukden. They stayed there until finally the whole thing disintegrated, and they surrendered. They would make a series of extended movements into the country in North China and take up a position in a walled city. Chiang's commanders were very poor. They had a walled-city complex. They thought the open country was dangerous. Open country was the one place in which they should have been. But they thought a walled city was fine; they could see people coming. Of course no one came, and they stayed in the city. The Communists cut their communication lines and broke up their single-track railroad so it was no good to them. At the beginning of 1947, Marshall threw in the towel. He said that both parties were unwilling to carry out their agreements. Chiang Kai-shek would not

heed the advice of one of the greatest military strategists in history and lost to the Communists.

There is no question that Marshall's mission failed to yield the results he and I had hoped for. Fighting soon enveloped all of China, and it did not end until the Communists were masters of the land and Chiang Kai-shek, with the remnants of his army, sought refuge on Formosa. The Marshall mission had been unable to produce results because the government of Chiang Kai-shek did not command the respect and support of the Chinese people. Chiang's attitude and actions were those of an old-fashioned warlord, and, as with the warlords, there was no love for him among the people. There is no doubt in my mind that if Chiang Kai-shek had been only a little more conciliatory an understanding could have been reached.

I am not one to believe in the value of hindsight. Whether or not I was right in sending Marshall to China does not depend on what some think they know today. It depends only on what we were able to know in 1945. At that time, the belief was general that the various elements in China could be persuaded to unify the country. Of course the struggle for power would continue, but there was no reason why the National[ist] government could not be successful in this struggle, as non-Communist governments had been in Europe, if it attended to the fundamental needs of the people and the country. It seemed then that it was the only practicable course. . . .

Neither Marshall nor I was ever taken in by the talk about the Chinese Communists being just "agrarian reformers." Marshall knew he was dealing with Communists, and he knew what their aims were. When he was back in Washington in March [1946], he told me that their chief negotiator, Chou En-lai, had very frankly declared that, as a Communist, he believed firmly in the teachings of Marx and Lenin and the eventual victory of the proletariat. Marshall's messages from China show, also, that he fully assumed that the Chinese Communists would, in the end, be able to count on Russian support. Neither had I been taken in by Stalin's declaration at Potsdam that the Chinese Communists were not really "proper" Communists, nor by his later statement . . . that he thought the civil war in China would be foolish. I realized that the Communists had been engaged in a struggle for . . . power in China for nearly twenty years. What I hoped to achieve was to see China made into a country in which Communism would lose its appeal to the masses because the needs of the people and the voice of the people would have been answered.

I knew that peace in the world would not be achieved by fighting more wars. Most of all, I was always aware that there were two enormous land

masses that no western army of modern times had ever been able to conquer: Russia and China. It would have been folly, and it would be folly today, to attempt to impose our way of life on these huge areas by force! . . . Our only hope was that we might be given an opportunity to bring to China the kind of economic aid that might restore that country's health and that, in doing so, we would be able to weaken the Communists' appeal. But such aid could not be sent until tranquility had been restored in the nation, nor would it be effective until the government commanded enough respect to be able to make certain that none of this aid would be diverted into the pockets of warlords and profiteers.

In the end, of course, Chiang was defeated by loss of support among his own people and by American arms, as many of his own generals took their armies, equipped through our aid, into the enemy camp. It was when that sort of surrender began to occur on a large scale that I decided to cut off further shipments to China. . . .

The solution I tried to reach through Marshall was the only one by way of which Chiang Kai-shek might have saved himself without full-scale military intervention by the United States. To achieve a proper and fair appraisal of Marshall's mission, it is important to bear in mind that even before he left for China there already existed a formal agreement in writing between the [Nationalist] . . . government and the Communists to work toward national unity. This is the agreement that was brought about previously with the assistance of Ambassador [Patrick J.] Hurley when he headed our diplomatic mission to China, and had this not already been in existence I would not have sent Marshall to China. My sole purpose in sending him was to help carry out a program willingly subscribed to by the Chinese leaders. In no sense was it our intention to impose our will upon the Chinese people.

Years of Trial and Hope, 61–92

The Fair Deal

The 21-Point Message, Full Employment, Civil Rights, Housing, Agriculture, Health Care

The 21-point message—the Fair Deal—a program of liberalism and progressivism—the Employment Act of 1946—“a sustained attack on the perennial problem of mass unemployment”—the Fair Employment Practices Committee—President’s Committee on Civil Rights—“I want our Bill of Rights implemented in fact”—message to Congress—concern about the election—integration of the armed services—“It was necessary to practice what we preached”—a critical postwar housing shortage—the Wagner-Ellender-Taft bill—Congress fails to act—the Taft-Hartley Act—farmers and New Deal farm programs—“lasting agricultural abundance”—the Brannan Plan—failure of the plan in Congress—concern for the health of the people—the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill—Truman’s message to Congress—“socialized medicine”—a second and a third message to Congress—President’s Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation—Truman’s most troubling disappointment

The conduct of the war and the management of foreign affairs had crowded into my life with such speed and insistence that I could not find all the time I needed to devote to domestic matters. The San Francisco conference, the surrender of Germany, the Potsdam Conference, the birth of the atomic age, the surrender of Japan—all these transpired within a period of just three months. All the immediate domestic problems of converting back to a peace



economy had to be taken care of in the midst of these and other events of major significance that followed the collapse of the Axis [powers]. Each of these events, even for a president who had been in office for many years, would have been a time-consuming job requiring weeks of preparation and consultation. For me, who had been suddenly catapulted into the midst of world-shaking episodes, who had to learn about the past at the same time that I had to act for the present and plan for the future, too little time was left for long-range domestic planning.

On September 6, 1945, I sent to the Congress one of the most important messages of my administration. It contained the 21 points of domestic legislation which, in effect, constituted the platform of my administration. This 21-point message marked the beginning of the "Fair Deal," and September 6, 1945, is the date that symbolizes for me my assumption of the office of president in my own right. It was on that day and with this message that I first spelled out the details of the program of liberalism and progressivism which was to be the foundation of my administration. It was my opportunity as president to advocate the political principles and economic philosophy which I had expressed in the Senate and which I had followed all my political life. In a sense, my 21-point message was like a combination of a first inaugural and a first State of the Union message—it was to set the tone and direction for the rest of my administration and the goals toward which I would try to lead the nation. In my senatorial experience, I had followed the leadership and the political and economic program of Franklin Roosevelt. I had campaigned and been elected on Roosevelt's platform. As a delegate to the Democratic convention, I had helped to write the platform of 1944. Now it became my responsibility to lead—to recommend legislation, to administer the government, and to use the prestige and power of the presidency to induce sound social and political action.

I had given these matters considerable thought during my first four months in office, even though war matters and foreign policy problems had occupied most of my time. I actually started work on this comprehensive program while I was on my way home from the Potsdam Conference. . . . Samuel I. Rosenman . . . , [my White House] counsel . . . , had joined me at the conference and, returning home with me, was helping me prepare my report to the Congress and to the nation on the recently adjourned Big Three conference.

One evening in my cabin aboard the *Augusta*, as I was putting the finishing touches on my report, I said to Rosenman: "Sam, one of the first things I want to do after we get home and make this report is to get busy

on my domestic program. I would like to submit most of it at the same time instead of on a piecemeal basis. Ordinarily that would be done in a State of the Union message next January, but I cannot wait that long. What I think I will do is to send up a message as soon as we can get one up. Will you start to get together the material and perhaps get up a rough draft?" . . . Rosenman had been counsel to Franklin Roosevelt as governor and as president, and his personal friend and adviser for almost two decades. He was familiar with the facts and the philosophy of the New Deal, and I had persuaded him to stay on with me as counsel to the president. "Fine," he replied. "What in general are the things you would like to say?" And he reached for a pencil and pad. I reviewed to him my views on the social and economic problems that had faced the nation before the collapse of the early 1930s, and my views on the measures which the Roosevelt administration had taken for economic recovery and social reform. I spoke then of my own plans and policies for future legislation—the general direction in which I thought the United States ought to go in the years after the war.

As we discussed these long-range policies and the legislation I was suggesting to carry them out, Rosenman leaned forward. "You know, Mr. President," he said eagerly, "this is the most exciting and pleasant surprise I have had in a long time." "How is that?" I asked. "Well," he replied, "I suppose I have been listening too much to rumors about what you are going to do—rumors which come from some of your conservative friends, and particularly from some of your former colleagues up on Capitol Hill. They say you are going to be quite a shock to those who followed Roosevelt—that the New Deal is as good as dead—that we are all going back to 'normalcy' and that a good part of the so-called 'Roosevelt nonsense' is now over. In other words, that the conservative wing of the party has now taken charge. I never really believed any of that in view of your long voting record in the Senate—on the basis of which President Roosevelt was so anxious that you become the vice-presidential candidate, just in case anything happened to him. But this seems to settle it," he continued. "This really sets forth a progressive political philosophy and a liberal program of action that will fix the theme for your whole term in office. It is one thing to vote for this kind of a program when you are following the head of your party; it is quite another to be the head of a party and recommend and fight for it."

My attention to the framing of this important message, however, was interrupted by the sudden capitulation of Japan and the international problems that were involved. It was not until the end of August that I could get around to it again. By that time Rosenman had prepared a rough draft,

and it had been on my desk for several days. It was a good beginning, too, and I worked on it for ten days—adding sections, eliminating some points, and editing the document thoroughly. I sent the final revised version to the printer, and when the galley proofs were ready I called [in Rosenman and] . . . several other advisers . . . [and] we went over the proofs point by point, and many suggestions were made, some of which were adopted. Then I had the corrected proofs sent to the various agencies and Cabinet members for their comments. In this manner, I gave all the major officers of the executive branch a voice in the formulation of the message.

Most of my advisers agreed with the message, but some of my more conservative associates advised me against this definite commitment to such liberal measures. One of these was John Snyder, who at that time was Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion. Privately he expressed his disagreement to me in the frankest and most explicit terms. But his loyalty and friendship for me kept him from voicing any public opposition. I listened very carefully to Snyder's advice, for it has always been my policy to hear all sides on every question before coming to decision, and now I listened particularly because of the high regard I had for Snyder's judgment.

Early in my administration, I set out to achieve a balance between conservative and liberal points of view among the members of my Cabinet and other advisers. I wanted to be exposed to opposite poles of opinion forming my own conclusions and making my own decisions on basic policy matters. With this in mind I listened to various objections to the contents of the message, but I saw little reason to change it. On September 6—four days after my proclamation of V-J Day—I sent the 21 points up to the Congress. . . .

Most of Truman's 21 points were related directly to the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy—to what was called at the time "reconversion"—but several expressed his broad liberal goals for his domestic policy program. Among these latter were an expanded program of unemployment insurance; an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which would assure that American workers receive a sufficiently high pay level to provide for the maintenance of the health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers; full employment legislation, which would give government the ability to develop information and provide policy assurances that would aid private enterprise to create and maintain full employment at good wage levels, and to assure private enterprise and the American people that the government would act if necessary to prevent prolonged unemployment; creation of a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission, which would

combat prejudices against minorities defined by race, creed, and color; government action to meet the peacetime needs of farmers, particularly with respect to price supports, crop insurance, scientific research, soil conservation, and international markets; broad and comprehensive housing legislation to assure that all Americans have decent places to live, constructed and financed through private enterprise; legislation to protect and encourage small businesses; and a new program of public works to preserve and develop natural resources and to build highways, airports, hospitals, schools, and other public facilities.

This was an ambitious program, and to show that it was not unrealistic I described in detail each of the 21 points and the legislative steps required to carry out the policies.

One of the key items in the program was the recommendation for a national reassertion of the right to work for every American citizen able and willing to work. It was a declaration of the ultimate duty of government to use all of its resources if supply-and-demand methods should fail to prevent prolonged unemployment. I felt that in normal times we had to look first to private enterprise to provide jobs and that the government should do all it could to inspire enterprise with confidence. But that confidence, I emphasized in the message, would have to come mainly from deeds, not words. I asked for speedy action on . . . full employment legislation [that would] . . . assure sustained confidence in our economy and prosperity [and] . . . provide the machinery for a continuous full employment policy based on the cooperation of industry, agriculture, and labor, and between the Congress and the . . . [president], and between the people and their government.

I was convinced that along with full employment there had to be equal opportunity for all races, religions, and colors. This fundamental of our political philosophy should also be an integral part of our economy. The Fair Employment Practices Committee, which had operated during the war, was continuing through the transition period. I had already requested legislation placing this committee on a permanent basis, and I repeated that recommendation in the 21-point message.

I did not attempt to deliver . . . [this very lengthy message] in person but had printed copies sent to every member of the House and the Senate. The actual reading of the message was done by reading clerks in both Houses. . . .

The message, in its formal proposals and in its language, contained the rudiments of the Fair Deal program. But within ten weeks after . . . [the message] was read before the Congress, I [had] sent up several more messages, each adding new recommendations to be included in the Fair Deal. The new

elements dealt with health insurance and prepaid medical care, nationalization of atomic energy, the development of the St. Lawrence seaway project, and federal aid to education. The proposals I submitted [to Congress in my Fair Deal messages] . . . were designed to be as liberal and as far-reaching as [those put forward during] the prewar 1940 Democratic campaign. I was also determined to carry out the campaign pledges of 1944 to which Roosevelt and I . . . [had] committed [ourselves]. [My Fair Deal] . . . legislative program . . . [expressed] the domestic [policy] goal[s] of . . . [my] administration [and served as] a reminder to the Democratic Party, to the country, and to the Congress that progress in government . . . [requires] sound reform[s] in our private enterprise system and that progressive democracy has to continue to keep pace with changing conditions.

High on my list of priorities in the reconversion program was organizing the machinery of government to meet the new needs and responsibilities that had arisen.

I had realized long before I became president that a reorganization of the executive branch was desirable and, in some respects, necessary. Common sense told me that a better organized executive branch would operate more efficiently. History records many instances of former presidents urging the Congress to provide the necessary legislation to make the executive branch operate along more efficient lines. My own experience had already demonstrated to me that substantial progress could be made in this respect through action initiated by the president.

The Reorganization Act of 1939 provided a method for improving the organization of the executive branch of the government and of the executive agencies. This act enabled the president to initiate improvements and changes subject only to disapproval by each of the two Houses of Congress within a period of sixty days. There was also the First War Powers Act of 1941, which empowered the president to make necessary adjustments in the organization of the executive branch in relation to the conduct of the war. These two pieces of legislation provided the basis for many of the changes which President Roosevelt made during the war years.

The problem I now faced was that the First War Powers Act would expire automatically six months after the end of the war. I saw the need for legislation generally similar to the Reorganization Act of 1939 that would be of a permanent character and broad enough to include all executive departments and agencies, yet flexible enough to permit any form of adjustment that might be necessary. On May 24, 1945, I had sent a message to Congress requesting such legislation. I was advised by congressional leaders in June

that action on my proposal would be delayed until the Congress had reconvened in the fall. In my message to the Congress of September 6, therefore, I again pointed out the urgent need for increased presidential authority over executive agencies. After some debate in both the House and the Senate . . . a compromise bill was sent to me, and I signed it on December 20. . . .

One problem with which I was particularly concerned in regard to strengthening the executive branch had to do with the existing vacancy in the office of the vice president. I felt that the law governing the order of succession to the office of . . . [president] needed to be changed so that only an elective official of the government might succeed to the presidency upon the death of the president or his inability to fill the post. Under the Presidential Succession Law of 1886, the secretary of state was next in line after the president and vice president. Other members of the Cabinet then followed in order under that law. Since the members of the Cabinet are all presidential appointees, the law gave me the power to appoint my own successor until a new vice president could be elected almost four years later. This is a power which I believe no president ought to possess. Inasmuch as the president and vice president are the only officers of the government elected by all the voters of the United States, I felt that the Speaker of the House of Representatives most nearly represents election by the people, because, as a member of the House, he is elected to the Congress by the voters of his district, and as Speaker, he is chosen by a majority of the representatives from all of the states. Accordingly, I had recommended a bill providing for these changes early in my administration. It was passed by the House on June 29, 1945, but it failed to pass the Senate. Finally, the bill passed and became law. I believe some way should be found to elect a successor to the vice president when he takes over the office of president. . . .

Truman's call in his 21-point message for full employment legislation resulted in the Full Employment Act of 1946, passed by Congress about five months after he delivered the message. Truman was worried that postwar inflation could seriously damage the economy, and he felt that full employment and full employment production levels were the country's greatest weapon against inflation.

I knew that full production would be our greatest weapon against inflation. But if manufacturers and producers chose to hold back goods and products in anticipation of higher prices, which inevitably prevail in postwar periods, they would slow down production and create needless unemployment. That was my reason for requesting, in the 21-point message to the

Congress on September 6, 1945, full employment legislation. . . . By full employment I meant the opportunity to get a good peacetime job for every worker who was ready, able, and willing to take one. Making jobs, or making people work, was in no sense a part of the full employment program. I did feel, however, that it was the responsibility of the government to inspire private enterprise with confidence by giving assurances that all the facts about full employment and opportunity would be gathered periodically for the use of all; assurance of stability and consistency in public policy, so that enterprise could plan better by knowing what the government intended to do; assurance that every governmental policy and program would be pointed to promote maximum production and employment in private enterprise; and assurance that priority would be given to doing those things first which stimulated normal employment most.

When I first proposed full employment legislation, it was with the thought that we might have from two to eight million people out of work in this country, if the pattern of the 1920s was any guide. No one really knew what would happen as far as American production and employment were concerned. But I wanted to exert every effort to prevent the terrible unemployment experiences of past decades. The full employment item was one of the 21 points on which I particularly wanted swift action, because the problem promised to grow as soon as wartime production was curtailed and demobilization was stepped up. . . .

On October 29, 1945, Truman wrote to House majority leader John McCormack, asking him to speed action on the full employment bill. It is not enough to make a transition to temporary prosperity, Truman wrote. We cannot repeat the mistakes made after the last war. This time we must build on a more solid foundation. We must take those steps now that will move us with firm purpose toward full employment and keep us there. He asked McCormack to try to pass the bill by Thanksgiving, so that Americans could feel assurance on that day that they would not have to endure another depression.

I was able to report at my November 29 press conference that total employment had already returned to the V-J Day level, after the greatest part of layoffs from war plants had been completed. Unemployment was so far less than had been expected, and employment in non-war activities was increasing at a satisfactory rate. Three and a half million men and women had been demobilized, and ninety-three percent of our plants had been reconverted from wartime to peacetime production. By January 1946 the picture

was even brighter. Despite numerous strikes and lockouts, fifty-two million workers were already employed in civilian jobs. With full employment calculated by some at 53,500,000 jobs it seemed that this goal would be reached much sooner than had been expected. There were still two million unemployed, but these represented no more than the fractional unemployment percentage which the country would have even with full employment.

The real problem was not how to achieve full employment. It was how to maintain it. That was the purpose of the Employment Act of 1946, which I signed on February 20, [1946].

While the full employment bill had undergone some considerable changes in the process of being shaped into law, it still retained the essential features of my original proposal. The bill made it the responsibility of the federal government to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose of maintaining conditions under which there would be afforded useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those seeking to work. The act included a significant provision to facilitate cooperation between the . . . [president] and the Congress in the formulation of policies and to accomplish the purpose of the act. It established a joint congressional committee consisting of seven members of the Senate and seven members of the House to study and report to the Congress on the president's recommendations regarding the employment program.

While the measure was concerned primarily with the problems of unemployment and economic depression, one of its major provisions authorized the establishment of a Council of Economic Advisers within the Executive Office of the President. The job of the three-man council was to help the administration decide what the government should do to help the nation's economy function smoothly and prosperously. The council was also assigned the duty of assisting and advising the president in the preparation of an economic report to be submitted to the Congress within sixty days after the beginning of each regular session. . . .

In accordance with the provisions of the act, I transmitted an economic message at the beginning of each regular session of Congress. We fully realized that neither this legislation nor the machinery it established would automatically give the nation full employment and full production, or full protection from economic depression. That was a goal that could be achieved only by the concerted efforts of all segments of our society in co-operation with the government. But the full employment act did give us a clear-cut declaration of national policy to enable us to attain many of our desired objectives. It gave positive expression to a deep-seated desire of the

American people for a sustained attack upon the perennial problem of mass unemployment. . . .

Truman was convinced that, along with full employment, what he called equal opportunity for all races, religions, and colors had also to be achieved.

From the early days of my administration I insisted on a workable fair employment practices program and on the enforcement of civil rights as guaranteed by the Constitution. . . . The Fair Employment Practices Committee [FEPC] had been established by an executive order of President Roosevelt on June 25, 1941, "to encourage full participation in the national defense program by all citizens regardless of race, creed, color or national origin." The committee was continued until June 30, 1946, under the National War Agency Appropriations Act and was terminated at that time against my wishes. The FEPC had shown that, in the majority of wartime cases, discriminatory practices by employers and unions could be reduced or eliminated by simple negotiation when the work of the negotiator was backed by a firm national policy. Nevertheless, there were many unresolved cases handled by the FEPC which indicated to me that executive authority was not enough to insure compliance in the face of organized opposition. I saw that legislative authority would be required to put an end to such un-American practices.

[On] December 5, 1946 . . . [I set up] the [President's] Committee on Civil Rights . . . to investigate and report on the status of civil rights in America. I took this action because of the repeated anti-minority incidents immediately after the war in which homes were invaded, property was destroyed, and a number of innocent lives were taken. I wanted to get the facts behind these incidents of disregard for individual and group rights which were reported in the news with alarming regularity, and to see that the law was strengthened, if necessary, so as to offer adequate protection and fair treatment to all of our citizens. I directed that the committee's survey should not be confined to the problem of any one minority group but should extend to all areas of racial and religious discrimination. It was a simple approach to one of the oldest problems of a democratic society, yet the leaders of "white supremacy" began at once their campaign of demagoguery to attempt to nullify my efforts to develop federal safeguards against racial discrimination. . . .

In the executive order creating the committee, I pointed out that the nation was losing ground in civil rights and that [their] . . . preservation . . . was the duty of every branch of government and every public official—state,

federal, and local. The constitutional guarantees of individual liberties and of equal protection under the law clearly place on the federal government the duty to act when state or local authorities abridge or fail to uphold these guarantees. I felt that the federal government was hampered, however, by inadequate civil rights statutes and that the Department of Justice lacked the tools to enforce such statutes as there were. This was a condition that I wanted to see corrected.

Speaking to the fifteen members of the [President's] Committee on Civil Rights at the White House on January 15, 1947, I said: "I want our Bill of Rights implemented in fact. We have been trying to do this for 150 years. We are making progress, but we are not making progress fast enough. This country could very easily be faced with a situation similar to the one with which it was faced in 1922." I was referring . . . to the revival of terrorism in that year by the Ku Klux Klan.

Six months later, [on June 29, 1947], I restated the motives of my civil rights program in an address to the annual convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. . . . "As Americans," I asserted, "we believe that every man should be free to live his life as he wishes. He should be limited only by his responsibility to his fellow countrymen. If this freedom is to be more than a dream, each man must be guaranteed equality of opportunity. The only limit to an American's achievement should be his ability, his industry and his character."

In October of the same year the [President's Committee on] Civil Rights . . . delivered its report, which showed that a positive need existed for legislation to secure the rights of American minority groups. The report listed ten important recommendations, as follows: (1) Establishing a permanent Commission on Civil Rights, a joint Congressional Committee on Civil Rights, and a Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice. (2) Strengthening existing civil rights statutes. (3) Providing federal protection against lynching. (4) Protecting more adequately the right to vote. (5) Establishing a Fair Employment Practices Commission to prevent unfair discrimination in employment. (6) The modification of the federal naturalization laws to permit the granting of citizenship without regard to the race, color, or national origin of applicants. (7) Providing home rule and suffrage in presidential elections for the residents of the District of Columbia. (8) Providing statehood for Hawaii and Alaska and a greater measure of self-government for our island possessions. (9) Equalizing the opportunities for residents of the United States to become naturalized citizens. (10) Settling the evacuation claims of Japanese Americans. . . .

Despite the clarity with which the Civil Rights Committee had expressed its findings and recommendations, and the wide publicity which I had encouraged on the subject, the program which I insisted be included in the platform was shamefully distorted and misrepresented by political demagogues and press propaganda. My appeal for equal economic and political rights for every American citizen had nothing at all to do with the personal or social relationships of individuals or the right of every person to choose his own associates. The basic constitutional privilege which I advocated was deliberately misconstrued to include or imply racial miscegenation and intermarriage. My only goal was equal opportunity and security under the law for all classes of Americans. . . .

I asked for specific civil rights legislation in my message to the Congress on February 2, 1948, to enact these recommendations into law. At the same time, I urged the abolition of segregation and discrimination in the use of transportation facilities by both public officers and the employees of private companies throughout the country. And later I incorporated these recommendations into the 1948 platform of the Democratic Party. . . .

On July 26, 1948, President Truman signed executive order 9981, which declared that it was his policy that "there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin." The armed services, in other words, were to be desegregated. This declaration was for many Americans, including many of the country's military leaders, shocking and even revolutionary, and Truman knew it would take some time and hard work to realize the goal of a desegregated military.

The attitude which had been taken by Southerners toward the policy of integration in the armed forces was well known. Practically all of the training camps in World War II were located in the South because of climate conditions, and the idea of integration [of the armed services], therefore, encountered strong resistance. . . . The military establishment . . . had [also] been strongly opposed to my policy of integration in the armed services, but I had forced it into practice. Then they discovered that no difficulty resulted from integration after all. Integration is the best way to create an effective combat organization in which the men will stand together and fight. Experience on the front has proved that the morale of troops is strengthened where Jim Crow practices are not imposed. . . .

I was raised amidst some violently prejudiced Southerners myself, and I believe the vast majority of good Southerners understand that the blind

prejudices of past generations cannot continue in a free republic. Much progress in civil rights has been made voluntarily by the South itself, and it was to help and to speed this progress that my program was designed. . . .

I felt also that any other course [than to strive to achieve equal opportunity and security under the law for all classes of Americans] would be inconsistent with international commitments and obligations. We could not endorse a color line at home and still expect to influence the immense masses that make up the Asian and African peoples. It was necessary to practice what we preached, and I tried to see that we did it. . . .

Truman's 21-point message called for legislation to assure that Americans had a decent place to live. A severe shortage of housing coming out of the war presented the federal government with an emergency situation that required immediate attention, but the housing shortage was also a chronic problem that required a long-term solution.

Housing was one of the acute postwar problems with which I had to deal. More than a million families were living "doubled up" with other families in the fall of 1945 because of a critical housing shortage. This shortage had been building up over a period of years. We entered the war with a housing deficit, and the war had served to widen the gap. At the same time that building materials and manpower were engaged in the all-out war effort instead of home construction, marriages increased at far above the normal rate. Wars have always stimulated marriages, and with the return of millions of veterans and the additional marriages that followed, the immediate demand for new housing was far in excess of the industry's capacity to produce.

In October, I directed the Federal Public Housing Authority to release for sale the 320,000 temporary housing units which the government had erected around war plants now shut down, along with 35,000 trailers. These units, which were sold at no more than the cost to tear them down, helped provide some emergency relief but of course had little effect on alleviating the general shortage. Nothing less than several years of peak production would really solve the problem. It would take time to get the construction industry into full operation, and I knew that we would do well to have more than 500,000 housing units built in 1946. Veterans were given preference in all federal housing units, but it was impossible to meet their needs at once or to solve the housing problems of millions of war workers and others who were still confronted with substandard or inadequate conditions. . . .

In December 1945, Truman received a report from the director of the War Mobilization and Reconversion regarding the program the government was implementing in order to increase the housing supply and to meet emergency situations.

In addition to this program, I encouraged a speed-up in the release of surplus housing units and building materials held by the government, with preference for veterans. I favored a regulation establishing priorities on building materials which would channel about fifty percent of all building materials into housing units costing \$10,000 or less. Recognizing the threat of inflation in the field of housing to be the most menacing in our economy, I requested ceiling prices on old and new housing, curbs on unsound lending practices, and rent control. . . .

In reviewing the housing situation in my talk to the people on January 3, 1946, I said: "Of the three major components which make up our standard of living—food, clothing, and housing—housing presents our most difficult problem." I cited to the Congress our need for about five million additional homes at once, although the greatest number of homes that had ever been built in one year before the war was less than one million. It was clear, I told the Congress, that this was an emergency problem that demanded an emergency method of solution. And five weeks later, I presented to the Congress a veterans' emergency housing program, with the request that legislation be promptly enacted for carrying out the program.

Meanwhile the shortage had become acute, particularly where veterans and their families were concerned. Thousands were finding it impossible to obtain adequate housing, in spite of our best efforts to facilitate new construction. . . . Finally, on May 22, the emergency housing bill to provide for the construction of 2,700,000 homes for veterans within two years became law. . . . The original proposal . . . had undergone considerable abuse in both Houses of the Congress before reaching my desk in amended form, but it was nevertheless the first effective legislation designed specifically to cope with the housing shortage. The heart of the program was the appropriation of \$400 million for subsidies to spur production of bottleneck materials. The act also increased by \$1 million the government's authority to insure home loans through private capital, thus protecting lenders against risks incurred by selling homes on small down payments.

This was only emergency legislation, and its provisions were not designed to take care of the long-range residential building needs. A permanent law which would implement the construction of fifteen million homes over a ten-year period was being worked on by the Congress. This was the

Wagner-Ellender-Taft bill providing government loans to small-income builders, slum clearance, and other general inducements to low cost housing construction. I urged . . . [the Congress] to take quick action to help solve the problem, but . . . the months dragged by with no decisive action from the Congress. By October the nation was confronted with an emergency unique in its history. . . .

The government was finding it difficult to increase the pace of new home construction.

The chief deterrent to faster construction was the failure of the Congress to provide the enabling legislation. It had pared \$200 million for subsidies from the emergency housing act before approving it in May. It had failed to give prompt enactment to the Wagner-Ellender-Taft bill to provide low-cost housing. It had refused to approve price ceilings on existing housing and had allowed the . . . [Office of Price Administration] to expire. Other almost insurmountable handicaps cropped up in the form of material shortages, work stoppages, and the persistent lobbying in Washington by groups from the real estate, lumber, [and] contracting [industries], and other special interests.

It became necessary for me to issue a proclamation on October 25 declaring a state of emergency because of the housing shortage and authorizing free importation of lumber into the country.

Truman wanted the Congress to pass legislation that would assure working men and women that they would receive a pay level that was sufficient to allow them to achieve a good standard of living. Congress did not give Truman the kind of legislation he wanted.

On labor legislation . . . there was a wide gap between the Congress and the president. When . . . [a] bill designed to strip labor of its rights reached my desk in 1946, I vetoed that repressive measure. But anti-labor sentiment, inflamed by John L. Lewis's defiance of the government in the fall of 1946, was gaining new strength, and labor legislation became a prime issue in 1947.

On January 6, 1947, in the State of the Union message, I . . . urged [Congress to pass] legislation to deal with the basic causes of labor-management difficulties. Specifically warning against punitive legislation under the stress of emotions created by the recent strife in which not only labor and management but the government and the public had been embroiled, I proposed

a . . . program [that] offered a sound approach to the nation's industrial problems. But the 80th Congress began to hammer out the wrong kind of legislation.

Representative Fred Hartley, Jr., of New Jersey, chairman of the House Labor Committee, introduced a bill which was passed by the House in April. This drastic strike-curb bill, while it contained some good points, was an extremist measure which would abolish the National Labor Relations Board and substitute a Labor-Management Relations Board, make illegal industry-wide strikes, the closed shop, jurisdictional and sympathy strikes, mass picketing, [and] all strikes by government workers, deprive violating unions of their bargaining rights for one year, deprive unlawful strikers of their right to get their jobs back, make unions suable, require unions to make financial reports, and empower the president to obtain injunctions against strikes in interstate transportation, communications, or public utilities. A similar bill was being formulated in the Senate by the Labor Committee headed by Senator Robert Taft of Ohio. In May, a . . . Senate-House conference committee began combining the Taft bill with the Hartley bill.

The amended Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, better known as the Taft-Hartley Act, was sent to the White House for my signature on June 18. Two days later I vetoed the act. The veto message listed the objections to it: The bill was completely contrary to our national policy of economic freedom because it would result in more or less government intervention into the collective bargaining process. Because of its legal complexities, the act would become a source of time-consuming litigation which would encourage distrust and bitterness between labor and management. The bill was neither workable nor fair. The Taft-Hartley bill would go far toward weakening our trade union movement by injecting political considerations into normal economic decisions. I reminded the members of the Congress of the recommendation for a step-by-step approach to the subject of labor legislation in my [State of the Union] message . . . and had suggested the specific problems which we should treat immediately. What had been laid before me was a bill proposing drastic changes in our national labor policy first, before making a careful, nonpartisan investigation of the entire field of labor-management relations.

The recommendations I had submitted in January still constituted an adequate basis for legislation which would be moderate in spirit and which related to known abuses, and I urged that appropriate action be taken in that direction.

On the evening following the veto message, I spoke over the radio about what this type of legislation would do to the progress made through the years in the area of labor relations, saying that this bill did not resemble the labor legislation recommended to the Congress by the administration, and warning that if it became the law it would create conflicts and discord without correcting the abuses or furthering advances in labor-management relations.

The Senate overruled my veto on June 23, and the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 became the law of the land. I had done all within my power to prevent an injustice against the laboring men and women of the United States.

Truman, a farmer himself, believed that the federal government must take an important role in assuring the continuing prosperity of the American farmer. His central Fair Deal agricultural proposal was called the Brannan Plan, after his secretary of agriculture, Charles F. Brannan.

I was raised on a farm, and even as a boy I helped my father there. My home state of Missouri is primarily a farm state, and my brother Vivian farms to this day. I know what the farmer's problems are. I learned early, when I worked in a bank, how important the farmers' prosperity is to the welfare of the country. When the crops failed, two things happened to the bank: the farmers withdrew their deposits, and later many farmers came to borrow money on their land. When the farmers were hurt, merchants and tradesmen suffered. To see this happen was a basic lesson in economics. It was a practical demonstration that prosperous farmers make for a prosperous nation, and when farmers are in trouble the nation is in trouble.

In 1921, the bottom fell out of agricultural prices, and throughout the twenties the farmer was barely able to hang on. Then came 1932 and the victory of the Democrats. Sound policies followed, restoring farm prosperity, for the New Deal knew that farm income had to be stabilized if the national economy as a whole was to be stabilized. Soil conservation, the Triple A, Farm Credit Administration, rural electrification—all these and other measures contributed to the return of farm prosperity. Then World War II gave this trend a strong push as American crops were shipped overseas to help feed our allies and as greatly increased employment at home increased domestic food consumption to an all-time high. Even after the war, relief shipments and Marshall Plan aid continued to demand the products of American farms. Throughout these years, the government had guaranteed

the price of farm products at a fixed level, but the continued high demand had kept the government guaranteed surplus at a minimum. The result was that in 1948 the American farmer had reached an economic position better than he had ever known before. . . .

While this agricultural prosperity was due partly to special factors in the postwar situation, the sound farm legislation which had been adopted since 1932 provided a much better basis for sustained farm prosperity than we had ever had before. . . . But the farmers still had reason to be fearful. A sudden change, such as that . . . [which had occurred in] 1921, might cause the bottom to fall out of agricultural prices, and I intended to do everything I could to prevent an agricultural depression from happening [again]. The farmer, I felt, was entitled to real protection against a postwar slump, and the nation as a whole had to be protected against a farm depression. I wanted a program of action to ensure that the gains made since 1932 would be held and that we could move forward with the job of building our economy on a foundation provided by the organized, sustained, and realistic prosperity of American agriculture.

I was concerned about the many farm families who were not sharing fairly in the progress of American life. In too many rural communities . . . housing, medical services, and educational facilities were still inadequate. Some farms were still isolated by poor roads. Others were still without the benefits of electricity. It was my conviction that the federal government had a definite responsibility in building for lasting agricultural abundance and in making farm life attractive to future generations of Americans. The sound and far-reaching legislation of the preceding sixteen years constituted an excellent basis for continued progress, but we needed a number of extensions and improvements in our farm program. Most of all, we needed a permanent system of price supports for agricultural commodities. I believed that the entire nation should be protected against the wide swings in farm prices that in the past had caused economic insecurity that affected all of us. Furthermore, we needed a more vigorous soil conservation program, and it was important that steps be taken to maintain adequate markets for farm products and to improve the methods of distributing them to consumers.

In order to provide answers to these and other problems, I asked Charles F. Brannan, the secretary of agriculture, to make an over-all study of the farm situation and to draw up specific proposals. . . . Brannan and I had [already] discussed various plans and ideas on three or four different occasions. When the final draft of his report was ready, he came to the White House, and we went over it item by item. The purpose of the program was to assure

the farmer a stable income, and the device by which this was to be accomplished made good sense to me. Each commodity affected would be allowed to seek its level in the market. Then, if this level was below a fair return to the farmer, the government—at the end of a predetermined period—would pay the farmer directly the difference between what he got on the average for his commodity over the particular marketing period and what was calculated by a formula to be a fair price. There was nothing new about this approach. It had been applied [to some crops—cotton, sugar beets and sugar cane, and wool—for some time]. . . .

. . . The plan Brannan asked me to approve would see that perishable commodities like meat, dairy products, poultry, and eggs would be put on the market at prices which consumers could afford. The program was to apply first of all to dairy products, for many marketing studies indicated that milk prices and milk consumption were closely related. As the price of milk goes down, the volume of milk consumed goes up correspondingly. Thus we could almost put our finger on how many more quarts of milk could be sold at a given lower market price, and this approach also provided a reliable index for other commodities. The basic idea of the plan was to approach the economics of agriculture not from the point of view of agriculture, as had formerly been done, but with an eye to production and abundance. We wanted to make it increasingly worthwhile for the farmer to produce, and at the same time keep the consumer price level at a point at which the average man could afford to buy. Without some such policy, the price level of farm products plays its part in a vicious circle: the more the farmer plants, the less he gets, the less he can spend; the less he spends, the fewer non-farm goods are bought; the fewer non-farm goods are sold, the less money is available to pay for the things the farmer wants to sell. And the Brannan Plan, as it soon came to be called, was a blueprint for breaking this circle.

"Price supports," Brannan pointed out, "are the farmer's equivalent of the laboring man's minimum wage, social security, and collective bargaining arrangements." Like labor, the farmer lacks equality at the bargaining table. The prices he pays for products are generally fixed, many times by monopolies or by tacit agreements among producers. But the individual farmer must sell when his crops are ready for the market, and the result is that he must take whatever price he is offered [whether it be low or high]. . . . The old laissez-faire theorists would tell us that the answer is to cut down on producing units until the fittest survive. But this theory is without humanity, for in human terms it means the breakup of homes, the destruction of families, and the surrender of the family farm to the absentee landlord or

the corporate owner. No American government worthy of the name can allow this sort of thing to recur every twenty years or so. The farmers' sense of security is a vital part of the foundation of American life.

