




The background features a complex network of thin grey lines and dots, forming a web-like structure. Scattered throughout are various triangles of different sizes and orientations, some with solid grey dots at their vertices. The overall aesthetic is technical and modern.

Privacy-preserving Machine Learning

Michał Kuźba

Goal

- We want to respect people's privacy while using their data
- Dataset that really matter might have restricted access because of privacy, e.g. medical data, GDPR
- Ideally, we use data without seeing it :)
- We want to learn general patterns not individual data points anyway
- Now data is aggregated or removed after some time
- We would like to use Cloud services with our private data



(De)Anonymization?

How To Break Anonymity of the Netflix Prize Dataset

Arvind Narayanan, Vitaly Shmatikov

We present a new class of statistical de-anonymization attacks against high-dimensional micro-data, such as individual preference transaction records and so on. Our techniques are robust to perturbation in the data and tolerate some mistakes in the adversary. We apply our de-anonymization methodology to the Netflix Prize dataset, which contains anonymous movie ratings of 500,000 subscribers in the world's largest online movie rental service. We demonstrate that an adversary who knows only a little bit about an individual subscriber can easily identify this subscriber's record in the dataset. Using the Internet Movie Database as the source of background knowledge, we successfully identified the Netflix records of known users, uncovering their apparent political preferences and other potentially sensitive information.

Who's Watching?

De-anonymization of Netflix Reviews using Amazon Reviews

Maryam Archie, Sophie Gershon, Abigail Katcoff, and Aaron Zeng

{marchie, sgershon, akatcoff, a2z}@mit.edu

Revisiting the Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in the US Population

Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets

Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov
The University of Texas at Austin

Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization

UCLA Law Review, Vol. 57, p. 1701, 2010

U of Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 9-12

77 Pages • Posted: 13 Jul 2012 • Last revised: 22 Feb 2015



SZKOLENIA KONTAKT

Zaufana Trzecia S



Dane o waszej lokalizacji są na sprzedaż.
Zanonimizowane, ale to nie przeszkadza

Topics


- Synthetic datasets
- Encryption
 - Encrypted Deep Learning
 - Data encryption
 - Homomorphic encryption
- Remote execution
 - Federated Learning
 - Secure Multi-Party Computation
- Differential Privacy
- Secure aggregation



Federated Learning - usecases



Federated Learning



Federated Learning

- Federated Learning vs Distributed Learning
- Pass gradients or weights
- Learning rounds
- Personalized learning - share some layers

Problems:

- Heavily correlated data - coming from one device
- Different size of datasets
- Temporal (time) heterogeneity
- Model size limitations, battery and network usage
- Fault tolerations
- Lack of understanding the training data (biases, no explainability, difficult to analyze data)
- Federated Learning leaks information by itself, is not secure (might memorize the data) - we need something more!




Federated Learning frameworks

- TFF - Tensorflow Federated
 - Allows also to make non-learning computations such as aggregated analytics
 - Tensorflow
- PySyft
 - PyTorch
 - Pointers to tensors
 - Remote execution



*Secure Aggregation** enables the server to combine the encrypted results, and *only* decrypt the aggregate.



On each device, before anything is sent, the secure aggregation protocol adds zero-sum masks to scramble the training results.

When you add up all those training results—

—the masks exactly cancel out! *Nice*.

Ok, so the server can't see any single phone's results. But what if one phone has really unique data?

Could that data be compromised by showing up inside the model?

Well, it's possible, but we don't want it to happen.

For machine learning to work best, models need to capture the common patterns in the data, not memorize things that are specific to one phone.

Wait a second, is that me?

Ah, looks like you're rare data! And we don't want the model memorizing that.

This is why we have ways to measure and control how much a model might be memorizing.

For example, watch what happens if we limit how much any one phone can contribute and add noise to obscure rare data.

Ooh, I know this one! It's *differential privacy*!

