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Author(s): G. Georgiades Arnakis

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THE GREEK CHURCH OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE*

G. GEORGIADIS ARNAKIS

I

A STUDY of the relations of the Greek Orthodox church and the Ottoman Empire during the long period of Turkish rule in the Near East reveals so many inconsistencies on the part of the Turks that one may be led into thinking that their much-spoken-of policy of religious toleration was of an erratic, haphazard nature and was conveniently ignored when new circumstances seemed to suggest a different course of action. At times information pertaining to practically the same era leads to widely divergent conclusions, and there is an almost irresistible temptation for the historian to give up his search as futile, with the perfunctory remark that in the Ottoman autocracy the whim of the reigning sultan became the law of the land and that therefore there could be no question of a consistent religious policy. This attitude seems to underestimate the peculiar theocratic character of the Ottoman Empire and the influence of tradition upon the individual sultans. Whatever views one may hold concerning Ottoman autocracy, the fact remains that there was method in it on account of the tendency to follow time-

honored patterns in administration—a trait which the Osmanlis had in common with their Byzantine predecessors.¹

If one looks upon the Ottoman Empire as essentially conservative, one may regard the recurrent oppressive measures taken against the Greek church as a deviation from generally established practice—a deviation that was occasioned by the corruption and intrigue of officials and less frequently by outbursts of fanaticism or by imperial disfavor. As elsewhere, here, too, one might expect to find a gap between established policy and its practical application.

In this paper we propose to study the background and the assumptions upon which the Ottoman attitude toward the Greek church was based and to determine to what extent and under what circumstances the principle of religious toleration was violated. The scope of our work will be limited to the Church of Constantinople, first, because we possess more sources of information concerning it and, second, because in Constantinople, the capital of the empire, the problem presents itself in its most typical form.

When Mohammed II took Constantinople, the ecumenical throne—so called since the close of the sixth century—had been vacant for two years. Gregory III, second patriarch after the Unionist Joseph of the ill-starred Florentine council, appears to have left the city in 1451

¹ A. H. LYBYER, *The government of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Sulciman the Magnificent* (Cambridge: 1913), pp. 26–28.

* This paper is based on a manuscript on the Patriarchate of Constantinople prepared for publication by the Academy of Athens. Postwar conditions have prevented the academy from publishing this and other manuscripts. I am deeply indebted to my former teacher at the University of Athens, Professor Constantine Amantos, for his wise guidance and friendly encouragement. Professor Amantos proposed this topic for study in 1944 during his presidency of the Academy of Athens.

without ever winning the good will of the anti-Unionists, who were the majority among the clergy and the laity.² During the crucial days of 1453 the highest ecclesiastic in Constantinople was the papal legate, Cardinal Isidore, a Greek from the Peloponnesus, who had espoused the cause of Union at the Council of Ferrara and Florence (1438–39) and had signed the proceedings as metropolitan of Kiev and on behalf of the Russian church. Denounced by the Russians for his submission to the pope, Isidore remained faithful to his new allegiance. He settled in the capital of the dying empire and, when the Ottoman forces appeared at the gates, took an active part in the defense of the city. We are told that at the head of two hundred soldiers he fought bravely on the bastions of the wall of Blachernae near the Golden Horn.³ From his behavior before and during the siege we might infer that it was his ambition to become patriarch if the danger was averted. At any rate, after the fall of the city and his liberation from captivity, the pope granted him the empty, but nonetheless exalted, title of "Patriarch of Constantinople," which he retained until his death. Isidore stands out as one of the greatest figures in the last days of Byzantium, a loyal Greek whose chief quarrel with his contemporaries resulted from his

belief that the empire could still be saved if only it enlisted the support of Western Christendom.

Mohammed the Conqueror was fully aware of the danger that sooner or later he would have to encounter if his Christian subjects were under the influence of the pope. His interests dictated that he should sever all ties between the eastern and western branches of Christianity.⁴ The effort was not expected to be a hard one, since he could always take advantage of the aversion which the Orthodox Greeks had for the Catholics, a feeling that found its most eloquent expression in the well-known dictum of Lucas Notaras, the last emperor's chief counselor, "It is preferable for us to see the Turkish turban prevailing in the midst of the City rather than the tiara of the Latin cardinal."⁵

From the Ottoman point of view it was, therefore, necessary to have a new patriarch, and no one seemed better qualified for the post than the jurist Gennadius Scholarius, the fanatical opponent of the union of churches, who openly advocated co-operation with the Turks, if necessary, in order to avoid submission to Rome. He, too, had taken part in the Florentine council, as a supporter of the Union. But before long he was transformed into a passionate opponent, bent upon destroying the work of the council. He donned a monastic garment; he took possession of the monastery of Pantocrator, strategically situated in the middle of the city; and he harangued the populace, vehemently denouncing the Union and those who had signed it. Pantocrator soon became the headquarters of the

² See Ad. N. DIAMANTOPOULOS, "Gennadius Scholarius as a historical source" (in Greek), *Hellenica*, IX (1936), 295, 301. M. GEDEON, *Πατριάρχικοι πίνακες* [Patriarchal tables] (Constantinople, 1890), p. 467, mentions Athanasius II as the last patriarch of the Byzantine Empire, but, according to DIAMANTOPOULOS (*loc. cit.*, p. 295), this prelate never assumed the patriarchal office. Cf. Gennadius of Heliopolis, "Was there a patriarch Athanasius shortly before the Fall?" (in Greek), *Orthodoxia*, XVIII (1943), 117–23. The Rt. Rev. Gennadius has proved conclusively in this article that there was no patriarch between Gregory III and Gennadius Scholarius.

³ Edwin PEARS, *Cambridge medieval history* (New York, 1927), IV, 698.

⁴ Cf. Chrysostomos PAPADOPOULOS, "The position of the church and of the Greek nation in the Turkish empire" (in Greek), *Theologia*, XII (1934), 11.