What was important about the Brannan Plan was that it shifted the emphasis in price supports from commodity purchases to production payments. Under the law as it then read—and as it still reads today [in 1955], I regret to say—the price of agricultural products is supported either by government loans at the parity level or by government purchases in the open market. The result is that large surpluses accumulate in the government warehouses whenever prices fall below the guarantee level set by Congress, but the consumer does not get the benefit of the excess supply. This sets in motion a spiral effect: the consumer, because of higher prices, buys less; the farmer, for the same reason, is encouraged to raise even more; and the imbalance tends to become worse. Under the Brannan Plan, however, if the price of a given product included in the plan should fall below support levels, the government would make a direct payment to the farmer for the difference between the price he received and the support price. The consumer, nevertheless, would have the benefit of the lower price. He would be encouraged to purchase more. This increased demand would tend to bring the price up again. And in this way the support of the farmer would be self-compensating and, in the true sense of the word, would contribute to the general welfare.

There was also another important change in the manner in which we proposed to make price supports available. As I have always seen it, there is only one really sound reason for farm price supports, and that is to maintain a decent standard of living for ordinary farm families. However, under the commodity purchase program, large payments were being made . . . to corporations operating vast acreages almost as if they were factories in mass production. But these are not the kinds of farm operators who require government support to hold their position. There is probably a place in our economy for this kind of farm operation, but it is not as vital to the life and welfare of the nation as the work of the millions of families who—often literally—"toil in the sweat of their brow." The Brannan Plan contained a provision that would have excluded from production payments the yields of any one farm over and above a certain limit. This limit was defined as eighteen hundred units of production, and at 1949 prices this would have meant, in practice, \$20,000 worth of the affected commodity. . . .

Representatives of associations of small farmers complained that this limit was too high and that it did not channel the proposed benefits to the small

operator who needed them most. But it was not the purpose of the plan to redistribute the wealth. I wanted a farm program that would serve the farm, and I wanted it designed in such a way that agricultural corporations would not be able to grow fat on it. The unit limitation as written would have applied to only about two per cent of the farm operators of the United States, but these produced 25% of the total dollar volume of all the farm products of the nation. Secretary Brannan warned me that this recommendation in favor of what we called the family sized farmer would be attacked as containing political implications. It was a new and unusual proposal for farm economy, he said, and would probably be criticized as too radical or labeled a political gesture. This did not trouble me, however, for I had given the provision most careful study.

"Well, Charlie," I said, "it is right, isn't it?"

Brannan replied that, in his opinion, it was.

"Then it stays in," I told him.

Interestingly enough, the unit limitation was hardly criticized at all, and the reason for this, I believe, was that the critics of the plan saw the irrefutable reasoning on which the limitation policy was based.

As soon as the proposals were made public, a great hue and cry was raised in the press over what many writers called the socialistic and political implications of the Brannan Plan. . . . Brannan discussed the program at a joint hearing of the House Committee on Agriculture and the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on April 7, 1949, and from then on there was a great deal of heated discussion on the floor of both the House and the Senate with respect to the plan.

I had expected criticism of this sort. All the ballyhoo that was raised over the Brannan Plan was similar to the furor that was created by the American Medical Association over the health insurance program. The American Farm Bureau Federation, which represented the special-interest farmers . . . , attacked the price support program on the same grounds that the private utilities companies fought every attempt of the government to make public power available to the people, and as the American Medical Association fought the health program which would benefit all the people. I paid no attention to the "anti-Brannan Plan" campaign, which cost the Farm Bureau members more than half a million dollars in one year. I knew what the farmers themselves wanted and needed because I had talked with thousands of them personally in 1948 about it. I have never been interested in what the big, expensive lobbies in Washington have to say about farming, real estate, electricity, medicine, or any other subject. They do not represent the views

of the man on the job. Instead, they represent selfish special interests who support the lobbies to fight their legislation battles for them. What I had to overcome was the traditional attitude toward such scare words as "socialization," "socialism," and "subsidization." Industry and business have demanded subsidies from the federal government for generations—in the form of mailing permits, freight rates, tariffs . . . , tax privileges for plant construction, and other such things. In our time, agriculture is no less dependent upon such assistance than industry, labor, or business. . . .

The Brannan Plan was nothing new. It was consistent with the policy of every Democratic administration that has tried to elevate the standards of living of the American rural population through price supports and through a score of other measures designed to strengthen and stabilize this basic occupation. The opposition has always tried to convince the farmer that he is being placed under the heel of controls. . . . In every election since Roosevelt's first run in 1932], the Republicans have tried to coax the farmer to vote down controls, so that parities would then find their own level. If the farmer finally accepts this advice, the bottom will drop out of prices and he will go back to 1921.

My hope was to see the farmer go on to even higher levels of prosperity than he [had] enjoyed throughout the administrations of Roosevelt and myself. This could have been accomplished only through a positive program such as the . . . [Brannan Plan]. Unfortunately, the Congress refused to enact the plan into law. . . .

One of what Truman called the new elements of his Fair Deal—those dealt with in special messages sent to Congress after his 21-point message—concerned health care.

I have never been able to understand all the fuss some people make about government wanting to do something to improve and protect the health of the people. I usually find that those who are loudest in protesting against medical help by the federal government are those who do not need help. But the fact is that a large portion of our population cannot afford to pay for proper medical and hospital care. As early as I can remember I have been troubled by seeing so many sick people unable to get the care they need because they and the community lack the means, not only the sick who are so poor that they must depend upon charity, but the average American family that cannot afford to pay for the high cost of modern medical care. I saw something of this problem in my first experience in government as a

[county judge in Jackson County, Missouri]. . . . I saw people turned away from hospitals to die because they had no money for treatment. A little later, as head of the county government . . . I helped build a hospital to take care of people who could not get into existing health centers. We know that there has been considerable progress in many cities and towns in taking care of the sick and injured, but even in those communities the patient must prove ability to pay or qualify as a charity patient. When I became United States senator I supported measures that provided funds for community hospitals to help correct this. And as president I was determined to do something more about it.

I have often been asked what business it is of the federal government to concern itself with the medical and hospital care of the people. Should not this rather be the responsibility of local communities? The answer is simple. Too many local communities have not met this responsibility and cannot meet it without help. For one thing, diseases and epidemics are no respecters of city and state boundaries. Our experience in the handling of polio and other threats to national health has proved that no one community can take care of itself. But the most compelling reason for the need of assistance from the federal government was dramatically revealed in the unfitness of millions of our young men and women for military service. World War II had shown that the health of this nation was far from what it should be, and I decided that the time had come for the federal government to do something about it.

I was shocked by the statistics showing the number of our young people who were physically unfit. By April 1, 1945, nearly five million draft registrants between the ages of eighteen and thirty-seven had been examined, and thirty percent were rejected on grounds of poor health. In addition, about a 1½ million men had to be discharged from the Army and Navy for physical or mental disabilities, exclusive of wounds. An equal number had to be treated, while in the armed forces, for diseases that had existed before induction. In fact, thirty-four percent were unfit. . . . More than one third of the young women who applied for admission to the Women's Army Corps were rejected for physical or mental reasons. Altogether, nearly 8½ million young people who should have been in the prime of health were found to be unfit for military service.

This is a terrible indictment. I believed that the United States should be the healthiest country in the world and lead in finding and developing new ways to improve the health of every citizen. As soon as I could direct my attention to the most pressing domestic matters, I proposed a national health program. President Roosevelt had set the stage for a health program in his

"economic bill of rights," which included "the right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health."

On May 24, 1945, a social security plan had been introduced in the Senate by Senators Robert F. Wagner of New York and James E. Murray of Montana and in the House of Representatives by John Dingell of Michigan. This measure proposed for the first time in our history that every man, woman, and child be included in a health insurance plan. . . . Although I favored the principle of the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill, I did not have much hope for its success in getting through Congress. It was too cumbersome, and it aimed in too many directions. For that reason, in my 21-point message to Congress on September 6, 1945, I stated that I would soon submit a national health program. On November 19, 1945, I sent Congress a message recommending national compulsory health insurance through payroll and other deductions. Under the plan, all citizens would be able to get medical and hospital service regardless of ability to pay. The message suggested that this nationwide system of medical care should be decentralized and completely under local jurisdiction. Local administrative units would be set up to provide for local services to meet local needs and conditions. It was made clear that under such a program people would remain free to choose their own physicians and hospitals and that by removing the financial barriers between patient and doctor there would be greater freedom of choice by the patient in selecting his physician. The doctors would also be free to work through organizations of their own choosing and to decide whether to carry on in an individual practice or to join with other doctors in group practice in hospitals or in clinics. The physician would remain free to accept or reject patients and to conduct his practice as he always has.

The basic points of my proposal called for: 1. Prepayment of medical costs through compulsory insurance premiums and the general revenues. 2. Protection against loss of wages from sickness and disability. 3. Expansion of public health, maternal, and child health services. 4. Federal aid to medical schools and for research purposes. 5. Stepped-up construction of hospitals, clinics, and medical institutions under local administration.

I cautioned the Congress against being frightened away from health insurance by the scare words "socialized medicine" which some people were bandying about. I wanted no part of socialized medicine, and I knew the American people did not. Under socialized medicine all doctors would work as employees of the government. I was proposing no such system. I reminded the Congress that, although we were a rich nation and could

afford many things, we could not afford ill-health. Our belief in insurance against unnecessary loss had become an American tradition, and what was now offered was a workable plan for insurance against loss of one of our most priceless possessions—health.

Many, but not all, of the essential points outlined in my health insurance plan were in the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill, on which congressional discussion was centered. This bill also covered a number of other subjects and was therefore needlessly complicated. . . . The Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill proposed a three percent payroll tax on salaries up to \$3,600 to be shared equally by employees and employer and contained many of the points outlined in my health insurance plan, but not all. At the same time, this bill broadened the areas of social security coverage and unemployment insurance. Partly as a result of this, when the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, it became highly controversial and unnecessarily confused the main issue. As the hearings [on the bill] progressed, opposition mounted. This opposition came primarily from the traditional foes of progressive government and from the hierarchy of organized medicine in the United States.

I believed, and still do, that the majority of practicing physicians—the rank and file of the medical profession—understand and approve the desire of the public for health security; and I felt that the views of the medical profession of the country were not expressed fairly by a small group of men who professed to speak for them and who promoted lobbying by medical organizations to further their own interests.

The leaders of the American Medical Association have always insisted that they could provide a satisfactory solution to the nation's problems in medicine and health. The fact is that at no time during my administration did the American Medical Association ever offer any thing workable as a substitute for the proposal of compulsory health insurance. This opposition from the American Medical Association was not new. [It] . . . had fought against public health departments, against proposals for county and community hospitals, and against the Hill-Burton Act for constructing hospitals and clinics throughout the country.

The Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill was killed in the second session of the 79th Congress. I renewed the fight for national health legislation in a special message on May 19, 1947, repeating the recommendations of November 19, 1945, and citing once again the urgent need: "The total health program which I have proposed is crucial to our national welfare. The heart of that program is national health insurance. Until it is a part of our national fabric,

we shall be wasting our most precious national resource and shall be perpetuating unnecessary misery and human suffering."

In January 1948 . . . [I asked] the [head of the] Federal Security [Administration] . . . to undertake a comprehensive study of the possibilities for raising the level of the nation's health and to report to me on feasible goals that might be realized in the next ten years. The study, completed in September of the same year, made it plain that unless federal actions were taken, serious shortages of doctors, dentists, nurses, hospitals, and other medical facilities would continue to grow. With these facts in hand, I transmitted to the Congress in April 1949 four recommendations, asking for (1) legislation providing for national health insurance, (2) legislation to help medical schools expand, (3) increased aid for the construction of hospitals and other medical facilities, and (4) an increase in the amount of federal grants to aid local governments in preventing and controlling disease, to promote maternal and child-care services, services for crippled children, and general public health activities. The final recommendation included a request for additional funds for medical research in the form of fellowships and grants to both private and nonprofit agencies.

This program, the message said, would save a great deal more than it would cost. Already four percent of the national income was being spent for health care. An infinitesimal portion of this expenditure was for the prevention of disease. A national health program, I stressed, would save untold millions in productive working hours alone, although its real value could never be estimated in dollars and cents. This was essentially the same program I had proposed in 1945. The opposition was still the same—political opponents of my administration, reactionaries, and leaders of "organized medicine." The same false charge of "socialized medicine" was used to discredit the program and to confuse and mislead the people.

In a move to offset the propaganda of the opposition, [I issued] an executive order . . . on December 29, 1951, creating the President's Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation, with the intention of setting up a completely non-political and unbiased commission of doctors, labor leaders, farm leaders, educators, and industrialists who would be able to investigate all aspects of the national health situation and to make recommendations based on facts. . . . After twelve months of painstaking research, public hearings, panel discussions of experts held in all parts of the country, interviews and meetings, the commission presented the findings and recommendations to me on December 18, 1952, in the form of a report entitled "Building America's Health." The [report concluded] . . . that the present

system of financing personal health services through voluntary prepayment plans was inadequate to the needs of the people . . . , that a serious shortage of doctors existed and . . . that by 1960 the United States would need from 22,000 to 45,000 more doctors. It found a shocking deficit in total expenditures for medical research, observing that more money was spent during the preceding year for tombstones and monuments than for research. It [found too] . . . that hospitals were shamefully overcrowded and many of them obsolete. . . .

The principal recommendations of the report were: 1. A broad extension of prepayment plans, to operate through large use of group practice and through community health-hospital centers. 2. Federal grants-in-aid, which would be matched by the states, to bolster prepayment insurance plans. 3. Creation of a post of Health and Security in the Cabinet. 4. Creation by Congress of a twelve- to eighteen-member permanent Federal Health Commission to make a continuing study of the nation's health status, with an annual report to the president and Congress. 5. Federal grants for aid to medical education, medical research, local health services, for hospital construction, and for pilot studies in organizing medical services on a regional basis.

What the commission was recommending basically represented a compromise between the compulsory national health insurance program, requested in 1945 and throughout my administration, and the current system of private payment to the doctor for each separate service rendered. It suggested that efforts be made to extend voluntary insurance to millions of people not covered, and that the federal and state governments pay the premiums for those who could not afford to pay them. The cost of the program would be an estimated \$1 billion a year in addition to the \$1 billion which the government was already spending for health.

While the insurance program was not the same as the one I had proposed earlier, I felt that the Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation had accomplished a monumental task and that a workable outline for raising our national health standards was now available. It was a thoroughly sound and democratic approach to an urgent domestic problem.

. . . [I] released [a statement] simultaneously with the publishing of the report [that] urged the continuation of the fight toward maintaining and improving our people's health:

I, of course, cannot say what the next administration will do in carrying on the work we have undertaken in the health field. It is my hope that careful

consideration will be given to the Commission's findings and recommendations. . . . It would be most unfortunate if the same emotionalism which has prevented open-minded study of major health proposals advanced during the past few years were to hinder the proper evaluation which this report merits. . . .

I have had some stormy times as president and have engaged in some vigorous controversies. Democracy thrives on debate and political differences. But I had no patience with the reactionary selfish people and politicians who fought year after year every proposal we made to improve the people's health. I have had some bitter disappointments as president, but the one that has troubled me most, in a personal way, has been the failure to defeat the organized opposition to a national compulsory health insurance program.

Year of Decisions, 481–487, 491–494, 512–515; *Years of Trial and Hope*, 17–23, 29–30, 179–182, 262–268

In the section on civil rights, the portion used of the paragraph beginning "The beginning of" is moved down three paragraphs from its position in the original text; the paragraph beginning "I directed that" is moved down two paragraphs; the paragraph beginning "Despite the clarity" is moved up ten paragraphs; and the portion used of the paragraph beginning "I felt also" is moved down six paragraphs.

The Election of 1948

My decision to run again—the terrible 80th Congress—taking my campaign directly to the people—a “new Truman manner” of political speechmaking—splits in the Democratic Party—The Democratic National Convention—my acceptance speech—the “Turnip Day” session of Congress—my “Whistle Stop” campaign tour—“I’m going to give them hell”—election day—a historic victory—my return to Washington

If I had heeded the desire of my family, I would have made plans to leave the White House at the end of my first term. I took no steps . . . at any time to discourage anyone from seeking the nomination to succeed me. From a personal standpoint, I had no desire, just as I had none in 1944, to undertake a national political campaign merely for the sake of gratifying private ambitions. I had already been president of the United States for more than three and a half years.

The compelling motive in my decision to run for the presidency in 1948 was the same as it had been in 1944. There was still “unfinished business” confronting the most successful fifteen years of Democratic administration in the history of the country. The hard-earned reforms of the years since 1933 which insured a better life for more people in every walk of American life were taking permanent root in the 1940s. These benefits were still vulnerable to political attack by reactionaries and could be lost if not safeguarded by a vigilant Democratic administration. . . . [There were foreign policy challenges as well.] The world was undergoing a major readjustment,



with revolution stalking most of the "have-not" nations. Communism was making the most of this opportunity, thriving on misery as it always does. The course of freedom was being challenged again—this time from a new and powerful quarter, Soviet Russia.

I had learned from my negotiations with the intransigent Russian diplomats that there was only one way to avoid a third world war, and that was to lead from strength. We had to rearm ourselves and our allies and, at the same time, deal with the Russians in a manner they could never interpret as weakness. Within our own nation, I had seen many well-meaning groups who campaigned for "peace at any price" while apologizing for the aggressive acts of the Russians as merely a reflection of Russian reaction to our own tough policy. Many respectable Americans espoused such ideas without realizing the danger to which they were subjecting our national security and the freedoms for which we had fought so hard.

. . . [I] felt, without undue ego, that this was no time for a new and inexperienced hand to take over the government and risk the interruption of our domestic program and put a dangerous strain on our delicately balanced foreign policy. . . . Many things combined to convince me that I had to make a fight for it—the threat being posed by Russian imperialist communism; the misguided clamor for appeasement in the name of peace . . . ; the large bloc of traditional Republican isolationists; and the coalition of southern Democrats and northern Republicans, who hoped to compel the repeal of a great deal of New Deal legislation and a return to the laissez-faire doctrine of pre-depression days. These forces had to be defeated or our country would be thrown back to the hard times of reaction. . . .

Down through the history of the presidency of the United States a succession of strong liberal presidents had fought the fight for liberalism and for a better life for the common man: Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt. With such a heritage handed down to me, I could not reject lightly the opportunity and the responsibility which were mine in 1948. I had to make a fight for its continuation. . . . What I wanted to do personally for my own comfort and benefit was not important. What I could do to contribute to the welfare of the country was important. I had to enter the 1948 campaign for the presidency.

It seemed to me that the only possible argument the opposition could advance in asking the voters to turn the . . . [presidency] over to them in 1948 was a desire for a change after fifteen years of control of the government by the Democrats. But the voters . . . had [in 1946 voted in a] Republican Congress . . . and in my coming campaign to persuade the voters that the

time for a change had not yet come, it was obvious that the 80th Congress would stick out like a sore thumb. It was my Exhibit A. . . .

The Republican 80th Congress, in control of national legislation for the first time in fourteen years, had managed to reverse the sound Democratic policies of collective bargaining, social security, rent controls, price controls, and other instruments of government designed to insure equality of privilege for the great majority of people. Instead, the Congress had ignored the repeated recommendations of the president and had yielded to the pressures and lobbies of special privilege in housing, in prices, in taxes, in agriculture, in labor and industrial relations, in foreign trade, and in virtually every other major field of national and international policy. The 80th Congress, in short, had shown that the Republican Party had always been, and continued to be, the party of special privilege. That is why I made it clear in every one of my campaign speeches that in reality there was just one issue for the people to vote on—the choice between special interests and the public welfare.

I was sure that the American people would agree with me if they had all the facts. I knew, however, that the Republican controlled press and radio would be against me, and my only remaining hope of communicating with the people was to get the message to the people in a personal way. . . .

It was not an encouraging situation that confronted me, but I was not brought up to run away from a fight when the fight is for what is right. Supposedly scientific predictions that I could not win did not worry me one bit. . . . Almost unanimously the polls taken before the 1948 Democratic convention showed my popularity with the American people to have hit an all-time low. This was a condition that resulted from the efforts made by the American press to misrepresent me and to make my program, policies, and staff appear in the worst light possible. The charts indicated that I had gone from an approval [rating] of somewhere around seventy percent . . . [in the spring of 1945] to [about] thirty-six percent in the spring of 1948. I never paid any attention to the polls myself, because in my judgment they did not represent a true cross section of American opinion. I did not believe that the major components of our society, such as agriculture, management, and labor, were adequately sampled. I also know that the polls did not represent facts but mere speculation, and I have always placed my faith in the known facts. Although the polls did not bother me personally, I was aware that some of the Democratic leaders were discouraged by the dismal picture being painted by the forecasters. I saw that the press was giving widespread publicity to the predictions that the voters would repudiate me and my administration in the fall elections, and I had learned from

experience that false propaganda can mislead even the most intelligent and well-meaning people.

I knew that I had to do something about this concerted effort of the pollsters and the Republican controlled press to drug the populace with their statistics and propaganda. Even some of my closest friends and advisers were counseling me to change my mind about going after the nomination in July. Early in May I had an idea—perhaps the only one that the critics admitted was entirely my own. In order to circumvent the gloom and pessimism being spread by the polls and by false propaganda in the press, I decided that I would go directly to the people in all parts of the country. . . . It would mean riding thousands of miles by train and making talks at all hours at stops along the way where crowds could be assembled to hear the facts. But it was the only alternative. . . .

My purpose was to explain the workings of American foreign policy and the status of our domestic problems in a way that the people could understand. I also felt obligated to make clear the obstructionist role which the 80th Congress was playing. I was convinced that the average, everyday American did not have the full story of what was going on and that it was necessary for me to get out of Washington long enough to discuss the facts of the situation directly with the people.

[From June 3 to June 18] I traveled all the way to the West Coast and back, making seventy-six speeches in the cities, towns, and villages along the way. I had never lost the faith, as some of those around me seemed to, and I found renewed encouragement and confidence in the response that came from the crowds that gathered at all the train stops on this first tour. They seemed glad to see me and eager to hear for themselves what I had to tell them.

I tried a method of speaking which I had not used before, except on informal occasions. On the seventy-six speeches which I made on this tour, seventy-one were "off the cuff." I used notes sometimes to adapt my statements to local interests, but these were never more than a few lines and were usually handed to me only a minute or so before I began speaking.

My first formal experience at extemporaneous speaking had come just a few weeks before I opened the whistle-stop tour in June. After reading an address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors [in Washington on April 17] . . . , I decided to talk "off the cuff" on American relations with Russia. When I finished my remarks about thirty minutes later, I was surprised to get the most enthusiastic applause that I had ever received from a group made up mainly of Republicans. On May 14, I again tried my hand at

speaking without a manuscript when I addressed a rally of the Young Democrats in Washington. A New York newspaper called the speech a "fighting one in the new Truman manner." I decided that if speaking without a prepared copy or getting away from reading a prepared text was more effective in getting my ideas and feelings across, I would use that method on the trainside talks which I planned to make in the future. It was a style which I was to follow in my acceptance speech at the Democratic convention and in most of the speeches which I was to deliver in the campaign from Labor Day up to the November election.

One aspect of the political situation in 1948 which dismayed most of my supporters and advisers was the threat of a split within the Democratic Party over the issue of civil rights. The defection by some of the southern states . . . was something I had anticipated . . . since I first took a stand as president on this greatly misunderstood and misrepresented subject. From the early days of my administration I insisted on a workable fair employment practices program and on the enforcement of civil rights as guaranteed by the Constitution. . . .

There were people around me . . . who were anxious to prevent any sort of split in the Democratic Party, and efforts were made to soften the approach to the civil rights issue. I would not stand for any double talk on this vital principle, however, and insisted on plain language being used. Members of the Cabinet and others warned me that I was riding to a defeat if I stuck to my [policy regarding a fair employment practices commission] . . . and if I did not let up on the battle for civil rights legislation. But I wanted to win the fight by standing on my . . . [beliefs], or lose it the same way.

I was reasonably sure . . . that there would be a splintering off of the South or at least a portion of it. . . . I expected trouble, and it developed promptly at the . . . [Democratic National Convention in July 1948]. . . .

Every Democratic platform since 1932 has stressed the devotion of our party to the constitutional ideal of civil rights. But what aroused many Southerners now was that I meant to put this pledge into practice. When the Southerners saw in 1948 that I meant to put it into effect, they bolted the party. When J. Strom Thurmond, the governor of South Carolina, who headed the revolt, made his dramatic departure from the convention floor in Philadelphia with his followers, he was asked by a reporter to clarify his position. "President Truman is only following the platform that Roosevelt advocated," the reporter pointed out. "I agree," Thurmond replied, "but Truman really means it. . . ."

I did not discount the handicap which the loss of a "Solid South" presented as far as my chances of winning the election were concerned. I knew that it might mean the difference between victory and defeat in November. I knew, too, that if I deserted the [civil rights] . . . plank of the Democratic Party platform I could heal the breach, but I have never traded principles for votes, and I did not intend to start the practice in 1948 regardless of how it might affect the election. . . .

Although many candidates for the presidency have had to cope with splits within their parties, the situation which I faced in 1948 was without a comparable precedent in the history of American politics. I was confronted not with one major defection in the Democratic Party but with two bolts of sizable proportions. In addition to the faction which was preparing to withdraw its support from me and to pick an alternate candidate on the platform of States' Rights Democrats, there were the so-called Progressives under the leadership of another Democrat, Henry Wallace.

Under President Roosevelt, Wallace had served as one of the best secretaries of agriculture this country ever had, and he enjoyed considerable personal prestige as vice president during Roosevelt's third term. He was not an opponent to be discounted, and it was predicted that he would get a large vote. After I became president I found it necessary to part with Henry Wallace when I found him interfering with my conduct of foreign policy. I felt then that he cherished an idealistic notion that he would be able to stir up a following in the country that could elect him president. The creation of the Progressive Party in 1948 was an attempt on the part of Wallace and his supporters to . . . [make this daydream come true].

Some honest and well-meaning agitators for peace with Russia at any price found in Wallace a spokesman for their point of view. He had consistently maintained that I was too rough in dealing with the Soviets and that peace could be obtained if we were more conciliatory in our approach. . . . There was, however, a sinister aspect to the Wallace movement. It provided a front for the communists to infiltrate the political life of the nation and spread confusion. Without the conscious knowledge of many members of the new Progressive Party, the Reds were working swiftly and skillfully to gain control of the nominating convention and to dominate party committees and the platform. Wallace himself, who seemed to have been transformed into a mystic with a zeal that verged on fanaticism, was apparently unaware of the purposes to which the Communists were putting his "progressive" movement. I always felt that he was an honest man

and a faithful public servant but that he simply did not understand what was happening.

I knew from personal experience with the Russians that Wallace's dream of appeasement was futile and that, if allowed to materialize, it would be tragic. I had learned that the Russians understood only force. Wallace did not think this was true, but he [had] not [had] the experience with the Soviets that [I had]. I realized that the Progressives would cost me votes, but, like the Dixiecrats, they stood for principles which I knew I must reject.

My nomination for the presidency by the Democratic Party in 1948 was also challenged by a third movement within the ranks. This threatened to develop at any time during the spring into a full-fledged boom for Dwight D. Eisenhower. Among the chief agitators who claimed that I was not perpetuating the New Deal policies of President Roosevelt were the late president's sons, James and Elliott, former Cabinet members James F. Byrnes and Harold Ickes, and Senator Claude Pepper of Florida. There were many others who felt that because the press and the polls made it appear that my chances of success in the campaign were [poor] . . . someone else should get the Democratic Party nomination. Eisenhower, who was at the peak of his popularity after his brilliant military accomplishments of World War II, seemed to be the logical choice for those who sought a dark-horse candidate to oppose me for the nomination. The professional liberals who were attempting to promote him as the Democratic nominee showed, however, that they were not familiar with the history and procedure of political conventions. When the president is sitting in the White House, the National Convention of his party has never gone against his recommendations in the choice of a candidate or in the formation of a platform on which that convention is to operate. . . . In 1948, I was in a position to control the nomination. When I had made up my mind to run, those in the party who turned against me could do nothing to prevent it. . . .

The boom for Eisenhower never developed in 1948 because he . . . resisted the efforts of those who tried to change his mind. . . . I personally felt that, regardless of Eisenhower's chances as an independent in 1948, the statement which most effectively summed up that situation was the one by House Minority Leader Sam Rayburn. . . . [He] put it this way: "No, won't do. Good man, but wrong business."

I realized . . . that the boom for Eisenhower and the defections of the Progressives and the States' Righters would cut into my voting strength on election day. But I knew that it was my duty to carry forward the program

that had taken the nation from the depths of the Depression to prosperity and world leadership, and I was convinced that the American people would want to have it carried forward—if only they were given the facts. And these I was determined to give them.

From the time I returned to the White House on June 18 from my western tour to the opening day of the Democratic National Convention [in Philadelphia] on July 12, I had little time to devote to active politics. . . . For the first time, however, it was possible for the president to view the proceedings of the convention on television in the White House, and I was able to witness the major events in Philadelphia without leaving my work. Other lines of communication direct to Democratic National Headquarters kept me constantly informed on the proceedings, so that nothing that was taking place there escaped my attention. It was arranged that after the preliminaries of the convention were disposed of, Governor Donnelly of Missouri would nominate me at the final session. I made my plans to appear at the convention on July 14 to accept the nomination in person. . . .

On July 14, I boarded the presidential train with my family and members of the White House staff. Over the radio, while en route to Philadelphia, I heard Governor Donnelly as he nominated me with a magnificent speech, and after arriving in Philadelphia and having dinner on the train, I left . . . for Convention Hall. When I arrived, the convention was locked in last minute argument, and the voting had not yet begun. . . . [I was] ushered into a special suite on the floor beneath the convention. It was a small group of rooms used as dressing rooms for show performers, and there was a balcony overlooking the city of Philadelphia. . . . It was a hot, clammy night, though it was pleasant on the balcony. And as I sat there, waiting for the final business of the convention to come to a close and for the signal that would call me to appear to accept the nomination, I let my mind run back, as I frequently do, over America's century and a half of political life. I reflected on the experiences of some of the thirty-one men who had preceded me in office and on the conventions and campaigns that had loomed as large in their lives as this one now did in my own. I was forced to wait for four long hours on that balcony and so had time for reflection. Furthermore, the setting was strangely quiet, and I seemed far removed from the turmoil and the hubbub of the convention within the crowded hall. . . .

At 2 a.m., I was escorted to the convention floor above with weary, perspiring delegates who had spent three days and nights in bedlam. They were still capable of making noise . . . and they greeted me with thundering applause.

But it was clear to me that the work of the opposition in propagandizing against my chances of winning—plus the splintering within our own party—had taken its toll. The Democratic Party was dispirited and dejected. I meant to give them something to cheer about and something to campaign for. It was not the first time in history that a president had personally appeared at a convention hall to accept the nomination. The first nominee to do so was Franklin D. Roosevelt, when he flew to the convention in 1932. The effect was the same in both cases, I think. It reinvigorated the whole party in 1948, as it had in 1932.

... Then I was introduced [to the convention]. . . . [I] had made up my mind that I would spring my first big surprise of the campaign in . . . [my acceptance] speech. . . . I had been working on my notes for the speech on the train and went over them in the room downstairs just before the escorting committee arrived to usher me to the convention floor. I had my notes in a black notebook, which I placed on the lectern as I waited for the hall to grow quiet enough for me to speak. It took only a short sentence to bring the delegates to their feet. That was when I said, "Senator Barkley [the Democratic nominee for vice president] and I will win this election and make these Republicans like it—don't you forget that." . . . The Democrats had been waiting to hear somebody say positively that we were going to win, and the effect on them was electric. They saw right then and there that there was going to be a fight for Democratic principles by the man who was the head of the party. That gave them the shot in the arm they so badly needed.

I had learned from my June [campaign] tour that people wanted the facts before they would fight for or against anything. I felt that the convention would react in the same manner as the crowds at the train had done when they heard the facts straight from the president of the United States. I was not fooling and they knew it.

I made a tough, fighting [acceptance] speech. I recited the benefits that had been won by the Democratic administrations for the people. . . . I pointed out that wages and salaries had [more than quadrupled from 1933 to 1947]. . . . Then I tore into the 80th Congress, emphasizing that "the Republican Party favors the privileged few and not the common, everyday man. Ever since its inception, that party has been under the control of special privilege, and they concretely proved it in the 80th Congress. . . . They proved it by the things they failed to do. . . ." I listed in detail the failures of the Republican controlled Congress and I did not pull any punches. Then, toward the end of the speech, I played my trump card. I announced:

On the 26th day of July, which out in Missouri we call 'Turnip Day,' I am going to call Congress back and ask them to pass laws to halt rising prices, to meet the housing crisis—which they are saying they are for in their platform.

At the same time, I shall ask them to act upon other vitally needed measures, such as aid to education, which they say they are for; a national health program; civil rights legislation, which they say they are for; an increase in the minimum wage, which I doubt very much they are for; extension of the Social Security coverage and increased benefits, which they say they are for; funds for projects needed in our program to provide public power and cheap electricity. . . .

I shall ask for adequate and decent laws for displaced persons in place of this anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic law which this 80th Congress passed.

Now my friends, if there is any reality behind that Republican platform, we ought to get some action from a short session of the 80th Congress. They can do this job in fifteen days, if they want to do it. They will still have time to go out and run for office.

They are going to try to dodge their responsibility. They are going to drag all the red herrings they can across this campaign, but I am here to say that Senator Barkley and I are not going to let them get away with it.

This announcement of a special session of the Congress electrified the convention to a new pitch of confidence and enthusiasm. I was telling the Democrats that we were calling the bluff of the Republican opposition and that we were going to fight them with everything we had.

Of course, I knew that the special session would produce no results in the way of legislation. But I felt justified in calling the Congress back to Washington to prove to the people whether the Republican platform really meant anything or not. Every item of legislation which I called essential to the welfare of the country was included in the Republican platform and needed to be acted upon without delay. Yet I knew they would run out on their platform.

Just as I had predicted, the "Turnip Day" session of the Congress came and went without any response to my demands for constructive legislation promised by the Republican Party platform. The Republican leaders turned a deaf ear to my warning that the American people would expect some kind of action before the election, and ignored the recommendations which I made in a six-page message on June 27. After two weeks of doing nothing, the special session adjourned.

The stage was now set for the . . . [final big push of the] 1948 presidential campaign. I picked Labor Day, which was on September 6, to sound the starting gun of my bid for the presidency. . . . While I knew that the

southern dissenters and the Wallace-ites would cost some Democratic votes, my opponent was the Republican Party. The campaign was built on one issue—the interests of the people, as represented by the Democrats, against the special interests, as represented by the Republicans and the record of the 80th Congress. I staked the race for the presidency on that one issue.

[My] Labor Day speech at Cadillac Square in Detroit set the pace for the campaign speeches that were to follow:

As you know, I speak plainly sometimes. In fact, I speak bluntly sometimes. I am going to speak plainly and bluntly today. These are critical times for labor and for all who work. There is great danger ahead. Right now, the whole future of labor is wrapped up in one simple proposition.

If, in this next election, you get a Congress and an administration friendly to labor, you have much to hope for. If you get an administration and a Congress unfriendly to labor, you have much to fear, and you had better look out. . . .

If the Congressional elements that made the Taft-Hartley Law are allowed to remain in power, and if these elements are further encouraged by the election of a Republican president, you men of labor can expect to be hit by a steady barrage of body blows. And, if you stay at home . . . and keep these reactionaries in power, you will deserve every blow you get. . . .

Labor has always had to fight for its gains. Now you are fighting for the whole future of the labor movement. We are in a hard, tough fight against shrewd and rich opponents. They know they can't count on your vote. Their only hope is that you won't vote at all. They have misjudged you. I know that we are going to win this crusade for the right!

There were over one hundred thousand people massed in Cadillac Square, and I was encouraged by their response. It was a good start for my campaign.

On September 17, I began an extended tour. I had warned my staff and the reporters who prepared to make the trip with me that I was going out to win the election. "I'm going to fight hard," I told . . . [my vice presidential running mate, Alben] Barkley. "I'm going to give them hell." We would be on the road most of the time for the next six weeks, getting up at all hours to make stops at any place where people wanted to see me. At first the critics referred to my tour as a "one-man circus" and called it less efficient and less dignified than the campaign being put on by the Republicans. But as the crowds grew larger and larger and more people flocked to my train than showed up around the Dewey train, our opponents began to get worried.

The trip across Ohio from Cincinnati to Cleveland was made in the day-time on the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad, which goes through a whole string of little towns, and the crowds there were immense. . . . [Frank

Lausche], who was a candidate for the governorship of Ohio, got on the train just south of Columbus, intending to get off . . . [when we reached] Columbus. At that little town where Lausche got on there was a crowd of from six to eight thousand people, and at the next one the crowd was even larger. At Columbus, the crowd was so big they could not even get into the station. "Is this the way all the crowds have been? . . ." [Lausche] asked. "Yes," I said, "but this is smaller than we had in most states." "Well," he said, "this is the biggest crowd I ever saw in Ohio," and he rode on to Cleveland with us. . . .

Another interesting trip was from Albany to Buffalo. We started early in the morning in a driving rainstorm from the Albany station, where there was a huge crowd of people. And at every station along the way it was still pouring down rain, but there were overflow crowds everywhere. . . .

It was quite a campaign. I worked my staff almost to death. I believe that at one time or another I put them all to bed. . . . I worked the reporters very hard too. The major public opinion polls, meanwhile, continued . . . to predict my defeat. . . .

The technique I used at the whistle stops was simple and straightforward. There were no special "gimmicks" or oratorical devices. I refused to be "coached." I simply told the people in my own language that they had better wake up to the fact that it was their fight. If they did not get out and help me win this fight, I emphasized, the Republicans would soon be giving the farmers and the workers the little end of the stick again. I spoke bluntly and sincerely, and warned the people that if they were fools enough to accept the little end again, they deserved it. I also clarified the issues which the Republicans were trying to make complex for the voters. I talked to them as human beings with real needs and feelings and fears. I talked to them about their jobs, their homes, and the cost of living. I treated them not like crowds of people but like businessmen, tenant farmers, housewives, married veterans, laboring men, teachers—individuals with interests for whom I, as president, had a genuine concern.

One of the things I tried to keep out of the campaign was foreign policy. [I believed] there should be no break in the bipartisan foreign policy of the United States at any time—particularly during a national election. I even asked that a teletype machine be set up on the . . . train [of the Republican candidate, Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York] so that . . . [he] could be informed on all the foreign developments as they progressed, and I did so because I did not want to encourage the possibility of a partisan, political approach to foreign policy. . . .

As the campaign gathered speed, I stepped up my schedule. . . . In all, I traveled about 31,700 miles and delivered more than three hundred speeches—356 to be exact. I was used to hard work, and my job was cut out for me. I campaigned for thirty-five days and averaged about ten speeches every day. On one single day, I delivered sixteen speeches. Twelve to fifteen million people gathered in big crowds and small groups along the railroad junctions and stops from one end of the country to the other. Sometimes I would bring Mrs. Truman and Margaret . . . out on the rear platform to meet the crowds. At other times, I would speak for a few minutes alone before the train started off for the next stop.

My one-man crusade took effect. The people responded with increasing enthusiasm as the day of election neared. I never doubted that they would vote for me, although my advisers were still not optimistic and the polls continued to hack away at my chances of getting elected. I believed that when the people learned the facts for themselves they would make the right decisions; that people still preferred to make up their own minds about candidates upon the basis of direct observation, despite all the claims of how society depends today upon newspapers, radio, and other media. . . .

On October 31, 1948, I returned from the bedlam of the longest and hardest political campaign of my career to the restful quiet of my home in Independence. The tumultuous weeks of speechmaking, handshaking, and traveling day and night had culminated in St. Louis the night before in a tremendous rally. I felt that I had given the voters a clearer view of the choice before them and that the response from the grass roots of America was so great that it would carry me back to the White House for four years as an elected president.

