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Source: Russian Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan., 1969), pp. 23-36

Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Editors and Board of Trustees of the Russian Review

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Catherine II, Potemkin, and Colonization Policy in Southern Russia

By James A. Duran, Jr.

ROM the viewpoint of modern Russian history, one of the unquestionably valuable and unquestionably valuable achievements of Catherine II was the conquest and assimilation after 1768 of the southern frontiers, which had been harassed for centuries by raiding Tatar hordes from the Ottoman Turkish Empire. However, the Turks were not content to accept the settlement of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji and the period between 1774 and the outbreak of the second Turkish War in 1787 was one of continual political struggle with Russia punctuated by occasional military demonstrations. The Empress and her advisors were interested in rapid settlement and economic development of the southern "virgin lands," a process that took a military orientation, as revealed in the fact that military settlers came to represent approximately eighty per cent of all state peasants settled in the area. A whole series of policies were established to encourage and hasten migration. Most interestingly, these policies departed from the class principle governing rural landownership in Great Russian territories, where private estates were reserved to the nobility. To a degree, Catherine's approach reflected the influence of physiocratic economic doctrine. The entrusting of her long-time favorite, Grigory Potemkin, with the commission to develop this area was not a sinecure but an indication of her personal interest in developing this region as quickly as possible. With her backing, he could pursue his grandiose schemes (many of which would fall short of realization). While the Saxon diplomat Helbig's caustic references to "Potemkin Villages" have set the pattern for much subsequent writing, even contemporary witnesses recognized that much was achieved. In contrast to such authors as George Soloveytchik and A. Brukhner, who, in writing of this period of Russian history, refer to the attracting of foreign colonists, the founding of cities, and the building of the Black Sea fleet, the primary purpose in this paper is to analyze the colonization policies which facilitated the migration of hundreds of thousands of peasants to the south within the span of a few decades.²

The area to which these peasants migrated consisted in 1774 of those territories between the Bug and the Dnieper rivers and between the lower Don and Eia rivers. The Crimean Khanate was annexed in 1783, and the region between the Dniester and the Bug was added at the completion of the second Turkish War in 1791. Also included were the lands of the former Zaporozhie Cossacks added to Novorossisk province after the destruction of their autonomy in 1775. The political divisions involved were the enlarged Novorossisk and Azov provinces, from 1775 until they were united in 1784 to form the vast Ekaterinoslav Viceroyalty (Namestnichestvo). In 1783, the Tavricheskaya Oblast' was formed from the Crimean Khanate. All of this territory was ruled by Potemkin from 1774 until his death in 1791, when he was succeeded by the last of Catherine's favorites, the far less competent Platon Zubov.

Catherine's belief in the importance of agricultural colonization was strengthened by her acceptance of the physiocratic economic doctrines emphasizing agriculture as the source of

¹ For a discussion of Helbig's influence, see A. G. Brikhner, "Potemkin" (St. Petersburg, 1891), pp. 2-4; E. I. Druzhinina, Severnoe Prichernomor'e v 1775-1880 gg. (Moscow, 1959); George Soloveytchik, Potemkin, A Picture of Catherine's Russia (London, 1938), p. xi. Throughout their volumes, both Brikhner and Soloveytchik refute particular statements originating with Helbig.

 $^{^2}$ For example, see Brikhner, op. cit., pp. 71-79, 91-102; Soloveytchik, op. cit., pp. 172-89.

wealth. In Article 294 of her Instruction to the Legislative Commission of 1767-8, she wrote: "There can be neither skillful Handicraftsmen, nor a firmly established Commerce, where Agriculture is neglected, or carried on with Supineness and Negligence." Depreciating livestock raising, she stressed that cultivation of the soil was more important economically since it provided more support for a larger population than did the former.4 Very critical of the heavy exactions of the landlords and of the government, the Empress projected a revision of policies to correct these abuses.⁵ In addition to a law limiting the dues of private landlords, she put repeated emphasis on property rights, e.g., in Article 295, where she wrote: "Agriculture can never flourish there, where no Persons have any property of their own."6 When depopulation resulted "from some internal Defect in the Constitution, and a bad Administration. . .," she felt that a policy must be urgently pursued in settling farmers on those lands left fallow and uncultivated. Then, her colonization policy was proposed in broad terms in Article 280:

