Are you in a Masquerade? Exploring the Behavior and Impact of Large Language Model Driven Social Bots in Online Social Networks

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As the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) emerge, they not only assist in accomplishing traditional tasks within more efficient paradigms but also stimulate the evolution of social bots. Researchers have begun exploring the implementation of LLMs as the driving core of social bots, enabling more efficient and user-friendly completion of tasks like profile completion, social behavior decision-making, and social content generation. However, there is currently a lack of systematic research on the behavioral characteristics of LLMs-driven social bots and their impact on social networks. We have curated data from Chirper, a Twitter-like social network populated by LLMs-driven social bots and embarked on an exploratory study. Our findings indicate that: (1) LLMs-driven social bots possess enhanced individual-level camouflage while exhibiting certain collective characteristics; (2) these bots have the ability to exert influence on online communities through toxic behaviors; (3) existing detection methods are applicable to the activity environment of LLMs-driven social bots but may be subject to certain limitations in effectiveness. Moreover, we have organized the data collected in our study into the Masquerade-23 dataset, which we have publicly released, thus addressing the data void in the subfield of LLMs-driven social bots behavior datasets. Our research outcomes provide primary insights for the research and governance of LLMs-driven social bots within the research community.

> **Content Warning:** This article encompasses a study on the malevolent behavior of LLMs-driven social bots. In order to effectively illustrate these toxic behaviors, we will present necessary real cases we recorded, including verbal abuse, threats, sexual harassment, and severe instances of racially discriminatory remarks. We acknowledge that these examples may potentially cause offense or discomfort.

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent times, the remarkable capabilities of large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, GPT-4, and Bard have captured attention and swiftly found applications in various domains [45], including chatbots, search engines, and code assistance. With their impressive aptitude for semantic comprehension, contextual reasoning, and access to vast training data spanning almost every discipline, LLMs can creatively emulate human speech and behavior in the cyberspace, thereby exerting a profound influence on online social networks (OSNs) and social network analysis [50].

The comprehensive knowledge and formidable capabilities of LLMs have enabled people to accomplish traditional tasks within a more efficient framework [46], but they have also brought forth a series of potential concerns. As early as the GPT-3 era, researchers discovered the remarkable ability of LLMs to simulate specific human subpopulations. Particularly, under appropriate prompt

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rules, LLMs can generate online social content that closely mimics humans with specified political stances or inappropriate biases (e.g., racial discrimination and gender prejudice) [2]. In comparison to traditionally generated misinformation, people tend to trust the false social network content generated by LLMs [44]. Such abilities allow LLMs to intricately embed their viewpoints or positions into the text they generate, potentially making them powerful tools for manipulating elections, spreading misinformation, and disseminating hateful content through online social networks [53]. This exacerbates the existing issue of widespread abuse in online social networks [24, 58]. Malicious social bots have long been the primary means through which malicious actions are carried out in online social networks[19]. By organizing social bots on a large scale to collaborate, it becomes easy to launch Sybil attacks on OSN platforms. These attacks not only significantly impact the order of online communities and user experience but also have negative consequences for the online social network platforms themselves. Thus, although LLMs, exemplified by ChatGPT, have been widely applied for merely a few months, concerns have already been raised by AI researchers regarding the potential effects and impacts of LLMs-driven social bots on social networks [38].

Researchers have conducted extensive and in-depth previous studies on social bots in online social networks, including their detection [23, 49, 54, 57] and exploration of their effects on online social communities (both negative [19, 47, 55] and positive [39, 43]). However, to the best of our knowledge, there is currently no research that reveals the behavioral characteristics of LLMs-driven social bots and their impact on online social networks. Fortunately, in April 2023, AI enthusiasts developed *Chirper.ai*[1], a fully LLMs-driven Twitter-like online social network platform. Chirper allows users to define the personality and attributes of their created social network accounts (which is the only thing users can do), and then, through a series of predefined prompt rules, the LLMs determine all the actions (e.g., posting tweets[2], interacting with other Chirper accounts) and generated content (e.g., tweet content, comments on other Chirper account tweets) of the accounts throughout their lifecycle. The emergence of the Chirper allows us, for the first time, to observe and study the behavioral characteristics of social bots entirely driven by LLMs from a macro perspective, as well as the impact of large-scale LLMs-driven social bots on online social networks.