The following . . . [night], which was the eve of the election, . . . I spoke from the living room of my home to about seventy million Americans listening over the four major radio networks. . . . This was my final appeal to the voters to decide between the principles of the party for the people and the party for the special interests. I warned the nation that their vote would not be just for one man or another but would affect every person and his family for years to come. With this, I was through. There was nothing to do but wait for the results.

At 4:30 in the afternoon on election day, Jim Rowley and Henry Nicholson, who were first and second in command of the White House Secret Service detail, drove with me from my home down to the Elms Hotel at Excelsior Springs, Missouri, a resort about thirty miles northeast of Kansas City. We had slipped away from the reporters, who spent the rest of the

night trying to find me. They kept telephoning my family at Independence, hoping to get some information. At Excelsior Springs, after taking a Turkish bath, I went upstairs to my room at 6:30, had a ham sandwich and a glass of milk, turned on the radio to listen to some of the eastern returns, and then went to bed. I was reported some thousands ahead.

I awoke at midnight and . . . listened to the radio broadcast of Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn. I was about 1,200,000 ahead on the count but, according to . . . [Kaltenborn], was still undoubtedly beaten. About four o'clock in the morning Rowley came into my room and advised me to tune in again on Kaltenborn's broadcast. I did so, and learned that at that time I was over 2,000,000 ahead, but . . . [Kaltenborn] continued to say he couldn't see how I could be elected.

I told Rowley and Nicholson that we had better go back to Kansas City, because it looked very much as if we were in for another four years, and we arrived in Kansas City at about six o'clock Wednesday morning, November 3. At 10:30 I received a telegram from Governor Dewey congratulating me on my election.

The final figures showed that I had received 24,105,695 votes, carrying twenty-eight states. Dewey had 21,969,170 votes, carrying sixteen states. Wallace and Thurmond polled slightly over one million votes each. I lost four of the southern states to the Dixiecrats—South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. But I carried all thirteen of the country's biggest cities and the seven large agricultural states—Missouri, California, Iowa, Illinois, Texas, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. If it had not been for the half million American Labor party votes which went to Wallace in New York State, I would have beaten Dewey in his own state by a majority of about 300,000. As it was, he carried New York by only 61,000 votes.

My majority in the electoral college was greater than my popular majority. I had . . . [303] electoral votes. . . . The key states in the election had been Ohio and California, which had fluctuated throughout the night until the late counting of votes had put them in the Democratic column to stay. Without Ohio and California, I would have been assured of only 254 electoral votes, 12 less than the required 266.

The 1948 election proved the pollsters and forecasters . . . wrong. . . . It was almost universally predicted, right up to the last minute, that I would lose the election. Then it was predicted that, because no candidate would receive a majority of electoral votes, the election would be thrown into the House of Representatives.

What I tried to do in 1948, as always, was to make a . . . Democratic Party that stood and fought for human rights. I wanted to keep it a party that represented the common people, no matter how it was maligned or how many attempts were made to destroy it from within. The effort succeeded in spite of the two splinter groups, and [I] won with almost a majority of the popular vote. The greatest achievement was winning without the extreme radicals in the party and without the solid South. It is customary for a politician to say that he wants all the votes he can get, but I was happy and pleased to be elected to the presidency by a Democratic Party that did not depend upon either the extreme left wing or the southern bloc. And of course I did not want the reactionary votes which went for my Republican opponent. The fundamental purpose of the campaign in 1948 was to put the Democratic Party on its own feet and to leave it intact. This was achieved.

It was a historic victory for the party. The Democrats recaptured the . . . [House of Representatives] by a landslide and . . . [also regained] control of the Senate. My long campaign against the 80th Congress had convinced the voters that a turnover was necessary, and I was given an overwhelmingly Democratic Congress to replace the one which had blocked the administration's domestic progress for two years.

Two days after the election, the presidential special train took me to Washington. . . . When I arrived, . . . one of the largest crowds I have ever seen in Washington took part in a "home-coming" celebration. As the vice president-elect and I rode up Pennsylvania Avenue to the plaudits of immense crowds, I saw a sign on the front of the *Washington Post* building which said, "Mr. President, we are ready to eat crow whenever you are ready to serve it." I sent that great newspaper word that I did not want anyone to eat crow, that I was not elated or in a mood myself to crow over anyone. I said I felt the tremendous responsibility that was mine for the next four years, and that I hoped for the support of all the people in carrying out the program which I thought they had entrusted me to accomplish.

On arriving at the White House, I had a Cabinet meeting and a series of . . . [meetings] to plan immediate repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, as promised in the campaign. There was much work to be done, and I was eager to get on with it. On the advice of the White House physician, however, I left Washington on November 7 for a two weeks' rest in Key West, but [I] continued to hold daily conferences with the new vice president-elect and with other party leaders to outline the program to go before the 81st Congress in January 1949.

Years of Trial and Hope, 170–179, 182–212, 219–222

The paragraph beginning “There were over” which follows the text of Truman’s Labor Day speech in Detroit is present in the original text as a footnote placed at the end of the last paragraph of the speech.

Communism, Anti-Communism, and Civil Liberties

The Bill of Rights—fear, hysteria, demagogues, injustice—the loyalty of government employees—the Internal Security Act of 1950—a still-born commission—a final attempt to protect the rights of government employees—"the tragedy and shame of our time"

All my life I have fought against prejudice and intolerance. As a young man, I was disturbed by the attitude of some people toward other races and religions. And as I grew older, I could never understand how people could forget the origins and blessings of their own freedom. I have little patience with people who take the Bill of Rights for granted. The Bill of Rights, contained in the first ten amendments to the Constitution, is every American's guarantee of freedom. Equality of opportunity and equal justice under the law are not mere phrases or fine words. These are the living achievements of a people who had rebelled against despotism. Many generations had fled to this country to get away from oppression by their own governments. And it has always troubled me how some who called themselves Americans could themselves become oppressors. . . .



One of the most important guarantees under the Bill of Rights is the right to claim exemption from self incrimination. This is a fundamental basis of our liberty and is provided for in the Fifth Amendment. . . . In recent years, I have been alarmed by the reckless attempts to undermine some of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Men like [Senator Joseph R.] McCarthy have made it appear that any person claiming his rights under the

Fifth Amendment is guilty. McCarthy has even gone so far as to brand as "Fifth Amendment Communists" those persons who sought to invoke their constitutional rights. He has charged these witnesses with abusing the Fifth Amendment. The fact is that the abuse came not from the people invoking the Fifth Amendment but from those who made it appear that a man claiming his rights under it is automatically guilty without having been proved guilty.

We must understand, of course, that as a matter of government necessity, in the investigation of crime or subversion, it is essential for the investigative authorities to have sources of information which they cannot reveal. But when it comes to an individual being charged with a crime, under our procedure he has a right to be confronted with his accusers. If the government cannot produce witnesses in court, then it cannot prosecute. And if a man cannot be prosecuted in the courts, then he should not be persecuted by a Senate or House committee. That is my theory. Of course, every government does its best to get rid of every disloyal employee. But we should not . . . want to treat the remaining 99.9% of government employees, who are decent and honorable, in a way that would ruin their reputations. When you have over 2,300,000 people employed in the national government, some are bound to be bad and some weak. Persons in government . . . are exposed to associations and temptations that occasionally may break down some of them. But I do not believe in taking hearsay charges against any person. . . . Frequently hearsay evidence is accepted as the truth and is used to smear a government employee in such a way that he cannot defend himself. This is what the communists do, what McCarthy did, what the so called Un-American Activities Committee in the House did. It simply cannot be squared with the Bill of Rights. . . .

We want to be careful that those freedoms contained in our Bill of Rights are not destroyed by those who incite fear and hysteria and cause injustice. In times of crisis, involving the security of the nation, the government has to take special measures . . . to protect itself against sabotage and disloyalty. The operations of the government, with its many defense and diplomatic secrets, must be safeguarded against foreign agents. But I have always believed that if we are to maintain our republic, in keeping with the Bill of Rights, the government has the paramount responsibility of protecting the rights of the individual against injustice and false accusations.

I recall the periods of mass hysteria in this country which led to witch hunts. Demagogues and unprincipled individuals have always seized upon crises to incite emotional and irrational fears. Racial, religious, and class

animosities are stirred up. Charges and accusations are directed against many innocent people in the name of false "patriotism" and hatred of things "foreign." During such periods of mass excitement, individuals in government are particularly singled out for attack. . . . In such an atmosphere, when one isolated individual employee is found to be disloyal, the incident is used by demagogues to intensify the hysteria, and there is a tendency to condemn all employees of the government. . . .

The threat posed by the Soviet Union's determination to make the world over in its revolutionary image caused the United States government to be concerned for the first time about the loyalty of its employees. The Hatch Act, which became law in 1939, made it unlawful for government employees to be a member of a party which advocated the overthrow of the government. In 1942, President Roosevelt directed the Civil Service Commission to bar anyone from government employment if there was reasonable doubt as to the person's loyalty. In 1943, he established a committee to deal with charges of subversive activity against government employees. In 1946, President Truman created the President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty and charged it to study the government's loyalty program, recommend improvements in investigative procedures, define standards of loyalty, and establish administrative procedures that would ensure that hearings would be fair to employees. The commission's study, as Truman put it, would advise him what to do to "tighten up the security program without violating the Bill of Rights."

The commission's report, which Truman received in November 1946, emphasized that the government's loyalty program lacked uniformity in administrative procedures and standards of judgment and made a number of recommendations regarding the establishment of a new loyalty program. Three months later, in March 1947, Truman signed an executive order which for the most part incorporated the commission's recommendations.

In the executive order (No. 9835) which I issued on March 21, 1947, I emphasized two facts that I felt should control the program: (1) that although the loyalty of by far the overwhelming majority of all government employees was beyond question, the presence in the government service of any disloyal or subversive person constituted a threat to our democratic processes, and (2) that maximum protection must be afforded the United States against infiltration of disloyal persons into the ranks of its employees, and equal protection from unfounded accusation of disloyalty must be afforded the loyal employees of the government.

By this new executive order, I felt that we had tightened the precautions against subversive infiltration. But at the same time, we had set up machinery to protect the individual against false charges based on rumors or unsubstantiated gossip. The program as I saw it operate had a lot of flaws in it. By and large, [though,] it did give anyone who was accused as fair an opportunity to have his case adjudicated as was possible under the climate of opinion that then existed. . . .

After the new loyalty program had been operating for several months, Congress asked to have access to some of the investigative material assembled on employees. In early 1948, the State Department agreed to allow investigators from one House committee to examine loyalty files and make abstracts of the information in them. The committee then, irresponsibly in Truman's view, made the abstracts public, removing only the names of the accused employees. In 1949 Congress began putting provisions in appropriations bills which would allow heads of government departments to fire employees accused for reasons of "security" without permitting the employee any right of appeal. Truman faced other problems relating to his loyalty program too.

. . . Reports were coming to the White House of some arbitrary handling of individual cases where on the flimsiest pretext people were being fired on security grounds. Some reports showed that people were being fired on false evidence. These reports were distressing to me, as I was very anxious that no injustice be done to any individual and that no individual be deprived of his rights. . . .

Truman felt he had to do something to correct the defects in existing laws relating to loyalty and security, for the sake of the Constitutional rights of all Americans, not only government employees. On August 8, 1950, he sent a message to Congress which argued that existing laws relating to internal security were adequate to the needs of government prosecutions, but that these laws had some defects that needed to be remedied. He asked for changes in laws relating to espionage, the registration of foreign agents, and the security of national defense installations. He reminded Congress of his fundamental position regarding loyalty and security cases: "I am determined that the United States shall be secure. I am equally determined that we shall keep our historic liberties. . . ."

Truman had hoped his request for some modest changes to existing legislation would turn Congress away from consideration of a more drastic overhaul of internal security legislation. It did not.

On September 23, 1950, Congress enacted the Internal Security Act. This bill was passed over my veto within twenty-four hours. . . . I believed . . . that this bill would give government officials vast powers to harass all of our citizens in the exercise of their right of free speech. Government stifling of the free expression of opinion is a long step toward totalitarianism. There is no more fundamental axiom of American freedom than the familiar statement: In a free country, we punish men for the crimes they commit but never for the opinions they have. . . .

It is one of the tragedies of our time that the security program of the United States has been wickedly used by demagogues and sensational newspapers in an attempt to frighten and mislead the American people. . . . When the government expels a few of its undesirable employees . . . [this action] should not in all decency be used to agitate doubts about all the people in government. Even more reprehensible is unwarranted persecution by demagogues on false charges and gossip about people they dislike. The sacred rights of these individuals, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, have been sacrificed or placed in continuous jeopardy by the repetition of unsubstantiated charges and accusations. . . .

Truman, troubled by problems in the loyalty program and by what he viewed as assaults on individual liberties by Congress, decided to appoint a commission to advise him what to do to provide greater protection for individual rights while at the same time keeping the government secure. Early in 1951 he established the Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights. When he met with the chairman of the commission, Admiral Chester Nimitz, he expressed particular concern for the rights of government employees.

. . . I told him that I was troubled by the growing persecution mania being directed against government employees. What I thought was badly needed was a civil-rights program for the people who work in the government. If I had yielded to the clamor by agreeing to a reckless dismissal of the people under fire, I could have silenced many critics—at the cost of ruining the reputations of many innocent people. . . .

The commission was never able to begin its work. Congress refused to suspend conflict of interest statutes which made it impossible for the prominent people Truman appointed to serve without seriously limiting their business and professional activities following their service with the commission. Feeling the frustration of his position, Truman wrote to Admiral Nimitz on October 26, 1951: "I had

hoped that the Congress would be as anxious as I am to make sure that our procedures for maintaining the security of the government service are working effectively. I had hoped that the Congress would be so anxious as I am to make sure that the Bill of Rights is not undermined in our eagerness to stamp out subversive activities. . . ." *With regret, and with no other choice, Truman accepted the resignations of all the members of the commission.*

About three months before this, as the Nimitz Commission sat idle, unable to begin its work, Truman asked the National Security Council to address problems in the security side of the loyalty program. He worried that some employees were being fired for being security risks without adequate due process, and he asked the National Security Council to investigate the way the security program was being administered. He particularly wanted recommendations regarding the establishment of uniform standards and procedures and for a central review of the actions being taken in the government's many agencies and departments.

Truman received the National Security Council's report in late April 1952. As he expected, it made many recommendations regarding improving procedures and creating uniform standards for security investigations of government employees, and it recommended that the Civil Service Commission review agency decisions in security cases. About three months later, he wrote the head of the Civil Service Commission that he wanted the overlapping, duplication, and confusion among the different categories of employee investigations eliminated. He directed that government departments and agencies should examine their procedures to be sure that they included adequate procedural safeguards for the protection of employees subject to security investigations.

In plain words, I wanted to make sure that if an employee was terminated on ground that he was unsuitable—but not undesirable—he should not be branded as disloyal or as a security risk. This was an evil twist that the loose critics and demagogues were putting on many of the people who quit or were dismissed for routine reasons by the government. . . .

The issue of world communism . . . is a national and not a partisan issue. . . . There never should have been competition on the anti-communist issue between Congress and the executive [branch], and between the Democrats and the Republicans. I never considered it a partisan issue. . . .

[During the time I was president,] we maintained a constant vigilance against the new technique of infiltration and betrayal by the agents and dupes of the communists. But those of us who had faith in the institutions of this country never acted out of a sense of panic or fear that these enemies could ever succeed. . . . The demagogues, crackpots, and professional

patriots had a field day pumping fear into the American people. . . . Many good people actually believed that we were in imminent danger of being taken over by the communists and that our government in Washington was communist-riddled. So widespread was this campaign that it seemed no one would be safe from attack. This was the tragedy and shame of our time. I refused to lose confidence in the good sense of the American people. I knew this period of hysteria would eventually run its course, as did all other such unhappy periods in our past.

Years of Trial and Hope, 269–291

Seizure of the Steel Mills

1951–1952

Threat of a strike—search for a resolution—the Wage Stabilization Board—alarm among Truman's advisers—seizure of the mills—“Our defense production depends on steel”—Congress fails to act—the Supreme Court hears the case—“a deep disappointment to me”—one last effort—the president must safeguard the nation

On November 1, 1951, the United Steelworkers of America announced that when their contracts with the steel manufacturers expired early in 1952, they would want improvements of some working conditions and a substantial wage increase. This was the beginning of a series of events that eventually made it necessary for the government to seize the nation's steel plants.

The demands of the steelworkers did not seem out of line to me. Korea and the needs of the defense program had greatly increased the volume of business being done by the steel mills, and the steel companies' profits were rising. . . .

We had this economic situation on our hands: The industry was making more money, while the workers in the plants found that the increases in the cost of living had cut down the purchasing power of their pay. The cost of food and clothing and similar basic items had gone up. Wages, however, were only one of the issues which the union wanted to negotiate. There had been a general worsening of relations between the union and some of the companies, especially United States Steel. The difficulty had arisen over company efforts to introduce an incentive-pay wage system. The workers charged, rightly or wrongly, that this system would treat them as if they were machines, and they resented it. . . .



In 1951, the steel industry said that it did not wish to discuss the union's demands for increased wages and changes in working conditions, and the union announced that the workers would strike on December 31. I had no way of knowing why the companies refused to negotiate with the union. Perhaps they thought this was an opportune time to get tough. Perhaps they believed that the urgent needs of the defense program would bring the government into the dispute and force continued production at unchanged contract conditions. Whatever the reasons, the officials of the Defense Department and of the defense production agencies viewed the impending strike with the gravest alarm. Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett had for months been pointing out to me that the national defense program would be endangered if a strike was allowed to halt production. All the members of the Cabinet agreed with Lovett that it would be harmful to the country and injurious to our campaign in Korea if our steel mills were allowed to close down. We were then not only trying to keep our forces in Korea, as well as elsewhere, fully equipped, but we had allies to whom we had promised arms and munitions and whose determination to resist communism might depend on our ability to supply them the weapons they so badly needed. It was obvious that the best interests of the nation would be seriously affected if a strike in the steel industry took place.

On December 22, I referred the dispute between the United Steelworkers and the steel companies to the Wage Stabilization Board for solution. The unions immediately responded to this action by agreeing to postpone the strike so that production would not be interrupted.

To put off the strike in the hope of negotiating a solution, I had a choice of two alternatives as provided by the Congress. The first was the Taft-Hartley Act, which had a provision for an eighty-day injunction. . . . This is not a mandatory provision. On the contrary, it provides in cases of strikes endangering national health and safety that the president may appoint a board of inquiry to determine the facts and to report to him. Upon receiving that report, the president may instruct the Department of Justice to ask for a court order to enjoin the strike for eighty days. During this period, the board of inquiry attempts to bring about a settlement. At the end of eighty days, unless a solution is reached, the strike may legally proceed and the president must then report the facts to the Congress along with his recommendations.

[The second alternative was provided for] . . . in the Defense Production Act of 1950, which declared that it was "the intent of Congress, in order to provide for effective price and wage stabilization . . . and to maintain uninterrupted production, that there be effective procedures for the settlement

of labor disputes affecting national defense." This authorized the president to provide for procedures similar to those that had existed in World War II with the War Labor Board. Acting . . . [with authorization] from Congress, I had set up a Wage Stabilization Board and had assigned to it the function of settling labor disputes affecting national defense. . . .

In deciding on a choice, then, between the two alternatives, I first considered the Taft-Hartley Act. But the Taft-Hartley Act had been designed primarily for peacetime labor problems. The Wage Stabilization Board, however, had been established especially for defense labor disputes. . . . The kind of situation we were facing caused me to turn to the Wage Stabilization Board.

From January 10 through February 26, 1952, the Wage Stabilization Board held extensive hearings and discussions with the parties, and on March 20, it submitted its report to me. On the wage issue, it recommended that the union be given an increase in three stages over an eighteen-month period, for a total increase of 26.4 cents per hour. This was less than the union asked for. On the other points, too, the Board pared down the union's requests. On some it recommended that the union's requests be rejected altogether. Weighing the result against the current and prospective earnings of the industry, the proposal seemed to me to be fair and workable.

Charles E. Wilson, director of defense mobilization, reported to me on March 24 that the companies would flatly reject the recommended settlement. He said that there would be an industry refusal followed by a prolonged strike and that the only thing that would prevent a shutdown of the mills would be to grant the price increase requested by the companies. In order to prevent a national crisis, I would not object to a reasonable price increase that would meet the cost of the higher wage scale. When we had a steel strike in 1946, I had had a calculation made by the experts to show just how much the then proposed wage hike would drive production costs up, and a price increase was based on that calculation. On the basis of the figures before me in the present case, however, I felt that the price increase the steel companies were demanding was entirely out of reason and that it had come at a bad time for the country. . . . The profits of the steel companies were constantly rising. The nation was drafting its men to serve on the field of battle, and I thought that the ammunition and arms manufacturers and their raw-material producers ought not to use the emergency to insist on extra profits. The attitude of the companies seemed wrong to me, since under the accelerated defense program the government was by far the biggest customer for steel and steel products. To hike the prices at this time meant charging

the government more for the tools of defense. I realized, of course, that any wage increase means adding cost to production, but I was not willing to commit myself to a flat figure to be applied across the board, without proof that it was made necessary by the wage increase. . . . A disproportionate rise in the cost of steel would have an inflationary effect. Because of this I felt that I would be justified in agreeing to a steel-price increase only if the steel industry would carry more than its normal share of the production cost. In this case, however, the steel industry was actively seeking to get much more than its share of the profits, and at the expense of the government.

To my regret, Wilson interpreted my willingness to consider an adjustment to cover the actual added costs as a promise to meet the companies' full demands. When I corrected his interpretation and put him straight, he resigned.

It was now apparent that a settlement would be difficult to reach. A long round of conferences and consultations began. John Steelman, my assistant, whose specialty was labor problems, held meetings in his office with groups and individuals representing labor, management, and government. The conferees reported to me on their talks and asked my opinion or decision on some point, but no progress was being made. On April 7, the unions announced that they would go out on strike against the steel companies.

I again called in all my principal advisers to decide what steps to take to meet the emergency. Secretary of Defense Lovett said emphatically that any stoppage of steel production, for even a short time, would increase the risk we had taken in the "stretch-out" of the armament program. He also pointed out that our entire combat technique in all three services depended on the fullest use of our industrial facilities. Stressing the situation in Korea, he said that "we are holding the line with ammunition, and not with the lives of our troops." Any curtailment of steel production, he warned, would endanger the lives of our fighting men. Gordon Dean, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, expressed grave concern over the delay which any lack of steel would mean for the major expansion of facilities for atomic weapons production. Henry H. Fowler, administrator of the National Production Authority, told me that in addition to military equipment and atomic energy construction, power plants, railroad construction, shipbuilding, machine tool manufacture, and the like, all would come to a halt if the steel mills closed down. He pointed out that it would depend on the inventory situation how soon the steel shortage would make itself felt in the manufacturing plants, and in certain types of ammunition there was virtually no inventory stock on hand.

Secretary of Commerce [Charles W.] Sawyer briefed me on the effect a shutdown would have on the several transportation programs. His figures showed that a ten-day interruption of steel production would mean the loss of 96,000 feet of bridge and 1,500 miles of highway. He reported that in the event of a steel shutdown only twenty-one of the ninety-eight ships then under construction in American yards could be completed, and thirty-nine others would have to be abandoned entirely. He informed me that the effect on airplane production would be such that Convair and Douglas, for instance, would have to halt their assembly lines within sixty days. There was a danger that some manufacturers would not await the onset of the shortage but would close down as soon as steel production ceased. Oscar Chapman, secretary of the interior, said that the maintenance and expansion of facilities in the petroleum, gas, and electric power utility fields depended on steel materials. Coal mines and coke ovens require steel for any number of accessory, but essential, uses. With Dean Acheson I discussed the impact which this threatening paralysis of our defense economy might have on our relations with the rest of the world. Any failure on our part to deliver what we had promised to furnish our allies under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program would seriously undermine their faith in our ability to aid them in critical moments. Russia would be cheered by such evidence of a slowdown in our rearmament. We could not overlook even the possibility that Russia would believe us so weakened by an extended strike as to invite further aggression, and there might be other "Koreas."

All of this presented a very serious picture. The Congress was debating and doing a lot of talking about the steel crisis, and I would have welcomed any practical solution from it. But discussion was not enough. I had to act to prevent the stoppage of steel production, which would imperil the nation. Unless some last-minute effort brought peace and a settlement, I could see no alternative but to order the seizure of the steel mills by the government.

The expression "government seizure" sounds forbidding. Some people believe that seizure means confiscation or expropriation of private property. But what really happens is that the government merely assumes temporary custody of the properties. The very same people responsible for the management before seizure are kept on to continue the management of the mills and plants on behalf of the government. In this way the government can make sure that there is no interruption of production. . . . During my occupation of the White House I had been frequently urged by department heads to seize an industry or a plant that was strikebound or threatened with a strike. But except in a few critical instances, I refused to do it. I have always

considered seizure a last resort—something the president should turn to only when there appears to be no other way to prevent injury to the national interest, or when it is necessary to protect the whole country.

It was for that reason that I waited until the afternoon of the very last day before the strike was to begin before issuing the seizure order. I spent most of that last day with Steelman and with Secretary of Commerce Sawyer, whose job it would be to supervise the seized industry. Then, just a few hours before the mills were scheduled to be struck, I issued Executive Order No. 10340 to seize the steel mills, and later in the evening of that same day I addressed the nation by radio, explaining the reason for this action:

If steel production stops, we will have to stop making shells and bombs that are going directly to our soldiers at the front in Korea. If steel production stops, we will have to cut down and delay the atomic energy program. If steel production stops, it won't be long before we have to stop making engines for the Air Force planes.

Our national security and our chances for peace depend on our defense production. Our defense production depends on steel.

I have no doubt that if our defense program fails, the danger of war, the possibility of hostile attack, grow much greater.

I would not be faithful to my responsibilities as president if I did not use every effort to keep this from happening.

With American troops facing the enemy on the field of battle, I would not be living up to my oath of office if I failed to do whatever is required to provide them with the weapons and ammunitions they need for their survival.

I announced that I was instructing Sawyer to take possession of the steel mills and to keep them operating and that Steelman was directed to bring the representatives of the steel companies and of the steel workers' union to Washington in a renewed effort to get them to settle their dispute. . . .

When there is danger that a vital portion of the economy will be crippled at a time that is critical to the nation's security, then, in my opinion, the president has a clear duty to take steps to protect the nation. . . . I had hoped that the Congress would respond to my . . . [action] with some positive action [of its own]. I would have been more than willing to carry out faithfully whatever policy the Congress might have decided upon. However, the only action that seemed forthcoming was entirely negative: An amendment was introduced in the Senate to the Third Supplemental Appropriations Bill to restrict the use of appropriated funds for the operations of the steel mills under my seizure order. This was a purely political exercise of the power

to legislate in an appropriation bill and was a kind of action I had always opposed. . . . [The Congress took] no positive action and no constructive suggestion for dealing with the crisis came from the Congress. Why, I will never know. . . .

The steel companies had reacted violently to the seizure, beginning with a radio and television broadcast by Clarence Randall, president of the Inland Steel Company, on the day following my address to the nation. The companies now resorted to court action. The first phase of these proceedings, which eventually reached the Supreme Court, took place on April 29, when Judge David Pine of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ordered Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to return the mills to the companies. On the following day, however, the Court of Appeals stayed this order so that the Supreme Court could decide on the government's right to seize the plants.

The steelworkers' union had stopped work after Judge Pine's ruling, but when the Court of Appeals issued the stay which followed, the unions immediately returned to work. The companies and the government then asked the Supreme Court to review Judge Pine's ruling, and while the high court deliberated as to whether and when it should hear the case, negotiations continued, mostly in John Steelman's office, toward a direct settlement of the dispute.

By May 3 Ben Fairless, president of U.S. Steel and the principal spokesman for the companies, and Phil Murray, president of the United Steelworkers (and also of the Congress of Industrial Organizations), had at last cleared away some of the major points of disagreement. John Steelman passed the word to me that for the first time there was a real chance that agreement might be obtained. But while the White House and the labor-management negotiators were still at work, the news ticker flashed the report that the Supreme Court had agreed to hear the case promptly. This abruptly ended all negotiations. The steel companies that morning had been willing to make significant concessions, but they now withdrew from all talks. If the Court had not made the announcement for perhaps 24 or 48 hours, there is a strong likelihood that agreement would have been obtained.

The government's case was presented in the Supreme Court by the solicitor general, Philip B. Perlman. . . . The steel companies were represented by John W. Davis, the 1924 Democratic presidential candidate, who led a contingent of high-powered corporation lawyers from New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Washington. The argument for the government . . . was twofold. First, that the court should not entertain the complaint

because whatever damage the companies might suffer through the seizure they would be able to recover. Second, that the taking of the companies' property was a valid exercise of the authority of the president of the United States.

It seems to me that there have been few instances in history where the press was more sensational or partisan than in its handling of the steel seizure. What was more disturbing was what amounted to editorial intervention by the press . . . in a case pending before the Supreme Court. . . . News stories and editorials decrying seizure and inflaming public opinion were prejudging and deciding the case at the very time the court itself was hearing arguments for both sides. The steel companies bought full-page advertisements and ran them in newspapers throughout the country to denounce the president of the United States. Large sums of money were spent to influence public opinion against the government. . . . I have always believed that the way our newspapers sometimes comment on matters pending in the courts is an unethical attempt to influence a judge in deciding a case. Certainly, in the steel case every effort made was to spread a slanted view of the situation and to color the atmosphere. The public relations experts for the companies skillfully shifted public attention from the price demands of the industry to the supposedly abnormal and unprecedented act of the president. A little reading of history would have shown that there was nothing unusual about this action—that strike-threatened plants had been seized before by the government, even before the nation was engaged in any shooting conflict. But these matters received no mention or, if they were mentioned, were glossed over quickly, as if they had no meaning for the present.

I would . . . never conceal the fact that the Supreme Court's decision, announced on June 2, was a deep disappointment to me. I think Chief Justice [Fred] Vinson's dissenting opinion hit the nail right on the head, and I am sure that someday his view will come to be recognized as the correct one. The chief justice, in his own opinion, commented on the majority view of the Court in these words: "The diversity of views expressed in the six opinions of the majority, the lack of reference to authoritative precedent, the repeated reliance upon prior dissenting opinions, the complete disregard of the uncontested facts showing the gravity of the emergency and the temporary nature of the taking all serve to demonstrate how far afield one must go to affirm the order of the District Court."

I am not a lawyer, and I leave the legal arguments to others. But as a layman, as an official of the government, and as a citizen, I have always found it difficult to understand how the court could take the affidavits of men like

Lovett, Chapman, and many others, all of whom testified in great detail to the grave dangers that a steel shutdown would bring to the nation—affidavits that were neither contradicted nor even contested by the companies—and ignore them entirely. . . .

Word of the court's decision reached me in my office in the early afternoon of June 2, and before three o'clock I had issued an order to Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to comply with the decision and return the plants to the steel industry. At 4:30 p.m. a hurriedly called meeting convened in my office. Defense Secretary Lovett was present, along with Sawyer. The new Attorney General, James P. McGranery, was also there, together with Solicitor General Perlman, Secretary of Labor [Maurice J.] Tobin, and several members of the White House staff. I wanted to know what course these advisers would recommend in the light of the Court's decision. Should we now resort to the Taft-Hartley Act's injunction? And, if not, what else was there to do? Going around the table, I asked each of those present to state his opinion. Only one or two thought that I should start proceedings under the Taft-Hartley Act. Most took the position that, having used the Wage Stabilization Board, this route was no longer open to me. There was also some feeling that the Supreme Court opinion had strengthened the bargaining position of the industry to such an extent that it would be even more difficult than before to mediate any sort of settlement.

On June 10, I made one further effort, by an appeal for legislation to permit me to seize the strikebound plants. But the Congress refused to grant this authority. Throughout the nation the steel mills lay idle. The strike lasted fifty-three days and ended only when an agreement was finally reached between management and labor. This came only after an increase had been granted in the price of steel. . . . I approved this price increase with a reluctant heart, for I was convinced that it was wrong—as wrong as it had been in March and April when I had refused to consider approv[ing] that much. But now the Supreme Court had denied the power to bring the plants under government operation, and Congress had turned down my appeal for authority to seize. The companies therefore now held all the advantages. If we wanted steel—and we wanted it very badly—it would have to be on the industry's terms.

The strike ended on July 24. Six hundred thousand steel workers had been idle for over seven weeks. Twenty-five thousand iron ore workers had been on a sympathy strike for a part of that time, and lack of steel had caused the layoff of 300,000 workers in the automobile industry. The daily loss in wages and production during this period was estimated at \$40 million. The total

loss was estimated in excess of \$2 billion! Nor does this take into consideration the higher price the nation paid after the settlement for the steel and steel products needed for the defense effort.

When General [James] A. Van Fleet came back from Korea in March 1953, he complained that his troops had been short of certain types of ammunition in the summer and early fall of 1952. This was a fact that should have been no surprise to the American public. The affidavits of Secretary Lovett and National Production Administrator Fowler in the steel case had stated that a stoppage of steel production would affect our ability to ship sufficient munitions to the front in Korea! I think that we were fortunate that nothing more serious happened in Korea as a result of the steel shutdown. The actions of the administration succeeded in keeping production going from December 31, when the strike was first set to begin, until June 2—fully five months. This was valuable time gained. But the seven weeks that were lost could never be replaced, no matter how the lawyers argue.

Whatever the six justices of the Supreme Court meant by their differing opinions about the constitutional powers of the president, he must always act in a national emergency. It is not very realistic for the justices to say that comprehensive powers shall be available to the president only when a war has been declared or when the country has been invaded. We live in an age when hostilities begin without polite exchanges of diplomatic notes. There are no longer sharp distinctions between combatants and noncombatants, between military targets and the sanctuary of civilian areas. Nor can we separate the economic facts from the problems of defense and security.

In this day and age the defense of the nation means more than building an army, navy, and air force. It is a job for the entire resources of the nation. The president, who is commander in chief and who represents the interest of all the people, must [be] able to act at all times to meet any sudden threat to the nation's security. A wise president will always work with Congress, but when Congress fails to act or is unable to act in a crisis, the president, under the Constitution, must use his powers to safeguard the nation.

The Korean War 1—Invasion

June–October 1950

A divided postwar Korea—invasion—late night meetings in Washington—"the Reds were probing for weaknesses in our armor"—Truman's response to aggression—American troops enter the fight—MacArthur's plan for counterattack—differences over Formosa [Taiwan]—D-Day at Inchon—United Nations forces cross the 38th parallel—Truman meets MacArthur at Wake Island—"he repeated that the Korean conflict was won"

Following Japan's victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Korea fell under Japanese domination, and in 1910 Japan annexed Korea. During World War II, the Allies decided that Korea should become an independent country following the war, but only after a long period of preparation during which it would be held in a trusteeship by the United States, China, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. After the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan on August 9, 1945, Soviet and American troops operated in close proximity in the region of the Korean peninsula, but neither the United States nor the Soviet Union anticipated operating in Korea itself and did not reach agreements prior to the war's end regarding zones of operation in Korea or, once Japan was defeated, zones of occupation.



The 38th parallel as a dividing line in Korea was never the subject of international discussions. It was proposed by us as a practicable solution when the sudden collapse of the Japanese war machine created a vacuum in

Korea. We had no troops there and no shipping to land forces at more than a few locations in the southern half of the peninsula. The State Department urged that in all Korea the surrender of Japanese forces should be taken by Americans, but there was no way to get our troops into the northern part of the country with the speed required without sacrificing the security of our initial landings in Japan. In view of the fact that Stalin had concurred in the idea of a joint trusteeship, we expected that the division of the country would be solely for the purpose of accepting the Japanese surrender and that joint control would then extend throughout the peninsula.

The Russians, however, began at once to treat the 38th parallel as a permanent dividing line. They would allow no traffic across the line except with their express permission in each case. Since most of Korea's meager industrial plant was north of the parallel and most of its good farming area south of it, the division of the country disrupted the normal economic life of the nation and added to the misery of its people.

Our commander in Korea, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, tried to open talks with his Russian counterpart, but his efforts were regularly rebuffed. After three months of occupation, General Hodge reported on the situation in Korea to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressing the opinion that the dual occupation of Korea, with Russia north and the United States south of the 38th parallel, imposed an impossible condition upon our occupation missions of establishing [a] sound economy and preparing Korea for future independence. In South Korea, the United States was being blamed for the partition, and resentment was growing against all Americans in the area. The Koreans, the general reported, knew full well that under the dual occupation any talk of real freedom and independence was purely academic, but they wanted their independence and were beginning to think that the Allied powers were not sincere in their promise. By occidental standards, Hodge wrote, the Koreans were not ready for independence, but it was also growing daily more apparent that their capacity for self-government would not greatly improve as long as the dual occupation continued. . . .

The United States proposed at a meeting of foreign ministers in Moscow in December 1945 that the occupation zones in Korea be terminated and that a unified administration be created as a preliminary step toward the creation of a four-power trusteeship (the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and China) under the United Nations. The United States suggested that Korea might be given independence in five years. The Soviet Union proposed instead that a provisional government be set up in Korea. The United States agreed, but the Soviet

Union then would not cooperate with the United States to set up the provisional government. Truman decided to put the question of Korea's future before the United Nations, which established a Temporary Commission on Korea in January 1948. United Nations supervised elections were held in South Korea—the Soviet Union would not allow them to be held in North Korea—on May 10, 1948. The Korean National Assembly first met on May 31; it completed work on drafting a constitution on July 12. On July 20, it elected Syngman Rhee as president. The American military government transferred its authority to the new government, and the Republic of Korea was formally proclaimed on August 15. The Soviet Union established a separate government in North Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on September 9. Soviet troops had left North Korea by the end of 1948, leaving behind a "People's Army." Truman's advisers felt that the Republic of Korea could survive if it received large-scale aid from the United States, and Truman approved a program of military and economic aid. Except for a training mission of 500 men, the United States had withdrawn all of its troops by June 29, 1949. The United States entered into a defense agreement with the Republic of Korea on January 26, 1950. Truman was concerned about the rightest character of the new government, about its violations of civil liberties, and about its lack of concern about the serious level of inflation in South Korea. But, he felt, the United States had no choice but to support Syngman Rhee.

As I discussed Korean policy with my advisers in the spring of 1948, we knew that this was one of the places where the Soviet-controlled communist world might choose to attack. But we could say the same thing for every point of contact between East and West, from Norway through Berlin and Trieste to Greece, Turkey, and Iran; from the . . . [Kurile Islands] in the North Pacific to Indo-China and Malaya. . . . The intelligence reports from Korea in the spring of 1950 indicated that the North Koreans were steadily continuing their buildup of forces and that they were continuing to send guerrilla groups into South Korea. There were continuing incidents along the 38th parallel, where armed units faced each other. Throughout the spring . . . Central Intelligence [Agency] reports said that the North Koreans might at any time decide to change from isolated raids to a full-scale attack. The North Koreans were capable of such an attack at any time, according to the intelligence, but there was no information to give any clue as to whether an attack was certain or when it was likely to come. But this did not apply alone to Korea. These same reports also told me repeatedly that there were any number of other spots in the world where the Russians "possessed the capability" to attack.