- . . . In such Circumstances, the same Method ought to be followed through the whole Extent of that Country, which the Romans practiced in one Part of theirs. To do, in a Scarity of Inhabitants, what they did in a Superfluity of them, to divide the Lands amongst the Families which had none, and to enable them to cultivate and improve them. This Division ought to be made without Loss of Time, as soon as ever one Man can be found who would undertake it on those Terms, that not a Moment might be lost before the Work is begun.⁸
- ³ Catherine II, Documents of Catherine the Great, The Correspondence with Voltaire and the Instruction of 1767 in the English Text of 1768. Ed. by W. F. Reddaway (Cambridge, England, 1931), p. 262.
 - ⁴ *Ibid*, Article 273, p. 258.
 - ⁵ Ibid, Article 269, p. 258, and Articles 275, 276, and 277, p. 259.
- ⁶ *Ibid*, Article 295, p. 262, and also Article 261, p. 257 and Article 296, p. 262.
 - ⁷ Ibid, Article 278, p. 259, and Article 279, p. 260.
- ⁸ Ibid, Article 280, p. 260. Concerning Catherine's economic ideas, see Basil Dmytryshyn, "The Economic Content of the 1767 Nakaz of Catherine II," The American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. XIX (1960), pp. 1-9. Also see M. M. Bogoslovsky; Istoriia Rossii XVIII veka (1725-1796 gg.) pp. 281-86.

What were the specific policies pursued by the government in encouraging settlement in the south? Legislation was issued in 1763 and 1764 regulating the status of foreign colonists who settled in cities or rural areas, either as individuals or in colonies.9 Families settling in colonies were granted parcels of land of 81 acres and freedom from taxes for periods ranging up to 30 years depending on the difficulty of bringing the land under cultivation. Such land could not be sold or mortgaged and title remained vested in the colony as a whole. Skilled tradesmen and entrepreneurs opening workshops received special privileges, including in some cases the right to acquire serfs. Individual foreigners could take advantage of provisions not only in these laws, but also in legislation designed primarily for Russian subjects. 10 Although studies of this period often stress those policies designed to attract foreign colonists, such colonization provided only a small minority of the settlers, numbering in 1787 only 11,613 persons in the area studied.11

Far more important was the legislation governing the settlement of Russian subjects and individual foreigners in these southern areas. In an *ukaz* of March 22, 1764, including the "Plan about the Distribution in Novorossisk Province of Treasury Lands for their Settlement," the general principles were enunciated which, with alterations, were later applied to the vast areas of virtually unpopulated land in the southern reaches of the Empire. ¹² According to the provisions of 1764, the area to be settled was divided into 70 districts, each of which in turn was divided into 700 parcels of 60.2 or 81 acres, depending on whether or not the land was forested. The military purpose of these frontier settlements is revealed by the fact that 52 of the

⁹ Polnoe Sobanie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii s 1649 goda, Vol. XVI, No. 11,880, July 22, 1763; No. 12,095, March 19, 1764. Henceforth the standard form of citation of this law code will be used: *PCZ*, volume number, number of law, and date.

¹⁰ PCZ, XVI, No. 12,099, March 22, 1764.

¹¹ Druzhinina, op. cit., pp. 154-55.

¹² PCZ, XVI, No. 12,099, March 22, 1764.

70 districts were reserved for military settlers who would man specified regiments. The acreage of the parcels was the area judged necessary to support the obligations of a single household, whether to provide one soldier in a military unit or to pay the normal tax obligations to the state. Such parcels were to remain a single unit in "eternal hereditary possession." Virtually anyone but privately-owned serfs could receive land if he agreed to become a soldier or to be an ordinary settler on treasury lands. For purposes of civil government these individual settlers were considered to be state peasants. In each military district, the company commander was the chief administrator. In military affairs, he was responsible to the regiment and in civil affairs to the Provincial Chancellory. State peasants from elsewhere in Russia could migrate only after authorization by the proper authorities and arrangements had been made for the uninterrupted fulfillment of their obligations in the place of original residence.