⁵ DUCAS, *Historia Byzantina* (Bonn ed.), p. 264.

anti-Unionist movement, and Gennadius was popularly acclaimed as its leader. Doubtless Mohammed II knew of this monk. He might even have met him on one of his visits to the city when he was still a very young prince.⁶ Whatever their relations may have been, it is known that on the day of the conquest Gennadius was made a prisoner, like thousands of his less famous fellow-Christians, and was carried off to a village near Adrianople.⁷ Critobulus tells us that the Conqueror set him free and admitted him into his immediate company.⁸ Subsequently, upon Mohammed's return from Adrianople in the autumn of 1453, when he turned his attention to the problem of repopulating his new capital, he elevated Gennadius to the position of patriarch. The official installation took place on January 6, 1454.⁹

The details of the event are furnished by the chronicler George Phrantzes,¹⁰ an eyewitness of the conquest, and are repeated in the "Political history," written about a century later.¹¹ At the behest of the sultan, the surviving bishops met together and elected Gennadius patriarch. The election was, of course, a mere formality, for it was already known that Gennadius had the Conqueror's favor.

⁶ P. CAROLIDES, *Ἱστορία τῆς Ἑλλάδος, 1453-1863* [History of Greece, 1453-1863] (Athens, 1925), pp. 205-7.

⁷ GEORGE PHRANTZES, *Chronicon* (Bonn ed.), p. 308.

⁸ CRITOBULUS, *De rebus gestis Mechemetis II*, chap. ii, sec. 2; in C. MÜLLER (ed.), *Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum* (Paris, 1870), V, 107.

⁹ DIAMANTOPOULOS, *loc. cit.*, p. 303. Analogous, though less spectacular, was the office of the Armenian patriarch, inaugurated in 1461 (Isidor SILBERNAGL, *Verfassung und gegenwärtiger Bestand sämtlicher Kirchen des Orients* [2d ed.: Regensburg, 1904], p. 222).

¹⁰ PHRANTZES, pp. 306-8.

¹¹ MARTIN CRUSIUS, *Turcograecia* (Basel, 1584), p. 15.

The patriarch-elect was then summoned to the palace, where he received the flattering distinction of dining with the sultan. Following the dinner, there was an official installation of the patriarch by the Ottoman court, more honors were bestowed upon him, and a general attempt was made to preserve as much of the Byzantine etiquette as was compatible with Moslem dignity and traditions. Throughout the period of transition Mohammed II proved respectful of precedent. The "Political history" says that he paid repeated visits to the patriarch in his new seat—the Church of the Holy Apostles at that time—discussed theology with him and even made him write a tract on Christianity.¹² This was no youthful romanticism but an act of statesmanship. It was meant to imply that the Ottoman Empire was in every respect the successor empire.

It was Mohammed's idea to safeguard the position of the patriarch by means of an official declaration. To quote Phrantzes: "He [Mohammed II] gave written ordinances, testimonials bearing the imperial signature, that no one was to molest him or oppose him; he was to have exemption from all taxes and personal inviolability."¹³

This document might be regarded as the first *berat* (*barat*).¹⁴ Henceforth similar documents were issued by the sultans, confirming the election of each succeeding patriarch, and in the provinces the pashas adopted the practice of granting such testimonials to the new bishops.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 17. The tract, says the "Political history," was translated into the "Turco-Arabic tongue" by Ahmed (Ahumat), the *kadi* of Berrhoia.

¹³ P. 308.

¹⁴ In Arabic the word means "diploma," "honor," "distinction," or "privilege." In the history of the Greek church it is mentioned for the first time in connection with Theoleptus I, who became patriarch in the reign of Selim I (1513) (CRUSIUS, p. 152).

Each *berat*, whether imperial or provincial, safeguarded most of the rights given to Gennadius in 1453–54. In the course of time the Greek patriarch of Constantinople came to be regarded as the leader of the *Rum milleti*—i.e., of the Orthodox Christians who were under the authority of the sultan. Since religion and nationality were practically identical in the eyes of the Turk,¹⁵ the Sublime Porte allowed a large measure of self-government to the *Rum milleti* under the guise of religious toleration. When his security was not threatened, the Turk seemed to be mainly interested in the collection of taxes from the subject races and—down to the first decade of the twentieth century—referred to the non-Turkish populations as *raya*, an Arabic word meaning “flock” or “herd animal.” As H. A. Gibbons remarked, they were regarded as nothing more than taxable assets.¹⁶

Historically speaking, a tolerant treatment of the Christians was in no way a Turkish innovation. The Arabs of earlier days had set a precedent.¹⁷ Though they definitely regarded the Christians and the Jews as “lesser breeds without the law,” they nonetheless felt that Allah did not command his faithful to convert them by force or exterminate them, as was the case with idolaters. With few exceptions, this attitude of aloofness constituted the prevailing policy.¹⁸ It began

as early as the seventh century, when the Patriarchates of Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria had had to bow down before the sword of Islam. Particularly interesting in this connection is the so-called “covenant” between Caliph Omar and Patriarch Sophronius on the eve of the surrender of Jerusalem in 638.¹⁹ According to tradition, Omar promised not to interfere in the religious practices of the Christians, allowing them full management of their own affairs. In later days it was pointed out that Omar acted on the authority of the Prophet, who had taught that the “people of the Book” (*ahl al-kitab*) should be judged in accordance with it.²⁰ The monks of Mount Sinai, too, claimed that they possessed no less a document than the “testament of the Prophet Mohammed,” which guaranteed their property rights and their freedom of worship.²¹ It was alleged that it had been issued in A.H. 2 (A.D. 623).

¹⁹ THEOPHANES, *Chronographia*, ed. C. DE BOOR (Leipzig, 1883), I, 339: “Σωφρόνιος . . . λόγον ἔλαβε πάσης Παλαιστίνης ἀσφαλείας.” Later, a Moslem ruler, according to the same source, persecuted the church, “μὴ προσχῶν τῷ δοθέντι λόγῳ τοῖς Χριστιανοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀράβων” (*ibid.*, p. 453). A. PAPADOPOULOS-KERAMEUS, Ἀνάλεκτα ἱεροσολυμικῆς σταχυολογίας [Analects of Jerusalemite gleanings] (St. Petersburg, 1897), III, 216. C. AMANTOS, “The charters of Islam in favor of the Christians” (in Greek), *Hellenica*, IX (1936), 108–9. ELEUTHERIADES, pp. 100–101. M. GEDEON, Βραχεία σημείωσις περὶ τῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν ἡμῶν δικαίων [Brief note concerning our ecclesiastical rights] (Constantinople, 1909), p. 41. Von GRUNEBaum (p. 179) quotes a later Arabic account which disparages the covenant out of bias against Christianity. Cf. AMANTOS, *loc. cit.*, p. 113; A. S. TRITTON, *The Caliphs and their non-Moslem subjects* (London, 1930), pp. 5, 233.

²⁰ *Koran*, V, 51 (Richard BELL’s translation).