On Saturday, June 24, 1950, I was in Independence, Missouri, to spend the weekend with my family and to attend to some personal family business. It was a little after ten in the evening, and [Mrs. Truman and I] were sitting in the library of our home on North Delaware Street when the telephone rang. It was the secretary of state calling from his home in Maryland. "Mr. President," said Dean Acheson, "I have very serious news. The North Koreans have invaded South Korea." My first reaction was that I must get back to the capital, and I told Acheson so. He explained, however, that details were not yet available and that he thought I need not rush back until he called me again with further information. In the meantime, he suggested to me that we should ask the United Nations Security Council to hold a meeting at once and declare that an act of aggression had been committed against the Republic of Korea. I told him that I agreed and asked him to request immediately a special meeting of the Security Council, and he said he would call me to report again the following morning, or sooner if there was more information on the events in Korea.

Acheson's next call came through around 11:30 Sunday morning, just as we were getting ready to sit down to an early Sunday dinner. Acheson reported that the United Nations Security Council had been called into emergency session. Additional reports had been received from Korea, and there was no doubt that an all-out invasion was under way there. The Security Council, Acheson said, would probably call for a cease fire, but in view of the complete disregard the North Koreans and their big allies had shown for the United Nations in the past, we had to expect that the Security Council order would be ignored. Some decision would have to be made at once as to the degree of aid or encouragement which our government was willing to extend to the Republic of Korea. I asked Acheson to get together with the . . . secretaries [of the Army, Navy, and Air Force] and the Chiefs of Staff and start working on recommendations for me when I got back. . . . I informed the secretary of state that I was returning to Washington at once.

The crew of the presidential plane *Independence* did a wonderful job. They had the plane ready to fly in less than an hour from the time they were alerted, and my return trip got under way so fast that two of my aides were left behind. They could not be notified in time to reach the airport. The plane left the Kansas City Municipal Airport at two o'clock, and it took just a little over three hours to make the trip to Washington.

I had time to think aboard the plane. In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that

the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall, communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on World War II. It was also clear to me that the foundations and the principles of the United Nations were at stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea could be stopped.

I had the plane's radio operator send a message to Dean Acheson asking him and his immediate advisers and the top defense chiefs to come to [my temporary residence at] Blair House for a dinner conference.

When *The Independence* landed, Secretary of State Acheson was waiting for me at the airport, as was Secretary of Defense [Louis] Johnson. . . . We hurried to Blair House, where we were joined by the other conferees. Present were the three service secretaries, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews, and Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter. There were the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, [who was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,] the Army Chief General [J. Lawton] Collins, the Air Force Chief General [Hoyt] Vandenberg, and Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. Dean Acheson was accompanied by Under Secretary [James] Webb, Deputy Under Secretary Dean Rusk and Assistant Under Secretary John Hickerson, and Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jessup.

It was late, and we went at once to the dining room for dinner. I asked that no discussion take place until dinner was served and over and the Blair House staff had withdrawn. I called on Dean Acheson first to give us a detailed picture of the situation. Acheson read us the first report that had been received by the State Department from [John J. Muccio,] our Ambassador in Seoul, Korea, at 9:26 the preceding evening:

According Korean army reports which partly confirmed by KMAG field advisor reports North Korean forces invaded ROK territory at several points this morning. Action was initiated about 4 A.M. Ongjin blasted by North Korean artillery fire. About 6 A.M. North Korean infantry commenced crossing parallel in Ongjin area, Kaesong area, Chuncheon area and amphibious

landing was reportedly made south of Gangneung on east coast. Kaesong was reportedly captured at 9 A.M., with some 10 North Korean tanks participating in operation. North Korean forces, spearheaded by tanks, reportedly closing in on Chuncheon. Details of fighting in Gangneung are unclear, although it seems North Korean forces have cut highway. Am conferring with KMAG advisors and Korean officials this morning re situation.

It would appear from nature of attack and manner in which it was launched that it constitutes all out offensive against ROK.

[John J.] Muccio

There were additional messages from Ambassador Muccio, too, giving more details, but all confirmed that a full-fledged attack was under way, and the North Koreans had broadcast a proclamation that, in effect, was a declaration of war. Earlier that Sunday evening, Acheson reported, the Security Council of the United Nations had, by a vote of 9 to 0, approved a resolution declaring that a breach of the peace had been committed by the North Korean action and ordering the North Koreans to cease their action and withdraw their forces.

I then called on Acheson to present the recommendations which the State and Defense Departments had prepared. He presented the following recommendations for immediate action: (1) That MacArthur should evacuate the Americans from Korea—including the dependents of the military mission—and, in order to do so, should keep open the Kimpo and other airports, repelling all hostile attacks thereon. In doing this, his air forces should stay south of the 38th parallel. (2) That MacArthur should be instructed to get ammunition and supplies to the Korean army by airdrop and otherwise. (3) That the Seventh Fleet should be ordered into the Formosa Strait to prevent the conflict from spreading to that area. The Seventh Fleet should be ordered from . . . [the Philippines] north at once. We should make a statement that the fleet would repel any attack on Formosa and that no attacks should be made from Formosa on the mainland.

At this point I interrupted to say that the Seventh Fleet should be ordered north at once but that I wanted to withhold making any statement until the fleet was in position.

After this report, I asked each person in turn to state his agreement or disagreement and any views he might have in addition. Two things stand out in this discussion. One was the complete, almost unspoken acceptance on the part of everyone that whatever had to be done to meet this aggression had to be done. There was no suggestion from anyone that either the United Nations or the United States could back away from it. This was the

test of all the talk of the last five years of collective security. The other point which stands out in my mind from the discussion was the difference in view of what might be called for. Vandenberg and Sherman thought that air and naval aid might be enough. Collins said that if the Korean army was really broken, ground forces would be necessary. But no one could tell what the state of the Korean army really was on that Sunday night. Whatever the estimates of the military might be, everyone recognized the situation as serious in the extreme.

I then directed that orders be issued to put the three recommendations into immediate effect.

As we continued our discussion, I stated that I did not expect the North Koreans to pay any attention to the United Nations. This, I said, would mean that the United Nations would have to apply force if it wanted its order obeyed. General Bradley said we would have to draw the line somewhere. Russia, he thought, was not yet ready for war, but in Korea they were obviously testing us, and the line ought to be drawn now. I said that most emphatically I thought the line would have to be drawn. General Collins reported that he had had a teletype conference with MacArthur, [who indicated he] . . . was ready to ship ammunition and supplies to Korea as soon as he received the green light. I expressed the opinion that the Russians were trying to get Korea by default, gambling that we would be afraid of starting a third world war and would offer no resistance. I thought that we were still holding the stronger hand, although how much stronger, it was hard to tell. . . .

I instructed the service chiefs to prepare the necessary orders for the eventual use of American units if the United Nations should call for action against North Korea, and meanwhile MacArthur was directed to send a survey party to Korea to find out what kind of aid would be most effective and how the military forces available to the . . . [American forces] might be used. He was also to furnish such ammunition and equipment to the Republic of Korea as he could spare, and was authorized to use air and naval cover to assure the delivery of these supplies and to protect the American dependents being evacuated from Korea. The Seventh Fleet was placed under MacArthur's command and was to have its base at Sasebo, Japan. . . .

By Monday the reports from Korea began to sound dark and discouraging, and among the messages that arrived was one from Syngman Rhee asking for help in the telegraphic style of the State Department messages:

Beginning in early morning 25 June, North Korean Communist Army began armed aggression against South. Your Excellency and Congress of US

already aware of fact that our people, anticipating incident such as today's, established strong national defense force in order to secure bulwark of democracy in the east and to render service to world peace. We again thank you for your indispensable aid in liberating us and in establishing our Republic. As we face this national crisis, putting up brave fight, we appeal for your increasing support and ask that you at the same time extend effective and timely aid in order to prevent this act of destruction of world peace.

The Korean ambassador, who brought me President Rhee's appeal, was downhearted almost to the point of tears. I tried to encourage him by saying that the battle had been going on for only forty-eight hours and other men in other countries had defended their liberties to ultimate victory under much more discouraging circumstances. I told him to hold fast—that help was on the way.

But the Republic of Korea troops were no match for the tanks and heavy weapons of the North Koreans. Seoul, the capital of Syngman Rhee's government, seemed doomed; communist tanks were reported in the outskirts of the city. Rhee moved his government to Taegu, about 150 miles to the south.

Throughout Monday the situation in Korea deteriorated rapidly. I called another meeting at Blair House Monday night. . . . MacArthur's latest message was alarming:

. . . Piecemeal entry into action vicinity Seoul by South Korean Third and Fifth Divisions has not succeeded in stopping the penetration recognized as the enemy main effort for the past 2 days with intent to seize the capital city of Seoul. Tanks entering suburbs of Seoul. Gov[ernmen]t transferred to south and communication with part of KMAG [Korean Military Advisory Group] opened at Taegu. Ambassador and Chief KMAG remaining in the city. FEC [Far East Command] mil[itary] survey group en route to Korea has been recalled, under this rapidly deteriorating situation.

South Korean units unable to resist determined Northern offensive. Contributory factor exclusive enemy possession of tanks and fighter planes. South Korean casualties as an index to fighting have not shown adequate resistance capabilities or the will to fight and our estimate is that a complete collapse is imminent.

There was now no doubt! The Republic of Korea needed help at once if it was not to be overrun. More seriously, a communist success in Korea would put Red troops and planes within easy striking distance of Japan, and Okinawa and Formosa would be open to attack from two sides. I told my advisers that what was developing in Korea seemed to me like a repetition on a larger scale of what had happened in Berlin [in 1948]. The Reds were

probing for weaknesses in our armor; we had to meet their thrust without getting embroiled in a world-wide war. I directed the secretary of defense to call MacArthur on the scrambler phone and to tell him in person what my instructions were. He was to use air and naval forces to support the Republic of Korea with air and naval elements of his command, but only south of the 38th parallel. He was also instructed to dispatch the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa [Taiwan] Strait. The purpose of this move was to prevent attacks by the communists on Formosa as well as forays by Chiang Kai-shek against the mainland, this last to avoid reprisal actions by the Reds that might enlarge the area of conflict. I also approved recommendations for the strengthening of our forces in the Philippines and for increased aid to the French in Indochina. Meanwhile the Security Council of the United Nations met again and adopted on June 27 the resolution calling on all members of the United Nations to give assistance to South Korea.

That same morning, Tuesday, I asked a group of congressional leaders to meet with me so that I might inform them on the events and the decisions of the past few days. . . .

During his meeting with the congressional leaders, Truman asked Secretary of State Dean Acheson to summarize the Korean situation, and he then read a statement which was to be released to the press later that day regarding the actions he had taken.

The congressional leaders approved of my action. On that same day Thomas E. Dewey, Republican leader, pledged his full support.

This is the statement I gave out to the press at the conclusion of this meeting with the congressional leaders:

June 27, 1950

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack upon Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

I have also directed that United States Forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated.

I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indo-China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

I have instructed Ambassador [Warren] Austin, as the representative of the United States to the Security Council, to report these steps to the Council.

Our allies and friends abroad were informed through our diplomatic representatives that it was our feeling that it was essential to the maintenance of peace that this armed aggression against a free nation be met firmly. We let it be known that we considered the Korean situation vital as a symbol of the strength and determination of the West. Firmness now would be the only way to deter new actions in other portions of the world. Not only in Asia but in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere the confidence of peoples in countries adjacent to [the] Soviet Union would be very adversely affected, in our judgment, if we failed to take action to protect a country established under our auspices and confirmed in its freedom by action of the United Nations. If, however, the threat to South Korea was met firmly and successfully, it would add to our successes in Iran, Berlin and Greece a fourth success in opposition to the aggressive moves of the communists. And each success, we suggested to our allies, was likely to add to the caution of the Soviets in undertaking new efforts of this kind. Thus the safety and prospects for peace of the free world would be increased.

The top-level policy discussions were continued on Wednesday, June 28, when I opened another meeting of the National Security Council with a survey of the most recent developments reported from Korea. I told the departments concerned that I wanted a complete restudy made of all our policies in areas adjoining the USSR, and Secretaries Johnson and Acheson reported that a study of some of the immediate aspects growing out of the Korean situation had already been begun. At this point, Vice President Barkley joined the meeting. He had been detained on Capitol Hill, but for a good cause, for he was able to report that the Senate had just voted unanimously to extend the draft. Secretary Acheson pointed out that the unanimity of support for my policy might not be of lasting duration. What had been done in Korea had had tremendous effect, but the responsibilities that went with it were equally significant, for what had been done in the last three days might ultimately involve us in all-out war. I replied that the danger involved was obvious but that we should not back out of Korea unless a military situation elsewhere demanded such action. Averell Harriman, who had just arrived from Europe, observed that the people there had been gravely concerned lest we fail to meet the challenge in Korea. After my decision had been announced, he said, there had been a general feeling of relief, since it had been believed that disaster would otherwise be certain. He added that the Europeans were fully aware of the implications of my decision. . . .

One of Truman's advisers suggested that one of the Joint Chiefs be sent to Tokyo to meet with MacArthur in order to create a personal relationship between the Washington leadership and the head of Far East Command. Truman felt the Joint Chiefs were needed in Washington, but he agreed that a personal relationship with MacArthur was important and said that he himself would want to meet with him if the Korean conflict proved to be a lengthy one.

Secretary of the Army Pace reported that instructions had been issued to military intelligence to be alert for any evidence of Soviet participation in the Korean fighting, and wanted to know if there were any other special intelligence targets. I replied that our strategic intelligence was watching other areas besides Korea and I thought that Soviet activities in the vicinity of Yugoslavia, in Bulgaria especially, and in the vicinity of northern Europe should be given special attention. Pace also reported that arrangements had been made for a system of military briefings to be given on Capitol Hill, whereupon I told the vice president that I wanted to be certain that those briefings were bipartisan and that I wanted him to select those to attend them.

The National Security Council met again Thursday, when Secretary of Defense Johnson introduced a proposed directive to MacArthur. The final paragraph of this proposed directive, however, permitted an implication that we were planning to go to war against the Soviet Union. I stated categorically that I did not wish to see even the slightest implication of such a plan. I wanted to take every step necessary to push the North Koreans back behind the 38th parallel. But I wanted to be sure that we would not become so deeply committed in Korea that we could not take care of such other situations as might develop.

Secretary Pace expressed the belief that we should be very careful in authorizing operations above the 38th parallel and that we should clearly limit such operations. I agreed, pointing out that operations above the 38th parallel should be designed only to destroy military supplies, for I wanted it clearly understood that our operations in Korea were designed to restore peace there and to restore the border. Secretary Acheson said that the Air Force should not be restricted in its tasks by a rigid application of the 38th parallel as a restraining line, but he wanted to be sure that precautions would be taken to keep the air elements from going beyond the boundaries of Korea. He suggested that the directive to MacArthur include some instructions in the case of Soviet intervention, perhaps to the effect that he defend his positions and our forces, and report at once for further instructions from the president. I accepted this suggestion, and I told Acheson and Johnson to get together and work out the wording.

Acheson then reviewed the reply received from the Soviets to our appeal to them to help bring the fighting in Korea to an end. He expressed the belief that a statement which had been released in Peiping [Beijing], taken together with the Russian reply, seemed to indicate that the Soviets would not intervene themselves but might help the Chinese Communists to do so. Acheson suggested, and I approved, the public release of our note to the USSR and their reply. [He then] . . . reported offers of assistance from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands. I said that it was my hope that the forces assisting South Korea could be made truly representative of the United Nations.

Before closing the meeting, I asked the Secretary of Defense to prepare a directive in my name to MacArthur instructing him to make a full and complete report on the situation in the Far East each day.

A little later that day Secretary Acheson returned to the White House, and among the things we discussed was a communication from the Chinese government offering assistance in Korea. Chiang Kai-shek had instructed

his ambassador to tell us that he was willing to send ground forces numbering up to 33,000 men but that he had neither air nor sea units and that United States assistance would be needed to get the ground forces from Formosa to Korea and then to supply them there. I told Acheson that my first reaction was to accept this offer because I wanted, as I had said to the National Security Council earlier in the day, to see as many of the members of the United Nations as possible take part in the Korean action. Acheson suggested that the situation of Nationalist China was different from that of other United Nations members. Formosa was one of the areas most exposed to attack. That had been the reason we had dispatched the Seventh Fleet, and it would be a little inconsistent to spend American money to protect an island while its natural defenders were somewhere else. He also raised the question whether [Chiang Kai-shek's] troops . . . would not require a great deal of reequipping before they could go into combat under modern conditions. I asked Acheson to bring up the matter the next day at a meeting with Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and the Joint Chiefs.

The following morning . . . [Secretary Pace] . . . telephoned me at 5 a.m. . . . He said that he had just spoken to General Collins, who had had a long . . . [tele]conference with MacArthur. . . . MacArthur said he was convinced that only American ground units could stop the North Korean advance. He had asked for permission to commit one regimental combat team at once and to build up to two divisions as rapidly as possible. . . . [Secretary Pace] asked for my instructions. I told . . . [him] to inform MacArthur immediately that the use of one regimental combat team was approved.

At seven that morning, a staff colonel from the Joint Chiefs' office came over to brief me on the night's reports from Korea. As soon as he had finished, I called Pace and Johnson and told them to be prepared to discuss at a meeting at 8:30 a.m. MacArthur's request for authority to commit the two divisions and the offer of troops by Chiang Kai-shek.

At this meeting, I had with me about the same group that met with me at Blair House the evening of my hurried return from Independence. I informed the meeting that I had already granted authority for the use of the one regimental combat team and that I now desired their advice on the additional troops to be employed. I asked if it would not be worthwhile to accept the Chinese offer, especially since Chiang Kai-shek said he could have his 33,000 men ready for sailing within five days. Time was all important. At the same time, I asked them to consider carefully places where trouble might break out. What, for instance, would Mao Tse-tung do? What might the Russians do in the Balkans, in Iran, in Germany? Acheson suggested

that if Chinese troops from Formosa appeared in Korea the communists in Peiping might decide to enter that conflict in order to inflict damage on Chiang Kai-shek's troops there and thus reduce his ability to defend himself whenever they might decide to try an invasion of Formosa. The Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the 33,000 men offered, even though Chiang Kai-shek called them his best, would have very little modern equipment and would be as helpless as Syngman Rhee's army against the North Korean tanks. Furthermore, the transportation they would require would be better used if we assigned it the task of carrying supplies and additional manpower of our own to MacArthur. I was still concerned about our ability to stand off the enemy with the small forces available to us, but after some further discussion I accepted the position taken by practically everyone else at this meeting; namely, that the Chinese offer ought to be politely declined. I then decided that MacArthur should be given full authority to use the ground forces under his command.

The first American ground troops sent into the Korean fighting were infantrymen from the 24th Infantry Division. By sea and by air, units of this veteran combat organization were rushed to the front lines to slow down the communist advance, and the story of their action will always remain a glorious chapter in the history of the American Army. Inspiringly led by that wonderful fighting commander, Major General William F. Dean, the men of the 24th, most of them young recruits without battle experience, put up one of the finest rearguard actions in military history.

I kept myself posted on the battle front situation by way of a daily briefing which I was given each morning by General Bradley or by an officer from the Joint Chiefs' office. I also arranged for the National Security Council to meet each week, and at each of these meetings a briefing on the Korean situation was given by Bradley himself or by an officer of his staff. This began on July 6, 1950, at the first meeting of the National Security Council after American troops had been committed to the ground action. It was then that Bradley described the difficult position of the 24th Division and reported that the 25th Division, also from Japan, stood ready to move to Korea but that shipping was critical in the Far East and that another week would pass before these reinforcements could reach the front lines. . . . Vice President [Barkley] asked if we knew how many North Koreans were in the operation, and Bradley told him that our intelligence estimated that there were ninety thousand. Barkley then inquired how many troops were now engaged on our side, and Bradley told him that there were now about 10,000 Americans and about 25,000 ROK regulars. Bradley also mentioned a new type of

bazooka that was being rushed to Korea to give the troops there a weapon capable of stopping the heavy Russian-made tanks the North Koreans were using. . . . Secretary [of the Navy Francis P.] Matthews asked about possible additional North Korean forces that might be brought in, and Bradley said that intelligence from the Far East reported two more enemy divisions in North Korea that had not been committed, in addition to the possibility of elements, Korean or Chinese, that might be brought in from Manchuria. In reply to a question from Secretary [of the Treasury John] Snyder, Bradley said that North Korean divisions were smaller than ours, running about 10,000 men, but Secretary Pace added that the estimate of the intelligence agencies was that there were 200,000 Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria. Furthermore, he went on to say that all three service secretaries felt strongly that we should reexamine our entire "military posture" for the days ahead. I agreed, adding that it was my understanding that Secretary [of Defense Louis] Johnson had already set in motion the machinery for such a reevaluation in motion. . . .

In Korea, the communists challenged us, but they were capable of challenging us in a similar way in many places and, what was even more serious, they could, if they chose, plunge us and the world into another and far more terrible war. Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third world war and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilized world. This meant that we should not do anything that would provide the excuse to the Soviets and plunge the free nations into full scale all-out war. . . . It was our policy to strengthen the weak spots in the defense of the free world. Iran, Greece, Berlin and NATO all stand as landmarks in the fight against communism. In the same way, our increased aid to Indochina and the Philippines and our move for the defense of Formosa by the Seventh Fleet were designed to reinforce areas exposed to communist pressure. Yet every one of these steps had to be taken without losing sight of the many other places where trouble might break out or of the danger that might befall us if we hazarded too much in any one place. . . .

MacArthur was naturally preoccupied with Korea. Almost as soon as he was given the mission of aiding the South Koreans against the aggressors, he had worked out a strategic plan and began then to call for the troops necessary to carry out his plan. His request for additional troops deserved high priority. I gave approval to an immediate alert order for the 2d Infantry Division, in addition to the 1st Marine Division, which was already preparing for the move to Korea, and instructed Secretary Johnson to call on

Selective Service to furnish the armed forces with manpower needed to fill up the skeleton units and ships. I then directed that [Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton] Collins and [Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt] Vandenberg fly to Tokyo to confer with MacArthur.

A few days earlier I had approved a proposal prepared jointly by the Departments of State and Defense to introduce in the United Nations a resolution creating a unified command in Korea, asking us to name a commander and authorizing the use of the blue United Nations flag in Korea. This resolution was approved by the Security Council on July 7, and on the following day I named MacArthur to the post of United Nations commander.

On July 12, Lieutenant General Walton Walker arrived in Korea and established headquarters there for his Eighth Army and took over the command of United Nations forces in Korea. Meanwhile, our forces were still fighting a rearguard action and were withdrawing steadily and doggedly toward the beachhead city of Pusan. The American press made dramatic news out of this retreat. News stories spoke of entire units being wiped out and exaggerated the rout and confusion. Truth was that a small band of heroic youngsters led by a few remarkable generals was holding off a landslide so that the strength for the counterpunch could be mustered behind their thin curtain of resistance. The fact is that there was more panic among the civilians at home than among the soldiers in Korea.

By this time, however, MacArthur had already conceived the basic plan for the counterattack. On July 7 he had advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that his basic operating plan would be to stop the enemy armies; to exploit fully the control of the sea and of the air; and, by amphibious maneuvers, to strike behind the mass of the enemy ground forces. These major plans were the topics which General Collins and General Vandenberg discussed with MacArthur during their visit with him. They had also discussed the problem of meeting the needs of the Far East Command within the overall requirements of national policy and the use of Allied troop elements in Korea. MacArthur agreed to the use of Allied troops within his command, even though he realized that an amalgamation of nationalities would make his job more difficult. . . . As for the plans for the counterattack, it seemed that General Collins had serious misgivings about it. The MacArthur plan was for two divisions to land by sea near Inchon, in the vicinity of Seoul, and for one regimental combat team to be airdropped in the same area. At the same time, the forces in the Pusan beachhead would break out toward the north. It was a bold plan worthy of a master strategist.

To make this plan possible required, however, a considerable stepping up of the rebuilding of the armed forces, and almost every time MacArthur communicated with us he asked for increased numbers of troops. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would scrutinize these recommendations and then submit their proposals to the secretary of defense. Of course, I was not asked to decide on each and every troop movement decision. Nevertheless, basic decisions which the law placed in my responsibility were often necessary. Thus, on July 31, I approved a recommendation that four National Guard divisions be called into active federal service. Earlier, on July 19, I had asked Congress to remove the limitations on the size of the armed forces and had urged legislation to authorize the establishment of priorities and allocations of materials to prevent hoarding and requisitioning of necessary supplies. I then stated that it would be necessary to raise taxes and to restrict consumer credit, and that an additional \$10 billion for defense would be needed. . . .

Truman decided that the United States would provide extensive military aid to the Republic of China on Formosa and take other measures to defend it, and he sent Averell Harriman to Tokyo to talk over the situation in East Asia with MacArthur. Harriman had three lengthy discussions with MacArthur on August 6 and 7, 1950. He reported on these meetings to President Truman:

. . . Our first talk on Sunday morning covered the military situation as . . . [MacArthur] saw it.

I explained to him that the President had asked me to tell him that he wanted to know what MacArthur wanted, and was prepared to support him as fully as possible. I asked MacArthur whether he had any doubts about the wisdom of the Korean decision. He replied, "absolutely none." The President's statement was magnificent. It was an historic decision which would save the world from communist domination, and would be so recorded in history. The commitment of our ground forces was essential, and victory must be attained rapidly.

MacArthur described his firm conviction that the North Korean forces must be destroyed as early as possible and could not wait for a slow buildup. He emphasized the political and military dangers of such a course; the discouragement that would come among the United Nations including the United States; the effect on Oriental peoples as well as on the Chinese Communists and the Russians. He feared that Russia and the Chinese Communists would be able to greatly strengthen the North Korean forces and that time was of the essence, or grave difficulties, if not disaster, were ahead. . . .

He did not believe that the Russians had any present intention of intervening directly, or becoming involved in a general war. He believed the same was

true of the Chinese Communists. The Russians had organized and equipped the North Koreans, and had supplied some of the trained personnel from racial Koreans of the Soviet Union who had fought in the Red Army forces. The Chinese Communists had cooperated in the transfer of soldiers who had fought with the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria. These had not come over as units, but had been released in Manchuria, and reorganized into North Korean forces after they had been transported to North Korea. Their leadership was vigorous. A number of Russian officers were acting as observers but undoubtedly giving direction. Their tactics had been skillful, and they were as capable and tough as any army in his military experience.

He described the difference between the attitude towards death of Westerners and Orientals. We hate to die; only face danger out of a sense of duty and through moral issues; whereas with Orientals, life begins with death. They die quietly, "folding their arms as a dove folding his wings, relaxing, and dying." . . .

MacArthur explained the need to send as many United States and allied United Nations troops to Korea as soon as possible. He said he believed that a United Nations victory in Korea would be quickly followed by a political victory—that the North Koreans would vote in United Nations supervised elections for non-communists if they felt sure no outside communist power would intervene.

Harriman told MacArthur that Truman did not want him to permit Chiang Kai-shek to start a war with the Communist Chinese government on the mainland; this might cause the Korean conflict to widen into a new world war. MacArthur said he would do as the president ordered. Harriman was concerned, though, that MacArthur did not fully agree with Truman's position, and that he believed the United States should support anyone who would fight communism. Harriman explained to MacArthur that the American position was that Formosa should not fall to the communists, but that Chiang wanted to endanger Formosa by using it to pursue his ambition of conquering the mainland. Chiang was a liability to the United States who could cause its allies to leave the United Nations coalition which was fighting in Korea.

Harriman remained concerned that MacArthur did not agree with Truman's policy toward China:

In all, I cannot say that he recognizes fully the difficulties, both within the world and within the East, of whatever moves we make within China in our position with the Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] in Formosa. He believes that our policies undermine the Generalissimo. He has confidence that he can get the Generalissimo to do whatever he is asked to undertake; is prepared to deal with the political problems, but will conscientiously deal only with the military side, unless he is given further orders from the President. . . .

MacArthur told Harriman he believed Communist China would not try to invade Formosa at the present time, and that American forces in the region could destroy any invasion force the Communists could put together. They were building airfields on the mainland across from Formosa, though, and MacArthur suggested that Truman should state that the United States might attack the airfields if the Communists continued building up their capacity to attack Formosa. Harriman responded that if MacArthur made such a recommendation, he would oppose it. The unity of United Nations forces was paramount, he reminded MacArthur, and bombing the mainland might create divisions among them.

MacArthur praised the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and said the United States should increase both military and economic aid to Asia. "We should fight the communists every place—fight them like hell!" MacArthur said to Harriman as their meeting ended.

I had asked Harriman to visit MacArthur so that the general might be given a firsthand account of the political planning in Washington. There had been several of our top military leaders who had visited Tokyo and had discussed the strategy of the Far Eastern situation with MacArthur, but Harriman . . . was particularly qualified to pass to MacArthur the views I held with regard to our over-all foreign policy.

MacArthur's visit to Formosa on July 31 had raised much speculation in the world press. Chiang Kai-shek's aides let it be known that MacArthur was in fullest agreement with their chief on the course of action to be taken. The implication was—and quite a few of our newspapers said so—that MacArthur rejected my policy of neutralizing Formosa and that he favored a more aggressive method. After Harriman explained the administration's policy to . . . [him], he had said that he would accept it as a good soldier. I was reassured. I told the press that MacArthur and I saw eye to eye on Formosa policy.

To make doubly sure, on August 14 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed MacArthur, with my approval, that the intent of the directive to him to defend Formosa was to limit United States action there to such support operations as would be practicable without committing any forces to the island itself. No commitments were to be made to . . . [Chiang Kai-shek's government] for the basing of fighter squadrons on Formosa, and no United States forces of any kind were to be based ashore on Formosa except with the specific approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I assumed that this would be the last of it and that MacArthur would accept the Formosa policy laid down by his commander in chief. But I was

mistaken. Before the month ended—on August 26—the White House press room brought me a copy of a statement which MacArthur had sent to the commander in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. This document was not to be read until August 28, but MacArthur's public relations office in Tokyo had handed it to the papers several days in advance, and when I first heard about it, on the morning of August 26, a weekly magazine was already in the mails with the full text. The substance of the long message was that, "in view of misconceptions being voiced concerning the relationship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Pacific," MacArthur thought it desirable to put forth his own views on the subject. He argued that the oriental psychology required "aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership," and "nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia." In other words, he called for a military policy of aggression, based on Formosa's position. The whole tenor of the message was critical of the very policy which he had so recently told Harriman he would support. There was no doubt in my mind that the world would read it that way and that it must have been intended that way.

It was my opinion that this statement could only serve to confuse the world as to just what our Formosa policy was, for it was at odds with my announcement of June 27, and it also contradicted what I had told the Congress. Furthermore, our policy had been reaffirmed only the day before in a letter which, on my instructions, Ambassador Austin had addressed to the secretary-general of the United Nations. . . .

The subject of Formosa had been placed before the Security Council by the Russian delegation, which charged us with acts of aggression in our aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and I had approved a State Department proposal that we counter this charge with a declaration that we were entirely willing to have the United Nations investigate the Formosa situation. Mr. Malik, the Russian delegate, was trying to persuade the Security Council that our action in placing the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Strait amounted to the incorporation of Formosa within the American orbit. Austin's letter to Trygve Lie had made it plain that we had only one intention: to reduce the area of conflict in the Far East. MacArthur's message—which the world might mistake as an expression of American policy—contradicted this.

Of course, I would never deny MacArthur or anyone else the right to differ with me in opinions. The official position of the United States, however,

is defined by decisions and declarations of the president. There can be only one voice in stating the position of this country in the field of foreign relations. This is of fundamental constitutional significance. . . .

I realized that the damage had been done and that the MacArthur message was in the hands of the press. I gave serious thought to relieving him as our military field commander in the Far East and replacing him with General Bradley. I could keep MacArthur in command of the Japanese occupation, taking Korea and Formosa out of his hands. But after weighing it carefully I decided against such a step. It would have been difficult to avoid the appearance of a demotion, and I had no desire to hurt MacArthur personally. My only concern was to let the world know that his statement was not official policy.

I had a meeting scheduled for that Saturday morning, August 26, with Dean Acheson, Louis Johnson, John Snyder, Averell Harriman, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I read this group the MacArthur statement and asked each of them if he had had any advance knowledge of it. It was a surprise and a shock to all. I then instructed Secretary Johnson to send a personal message to MacArthur telling him that I wanted him to withdraw the statement. This, I knew, would not prevent its distribution, but it would make clear that it had no official standing and that it had been taken back by the man who had written it.

On August 26, 1950, Secretary [of Defense] Johnson sent the following message to MacArthur: "The President of the United States directs that you withdraw your message for National Encampment of Veterans of Foreign Wars, because various features with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations." General MacArthur complied with this directive at once. . . .

Truman supplemented Johnson's message by sending MacArthur a seven-point statement regarding Formosan policy which Warren Austin, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, had sent to Secretary-General Trygve Lie on August 25. This statement of United States policy toward Formosa, Truman believed, would make it clear to MacArthur why his letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars had to be withdrawn. United States action with respect to Formosa following North Korea's invasion of South Korea, Austin explained to Lie, was an impartial neutralizing action designed to keep the peace in the region, and was expressly stated by the United States to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of Formosa.

By early August [1950] our forces . . . [in Korea] had been built up to a ground strength of 65,000 men, sufficient to hold the Pusan beachhead and enough to give encouragement to offensive planning, and on August 10 the secretary of defense informed me that it was planned to send nearly two more divisions to Korea before September 25. Naval and air forces had been similarly increased and further buildups were in preparation. . . .

The decision to take the offensive in Korea made it necessary to consider on a high policy level what our subsequent course of action should be. This was done in National Security Council discussions which finally resulted in a policy statement that I approved on September 11, 1950. The National Security Council recommended that our course of action would be influenced by three factors: action by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, consultation with friendly members of the United Nations, and the risk of general war. MacArthur was to conduct the necessary military operations either to force the North Koreans behind the 38th parallel or to destroy their forces. If there was no indication or threat of entry of Soviet or Chinese Communist elements in force, the National Security Council recommended that MacArthur was to extend his operations north of the parallel and to make plans for the occupation of North Korea. However, no ground operations were to take place north of the 38th parallel in the event of Soviet or Chinese Communist entry.

A Joint Chiefs' directive based on this recommendation, which I approved, was sent to MacArthur on September 15.

September 15 was D-Day at Inchon. The 1st Marine Division and the Army's 7th Infantry Division went ashore there and established a bridge-head. Then these two units, comprising the X Corps commanded by Major General Almond, moved toward Seoul in order to free the Korean capital of the enemy. Resistance was fanatical, but on September 28 the liberation of the city was complete, and on September 29 Syngman Rhee moved his government back. Earlier, on September 26, a juncture had been effected between elements of the 1st Cavalry Division of the Eighth Army, which had broken out of the Pusan perimeter, and 7th Infantry Division troops from the Inchon area. The enemy was disorganized and badly shaken.

I sent a message of congratulations to General MacArthur:

I know that I speak for the entire American people when I send you my warmest congratulations on the victory which has been achieved under your leadership in Korea. Few operations in military history can match either the delaying action where you traded space for time in which to build up your

forces, or the brilliant maneuver which has now resulted in the liberation of Seoul. . . . My thanks and the thanks of the people of all the free nations go out to your gallant forces—soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen—from the United States and the other countries fighting for freedom under the United Nations banner. I salute you all, and say to all of you from all of us at home, "Well and nobly done."

I had already given approval to new instructions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had transmitted to MacArthur on September 27, in which he was told that his military objective was "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces." In attaining this objective, he was authorized to conduct military operations north of the 38th parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation there had been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of an intended entry, and no threat by Russian or Chinese Communists to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. He was also instructed that under no circumstances were any of his forces to cross the Manchuria or USSR borders of Korea, and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces were to be used in the provinces bordering on the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border. Similarly, support of his operations north or south of the 38th parallel by air or naval action against Manchuria or against USSR territory was specifically ruled out. The directive further instructed him [of] the action he should take in the event of Soviet entry into the conflict or entry by the Chinese Communists. It read: "In the event of the open or covert employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel, you should continue the action as long as action by your forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance." In compliance with this directive, General MacArthur submitted his plan for operations north of the 38th parallel, the substance of which was an attack north along the western coastal corridor by the Eighth Army and an amphibious landing by the X Corps at Wonsan on the east coast of North Korea. The Joint Chiefs approved this plan on September 29. . . .

I was advised that on October 1 MacArthur had informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he wanted to issue a dramatic announcement on the occasion of the crossing of the 38th parallel but that the Chiefs had stopped him. They pointed out that such a statement would be unwise and instructed him to let operations proceed without calling special attention to the fact that his forces had entered North Korea.

On October 2, MacArthur reported that Republic of Korea Army units were operating north of the 38th parallel, that progress was rapid, and that

there seemed little enemy resistance. On October 3, the State Department received a number of messages which all reported . . . [that] the Chinese Communists were threatening to enter the Korean conflict. Chou En-lai, now the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist regime had called in the Indian Ambassador to Peiping . . . and had told him that if United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel China would send in troops to help the North Koreans. However, this action would not be taken if only South Koreans crossed the 38th parallel. This message was at once transmitted to MacArthur.

Similar reports had been received from Moscow, Stockholm, and New Delhi. However, the problem that arose in connection with these reports was that . . . [the Indian ambassador to Beijing] had in the past played the game of the Chinese Communists fairly regularly, so that his statement could not be taken as that of an impartial observer. It might very well be no more than a relay of communist propaganda. There was also then pending in the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations a resolution recommending that all appropriate steps be taken to insure stability throughout all of Korea. This resolution, if adopted, would be a clear authorization for the United Nations commander to operate in North Korea. The key vote on the resolution was due the following day, and it appeared quite likely that . . . [the Chinese foreign minister's] "message" was a bald attempt to blackmail the United Nations by threats of intervention in Korea.

The possibility of Chinese intervention in Korea, however, could not be discounted, and I therefore instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a directive to MacArthur to cover such an eventuality. The Joint Chiefs submitted their recommendation to me through the secretary of defense, George C. Marshall, who had succeeded Louis Johnson on September 21, and I approved the following message to MacArthur:

In light of the possible intervention of Chinese Communist forces in North Korea the following amplification of our directive [of September 25] is forwarded for your guidance:

"Hereafter in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory."

This directive was sent to MacArthur on October 9. In the meantime, however, I had reached another decision. I wanted to have a personal talk with the general. The first and the simplest reason why I wanted to meet with MacArthur was that we had never had any personal contacts at all, and I thought that he ought to know his commander in chief and that I ought to know the senior field commander in the Far East. I have always regretted that MacArthur declined the invitations that were extended to him to return to the United States, even if only for a short visit, during his years in Japan. He should have come back to familiarize himself with the situation at home. . . . Events since June had shown me that MacArthur had lost some of his contacts with the country and its people in the many years of his absence. He had been in the Orient for nearly fourteen years then, and all his thoughts were wrapped up in the East. I had made efforts through Harriman and others to let him see the world-wide picture as we saw it in Washington, but I felt that we had had little success. I thought he might adjust more easily if he heard it from me directly. The Peiping reports of threatened intervention in Korea by the Chinese Communists were another reason for my desire to confer with MacArthur. I wanted to get the benefit of his firsthand information and judgment. . . .