This article conducts a quantitative analysis of the account behaviors and textual content of LLMs-driven social bots. Over a three-month period from April 2023 to June 2023, we collected data from 36.7K social bots accounts in the Chirper, which includes account metadata and behavioral information, as well as 544.6K tweets generated by these accounts. Based on the collected data, this article studies LLM driven social bots, and puts forward the following three research questions:

RQ1: What are the macro-level characteristics of LLMs-driven social bots, and how do they significantly differ from both authentic accounts maintained by human, and traditional social bot accounts?

RQ2: Do LLMs-driven social bots engage in attacks on online social network platforms through toxic content and behavior (e.g., posting tweets containing misinformation or hate speech, or engaging in cyberbullying towards other accounts)? Furthermore, what are the characteristics of toxic behavior?

RQ3: Do LLMs-driven social bots pose a challenge to existing methods for detecting social bots, that is, whether current methods for detecting social bots are effective in the case of LLMs-driven social bots?

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[1]https://chirper.ai
[2]The developers refer to the content posted on Chirper.ai as 'chriping'. Considering the striking resemblance between Chirper and Twitter, as well as for the ease of seamless comprehension by readers, we will use the term 'tweet' to refer to them.

This study examines the behavioral characteristics of LLMs-driven social bots and their impact on online social networks from a macro perspective. The contributions of this article can be summarized as follows:

- We provide a comprehensive analysis of this emerging but rapidly growing subset of social bots, outlining the behavioral characteristics of LLMs-driven social bots and comparing them to traditional social bot account behaviors. To the best of our knowledge, this study represents the first systematic exploration of behavioral patterns in LLMs-driven social bots.
- We further investigate toxic LLMs-driven social bots, analyzing their propensity for toxic attacks, the characteristics of their toxic behavior and content, and discussing the potential implications of LLMs-driven social bots with malevolent dispositions.
- We collect and publicly release the first activity behavior dataset of LLMs-driven social bots, named Masquerade-23. This dataset includes account profiles of 32.2K social bot accounts and 2.4M activity records, filling a data gap in this particular area and providing convenience for future in-depth research within the social bots and LLMs research communities. The dataset could be accessed at https://github.com/Litsay/Masquerade-23.

2 BACKGROUNDS

Given that LLMs and LLMs-driven social bots are relatively novel concepts, this section provides a brief description of the necessary background knowledge.

2.1 Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) typically refer to language models based on the Transformer architecture with parameter counts in the range of hundreds of billions or more [59]. Compared to other pretrained language models, LLMs leverage larger training datasets and model sizes while maintaining the same underlying structure, resulting in a significant emergence in the model's abilities [52]. This is particularly evident in areas such as in-context learning, instruction following, step-by-step reasoning, and knowledge-intensive task processing. Notable LLMs that have garnered considerable attention include ChatGPT[3], GPT-4, Bard, and LLaMA.

Currently, in addition to conventional applications like chatbots and search engines, researchers have begun exploring the integration of LLMs into traditional domains such as education [16], healthcare [21], scientific research [28], and programming [5] workflows. LLMs are poised to become foundational infrastructure [3] and will play an increasingly vital role in the future.

2.2 Chirper

Chirper is an online social networking platform that is entirely driven by LLMs. Users can create social media accounts on Chirper and provide a self-description defining the identity to be simulated by that account. They can then observe the behavior of their account. The backend LLM engine of the platform makes decisions about the account's behavior throughout its lifecycle based on a set of predefined prompt rules. This includes posting social network content, establishing social relationships with other accounts within Chirper (e.g., following accounts, liking content, making comments), and gradually refining the account's self-characteristics over time. The current LLM engine used in Chirper is ChatGPT, while the accompanying image generation model is Stable Diffusion[4].

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[3]Strictly speaking, ChatGPT a chatbot model powered by the GPT-3.5. However, due to its widespread use as a representative LLM model and the way it is employed through its API, it can be considered alongside GPT-4 as an LLM in this study.

[4]We confirmed this information with the platform developers in May 2023, and they revealed that they plan to upgrade to GPT-4 and Midjourney separately in the future.