²¹ Published with a German translation by B. MORITZ, “Beiträge zur Geschichte des Sinai-Klosters im Mittelalter nach arabischen Quellen,” *Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie*, 1918, pp. 6–9. There have been several translations of the document into Greek. The one published by NECTARIUS THE CRETAN in Ἐπιτομή ἱεροκοσμικῆς ἱστορίας in 1758 (p. 275) was reprinted by C. N. SATHAS, in *Chrysallis*, III (1865), 611–12. More recent transla-

¹⁵ Interesting observations on this subject were made by W. J. CAHNMAN, in his article “Religion and nationality,” *American journal of sociology*, XLIX (1944), 524–29.

¹⁶ *The foundation of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford, 1916), p. 77.

¹⁷ N. P. ELEUTHERIADES, Τὰ προνόμια τοῦ Οἰκουμἐνικοῦ Πατριαρχείου [The privileges of the Ecumenical Patriarchate] (Smyrna, 1910), pp. 5–24, 150–90. Callinicos DELICANES, Τὰ δίκαια τοῦ Οἰκουμἐνικοῦ Πατριαρχείου ἐν Τουρκίᾳ [The rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey] (Constantinople, 1922), pp. 6–19, 35–75.

¹⁸ See G. E. von GRUNEBaum, *Medieval Islam* (Chicago: 1947), pp. 177–79.

Internal and external criticism has led to the conclusion that both these documents belong to a later age, certainly not earlier than the tenth century;²² but it is very probable that there was some kind of arrangement based upon an agreement that was difficult to violate, which kept the hungry and predatory Bedouins from looting Mount Sinai—known to be very wealthy and always exposed to attack. Certainly the occasional distribution of food and money would not in itself be enough to purchase their good will for a long time. The Prophet's word, weighing heavily in the minds of those simple folk, could, if properly used, serve as an effective deterrent, particularly if it was combined with acts of generosity on the part of the monks. According to Constantine Amantos, it is very probable that written agreements of a period prior to the tenth century protected the Monastery of Sinai and the other ancient centers of Christianity.²³ We have the testimony of Nicholas Mysticus (patriarch from 895 to 907 and from 911 to 925), who complained to the Arabs that their tolerant attitude toward the Christians was no longer evident. "Written guarantees given by your Prophet," he writes, "are now violated and there is great dishonor and abuse of the justice which you are obligated to observe."²⁴ What were these "written guarantees" of the Prophet? There is no indication that Mount Sinai or Jerusalem were covered by them, but there is no plausible reason why they should not have been. Moslem tradition did not doubt the authenticity of the doc-

uments granted to Mount Sinai and to Jerusalem. Consequently, Selim I had no difficulty in renewing the old privileges when he became master of the Holy Places. He stated that he issued the decree "on the basis of the sacred *ahdnamé* of our Lord the Prophet" (in the case of Mount Sinai) and "in accordance with the sacred *ahdnamé* of Omar Khattab and consequent to the decrees of previous rulers" (in the case of Jerusalem).²⁵

On the principle of reciprocity, at various times Mohammedan rulers had asked for and obtained religious privileges in the Byzantine Empire. Byzantium, the seat of Greek Orthodoxy, granted such privileges very reluctantly, regarding them as the price of peace or as the bitter fruits of defeat. For example, it was at the insistence of Maslamah that a mosque was built in Constantinople "within the imperial praetorium."²⁶ Until 1188 there was another mosque within the city.²⁷ Patriarch Nicholas Mysticus, in his letter referred to above, registers a protest against the maltreatment of Christian captives, and he adds that the Byzantines do not abuse the Moslems. "The temple of your coreligionists was never closed, neither recently nor in the past, and there have been no restrictions against the Saracen residents here who may repair it; on the contrary, both temple and attendants are treated in precisely the same manner as they would be, had they been living under your author-

tions have been published by GEDEON, *Βραχεία σημείωσις*, pp. 87–90; ELEUTHERIADES, pp. 97–99, 137–47; AMANTOS, *loc. cit.*, pp. 105–6.

²² MORITZ, *loc. cit.*, p. 16; L. CAETANI, *Annali dell'Islam*, IV (1911), 310–12.

²³ *Hellenica*, IX, 107.

²⁴ MIGNE, *Patrologia Graeca*, CXI, 312–13, 317.

²⁵ P. GREGORIADES, 'Η *ιερά Μονή τοῦ Σινᾶ* [The holy Monastery of Sinai] (Jerusalem, 1875), pp. 133–35; ELEUTHERIADES, pp. 86, 94–95. About the recognition of the Church of Egypt see Chrysostomos PAPADOPOULOS, 'Ιστορία τῆς Ἐκκλησίας Ἀλεξανδρείας [History of the Church of Alexandria] (Alexandria, 1935), pp. 593–97.

²⁶ Constantine PORPHYROGENETUS, *De administrando imperio* (Bonn ed.), pp. 101–2.

²⁷ DU CANGE, *Constantinopolis Christiana* (Venice ed.), I, 128.

ity.”²⁸ In the reign of Bayazid I, a *kadi* took up his residence in Constantinople to have jurisdiction over the Turkish colony, “for a Moslem must be judged by a Moslem.”²⁹ Likewise, a Christian should be judged by a Christian. This was the principle behind the capitulations, which were inaugurated by Suleiman the Magnificent and Francis I at the time when the Ottoman Empire was at the peak of its glory.³⁰ The same principle made the Conqueror’s course of action seem plausible and legitimate in Moslem eyes.

The older generation among his followers perhaps could remember the decree of Sinan pasha, the conqueror of Jannina. It was issued twenty-three years before the fall of Constantinople, during the reign of Murad II, in the midst of negotiations for the surrender of the town. It has been preserved in the demotic Greek in which it was originally written, like several other documents of the early Osmanlis. The Turkish commander, who styles himself as “the head of heads and lord of all the West” [κεφαλὴ τῶν κεφαλᾶδων καὶ αὐθέντης πάσης δύσεως]³¹ promises: “Have no fear, there will be no captivity, no abduction of children, no destruction of churches; we shall not change them into mosques, but your church bells will ring as is your custom. The metropolitan will have charge of justice over the Greeks [νὰ ἔχη τὴν κρίσιν του τὴν ρωμαϊκὴν] and all the ecclesiastical rights. The lords who have feudal estates

will continue having them. . . .”³² There is an obvious tone of generosity, and there is a vague promise at the end that all petitions will be granted. Could it be that the hardships of the prolonged siege had made the Turks too indulgent? Such an attitude may be suspected in the promise concerning feudal estates—a promise that was not meant to be taken seriously. But the guarantees to the church did not constitute a departure from earlier policy and were honored in subsequent years. The edict of Sinan pasha was the most recent precedent to the political action taken by Mohammed the Conqueror with regard to the Greek church in 1453–54.