In addition to those settlers who would become state peasants, (zvanie) people of any rank — anyone but freeholders (odnodvortsy), state peasants, and serfs - had the right to receive an estate ranging in size up to a maximum of 48 parcels, i.e., 3,888 acres. Having received such an estate without payment, the owner had the obligation to settle one household per parcel at his own expense within three years or return the unsettled land to the treasury. If more than 48 parcels were acquired, the excess had either to be sold to other landowners or to be returned to the treasury at fair value. After the tax-exempt periods of six, eight, or sixteen years were terminated, these estate owners would have to pay a land tax at one-half the rate prescribed for state peasants. This tax was reduced since the owners bore the expense of recruiting settlers. To further encourage those who would seek settlers, military rank was accorded to owners on the basis of the number of male immigrants recruited. Those who recruited 300 military settlers or 600 ordinary agriculturists for their estates were to be awarded the military rank of

major. Lower ranks could be earned for smaller numbers. No active military duty was expected of such individuals. However, if the recruitment was done at state expense, the recruiter did not receive title to the land, but did receive a cash premium and military rank on the same basis. Entrepreneurs, especially those establishing workshops and factories that would serve the needs of the armed forces or which represented infant industries, had the right to receive lands and in some cases state loans at six per cent annual interest.

In the section under privileges, all settlers were to have the rights of "Old Russian" subjects. In addition to certain financial subsidies, there were special privileges such as free trade in salt and vodka, exemption from paying import and export duties on many goods, and, as noted above, tax exemptions for varying periods with possible prolongation dependent upon the difficulty of bringing the land under cultivation. In place of the usual form of *obrok* paid by state peasants, a land tax was levied.¹⁸ At first, military settlers were exempt from such a land tax, though this was later voided.¹⁴ If there was no male in a military household able to serve, the land would be turned over to another household that could provide such a man.¹⁵

After 1776 with the inclusion of large additional territories, larger parcels were distributed — 142 acres instead of 60 or 81. Moreover, the limits on the size of private estates were virtually removed. Private owners were allowed to hold estates ranging from 3,050 to 32,400 acres and were not limited to single estates. In some cases, estate owners had to settle only 15 households on each 3,050 acres within a period of ten years to retain title, a considerable relaxation from the prior requirement of one household per parcel. Estate owners again did not need to be of noble origin, though in practice freeholders, all peasantry and others bound to private individuals were excluded. A report of the

¹³ *Ibid*.

¹⁴ PCZ XX, No. 14,522, December 24, 1776; Druzhinina, op. cit., pp. 62.
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¹⁵ PCZ XVI, No. 12,099, March 22, 1764.

Azov provincial chancellory in 1776 listed as owners former Cossack elders, soldiers of various lower ranks and nationalities, low ranking bureaucrats such as an archivist, a translator, two registrars, a merchant and a simple townsman. Later lists cite similar non-gentry owners of estates. In practice, sales of populated land could only be made to those holding noble rank, but non-noble landowners had the right to will their estates to non-noble heirs. The disregard of the legal monopoly of the nobility in rural landownership is significant and typical of Catherine's Russia. Peasant settlers on private estates were not serfs bound to the land or to the owner, but made contractual arrangements, often on comparatively favorable terms due to the shortage of labor in the region. Only after the death of Catherine were these settlers on private estates to be fixed in residence by the Emperor Paul.

To attract settlers, a whole series of decrees were issued. A number of these allowed the economic and state peasantry, with the safeguards for the state already noted above, to move from areas where there was a scarcity of land to the south. By manifestos of 1779, 1780, and 1787, military deserters, fugitive peasants and former Zaporozhian Cossacks who had fled abroad were called upon to return to the fatherland within two years. If they did so, they were given full pardon for any crime, except murder. On a strictly voluntary basis, they could choose to reenter military service or to return to their private owners. If they did not wish to exercise either of those options, they could settle where they wished, and the south was cited as a particularly fruitful area. There they were to receive the same privileges as any other settler. If a fugitive serf was discovered and chose not

¹⁶ Druzhinina, op. cit., pp. 62-64, 70-71, 160-62.

¹⁷ PCZ, XXIV, No. 17,638, December 12, 1768.

