

# Change in Representation: Are Citizens Represented in the System?

Carlos Algara  
[calgara@ucdavis.edu](mailto:calgara@ucdavis.edu)

November 21, 2017




# Agenda

- 1 District-Centered Representation
- 2 Partisan-Centered Representation


*District vs. Party in Congress**Congress Type*

	<b>District Centered</b>	<b>Party Centered</b>
Committees	Autonomous	Arms of Parties
Policies	Particularized Policy; Universalism	Party Agenda
Election Mechanism	Incubency	Partisanship
Representation	Individual responsibility, district-focused responsiveness to median voter	Collective responsibility, ideological conflict, partisan tides decide MC fate

- ▶ What does district-centered representation look like with respect to congruence between constituent & member ideology?



- ▶ Who determines “district ideology” under the district-centered model? What incentive for candidates?



# District-Centered Representation: *Miller & Stokes*


- ▶ Two contrasting models of representation: *delegate* vs. *trustee* model
- ▶ Which does Madison's *Republic* adhere to?
- ▶ Under what conditions are constituents able to influence representation? How is representation conceptualized as?
- ▶ Constituents influence MCs on social policies (Burkean model)
- ▶ On Civil Rights, MCs using the delegate model (usually regional salience wins out over partisan salience)
- ▶ View of voters: ambivalent and low information on how MCs provide ideological representation

## Consequence of Being “Out-of-Step”?


“You can only go so far in Texas... there's nothing more useless to the Democrats than a dead liberal.” Rep. Lyndon Johnson (D-TX)

- ▶ Another assumption about voters: “individual voters are fairly ignorant about members' policy actions”
- ▶ However, are members still attentive to constituent opinion? Particularly which constituents under the district-centered model?
- ▶ What do Canes-Wrone & her authors find?
- ▶ Electoral *consequence* for “out-of-step” members that privilege party over district preferences
- ▶ Extremists less likely to be re-elected & they lose vote-share (both in marginal & safe seats)
- ▶ Evidence for the district-centered model?

- ▶ What does partisan-centered representation look like with respect to congruence between constituent & member ideology?




- ▶ Who determines “district ideology” under the district-centered model? What incentive for candidates?



# Implications of the *Partisan-Model*

- ▶ What's Bafumi & Herron's argument?
- ▶ *Leap-frog representation*: median voter “leap-frogged” & change in representation happens at the extremes


Leapfrog Representation: Change in Representation among Swing Districts, 2010



## Implications of the *Partisan Model*


- ▶ What are the implications of the *partisan model* with respect to accountability?
- ▶ Collective responsibility more paramount in *partisan model*
- ▶ Which set of voters are pivotal in the partisan model?
- ▶ Which legislative chamber is relatively “more extreme” according to Bafumi & Herron? What are the implications for transaction costs?
- ▶ Why would this disconnect between the median voter & member ideology exist?
- ▶ Are MCs more *ideologically extreme* than their constituents? What's the implications for this with respect to Madison's *Republic*?

# Contrasting Sources of Representation



- ▶ If **A** is dominant, which system of representation do you get?
- ▶ If **B** is dominant, which system of representation do you get?
- ▶ What if **C** is dominant, which system of representation do you get?


# Evidence of *Change* in Representation



- ▶ Which Congress is more consistent with the “district-model?”  
Which is more consistent with the “partisan model?”


# Evidence for the *Partisan Model?* Candidate Emergence

House Candidates' Ideological Positions by District Ideology Preferences in the 2016 Elections




## Evidence for the *Partisan Model*? Winning Candidates

## House Winning Candidates' Ideological Positions by District Ideology Preferences in the 2016 Elections




# Evidence for the *Partisan Model?* Candidate Emergence


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
# Potential for Leap-Frog Representation: U.S. House



# Leap-Frog Representation: U.S. Senate




# Hybrid Model of Representation?



Is there evidence that district ideology influences representative's party? Does this fit with any of the models discussed?

# Contrasting Representation Outcomes Across Models



- ▶ How is the model a blend of the Madisonian & partisan model? Does this fit Bafumi & Shapiro's thesis?

## Key Points:

- ▶ Madisonian Theory suggests perfect congruence between district (median voter) preferences & member ideology
- ▶ Miller & Stokes find in the 1960's that MCs largely responsive to district preferences on social policies but not & foreign policy
- ▶ Canes-Wrone find a penalty for voters that are "out-of-step with district" & consistent with district-centered representation
- ▶ Current partisan polarization leads to "leap-frog" representation where voters are represented by either a relatively liberal Democrat or conservative Republican (insignificant moderates)
- ▶ Greater variation within party (not perfect) leads to hybrid model between district & party models