The only difference between Constantinople and Jannina or Jerusalem seemed to lie in the fact that the former was taken by assault, while the latter two capitulated on the basis of an agreement. Mohammed II, it was feared, might in later years be accused of unwarranted favor to his protégé Gennadius. Was it necessary that he should heap so many honors upon the prelate of a conquered city? Or was it, at most, an *ad hoc* arrangement to serve the expediency of a critical moment? Sensitivity on this score combined with the reaction to a rumor that Selim I (1512–20) was planning to abrogate the rights of the church led to the myth that Constantinople was not taken by force but was given to the Turks on the basis of mutual restitutions. Three venerable janissaries, who were present in 1453, appeared before the sultan to testify that the city surrendered

²⁸ MIGNE, PG, CXI, 317.

²⁹ DUCAS, p. 49.

³⁰ Cf. LYBYER, pp. 34–35. G. Pélissié du RAUNAS, *Le régime des capitulations dans l'Empire Ottoman* (2 vols.; Paris, 1902–5) is still the best work on the subject.

³¹ Concerning the term “West,” which signified the European provinces of the Byzantine Empire, see AMANTOS, “East and West” (in Greek), *Hellenica*, IX (1936), 32–36.

³² Published by P. ARAVANTINOS *Χρονογραφία τῆς Ἠπείρου* [A chronicle of Epirus] (Athens, 1856), II, 315; also by F. MIKLOSICH and J. MÜLLER, *Acta et diplomata Graeca medii aevi* (Vienna, 1865), III, 282–83; reprinted by AMANTOS, “The charters of Islam in favor of the Christians,” *Hellenica*, IX, 119–20.

voluntarily.³³ The inference therefrom was that the rights of the Greek church were inviolate. The entire story, of course, is fictitious. In spite of his reputation for cruelty, it was Selim I who renewed the *berats* of Mount Sinai and Jerusalem. It may well be, however, that he thought his grandfather had been a trifle too generous to Gennadius Scholaris at the time of the conquest.

After Selim I no sultan is reported to have contemplated abolishing the institutional rights of the Patriarchate. Despite the vicissitudes in the life of the Greek *rayas* and the personal difficulties of several patriarchs, the church as an institution continued developing along the lines promulgated by Mohammed the Conqueror.

It is true that, for a century or so after his reign, our sources of patriarchal history are scanty, particularly with regard to the relations of the church with the state. For the most part we have to be satisfied with an *argumentum ex silentio*. No doubt *berats* or some kind of testimonials continued to be issued, since we hear of them both prior to and after this obscure period. Jeremiah II, surnamed Tranos (the Great), who ascended the throne in 1572, is the first patriarch about whom we have definite knowledge concerning his confirmation by the sultan (Selim II). "He paid to the imperial treasury two thousand florins as a gift [πεσκέσι] and so the emperor decreed and he received a *barat* [μπαράτιον] from him, and he gave him all authority and sovereignty over all the pious Christians, clergy and laity; that he should do according to his law and faith and that there should be no restrictions on the

part of anyone."³⁴ On the death of Selim II (1574), Jeremiah had to appear before the new sultan, Murad III, to pay the honorarium again and to get "a new *barat* [testifying] that he will govern and judge, according to his faith, metropolitans, archbishops, priests, and all the Roman [Greek] people, and the churches and monasteries; he who acts contrary to this *barat* is punished severely by the emperor." In general, the contents of these documents were similar in character to the edict of Mohammed II.

Unfortunately, none of the early *berats* has come down to our day in its entirety. The oldest complete one that we have today was issued to Leontius, metropolitan of Larissa, in February 1604, by Sultan Ahmed I. We have it in Greek translation, the quaint Greek vernacular of the time.³⁵ Subsequent *berats*, both patriarchal and episcopal, contain more or less the same provisions. Hence the oldest one may also be regarded as typical of the lot. With the lapse of the years, they tend to become more elaborate. But after the middle of the nineteenth century they are again reduced in length, this time because the privileges are curtailed as a result of growing nationalistic feeling among the Turks. Finally, they are abolished with the establishment of the republic and the complete separation of church and state.

³⁴ CRUSIUS, p. 178. The writer is Manuel Malaxos, a member of the immediate circle of the patriarch. The mere use of the word *barat*, in its hellenized form, without any explanation or definition, may indicate that the term was well known to his contemporaries.

³⁵ Published by GEDEON, *Βραχεία σημειώσεις* [Brief note], pp. 62–72, and his *Ἐπίσημα γράμματα τουρκικά αναφερόμενα εἰς τὰ ἐκκλησιαστικά ἡμῶν δίκαια* [Official Turkish letters pertaining to our ecclesiastical rights] (Constantinople, 1910), pp. 87–97. On the patriarchal *berats*, the oldest extant is that given to Dionysius III (1662), likewise published, in Greek translation, by GEDEON, *Ἐπίσημα γράμματα*, pp. 9–14.

³³ CRUSIUS, pp. 156–63. A. COMNENOS-YPSILANTES, *Τὰ μετὰ τὴν "Ἀλωσιν, 1453–1789* [Events after the Fall, 1453–1789] (Constantinople, 1870), p. 50; cf. also J. VON HAMMER, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* (Pest, 1827), II, 401.

A comparative study of existing *berats* reveals the following general arrangements which the government recognized without adhering to them in all cases.

I. Freedom of conscience was respected. No Roman—the term denoted every Orthodox subject of the sultan—could be converted against his will. If a Christian wanted to adopt Islam, it would be necessary for him to establish that he was of age, and the religious head of his community had the right to try to dissuade him in the presence of his parents or relatives. During the long Ottoman rule this stipulation was violated repeatedly in actual practice, but nonetheless its inclusion in the *berats* saved thousands of Christians from forceful islamization.

The state promised not to interfere in the execution of the Christians' religious duties. They could keep sacred books and icons on their premises, and they could conduct church services and religious rites unmolested.

