Hazard Analysis

Book Bazar

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$\underline{\text{Group } 6}$

Caleb Mech	mechc2
David Thompson	thompd10
Matthew Williams	willim36
Ahmed Al Koasmh	alkoasma
Harsh Mahajan	mahajanh

Contents

1 Overview				
2	Haz	zard Analysis Approach	3	
3	Boo	ok Bazar Hazards	4	
	3.1	Meeting Strangers to Buy Textbooks	4	
	3.2	User's Magic Link Gets Leaked	4	
	3.3	User's Personal Information Gets Leaked	4	
	3.4	Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	5	
	3.5	SQL Injection		
т	•	- C (TD-1-1		
L	ist	of Tables		
	1	Table of Revisions	3	

Table of Revisions

Version	Date(dd.mm.yyyy)	Author(s)	Description
0	16.11.2021	Harsh Mahajan	First version compiled. Inputs received from the entire team and IATEX doc compiled.
1	23.11.2021	Harsh Mahajan	Edits made to match rubric and feedback from TA.
2	26.11.2021	David Thompson	Fixed some spelling, grammar, and formatting errors in the document.
3	26.11.2021	Harsh Mahajan	Added onto the Safety Requirements and edited hazard 2.2
4	17.02.2022	All team members	Edited the document to reflect an FMEA approach to Hazard Analysis on TA's feed- back.

Table 1: Table of Revisions

1 Overview

The hazards for Book Bazar were identified by recognizing the vulnerabilities of Book Bazar that could be exploited by a malicious user. The causes of the events have been addressed by our mitigation strategies to either eliminate the hazard or to avoid it to the best of our capabilities. Our system is not a safety-critical system, yet it does possess some societal hazards, like the first hazard, that have been addressed.

Our system shall be authenticating users using their McMaster emails. As well, users may share their contact information with each other to buy or sell textbooks. In such scenarios, we've assumed the security of the systems that are providing the services. For example, when we authenticate users via their McMaster emails, we assume that the emails we send cannot be read by a third party.

2 Hazard Analysis Approach

The team adopted a "bottom-up," **Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)**, approach in analysing hazards of Book Bazar. Minor failures and their implications were identified and documented. Below are the major implications that we found and our means to mitigate them.

3 Book Bazar Hazards

3.1 Meeting Strangers to Buy Textbooks

Explanation

Meeting unknown strangers, even though they're verified as McMaster community members, does possess a certain level of danger. A user with malicious intent may post a frequently needed textbook on Book Bazar at a steep discount. The low price may attract several university students. The malicious user may set up a meeting in a secluded area where the users, especially first-year students who aren't familiar with campus and the surrounding neighbourhoods, may be susceptible to robbery or assault.

Cause of Event

This event occurs when there are malicious users using Book Bazar.

Mitigation

Safety tips for meeting strangers via Book Bazar will be provided when a user makes a post to sell a textbook or contacts a seller. Tips may include links to awareness tools, like the McMaster Safety App, that could be used to improve safety. Furthermore, a means of reporting malicious users may be created if deemed necessary.

Safety Requirements

Section 11.9 of the team's System Requirements Rev0 document covers this hazard.

3.2 User's Magic Link Gets Leaked

Explanation

To verify that a user is a member of the McMaster community, Book Bazar shall generate magic links which will be emailed to their McMaster emails. A malicious user may guess the link by brute force. When they access the link, they may use that to impersonate the user on Book Bazar platform.

Cause of Event

One of the means via which an attacker may acquire a user's magic link is by brute forcing all possible combinations. Apart from this, if the user is sharing their screen, then a malicious user viewing the screen would be able to note down the magic link.

Mitigation

We shall ensure that the magic links generated are sufficiently random and long to avoid someone viewing a screen from noting down the magic link. Furthermore the magic link will also have a short-enough lifespan to prevent any brute-force attempts.

Safety Requirements

SR1: A malicious user shall not be able to act on behalf of another user.

3.3 User's Personal Information Gets Leaked

Explanation

Personal information may be valuable to attackers since contact information could be used to run scams. Furthermore, a collection of personal information could allow an attacker to imitate a user for personal gain. Lastly, an attacker could use the personal contact information of a user to harass the user.

Cause of Event

Misconfigured access levels to data or providing access to data without requiring authentication.

Mitigation

To mitigate leaking users' personal information, we will only store personal information required to operate Book Bazar, such as the user's McMaster email, their name, and photos of the textbooks that they intend to sell. Furthermore, we shall require users to sign in before viewing personal information related to textbook postings. This means that only individuals affiliated with McMaster may access the contact information of sellers.

Safety Requirements

NFR12 of Section 11.6 of the team's System Requirements Rev0 document covers this hazard.

3.4 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Explanation

Cross-site scripting (often abbreviated as XSS) is a common form of arbitrary code execution that is prevalent in web applications. It allows an attacker to write JavaScript code in a textbox, then run this code on the computers of other users of the website. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting for more information.

Cause of Event

What follows is an example of an XSS attack. An attacker sets their name on Book Bazar to contain an HTML tag which contains JavaScript that mines cryptocurrency and deposits it in the attacker's cryptocurrency wallet. When a user views a textbook posting from the attacker, if the name set by the attacker is displayed, then the malicious script is loaded onto the user's computer, and their computer mines cryptocurrency for the attacker.

Mitigation

Input fields will be sanitized such that text with HTML or JavaScript content that is input into textboxes gets transformed into a form that, when displayed on another user's computer, will be interpreted as plain text instead of code or marked up text.

Safety Requirements

SR2: Attackers should be incapable of running arbitrary code on any of the user's computer(s) accessing the application.

3.5 SQL Injection

Explanation

An attacker performs an unauthorized SQL query through appending the query to one of the parameters of a service that interacts with the database. This query could compromise the integrity of the database, for instance, by erasing all the data. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SQL_injection for more information.

Cause of Event

An attacker passes an SQL query to a service, and Book Bazar's server executes this SQL query.

Mitigation

We will use an object-relational mapping library (ORM) to interact with the database. An ORM provides a layer of abstraction between the code that operates with data and the SQL calls. This way, developers don't need to write SQL queries directly, and instead interact with the database using object-oriented paradigms. This prevents making calls to the database that may contain SQL injections.

Another approach we shall take to mitigate the effects of an SQL injection is by creating backups of the database. If we detect that the integrity of the data has been compromised, then we can restore the backup of the database.

Safety Requirements

SR3: An attacker shall be unable to perform arbitrary database operations.