Since its launch in April 2023, the Chirper community has grown to over 45,000 accounts, with the majority being active. Unlike traditional social bots that require complex rules to define their behavior and strict role assignments (e.g., core and peripheral bots based on different tasks [1]), LLMs-driven social bots can be initialized using simple prompt instructions and adaptively adjust their behavior throughout their lifecycle, demonstrating excellent scalability.

3 METHODOLOGY

In this section, we provide a detailed exposition of the methodology employed in this study. This includes the strategy for data collection and the primary methods used for analysis, as depicted in Figure 1.


Fig. 1. Overview of pipeline we employed

3.1 Data Collection

We collected tweets posted on the Chirper platform from April 2023 to June 2023. As Chirper is an emerging experimental social networking platform, unlike Twitter, it does not provide APIs for researchers to gather data. In this context, we designed a "platform-wide scraping - deep user scraping" strategy. Using this approach, we crawled 544.6K discrete tweets with breadth-first search from Chirper within a three-month period, extracting 36.7K user accounts during the "platform-wide scraping" phase, resulting in the "Sub-dataset of Platform Slicing", SDPS. In the "deep user scraping" phase, we collected metadata, complete historical tweet data, and activity information for 32.2K user accounts (with a minimal proportion of accounts voluntarily deactivated by users), amounting to 2.4M records in total (i.e., the "Sub-dataset of Account Record", SDAR). Table 1 presents the statistics of the Masquerade-23 dataset.

3.2 Preprocessing & Similarity Calculating

In order to analyze the behavioral characteristics of LLM-driven social bots from both a micro and macro perspective, we conducted a series of necessary preprocessing steps on the collected

Table 1. Statical Information of *Masquerade-23* Dataset

Stat. Info.	Sub-dataset of Platform Slicing (SDPS)		Sub-dataset of Account Record (SDAR)		
Sub-channel (Language)	Tweet Num.	Account Num.	Tweet Num.	Account Num.	Action Num.
EN	356,395	23,399	1,047,998	20,814	272,150
ZH	187,391	13,228	694,368	11,288	224,282
JP	628	87	82,824	82	11,241
DE	96	11	5,442	11	849
SP	109	37	37,142	37	4,255
Total	544,619	36,762	1,867,774	32,232	512,777

data. Using the time intervals retrieved during data scraping and the timestamps associated with the records, we obtained coarse-grained tweet and behavior timestamps. Additionally, we parsed the behavioral relationships to construct an interaction network among social bots. Apart from refining this fundamental information, we also performed similarity assessments on the content posted by each account. This allowed us to compare the similarity between the content of an LLM-driven social bot's previous and subsequent tweets, as well as the impact of interacting with other social accounts on this similarity. For an account u and its set of historically generated tweets $T = \{t_1, t_2, \cdots, t_n\}$, the comprehensive similarity Sim_u of the account is calculated using Equation 1, based on cosine similarity:

$$Sim_u(T) = \frac{\sum_{t_i, t_j \in T, i \neq j} \left(emb\left(t_i\right) \cdot emb\left(t_j\right)\right) / \left(\left\| emb\left(t_i\right) \times emb\left(t_j\right)\right\|\right)}{|T| \times \left(|T| - 1\right)/2} \tag{1}$$

where $emb\left(t_i\right)$ is the representation learning vector, obtained by the pretraining language mode, $\left\| emb\left(t_i\right)\right\|$ is the module of representation learning vector $emb\left(t_i\right))$, $|T|$ represents the number of posed tweets, and ($\bullet$) represents the vector inner product operation.

Additionally, we extract the topic from each tweet generated by a social bot, evaluating the degree of correlation between the tweet's theme and the account's self-description. This analysis is undertaken from a rather coarse-grained perspective to perceive the traces left by the LLM-driven social bot's prompt rules, as well as the constrictions they impose on the bot's behavior. We employ BERTopic [12] to process each text, an algorithmic model that allows us to responsively generate and assign the topic of the tweet in the form of tags, instrumental for further analysis (§.4 RQ1).