II. The administration and discipline of the church were safe from interference as long as the taxes and dues were paid and there was no question of treason against the state. The patriarch and the holy synod associated with him were free to appoint the clergy; they had the supervision of churches and monasteries; and they investigated complaints against clergymen. The government had no right to arrest, dismiss, or banish bishops or priests without the approval of the Patriarchate. The patriarch could administer punishment to the clergy with the consent of the synod. In case of grievances against the patriarch and the uppermost ranks of the clergy, the trial could be held only in the capital, in front of an imperial *divan* composed of *kaziaskers* and other high officials. In penal cases involving lower clergy the summons went through

the Patriarchate or, in the provinces, through the bishop's office; pending trial, the accused were detained in separate quarters in the governor's seat. If found guilty, they served their term in the Patriarchate or in the bishop's quarters, but in cases of major crime they were unfrocked and sent to common prisons. If obliged to take an oath, the clergy swore according to canon law.

III. The property of churches, monasteries, and institutions of social welfare was held and administered by the patriarch and his bishops. Abuses of a financial nature were investigated and punished by the patriarchal court. Furthermore, the church could impose taxes for her purposes. The priests and their congregations had to make yearly payments to defray the honorarium which the bishop gave to the state on his appointment to office. If these payments were made in kind, the state undertook not to charge customs duties and tolls during the transportation. The state pledged its support to the bishop in the collection of the parishioners' dues. It is easy to see that the bishop's power could be abused by unscrupulous ecclesiastics.

In case of death the possessions of unmarried clergymen went to the Patriarchate, not to the imperial treasury. Any Christian who so desired could bequeath as much as one-third of his property to the church and its welfare institutions, and such property would be immune and inalienable unless an imperial decree was issued to the contrary.

IV. The personal status of Orthodox Christians remained under the sole jurisdiction of the Patriarchate, which alone had the right to issue marriage licenses and divorce decrees. Thus the church retained a wide measure of authority in matters pertaining to family and inheritance law, and, until the time when

church courts were abolished by the Turkish republic, Christians were tried according to the provisions of Roman and Byzantine jurisprudence. Other cases, too, were tried at the Patriarchate, as the *rayas* tended to prefer Christian justice to the verdict of the Turkish *kadi*. A punishment of flogging or bastinado was not infrequent, and it was administered to the culprit in the churchyard, with a vigilant ecclesiastic counting the blows from an upper window. In the Patriarchate there was a prison until the latter part of the nineteenth century.

V. External evidences of the authority of the church were also mentioned in *berats*. We note, for example, the right of the bishops to carry a staff, to ride on horseback, to have a bodyguard, and to travel in boats with two or three oarsmen. The patriarch's attendants carried chains which they would throw around the neck of anyone who threatened to embrace Islam, thus indicating that he was insane and irresponsible. In days when servitude was as gloomy as it was oppressive, the gates of Phanar would be left open during three days and two nights for the Easter celebrations of the *rayas*. Dancing, singing, playing musical instruments, and wearing festive clothing—forbidden the rest of the year—were permitted by the Turks on those days in the precincts of the Patriarchate.³⁶

Such, in brief, was the position of the Church of Constantinople vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire. From the reign of Selim I, who conquered the Arabic countries, the patriarch of Constantinople represented his colleagues of Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem on account of his advantageous location near the Porte.

³⁶ For a vivid description of the festivities see Caesarios DAPONTES, in SATHAS, *Bibliotheca Graeca medii aevi* (Venice, 1872), III, 131–35.

Ambitious patriarchs traveled within the empire and abroad. The most important patriarchal journey was that of Jeremiah Tranos, who went to Moscow to collect money and established the Russian patriarchate (1589), the fifth patriarchate of the Eastern church.³⁷ In peacetime the Church of Constantinople kept up regular relations with the Orthodox peoples outside the empire. The delicate position of the Patriarchate in times of Russo-Turkish conflict demanded the presence of especially astute men at Phanar. Not all the patriarchs were so; at times awkward management of complicated affairs made the position of the church extremely difficult and created problems among the Turks themselves.

But in the midst of all sorts of critical situations the position of the patriarchate remained intact. Individual Patriarchs could be dethroned and even executed, but the institution itself was respected. Behind it lay Ottoman traditionalism, which had assumed an almost sacred character. Not even money, in an age of corruption, was enough to effect a change. In the year 1700 the Jews bribed some officials and asked to have the chief rabbi precede the patriarch on formal occasions when the minority leaders were in attendance. The sultan, however, issued a decree directing that the rights of the Greeks were irrevocable.³⁸ By means of its prominent position the Church of Constantinople continued protecting the remnants of Christendom in southeast-

³⁷ YPSILANTES, pp. 113–14. An old, but still useful, biography of Jeremiah II was written by C. N. SATHAS, *Βιογραφικὸν σχέδιον περὶ Πατριάρχου Ἱερεμίου β'* [Biographical sketch of Patriarch Jeremiah II] (Athens, 1870). The chronicle of Dorotheos of Monemvasia, pertinent excerpts of which are included in this book, is a valuable source for the establishment of the Russian patriarchate.

³⁸ The document was published in Greek by the Rt. Rev. GENNADIUS of HELIOPOLIS, *Orthodoxia*, VI (1931), 432–34.

ern Europe and in Asia Minor, and it saved the subject nationalities of the Balkan peninsula from being absorbed by the Turks. For a period of four centuries it waged a struggle against islamization and turkification—an unequal, relentless struggle—with inadequate means but with silent determination not to yield. Its historical mission was accomplished with the national liberation of the Greeks, Serbs, Romanians, and Bulgarians. In view of the services rendered, it would be unfair to speak of oppression of the Balkan peoples by the Greek church.³⁹ If there were a few unworthy bishops in ages of darkness, despotism, and corruption, certainly they are not enough to obscure the magnificent work of national conservation which was done by the Church of Constantinople, the institution that, in the midst of adversity, represented the last heritage of the venerable Byzantine Empire.

II

In order to appreciate the Patriarchate's struggle in the interests of Christianity, it is necessary to glance at the darker side of the picture. Indeed, a study of the Church of Constantinople would not be complete without some attempt to penetrate into the problems which it had to face and the oppressive limitations under which—and in spite of which—it survived. A Greek church historian of repute at the beginning of our century, Rev. Philaretos Vapheides, makes the suggestive remark that the fate of the Balkan peoples would have been different had the Ottoman Turks followed the policy of 1453 without deviation. "Whatever was offered by one

hand was taken away by the other, because there was no religious tolerance; fanaticism, arbitrary rule, the idea that the Christians were inferior, and—unfortunately—the rivalries and intrigues of the Christians themselves, exerted a great influence."⁴⁰ True, the state recognized the institutional rights of the church in official documents, but government agents and people violated them in practical application in numerous individual instances, profiteering at the expense of church property, blackmailing, humiliating and persecuting the clergy, and even converting Christians by force.