¹⁸ PCZ, XXI, No. 15,177; XXII, No. 16,559, August 3, 1787; XXII, No. 16,631, February 24, 1788. While the 1787 decree refers in the text to "economic" peasants, the index refers to treasury or state peasants. "Economic" peasants were those who lived on former church estates which were secularized in 1764.

to return to his owner, that owner received credit for a recruit, but the serf was not returned.19 Potemkin consistently evaded returning fugitive serfs. In 1775, he ordered Novorossisk Governor Muromtsev to tell former owners that all fugitive serfs who had fled to the former Zaporozhie Cossack area had now been taken into military settlements and hence could not be returned since they were in the service of the state. In a great many cases, the local administation simply declared the fugitives "undiscovered." In a letter to Catherine II dated June 22, 1787, Potemkin expressed his position on the fugitives: "It would be contrary to the well-being of the state to prohibit the reception of fugitives here. Then Poland would benefit by all of them."20 It is no wonder the estate owners of the neighboring settled provinces were petitioning the Empress for strict enforcement of fugitive serf laws. Other illustrative laws facilitated the resettlement of the Zaporozhian Cossacks after 1775 and had convicts shipped south.21 In 1778, 32,000 Christians were resettled from the Crimean Khanate with special privileges in certain areas.²² All of these are examples of the legislation designed to encourage settlers to take advantage of the open frontier to the south.

In the former Crimean Khanate, the native Tatars on the orders of Potemkin were treated with care and respect, notably in regard to their religious customs. That small element of the Tatar nobility who chose not to emigrate received the full rights and privileges of the Russian nobility and retained title to their lands.²³ While non-noble Tatar landowners were recognized as

¹⁹ PCZ, XXI, No. 14,870, May 5, 1779; XXI, No. 15,008, April 27, 1780; XXII, No. 17,149, September 2, 1793.

²⁰ Druzhinina, op. cit., pp. 65, 131, 156.

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 66.

²² *Ibid*, p. 68; *PCZ*, XVIII, No. 14,942, November 14, 1779; No. 14,943, November 14, 1779.

²⁸ PCZ, XXI, No. 15,708, April 8, 1783; "Rasporiazheniia svietlieishago kniazia Grigoriia Aleksandrovicha Potemkina-Tavricheskago kasatel'no ustroeniia Tavricheskoi Oblasti s 1781 po 1786 god," Zapiski Imperatorskago Odesskago Obshchestva Vol. XII (1881), pp. 286-87, 304. This periodical henceforth will be cited as Odessa Zapiski.

legal owners of their estates with the right of bequest to their heirs, sale could only be made to those with noble rank.²⁴ The Crimean Khan's huge estates and those of some of the emigrating nobility were transferred to the Russian treasury, and the peasants on them became state peasants. After a systematic survey of the lands and resources of the territory, efforts were initiated to attract settlers from the north. Typically, among those receiving lands were Potemkin, his secretay, and the Russian bureaucrats ruling the province.25 There also arrived as settlers some 3,000 Old Believers, approximately 4,000 surplus minor clerics, 600 retired and disabled soldiers who proved to be poor agriculturists, various foreigners (such as 2,353 from Moldavia) as well as the more typical types of settlers already discussed.²⁶ Facing the usual frontier problem of too few women for too many men, 4,425 wives of recruits were ordered south to join their husbands in 1785. On October 20, 1785, Potemkin sanctioned an order by the Oblast' governor to pay a recruiter five rubles for each maiden brought south to settle. Of 1,497 women who were brought from the central provinces in 1786, 1,032 were soldiers' wives and 465 were single. Two hundred eighteen of the latter were immediately married to Russian settlers.²⁷ Potemkin also ordered that the settlers be provided with cattle, agricultural implements, and the materials necessary for the construction of their houses.²⁸ At the time of annexation in 1783. it is estimated that the population of the Khanate had ap-

²⁴ PCZ, XXIII, No. 17,265, November 9, 1794.

²⁵ Druzhinina, op. cit., pp. 115-21; Murzakevich (ed.), op. cit., p. 303.

²⁶ Druzhinina, op. cit., pp. 124-30; PCZ, XXII, No. 16,239, August 13, 1785; No. 16,249, September 1, 1785; Murzakevich (ed.), op. cit., pp. 292, 306-7, 312.