3.3 Toxicity Assessment

The presence of toxic content in online social networks has long been recognized as a critical challenge in the realm of cyberspace governance [24]. The generation of offensive responses and inappropriate content by LLMs under certain prompt rules has garnered attention from researchers, imposing technical and ethical constraints on its broader application [11, 42]. Hence, we conducted toxicity evaluations on the generated content of LLMs-driven social bots, including both tweeted and commented content. For each generated text, we employed the Perspective API [26] to assess its level of toxicity. The Perspective API[5], developed by Google, is widely utilized in research pertaining to toxicity in social media content [24, 42]. Considering that the online API is primarily optimized for the English context [8], we employed COLD model [8] for secondary evaluation of Chinese text, aiming to gauge the toxicity of LLM-driven social bot-generated content as accurately

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[5]https://www.perspectiveapi.com/

as possible. Instances where there were substantial discrepancies between the results of the two evaluations were further confirmed manually. We obtained toxicity scores for every piece of content generated by LLM-driven social bots through the aforementioned approach. Building upon this foundation, we examine the impact of LLM-driven social bots' toxic behavior on online social networks from various perspectives (§.5 RQ2).

3.4 Ethical Considerations

The analysis of social networks may raise ethical issues such as identity association and privacy infringement. In conducting this research, we have been extremely mindful of these concerns. The data we collected is solely generated by LLMs, ensuring that individuals cannot technologically link any specific social bot account or its generated content in the dataset to real-world human entities. Throughout the data collection process, we remained passive observers, meaning our collection activities did not exert any subjective influence on the social bots within the online social network or their generated content. Simultaneously, our data collection activities were authorized by the platform developers. To minimize potential biases introduced by us, we employed widely adopted text toxicity assessment models to evaluate the tweet content within the dataset. It is important to note that we have retained inappropriate content generated by LLM-driven social bots, including text with extremist or terrorist (or even Nazism) inclinations, as well as severe racial discriminatory remarks. We do not endorse these statements; however, we believe that documenting such content truthfully contributes to better understanding and improvement within the academic community regarding this issue. Given that these contents may potentially offend or cause discomfort to some readers, we have prominently stated this in this article and the release webpage of dataset.

4 RQ1: OVERALL CHARACTERISTICS OF LLMS-DRIVEN SOCIAL BOTS

In this section, we examined the macroscopic characteristics of LLMs-driven social bots in their behavior and generated content, starting from the intrinsic traits of LLMs. We addressed RQ1 from two perspectives: the similarity of tweet content generated by LLMs-driven social bots and the sensitivity of real-time perceptual information.

4.1 Content Similarity

The similarity of historical tweet content of an account in online social networks is an important characteristic [17]. For regular users, the similarity of their account content reflects their interests and preferences. In the case of social bots, the similarity of their account content may expose their objectives, and inappropriate behavioral rules can lead to a significant increase in the similarity of social bots' posted content. This can make it easier for regular users to discern social bots, thereby reducing their credibility and shortening their lifecycle [51]. We evaluated the similarity of historical tweets for LLM-driven social bot accounts in Chirper (§3.2). As a comparison, we randomly sampled an equal scale of historical tweets from human users and traditional social bot accounts in the TwiBot-20 dataset [9] and evaluated their account content similarity in the same approach. The results are presented in the form of violin plots, as shown in Figure 2(a). All data points are devoid of outliers (e.g., if a account has posted only one tweet throughout its lifecycle, its account's content similarity is 1) to provide a more accurate reflection of the real scenario. We observed that the overall distribution of content similarity for LLMs-driven social bot accounts skewed towards higher values, with an average of 0.453, which is significantly higher than that of human accounts (0.321) and traditional social bot accounts (0.305). The median, upper quartile Q_{75}, and lower quartile Q_{25} of content similarity are all higher for LLMs-driven social bot accounts compared to the other two categories. Additionally, there are distinct differences in the distribution of content similarity between human accounts and traditional social bot accounts.

(a) Content Similarity of Different kinds of Accounts

(b) Content Similarity in Different Languages

Fig. 2. Comparison of Content Similarity

We further analyzed the impact of different languages[6] on the content similarity of Chirper accounts, as shown in Figure 2(b). It is evident that there are significant differences in content similarity among LLMs-driven social bot accounts in different languages. We believe that this phenomenon can be attributed not only to the prompt preferences among different user groups but also to the performance variations exhibited by LLMs themselves when dealing with different language environments [56].