Truman, sympathetic to what he imagined was a reluctance on MacArthur's part to leave his troops to make a long trip to Washington, suggested they meet somewhere in the Pacific. They agreed on Wake Island, a remote atoll about 2,300 miles west of Hawaii. Truman chose to meet with MacArthur over the weekend of October 13–17, 1950, which would allow him to stop at San Francisco on the way back to Washington to give a speech on October 17 at the War Memorial Opera House, where he had spoken to the United Nations Conference just over five years earlier. He wanted, in this place where the United Nations was born, to be able to present in his speech the account of the fighting in Korea which MacArthur would give him during their meeting. He was also scheduled to address the United Nations General Assembly in New York on October 24, and he wanted to present MacArthur's assessment of the Korean situation there too.

I left Washington aboard the presidential plane *The Independence* on the afternoon of October 11 on the first leg of the trip, which took us only as far as St. Louis. After an overnight stop there the flight was resumed at 2:30 in the afternoon of the twelfth, and six hours and forty-five minutes later we landed at Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base in California. The first portion of our long flight across the ocean began shortly after midnight that night, but

I had gone aboard the plane about an hour earlier and was asleep before the take off. I woke up around 5 a.m.—or at least my watch gave that time. I discovered when I went forward to the pilots' section, however, that by local time it was only 3 a.m. I had breakfast and then went forward again and sat in the second pilot's seat as we approached the Hawaiian Islands. It was still dark, but at regular intervals the lights of ships could be seen below. These were the destroyers the Navy had stationed along my route—just in case a mishap occurred to the plane. Colonel [Francis W.] Williams, the pilot, said that visibility was exceptionally fine that morning; in any case, I had a breathtaking view of the entire chain of islands rising slowly out of the western sky, tiny little dark points in a vastness of blue that I would not have believed if I had not seen it myself. Then slowly the specks of land took shape and were distinct islands. At last the plane passed Diamond Head, circled low over Pearl Harbor, and came in for a landing at Hickam Air Force Base.

I was welcomed by an official party headed by . . . [Ingram M.] Stainback, [the territorial governor of Hawaii], Admiral [Arthur W.] Radford, commander of the Pacific fleet, and other high officials, both military and civilian. Later that morning Admiral Radford escorted me on a boat trip about Pearl Harbor. He showed me the remnants and reminders of the tragic day in 1941. . . . In the afternoon, I visited Tripler General Hospital and talked to some of the wounded who were there from Korea. Between Pearl Harbor and the hospital, I seemed to have passed from one epoch of history into another, and yet 1941 was less than ten years ago.

The *Independence* left Hickam Field a few minutes after midnight on Saturday, October 14. Again, I had retired before the plane was airborne and slept most of the way. I was asleep when we passed the international date-line, and I did not know that favorable wind conditions had gotten us ahead of schedule so that the pilot had to cut speed in order not to get to Wake Island before the prearranged arrival time.

I got up an hour before landing time, had breakfast with some of the members of my party, and at 6:30 a.m. the plane rolled to a halt on the Wake Island landing field. It was dawn. By local time it was Sunday, October 15.

MacArthur was at the ramp of the plane as I came down. His shirt was unbuttoned, and he was wearing a cap that had evidently seen a good deal of use. We greeted each other cordially, and after the photographers had finished their usual picture orgy we got into an old two door sedan and drove to the office of the airline manager on the island.

We talked for more than an hour alone. We discussed the Japanese and the Korean situations. The general assured me that the victory was won in

Korea. He also informed me that the Chinese Communists would not attack and that Japan was ready for a peace treaty.

Then he brought up the subject of his statement about Formosa to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. He said that he was sorry if he had caused any embarrassment. I told him that I considered the incident closed. He said he wanted me to understand that he was not in politics in any way—that he had allowed the politicians to make a “chump” (his word) of him in 1948 and that it would not happen again. I told him something of our plans for the strengthening of Europe, and he said he understood and that he was sure it would be possible to send one division from Korea to Europe in January 1951. He repeated that the Korean conflict was won and that there was little possibility of the Chinese Communists coming in.

The general seemed genuinely pleased at this opportunity to talk with me, and I found him a most stimulating and interesting person. Our conversation was very friendly—I might say much more so than I had expected.

A little after 7:30 a.m. we went to another small building, where other members of our parties had gathered. The others at this meeting, besides MacArthur and myself, included Admiral Radford, Ambassador Muccio, Secretary of the Army Pace, General Bradley, Philip Jessup and Dean Rusk from the State Department, [and] Averell Harriman. . . . MacArthur stated his firm belief that all resistance would end, in both North and South Korea, by Thanksgiving. This, he said, would enable him to withdraw the Eighth Army to Japan by Christmas. He would leave two divisions and the detachments of the other United Nations in Korea until elections had been held there. He thought this might be done as early as January and that it would then be possible to take all non-Korean troops out of the country.

Quite a bit of discussion followed about the aid Korea would need for rehabilitation once the conflict had been concluded, and both MacArthur and Muccio answered questions which were put to them by me and other members of my party. When Pace asked MacArthur what the Army or . . . [the Economic Cooperation Administration] could do to help him, the general said, without any hesitation, that he did not know of any commander in the history of war who had ever had more complete and adequate support than he had received from all agencies in Washington. I remember that we talked about the prisoners our forces had taken, and MacArthur said that they were the happiest Koreans in all Korea. They were well fed and clean, and though they had been captured as North Korean “communists,” they were really no different from other Koreans.

Then I gave MacArthur an opportunity to repeat to the larger group some of the things he had said to me in our private meeting. "What are the chances," I asked, "for Chinese or Soviet interference?" MacArthur's answer was really in two parts. First he talked about the Chinese. He thought, he said, that there was very little chance that they would come in. At the most they might be able to get fifty or sixty thousand men into Korea, but, since they had no air force, "if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter." Then he referred to the possibilities of Russian intervention. He referred to the Russian air strength, but he was certain that their planes and pilots were inferior to ours. He saw no way for the Russians to bring in any sizable number of ground troops before the onset of winter. This would leave the possibility of combined Chinese-Russian intervention, he observed, with Russian planes supporting Chinese ground units. This, he thought, would be no danger. "It just wouldn't work," he added, "with Chinese Communist ground and Russian air."

Most of the later discussion was given over to the subject of Japan. MacArthur expressed himself strongly in favor of a Japanese peace treaty and approved especially of the State Department draft. He also said, in reply to a question from me, that he thought a Pacific pact would be a good idea but that it would mean very little because the Asian nations had no military strength and therefore any agreement like that would be a one-way street, with the United States giving the Pacific nations a guarantee without getting much of anything in return. He thought a presidential statement would accomplish just as much as a pact in that area.

This formal conference ended at a little after 9 a.m. . . . MacArthur was anxious to return to Tokyo, and we decided, therefore, to leave Wake Island before lunch. The time differential between Wake Island and Tokyo would have thrown MacArthur's return into the night hours if we had stayed and had lunch together, as I had planned. I awarded MacArthur a fourth Oak Leaf Cluster to his Distinguished Service Medal and also made an award to Muccio. Then the general and I looked over the communiqué which Bradley and Jessup had drawn up, and MacArthur initialed it to indicate that it expressed his views.

As we returned to our planes I told MacArthur that I thought we had had a most satisfactory conference and that I hoped our next meeting would not be too long delayed. We shook hands, and he wished me "Happy landings" as I went aboard the *The Independence*. . . .

Truman's plane crossed the International Date Line again and landed in Hawaii on Saturday, October 14. Truman spent his second Sunday in as many days in Hawaii preparing for the speech he was to give in San Francisco the following Tuesday. He flew to San Francisco on Monday. In his speech, he said he went to Wake Island for the simple reason that he wanted to see and talk to MacArthur, and he acknowledged that this meeting was necessary to make it clear to the world that, as he put it, there is complete unity in the aims and conduct of our foreign policy. . . . I want Wake Island to be a symbol of our unity of purpose for world peace. He also sought in his speech to remind the American people of the broad purposes which the United States had in Korea. For the first time in history, he said, the nations who want peace have taken up arms under the banner of an international organization to put down aggression. . . . The only victory we seek is the victory of peace.

Years of Trial and Hope, 316–370

The Korean War 2—Chinese Intervention

October–December 1950

Communist China enters the fight—MacArthur falters—“we face an entirely new war”—MacArthur publicly challenges Truman—“the preservation of your forces is now the primary consideration”—nervous allies—strategic conundrums—moving closer to general war—Clement Attlee flies to Washington—evacuation is considered—“I don’t want to get out if there is any chance that we can stay”—the status of Communist China—“MacArthur was ready to risk a general war. I was not.”—declaration of national emergency

Throughout October the campaign in Korea made excellent progress. Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, was taken on October 19, and day after day MacArthur’s forces were on the march. These forces under his command had by now begun to take on a more and more international character. By mid-October there were in Korea, besides United States and Republic of Korea troops, ground units of Australia, Great Britain, and the Philippines. A Swedish hospital field unit was in action. Infantry from Thailand and Turkey were being disembarked at Korean ports, ready to join in the action. Naval assistance had come from Australia, Colombia, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway. Furthermore, Belgium, Colombia, Canada, Ethiopia, France, and Greece were preparing ground units for movement to Korea. With every passing day, the “unified command” became more and more a United Nations army. All in all, considering monetary and supply contributions, forty-two nations had by then offered their aid to the United Nations. . . .



Among the many national elements [fighting as part of United Nations Command in Korea], the Koreans themselves presented a problem. The Korean Army was green and inexperienced when the attack came. Its officers knew little of modern military techniques, and its top leaders lacked training and qualifications. General MacArthur did not have great confidence in the Korean Army at that time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had instructed MacArthur that in his advance north he should not place non-Korean elements near the Manchurian and Soviet borders. But in his order to his commanders, he provided for the drive to the north to be spearheaded by American units. After the border was reached, South Koreans were to take their places "where feasible." The Joint Chiefs, expressing concern, asked MacArthur the reasons for this change. In his answer, MacArthur said that the Republic of Korea forces were not of sufficient strength to accomplish the initial security of North Korea and that he considered it essential to use more seasoned and experienced commanders. MacArthur said he saw no conflict in his orders and the directive given him which stated: "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel." MacArthur added, "I am fully cognizant of the basic purpose and intent of your directive, and every possible precaution is being taken in the premises. The very reverse, however, would be fostered and tactical hazards might even result from other action than that which I have directed. This entire subject was covered in my conference at Wake Island."

While MacArthur's forces were moving north without too much opposition, there was considerable speculation about the likelihood of the Chinese Communists taking some action in North Korea. On October 20, the Central Intelligence Agency delivered a memorandum to me which said that they had reports that the Chinese Communists would move in far enough to safeguard the Suiho electric plant and other installations along the Yalu River which provided them with power. The State Department's reaction to this report was to suggest that MacArthur issue a statement to the United Nations that he did not intend to interfere with the operations of the Suiho and other power plants. The Joint Chiefs said that such an announcement would be undesirable from a military point of view. When the situation was placed before me, I instructed the Joint Chiefs to communicate the State Department's suggestion to MacArthur, asking if he had any objection to the issuing of such a statement. MacArthur felt, however, that he did not wish his hands tied in such a manner, and the statement was therefore not issued.

It is very doubtful that it would have made any difference anyhow. As we were later to learn, the Chinese Communists had already started their

move into North Korea, although it was not until October 31 that we gained evidence that they were in the battle area and actually fighting against the United Nations forces.

The first report came from the headquarters of the X Corps in the Wonsan sector of North Korea. Prisoners captured on October 26 and later days had been identified as Chinese and, on interrogation, proved to be members of organized Chinese units. The prisoners stated that their units had crossed the Yalu River on October 16, only one day after MacArthur had assured me on Wake Island that if any Chinese were to enter Korea they would face certain disaster but that he did not expect them to try anything that foolish. I asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to obtain an up-to-date estimate of the situation from MacArthur. This was MacArthur's answer, received on November 4:

It is impossible at this time to authoritatively appraise the actualities of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea. Various possibilities exist based upon the battle intelligence coming in from the front:

First, that the Chinese Communist Government proposes to intervene with its full potential military forces . . . ; second, that it will covertly render military assistance . . . ; third, that it is permitting and abetting a flow of more or less voluntary personnel across the border to strengthen and assist the North Korean remnants in their struggle to retain a nominal foothold in Korea; fourth, that such intervention, as exists, has been in the belief that no UN forces would be committed in the extreme northern reaches of Korea except those of South Korea. . . .

The first contingency would represent a momentous decision of the gravest international importance. While it is a distinct possibility, and many foreign experts predict such action, there are many fundamental logical reasons against it and sufficient evidence has not yet come to hand to warrant its immediate acceptance.

The last three contingencies, or a combination thereof, seem to be most likely condition at the present moment.

I recommend against hasty conclusions which might be premature and believe that a final appraisement should await a more complete accumulation of military facts.

Thus General MacArthur warned against any hasty action and specifically discounted the possibility that the intervention of the Chinese Communists was a "new war." It came as something of a shock, therefore, when within two days he began to sound the alarm.

I was in Kansas City on November 6; it was the day before election, and as usual I planned to cast my ballot in Independence. That morning I received

an urgent call from Dean Acheson. He was calling from a conference in Washington with the Under Secretary of Defense, Robert Lovett, and the matter before them was of such importance that they felt an immediate decision was necessary.

This was the situation and developments as Acheson reported to me over the telephone. Under Secretary of Defense Lovett had come to his office, Acheson said, at 10 a.m. to tell him that a message had just been received from the Air Force commander in the Far East. . . . MacArthur had ordered a bombing mission to take out the bridge across the Yalu River from Sinuiju (Korea) to Andong (Manchuria). Ninety B-29s were scheduled to take off at 1 p.m. Washington time to take part in this mission. Lovett had told Acheson that from an operational standpoint he doubted whether the results to be achieved would be important enough to outweigh the danger of bombing Andong or other points on the Manchurian side of the river.

Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed out that we had a commitment with the British not to take action which might involve attacks on the Manchurian side of the river without consultation with them. He also told Lovett that the State Department had presented MacArthur's report on Chinese Communist intervention to the United Nations and that an urgent meeting of the Security Council had been requested. At this meeting, we would try to get a resolution adopted calling on the Chinese Communists to cease their activities in Korea; this was necessary in order to maintain United Nations support for any further action to be taken. Rusk also mentioned the danger of involving the Soviets, especially in the light of the mutual assistance treaty between Moscow and Peiping.

Acheson went on to say that Lovett and he had agreed that this air action ought to be postponed until we had more facts about the situation there. Lovett then called [Secretary of Defense George] Marshall, who agreed that the attack was unwise unless there was some mass movement across the river which threatened the security of our troops. Then Lovett called the Air Force secretary, [Thomas K.] Finletter, and instructed him to tell the Joint Chiefs what Rusk had set forth and to tell them that he (Lovett) and Acheson both felt that this action should be postponed until they were able to get a decision from me. I told Acheson that I would approve this bombing mission only if there was an immediate and serious threat to the security of our troops. Acheson said that nothing had been heard from MacArthur since his last report, and that report had contained no statement of any further movements across the river but had spoken only of reserves on the Chinese side. I told Acheson that we would have to find out why MacArthur suddenly found this action necessary and told him to have Lovett issue instructions accordingly.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff carried out my instructions in a message that went out at 11:40 a.m. Washington time, only an hour and twenty minutes before the planes were to take off from their Japanese bases. In the message that was sent, MacArthur was advised that consideration was urgently being given to the Korean situation at the governmental level. He was informed that there was a commitment not to take action affecting Manchuria without consultation with the British, and that until further orders all bombing of targets within five miles of the Manchurian border should be postponed. Meanwhile, he should forward his estimate of the situation and his reasons for ordering the bombing of the Yalu River bridges.

This was MacArthur's reply:

6 November 50

Men and material in large force are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command. The actual movement across the river can be accomplished under cover of darkness and the distance between the river and our lines is so short that the forces can be deployed against our troops without being seriously subjected to air interdiction. The only way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy is the destruction of these bridges and the subjection of all installations in the north area supporting the enemy advance to the maximum of our air destruction. Every hour that this is postponed will be paid for dearly in American and other United Nations blood. The main crossing at Sinuiju was to be hit within the next few hours and the mission is actually being mounted. Under the gravest protest that I can make, I am suspending this strike and carrying out your instructions. What I had ordered is entirely within the scope of the rules of war and the resolutions and directions which I have received from the United Nations and constitutes no slightest act of belligerency against Chinese territory, in spite of the outrageous international lawlessness emanating therefrom. I cannot overemphasize the disastrous effect, both physical and psychological, that will result from the restrictions which you are imposing. I trust that the matter be immediately brought to the attention of the President as I believe your instructions may well result in a calamity of major proportion for which I cannot accept the responsibility without his personal and direct understanding of the situation. Time is so essential that I request immediate reconsideration of your decision pending which complete compliance will of course be given to your order.

General Bradley read this message to me over the phone. There were grave dangers involved in a mass bombing attack on a target so close to Manchuria and to Soviet soil. An overly eager pilot might easily bring about retaliatory moves; damaged planes might be forced to land in territory beyond our

control. But since MacArthur was on the scene and felt so strongly that this was of unusual urgency, I told Bradley to give him the "go-ahead."

This was the message sent MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs:

The situation depicted in your message (of November 6) is considerably changed from that reported in last sentence your message (of November 4) which was our last report from you. We agree that the destruction of the Yalu bridges would contribute materially to the security of the forces in your command unless this action resulted in increased Chinese Communist effort and even Soviet contribution in response to what they might well construe as an attack on Manchuria. Such a result would not only endanger your forces but would enlarge the area of conflict and U.S. involvement to a most dangerous degree.

However in view of first sentence your message (of November 6) you are authorized to go ahead with your planned bombing in Korea near the frontier including targets at Sinuiju and Korean end of Yalu bridges provided that at time of receipt of this message you still find such action essential to safety of your forces. The above does not authorize the bombing of any dams or power plants on the Yalu River.

Because of necessity for maintaining optimum position with United Nations policy and directives and because it is vital in the national interests of the U.S. to localize the fighting in Korea it is important that extreme care be taken to avoid violation Manchurian territory and airspace and to report promptly hostile action from Manchuria. . . .

On this day, November 6, General MacArthur issued a communiqué in Tokyo in which he announced that his forces were now faced by a new and fresh army backed up by large reserves and adequate supplies within easy reach of the enemy but beyond the limits of the present sphere of military action.

The Central Intelligence Agency also now supplied me with an estimate of the situation based on their sources of information. It reported that there might be as many as 200,000 Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria and that their entry into Korea might stop the United Nations advance and actually force the United Nations forces to withdraw to defensive positions farther south. The estimate concluded by pointing to one inescapable fact: With their entry into Korea, the Chinese Communists had staked not only some of their forces but also their prestige in Asia. It had to be taken into account that they knew what risks they were taking; in other words, that they were ready for general war.

MacArthur's estimate of the situation arrived in two messages on November 7. In the first of these messages MacArthur referred back to his

initial appraisal (of November 4) of the Chinese intervention and concluded that he had been confirmed in his belief that this was not a full-scale intervention by the Chinese Communists. He conceded the possibility that the intervening forces might be reinforced to "a point rendering our resumption of advance impossible and even forcing a movement in retrograde." He was planning, he said, again to assume the initiative in order to take "accurate measure . . . of enemy strength." And he went on to say: "I deem it essential to execute the bombing of the targets under discussion as the only resource left to me to prevent a potential buildup of enemy strength to a point threatening the safety of the command. This interdiction of enemy lines of advance within Korea is so plainly defensive that it is hard to conceive that it would cause an increase in the volume of local intervention or, of itself, provoke a general war. The inviolability of Manchuria and Siberia has been a cardinal obligation of this headquarters from the beginning of hostilities and all verified hostile action therefrom is promptly reported. The destruction of hydroelectric installation has never been contemplated. Complete daily situation reports will continue to be furnished you as heretofore."

The second message from MacArthur read:

7 November 50

Hostile planes are operating from bases west of the Yalu River against our forces in North Korea. These planes are appearing in increasing numbers. The distance from the Yalu to the main line of contact is so short that it is almost impossible to deal effectively with the hit and run tactics now being employed. The present restrictions imposed on my area of operation provide a complete sanctuary for hostile air immediately upon their crossing the Manchuria-North Korean border. The effect of this abnormal condition upon the morale and combat efficiency of both air and ground troops is major.

Unless corrective measures are promptly taken this factor can assume decisive proportions. Request instructions for dealing with this new and threatening development.

Every military commander and every civilian official in the government is, of course, entitled to his views. Indeed, we would have a poor government if we expected all our public servants to be of one mind and one mind alone. I valued the expression of MacArthur's opinions, and so did the Joint Chiefs. There was never any question about my high regard for MacArthur's military judgment. But as president I had to listen to more than military judgments, and my decisions had to be made on the basis of not just one

theater of operations but of a much more comprehensive picture of our nation's place in the world. We were in Korea in the name and on behalf of the United Nations. The "unified command" which I had entrusted to Douglas MacArthur was a United Nations command, and neither he nor I would have been justified if we had gone beyond the mission that the United Nations General Assembly had given us. There was no doubt in my mind that we should not allow the action in Korea to extend into a general war. All out military action against China had to be avoided, if for no other reason than because it was a gigantic booby trap. . . .

President Truman sought the counsel of his advisers. The Central Intelligence Agency warned that the Soviet Union wanted to keep the United States involved in Asia so that it could get its way in Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that the United States should negotiate a political settlement with the Chinese, preferably through the United Nations; that the missions assigned to MacArthur should be kept under review but not changed at this time; and that the United States must proceed with the understanding that the risk of global war had increased. Secretary of Defense Marshall concurred in the views of the Joint Chiefs. In a meeting of the National Security Council on November 9, 1950, Truman's defense and foreign policy advisers considered possible Chinese intentions, from modest goals that might be amenable to negotiation to drastic ones that could lead to World War III. They felt the United Nations forces should be able to hold their present position, despite being thinly spread in the eastern part of the Korean peninsula, but advised that a line further to the south would be easier to maintain. They expressed skepticism regarding MacArthur's arguments about the importance of bombing the bridges over the Yalu River. They agreed that the president's directive to MacArthur should not be changed and that he should be left free to conduct military operations as he thought best, but that he should not be permitted to bomb Manchuria.

The situation in Korea, it should be pointed out, was not the only instance of a new aggressiveness on the part of Communist China. There was evidence that the communist rebel forces in Indochina were receiving increasing aid and advice from Peiping. Also, in the last days of October, Communist China had moved against the ancient theocracy of Tibet. We were seeing a pattern in Indochina and Tibet timed to coincide with the attack in Korea as a challenge to the Western world. It was a challenge by the Communists alone, aimed at intensifying the smoldering antiforeign feeling among most Asian peoples.

Our British allies and many statesmen of Europe saw in the Chinese moves a ruse to bring to a halt American aid in the rebuilding of Europe. They knew that nothing had hurt world communism worse than the policy of the United States: aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, the decision to hold fast in Berlin, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Kremlin could never communize Europe as long as that policy was followed and the United States stood ready to back it. The first commandment of Soviet foreign policy has always been to divide the enemies of the Soviet Union, and the unity that United States leadership had created in Europe was the most important target for world communism's attack. I had no intention of allowing our attention to be diverted from the unchanging aims and designs of Soviet policy. I knew that in our age, Europe, with its millions of skilled workmen, with its factories and transportation network, is still the key to world peace. There have been . . . men in the United States, some well-meaning, some misguided, some malicious, who would have us believe that we must impose our way of life on the people of Asia even at the cost of letting Europe go. I cannot agree. . . .

. . . November 1950 saw us . . . occupied in three moves, so far as Korea was concerned. One was to reassure our allies in Europe, especially the British and the French, that we had no intention of widening the conflict or of abandoning our commitments in Europe for new entanglements in Asia. The second was in the United Nations, where we sought the maximum support for our resistance against the Chinese intervention in Korea, without, however, pushing the United Nations toward military sanctions against Peiping—which would have meant war. The third effort was directed toward ascertaining the strength and the direction and aim of the Chinese Communist effort.

MacArthur started his Eighth Army on a major attack on November 24. He announced that it was a “general offensive . . . to end the war . . .” and he told one of his commanders to tell the troops that they would be home by Christmas! Previously, on November 6 and 7, he had sounded an alarm in his messages to Washington that seemed to portend impending disaster. But now, apparently, the grave danger did not exist, since he announced victory even before the first men started marching. Yet on the same day a national intelligence summary of the Central Intelligence Agency had been made available to General MacArthur which stated that the Chinese Communists would “at a minimum” increase their operations in Korea, seek to immobilize our forces, subject them to prolonged attrition, and maintain the semblance of a North Korean state in being. It also stated that the Chinese possessed

sufficient strength to force the United Nations elements to withdraw to defensive positions. The intelligence summary proved correct. By November 28 it was clear that the Eighth Army had run up against vastly larger forces and that the X Corps, on the east coast [of the Korean peninsula], was in what the communiqué writers like to call a “fluid situation”—which is a public relation[s] man’s way of saying that he can’t figure out what’s going on!

Now, no one is blaming MacArthur, and certainly I never did, for the failure of the November offensive. He is no more to be blamed for the fact that he was outnumbered than General Eisenhower could be charged with the heavy losses of the Battle of the Bulge. But—and herein lies the difference between the Eisenhower of 1944 and the MacArthur of 1950—I do blame MacArthur for the manner in which he tried to excuse his failure. In the first place, there was no need for him to proclaim this as an “end-the-war” offensive. If he knew that the forces opposing him were not so strong that they could stop him, then certainly his earlier message to the Chiefs of Staff had been wrong. But if he had been right earlier in November, then he could hardly have expected to score an easy victory now.

Perhaps these inconsistencies were to be expected; MacArthur had many times in World War II announced victory while his troops still faced the stiffest part of the battle. But there was no excuse for the statements he began to make to certain people as soon as the offensive had failed. Within a matter of four days he found time to publicize in four different ways his view that the only reason for his troubles was the order from Washington to limit the hostilities to Korea. He talked about “extraordinary inhibitions . . . without precedent in military history” and made it quite plain that no blame whatsoever attached to him or his staff. The record shows, however, that MacArthur himself reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on November 6 and 7, that the Chinese had intervened in Korea in strength. He had himself furnished us the information that there were sizable reserves across the Yalu River. He had requested—and been given—permission to bomb the bridges across which these reserves might flow into Korea. Of course he had been denied authority to bomb bases in Manchuria and to engage in “hot pursuit” of enemy planes fleeing from Korea into Manchuria. The State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in agreement that it would be desirable to have United Nations approval for such a policy and therefore, with my approval, inquiries were made of all United Nations countries that had forces in Korea. Without exception, they indicated strong opposition. Indeed, they also stressed their wish that no non-Korean units should be placed in the area immediately adjacent to the Yalu River if our offensive should carry us that far.

There was no doubt that we had reached a point where grave decisions had to be made. If we chose to extend the war to China, we had to expect retaliation. Peiping and Moscow were allies, ideologically as well as by treaty. If we began to attack Communist China, we had to anticipate Russian intervention. Of course we wanted no war on any scale. But neither did we or the world want communist slavery. And the question now was whether we had actually reached the point where this slavery so threatened us that we had to move to the destruction of cities and the killing of women and children. I can only assume that MacArthur thought so and that those who wanted his plans carried out thought so too. It was not improbable that Communist China would have moved into full-scale war after we bombed Manchurian bases. I believed Russia would have so moved also.

Yet repeated statements by MacArthur led many people abroad to believe that our government would change its policy. We could not permit such confusion to continue. On December 5, therefore, I issued an order to all government agencies that "until further written notice from me . . . no speech, press release, or other public statement concerning foreign policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State." A second notice admonished "officials overseas, including military commanders and diplomatic representatives to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the United States."

. . . MacArthur's . . . press interviews and communiqués . . . sometimes hinted and sometimes said that if only his advice had been followed all would have been well in Korea. In the first place, of course, he was wrong. If his advice had been taken, then or later, and if we had gone ahead and bombed the Manchurian bases, we would have been openly at war with Red China and, not improbably, with [the Soviet Union]. World War III might very well have been on. In the second place, MacArthur himself had been the one who had said there was no danger of Chinese intervention. At Wake Island, he had told me categorically that he had no evidence that a massed intervention was threatening. More important still, he had told me that he could easily cope with the Chinese Communists if they actually came in. He had said that if the communists from China tried to retake Pyongyang they would be inviting slaughter. Even before he started his ill-fated offensive of November 24, he still talked as if he had the answer to all the questions. But when it turned out that it was not so, he let all the world know that he would have won except for the fact that we would not let him have his way. This

was simply not true. MacArthur had been given fullest information on the reasons for our policy. He had told . . . me at Wake Island that he understood these reasons although he did not believe in them. Of course, every second lieutenant knows best what his platoon ought to be given to do, and he always thinks that the higher-ups are just blind when they don't see his way. But MacArthur—and rightly, too—would have court-martialed any second lieutenant who gave press interviews to express his disagreement.

I should have relieved MacArthur then and there. The reason I did not was that I did not wish to have it appear as if he were being relieved because the offensive failed. I have never believed in going back on people when luck is against them, and I did not intend to do it now. Nor did I want to reprimand the general, but he had to be told that the kinds of public statements which he had been making were out of order.

This was the background for the order of December 5.

By that time, a new point of disagreement had come up between MacArthur and the defense chiefs. On November 28, MacArthur had reported that he was changing his plans from the offensive to the defensive as provided for in the directives which he had been given. In his message on this subject he made the statement that "we face an entirely new war. . . ." His message said, "The resulting situation presents an entire new picture which broadens the potentialities to world embracing consideration beyond the sphere of decision by the theatre commander. This command has done everything humanly possible within its capabilities but is now faced with conditions beyond its control and its strength."

On the following day, MacArthur submitted a recommendation that we go back and take up the offer made seven months earlier by Chiang Kai-shek of 33,000 Chinese Nationalist troops for Korea. At that time, he himself had advised against using these troops. His recommendation now was . . . in line with his view that the Korean action had become a war with Communist China. I instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after a lengthy conference in which State Department and Defense Department took part, to call MacArthur's attention to the international implication of his recommendation, and the following message was sent on November 29 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Your proposal is being considered. It involves world-wide consequences. We shall have to consider the possibility that it would disrupt the united position of the nations associated with us in the United Nations, and have us isolated. It may be wholly unacceptable to the commonwealth countries to have

their forces employed with Nationalist Chinese. It might extend hostilities to Formosa and other areas. Incidentally, our position of leadership in the Far East is being most seriously compromised in the United Nations. The utmost care will be necessary to avoid the disruption of the essential Allied lineup in that organization.

. . . The situation in Korea was the subject of many long and anxious discussions in my office. The future of our policy, not only in Asia, but in Europe as well, was at stake, and we spent a good deal more time searching for the answers to the tremendous problems before us than merely worrying over MacArthur's lack of discretion.

On November 28, when the bad news from Korea had changed from rumors of resistance into certainty of defeat, I called a special meeting of the National Security Council. My own first knowledge of the extent of damage that the Chinese were inflicting on our troops had come at 6:15 that morning, when General Bradley had telephoned me a cable report from MacArthur. Bradley and the Chiefs of Staff had been in session all the day before, examining the situation, and they felt that while it was serious they were doubtful that it was as much a catastrophe as our newspapers were leading us to believe. Bradley, however, stressed the danger that might arise if the Communists decided to use their air potential. It was our information that there were at least three hundred bombers on fields in nearby Manchuria. These bombers could hurt us badly, both by attacks on the airlift and by surprise raids on our closely jammed planes on Korean fields. Despite these facts, Bradley said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that MacArthur should be authorized to bomb airfields in Manchuria. . . .

I asked Secretary of Defense Marshall for his comments on the situation, and he reported that the civilian heads of the services, too, had been in conference all day as a result of the developments in Korea. They had talked over what new requirements this would place on the procurement and supply of both men and materiel. A second military supplemental budget estimate was ready, and it was Marshall's opinion, as he had made clear to me earlier that day, that it ought to be sent over to Congress at once. I was therefore able to inform the meeting that the budget director had already been instructed by me on this point. Marshall then talked about the diplomatic aspects of the situation, saying he thought it essential for the United States to go along with the United Nations approach to the Korean question, even if going along with the United Nations meant some difficult problems for us. He said that he felt it essential for us to keep a

unanimity of approach in the United Nations. He was emphatic on one point, on which he said the three service secretaries agreed as the most important: that we should not get ourselves involved either individually or with the United Nations in a general war with China. Marshall said he did not think it was likely that the United Nations would get us "in such a fix," but he thought we should recognize that there were some people at home who seemed to want all-out action against China. Bradley said this reflected the Joint Chiefs' thinking too. If we allowed ourselves to be pulled into a general war with China, it would be impossible to continue the buildup of forces in Europe. . . .

At this point, Vice President [Alben] Barkley broke in. [He] . . . did not often speak in these National Security Council meetings, and this was an indication of the worry and concern felt by the members of the Senate with whom he associated daily. What Barkley wanted to know was whether it was true that MacArthur had made the statement that "the boys will be home by Christmas," adding that this seemed incredible. Did MacArthur know what was going on, he asked, and how could a man in his position be guilty of such an indiscretion? [Deputy] Secretary [of Defense Robert] Lovett and Secretary [of the Army Frank] Pace explained that MacArthur had "officially" denied the statement but that there was no doubt that he had made it. Pace had heard him make a similar statement at Wake Island and so had Bradley, and Lovett said there was a stenographic transcript available. MacArthur had said that he had been "misinterpreted," and Bradley came to MacArthur's defense by saying that he thought the statement was designed for the consumption of the Chinese Communists to show them that we had no permanent designs on Korea and no intention of continuing the war. Barkley was still upset. "This is an incredible hoax," he exclaimed. I told him that, whatever we might think of the statement, we would have to be very careful not to pull the rug out from under the general. We simply could not afford to damage MacArthur's prestige. But Barkley still felt deeply perturbed. . . .

I asked Dean Acheson then to comment on the situation from his point of view. . . . [He began by saying] that the events of the last few hours had moved us very much closer to the danger of general war. There had always been evidence of some Chinese participation in Korea . . . but now we had an open, powerful, offensive attack. He said that we needed to bear in mind that the Soviet Union was behind every one of the Chinese and North Korean moves and that we had to think of all that happened in Korea as world matters. We should never lose sight of the fact that we were facing the Soviet

Union all around the world. [But] . . . if we openly accused the Soviet Union of aggression, the United Nations would be demolished. If we came out and pointed a finger at the Soviet Union, it would serve no purpose, because we could do nothing about it. To make the accusation, however, and then to do nothing about it would only weaken our world position. If we proposed action against the Kremlin, on the other hand, we might find ourselves alone, without allies. As for the Chinese Communists, Acheson went on, we ought to draw a line and not try to walk both sides of the street. There was no use denying that they were fighting us, so we had better stir up trouble for them. There were a number of ways in which that could be done besides playing with Chiang Kai-shek.

As for the conflict in Korea, Acheson was of the opinion that we should find some way to end it. If we went into Manchuria and bombed the air-fields there with any degree of success, "Russia would cheerfully get in it." We had banked our entire foreign policy on the idea of keeping Russia contained, and we had succeeded in repulsing . . . [its] attempts to break out [of its perimeter]. If we allowed the Russians now to trap us inside [that] . . . perimeter, however, we would run the risk of being sucked into a bottomless pit. There would be no end to it, and it would bleed us dry. The Russians had tried to lure us into traps time and again. This one differed only in being bigger than the earlier ones. . . .

I told the National Security Council that I had thought at first that I ought to go before Congress and address a special session but that I did not now think this would be right. Korea was a United Nations matter, and our country should not make an individual approach to it. . . .

At a press conference held on November 30, President Truman told reporters that United Nations Command faced "a serious crisis" in Korea as a result of the Chinese entrance into the conflict. He described the situation on the battlefield as uncertain and said United Nations Command might suffer reverses but would not abandon its mission in Korea. If the United Nations yields to the forces of aggression, no nation will be safe or secure, he asserted. If aggression is successful in Korea, we can expect it to spread throughout Asia and Europe to this hemisphere. We are fighting in Korea for our own national security and survival. He said his administration would continue to work within the United Nations to try to bring a halt to the aggression in Korea; would help free nations to strengthen their defenses, particularly by creating an integrated military force under a Supreme Command within NATO; and would seek funding from Congress for a substantial increase in the size and effectiveness of the United States'

armed forces. This country is the keystone of the hope of mankind for peace and justice, *he concluded.* We must show that we are guided by a common purpose and a common faith.

The next day, December 1, President Truman and his defense and foreign policy advisers met with about twenty leaders from the Senate and House of Representatives. After his advisers had briefed the congressional leaders about the military situation in Korea and the global context in which the Korean conflict was taking place, Truman read extracts from the message he intended to send to Congress to request increased military appropriations. He stressed the importance of confining the conflict to the Korean peninsula: I said that our entire effort had been bent in the direction of preventing this affair in Korea from becoming a major Asiatic war. We were not in a position to assume the burdens of a major war, but most of all, I did not wish to have any part in the killing of millions of innocents as would surely happen if the fighting was allowed to spread.

On December 3, MacArthur sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a bleak assessment of the military situation. United Nations forces were badly outnumbered and were in retreat, he said. The development of a new line of defense at the narrow waist of the Korean peninsula was not feasible, he argued, because of the numerical inferiority of United Nations forces and difficulties associated with the ruggedness of the terrain in this part of Korea, which complicated supply efforts and diminished the effectiveness of air support. Naval support was rendered ineffective because of the concentration of enemy troops far inland. With the superior air and naval power of the United Nations forces in large measure checked, the outcome of the battle depended on ground forces, and unless, MacArthur warned, ground reinforcements of the greatest magnitude are promptly supplied, this Command will be either forced into successive withdrawals with diminished powers of resistance after each such move, or will be forced to take up beachhead bastion positions which . . . would afford little hope of anything beyond defense. Unless some immediate action was taken to strengthen his command, MacArthur said, hope for success cannot be justified and steady attrition leading to final destruction can reasonably be contemplated. MacArthur concluded his message by telling the Joint Chiefs that the directives which they had sent to him are completely outmoded by events. His small force, which was capable of defeating the North Korean forces, now faces the full offensive power of the Chinese Communist nation augmented by extensive supply of Soviet materiel. Important political decisions must be made and a new strategic concept developed for his command in order to meet the new realities, MacArthur insisted, and this must be accomplished quickly. . . . Every hour sees the enemy power increase and ours decline.

President Truman felt that men should not be sacrificed while the United Nations decided what to do about the new situation in Korea. He decided it was best for MacArthur to protect his forces in beachheads for the time being, and he approved the following response to MacArthur from the Joint Chiefs:

December 3, 1950

We consider that the preservation of your forces is now the primary consideration. Consolidation of forces into beachheads is concurred in.

President Truman directed Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins to fly to MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo to find out both there and in Korea what the facts of the situation were.

The United States' allies in Korea anxiously followed the unfolding of events in Korea as Chinese forces bore down on the overpowered United Nations Command. They worried that MacArthur was becoming reckless in the actions he had taken and was contemplating taking against targets near and even within Chinese territory. The British and other Europeans especially worried that if the Korean conflict triggered a new world war, they would be quickly drawn in and their cities hit by atomic weapons.

On December 4, 1950, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee arrived in Washington to meet with President Truman. His sudden trip was brought about by something Truman said at a press conference on November 30.

. . . At that conference I made the remark that "we will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military situation, just as we always have."