²⁷ PCZ, XXII, No. 16,130, January 14, 1785; Druzhinina, op. cit., p. 128; Murzakevich (ed.), op, cit., pp. 315, 317; "Pis'my pravitelia Tavricheskoi oblasti Vasilia Vasil'evicha Kokhovskago pravitelu kantseliarii V.S. Popovu, dlia doklada ego svietlosti kniazu Grigoriu Aleksandrovichu Potemkinu-Tavricheskomu," Odessa Zapiski, Vol. X (1877), p. 239.

²⁸ PCZ, XXIII, No. 17,039, April 27, 1792; Druzhinina, op. cit., pp. 324-25.

proached 100,000 individuals; at the beginning of the nineteenth century it was approximately 190,000.²⁹

Much more impressive was the total migration into Ekaterinoslav Viceroyalty during the administration of Potemkin, especially when the limitations of eighteenth century modes of transportation and the primitive conditions of these frontier lands are considered. In the mid-1770s, the total population of the area has been estimated at approximately 262,920 individuals. In 1787, the figures of a special census totalled 724,678, an increase in thirteen years of 461,758 persons. Despite a ban on migration from 1787 to 1795 due to unsettled wartime conditions, the population in 1793 had increased by another 95,053 for a total accession in approximately twenty years of more than 555,000³⁰ Certainly, the policies permitting and encouraging migration had attained their aim.

A study of the distribution of the population reveals several important features. First of all, the importance of military considerations is shown by the fact that eighty per cent (159,516) of the 200,736 state peasants lived in military settlements in 1784. In that year, there were 148,949 peasants who lived on a contractual basis on private estates. The number listed as privately-owned serfs was 4,139, only 2.7 per cent of the *rural* peasant population.³¹ While border changes introduced by the Emperor Paul complicate use of the 1799 census data for comparison, it is clear that in the southern provinces the serfs remained a very small percentage of the total population.³² Since the distribution of state lands to favorites ceased with the accession of Alexander I, the imperial treasury remained the owner of much of the rich agricultural land of this area. In 1787,

²⁹ Druzhinina, op. cit., pp. 105-6, 202-3.

³⁰ Ibid, pp. 69, 199-200.

³¹ *Ibid*, pp. 153-54, 157-58, 167. The number of military settlers rose in 1787 to 173,366.

³² Ibid, pp. 162, 201-3. For a study of Russian census techniques and accuracy, see V. M. Kabuzan, Narodoselenie Rossii v XVIII-pervoi polovine XIX v. (Moscow, 1963).

8,185,174 desiatins belonged to the treasury and 5,729,094 to private landowners.⁸³

Another important aspect of Catherine's peasant policy in the south was the institution in 1787 of a system of rural selfgovernment among the state peasants of Ekaterinoslav Viceroyalty.84 Evidence shows that this measure was designed to be a preliminary trial of a plan which she was considering introducing for all the state peasants of Russia.35 Such a general measure would have compared in importance with the Charter of the Nobility and the Charter of the Cities which she introduced in 1785. This 1787 measure also is illustrative of her cautious preparation of what can be referred to as fundamental laws. She would institute a trial in one or two provinces of the Empire and then, after having observed its operation and made necessary alterations, she would issue the basic law. From the papers found in her private cabinet after her death, it is clear that the legislation governing "rural free dwellers" was still being developed in the form of three draft laws.

The 1787 act affecting the state peasantry of Ekaterinoslav Viceroyalty was a very comprehensive measure, defining the responsibilities of the village and of each type of elected official. It not only covered questions of particular interest to the government such as tax, police, and recruiting measures, but also fire protection, water supply, forestation, and schooling. Provisions for permitting villagers to migrate were included. Understandably, Catherine showed great sympathy for unwed mothers and gave especially thorough instructions for handling their personal problems and those of their illegitimate children. In

⁸³ Druzhinina, op. cit., p. 162.

³⁴ PCZ, XXII, No. 16,603, n.d. From the context, it appears this decree was issued in December, 1787.

⁸⁵ V. I. Veshniakov, "Proekt Imperatritsy Ekaterina II ob ustroistvie svobodnykh sel'skikh obyvatelei," *Sbornik Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva*, Vol. XX (1877), pp. 447-98.