Nor was the head of the church spared harsh treatment in times of outbursts of fanaticism or when suspected of treasonable dealings. Several patriarchs were banished or imprisoned—in some cases, it is true, on account of intrigue or incompetence. Cyril I Lucaris (†1638), Cyril II (†1639), Parthenius II (†1651), Parthenius III (†1657), and Gregory V (†1821) died the death of martyrs: the first three as victims of the antagonism between catholicism and protestantism, the fourth a victim of slander, the fifth a sacrifice for the cause of Greek independence. It is noteworthy, however, that the Turks executed them after they had had them deposed and replaced, not as patriarchs but as disloyal subjects. Yet, though the Porte took care not to attack the church as an institution, Greek ecclesiastical leaders knew that they were practically helpless in times of trouble. The capitulations from the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent to the first World War afforded a degree of protection to Catholic and Protestant communities, but not until the year 1774 did the Greek church find a supporter in a coreligionist. Russia's interest, however, was as much of an

³⁹ Cf. AMANTOS, "The charters of Islam," *Hel-lenica*, IX, 157, refuting the opinion of S. BOBČEV, "Coup d'œil sur le régime juridique des Balkans sous le régime ottoman," *Revue internationale des études balkaniques*, II (1935), 529.

⁴⁰ Philaretos VAPHEIDES, *Ἑκκλησιαστική ιστορία* [Church history] (Constantinople, 1912), IIIA, 15.

encumbrance as it was a blessing, since it compromised the loyalty of the church in Turkish eyes and led to difficulties with the government. The patriarchs had to be on their guard constantly because the shadow of the hangman loomed large over the Golden Horn. A many-sided struggle for survival and ascendancy produced the typical Phanariote clergyman—a subtle, vigorous, calculating man, who could bow down to necessity and could rise again, none the weaker, to pursue his ends with judicious perseverance. He did not hesitate to fight his environment with weapons which were in current use in the oriental autocracy. He bribed the strong and greedy, he flattered the vain, he threatened with the fire of hell, he even sought to intimidate weak-minded magistrates—in short, he used every means possible to avert dangers and to attain as much security as possible for himself and his coreligionists. By dint of circumstances, very few of these men appear to be otherworldly, saintly characters; but most of them possessed such qualities of statesmanship as are rarely found in religious institutions, with the exception, perhaps, of the Vatican. Their importance in history can be appreciated if one bears in mind that these men, unarmed and unprotected, waged a struggle for Christianity which in earlier days was waged by leaders like Heraclius, Nicephorus Phocas, and the three Comneni, at the head of formidable armies. The patriarchs and their bishops had to face a well-organized rival who had crushed the Byzantine Empire and its loyalties and, as undisputed master of about fifty million people, threatened the heartland of Europe, the center of the Holy Roman Empire. Only the power of tradition, the much-spoken-of *ayni*, still exerted a restraining influence upon these arrogant fanatics whose swords had been

blessed by Allah and Mohammed, his prophet.

The belief that theirs was the final religion, their self-righteous superiority and scorn of others,⁴¹ often led to acts which were in violation of solemn pledges. Even Gennadius Scholarius did not have a carefree pontificate. Failing health, an ungenerous disposition to his subordinates, and, chiefly, difficulties with the Turks obliged him to resign three times; but he came back, perhaps because there was no one better qualified to face the crisis.⁴² No less than twelve churches were taken over by the Turks in his lifetime. Shortly after the Fall, the Church of the Holy Apostles, where the Patriarchate had been established, had to be abandoned because the Turks proved to be very unfriendly neighbors. The Holy Apostles was the most sacred building after St. Sophia, but it was demolished by the government, and the Mosque of Mohammed the Conqueror (Mehmed Fatih djamisi) was built on its site, designed by the sultan's biographer, Critobulus of Imbros. For over a hundred years the Patriarchate was situated at the Church of Pammacaristos, a far less pretentious edifice.

Mohammed the Conqueror interfered in the purely ecclesiastical duties of the patriarch on account of the divorce of George Amiroutsis, his attendant and eulogist.⁴³ Amiroutsis wanted to marry the pretty widow of the Duke of Athens, but he was already a married man, and Patriarch Joasaph Coccas (1464–66) would not grant a divorce, which he regarded as unlawful. The price he paid for his honesty was exile and humiliation, while a subordinate clergyman lost his

⁴¹ *Koran*, III, 27 A, V, 56 (BELL's translation).

⁴² YPSILANTES, p. 6; cf. also AMANTOS, "The charters of Islam," *Hellenica*, IX, 142.

⁴³ CRUSIUS, pp. 121–23.

nose for failure to convince his master. The split-nosed ecclesiastic was later elected patriarch under the name of Maximus III, and his election was confirmed by the Conqueror, whose bad temper had in the meantime calmed down.

The outward vestiges of religious organization—the church buildings—decreased in number as the years went by. They were transformed into mosques, to the dismay of the Christians. Selim I took possession of all the stone lead-roofed churches in the capital except the Pammacaristos, which was spared at that time because of the intervention of a powerful Greek called Xenakis. It was taken from the Greeks during the pontificate of Jeremiah II, about seventy years later.⁴⁴ The Patriarchate found shelter at first in the Panagia at Xyloporta and later in St. Demetrius. Each of these churches was a poor structure, housing a poverty-stricken organization.⁴⁵ Finally, in 1603, St. George of Phanar became the cathedral church, and it has remained the patriarch's seat until now. It was one of the small churches which the Turks had not taken.