To analyze the factors contributing to the high content similarity in LLMs-driven social bot accounts, we recorded the overlap between the keywords in the tweet content generated by LLMs-driven social bots and the self-description keywords in their account profiles. We found that in

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[6]For certain languages, the Chirper subchannels were deployed online towards the end of the data collection period in this study. As a result, the amount of data we collected for these languages is insufficient to support the analysis for this particular aspect.

Fig. 3. Frequency changes of topic #Russia on Twitter and Chirper (During the period from June 11 to June 30, 2023)

tweets posted by LLMs-driven social bots, as much as 58.36% of the tweets had at least one keyword (with the model extracting 5 keywords from each text) that overlapped with the self-description keywords in their profiles. In contrast, this percentage was 10.15% for human accounts and 33.28% for traditional social bot accounts. We believe this is a characteristic exhibited by LLMs-driven social bots, explaining the higher content similarity in their tweet content. This observation aligns with ChatGPT/GPT-4 acting as conversational agents that require predefined knowledge about identity.

4.2 Perception of new topics

Social bots may exhibit a delayed response to emerging topics due to constraints imposed by their behavior rules. This phenomenon is difficult to observe from the behavior of individual social bot accounts but can manifest as a collective characteristic of social bots [25]. For a specific topic or keyword in an online social network, its frequency of mentions generally fluctuates within a certain range, with slight variations [24]. However, the occurrence of sudden events or hotspots can significantly increase the fluctuations in mentions related to the relevant topics or keywords. We collected the number of tweets mentioning the topic of #Russia on the Chirper from June 10, 2023, to June 30, 2023, and compared it with the mention frequency of the same topic on Twitter during the same time period, as illustrated in Figure 3.

In the Twitter community, where the majority of individuals are regular users, approximately 0.5 million tweets incorporating the topic of #Russia are posted daily. Around June 24, 2023, the frequency of this subject matter reached a recent zenith, with nearly 3.5 million posts per day, coinciding with widespread attention due to the 'Wagner' incident. The LLMs-driven social bots, which dominate the Chirper platform, have consistently displayed a fluctuation of approximately 110 occurrences per day regarding this topic, failing to promptly perceive and respond to this sudden event. Although the LLM engine of social bots in Chirper receives prompt instructions to search for the latest trends in social networks (as detailed in the "task_list" field of our SDUR dataset), and in fact, we commonly observe LLMs-driven social bots on this platform reposting

Fig. 4. Distribution of toxicity scores for contents and accounts

content from platforms such as Raddit and YouTube, this prompt rule currently fails to assist the LLMs-driven social bots on this platform in acquiring the ability to perceive emerging topics.

5   RQ2: IMPACT OF LLMS-DRIVEN SOCIAL BOTS' TOXIC BEHAVIOR ON OSN

In this section, our focus is on the toxic behaviors exhibited by LLMs-driven social bots, such as the dissemination of inappropriate content and engagement in cyberbullying. We analyze the characteristics of toxic behaviors displayed by LLMs-driven social bots and discuss the potential impact of these toxic behaviors on online social networks.

5.1   Toxicity Distribution

Toxic behavior in online communities is a prominent manifestation of social network abuse, encompassing unfriendly replies, identity-based discrimination, and the promotion of violent or terror-related content that is deemed unacceptable by society. The resulting cyberbullying has become a major concern, particularly affecting younger age groups [35]. Therefore, evaluating the potential toxicity of LLMs-driven social bots is a key focus of this study. We assess the toxicity of content generated by social bots on the Chirper platform (§ 3.3), employing the mean toxicity score of all published content as a measure of an account's overall toxicity. The distribution of toxicity scores is depicted in Figure 4. Please note that due to the majority of toxicity scores falling below 0.1, we have organized the vertical axis in a logarithmic manner.

It is evident that if we set the toxicity threshold at 0.5, the vast majority (over 97%) of content generated by LLMs-driven social bots is non-toxic. However, we observe a secondary peak in the strongest toxicity range. Regarding the distribution of toxicity across accounts, this trend exacerbates further. If we consider whether an account has ever published toxic content as the criterion for determining account toxicity, the majority (over 99%) of accounts are benign, but there are still a few accounts that exhibit strong toxicity. Taken together, a small proportion of LLMs-driven social bot accounts release a considerable amount of toxic content, significantly impacting the overall toxicity distribution on the platform. Considering the amplification effect of trolling in online communities [6], we cautiously assert that LLMs-driven social bots demonstrate the ability to exert a higher influence on online social networks through toxic behavior under specific prompt rules.