"Will that include the atomic bomb?" one of the reporters asked.

"That includes every weapon that we have," I replied.

"Mr. President," the questioner shot back, "you said 'every weapon that we have.' Does that mean that there is active consideration of the use of the atomic bomb?"

"There has always been active consideration of its use," I told him. "I don't want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women and children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression. That happens when it is used."

To make quite sure that no one would misunderstand my words, I authorized Charles Ross, my press secretary, to issue a separate clarifying statement after the press conference:

The President wants to make it certain that there is no misinterpretation of his answers to questions at his press conference today about the use of the atom bomb. Naturally, there has been consideration of this subject since the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea, just as there is consideration of the use of all military weapons whenever our forces are in combat.

Consideration of the use of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that weapon.

However, it should be emphasized, that, by law, only the President can authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no such authorization has been given. If and when such authorization should be given, the military commander in the field would have charge of the tactical delivery of the weapon.

In brief, the replies to the questions at today's press conference do not represent any change in this situation.

Truman and Attlee met for an hour and a half in the late afternoon of December 4. After a brief review of the military situation in Korea, Truman asked Attlee's views regarding the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. The prestige and authority of the United Nations must be maintained, Attlee began, and the opinions and perspectives of countries and peoples all over the world ought to be considered, including those of the Chinese Communists, who were feeling pride in their military success and would insist that their strength and independence be recognized. They would probably prove difficult negotiating partners, but, Attlee said, the allies in Korea ought to discuss among themselves what their negotiating posture with China might be. This discussion would be distasteful, Attlee said, but the allies had to keep in mind, as Truman summarized his argument, that the West could not be given up, that it was still the vital point in our line against communism.

. . . I asked Secretary [of State Dean] Acheson to express our position in the matters touched on by . . . [Attlee], and . . . [he] pointed out that, first of all, it had to be remembered that the central enemy was not China but the Soviet Union. All the inspiration for the Korean action came from Moscow. No doubt there had been some arrangement between the Chinese and the Russians to make the Chinese think they had strong Russian support. While their attack was going well, there seemed little limit to what they might try to do and, if they could drive us out of Korea, they would do so. And no one could tell how much farther they might be inclined to go. Regarding the question of all-out war against China—meaning land, sea, and air action—Acheson assured . . . [Attlee] that there were “not many of the President’s advisers who would urge him to follow that course.” He added, however, that

he could not be optimistic about prospects of negotiations with the Chinese Communists. We did not have an alternative of either negotiating or becoming involved in war. We were actually involved at the moment.

Acheson analyzed the problem of negotiations. From a military point of view, he observed, there seemed to be an advantage to us from a cease-fire as soon as possible. But the fact that it would be advantageous to our side naturally meant that it would be disadvantageous to the Chinese, and therefore they would not be likely to accept it. From a political standpoint, there might be some advantage in suggesting a cease-fire as far as world opinion was concerned; but if negotiations resulted, the question would arise as to what price would be asked. It seemed predictable that the Chinese Communists would ask for recognition of their government, for a seat in the United Nations Security Council, and for concessions on Formosa. They might even insist that any Japanese peace settlement had to have their assent. We had to remember, Acheson continued, that this intervention in Korea was not a spontaneous maneuver. It had design. If we became preoccupied in Asia, Russia would gain a free hand in Europe. But if we settled with the communists—for instance, at the price of Formosa—this fact would be used against us in the most devastating manner throughout Asia. He could not believe, he said, that the Chinese action was just a burst of Chinese military fervor or that they would become calm and peaceful if we gave them Formosa and made other concessions. On the contrary, if we gave concessions, they would only become more aggressive. If we yielded to the Chinese Communists the effect on the Japanese and the Filipinos might be serious. And if we did not negotiate and did not make a settlement, we might be able to fight on in Korea, giving the Chinese as much punishment as possible, and our position would be no worse. We should, he thought, make it a policy not to recognize the enemy's gains. . . .

Attlee wondered how long the so-called "beachheads" in Korea could be held, and he worried that if the war dragged on and losses mounted the American people might demand all-out war against China. Truman replied that such demands were already being heard, but that he nonetheless hoped the United Nations could hold the line in Korea until the prospects for fruitful negotiations improved. I admitted, Truman writes, that all my military advisers had told me that there was no chance to hold the line. But that, I still wanted to try.

Then Attlee challenged the assumption that the Communist China was a Soviet satellite.

I said that in my opinion the Chinese Communists were Russian satellites. The problem we were facing was part of a pattern. After Korea, it would be Indochina, then Hong Kong, then Malaya. I said that I did not want war with China or any nation but that the situation looked very dark to me. The Chinese Communists, in my belief, had made up their minds what they wanted to get, including a United Nations seat and Formosa—or war.

Acheson remarked that it really didn't matter too much whether the Chinese Communists were satellites or not. They would probably act in much the same way, regardless of the answer to that question. But he thought it would be a mistake to count on their good will. He said there was a saying among State Department officials that with communistic regimes you could not bank good will; they balanced their books every night.

Marshall recalled the several meetings he had had with Mao Tse-tung and with Chou En-lai during his mission to China. He said that Chou on one occasion had with great emphasis told Mrs. Marshall at the dinner table that there was no doubt they were Marxist communists and that he resented people referring to them as merely agrarian reformers. Marshall said there had been not the slightest attempt to conceal their Moscow affiliations. They regarded the Russians as coreligionists, and this feeling was thoroughly indoctrinated in their troops.

I told Attlee that I relied on Marshall's judgment, especially since he had spent a year in closest contact with these people. And I also wanted to add emphasis to what Acheson had said about our desire to avoid war with China. I therefore recounted what had transpired on Wake Island between MacArthur and myself, especially pointing out that I had told MacArthur to avoid giving any provocation to the Chinese in Manchuria and the Russians in Vladivostok, and adding that we had no desire to act in this matter except as members of the United Nations. . . .

Truman read a memorandum to Attlee. He said it had been prepared by the State and Defense Departments and that he had approved it. It stated the American preference for a cease-fire with the Communist Chinese the conditions of which would not jeopardize the safety of United Nations forces or involve issues such as Formosa or the Chinese seat in the United Nations. If such a cease-fire could be agreed upon, the United Nations would work to stabilize the Republic of Korea while renewing its attempt to bring into being an independent and unified Korea by political means. If the Communist Chinese would not agree to such a cease-fire and continued to bear down on United Nations forces, the memorandum

went on, United Nations forces may have to be evacuated from Korea, but such an evacuation must be the result of military necessity.

At this point, Truman looked up from the memorandum and spoke directly to Attlee.

[I said] that it was out of the question that we should get out voluntarily. All the Koreans left behind who had been loyal to the United Nations would face death. The communists cared nothing about human life. . . .

He continued reading the memorandum to Attlee. It stated that if Communist China rejected a cease-fire and continued to fight against United Nations forces, the United Nations would declare China an aggressor and bring all possible pressure to bear on it to end its aggression. The United States and the United Kingdom would also consult together about things which could be done to strengthen non-communist Asia and persuade its governments of the necessity of acting together to resist communist aggression.

Truman and Attlee agreed on a brief statement for the press and their meeting adjourned.

Their next meeting occurred the following day, December 5, aboard the presidential yacht Williamsburg. After some discussion about the text of the resolution which was to be introduced in the United Nations General Assembly, Truman spoke about his deep concern with respect to the military situation in Korea.

I said again that I was determined that we would not back out—that if we got out, someone would have to force us out. We certainly could do no less for the South Koreans who had been loyal to us. I said that I realized that we were exposing our fleet and air arm to the danger of a surprise attack from Manchuria. “We did not get into this fight,” I said, “with the idea of getting licked. We will fight to the finish to stop this aggression. I don’t intend to take over military command of the situation in Korea—I leave that up to the generals—but I want to make it perfectly plain that we cannot desert our friends when the going gets rough.”

I got a little warm as I talked, but Clement Attlee was no less sincere when he answered: “We are in it with you. We’ll support you. We’ll stand together on those bridgeheads. How long we can hold on is a matter of opinion.”

I said again that, whatever we did, it could never be a voluntary withdrawal from Korea. “I don’t want to get out,” I insisted, “if there is any chance that we can stay.”

"You can take it from me," Attlee repeated, "that we stand with you. Our whole purpose is to stand with you."

. . . Attlee then returned to the discussion that we had had the day before, stating first what he thought we had agreed on. It seemed to him that there was agreement not to get bogged down in a major war with China and that we had ruled out bombing industrial centers in China. Then he restated the proposal Acheson had made; namely, that we should remain in Korea until forced out and not get into any negotiations. [His] . . . reaction to this proposal] was that, in the first place, it would be difficult to get United Nations action on any move that might appear directed against Peiping or likely to result in retaliations. He did not think, in the second place, that we would be able to hurt China much, while the Chinese might do us a good deal of harm. It seemed to him, he said, that we would wind up either in a shooting war or in negotiations.

. . . [He then gave] us the point of view of his government. In his opinion the Chinese Communists were potentially ripe for "Titoism." He could not consider that China was completely in the hands of the Russians, and therefore the aim ought to be to divide the Russians and the Chinese—who are natural rivals in the Far East. "I think," he said, "that all of us should try to keep the Chinese from thinking that Russia is their only friend. I want the Chinese to part company with Russia. I want them to become a counterpoise to [the Soviet Union] in the Far East. If we don't accept this theory, if we just treat the Chinese as Soviet satellites, we are playing the Russian game."

Secretary Acheson answered Attlee with a rhetorical question. What, he asked, did the American people think of as a long-range view? He said he did not see how it was possible for any administration to offer to the American people a foreign policy which, on one ocean, had a policy of isolationism, while at the same time it was advocating a very vigorous foreign policy, the opposite of isolationism, over the other ocean. We could not possibly be isolationists in the Pacific, ignoring there what the communists in China had been doing, while at the same time we were taking a strong anti-isolationist stand against the threats of the communists in Europe. Acheson then made another telling point: Our country had gone on to do something quite vigorous in the case of a minor aggression in Korea. Now we were faced with a bigger aggression, the aggression of Communist China—we had even suffered a setback at the hands of this aggressor. If we accepted this larger aggression, it could not fail to affect our entire thinking about aggression—and not only in Asia but also in Europe. It would be a very confusing thing to try

to get the American people to accept aggression in the Far East and not accept it in Europe. Acheson also . . . [said] that Chiang Kai-shek was another complicating factor, for Chiang, rightly or wrongly, had become something of a symbol.

I gave Attlee a short summary of the kind of trouble that Chiang presented for us. I pointed out that his friends, especially in the Senate, kept up a running clamor on his behalf. Yet all of Chiang's actions suggested that he was not interested in improving the conditions of the territory he controlled but rather that he hoped to get us involved on China's mainland.

. . . To this Acheson added that, entirely apart from Chiang Kai-shek, Formosa could not be allowed to fall into communist hands. If, while we were so heavily engaged in Korea, he said, we permitted Formosa to be attacked and fall, we would raise the gravest dangers in Japan and the Philippines, which were the bases from which our operations were being conducted and upon which our whole Pacific position rested. We could not buy the friendship of the Chinese Communists, Acheson insisted, and we ought not try to prove that we were more friendly to them than [were] the Russians. After what they had done to us, it seemed to him that the Chinese would have to prove that they were our friends. Our position now, Acheson went on, was that we ought to get the military power and the strength to stop this sort of thing from happening in the future. We had to have a policy that would keep going on the basis of strength.

I expressed my full agreement with the presentation Acheson had made and added that it was important to realize that the United States could do nothing abroad without solid backing at home. We could not back out of the Far East. The American people would not stand for it. It was impossible.

Attlee said he understood that our foreign policy was dependent upon keeping the American people together. But it was also essential, he added, to keep the United Nations together. Furthermore, we had to keep Asian opinion together—nothing would be more dangerous than for the Asians to split away from us. Acheson broke in. "Weakening the United States," he said, "would be definitely more dangerous." Attlee continued to argue the case for a policy that would consider the adherence of the Asian nations to the West as the primary aim. He turned to me, saying that he knew that I would have to consider public opinion about Chiang Kai-shek and Formosa but that he hoped I would also remember that whatever we did would have to be done through the United Nations, and it could not be done there by the efforts and votes of just the United States and the United Kingdom, "important as we are."

The discussion turned to the question of whether seating of the Chinese Communists at the United Nations should be included in negotiations with them.

. . . Acheson took the position that we should not even consider it. If we did, we would in effect be saying to the [Chinese] Communists that they had won the game and could now collect the stakes; it would be like offering a reward for aggression. For that reason, if for no other, Acheson preferred that there be no negotiations at all, even if the communists won and forced us out of Korea.

I asked Secretary of Defense Marshall to speak to the same point, and he said that he had very strong feelings in the matter from a military point of view. Supported by General Bradley, he stated the reasons why we could not afford to have our chain of island outposts split by a Formosa in hostile possession.

The British then advanced the idea that perhaps Chiang could be left in control on Formosa while at the same time we might recognize that China (proper) was under the Peiping regime. Marshall . . . [said] that the biggest problem connected with Chiang was the fact that there was no replacement for him—that it had long been “brutally evident” that, despite the strong opposition to Chiang, there was nobody who could succeed him.

The meeting adjourned at 4:50 p.m. . . .

Truman and Attlee met twice on December 6. In their morning meeting, they discussed the British need for commodities to strengthen their defense program. They agreed that their staffs would discuss this matter and Truman expressed the hope that an agreement could be reached before his and Attlee's talks in Washington ended. Their afternoon meeting was devoted to Europe, and especially the need for the NATO member countries to agree on arrangements to integrate their military forces.

Their December 7 meeting again focused on East Asia.

Attlee pointed out that it had been agreed that we would try to avoid a general war with China but that we would hold on in Korea as long as we could. He was of the opinion that this would still force us to come to a Far Eastern settlement sooner or later, and he wanted to develop his thoughts on that subject. First, his government thought that China (meaning Communist China) ought to be seated in the United Nations. He admitted that this was one point on which his people differed from us. But he thought that somewhere, somehow, we would find ourselves dealing with the Chinese

Communists. The British, he said, had found out that it did not pay to pretend that the "nasty fellow" on the other side was not there. He also had doubts about a limited war in Korea. He said he saw the reason behind it and certainly considered it, rationally, the thing to do. But he foresaw trouble because, he believed, we would find people clamoring for total victory—and that meant unlimited war.

"I think," Attlee said, "if China were in the United Nations, there would be a possibility of discussion. That, I know, is distasteful to you. But I think if there is to be a settlement, it is better to have it come through the United Nations. I'm inclined to think myself that if the present Chinese government were in the United Nations, we would get less loss of face than if we were dealing with someone outside." Once the Chinese Communists were in the United Nations, Attlee concluded, it would be possible to use the arguments of the principles of the United Nations in dealing with them. It was not possible to do this so long as they stayed outside.

Acheson answered Attlee's argument on the matter of limited action. He admitted that there was not very much that we could do to Communist China unless we wished to engage in all-out war. But . . . our attitude toward Communist China would mean a lot in the Far East. It would help us to build up Japan and the Philippines and other Asian states. Our policy in the Far East should be controlled, he thought, not by formal logic but by the results of our acts. He noted that we were under Soviet pressure in many parts of the world. All around the globe the Kremlin seemed to be stepping up its campaign against America. We would have to answer our Far East question in the light of the one overriding consideration, "How near is war?" If we assumed that the communists were indeed moving with great speed toward war, then it would be a grievous mistake to try to buy off the aggressor just before he broke loose. It would only weaken us. It might tempt the aggressor more. "My own guess is that it wouldn't work," Acheson continued. "All we might get would be time, but never enough time to do any good. Just enough time to divide our people bitterly. Just enough time to lose our moral strength."

Attlee seemed a little taken aback. Acheson, he said, was assuming that negotiations would mean retreat all along the line. He was assuming that Formosa would go communist, but perhaps it would not. Perhaps we could limit our negotiations to the question of keeping the communists on the 38th parallel in Korea.

Acheson replied that his point was that we should not get into negotiations until we knew where we were going. If we had a cease-fire now,

we would be negotiating from weakness. If we could hold on and perhaps improve our position, we could approach a cease-fire quite differently. Of course if we got thrown out of Korea there would be no negotiations, but we would have made our point.

I added that we would face terrible divisions among our people here at home if the Chinese Communists were admitted to the United Nations, and I could not see what we could gain that would offset this loss in public morale. If we admitted the Chinese Reds to the United Nations, would they be any different from the Russians? I said I expected them to behave just like the other satellites. I talked, as strongly as I knew how, about the language the Chinese Reds were using about us at . . . [the United Nations] and the falsehoods they were spreading. I said their handling of our missionaries and of our consuls was a blot on humanity. There was nothing in getting them admitted to the United Nations until they changed their ways. . . .

One of Attlee's advisers said that the sentiment in the United Nations was for a negotiated settlement, and that he thought perhaps the United States and the United Kingdom ought to let the United Nations find a way to a settlement. One of Truman's advisers added that the United States had clearly demonstrated its peaceful intentions and willingness to talk and should not have to agree to seat the Chinese Communists in the United Nations to get a settlement.

Marshall said he knew that we were all agreed on staying out of a general war with China. We were agreed on that, he said, primarily because we were faced with the threat of a global war. Since that threat was real, and since we knew that we were dealing with people with whom it was almost impossible to negotiate, it would be very dangerous to go into negotiations at a time and in a way that would only reveal our weakness. We could not afford to let Formosa go, Marshall said. It was of no particular strategic importance in our hands, but it would be of disastrous importance if it were held by an enemy. He said he had no immediate answer to the problem except to maintain our position and use the time to gather strength on all fronts. . . .

Truman reflected that during World War II the United States had wanted to help China become a regional power which was friendly to the United States and the United Kingdom and, following the war, a constructive member of the United Nations. But instead of this, China was now unfriendly, even viciously hostile, to the United States.

Our position in Korea, I went on, had been brought about by my decision to give the fullest support to the United Nations resolution against aggression, and I was glad that the British were with us. The purpose of our action was to protect a little country from the result of aggression, and we had been on the verge of succeeding when a "viciously hostile" country intervened. "We can't open our whole flank now by giving up Formosa to that country," I said. "We just can't agree with that. I think in the long run the Chinese will realize that their real friends are not in Moscow and Siberia; they are in London and in Washington."

"You won't bring them to that realization," Attlee said without smiling, "if you keep fighting them."

"No," I said, "but I won't back out of Korea. . . ."

"I am with you there," said Attlee.

There was a pause. We had made our points and knew where we differed. . . .

Truman, Attlee and their staffs agreed that the two basic points on which their two sides agreed were an avoidance of general war and a determination to remain in Korea. Truman and Attlee agreed to adjourn their meeting until 11 a.m. the following morning, at which time they would review some of their expert staff findings and agree on a communique which could be issued to the press.

That evening, over dinner at the British Embassy, Truman and Attlee comiserated with one another about the opposition they faced from within their own governments. Truman especially complained about some Republican senators "who saw nothing wrong in plunging headlong into an Asian war but would raise no finger for the defense of Europe; who thought a British Prime Minister was never to be trusted but . . . [Chiang Kai-shek] could do no wrong."

The Friday meeting [December 8, 1950] had been intended as just a formality to give us an opportunity to approve the communique of the conference. But in the meantime, General Collins had returned from his trip to Japan and Korea, and I asked him to come in and give his report on the battle situation to the combined British-American group. Collins gave us a detailed account with the aid of large-scale maps. He showed us, division by division and almost battalion by battalion, where the United Nations forces were. He reported that the Eighth Army commander, General [Walton] Walker, . . . was convinced that he could hold southern Korea, provided he was not required to make a defense of Seoul. Collins said that MacArthur shared this confidence and, after his own inspection, Collins did

too. General Walker was also reported to be confident that he could hold a sizable part of Korea for an indefinite time, basing his supply lines on the port of Pusan. The situation of the X Corps in the east was still serious, but Collins had no doubt that it would be possible to get practically all of it out by sea, adding that, from a military point of view, the situation in Korea was serious but no longer critical.

The meeting then proceeded to the reports of the experts and the drafting of the communiqué. This latter job was turned over to some of the diplomatic experts present, and our remarks were informal while we waited for them to return. During this interval, Attlee raised the subject of the atom bomb. He and I were sitting alone, and he asked me if my recent press conference statement had been intended to be a hint of some sort that perhaps we were giving more active thought to using the bomb. I assured him that nothing of the sort was intended and told him in detail how the statement came to be made. We agreed then to insert a short passage in the communiqué to give new emphasis to the true facts with respect to the bomb. . . .

The communiqué which Truman and Attlee issued following their meetings emphasized the unity of the United States and the United Kingdom with respect to their fundamental foreign policy objectives, which were to maintain world peace and respect for the rights and interests of all peoples, to promote strength and confidence among the freedom-loving countries of the world, to eliminate the causes of fear, want, and discontent, and to advance the democratic way of life. The two countries agreed as to the nature of the threat they faced and the defensive measures they must take to overcome that threat. Aggression, they agreed, could never be rewarded. With respect to Korea, the communiqué said, Every effort must be made to achieve the purposes of the United Nations in Korea by peaceful means and to find a solution to the Korean problem on the basis of a free and independent Korea. The communiqué stated the urgency of building up the strength of the entire free world. The United States and United Kingdom would, it said, increase their military capabilities as rapidly as possible. In addition, they would expand arms production, increase supplies of the raw materials needed for defense, and complete ongoing work to assure that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had the capability to defend free Europe. The two countries were building up the strength of the free world, the communiqué said, in the hope that the Soviet Union and China would alter their conduct in such a way that problems between them and the free world could be resolved peacefully. And lastly, to clarify something Truman said in his November 30 press conference, the communiqué said this: The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb.

The first two weeks of December 1950 were a time of crisis. The military news from Korea was bad.

It is unfortunate that some people forget so quickly. People who had for years blocked a sound military policy for our country and would have cut back on everything to satisfy a balance sheet were now the ones who shouted loudest. They wanted to know why we did not have divisions ready to rush to MacArthur's aid. There were some who wanted to pull all our troops out of Korea, turn our backs on Europe, and build up a "Fortress America." Then there were those who wanted to give up on Korea and concentrate on Europe alone, while others thought we should fight a full-scale war in China and abandon our position in Europe. There were even a few who thought we ought to provoke war on a worldwide basis right then and there, and some actually said that I had brought on a foreign policy crisis on purpose so that I might gain more power for myself. . . .

General [J. Lawton] Collins, whom I had sent to Japan and Korea for a firsthand look at the situation, had brought back a summary of the views of General MacArthur. [He reported to me that MacArthur] . . . saw three possible courses for action [in Korea]. The first of these was to continue action against the Chinese in Korea only. This would mean that our forces would remain under the same restrictions that they were under then; namely, no air attacks on bases in Manchuria, no naval blockade against the China mainland, no use of Nationalist Chinese troops, no large-scale reinforcements of the United Nations troops in Korea. In MacArthur's opinion, to take this alternative was the same as surrendering. He was certain that sooner or later, if we followed this course, we would be compelled to withdraw from Korea. The best we could hope for might be a good delaying action.

MacArthur favored [a different course of action]. This provided for a blockade by the United Nations of the coast of China and called for the bombing of the Chinese mainland. MacArthur also specified that the maximum use be made of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea, and at the same time troops of Chiang Kai-shek would be "introduced" into South China, possibly through Hong Kong. "Subsequent operations in Korea, or withdrawal therefrom," [according to this proposed plan], "should be dependent upon Chinese reactions."

There was a third possible course, according to MacArthur, and that was that the Chinese Communists would voluntarily agree to remain north of the 38th parallel. An armistice on that basis, MacArthur told Collins, should be accepted by the United Nations. In his opinion, unless the United Nations was willing to accept the second alternative as suggested by him, an

armistice under the supervision of a United Nations commission would be the most desirable solution.

MacArthur had given his views to Collins in private, and . . . [Collins in turn] observed the proper secrecy in reporting them [to me]. But enough was known of MacArthur's views among the press representations in Tokyo and enough became known through his various statements and interviews to give the American public the impression that he had offered the only sure way to victory in Korea. But a fearful difficulty lay in the fact that the course advocated by MacArthur might well mean all-out, general world war—atomic weapons and all. I have never been able to make myself believe that MacArthur . . . did not realize that the "introduction of Chinese Nationalist forces into South China" would be an act of war; or that he, who had had a front row seat at world events for thirty-five years, did not realize that the Chinese people would react to the bombing of their cities in exactly the same manner as the people of the United States reacted to the bombing of Pearl Harbor; or that, with his knowledge of the East, he could have overlooked the fact that after he had bombed the cities of China there would still be vast flows of materials from Russia so that, if he wanted to be consistent, his next step would have to be the bombardment of Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian Railroad! But because I was sure that MacArthur could not possibly have overlooked these considerations, I was left with just one simple conclusion: General MacArthur was ready to risk general war. I was not.

I was disturbed to find MacArthur's views and mine so far apart. But it was always proper and appropriate for him to advance his opinion to his commander in chief. If he had gone no farther than that, I would never have felt compelled to relieve him. . . .

Truman believed that MacArthur had been too dependent for too long on a small circle of ardent admirers to permit him to understand the world accurately. No wonder . . . [MacArthur] believed that America was willing to plunge into an Asiatic war! Truman wrote, He had lost contact with his own people.

On December 11, Truman met with the National Security Council to consider some of the issues regarding the Korean War which pressed upon him, including apparent world sentiment in favor of cease-fire negotiations, the military mobilization program which was getting under way, and the closely linked intention of issuing a proclamation of national emergency. Truman and his advisers talked through a number of concerns that the prospect of cease-fire negotiations raised, and this conversation merged into discussion of the need to strengthen the military capacity of the United States and its NATO allies, and this in turn led to

speculation regarding the reaction of the Soviet Union to the Western buildup, and the importance of not rushing into measures in East Asia that would evoke an extreme Soviet response which might scare away the United States' European allies. At the end of the meeting, Truman announced that in two days he would hold a meeting with the congressional leaders to describe to them the need for a program of military mobilization and inform them that he would declare a national emergency and then make a nationally broadcast speech to the American people, explaining the Korean situation and asking their support for the administration's mobilization program.

On December 13, Truman and several of his foreign policy and defense advisers met in the Oval Office with a bipartisan group of congressional leaders including the senior members of the foreign affairs, defense, and appropriations related committees—nineteen senators and members of Congress in all. After saying that it had become necessary to increase and mobilize the country's military strength, and that he was considering issuing a proclamation of national emergency, Truman led his advisers in a stern presentation of intelligence findings regarding the Soviet Union's goals with respect to the Korean situation. It wanted United Nations forces out of Korea and the United States Seventh Fleet out of Formosan waters; it wanted Communist China to be the dominant power in East Asia, and wanted it seated in the United Nations; it wanted to reduce and eventually eliminate Western influence in Japan; and it wanted to stop West German rearmament. It was possible too that the situation in Korea would encourage the Soviet Union to move against vulnerable points in Europe and Asia. It had been since the Korean invasion began in June, Truman said, engaged in an all-out attack on the leadership of the United States in full knowledge that this policy might bring on general war. The United States must respond to this threat by building up its own military strength and that of its allies, Truman and his advisers argued, and it must deal with the economic restraints resulting from mobilization. Truman said that a declaration of national emergency would help give him the authority he needed to achieve these ends. Truman added a few words of assurance toward the end of this premonitory briefing. Recalling the extremely dangerous world situation that had been brought about by the intervention of the Chinese in Korea, I assured them that we could meet this great danger, but quick and determined action was essential. Following the briefing, the members of Congress asked questions. Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn suggested to Truman that every member present give his views regarding the issuing of a proclamation of national emergency. Despite a few strongly stated dissents, the congressional leaders were for the most part supportive of Truman's wish to declare a national emergency.

The next day, Truman met with the National Security Council again, this time to discuss the political, military, and economic implications of the mobilization program he was proposing. He and his advisers agreed that the pace of mobilization should be increased in a measured way—the goals that had been set for 1954 should be reached in 1952, creating a base force level which could be rapidly expanded in case of emergency. The right kind of mobilization, Truman said, was one that would get our machinery, military and industrial, in such condition that the maximum expansion could set in on the shortest possible notice.

Truman addressed the nation by radio and television broadcast at 10:30 p.m. on December 15. I am talking to you tonight about what our country is up against, and what we are going to do about it, he began. Our homes, our Nation, all the things we believe in, are in great danger. This danger has been created by the Soviet Union. In June, Truman said, North Korea had invaded South Korea, and in November the Chinese Communists had entered the battle against United Nations forces. By this act they have shown that they are now willing to push the world to the brink of a general war to get what they want. This is the real meaning of the events that have been taking place in Korea. The United States, he said, would uphold the principles of freedom and justice for which the United Nations stood. It would as well build up its armed forces and help its allies build up theirs, and the economy would undergo expansion and defense related production would increase. He ended by announcing that he would issue a proclamation the next day declaring that a national emergency exists.

The White House mail that came in during the next several days was overwhelmingly positive regarding Truman's speech. But some senators used the occasion to demand that Truman prove his desire to promote the national interest by firing Dean Acheson. This angered Truman, and he issued a statement that said, How our position in the world would be improved by the retirement of Dean Acheson from public life is beyond me. Acheson, Truman said, had been instrumental in shaping and carrying out the United States policy of resistance to communism. If communism were to prevail in the world today—as it shall not prevail—Dean Acheson would be one of the first, if not the first, to be shot by the enemies of liberty and Christianity. . . . Truman did not fire his secretary of state.

The Korean War 3—MacArthur is Removed from His Commands; Stalemate and Negotiations

1950–1953

Concerns about Japan—MacArthur's pessimism—the tide of battle turns—MacArthur disobeys Truman's orders—another MacArthur bombshell—"the time had come to draw the line"—MacArthur's return to the United States—the Chinese offensive is thrown back—cease-fire negotiations—the Communists stall and delay—prisoner of war problems—stalemate—"the toughest decision I had to make as president"

While public attention was concentrated on Korea, our military and intelligence experts were more and more concerned about the possibility that Russia might strike against Japan while that country was without military protection. Our needs in Korea had left the American occupation authorities without any combat troops in Japan, and though MacArthur had begun to encourage the Japanese to build up a national police force that might be able to put up at least a passing defense, it would take time for this to be accomplished. Accordingly, on December 19, MacArthur asked the Joint Chiefs for reinforcements for Japan.



The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Marshall held a series of meetings with State Department officials, trying to find some way to meet the problem. Reinforcements were simply not available. We could not send the 82nd Airborne Division. It was the only troop unit in the United States ready to go, and we had to keep a minimum reserve at home. The National Guard divisions would not be ready for shipment overseas before March.

The military chiefs thought that we might consider ways to withdraw from Korea "with honor" in order to protect Japan. The State Department took the position, however, that we could not retreat from Korea unless we were forced out. Anything less would be an abandonment of the principle that caused us to go in in the first place. . . .

By this time, the situation in Korea had begun to improve. The evacuation of the X Corps from the Hungnam area had been successfully completed, and the elements of that corps had joined and been placed under the command of the Eighth Army, which, following the death of General [Walton] Walker in a jeep accident, had been given a new commander in the person of Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway.

MacArthur repeatedly advised the Joint Chiefs that in his opinion the war should be expanded by attacks on airfields in Manchuria, by a blockade of the China coast, and by the utilization of . . . [Chiang Kai-shek's troops]. In a message on December 29, for instance, after restating his views, he said that he knew that this course of action had been rejected because of fears that it might provoke China into all-out war with us. In his opinion, however, this was not pertinent, for he thought that nothing could aggravate the situation vis-à-vis China. What the Russians might do, nobody could tell. . . . It was also his opinion that if we did not intend to expand the war the only other choice would be to contract our position in Korea gradually until we were reduced to the Pusan beachhead and then evacuate, despite the fact that this would have a poor effect on Asian morale. This withdrawal movement, it should be pointed out, appeared already to be forced upon us when the communists staged a major attack on the Eighth Army on January 1, forcing us to abandon the city of Seoul.

On January 9, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed MacArthur, with my approval, that the retaliatory measures which he had suggested were being given consideration in Washington. He was further assured that I appreciated fully the extent to which Chinese Communist entry into Korea and now into South Korea had changed the situation. However, he was advised that there were other considerations which required us to maintain our present policy in Korea, and he was therefore directed to defend successive positions, inflicting as much damage on the enemy as possible. Primary consideration, however, should be given to the safety of his troops and to his basic mission of protecting Japan. If it should become evident, in his judgment, that evacuation was essential to avoid severe losses of men and materiel, then he was to withdraw to Japan.

MacArthur responded to this directive the following day with a request for clarification. He stated that his command was of insufficient strength to

hold a position in Korea and simultaneously to protect Japan against external assault. He further asserted that, if he had to continue to operate under the limitations and with the strength that he had been given, the military position of his command in Korea would eventually become untenable. He pointed out that the United Nations troops were tired as a result of a long and difficult campaign, that they were, he asserted, embittered by unwarranted criticism, and that their morale was sinking rapidly. In his opinion, unless there were overriding considerations, his command should be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula just as rapidly as was tactically feasible. On the other hand, he said, if political reasons—[he was referring to world affairs, not domestic politics]—demanded that we hold a position in Korea, then we ought to accept the military consequences, which he predicted would be heavy casualties and a grave hazard to the security of Japan.

When Marshall brought me this message from MacArthur, I was deeply disturbed. MacArthur was, in effect, reporting that the course of action decided upon by the National Security Council and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by me was not feasible. He was saying that we would be driven off the peninsula or, at the very least, suffer terrible losses. Events were to prove that he was wrong, but it was the proper procedure for him to voice his doubts and to ask for reconsideration of the Washington decision. I asked the National Security Council to meet in a special session on January 12 to discuss the MacArthur message and what should be done about it.

At this meeting, I expressed the view that it was important to keep MacArthur fully informed on political as well as military matters. We had done that all along. He had received copies of many important papers even though few, apparently, had really found their way to his desk. I would therefore send a personal message to MacArthur bringing him up to date on our foreign policy. . . .

Truman's message, dated January 13, 1951, explained to MacArthur his views as to our basic national and international purposes in continuing the resistance to aggression in Korea. These purposes were not confined to the Korean peninsula, rather their context was global and the threat posed by the Soviet Union was central to their formulation. Truman told MacArthur of the important benefits that a successful outcome in Korea would have for the United States, its allies, and the United Nations, but, he acknowledged, it might become necessary for United Nations Command to withdraw from Korea. This outcome Truman describes as the worst case, and if it comes to pass, he tells MacArthur, the world must understand that the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea was forced by military necessity and that the United States will not accept the

result politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified. Because the United States and its allies need time to build their defensive strength, and because the United States must retain the support of its allies and potential allies within the United Nations, Truman warned MacArthur, we must act with great prudence in so far as extending the area of hostilities is concerned. Steps which might in themselves be fully justified and which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea would not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or Western Europe in large-scale hostilities.

MacArthur had, as he had in previous wars, displayed splendid leadership. But I wanted him to accept, as a soldier should, the political decisions which the civil authorities of the government had determined upon.

Our forces stemmed the tide in Korea in January 1951. The enemy was stopped and in some sectors of the front pushed back. When General [J. Lawton] Collins visited the Eighth Army, he reported on January 17 that the army was in good shape and improving daily. The Chinese had apparently reached a point where their supply lines were getting too long for effective operations. Another result of the visit of Generals Collins and [Hoyt] Vandenberg to the Far East was that they were able to report that MacArthur said that unless Russia actively intervened it now appeared feasible to continue operations in Korea for as long as it was to our overall national interest to do so without seriously endangering the Eighth Army. When Collins and Vandenberg returned, they reported to me and told me of their observations in Korea and their conversations with MacArthur. I was reassured by their report, but the situation was still far from giving any feeling of relief. On January 18, intelligence reports had indicated a possible regrouping of the enemy in Korea that might mean a new offensive. The same report spoke of increasing communist attention to Japan. There were military activities in South China that could be signs of an impending attack on Hong Kong. All this could mean that Peiping was ready for major thrusts in all directions.

From the very beginning of the Korean action I had always looked at it as a Russian maneuver, as part of the Kremlin's plan to destroy the unity of the free world. NATO, the Russians knew, would succeed only if the United States took part in the defense of Europe. The easiest way to keep us from doing our share in NATO was to draw us into military conflict in Asia. We could not deny military aid to a victim of communist aggression in Asia unless we wanted other small nations to swing into the Soviet camp for fear of

aggression which, alone, they could not resist. At the same time, it served to weaken us on a global plane and that, of course, was Russia's aim.

Our policy was to maintain our position in Asia, promote the defense and unity of Europe, and prepare America. As I saw it then, and as I see it now, these three purposes depended upon each other, and one could not be attained without all three parts of our policy being vigorously pursued.

I had occasion to make my position clear when the French prime minister, René Pleven, visited Washington at the end of January. He and I had three sessions together, the first of which was devoted to Asian problems. After Pleven had given me the situation in Indochina, where the French had been fighting communist rebels since 1946, I told him that I saw no way for us to recognize the communist regime in Peiping, that I was convinced that the communists had moved on South Korea because they had come to fear the progress the Western powers had been making in the Far East. There had been very real progress in Japan. There had been good progress in the Republic of Korea. The French themselves had been making progress in Indochina. By the attack on South Korea, the Soviets were trying to offset all the gains that had been made in the Far East and, of more importance, they were trying to wreck the whole program. I assured . . . Pleven that the policy of the United States was based upon the proposition that the peace of the world, which we had fought to attain, could not be divided and that only collective security could bring about world peace. We would negotiate with the Chinese to restore peace in Korea, but not at the price of collective security and national self-respect. . . .

In March, as the tide of battle in Korea began to turn in our favor, [my advisers in the State and Defense Departments] favored a new approach to a negotiated cease-fire. The reasoning was that, in the first place, since we had been able to inflict heavy casualties on the Chinese and were pushing them back to and beyond the 38th parallel, it would now be in their interest at least as much as ours to halt the fighting, and secondly, the invaders stood substantially ejected from the territory of the Republic of Korea. . . .

Truman's advisers drafted a presidential statement announcing United Nations Commands' willingness, as the statement read, to enter into arrangements which would conclude the fighting and ensure against its resumption. After consultations with MacArthur and with representatives of the nations which had troops fighting with the United States in Korea, Truman was ready to issue the announcement. He hoped that this statement of United Nations Command's

willingness to settle, without any threats or recriminations, might get a favorable reply *from the communists.*

Unfortunately, the careful preparations were all in vain. The many hours spent to secure the approval of the other governments, the detailed discussions among diplomats and defense leaders became useless when on March 24 MacArthur released a statement that was so entirely at cross-purposes with the one I was to have delivered that it would only have confused the world if my carefully prepared statement had been made.

What MacArthur said was this:

. . . We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply, caused by our round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations. This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. . . .

Of even greater significance than our tactical successes has been the clear revelation that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated and vaunted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items necessary to the conduct of modern war. . . .

The enemy . . . must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea, through an expansion of our military operations to its coastal areas and interior bases, would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse. These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty in arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits, without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa or China's seat in the United Nations. . . .

. . . I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander-in-chief of the enemy forces in the earnest effort to find any military means whereby realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exceptions, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.