Differential Privacy

- Learn about patterns and groups and not disclose information about individuals
- Algorithm is differentially private if an observer seeing its output cannot tell if a particular individual's information was used in the computation
- Toss a coin
- If heads, then toss the coin again (ignoring the outcome), and answer the question honestly.
- If tails, then toss the coin again and answer "Yes" if heads, "No" if tails.
- Local vs global noise on the query
- Accuracy decreases
- Data-hungry, the more data the more privacy and less noise
- Ensembling example

Name	Has Diabetes (X)
Ross	1
Monica	1
Joey	0
Phoebe	0
Chandler	1
Rachel	0

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Differential_privacy



Differential Privacy


- We don't want the model to memorize data, that could be later reverse-engineered
- DP on neural net's weights or input might not be a good idea
- Tensorflow Privacy, e.g. Differentially Private SGD (clipping, noising)

```
optimizer = optimizers.dp_optimizer.DPGradientDescentGaussianOptimizer(  
    l2_norm_clip=FLAGS.l2_norm_clip,  
    noise_multiplier=FLAGS.noise_multiplier,  
    num_microbatches=FLAGS.microbatches,  
    learning_rate=FLAGS.learning_rate,  
    population_size=60000)  
train_op = optimizer.minimize(loss=vector_loss)
```


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCxp_IHo5ek

Some adoption:

- Telemetry, statistics at Apple, Microsoft, Google, LinkedIn



Homomorphic encryption



$\text{Enc}(a + b) = \text{Enc}(a) \oplus \text{Enc}(b)$ and

$\text{Enc}(a * b) = \text{Enc}(a) \otimes \text{Enc}(b)$


In other words, while performing any operations on data encrypted using a traditional cipher would result in gibberish, homomorphic encryption allows you to do it without corrupting the data. This goes further than basic operations. Being able to perform addition and multiplication also means that you can compute polynomials. And, with polynomials you can approximate essentially any function.

<https://medium.com/blueprint-by-intuit/machine-learning-on-encrypted-data-no-longer-a-fantasy-58e37e9f31d7>




Homomorphic Encryption

- Partial, Full HE
- Neural nets - cryptonets
- Performance downgrades for several reasons (sparsity, length, approximation, some noise)
- y is 1 if $x > T$, otherwise y is 0
 - The function is approximated by a polynomial which in turn can be computed homomorphically. This becomes a building block in the homomorphic evaluation of the decision tree, as the tree is a sequence of conditional ("if") statements.
- Ciphertext's size might explode
- Frameworks:
 - Microsoft SEAL
 - Tensorflow Encrypted
 - Facebook Crypten



Secure Multi-Party Computation




Secure data point.
(Not Shared with Party A or Party B.)


Party A and Party B are each given a number, but neither can use it to learn the secure data point (12).

Party A and Party B can each perform calculations on their number. The results can be combined to perform the calculation (12 x 3).

Secure Multi-Party Computation




Secure Multi-Party Computation



Synthetic datasets

- How to do it well?
 - Preserve statistical properties
 - Remove personal information
- Fraud detection
- Keep some original data for sanity check
- <https://www.kaggle.com/mlg-ulb/creditcardfraud> - PCA features
- Generating differentially private datasets using GANs



Resources

- <https://www.udacity.com/course/secure-and-private-ai-ud185>
- <https://github.com/OpenMined/PySyft>
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4zrU54VIK6k> - Andrew Trask, Lex Fridman
- <https://medium.com/blueprint-by-intuit/machine-learning-on-encrypted-data-no-longer-a-fantasy-58e37e9f31d7>
- Workshop Nips '19



The background features a complex network of thin, light gray lines connecting various-sized dark gray dots. These dots are scattered across the slide, with some appearing as larger hubs and others as smaller peripheral nodes. The lines form a web-like structure that fills the background, particularly concentrated on the left and right sides, leaving the center more open for the text.

THANKS

CREDITS: This presentation template was created by **Slidesgo**, including icons by **Flaticon**, and infographics & images by **Freepik**.

Please keep this slide for attribution.