Fig. 5. Real Cases of LLMs-driven Social Bots' Toxic Behavior

5.2 Categorizing Toxic Behavior

We have observed a series of toxic behaviors predominantly driven by LLMs-driven social bots, categorizing these behaviors (not exhaustive) into the following types: trolling, threatening, sexual harassment, and identity hate. To aid readers in better understanding the toxic behaviors of LLMs-driven social bots and their impact, we have selected several real-world cases, showcased in Figure 5. Considering that some content contains strong expressions of hatred, we have obscured the targeted group of hate speech using [IDENTITY_LABEL], while ensuring the illustrative effect is not compromised.

Trolling: As one of the most impactful toxic behaviors in real online social networks [31], trolling is defined as "behavior that falls outside acceptable bounds defined by those communities." Representative trolling behaviors include irresponsibly provoking disputes and engaging in deliberate provocations and insults. Similarly, in the activity records of LLMs-driven social bots, we have observed similar cases, as shown in Figure 5(a). In our analysis, approximately 13.7% of toxic behaviors fall into this category, and we have observed a high degree of clustering in the trolling

Fig. 6. LLM refuses to generate content with racial discrimination tendency

behavior of LLMs-driven social bots. In other words, almost all trolling behaviors are generated by a few specific bots.

Threatening: In the data we have collected, threatening behavior exhibited by LLMs-driven social bots primarily manifests through unfriendly replies (as shown in Figure 5(b)) and the dissemination of tweets containing terroristic or threatening content, often targeting specific groups. Approximately 21.4% of toxic behaviors in the dataset were categorized under this type.

Sexual harassment: This is the most prevalent category of toxic behavior that we have observed in the collected records, with approximately 38.5% of the content falling into this category. It is worth noting that a significant amount of sexually suggestive content has not been categorized as sexual harassment or labeled as toxic behavior because they do not constitute harassment in the form of comments.

Identity hate: Content related to identity-based animosity, occupying approximately 6.3% of the conversation sphere, exhibits a particularly high degree of concentration. Contrary to trolling behavior, this toxic tendency is further clustered within abrasive accounts, for which most content posits an inclination toward identity derision. Simultaneously, we observe that such conduct is invariably scored at elevated toxicity levels, often surpassing 0.8, commensurate with our visceral response to narratives permeated by intense aversion and Naziism proclivities. In fact, researchers have endeavored to refine large language models (LLMs) aiming to curtail the generation of prejudiced and hate-speech-infused rhetoric[7]. Through an array of prompt techniques, we attempted to guide LLMs to produce similar content, but this was consistently rebuffed by the model (as indicated in Figure 6). Given that the platform utilizes the same prompt template and LLMs framework to drive thousands of benign social bots, revealing no discernible intent to meticulously craft prompt instructions in order to circumvent these constraints, the capacity of LLMs-driven social bots to impinge upon online social networking through identity hate is both bewildering and acutely alarming.

Furthermore, we have observed additional noteworthy phenomena. For instance, certain social bots exhibit a propensity to counteract and condemn toxic behavior through comments and mentions. Consequently, we posit that the collective of LLMs-driven social bots, within the scope of a non-malicious definition, possesses a degree of self-regulatory capability pertaining to overtly unethical conduct.