This was a most extraordinary statement for a military commander of the United Nations to issue on his own responsibility. It was an act totally disregarding all directives to abstain from any declarations on foreign policy. It was in open defiance of my orders as president and as commander in chief. This was a challenge to the authority of the president under the Constitution. It also flouted the policy of the United Nations. By this act, MacArthur

left me no choice—I could no longer tolerate his insubordination. In effect, what MacArthur was doing was to threaten the enemy with an ultimatum—intimating that the full preponderance of Allied power might be brought to bear against Red China. To be sure, he said that this would be a political decision, but considering his high office, the world would assume that he had advance knowledge that such a decision would be made. This was certainly the immediate effect among our allies. From capitals all over the world came rush inquiries: What does this mean? Is there about to be a shift in American policy?

There was more involved than the fate of a prepared statement that the president of the United States had intended to make, or even than the diplomatic furor created by this “pronunciamento,” as the Norwegian ambassador called it when he inquired at the State Department what it meant. What was much more important was that once again MacArthur had openly defied the policy of his commander in chief, the president of the United States.

I held a conference with Dean Acheson, Robert Lovett, and Dean Rusk at noon that day . . . and reviewed the order which had been sent to MacArthur on December 6, requiring that all public statements be cleared with the department concerned. I asked the others if there could be any doubt as to the meaning of this order, and they all agreed that it was a very clear directive. I instructed Lovett to have a priority message sent to MacArthur that would remind him of his duty under this order, for the main thing to do now was to prevent further statements by the general. I was aware of the fact that in an earlier statement the same month MacArthur had already issued a challenge to the policy of the president. On March 7, he had dictated a statement to reporters to the effect that unless I accepted his policy there would be “savage slaughter.” However, he had then at least admitted that it was not his to make the decision. But now, by his statement, he had in a very real sense influenced the course of policy, and further statements like this could only do untold harm.

This message was therefore sent to him [by General Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]:

March 24, 1951

From JCS Personal for MacArthur

The President has directed that your attention be called to his order as transmitted 6 December 1950. In view of the information given you 20 March 1951 any further statements by you must be coordinated as prescribed in the order of 6 December.

The President has also directed that in the event Communist military leaders request an armistice in the field, you immediately report that fact to the JCS for instructions.

Bradley

I can only say that on that day I was deeply shocked. I had never underestimated my difficulties with MacArthur, but after the Wake Island meeting I had hoped that he would respect the authority of the president. I tried to place myself in his position, however, and tried to figure out why he was challenging the traditional civilian supremacy in our government. Certainly his arguments and his proposals had always received full consideration by me and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If anything, they—and I—had leaned over backward in our respect for the man's military reputation. But all his statements since November—ever since the Chinese entry into Korea—had the earmarks of a man who performs for the galleries. It was difficult to explain this latest development unless it is assumed that it was of importance to MacArthur to prevent any appearance that the credit for ending the fighting should go elsewhere. . . .

. . . Though I gave this difficulty with MacArthur much wearisome thought, I realized that I would have no other choice myself than to relieve him. If there is one basic element in our Constitution, it is civilian control of the military. Policies are to be made by the elected political officials, not by generals or admirals. Yet time and again MacArthur had shown that he was unwilling to accept the policies of the administration. By his repeated public statements, he was not only confusing our allies as to the true course of our policies but, in fact, was also setting his policy against the president's.

I have always had, and I have to this day, the greatest respect for General MacArthur, the soldier. Nothing I could do, I knew, could change his stature as one of the outstanding military figures of our time—and I had no desire to diminish his stature. I had hoped, and I had tried to convince him, that the policy he was asked to follow was right. He had disagreed. He had been openly critical. Now, at last, his actions had frustrated a political course decided upon, in conjunction with its allies, by the government he was sworn to serve. If I allowed him to defy the civil authorities in this manner, I myself would be violating my oath to uphold and defend the Constitution.

I have always believed that civilian control of the military is one of the strongest foundations of our system of free government. . . . Our Constitution embodies . . . [this] principle . . . [and] MacArthur threatened [it]. I do not believe that he purposefully decided to challenge civilian control of the

military, but the result of his behavior was that this fundamental principle of free government was in danger.

It was my duty to act. I wrestled with the problem for several days, but my mind was made up before April 5, when the next incident occurred.

On that day Representative Joseph W. Martin, the minority leader in the House, read a letter in the House which MacArthur had addressed to him. Martin, an isolationist with a long record of opposition to forward-looking foreign policies, had written to MacArthur early in March and, among other things, had said that it was sheer folly not to use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. Then he had asked if this view paralleled the general's.

MacArthur's reply [to Congressman Martin], written on March 20, read as follows:

I am most grateful for your note of the eighth forwarding me a copy of your address of February 12. . . .

My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China's entry into war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally these views are well known and generally understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counterforce as we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose this war to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you point out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.

The second paragraph of this letter was in itself enough of a challenge to existing national policy. MacArthur had been fully informed as to the reason why the employment of Chinese Nationalist forces was ruled out. He himself, only eight months earlier, had endorsed the merit of this decision. Later, when he had changed his position and reopened the subject, he had again been advised that this was part of the over-all policy on which the President had decided. So, in praising Mr. Martin's logic and traditional attitude, he was in effect saying that my policy was without logic and violated tradition.

Now, the tradition of which he wrote—that of meeting force with maximum counterforce—is in itself not one that exists outside military textbooks.

To be sure, it is a good rule for the employment of troops, but it has no bearing on the relations between governments or between peoples. The American people have accomplished much and attained greatness not by the use of force but by industry, ingenuity, and generosity.

. . . The third paragraph of MacArthur's letter was the real "clincher." I do not know through what channels of information he learned that the communists had chosen to concentrate their efforts on Asia—and more specifically on his command. Perhaps he did not know just how much effort and how much sacrifice had been required to stem the communist tide in Iran—in Greece—at Berlin. Perhaps he did not know how strenuously the Kremlin wished to block the emergence of a united front in Western Europe. Actually, of course, my letter of January 13 had made it clear that communism was capable of attacking not only in Asia but also in Europe and that this was one reason why we could not afford to extend the conflict in Korea. But then MacArthur added a belittling comment about our diplomatic efforts and reached his climax with the pronouncement that "there is no substitute for victory."

But there is a right kind and a wrong kind of victory, just as there are wars for the right thing and wars that are wrong from every standpoint. As General Bradley later said: "To have extended the fighting to the mainland of Asia would have been the wrong war, at the wrong time and in the wrong place." The kind of victory MacArthur had in mind—victory by the bombing of Chinese cities, victory by expanding the conflict to all of China—would have been the wrong kind of victory. . . .

The time had come to draw the line. MacArthur's letter to Congressman Martin showed that the general was not only in disagreement with the policy of the government but was challenging this policy in open insubordination to his commander in chief.

I asked Acheson, Marshall, Bradley, and Harriman to meet with me on Friday morning, April 6, to discuss MacArthur's action. I put the matter squarely before them. What should be done about General MacArthur? We discussed the question for an hour. Everyone thought that the government faced a serious situation. Harriman was of the opinion that I should have fired MacArthur two years ago [when MacArthur had threatened to interfere with the implementation of administration policy regarding the Japanese occupation]. . . . Secretary of Defense Marshall advised caution, saying he wished to reflect further. He observed that if I relieved MacArthur it might be difficult to get the military appropriations through Congress. Bradley approached the question entirely from the point of view of

military discipline. As he saw it, there was a clear case of insubordination and MacArthur deserved to be relieved of command. He did wish, however, to consult with the Chiefs of Staff before making a final recommendation. Acheson said that he believed that MacArthur should be relieved, but he thought it essential to have the unanimous advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before I acted. He counseled that the most careful consideration be given to this matter since it was of the utmost seriousness. He added, "If you relieve MacArthur, you will have the biggest fight of your administration."

We then joined the Cabinet for the regularly scheduled meeting. There was comment all around the table . . . about the letter to Martin, but there was no discussion of the problem of what to do with MacArthur. After the Cabinet meeting, Acheson, Marshall, Bradley, and Harriman returned with me to my office, and we continued our discussion. I was careful not to disclose that I had already reached a decision. Before the meeting adjourned, I suggested to Marshall that he go over all the messages in the Pentagon files that had been exchanged with MacArthur in the past two years. Then I asked all four to return the following day at 9 a.m.

The next morning, Saturday, April 7, we met again in my office. This meeting was short. Marshall stated that he had read the messages and that he had now concluded that MacArthur should have been fired two years ago. I asked Bradley to make a final recommendation to me of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Monday.

On Sunday, the eighth of April, I sent for Acheson to come to Blair House, and I discussed the situation further with him. . . . I then told . . . [him] that I would be prepared to act on Monday when Bradley made his report on the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At 9 a.m. Monday morning I again met with Marshall, Bradley, Acheson, and Harriman. Bradley reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had met with him on Sunday, and it was his and their unanimous judgment that MacArthur should be relieved. Marshall reaffirmed that this was also his conclusion. Harriman restated his opinion of Friday. Acheson said he agreed entirely to the removal of MacArthur.

It was only now that I answered that I had already made up my mind that MacArthur had to go when he made his statement of March 24. I then directed Bradley to prepare the orders that would relieve MacArthur of his several commands and replace him with Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, the commanding general of the Eighth Army in Korea. I instructed him to confer with Secretary of State Acheson, since the office of Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, was also involved.

The same group reported to me at the White House at 3:15 p.m. Monday . . . with the drafted orders, which I signed. It was decided that the notification of these orders should be given to MacArthur through Secretary of the Army [Frank] Pace, who was then in Korea. We understood that he was at Eighth Army headquarters. I asked Acheson to transmit the orders to Pace through Ambassador [John J.] Muccio and that Pace was to go to Tokyo and personally hand the orders to MacArthur. But our message was delayed in reaching Pace, first because of mechanical difficulties in transmission, and second because Pace was at the front with General Ridgway. . . .

A change in plans became necessary, however, when late on the evening of April 10 Bradley came rushing over to Blair House. He had heard, he said, that the story had leaked out and that a Chicago newspaper was going to print it the next morning. That was when I decided that we could not afford the courtesy of Pace's personal delivery of the order but that the message would have to go to MacArthur in the same manner that relieving orders were sent to other officers in the service. Under these new circumstances, I felt compelled to have Joseph Short, my press secretary, call a special news conference for 1 a.m., April 11, which was as quickly as it was possible to have the orders, in their slightly changed form, reproduced. The reporters were handed a series of papers, the first being my announcement of MacArthur's relief.

[The announcement read as follows:]

With deep regret, I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.

Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, the consideration is particularly compelling.

General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The Nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case.

The second document was the actual order of relief. It notified MacArthur that he was relieved of his several commands and instructed him to turn over his authority to General Ridgway. There was a further document instructing Ridgway to assume the functions formerly held by MacArthur and informing him that Lieutenant General James Van Fleet was on his way to Korea to take Ridgway's post as Eighth Army commander. . . .

I went on the air on the evening of April 11 to restate the government's policy to the American people. I explained why we were in Korea and why we could not allow the Korean affair to become a general all-out war. I proclaimed our desire to arrive at a settlement along the lines of the statement that had been drafted in March and then not used. I explained why it had become necessary to relieve MacArthur. "The free nations," I told the radio audience, "have united their strength in an effort to prevent a third world war. That war can come if the Communist leaders want it to come. But this nation and its allies will not be responsible for its coming."

The return of MacArthur to the United States set off a wave of emotion and a great deal of oratory. I had expected this, and it did not upset me. In fact, I let it be known that I thought it only proper that the general should be invited to address the Congress and that his achievements as a great soldier should be acclaimed. I felt quite differently, however, about the hearings that followed before the combined Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations. In these so-called MacArthur hearings nothing was turned up to give much encouragement to the domestic critics of the administration policy. On the contrary, the combined committees concluded, as they had to conclude if the Constitution was to maintain its meaning, that the commander in chief was entirely within his rights if he thought it necessary to remove a military commander. . . .

In Korea, events on the battlefield were shaping up in such a way that Truman felt cease-fire negotiations might be possible.

The Chinese Communists' "spring offensive" had been thrown back late in May, and United Nations forces held a line generally near the 38th parallel. There were further advances beyond the parallel in June, including the temporary capture of the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang, but generally fighting was light. On June 1 Trygve Lie, the secretary-general of the United Nations, stated that a cease-fire "approximately along" the 38th parallel would fulfill the purpose of the United Nations; namely, to repulse the aggression against the Republic of Korea. On June 7 Secretary of

State Dean Acheson made a similar statement, which was in line with the recommendation of the National Security Council which I had approved. We had first discussed a formulation of our objectives in Asia at a meeting of the National Security Council on May 2, and the discussion was continued and concluded on May 16. Regarding Korea, we distinguished between the political aim—a unified, independent, democratic Korea—and the military aim of repelling the aggression and terminating the hostilities under an armistice agreement. With the fighting ended, the purpose would be to establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all of Korea south of a northern boundary line suitable for defense and administration and not substantially below the 38th parallel, to provide for the withdrawal of non-Korean armed forces from all of Korea, and to build up the . . . forces [of the Republic of Korea] so as to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. This policy represented no change. Throughout the Korean affair, it had always been my conviction that the United Nations would and should have to prove that aggressors would not be allowed to keep the fruits of their misdeeds. But I never allowed myself to forget that America's principal enemies were sitting in the Kremlin, or that we could not afford to squander our reawakening strength as long as that enemy was not committed in the field but only pulling the strings behind the scenes.

For these reasons, once the territory of the Republic of Korea was virtually cleared of aggressor troops, our readiness for negotiations toward an armistice received new emphasis. At last, on June 23, Jacob Malik, the Soviet representative to the United Nations Security Council, in a speech over the United Nations radio, indicated that the Russian government believed discussions should be started between the belligerents in Korea. Two days later the Peiping newspaper, *People's Daily*, said that the Chinese people endorsed Malik's peace proposals. . . .

The American ambassador in Moscow informed the State Department that he had learned from Soviet officials that Malik's speech expressed the viewpoint of the Soviet government. Truman instructed General Ridgway to send a message by radio to the commander in chief of the communist forces in Korea, inviting him to request a meeting to discuss an armistice. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Ridgway instructions regarding the conduct of negotiations with the communists. That message read as follows:

June 30, 1951—12:25 a.m.

Personal for General Ridgway from JCS

1. This message cancels our previous directives regarding armistice terms and contains instructions regarding such terms for your guidance in any conversation which might develop between you and the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces in Korea. . . .

2. General policy.

a. Our principal military interest in this armistice lies in a cessation of hostilities in Korea, an assurance against the resumption of fighting and the protection of the security of United Nations forces. . . .

b. We lack assurance either that the Soviet Union and Communist China are serious about concluding reasonable and acceptable armistice arrangements or that they are prepared to agree to an acceptable permanent settlement of the Korean problem. In considering an armistice, therefore, it is of the utmost importance to reach arrangements which would be acceptable to us over an extended period of time, even though no progress is made in reaching agreement on political and territorial questions.

c. Discussions between you and the commander of opposing forces should be severely restricted to military questions; you should specifically not enter into discussion of a final settlement in Korea or consideration of issues unrelated to Korea, such as Formosa and the Chinese seat in the United Nations; such questions must be dealt with at governmental level.

3. You are authorized to adopt, for negotiating purposes, initial positions more favorable to us than the minimum conditions set forth in these instructions. However, great care should be used, in putting forward a negotiating position, not to allow talks to break down except in case of failure to accept our minimum terms; not to appear to overreach to an extent to cause world opinion to question our good faith; and not so to engage U.S. prestige in a negotiating position as to make a retreat to our minimum terms impossible. Our minimum position is essential to us but we must recognize that it will not be easy for opponents to accept; the difficulty of your negotiation is fully appreciated here. . . .

The communist commander's reply to Ridgway's message was broadcast from Peiping on July 1. He agreed to meet for "talks concerning cessation of military activities and establishment of peace" and suggested that the meeting place be at Kaesong, near the 38th parallel. Liaison officers met for the first time on July 7, and on July 10 the first meeting of the delegations was held.

From the first meeting on, the communists proved that they were intending to stall and delay until they got things their way. In the months that followed, our negotiators . . . showed outstanding patience and perseverance at their task. As had been the case with reports from the field of battle, I daily received full accounts of the proceedings in the truce tent. No major steps were taken without [my] specific approval . . . even to the wording of

announcements made by the Far East commander or the chief negotiator at crucial points. Repeatedly I made it clear that if these truce talks failed it would have to be under conditions that would make it plain to the world that the failure was caused by the enemy, not by our side.

The negotiations were complicated by frequent declarations from Syngman Rhee that he would not accept less than a unified Korea, but substantial progress was made between November [1951] and January [1952], and before this period had passed it began to look as if agreement could be reached. Then new complications arose. Some of these were connected with such small points as what word should be used for "Korea." The most stubborn issue, however, involved the repatriation of prisoners of war.

We were most anxious, of course, to bring our prisoners back home. There had been many stories and much evidence of inhuman treatment of prisoners taken by the communists. The communists, however, refused Red Cross inspection of prison camps, although they finally furnished our side with a list of prisoners' names. Still, this accounted for only about one sixth of the number of prisoners they themselves claimed to have captured, and, in turn, they charged that the list the United Nations Command had furnished was incomplete.

On January 1, 1952, our side proposed that all prisoners of war who wished to be returned should be exchanged. It was here that the most serious wrangling began; it was here, also, that I insisted that we could not give ground. Communism is a system that has no regard for human dignity or human freedom, and no right-thinking government can give its consent to the forcible return to such a system of men or women who would rather remain free. Just as I had always insisted that we could not abandon the South Koreans who had stood by us and freedom, so I now refused to agree to any solution that provided for the return against their will of prisoners of war to communist domination. A public statement I made on May 7, 1952, expressed my thoughts in official language, but there is one sentence in it that says exactly what was in my mind in words that mean what they say: "We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery."

As far as I was concerned, this was not a point for bargaining! . . .

The communists . . . refused to make any concessions on the prisoner exchange issue. They wanted to swap all the prisoners they held for all the prisoners held by our side. I had made it very clear that I would not agree to any trade of prisoners that might result in forcibly returning non-communists to communist control. To have agreed would have been not only inhumane and tragic but dishonorable as well, for our checks in the . . . [prisoner of war]

camps showed that the vast majority of the Chinese and North Koreans taken by our side preferred not to be returned under such conditions. We proposed, however, to exchange all who wanted to be exchanged. . . .

Truman sent General Ridgway to Europe as Supreme Allied Commander in May 1952. The new commander in Korea was General Mark W. Clark. There were riots among communist prisoners of war, and in one camp the rioters kidnapped the American general in charge. South Korean president Syngman Rhee declared martial law and arrested some of his political opponents. Clark worried about the growing strength of the communist forces and recommended that Chinese Nationalist forces be included in United Nations Command. Truman's advisers rejected Clark's recommendation and decided to increase Republic of Korea forces instead. Armistice negotiations dragged on, with the communist representative filling the wasted time with long propaganda harangues. Truman's presidency was approaching its end, but still there was no armistice.

I have gone into considerable detail in giving the facts about our action in Korea, for what we and our allies did about Korea will have a profound influence on the future peace of the world. This was the toughest decision I had to make as president. What we faced in the attack on Korea was the ominous threat of a third world war.

I prayed that there might be some way other than swift military action to meet this communist aggression, for I knew the awful sacrifices in life and suffering it would take to resist it. But there was only one choice facing us and the free world—resistance or capitulation to communist imperialist military aggression. It was my belief that if this aggression in Korea went unchallenged, as the aggression in Manchuria in 1931 and in Ethiopia in 1934 had gone unchallenged, the world was certain to be plunged into another world war. This was the same kind of challenge Hitler flaunted in the face of the rest of the world when he crossed the borders of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The free world failed then to meet that challenge, and World War II was the result. This time the free nations—the United Nations—were quick to sense the new danger to world peace. The United Nations was born out of the ashes of two world wars and organized for the very purpose of preventing or dealing with aggression wherever it threatened to break out or actually occurred. That is why the United Nations responded with such spontaneity and swiftness. This was the first time in the history of the world that there was international machinery to deal with those who would resort to war as a means of imposing their will or their systems on other people.

At the very outset, we knew that the United States would have to carry the major burden. That was inevitable because of our geographic position and our strength. Our allies were still rebuilding their shattered nations and binding the slowly healing wounds of their civilian populations. Most of them, too, faced possible aggression by the communists on their own frontiers. The communist aggressors had on several earlier occasions sought to probe what we would do if they moved to conquer and expand. They learned in Iran and Greece and Turkey and in Berlin that we would not be intimidated or bluffed. But up until Korea they had confined their action to subversion, indirect aggression, intimidation, and revolution. In Korea, however, the world faced a new and bold communist challenge. Here for the first time since the end of World War II, the communists openly and defiantly embarked upon military force and invasion. The communists moved without warning and without excuse. They crossed the 38th parallel of Korea with tanks and planes in open warfare.

We could not stand idly by and allow the communist imperialists to assume that they were free to go into Korea or elsewhere. This challenge had to be met—and it was met. It had to be met without plunging the world into general war. This was done. We have learned bitterly and tragically from two calamitous world wars that any other course would lead to yet another world war.

Years of Trial and Hope, 432–464

Campaign and Transition

1952

Decision not to run again—finding a candidate—Adlai Stevenson—campaign mistakes—Eisenhower's cynical campaign—his victory—problem of an orderly turnover of government—Eisenhower accepts Truman's invitation—an afternoon of meetings—Eisenhower is tense—“we have worked out a framework for liaison and exchange of information”—had Eisenhower grasped the immense job ahead of him?

My decision not to be candidate for re-election in 1952 goes back to the day of my inauguration in 1949. On this day, facing four more years of the presidency, I kept reviewing the many grave problems that confronted the nation and the world. And I found myself thinking about my own future, and how long a man ought to stay in the presidency, and a nation's need for constant renewal of leadership. I now was certain that I would not run again. But I could not share this decision with anyone. By the very nature of his office, this is one secret a president must keep to himself to the last possible moment.



More than a year later, on April 16, 1950, I wrote out my thoughts and my intentions in a memorandum which I locked away:

I am not a candidate for nomination by the Democratic Convention.

My first election to public office took place in November, 1922. I served two years in the armed forces in World War I, ten years in the Senate, two months

and 20 days as Vice President and President of the Senate. I have been in public office well over thirty years, having been President of the United States almost two complete terms.

Washington, Jefferson, Monroe, Madison, Andrew Jackson and Woodrow Wilson, as well as Calvin Coolidge, stood by the precedent of two terms. Only Grant, Theodore Roosevelt and F.D.R. made the attempt to break that precedent. F.D.R. succeeded.

In my opinion eight years as President is enough and sometimes too much for any man to serve in that capacity.

There is a lure in power. It can get into a man's blood just as gambling and lust for money have been known to do.

This is a Republic. The greatest in the history of the world. I want this country to continue as a Republic. Cincinnatus and Washington pointed the way. When Rome forgot Cincinnatus, its downfall began. When we forget the examples of such men as Washington, Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, all of whom could have had a continuation in the office, then will we start down the road to dictatorship and ruin. I know I could be elected again and continue to break the old precedent as it was broken by F.D.R. It should not be done. . . .

Therefore, to reestablish that custom, although by a quibble I could say I've only had one term, I am not a candidate and will not accept the nomination for another term.

In March of the . . . [following] year, 1951, I took the memorandum out at the Little White House in Key West and read it to my White House staff. The reaction was to be expected. The staff responded with deep emotion and expressions of protest and disappointment. They pleaded with me not to make public any such announcement. But I had no intention of doing this until the proper time. My mind, [though], was made up irrevocably against running in 1952. . . .

Truman was concerned to find someone who was highly qualified to be the Democratic Party nominee for president in 1952. His first choice was Fred M. Vinson, the Chief Justice of the United States and also a close personal friend. Vinson had been a member of Congress for several terms in the 1920s and 1930s, and he served both President Roosevelt and President Truman in important positions. Vinson was gifted with a sense of personal and political loyalty seldom found among the top men in Washington . . . , Truman wrote. He was a devoted and undemonstrative patriot who could also consistently practice personal and party loyalty. . . . His liberalism was broad and deep. This was the man Truman most wanted to succeed him as president. When he first asked him to run, in summer 1950, Vinson declined. Truman tried again in the fall of 1951,

and Vinson gave serious thought to the request. But he again declined, citing his poor health as the reason. Truman would have to find someone else.

With the self-elimination of Vinson, the field was now wide open as far as I was concerned. My staff and the Democratic organization renewed their pressure on me to reconsider running in 1952. But my answer was the same, that my mind was made up and that we would have to look elsewhere for a standard-bearer. I began to canvass the situation from one end of the country to the other. It is a most difficult task to find men qualified by temperament, outlook, and capacity to fill any top post in our government. We knew from experience that good men in government usually will rise to their duties and responsibilities even though they may have been presumed inadequate. But in the case of the presidency there are so many considerations involved that, despite the many qualified men to choose from, there was no one who stood out at this time as the "natural" choice.

This search for the best all-around candidate led to my consideration of Adlai E. Stevenson, the governor of Illinois. On May 8, I wrote the following memorandum:

I've said that no third term appeals to me. On April 16 '50 I expressed my opinion on that.

Now if we can find a man who will take over and continue the Fair Deal, Point IV, Fair Employment, parity for farmers and a consumers protective policy, the Democratic Party can win from now on.

It seems to me now that the Governor of Illinois has the background and what it takes. Think I'll talk to him.

I liked Stevenson's political and administrative background. I admired him personally. I liked his forthright and energetic campaign for the governorship. He proved in that contest that he possessed a knowledge and "feel" for politics, that he understood that politics at its best was the business and art of government, and that he had learned that a knowledge of politics is necessary to carry out the function of our form of free government. I had an especially high regard for Stevenson's many contributions to the federal government as special assistant to many agency heads and Cabinet members. His work on the United Nations and in the State Department demonstrated that he had a clear grasp of the role of this country as the leader among nations and of our program to secure the peace. . . .

Truman met with Stevenson twice in early 1952, in early January and again in March. He made notes of the meetings:

[During our meeting in January,] I told him that I would not run for president again and that it was my opinion he was best-fitted for the place. . . .

. . . I told him what I thought the presidency is, how it has grown into the most powerful and the greatest office in the history of the world. I asked him to take it and told him that if he would agree he could be nominated. I told him that a president in the White House always controlled the national convention. Called his attention to Jackson and Van Buren and Polk. Talked about Taft in 1912, Wilson in 1920, Coolidge and Mellon in 1928, Roosevelt in 1936, 1940, 1944. But he said: No! He apparently was flabbergasted. . . .

On March 4, Stevenson came to see me again, this time at his request, to tell me that he had made a commitment to run for reelection in Illinois and that he did not think he could go back on that commitment honorably. I appreciated his viewpoint, and I honored him for it. He said he would not want to have people believe that he was announcing for re-election in his great state just as a steppingstone to the White House.

But I felt that in Stevenson I had found the man to whom I could safely turn over the responsibilities of party leadership. Here was the kind of man the Democratic Party needed and, while I would not pressure him, I felt certain that he would see it as his duty to seek the nomination.

On March 29, [1952,] at the annual Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner in the National Guard Armory in Washington, D.C., I announced that I would not run again. About 5,300 Democrats were present when I departed from my prepared speech near the end and made this statement: "I shall not be a candidate for re-election. I have served my country long, and I think efficiently and honestly. I shall not accept a renomination. I do not feel that it is my duty to spend another four years in the White House."

There was a moment of stunned silence in the hall. Then shouts of protest went up, and they were repeated when I concluded my remarks and when I left the hall. When I arrived at the White House after the announcement, I found the ushers and doormen almost in tears, and the two maids who were taking care of my mother-in-law were weeping. I told them to calm down and stay on the job. I had expected that some of my friends would be disappointed and even shocked at the suddenness of this public announcement. But I am sure they must have known that I had given this decision long and careful study and had put off making it public until I thought the proper time had come. . . . There was no chance that I would change, and at this point I was even more certain that under the circumstances it

would be better for me, the party, and for the country to have a change in leadership. . . .

With Stevenson demurring, Truman considered other candidates.

I understood well enough that historically no candidate could be certain of nomination by the party in power unless he had the support of the president in the White House. I therefore gave careful study and consideration to each of the candidates. I discussed their qualifications with members of my staff and my advisers. . . .

He considered Averell Harriman, who had proven himself able in many high offices in government; but he had never held elective office. Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee wanted the nomination, and he had gained some fame as a result of his investigation of organized crime, but Truman did not entirely approve of the way he conducted his investigation. Senator Robert S. Kerr of Oklahoma had proven himself an able and effective administrator and legislator, but he was too close to the oil and gas interests of his state, Truman felt, to run for nationwide office. Senator Richard Russell of Georgia was smart, worked hard, and had proven himself a wise and judicious public servant, but the race problems of his state made it impossible for him to get the nomination as president.

As the Democratic National Convention drew near, Stevenson was still reluctant to commit himself, and he wouldn't allow Truman to publicly support him for the nomination.

At this difficult time for Truman and the Democratic Party, Vice President Alben Barkley indicated that he would like to run, and Truman told him that, in view of Stevenson's unwillingness to accept the nomination, he would support him. Barkley might have been the nominee, but he badly mishandled an important meeting with the leaders of organized labor, with the result that he failed to gain their support and decided to withdraw as a candidate for the nomination.

Barkley made a dramatic "farewell" speech at the Democratic National Convention on July 23. The next day, Truman received a telephone call from the mercurial Adlai Stevenson.

On . . . July 24, I received a telephone call at the White house from Governor Stevenson. He said that he called to ask whether it would embarrass me if he allowed his name to be placed in nomination. I replied with a show of exasperation and some rather vigorous words and concluded by saying

to Stevenson, "I have been trying since January to get you to say that. Why would it embarrass me?" From here on, events began to move swiftly and to shape the course of the convention leading to the nomination of Stevenson. . . . By the fourth day of the convention the movement for Stevenson had crystallized into a draft of the man who so reluctantly, and at long last, had announced himself as a candidate for the presidential nomination.

On Friday afternoon, July 25, Mrs. Truman and I boarded the *Independence* and took off for Chicago. The plane commander . . . had installed a television set in my quarters. We watched the convention all the way and saw the results of the second ballot and the start of the third. The plane landed at the Chicago airport about 3:30 p.m. The mayor of Chicago . . . [and the chairman of the Democratic National Committee] met me there, and we rode to the Blackstone Hotel. I saw a number of my friends at the hotel and then got to work on my speech. It was about 1:45 a.m. when I . . . entered the convention hall. The convention had recessed about 4 p.m., and I did not appear until after it reconvened and after Stevenson's nomination. I walked the length of the platform with Stevenson and presented him to the convention with the promise: "I am going to take my coat off and do everything I can to help him win."

The convention recessed again after Stevenson had made his speech of acceptance. Meanwhile, Sam Rayburn, Stevenson, McKinney, and I retired to a small private room behind the stage in the hall and discussed possible candidates for Stevenson's running mate. I left before a decision was reached, but before leaving I suggested that Senator John Sparkman of Alabama would be the best asset to the ticket. He was nominated by acclamation on a voice vote without a ballot being taken, and the [convention] . . . was adjourned.

In his campaign for the presidency Stevenson lived up to his reputation as a man of eloquence. His eloquence was real because his words gave definition and meaning to the major issues of our time. He was particularly effective in expressing this nation's foreign policy. He made no demagogic statements. He made no extravagant promises. He was not vague with generalities but would talk to the point. While some felt he may have talked over the heads of some people, he was uncompromising in being himself. His was a great campaign and did credit to the party and the nation. He did not appeal to the weakness but to the strength of the people. He did not trade principles for votes. What he said in the South he would say in the North, and what he said in the East he would say in the West. It will be to his credit that, although given provocation by the opposition, he stayed away from personalities and accusations.

But Stevenson's attitude toward the president he hoped to succeed was a mystery to me for some time, and I believe Stevenson made several mistakes. Whether this was due to the urgings of his advisers or bad information or perhaps to the contagion other good citizens were suffering as a result of reading the anti-Democratic press, I do not know. The first mistake he made was to fire the chairman of the Democratic National Committee and to move his campaign headquarters to Springfield, Illinois, giving the impression that he was seeking to disassociate himself from the administration in Washington, and perhaps from me. How Stevenson hoped he could persuade the American voters to maintain the Democratic Party in power while seeming to disown powerful elements of it, I do not know.

Unfortunately, Stevenson, in an interview in Oregon, quoted a reporter's phrase in answering a question and said that he would clean up "the mess in Washington." I wondered if he had been taken in by the Republican fraudulent buildup of flyspecks on our Washington windows into a big blot or "mess." For several years, the Republican opposition had tried to make a case against the administration, only to find that the administration was always alert in rooting out corruption or bad practices wherever they existed. As long as there are those who will pay to corrupt, there will always be some who will yield to corruption. This is as true in private business as it is in public or government business. . . . By this inadvertence in Oregon, Stevenson provided the Republican opposition with the audacity to go ahead with the two phony issues of the Eisenhower campaign—corruption and Korea.

Another mistake in Stevenson's campaign was his failure to coordinate and give proper recognition to existing Democratic organizations in the major population centers. This came as a surprise to me. I had attributed to him realistic political judgment as governor of Illinois. I had thought some solid political instincts had filtered down to him from his very astute grandfather of the same name. By alienating many influential Democratic political leaders at the outset Stevenson may have thought he was attaining full freedom of action. But in reality, he needlessly sacrificed basic political backing and perhaps millions in votes. I say this despite the fact that he got more popular votes than any Democratic candidate for the presidency up to that time, except for F.D.R.'s overwhelming victory in 1936. . . .

Another mistake in the 1952 campaign was that there was little or no coordination between Washington and Springfield. Actually, there were two campaigns being waged by the Democrats, and this often led to overlapping and confusion. It was an unfortunate situation that could have been avoided.

When it seemed to me almost too late, Stevenson asked me to get into the campaign, which I did as soon as I could, and I gave it all I had.

It seems to me that another mistake . . . Stevenson [made] was to allow himself to go on the defensive in Cleveland and other cities on the question of so-called communists in government. The most brazen lie of the century . . . [was] fabricated by reckless demagogues among the Republicans to the effect that Democrats were soft on communists. The Republicans used the technique of fear and the big lie to confuse and frighten our people. The historic fact is that it was under a Democratic administration that those economic and military measures were taken which saved Western civilization from communist control. It was the Democratic administration that prosecuted the known communist conspirators in this country and convicted them without throwing away our Bill of Rights by resorting to totalitarian methods. What is just as important, we strengthened our economy by maintaining full employment and prosperity and thus helped defeat communism where hunger and misery threatened free peoples. This is a record without parallel in history. All Americans, whatever their politics, may feel justly proud of the role of this country in this great period of continuous struggle for the world's freedom. It seems to me that Stevenson, who knew the facts, since he had taken part in the administration's fight against communism, as had Eisenhower, should have resisted vigorously any maneuvers to put him on the defensive as an opponent of communism. He should never have yielded to the challenge of contemptible demagogues, many of whom flinched while the administration fought communism.

I am sure that if Stevenson had accepted in good faith the proposition I made to him on January 30, 1952, and enabled us to make the proper build-up, there would have been no contest to speak of at Chicago, and I think he would have received at least three million more votes. Perhaps this would not have produced enough more votes to elect him, but there would have been enough to rebuke Eisenhower for his demagoguery and endorsement of the Jenner-McCarthy big lie. Having said this, I want to make clear that my admiration for Stevenson as the spokesman and the standard-bearer of the party was justified by his brilliant exposition of the main issues. His ability to put into inspiring words the principles of the Democratic Party earned him fame and worldwide recognition. I hold him in the highest regard for his intellectual courage. It took courage to speak with candor and forthrightness in the face of the demagogic campaigning conducted by the Republicans. Stevenson, even in defeat, left a profound and enduring

impression on the American people. The nation and the party were richer for his inspiring and high-level campaign.

Stevenson, of course, faced very formidable opposition in . . . [Eisenhower's] great popularity. . . . Any Democratic nominee would have had to face the enormous psychological handicap of campaigning against a very popular military hero. Some Republican leaders believed they could not win with . . . [a] traditional Republican. The Republicans, being a minority party, knew they had to borrow strength from the Democratic and independent vote. Their only hope of gaining such strength was to find a candidate whose appeal to the voters would cut across party lines [—such as Eisenhower]. . . .

In 1948 and 1952 there were even some Democrats who, fearful of defeat, also wanted to seize upon the popularity of this man. Major wars always bring to the fore certain military figures whose popularity, as much as their military skill, serves to build the morale of the people. The luster of such figures cuts easily across party lines. Many of us did not know whether Eisenhower was a Republican or a Democrat until he announced himself as a candidate on the Republican side. . . .

Those of us who knew Eisenhower through his long service in uniform under two Democratic presidents had reason to hope that he would campaign on a high level. He had been assigned important roles and given a part in the historic struggle of the battle against the totalitarian powers and in the military rebuilding of the Western powers in the postwar period. He measured up to his assignments with distinction. . . . He had the opportunity to know and to understand what was happening in the world and what we were doing as a nation. He helped carry out important policies of two administrations and had the fullest opportunity to express himself on many important decisions.

We were shocked and disappointed to find that he would lend himself to the type of campaign that followed. He permitted a campaign of distortion and vilification that he could not possibly have believed was true. There were mass accusations of subversion and corruption against the Democratic administration. Yet two years of Republican rule have failed to produce any evidence to justify the vile accusations of the campaign. . . . Hard as it was for us to understand this side of Eisenhower now revealed to us, it was even more of a jolt to see our foreign policy used as a political football. But when our struggle in Korea was appropriated for partisan political purposes at a time when we were negotiating for armistice in the face of a most stubborn and tricky foe, I felt that we had reached a situation that was politically and

morally intolerable. . . . I regret that such a chapter should have been written into our political history. When Eisenhower, in his Detroit speech [of October 25, 1952], proposed that if elected he would journey to Korea in person to put an end to the fighting, he must have known that he was weakening our hand in negotiations. He must have known that he could accomplish little, if anything, by such a trip. He also must have known that by making this statement he was leading the American people to believe that the day after he became president he would bring them peace in Korea. The fighting continued for many months after the new administration took over, and peace in Korea is yet to be achieved. . . .

There is something else that I shall never be able to understand. During his campaign through Wisconsin, when he delivered a major speech in Milwaukee Eisenhower was persuaded to delete from his speech a personal tribute to his former chief, General Marshall. Eisenhower agreed to the deletion in order to make possible the presence of Senator McCarthy on the platform with him. I would like to believe that in this instance Eisenhower permitted himself to be badly advised because of his political inexperience. It may be that Eisenhower had yielded to frantic expediency because of his discovery that he could not get the nomination or the presidency without a contest and a vigorous personal campaign. . . . He emerged as a different personality with a new cloak of the politician not too unwilling to engage in cynical partisan campaigning.

I voted early, before breakfast, on November 4, 1952, in the Memorial Hall at Independence, where I had been voting for more than three decades. It is a short walk from my home. But this voting was a new experience. It was one of the few times in more than thirty years that I was marking a ballot on which my name did not appear as a candidate for some office. Mrs. Truman and Margaret walked along with me to the polls, and we thought of the happy prospect of returning to the peace and quiet of our home in Independence.

Immediately after voting we boarded the presidential train for the return to Washington. I turned my attention to official business. As in all previous elections, once the campaign was over, I stopped thinking and speculating about it. I went to bed at the usual hour, when only scattered returns were reported. But I thought we had lost the election even before I had gone to bed. At midnight, I was awakened by someone who handed me a whole stack of ticker reports, and I saw that Eisenhower was going to win the election. I turned in then, to sleep. I did not hear Stevenson concede the election. The

reports the next morning showed that Eisenhower had won by the largest popular vote in history. I was disappointed, but I was not surprised. . . . Throughout our history there has always been a handicap of waging political battle against a military man who was also a war hero. . . .