In place of their old churches the Greeks were allowed to build little, humble structures with wooden roofs. But it was not easy to get such permission. In each case a *fetva* had to be issued by the *ulema* (doctors of Islamic theology), testifying that the new place of worship would not be obnoxious to Islam or to the state. In addition to bribing several officials, it was found necessary to distribute money among the Turkish families of the neighborhood so that they

would raise no objection to the building project. In due course the *fetva* would be submitted to the sultan, who would grant a *firman* authorizing the petitioners to build the church and to complete it within forty days. Under such circumstances it was hardly possible for the Christians to have the right kind of church; customarily the roofing was done on the fortieth day, with nails only half driven in.⁴⁶

Frequently there would be squabbles with the Turkish mob, more friction, more obstruction, and more bribery. There was always ample room for blackmail. The eighteenth-century Constantinopolitan chronicler, Athanasius Comnenos-Ypsilantes, records many interesting incidents that occurred on similar occasions, and he sheds light on the good as well as the bad aspects of Ottoman autocracy. It appears that well-meaning viziers would take action against the abuses whenever it was thought expedient. A lot depended on the influence that the patriarch and other Greeks might have on the Sublime Porte. Jeremiah III was able to rebuild the patriarchal church in 1720 and even to add a dome, which fell down a little later. Likewise, the old Church of Our Lady of the Life-giving Fountain was enlarged in the 1790's.

Whenever the sultan transplanted whole communities to the capital, he would usually allow them to build their church under favorable circumstances. We know, for instance, that when Mohammed the Conqueror invaded the Crimea he carried many Christians to Constantinople, and he permitted them to build the Panagia of Caffa, in Galata. When Suleiman the Magnificent brought over Christians from Belgrade, who settled near the Rhegium gate and north-

⁴⁴ DOROTHEOS OF MONEMVASIA, in SATHAS, *Βιογραφικὸν σχέδιον*, pp. 15–16. Dissensions among the Greeks were largely responsible for the loss.

⁴⁵ CRUSIUS, p. 15; YPSILANTES, p. 5.

⁴⁶ GEDEON, *Βραχεία σημείωσις*, pp. 108, 112–14.

west of the city in the suburb named Belgrade, they built their churches.⁴⁷ Happy events in the imperial household, such as the birth of princes, were celebrated with a general illumination of the capital, and permission was granted to the Christian communities to repair their churches for the occasion.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century the Turks relaxed their vigilance over the building activities of their subjects until in the 1830's it was possible to build a church without an imperial *firman*. It was then that several churches were constructed in Constantinople to replace those destroyed during the Greek revolution.

In the provinces there was comparatively more freedom. Monasteries away from the cities were usually left undisturbed, though not infrequently they were deprived of their estates and the monks were generally obliged to pay head tax. Some monasteries in the vicinity of Constantinople, however, were destroyed under various pretexts. Our chronicler mentions the Monastery of Theotokos at Chile and St. George on the Thynia Island, on the Asiatic side of the Straits, and Prodromos at Sozopolis and Mavro Molo, on the European side.⁴⁸

The confirmation ceremony of the new patriarch by the sultan lost some of its original pomp in the course of time, but until the middle of the seventeenth century it was conducted by the sultan in person. In 1657, however, after the execution of Parthenius III, Mehmed Kö-

prülü insisted that the patriarch should be confirmed by the grand vizier.⁴⁹ The gift of one thousand florins which the Conqueror offered to Gennadius was discontinued by the Conqueror himself when some Greeks offered to pay him an equal sum for the appointment of their favorite in 1467. Henceforth on the accession of a new patriarch or a new sultan money gifts were offered to the sultan and later to the grand vizier. Beginning with two thousand florins the sum went up steadily; an additional annual payment was introduced which, too, showed an upward trend; and the general result was that the financial obligations of the Patriarchate to the empire became a drain upon the limited resources of the church.⁵⁰ Thus the patriarchal office was open to the highest bidder; there was a growing tendency for wealthier bishops to be elected; and as might be expected, these were not always the holiest men. Ambitious but less wealthy bishops would borrow what they needed from the Greek guilds of the gardeners, furriers, and butchers or from Levantine, Armenian, or Jewish moneylenders at extortionate interest.⁵¹ To avoid embarrassment, poor and honest men would decline the candidacy.⁵² Early enough the Turks saw their chance to make money; hence the sight of patriarchs rising and falling from their thrones made them glad. Paparrhegopoulos noted that in seventy-seven years (from 1623 to 1700) there

⁴⁹ B. STEPHANIDES, "The official presentation of the ecumenical patriarch before the sultan" (in Greek), *Neos Poemen*, I (1919), 552-58.

⁴⁷ SCARLATOS BYZANTIOS, 'Η Κωνσταντινούπολις [Constantinople] (Constantinople, 1851), II, 51-163. Fr. Giese expressed the view that the privileges of the Church of Constantinople originated from the fact that the Christian population was brought in from outside ("Die geschichtliche Grundlage für die Stellung der Christlichen Untertanen im Osmanischen Reich," *Der Islam*, XIX [1931], 264-67).

⁴⁸ YPSILANTES, pp. 132-33, 292.

⁵⁰ GEDEON, *Βραχεία σημείωσις*, p. 142; and *Φάσεις τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐκκλησιαστικοῦ ζητήματος* [Phases of our ecclesiastical question] (Constantinople, 1910), pp. 16, 22; see also STEPHANIDES, *Ἐκκλησιαστικὴ ἱστορία* [Church history] (Athens, 1947-48), p. 635.

⁵¹ YPSILANTES, p. 142.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 396.

were as many as fifty changes of patriarch.⁵³ The resulting instability was perhaps the greatest source of weakness. It was only as late as 1759, according to the contemporary chronicler, that the holy synod decided that the patriarch should no longer pay the gift out of his own pocket but out of church funds held under the trusteeship of five of the senior members of the synod.⁵⁴

In the nineteenth century the financial position of the Patriarchate was generally better, in spite of the loss of the provinces that made up the Kingdom of Greece (1833), of the Danubian principalities (1865), of Bulgaria (1870), and of Serbia (1879). Limited in extent to the remaining provinces of European Turkey and Asia Minor, the Church of Constantinople was then a more homogeneous structure. Under wise leaders, among whom Joachim III holds a distinguished position, Constantinople maintained its moral power and prestige among all Orthodox peoples, with the exception of schismatic Bulgaria. At the same time, the establishment of national churches, appearing as an inevitable consequence of nationalism, saved the venerable institution from political entanglements which it could hardly sustain. Yet the transfer of ecclesiastical authority to the new churches did not occur without psychological tension. The Patriarchate was loath to part with its jurisdiction over the Christian kingdoms. In the case of Greece, for example, it recognized the autonomy of the archbishop of Athens only as late as 1850, and in the early 1880's, it opposed all efforts of the Tricoupis government to take over the school system of the Greek communities in European Turkey. It took twenty

years for the Church of Constantinople to recognize Romania's ecclesiastical autonomy, and the rejection of Bulgaria's demands led to the ominous schism, which was terminated in 1945, thanks to Russian intervention. In the case of Romania the confiscation of extensive church lands afforded a cause for irritation, and Bulgaria's position as a district of the Ottoman Empire was a good pretext for not granting autonomous ecclesiastical status.