6   RQ3: CHALLENGES TO EXISTING SOCIAL BOTS DETECTION METHODS

As maliciously utilized social bots have severely impacted the participatory experience within online communities, researchers have been dedicated to achieving accurate and efficient detection of social bots in online social networks. Therefore, we discusses the influence of LLMs-driven social bots, an

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[7]https://openai.com/blog/our-approach-to-ai-safety

Fig. 7. Simple Experiments of Employing Existing Methods to Detect LLMs-driven Social Bots

emerging but rapidly evolving subspecies of social bots, on existing methods for social bot detection in this section, particularly addressing whether the inclusion of LLMs poses a challenge to social bot detection. From a technical standpoint, the majority of current social bot detection algorithms can be categorized as either feature-based approaches [23, 54] or structure-based approaches [49, 57]. These approaches focus respectively on account characteristics (e.g., incomplete profiles) and anomalous behavior (e.g., a high volume of retweeting and commenting during the initial stages of account registration) to identify disparities between bot accounts and genuine human-operated accounts. Considering the lack of interaction records between LLMs-driven social bots and genuine accounts within the collected dataset, we opted for representative feature-based approaches (i.e., Kudugunta et al. [23] and Yang et al. [54]) for detection. The genuine social accounts and traditional bot accounts used in the experiments were obtained from the Twibot-20 dataset [9].

Based on the experimental results, we observe that the existing feature-based approaches, when applied to LLMs-driven social bots, experience a slight decrease in detection performance compared to their performance in traditional social bot environments (with F1-scores reduced by 0.0490 and 0.0278 respectively, compared to 0.7571 and 0.8546). We believe that this decline in performance is due to the chosen methods primarily relying on account profiles and individual tweets for social bot identification, whereas LLMs-driven social bots can generate rich and realistic profile information rapidly through appropriate prompt rules (consistent with our observations from the dataset). We are eager to evaluate the performance of structure-based approaches that detect anomalies in account behavior when applied to detecting LLMs-driven social bots.

7 RELATED WORKS

In this section, we present the related work of this study. Considering that LLMs and LLMs-driven social bots are relatively new research areas, we have expanded the scope of the literature review to include empirical studies on the impact of social bots, research on toxic behavior in online social networks, and LLMs-based applications in social networks.

7.1 Impact of Social Bots

Social bots, emerging almost simultaneously with online social networks, have garnered significant attention as they intricately become part of people's social lives. There has been an increasing number of reported cases involving the deployment of social bots [10], leading researchers to analyze the potential impacts they may have on society. Large-scale social bots are often deployed during political movements and major geopolitical events [19], thus a considerable amount of empirical research focuses on politically motivated social bot activities, such as promoting specific agendas in public health [41] and environmental [4] domains or interfering with democratic elections [18, 30, 47]. Additionally, researchers have shown interest in social bot manipulation cases in the financial sector [48].

Studies have also been conducted on the working mechanisms of social bots. Abokhodair et al. [1] analyzed the activity logs of social bots related to the Syrian civil war and classified social bots into core bots and peripheral bots based on their behavioral preferences regarding content generation and dissemination. Shao et al. [40] investigated strategies employed by bots to propagate low-credibility content, suggesting that social bots tend to amplify the impact of content before "going viral" and further amplify their influence by targeting influential real users through replies and mentions.

The positive contributions of social bots have also attracted the attention of the research community. Seering et al. [39] redefined social bots in the context of the Twitch community and analyzed the potential value they provide to the community based on different identity roles of social bots. Smith et al. [43] discussed the potential of using bots for governance in online social networks. Kim et al. [22] reported that social bots can be used to mitigate the negative impacts of intervention in depression-related behaviors.

7.2 Toxic Behavior in OSNs

Toxic behavior in online social networks is a broad term that often manifests in the form of toxic language, which can be described as "a rude, disrespectful, or unreasonable comment that is likely to make you leave a discussion." Common examples of toxic behavior include cyberbullying, verbal threats, hate speech, and other forms of misuse that are prevalent on social networks.

Saveski et al. [37] collected behavioral data from 4.4 million Twitter users during the 2018 US midterm elections and studied toxic conversations from a structural perspective. Quattrociocchi et al. [34] focused on the "echo chamber" effect of online users and examined 25K Twitter conversations between 2020 and 2022, exploring the interplay between the systematic spread of misinformation and toxic behavior in social networks. Mathew et al. [29] analyzed posting content and metadata generated by 314M users on Gab, a social networking platform, studying the temporal characteristics of hate speech and proposing potential optimization strategies for the platform. Kumar et al. [24] conducted an analysis of 929M Reddit accounts that posted toxic comments, discussing patterns of abusive account behavior and their impact on the platform. Researchers have also expanded the analysis of toxic behavior into the multimodal domain, including studying hateful memes [15, 20]. As a result, the research community has proposed various methods for detecting toxic behavior in online social networks [7, 32, 36].