⁸⁶ PCZ, XXII, No. 16,603, n.d.

matters of taxation, elected village assessors were enjoined to divide the burden fairly according to capacity to pay and the elected village collector had the responsibility not only for collections but also, jointly with other officials, to forward the revenue to the county seat. Careful division of power was made between the judicial and administrative authorities with the villagers being given the right to appeal to the Governor or to the provincial Director of Economy, who was in charge of state peasant affairs. Appeals could be made only about specific problems and abuses, but not about general legislation and the general welfare. This act of 1787, which codified existing piecemeal legislation, custom, and some of the ideas of Catherine, was subsequently extended to two other Vicerovalties.37 The three draft laws found in Catherine's cabinet after her death represent mainly amendments to the 1787 law and a systematic coordination with other basic statutes introduced during her reign.³⁸ With Paul's accession, they were destined not to be enacted. However, it is interesting to note that in the last years of her reign Catherine was seriously considering such a comprehensive measure designed to govern the life of more than forty per cent of Russia's peasants.

The landlord class, both northern and southern, increasingly exerted pressure on the government to end the free migration of peasants among private estates in the south. Landlords in the older territories, particularly those bordering on Ekaterinoslav Viceroyalty, resented the loss of serfs illegally fleeing south to find better opportunities. However, Catherine did not grant the owners' request, but soon after her death Paul, on December 12, 1796, forbade by *ukaz* the migration of peasants within Potemkin's former domains. Landlords who had discovered their fugitive peasants on southern estates before publication of the de-

³⁷ PCZ, XXIII, No. 16,840, March 2, 1790.

³⁸ Veshniakov, op. cit., pp. 447-98.

³⁹ Drushinina, op. cit., pp. 156, 194-95.

cree had the right to sue within two years to recover fifty rubles per male serf or to have the serf returned. Owners were to be given credit for a recruit if one of their serfs had been discovered in a state village. No suits were to be permitted for peasants who had fled and remained undiscovered before the publication date of the decree. Henceforth, the normal regulations applying to fugitive serfs and those who harbored them were to be enforced. This decree represented a compromise whereby the southern landlords, who suffered from a shortage of labor, retained their existing manpower while the northerners obtained assurance that the fugitive serf laws would be strictly enforced.

The population of the cities according to the 1784 census represented only an estimated 1.9 per cent of the total population of Ekaterinoslav Viceroyalty in comparison to 2.9 per cent for Russia as a whole. 41 This percentage is not a surprising figure for frontier areas are generally more rural but the narrow legal definition of what constituted a townsman was responsible for keeping the percentage of urban population artificially low for all Russia. Such residents of the town as those in the higher administration, the officer corps, the clergy, and the raznochintsy were by and large not entered into these figures. Also numbers of state and private peasants actually resident in the town were omitted. 42 Despite the smallness of the town population, great attention has been paid to Potemkin's grandiose plans for the development of such cities as Kherson, Sevastopol, and especially Ekaterinoslav. Many in the suite of Catherine during her great southern tour in 1787 were impressed by what had been accomplished in such a short period of time. 43 Even the skeptical Joseph II was amazed by what he had seen in Sevastopol, a city

⁴⁰ PCZ, XXIV, December 12, 1796

⁴¹ Druzhinina, op. cit., pp. 152-55.

⁴² For information on this, see IU. R. Klokman, Sotsial'no- ekonomicheskaia istoriia Russkogo goroda, vtoraia polovina XVIII veka (Moscow, 1967).

⁴³ Brikhner, op. cit., pp. 80-102.

founded in 1785.⁴⁴ Certainly, Catherine was very pleased by what Potemkin had accomplished in territories largely unsettled a decade earlier. It was for his successes that she awarded him the title "Tavricheskii."⁴⁵ Despite his moodiness, his casual handling of vast state sums, and his frequent disagreements with other high officials, he had proven an effective administrator.

In retrospect, the greatest permanent monument to the relationship of Prince Potemkin to Catherine the Great was the assimilation of these territories into the Russian Empire. Only by virtue of his influence on her and her confidence in him and his grandiose dreams were the vast sums necessary to develop the area released. Certainly, the observations of the French Ambassador Segur and of Emperor Joseph II that all was only begun and nothing completed were correct, but these were magnificent beginnings expressive of the grandeur that was the reign of Catherine II. No ruler of contemporary Europe could match this accomplishment of Catherine and the greatest of her favorites.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 96.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 101; Bogoslovsky, op. cit., pp. 286-87.