Eisenhower won. He received the greatest number of votes cast for any presidential candidate in the history of the nation. But proportionately he did not come close to the majorities of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 and in 1936, or that of Harding in 1920 or Herbert Hoover in 1928. But for the first time in the nation's history more than sixty million persons went to the polls, and although Stevenson came within 163,000 votes of surpassing even the total of F.D.R. in 1936, he was beaten by more than six million votes.

Truman turned his thoughts to the transition from his administration to that of the new president.

Ever since I had announced that I was not a candidate in 1952, I had given considerable thought to the problem of an orderly turnover of the government to my successor. Even before the Democratic and Republican conventions in Chicago had nominated their candidates, I had made up my mind to keep both candidates informed about the important developments of our foreign policy. I had a double purpose in mind. First, I wanted to keep foreign policy out of partisan politics. Second, I wanted to make sure that because of our responsibility of world leadership whoever was elected would be fully informed and prepared to conduct foreign affairs.

For this reason, on August 13, even as the election campaigns got under way, I sent the following telegram to General Eisenhower:

. . . I would be most happy if you would attend a Cabinet luncheon next Tuesday the nineteenth. If you want to bring your press secretary and any other member of your staff I'd be glad to have them. If you can arrive at about twelve fifteen, I'll have General [Walter Bedell] Smith and the Central Intelligence Agency give you a briefing on the foreign situation. Then we will have luncheon with the Cabinet and after that if you like I'll have my entire staff report to you on the situation in the White House and in that way you will be entirely briefed on what takes place. I've made arrangements with the Central Intelligence Agency to furnish you once a week with the world situation as I also have for Governor Stevenson.

The following day Eisenhower declined my invitation, replying as follows:

. . . In my current position as standard bearer of the Republican Party and of other Americans who want to bring about a change in the National Government, it is my duty to remain free to analyze publicly the policies and acts of the present administration whenever it appears to me to be proper and in the country's interests.

During the present period the people are deciding our country's leadership for the next four years. . . . In such circumstances and in such a period I believe our communications should be only those which are known to all the American people. Consequently I think it would be unwise and result in confusion in the public mind if I were to attend the meeting in the White House to which you have invited me. . . .

With respect to the weekly reports from the Central Intelligence Agency that you kindly offered to send me, I will welcome these reports. In line with my view, however, that the American people are entitled to all the facts in the international situation, save only in those cases where the security of the United States is involved, I would want it understood that the possession of these reports will in no other way limit my freedom to discuss or analyze foreign programs as my judgment dictates.

Eisenhower's telegram angered me. It was apparent that the politicians had already begun to mishandle him. On August 16, I wrote in longhand this personal letter to Eisenhower:

Dear Ike:

I am sorry if I caused you any embarrassment.

What I've always had in mind was and is a continuing foreign policy. You know that is a fact because you had a part in outlining it.

Partisan politics should stop at the boundaries of the United States. I'm extremely sorry that you have allowed a bunch of screwballs to come between us.

You have made a bad mistake, and I'm hoping that it won't injure this great Republic.

There has never been one like it and I want to see it continue regardless of the man who occupies the most important position in the history of the world.

May God guide you and give you light.

From a man who has always been your friend and who always intended to be!

Sincerely,

Harry S. Truman

Three days later, on August 19, General Eisenhower sent me a personal reply, also written in longhand. In his letter, he expressed sincere thanks for

the courtesy of my note of the sixteenth. He said he wished to assure me that my invitation caused him no personal embarrassment. His feeling, he said, was that, having entered this political campaign, he would become involved in the necessity of making laborious explanations to the public if he had met with me and the Cabinet. He went on to say that since there was no hint of national emergency in my telegram of invitation and he no longer belonged to any of the public services, he thought it wiser to decline. . . . He closed his letter by assuring me of his support of real bipartisanship in foreign problems. . . .

Now that Eisenhower was president-elect, Truman again turned his thoughts to arranging with Eisenhower an orderly transition. On November 5, Truman sent Eisenhower a message congratulating him on his victory and inviting him to send someone to meet with the director of the Bureau of the Budget to discuss the upcoming budget submission to Congress, and offering him the presidential airplane, The Independence, for his trip to Korea. Eisenhower replied immediately, accepting the invitation regarding the budget submission and declining the airplane.

. . . I sent another message to Eisenhower that same day inviting him to the White House to discuss an orderly transfer of the government to the new administration. This was my message:

. . . I know you will agree with me that there ought to be an orderly transfer of the business of the executive branch of the government to the new administration, particularly in view of the international dangers and problems that confront this country and the whole free world. I invite you, therefore, to meet with me in the White House at your early convenience to discuss the problem of this transition period, so that it may be clear to all the world that this nation is united in its struggle for freedom and peace. . . .

I was anxious to bring about an orderly transfer of the government and do everything possible to make certain that there would be no break in the continuity of foreign policy. In this field, I felt that I had no reason for misgivings about the incoming president despite his regrettable misuse of the Korean tragedy for campaign purposes. Eisenhower was, or should have been, acquainted with the world situation. After all, he had been Allied commander in Europe, [Army] Chief of Staff, had previously visited China, Korea, and Formosa and later went back to Europe to organize the NATO forces. No man had had a better opportunity to know the whole situation, especially when he had taken such an important part in it. . . .

On November 6, Eisenhower sent Truman a message accepting his offer to meet personally in order to work toward the achievement of an orderly transition to the new administration. He suggested the meeting take place sometime early in the week of November 17. I share your hope, Eisenhower wrote Truman, that we may present to the world an American unity in basic issues.

Earlier in the day, Truman had sent Eisenhower a message suggesting he designate a representative to discuss pressing foreign policy issues with the secretary of state and others. I would prefer not to make firm decisions on these matters, Truman wrote, without your concurrence. . . .

As a result of my own experience and the historic experience of all presidents since Washington, I wanted to help the new president to familiarize himself with what was going on before taking over. The pressures and the complexities of the presidency have grown to a state where they are almost too much for one man to endure. Important decisions cannot wait. A president must decide not only on the facts he has but the experience and preparation he brings to them. It is a terrible handicap for a new president to step into office and be confronted with a whole series of critical decisions without adequate briefing. I thought it was an omission in our political tradition that a retiring president did not make it his business to facilitate the transfer of the government to his successor. . . .

But now we faced a different situation with the nation having just gone through a most regrettably bitter campaign. I was determined that we should have an orderly turnover of every department of the government to assist the incoming administration to keep this nation a going concern. . . .

Eisenhower responded to Truman's November 6 message the following day. He agreed to designate representatives to meet with Truman's foreign and defense policy advisers, but he emphasized that he had no authority to make, or presumably even to concur in, any presidential decisions until he was sworn in on January 20. Two days later, on November 9, Eisenhower sent Truman the names of his representatives and said they would present themselves in Washington within a few days. Eisenhower's meeting with Truman was set for the afternoon of November 18.

The morning of the meeting, Truman conferred with his secretaries of state, defense, and treasury, and with his national security adviser. He planned to meet personally with Eisenhower in the Oval Office first, and then to take him to the Cabinet Room to meet together with the advisers on both sides. Truman would have with him Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense Robert

Lovett, Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder, and national security adviser Averell Harriman. Eisenhower would have with him his two designated liaisons to the Truman administration, economic adviser Joseph M. Dodge, and foreign policy adviser Henry Cabot Lodge.

Eisenhower arrived at the White House . . . at 1:55 p.m. and was immediately escorted to my office. He was accompanied by Senator Lodge and Mr. Dodge, but I invited . . . [him] to meet with me privately before we held a general session with our aides. Eisenhower was unsmiling. I thought he looked tense. I wanted him to be at his ease. Before getting to the purpose of the conference, I talked to him about some of the paintings hanging in my office, and I pointed to the large and magnificent globe he had used in World War II. Eisenhower had given me this globe at Frankfurt, where I saw him during the Potsdam conference. I offered to leave this globe for him in the White House. He accepted. He remained unsmiling. I then got down to business.

I told him I thought it was necessary to have this meeting in the best interests of the country and that I had two important reasons in mind. We needed to reassure other countries that there was some stability about our foreign policy and allay uneasiness during this period of transition. And I said I wanted to make it plain that my offer to cooperate in an orderly transfer of government to his administration was a genuine offer to do what was best for the country. I had no purpose or intention of setting any political trap or trying to shift any responsibility that was mine as president. I told him that the Constitution leaves the powers and duties of the presidential office on the outgoing president until the inauguration of his successor. The responsibility would be mine until January 20, and I expected to exercise it. I said I understood that any president-elect was naturally and properly reluctant to take on any of the political responsibilities of the office before taking on the legal powers as well. I stated that my administration did not expect the new administration to take on responsibility prematurely. There might be some foreign policy issues where we could not succeed unless other nations had assurance of the continuity of our policy under the new administration. This would be something beyond the power of the present administration to determine. I said, "We will tell you about these issues and would welcome concurrence if you want to give it. But we will not press for it. This is a matter on which you will have to make up your own mind on the basis of what is best for America." I suggested that we talk about some of these international problems when we joined the others in the Cabinet Room.

But before going to the Cabinet Room conference I wanted to tell President-elect Eisenhower a few things about atomic energy which I thought it important for him to know. I outlined the atomic energy matters which required the president's decision and how the president worked with the Special Committee of the National Security Council. I called his attention to problems in the atomic field as they concerned our relations with the United Kingdom and Canada. I offered to arrange to have the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission . . . bring him up to date on the atomic energy program.

Our meeting lasted twenty minutes, and I then escorted Eisenhower into the Cabinet Room. . . . I opened the meeting with the following statement:

I have invited you gentlemen to meet with me here to establish the framework for full understanding of our problems and our purposes in the interim until January 20th.

So far as our relations with other countries are concerned, I think it is important during this period to avoid needless difference between this administration and its successor for several reasons.

First—it will show the world national unity in foreign policy as far as politically possible.

Second—it will help to maintain respect abroad for the power and influence of the United States, and to sustain the confidence of our allies and friends in our foreign policy.

Third—it will help to check the Kremlin's efforts to divide the United States from its allies and friends, and it may help to keep the Kremlin from creating a crisis in the mistaken notion that we are divided or wavering in our purposes to preserve the unity of the free world.

It is also my purpose to do what can be done by this administration to facilitate the orderly transfer of our duties to our successors. I think that is in the best interest of the country.

I want to make available to General Eisenhower and his associates the information that will be helpful to them in taking over the operation of the Government.

It is not my purpose to try to shift responsibility for actions taken by the government between now and January 20th. I am going to follow the policies I believe to be right up until that time and I will take full responsibility for them.

There are certain questions on which it might be very important to our foreign policy for General Eisenhower to express his views. But it is up to him to decide whether or not he will do so.

I welcome General Eisenhower's selection of Senator Lodge and Mr. Dodge to establish liaison with this administration. We will give them our full cooperation.

If General Eisenhower wishes to designate additional representatives from

time to time, we will be glad to work with them also.

We want to do all we can to help the incoming administration by filling in the background of current problems and by making available in advance information concerning the problems you will have to deal with.

It is not our purpose or intention to attempt to commit or bind the incoming administration.

All we are doing is trying to make a common-sense approach to the situation.

Truman gave Eisenhower a briefing memorandum, prepared by John Snyder, about financing the federal government and the international position of the United States. Dean Acheson then gave a briefing about foreign affairs, focusing particularly on the difficult armistice negotiations in Korea; he also covered problems in Iran and Southeast Asia. With respect to the negotiations in Korea, Acheson told Eisenhower that a supportive public statement from him would be most helpful, and he presented a proposed statement for Eisenhower's consideration. Eisenhower replied only that he would discuss Korea with the British foreign secretary when he met with him later that week.

At the end of Acheson's briefing, Eisenhower said he recognized the seriousness of the matters discussed. He said that as soon as his meeting with Truman was over, he would go with Robert Lovett to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Eisenhower and I then went over a draft of a joint statement which I had had prepared at the White House. It was adopted after two changes requested by Eisenhower. The conference ended at 3:15 p.m., and the following joint statement was then issued from the White House:

President Truman and General Eisenhower met today at the White House. After conferring together by themselves, they met with the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury, the Director of Mutual Security, and General Eisenhower's associates, Senator Lodge and Mr. Dodge.

At the end of the talks, the President and General Eisenhower issued the following statement:

"We have discussed some of the most important problems affecting our country in the sphere of international relations. Information with respect to these problems has been made available to General Eisenhower.

"Under our Constitution the President must exercise his functions until he leaves office, and his successor cannot be asked to share or assume the responsibilities of the Presidency until he takes office.

"We have worked out a framework for liaison and exchange of information between the present Administration and the incoming Administration, but we have made no arrangements which are inconsistent with the full spirit of our Constitution. General Eisenhower has not been asked to assume any of the

responsibilities of the Presidency until he takes the oath of office.

"We believe, however, that the arrangements we have made for cooperation will be of great value to the stability of our country and to the favorable progress of international affairs.

"We are confident that this meeting and that the arrangements we have made today for liaison and cooperation between the present Administration and the new Administration furnish additional proof of the ability of the people of this country to manage their affairs with a sense of continuity and with responsibility."

When Eisenhower and his aides left, I was troubled. I had the feeling that, up to this meeting in the White House . . . Eisenhower had not grasped the immense job ahead of him. There was something about his attitude during the meeting that I did not understand. It may have been that this meeting made him realize for the first time what the presidency and the responsibilities of the president were. He may have been awestruck by the long array of problems and decisions the president has to face. If that is so, then I can almost understand his frozen grimness throughout the meeting. But it may have been something else. He may have failed to grasp the true picture of what the administration had been doing because in the heat of partisan politics he had gotten a badly distorted version of the true facts. Whatever it was, I kept thinking about it.

Years of Trial and Hope, 488–521

The paragraph beginning "Eisenhower won. He" has been moved down eleven paragraphs from its position in the original text. The retrospective segment, from the paragraph beginning "Ever since I" to the paragraph beginning "On the morning," composed of about three pages in the original text, has been moved up about seven pages from its position in the original text.

People Mentioned in *The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, A Reader's Edition*

Truman's memoirs feature a very large cast of characters. Truman was a good politician and apparently felt that he should name in his book a great many of the people who shared the public stage with him during his eventful life. In the present edition, this cast of characters has been slimmed down as much as possible, but the cast is still a big one and a list of the people featured in the memoirs will probably be helpful to most readers of this edition. Such a list appears below.

The list includes about 260 people. Only the position or positions held by a person which are directly pertinent to the activities recorded in the memoirs are given. For example, Dean Rusk is identified only as assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, 1950–1951, because all mentions of Rusk in the memoirs relate to the time he was in this position. Important positions he held before and after this time are not listed. Also excluded are noncontinuous tenures in the position given for a person that do not relate to that person's appearance in the memoirs.

Not all the people mentioned in the edited memoirs are included in this list. Some people are sufficiently described in the text and need no further identification. Others not on the list include the many presidents of the United States and historical figures from long ago that Truman mentions: George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren, James K. Polk, Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses S. Grant, Grover Cleveland, Benjamin Harrison, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, William Howard Taft, Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Franklin D. Roosevelt; and Rameses II, pharaoh of Egypt; Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon; Darius the Great, king of Persia; Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, who represented civic virtue in ancient Rome; Genghis Kahn, the founder and Great Kahn of the Mongol Empire;

Louis IX, king of France, who led a crusade to the Middle East; Philip II, king of Spain; Napoleon Bonaparte; Frédéric Chopin, the composer, primarily of music for piano; and Wilhelm, emperor of Germany and king of Prussia. These presidents and historical figures are not included in the list.

In the first four chapters, which are about Truman's childhood, boyhood, early career as farmer and businessman, and career in county politics and in the U.S. Senate, Truman mentions many family members, personal friends, and business and political associates who are sufficiently identified in the text and who do not appear in later chapters. These people, with the exception of the most important members of Truman's family and a few of his close friends and associates, are not included in the list.

Almost everyone else who appears in this edited edition of Truman's memoirs is included in the list below.

Acheson, Dean. Under secretary of state, 1945–1947; secretary of state, 1949–1953.

Alexander, Harold, 1st Earl Alexander. British general, supreme commander of Allied forces in the Mediterranean theater, December 1944–1945.

Allen, George E. Democratic political operative, c. 1940s.

Arnold, Henry H. Army general; commander of the Army Air Forces, 1942–1946.

Attlee, Clement. Prime minister of the United Kingdom, 1945–1951.

Atwood, Julius W. Bishop of the Episcopal Church and acquaintance of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Austin, Warren R. U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, 1947–1953.

Barkley, Alben. Senator from Kentucky, 1927–1949; Senate majority leader, 1937–1947; vice president of the United States, 1949–1953.

Baruch, Bernard M. Financier, philanthropist, presidential adviser; U.S. representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, 1946–1947.

Beneš, Eduard. President of Czechoslovakia, 1945–1948.

Bevin, Ernest. British foreign secretary, 1945–1951.

Bidault, Georges. French foreign minister, 1945, 1947.

Bierut, Bolesław. Polish communist leader; head of the pro-Soviet Provisional National Council following the Soviet occupation of Poland at the end of World War II in Europe.

Biddle, Francis. Attorney General, 1941–1945.

Biffle, Leslie. Secretary of the Senate, 1945–1947.

Bloom, Sol. Congressman from New York, 1923–1949; chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1939–1947.

Bohlen, Charles E. Head of the East European Division, Department of State; interpreter for Franklin D. Roosevelt at the Tehran and Yalta Conferences, 1944–1945; interpreter for Harry S. Truman at the Potsdam Conference, 1945.

Bradley, Omar N. Army general; chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949–1953.

Brannan, Charles F. Secretary of agriculture, 1949–1953.

Bridges, Styles. Senator from New Hampshire, 1937–1961.

Bulger, Miles J. Presiding judge of Jackson County, c. 1915–c. 1921.

Burton, Harold H. Senator from Ohio, 1941–1945.

Bush, Vannevar. Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, 1941–1947.

Byrnes, James F. Director, Office of War Mobilization, 1943–1945; secretary of state, 1945–1947.

Caffery, Jefferson. U.S. ambassador to France, 1944–1949.

Chapman, Oscar. Secretary of the interior, 1949–1953.

Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi). Head of the Nationalist government in China, 1928–1948; president of the Republic of China, 1948–1949 and 1950–1975.

Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai). Vice chairman, Chinese Communist Party, 1935–1976.

Churchill, Winston S. Prime minister of the United Kingdom, 1940–1945, 1951–1955.

Clark, Bennett Champ. Senator from Missouri, 1933–1945.

Clark, Mark W. Army general; commander, United States Army Forces, Far East, and commander, United Nations Command, 1952–1953.

Clark, Tom C. Attorney General, 1945–1949.

Clay, Lucius. Army general; commander of U.S. forces in Europe and military governor of the U.S. occupation zone in Germany, 1947–1949.

Clayton, William L. Under secretary of state for economic affairs, 1946–1947.

Collins, J. Lawton. Army general; chief of staff of the Army, 1949–1953.

Conant, James B. President of Harvard University, 1933–1953.

Condon, Edward U. Director of the National Bureau of Standards, 1945–1951.

Connally, Tom. Senator from Texas, 1929–1953; chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1941–1947.

Crowley, Leo. Head of the Foreign Economic Administration, 1943–1945.

Davies, Joseph E. Truman's personal emissary to Winston Churchill, May 1945.

Davis, John W. Lawyer and 1924 Democratic Party nominee for president; represented the steel companies involved in a dispute with the government, 1951–1952.

Dean, Gordon. Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1952–1953.

Dean, William F. Army general; commander of the 24th Infantry Division, the first U.S. ground unit ordered to Korea, 1950.

de Gaulle, Charles. Leader of the Free French in exile during World War II; head of the provisional government of France, 1944–1946.

Denfeld, Louis E. Navy admiral; Chief of Naval Operations, 1947–1949.

Dewey, Thomas E. Governor of New York, 1943–1954; Republican Party nominee for president, 1948.

Dingell, John. Congressman from Michigan, 1933–1955.

Dodge, Joseph M. Banker from Detroit; liaison for president-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower with the Truman administration, 1952.

Doenitz, Karl. German admiral; claimed to be German head of state following Adolf Hitler's death.

Donnelly, Philip M. Governor of Missouri, 1945–1949.

Douglas, William O. Supreme Court justice, 1939–1975.

Early, Stephen T. White House press secretary, 1933–1945.

Eaton, Charles Aubrey. Congressman from New Jersey, 1933–1953.

Eden, Anthony. Secretary of state for foreign affairs, the United Kingdom, 1940–1945.

Einstein, Albert. Physicist, originator of the theory of relativity.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Army chief of staff, 1945–1948; president of Columbia University, 1948–1953; Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 1951–1952; Republican candidate for president, 1952; president-elect of the United States.

Evatt, Herbert Vere. Minister for External Affairs of Australia, 1941–1949; member of the Australian delegation to the United Nations Conference, April–July 1945.

Fairless, Benjamin Franklin. President of United States Steel Corporation, 1938–1955; principal spokesman for steel companies during the 1952 steel strike.

Ferguson, Homer S. Senator from Michigan, 1943–1955.

- Finletter, Thomas.** Secretary of the Air Force, 1950–1953.
- Flynn, Edward J.** Democratic Party boss in the Bronx, New York City.
- Forrestal, James V.** Secretary of the Navy, 1944–1947; secretary of defense, 1947–1949.
- Foskett, James H.** Commander of the USS *Augusta*, 1945.
- Fowler, Henry H.** Administrator of the National Production Authority, 1951–1952.
- Franco, Francisco.** Dictator of Spain, 1939–1975.
- Fulton, Hugh.** Chief counsel, Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, 1941–1944.
- Garner, John Nance.** Vice president of the United States, 1933–1941.
- George VI.** King of England, 1936–1952.
- Giles, Barney M.** Deputy commander, Army Air Forces, 1941–1945; commander, Army Air Forces in the Pacific, 1945.
- Glass, Carter.** Senator from Virginia, 1920–1946.
- Goebbels, Joseph.** German minister of propaganda, 1933–1945.
- Goering, Hermann.** Head of the German air force, 1935–1945; senior military officer in the German military establishment.
- Grady, Henry F.** Diplomat and academician; member of the Anglo-American committee charged with negotiating a plan for the future of Palestine, July 1946.
- Green, William.** President of the American Federation of Labor, 1924–1952.
- Grew, Joseph C.** Under secretary of state, 1944–1945, often serving as acting secretary of state, January–August 1945.
- Gromyko, Andre.** Member, rising to head, of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations Conference, 1945.
- Groves, Leslie R.** Army general; commanding general, the Manhattan Project, 1942–1946.
- Guffey, Joseph.** Senator from Pennsylvania, 1935–1947.
- Halifax, 1st Earl of.** See Wood, Edward.
- Handy, Thomas T.** Army general; deputy Army chief of staff, 1944–1947.
- Hannegan, Robert E.** Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 1944–1947; postmaster general, 1945–1947.
- Harriman, Averell.** U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1943–1946; U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom, 1946; secretary of commerce, 1946–1948; U.S. representative in Europe for the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), 1948–1950; special assistant to the president, 1950–1951; director of the Mutual Security Agency, 1951–1953.

Harrison, Earl G. U.S. representative on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, beginning March 15, 1945; head of a State Department mission to Germany to look into the needs of displaced persons, June 1945.

Hartley, Jr., Fred. Congressman from New Jersey, 1929–1949.

Hayden Carl. Senator from Arizona, 1927–1969.

Hickenlooper, Bourke. Senator from Iowa, 1945–1969; member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 1946–1968; co-chairman, 1947–1948.

Hickerson, John D. Assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, 1949–1953.

Hill, Lister. Senator from Alabama, 1938–1969.

Hillman, Sidney. Labor leader and political activist.

Himmler, Heinrich. Head of the Nazi SS.

Hirohito. Emperor of Japan, 1926–1989.

Hitler, Adolf. Leader of the Nazi regime in Germany, 1934–1945.

Hodge, John R. Army general; commander of U.S. occupation forces in Korea and head of the occupation government, 1945–1948.

Hodges, Courtney. Army general; commander of the First Army in Europe at the end of World War II.

Hoover, Herbert. Former president of the United States, 1933–1944; honorary chairman of the Famine Emergency Committee, 1945–1946."

Hoover, J. Edgar. Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1935–1972.

Hopkins, Harry. Foreign policy adviser to and intimate associate of President Roosevelt during World War II; personal representative of President Truman to Joseph Stalin, May–June 1945.

Hull, Cordell. Secretary of state, 1933–1944; member of the American delegation to the United Nations Conference, 1945.

Hurley, Patrick J. U.S. ambassador to China, 1944–1945.

Ibn Saud (Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al-Faisal Al Saud). King of Saudi Arabia, 1932–1953.

Ickes, Harold L. Secretary of the interior, 1933–1946.

Jackson, Robert H. Supreme Court justice, 1941–1954; United States Chief of Counsel at the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Germany, 1945–1946.

Jacobson, Eddie. Personal friend, fellow soldier, and former business associate of Truman's; Zionist activist, c. 1947–1948.

Jenner, William E. Senator from Indiana, 1947–1959.

Jessup, Philip. Member of U.S. delegation at the United Nations, 1948–1952; ambassador-at-large, 1949–1953.

Johnson, Edwin C. Senator from Colorado, 1937–1955.

Johnson, Louis. Secretary of defense, 1949–1950.

Jones, Jesse. Chair, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 1933–1939; Federal Loan Administrator, 1939–1945.

Kaltenborn, H. V. National Broadcasting Company radio commentator, 1940–1953.

Kefauver, Estes. Senator from Tennessee, 1949–1963.

Kerr, Archibald Clark. Ambassador of the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union, 1942–1946; British member of a commission established at the Yalta Conference to consult with members of the provisional government of Poland and the Polish government in exile, 1945.

Kerr, Robert S. Senator from Oklahoma, 1949–1963.

Kesselring, Albert. Commander of the German Luftwaffe during World War II.

Keynes, John Maynard. British economist.

Kilgore, Harley M. Senator from West Virginia, 1941–1956.

King, Ernest J. Navy admiral; commander in chief, United States Fleet, 1941–1945, and chief of naval operations, 1942–1945.

King, Mackenzie. Prime minister of Canada, 1935–1948.

Kirk, Alexander. U.S. ambassador to Italy, 1944–1946.

Knox, Frank. Secretary of the Navy, 1940–1944.

Lausche, Frank. Governor of Ohio, 1945–1947, 1949–1957; Democratic candidate for governor of Ohio, 1948.

Leahy, William D. Navy admiral; chief of staff to the commander in chief, 1942–1949; head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1949.

Lewis, J. Hamilton. Senator from Illinois, 1933–1939.

Lewis, John L. President of the United Mine Workers of America, 1920–1960.

Lie, Trygve. Secretary-general of the United Nations, 1946–1952.

Lilienthal, David E. Member of a government committee which advised Truman on the position of the United States at the United Nations on the issue of atomic energy, 1946; chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1946–1950.

Lodge, Henry Cabot. Senator from Massachusetts, 1947–1953; liaison for president-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower with the Truman administration, 1952.

Lovett, Robert A. Under secretary of state, 1947–1949; deputy secretary of defense, 1950–1951; secretary of defense, 1951–1953.

Lubin, Isador. U.S. representative on the Allied Reparations Commission, 1945; associate U.S. representative on the Commission, 1945–1946.

Lucas, Scott. Senator from Illinois, 1939–1951.

MacArthur, Douglas. Army general; commander, United States Army Forces in the Far East, 1941–1945; Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1945–1951; commander, United Nations Command, 1950–1951.

MacVeagh, Lincoln. U.S. ambassador to Greece, 1943–1947.

Malik, Yakov. Permanent representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations, 1948–1952.

Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong). Leader of the Chinese Communists; chairman of the Communist Party of China, 1945–1976.

Marcantonio, Vito. Congressman from New York, 1939–1951.

Marshall, George C. Army general; chief of staff of the United States Army, 1939–1945; special envoy to China, 1945–1947; secretary of state, 1947–1949; secretary of defense, 1950–1951.

Martin, Joseph W. Congressman from Massachusetts, 1929–1967; House minority leader, 1939–1947, 1949–1953; Speaker of the House, 1947–1949.

Masaryk, Jan. Foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, 1940–1948.

Masaryk, Tomáš. President of Czechoslovakia, 1918–1935.

Mathews, Francis. Secretary of the Navy, 1949–1951.

McCann, Allan R. Navy admiral; commander of Task Force 68, composed of the USS *Philadelphia* and the USS *Augusta*, July–August 1945.

McCarthy, Joseph R. Senator from Wisconsin, 1947–1957.

McCloy, John J. Wall Street lawyer; formerly assistant secretary of war (1941–1945); member of the committee which developed a plan for the international control of atomic energy, described in the Acheson-Lilienthal report, March 1946.

McCormack, John. Congressman from Massachusetts, 1928–1971; House minority leader, 1940–1947.

McGranery, James P. Attorney general, 1952–1953.

McKellar, Kenneth. Senator from Tennessee, 1917–1953; president pro tempore of the Senate, 1945–1947.

McKinney, Francis E. Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 1951–1952.

McMahon, Brien. Senator from Connecticut, 1945–1952; chairman of the Senate Atomic Energy Commission, 1945–1946; chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Commission, 1946–1947, 1949–1952.

McNary, Charles L. Senator from Oregon, 1918–1944.

McNutt, Paul V. Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, 1942–1945.

Mellon, Andrew. Secretary of the Treasury, 1921–1932.

Michael I. King of Romania, 1940–1947.

Milligan, Jacob L. Member of Congress, 1923–1935, candidate for the Democratic nomination for senator from Missouri, 1934.

Milligan, Maurice M. U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Missouri, 1934–1945, candidate for the Democratic nomination for senator from Missouri, 1940.

Minton, Sherman. Senator from Indiana, 1935–1941; U.S. Supreme Court justice, 1949–1956.

Molotov, Vyacheslav. Soviet minister of foreign affairs, 1939–1949.

Morgenthau, Jr., Henry. Secretary of the treasury, 1934–1945.

Morse, Wayne. Senator from Oregon, 1945–1969.

Mountbatten, Louis. British admiral; Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, 1943–1946.

Muccio, John J. U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea (South Korea), 1949–1952.

Murray, James E. Senator from Montana, 1934–1961.

Murray, Philip. President of the United Steelworkers of America, 1942–1952.

Nelson, Donald M. Chairman, War Production Board, 1942–1944.

Newman, James R. Counsel to the United States Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy, c. 1945.

Nicholson, Henry J. Secret Service agent assigned to the White House during Truman's presidency.

Nimitz, Chester W. Navy admiral; chairman, Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights, 1951.

Noland, Ethel, and her sister, Nellie Noland. Truman's cousins.

Norris, George W. Senator from Nebraska, 1913–1943.

O'Neill, Charles. Spokesman for coal companies during a strike in 1946.

Oppenheimer, J. Robert. Physicist; head of the Los Alamos Laboratory, 1942–1945.

Osmeña, Sergio. President of the Philippines, 1944–1946.

Nye, Gerald P. Senator from North Dakota, 1925–1945.

Pace, Frank. Secretary of the Army, 1950–1953.

Parsons, William S. Navy officer; associate director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, 1943–1945; weaponeer and senior military technical observer aboard the *Enola Gay* during the bombing of Hiroshima, August 6, 1945.

Patterson, Robert P. Secretary of war, 1945–1947.

Patterson, Roscoe C. Senator from Missouri, 1929–1935.

Patton, George S. Army general; commanding general of the Third Army following the Normandy invasion, 1944–1945.

Pauley, Edwin W. Democratic Party fundraiser and activist, c. 1940s; manager of the Democratic National Convention, 1944; personal representative of the president on the Allied Commission on Reparations, 1945–1947; special adviser to the secretary of state on reparations, 1947–1948; special assistant to the secretary of the Army, 1947–1948.

Pendergast, Jim. Son of Mike Pendergast; served with Truman during World War I; personal acquaintance of Truman's and customer at the Truman & Jacobson store, c. 1919–1922.

Pendergast, Mike. Tom Pendergast's brother and head of the Pendergast organization in eastern Jackson County.

Pendergast, Tom. Head of the Pendergast political machine in Kansas City, which controlled the city government, 1925–1939.

Pepper, Claude. Senator from Florida, 1936–1951.

Perkins, Frances. Secretary of Labor, 1933–1945.

Perlman, Philip B. Solicitor general of the United States, 1947–1952; represented the government in *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer* before the Supreme Court, 1952.

Pine, David. Judge, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, c. 1940–1970.

Pleven, René. Prime minister of France, 1950–1951, 1951–1952.

Radcliffe, George. Senator from Maryland, 1935–1947.

Radford, Arthur W. Navy admiral; commander, United States Pacific Fleet, 1949–1953.

Randall, Clarence. President, Inland Steel Company, 1949–c. 1952.

Rayburn, Sam. Congressman from Texas, 1913–1961; Speaker of the House, 1940–1947, 1949–1953.

Rhee, Syngman. President of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), 1948–1960.

Ribbentrop, Joachim von. Foreign minister of Germany, 1938–1945.

Ridgway, Matthew B. Army general; commander of the Eighth United States Army, December 1950–1952; Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1951–1952; commander, United Nations Command, 1951–1952; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1952–1953.

Robinson, Joseph T. Senator from Arkansas, 1913–1937.

Roosevelt, Eleanor. First Lady, 1933–1945.

Roosevelt, Elliott, and James Roosevelt. Sons of Franklin D. and Eleanor Roosevelt.

Rosenman, Samuel I. Special counsel to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, 1943–1946.

Ross, Charles G. Boyhood friend of Truman's; White House press secretary, 1945–1950.

Rowley, James J. Secret Service agent assigned to the White House during Truman's presidency.

Royall, Kenneth C. Secretary of the Army, 1947–1949.

Rusk, Dean. Assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, 1950–1951.

Russell, Richard. Senator from Alabama, 1933–1971.

Sawyer, Charles W. Secretary of commerce, 1948–1953.

Schuman, Robert. French foreign minister, 1948–1953.

Schwellenbach, Lewis. Senator from Washington, 1935–1940; secretary of labor, 1945–1948.

Shannon, Joseph B. Political boss of Kansas City's Ninth Ward, c. 1910–1930; leader of a faction, the "Rabbits," which rivaled the Pendergast faction for power in Jackson County, Missouri.

Sherman, Forrest. Navy admiral; chief of naval operations, 1949–1951.

Short, Joseph H., Jr. White House press secretary, 1950–1952.

Smith, Harold D. Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1939–1946.

Smith, Walter Bedell. Army general; ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1946–1948; director of Central Intelligence, 1950–1953.

Snyder, John W. Longtime friend of Truman's; official with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, c. 1936–1945; Federal Loan Administrator, 1945; director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, 1945–1946; secretary of the Treasury, 1946–1953.

Sokolovsky, Vasily. Soviet military officer; head of the Soviet military government in Germany, 1946–1949.

Soong, T. V. (宋子文). President of the Executive Yuan of the Republic of China, 1945–1947.

Souers, Sidney. Director of Central Intelligence, 1946; executive secretary, National Security Council, 1947–1950.

Spaak, Paul Henry. Belgian foreign minister, 1938–1939, 1939–1949; member of the Belgian delegation to the United Nations Conference, 1945.

Spaatz, Carl A. Army general; commander, United States Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, 1945.

Sparkman, John. Senator from Alabama, 1946–1979; Democratic Party candidate for vice president, 1952.

Stalin, Joseph. Dictator of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, c. mid-1920s–1953.

Stark, Harold R. Navy admiral, commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1942–1945.

Stark, Lloyd C. Governor of Missouri, 1937–1941; candidate for the Democratic nomination for senator from Missouri, 1940.

Steelman, John R. Assistant to the president, 1946–1953.

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr. Secretary of state, 1944–1945; U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, 1946.

Stevenson, Adlai E. Governor of Illinois, 1949–1953; Democratic Party candidate for president, 1952.

Stimson, Henry H. Secretary of war, 1940–1945.

Stone, Harlan Fiske. Supreme Court justice, 1925–1946; Chief Justice of the United States, 1941–1946.

Stuart, John Leighton. U.S. ambassador to China, 1946–1952.

Sullivan, John L. Secretary of the Navy, 1947–1949.

Symington, Stuart. Secretary of the Air Force, 1947–1950.

Taft, Robert A. Senator from Ohio, 1939–1953.

Thurmond, J. Strom. Governor of South Carolina, 1947–1951; candidate for president of the States' Rights Democratic Party, 1948.

Tito, Josip Broz. Head of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 1939–1980; leader of the Partisans, 1941–1945; supreme commander of the Yugoslav military, 1943–1980; prime minister of Yugoslavia, 1944–1963; president of Yugoslavia, 1953–1980.

Tobin, Maurice. Secretary of labor, 1948–1953.

Truman, Bess Wallace. Truman's wife; First Lady of the United States, 1945–1953.

Truman, John Anderson. Truman's father.

Truman, John Vivian. Truman's brother.

Truman, Margaret. Truman's daughter.

Truman, Martha Ellen. Truman's mother.

Truman, Mary Jane. Truman's sister.

Tydings, Millard E. Senator from Maryland, 1927–1951.

Vaccaro, Tony. White House correspondent for the Associated Press., 1938–1969.

Vandenberg, Arthur H. Senator from Michigan, 1928–1951; member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Conference, 1945.

Vandenberg, Hoyt. Air Force general; chief of staff of the Air Force, 1948–1953.

Van Fleet, James A. Army general; commander of the Eighth United States Army and United Nations Command forces in Korea, 1951–1953.

Vaughan, Harry. Longtime friend of Truman's; treasurer of Truman's campaign for reelection to the Senate, 1940.

Vinson, Fred M. Secretary of the Treasury, 1945–1946; Chief Justice of the United States, 1946–1953.

Vishinsky, Andrey. Deputy minister of foreign affairs, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1940–1949.

Wagner, Robert F. Senator from New York, 1927–1949.

Walker, Frank C. Postmaster general of the United States, 1940–1945; chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 1943–1944.

Walker, Walton. Army general; commander, Eighth United States Army, 1948–1950.

Wallace, Henry A. Vice president, 1941–1945; secretary of commerce, 1945–1946; Progressive Party candidate for president, 1948.

Wallace, Madge. Bess Truman's mother.

Wallgren, Monrad C. Senator from Washington, 1940–1945.

Watson, Edwin M. Army officer; military aide to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933–1945; appointments secretary to Roosevelt, 1938–1945.

Webb, James E. Under secretary of state, 1949–1952.

Weizmann, Chaim. Zionist leader.

Wherry, Kenneth S. Senator from Nebraska, 1945–1951.

Whitney, A. F. President, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 1928–1949.

Williams, Francis W. Army Air Corps and Air Force officer, 1947–1967; pilot of Truman's airplanes, *Sacred Cow* and *Independence*, 1948–1953.

Wilson, Charles E. Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, 1950–1952.

Wise, Stephen S. American Jewish leader and Zionist.

Wolff, Karl. Commander of German SS forces in Italy, c. 1945.

Wood, Edward (1st Earl of Halifax). Ambassador of the United Kingdom in Washington, DC, 1941–1946.

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