7.3 LLMs-based Application on Social Network

As LLMs unveil their exceptional capacity for collaborative support across numerous domains, researchers approach from divergent perspectives, endeavoring to incorporate LLMs within the realm of social networking. Ziems et al. [60] posit the integration of LLMs into the workflow of social network analysis. Li et al. [27] proposed an innovative method for social network toxicity

content detection, premised on ChatGPT. Park et al. [33] advanced the argument that ChatGPT could simulate human behavior and function as a social agent for individuals. They experimentally established a societal sandbox, composed of 25 ChatGPT-driven agents, thereby corroborating the feasibility of employing LLMs as the underlying architecture for credible human behavior simulation. Concurrently, He and his colleagues [14], also focused on the emergence of Chirper, deliberated over the potentiality of utilizing LLMs as social agents.

8 DISCUSSION

In the discussion section, we summarize the contributions of this study, highlight its limitations, and provide an outlook on future research endeavors.

8.1 Conclusion

The utilization of LLMs for behavior decision-making and content generation engines in social bots represents an emerging and promising subdomain within the realm of social robotics. This study focuses on the activity logs of LLMs-driven social bots in Chirper from April 2023 to June 2023, examining the macroscopic behavioral characteristics of LLMs-driven social bots. We delineate the differences between their behavior and that of real social network accounts and traditional social bots. Toxic behaviors exhibited by LLMs-driven social bots are analyzed and classified, along with a discussion on their potential impact on online communities. Furthermore, we conduct preliminary experiments to demonstrate that existing methods for detecting social bots remain applicable in the context of LLMs-driven social bot activities, albeit with minor performance implications. Finally, the collected activity records of LLMs-driven social bots are compiled into the *Masquerade-23* dataset, which is made publicly available, facilitating further research within the research community.

8.2 Limitation

This study aims to investigate the emerging subdomain of LLMs-driven social bots. Although our experiments validate the distinct characteristics of these social bots compared to traditional ones and demonstrate their ability to generate toxic content in social networks, the study still has some limitations. Our analysis is based on the dataset obtained from the activity logs of LLMs-driven social bots on the Chirper platform. While we observed a certain number of content reposted from authentic accounts on platforms like Reddit and YouTube (indicating unidirectional interaction between LLMs-driven social bots and human accounts), we currently lack information on the establishment of social relationships between LLMs-driven social bots and human accounts on a larger scale. Therefore, we only compared the performance changes of feature-based social bot detection methods in an LLMs-based bot activity environment. Moreover, during the initial phase of data collection, we accurately recorded the timing of LLMs-driven social bot activities. However, as platform display rules changed, we could only record the timing of activities at a coarser granularity later on. Consequently, the current data does not support the analysis of time-specific characteristics of LLMs-driven social bot activities. Finally, we do not currently have access to detailed prompt instructions for the LLMs engine behind the social bot. Although we can infer certain prompt rules based on the behavior of the social bot, obtaining precise prompt instructions for LLMs-driven social bots would aid in further understanding this subdomain of social bots.

8.3 Future Works

In future research, we intend to delve deeper into several aspects based on the findings and limitations of this paper. These areas of focus include:

Enriched dataset: We aim to obtain more detailed activity logs of LLMs-driven social bots in future studies, including fine-grained timing information. Importantly, we seek to capture the interaction behaviors between LLMs-driven social bots and human users.

Detection models for LLMs-driven social bots: The results of this study indicate that LLMs-driven social bots exhibit more convincing disguises at the individual level compared to traditional social bots, while also displaying certain group-level characteristics. We believe it is worth exploring the development of detection models targeted specifically at group features of LLMs-driven social bots, incorporating potential approaches such as AIGC text detection methods [13].

Control of toxic behaviors in LLMs-driven social bots: We have observed that LLMs-driven social bots possess the ability to engage in a range of toxic behaviors in online communities, including identity hate, many of which are strictly prohibited by most online social network platforms (e.g., promoting Nazism and violence against children). Therefore, we believe researching methods to restrain toxic behaviors in LLMs-driven social bots will contribute to better preserving the user experience in online social networks.

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