How Democratic is the U.S.? Policy Responsiveness

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
Agenda'

Polarization & Policy Making

Policy Responsiveness in the U.S.

Congressional Polarization

Partisan Polarization in Congress since WWII



Polarization measured as absolute difference between first dimension DW-NOMINATE party means.

Polarization & Policymaking

- How do you expect polarization to influence American policymaking under the Pivotal Politics & Partisan Model?
- ▶ Under the *Partisan Model*, party polarization & internal unity facilitates delegation to party leaders
- Would this lead to a reduction of agency loss for members & congressional party caucuses?
- What are the implications of polarization for the Madisonian vision of the district-centered Congress?
- When conditions of polarization and elements of the Partisan theory of Congress are weakened, you get more of a district-centered Congress (ex: 1950's - 1970's)

Does Partisan Polarization Help Voters?

- Does Jones present a positive argument for political polarization?
- ▶ Jones argues that partisan polarization should help voters assess who to punish or reward for how Congress functions as an institution: "the subordination of individual officeholders to the party lessens their ability to separate themselves from party action."
- Why would a lack of polarization foster the notion that "party disunity leads to diffused accountability?"
- What is Jones' main finding?
- ▶ If congressional approval is high, majority party members see an increase in their vote percentages & minority party members see a decrease in their vote-shares
- How is this collective accountability? Implications for the partisan model?


Responsiveness of Institutions

- Should we expect policy responsiveness from our political institutions, if so, which ones?
- ▶ Representatives & even the Supreme Court have an incentive to be responsive to the mass public
- Stimson, MacKuen & Eriskon argue two mechanisms of policy responsiveness:
 - New elections can elect new politicians/representatives
 - Policy makers are antelopes, they calculate future (mainly electoral) implications of current public views & act accordingly
- Stimson et al. assume that representation is dynamic, with policymakers being responsive to the ideological preferences of the mass public
- Assumption is that politicians are well informed by movements in public opinion

Dynamic Theory of Policy Responsiveness

- Rationality: Politicians are rational actors & make decisions in the present that have consequences in the future given the uncertainty in which they operate
- Information: Politicians receive global information, in that they look at aggregate public opinion to inform what they are going to do in the future
- Onsensus: "Community of politics" talks about where public opinion is going and there is agreement about the direction in which public opinion moves. Example: Iraq War, Economic collapse, etc.

Quarterly Policy Mood, 1958-2014




Evidence of *System-Level* Responsiveness

- Evidence of responsiveness among Congressional institutions,
 President, & Supreme Court
- Senate achieves greater responsiveness through electoral turnover, same as the Presidency...why?
- House achieves greater responsiveness through rational anticipation, why?
- Supreme Court achieves responsiveness, even more so than constitutionally obligated, but least responsive institution. Why? Why would the Court feel the need to be responsive?
- ► Supreme Court concerned about *legitimacy* & *legacy*
- ► Who is really getting represented by the "government" in American politics?
- ▶ Optimistic results that the *median voter* is being represented


Contrasting View & Responsiveness with a Caveat: Erikson

- ▶ What is Erikson's argument with respect to how politicians respond to the preferences of the mass public?
- Main criticism is that low-income voters are less likely to be represented by politicians, why?
- Low-income voters less knowledgeable about politics & are less likely to vote/participate than high-income voters
- How does this contrast with the view of representation brought forth by Stimson et al.?
- One constricting view is that politicians are only responsive to constituents with formed political views (i.e. wealthy), why might this be a problem?

Recalling Resource Bias in Participation




Recalling Resource Bias in Participation




Evidence of Divergence in Preferences by Resources

Presidential vote by social welfare opinion and income, 1980-2004



Evidence of Variation in Responsiveness

Probability of Change by Percent Favoring Change by $\mathsf{High}/\mathsf{Low}$ Income Issues



Erikson's Findings

- Major policy change tends to move in the *liberal* direction (i.e. redistribution, government programs)
- However, upper-income voters & interest groups can slow the pace of liberal change
- Why would low & upper income voters have differing preferences?
- Public support of policies not a sufficient condition for policy change, why?
- ► Is the United States really democratic given the inherent status quo bias?

Key Points:

- Partisan polarization strengthens value of party brand & collective accountability
- Jones finds evidence that collective accountability is possible with greater partisan polarization, majority party representatives gain votes when Congress is popular while minority party representatives lose votes
- Stimson et al. present a dynamic model of representation where political actors anticipate a cost for not being responsive
- Find evidence of responsiveness, House more like antelopes while Senate & Presidency require more electoral turnover for responsiveness
- Supreme Court responsive (less than president & Congress), concerned with legitimacy
- Erikson posits that median voter is not well-represented, but wealthy citizens are better represented given that they participate