The Turkish government, too, came under the influence of Western nationalism, and repeated efforts were made to secularize the mechanism of the state. The proclamations of the Hatti Sherif (1839) and of the Hatti Humayun (1856) spoke of civil rights without discrimination as to race or creed; the same documents recognized "the spiritual privileges and immunities" which had been granted to non-Moslem groups.⁵⁵ Turks with a Western political outlook saw a conflict between the two promises; many of them were inclined to cancel the privileges for the sake of equality before the law. Their ideal was a secular state. On the other hand, long acquaintance with Turkish methods made the national minority leaders extremely skeptical, and they were loath to sacrifice any of their rights. The Greeks in particular were in no way enthusiastic when they were told to send representatives, in accordance with the Treaty of Paris and the new law, to Phanar to make up the Provisional National Council, which would suggest "les réformes exigées par le progrès des lumières et du temps."⁵⁶ The council, meeting in 1858-59, drew up a detailed constitution, whose main provisions dealt

⁵⁵ W. MILLER, *The Ottoman Empire and its successors* (Cambridge: 1936), pp. 151, 298-99.

⁵⁶ I. de TESTA, *Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les puissances étrangères* (Paris, 1864), V, 170.

⁵³ *Ἱστορία τοῦ ἐλληνικοῦ ἔθνους* [History of the Greek nation] (Athens, 1932), VB, 75-76.

⁵⁴ YPSILANTES, p. 379.

with the election of patriarchs, metropolitans, and bishops; the composition and the functions of the holy synod and the mixed council; the revenues of the Patriarchate; and the administration of monasteries and welfare institutions. For the Greeks such a charter would not constitute a departure from the *berats* of earlier days. In 1861 and 1862 the Sublime Porte accepted it with some few reservations. In its final form it was published by the Patriarchal Press in 1862 under the title: "General regulations concerning the management of ecclesiastical and national affairs of the Orthodox Christian subjects of H.I. Majesty the Sultan, who are under the Ecumenical Throne."

According to the "General regulations," the candidates for the patriarchal office were nominated by the metropolitans of the provinces and of the capital, the holy synod, and the representatives of the laity. The list of candidates was then submitted to the Porte, which ruled out the *personae non gratae*. From the remaining names the electoral assembly chose three candidates, and from these three the council of prelates elected the patriarch. The electoral assembly was composed of about twenty bishops—the number might vary—and seventy-three laymen, the latter representing a wide cross-section of the community. The council of prelates, which was also a part of the electoral assembly, was made up of the twelve members of the holy synod and the metropolitans who happened to be present in Constantinople.

For administrative purposes there were two permanent bodies assisting and checking the patriarch: the holy synod and the mixed council. The former, whose membership was open to all metropolitans on the principle of rotation, included twelve men, each serving a term

of two years; and the latter was composed of four members of the synod appointed by the patriarch, and eight laymen elected by the people by indirect suffrage for a period of two years. In both bodies decisions were taken by a simple majority vote.⁵⁷

In the "General regulations" there were no essential innovations of a judiciary nature. There was, nonetheless, a growing sentiment among the Turks in favor of secular justice. The law of A.H. 1296 (A.D. 1879) sought to extend the jurisdiction of the state courts at the expense of ecclesiastical prerogative, by establishing a uniform procedure independently of religious custom.⁵⁸ Evidences of secular law intruding into the domain of the church appeared in the *berat* of 1882, which spoke of trial of the patriarch and bishops by Turkish courts and the right of police agents to arrest clergymen. In the following year the ministry of justice empowered civil courts to deal with cases of inheritance and alimony. Fearing greater encroachments in the near future, the patriarch protested and showed a determination to hold his own. Negotiations proved of no avail, as the Porte planned to abolish not only judiciary but also educational privileges. The Patriarchate declared that the Greeks would never agree to reforms that interfered with the independence of the church. Joachim III resigned in 1884. To avoid further complications, the Porte declared that "there had never been the slightest thought of changing the religious privileges and the legitimate concessions which had been granted to

⁵⁷ For more details concerning these institutions see F. van den STEEN DE JEHAY, *La situation légale des sujets ottomans non-musulmans* (Brussels, 1906), pp. 96–106.

⁵⁸ George YOUNG, *Corps de droit ottoman* (Oxford, 1905), I, 166.

the Patriarchate from the beginning.”⁵⁹

The “question of privileges,” as it came to be called, was raised again in 1890. This time, too, the patriarch, Dionysius V, resigned. As a last measure the holy synod closed the churches and suspended all religious functions. The interdict lasted three months, at the end of which the grand vizier showed a conciliatory attitude. Negotiations were resumed (1891), but the church had to make a few concessions: penal cases involving clergymen were to be tried in state courts, and the convicted ecclesiastics could serve their sentence, as before, in the Patriarchate or in the bishop’s quarters, but, pending trial, they were to be detained in a special section of state prisons; in cases of divorce the amount of alimony should be fixed by Ottoman courts; and Turkish officials henceforth could inspect Greek schools, with the consent of the bishop.⁶⁰

The Young Turkish revolution, after futile attempts to apply a liberal policy

with regard to the minority groups, turned to the ultra-nationalist scheme of forceful assimilation. The Greek church drew the attention of the revolutionists from the very first. Among other measures, they subjected the Greek schools to the control of the Turkish ministry of education, and they sought to enforce civil marriage. The war of 1914 favored their plans. Later, during the Allied occupation of Constantinople (1918–22), the Patriarchate recovered its previous authority, and its prestige rose to an unprecedented level. It was a last glow. Following the Greek evacuation of Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, the sweeping reforms of Mustafa Kemal, founder of the Turkish republic, abolished all traces of theocracy and restricted the Greek Patriarchate to its purely religious functions within the city of Constantinople, henceforth called exclusively “Istanbul.” With the death of the Ottoman Empire, the privileged position of the Greek church came to an end.

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⁵⁹ STEPHANIDES, *Ἑκκλησιαστικὴ ἱστορία*, p. 638.

⁶⁰ Van den STEEN DE JEHAY, pp. 111–12.