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the ministry of defence of ukraine: the role of character in reform

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Yuriy Husyev, a deputy minister in Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence, was at an impasse. It was March 2015, one year after Ukraine’s revolution and six months after Husyev had been hired as part of the new government’s attempt to change the public service. However, despite the new government and many small adjustments in the ministry, little in Ukraine’s political system or the ministry had changed.

Ukraine was attempting to right itself after months of protests, civil unrest, and a climactic, violent revolution that had overthrown the Ukrainian government in February 2014. Elections had resulted in a new government that styled itself the “kamikaze government,” reflecting its unbridled determination to institute reform in a bureaucracy crippled by years of corruption, inefficiencies, and outdated supports.[[1]](#footnote-1) It was in that context of hope that had Husyev joined the Ministry of Defence.

The military was in dire straits: it was doing its best to defend Ukraine against opportunistic Russian incursions and pro-Russian uprisings, but it was handicapped by a corrupt procurement system, inadequate provisions, and woefully outdated field supports. Husyev believed that people made the difference; if the right people were placed in the right positions, the government could fight Ukraine’s pervasive corruption and reform the whole system of governance. Husyev did his best, putting intelligent people with the necessary competencies in the right places. As a team, they had made noticeable adjustments in the system, but very little resulted in different outcomes for the soldiers.

Husyev knew something more needed to be done. What more could he do, or do differently, to initiate and lead change?

Ukraine: A HISTORY of Unrest AND CORRUPTION

Husyev became a deputy minister of defence on the heels of radical upheaval in Ukraine. On November 21, 2013, Ukraine’s then-president Viktor Yanukovych and his government refused to proceed with drafting and implementing an economic association agreement with the European Union. Civil protests erupted in public spaces; protestors wanted a clean break from Russia and closer ties with the European Union.

Ukrainians had already endured years of corruption, mismanagement, and stalled economic growth. State-owned enterprises were either not working or ineffective, and Ukraine’s economy was weak. The government’s rejection of the agreement with the European Union fanned protestors’ existing frustration.[[2]](#footnote-2) The flagrant misuse of an excessive concentration of power held by Yanukovych and his relations and closest associates fuelled the fire. Protests escalated and quickly spread, becoming an organized movement known as *Euromaidan*.[[3]](#footnote-3)

The Euromaidan protests lasted for two months, then, on February 18, 2014, the protests erupted in a revolution known as the Revolution of Dignity. More than half a million protestors converged on Kiev, with more protesting in other cities, clashing with police and Yanukovych’s government over five days of violence. Public transit, government facilities, and many markets were closed. Random shootings in the public square, much of it a result of the government’s heavy-handed attempts to control rioting, resulted in the deaths of more than 100 people. The uprisings and significant international political pressure finally led Yanukovych and other government officials to flee the country, mostly to Russia.

The next few months were politically chaotic. Ukraine’s previous constitution was restored, an interim government was installed, and elections were held for a new president and parliament. The elections were tumultuous; some polling stations did not even open due to threats of violence from pro-Russian insurgents. But a year after the protests began, Ukraine had a new government, and communities of experts emerged to help rebuild the country. The new government claimed that the reforms in Ukraine would be applied across all ministries and departments, policies and regulations. Reform would address corruption and mismanagement, where the need for change was pressing; ineffective public institutions; and outdated systems.[[4]](#footnote-4)

The most urgent need for reform was in the Ministry of Defence. Russia had already been a threat in the eastern regions of Ukraine; then, amid post-revolution turbulence in Ukraine, the Russian military annexed the autonomous Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Pro-Russian groups in the Ukraine added more pressure, leading to armed conflict in the eastern regions. However, the Ukrainian military was both tactically and logistically crippled and unprepared to handle the necessary defence. At the most basic level, soldiers were not even adequately outfitted or fed. Civil volunteer groups, many populated by volunteers from the Euromaidan uprising, emerged to support the military with resources normally provided by the state. Aid ranged from social networks and emotional support to crowdfunding projects that supplied the military with everything from night-vision goggles to armour for vehicles. Some also volunteered as fighters in volunteer nationalist battalions.

The military’s shortcomings could be largely attributed to corruption within the public sector. Corruption had been a problem in all public organizations at all levels since Ukraine’s independence 25 years earlier. Many of the companies that successfully bid for government tenders were owned by people related to, or associated with, members of the tender commission. Bribery of government officials was widely practiced. Companies would be awarded contracts even if their products or services were inferior. The tender process involved choosing a provider who would participate in the corrupted scheme as opposed to selecting a provider who could supply the best services at the lowest prices.[[5]](#footnote-5)

Public procurement was also corrupted by faulty announcements or announcements that were deliberately worded to reduce competition. Errors and incorrect data were other problems with requests for tender. Whether the actions were careless or deliberate, the tender process resulted in faulty products, competitors who could not meet the requirements specified in the tender, and either too many or not enough of the needed supplies. The problems stretched from procurement of the largest equipment (for example, a request for cranes provided the wrong number of cranes needed and the wrong year for delivery) to provision of the smallest items of military clothing. A series of requests for tender of military footwear included an unexplained need for a specific type of sole that could be provided only by one manufacturer; that one manufacturer secured all 28 tenders. In a warm clothing initiative for the soldiers, the Ministry of Defence issued a request for tender of winter trousers. A company was hired in 2014 to sew and provide 9,000 pairs of trousers; however, the company that won the contract only had the capacity to produce 1,000 pairs of trousers by the necessary deadline.

The government in general, and the Ministry of Defence in particular, was demoralized from the inside out. Corruption and autocratic leadership had stripped the ministry and its staff of motivation and interest. Military enrolment was decreasing, and many in service support were laid off. Decision-making committees lacked specialists who could understand the technical issues. Even ranks in the military had become subject to black market sale; people with only a few years of military experience were able to simply buy a higher rank at a given price.[[6]](#footnote-6)

YURIY HUSYEV

Thirty-five-year-old Husyev was different than the usual public servant. He was among one of the first cohorts of people who came to the ministry from outside public service. He had a background in economics and finance and a doctorate in economics, and he had completed an executive development program in leadership, governance, economic development, and reform at the Harvard Kennedy School. His education and experience were uncommon in the recent history of the Ministry of Defence.

However, Husyev was familiar with problems in the military. He had been active with the volunteer movement that supplied the armed forces with equipment and supplies the state had not provided. Husyev’s contribution was as co-founder and leader of the charity organization Association of National Volunteers Ukraine (ANV).[[7]](#footnote-7) This group provided support to both Ukrainian soldiers and families in need as a result of the conflict, broken economy, and lack of employment. Members of the association collected donations, offered their time, and gathered an array of needed items.

Husyev had a good reputation among the volunteers who supported the Ukrainian military. He was especially known for his ability to recruit and work with people and to influence groups and activities. His reputation as a volunteer led ANV to recommend Husyev for the position of deputy minister.

The Ministry of Defence: A System of Apathy

Husyev was appointed as deputy minister of defence responsible for acquisitions, support, and supply in November 2014 (see Exhibit 1). At that time, Ukraine employed about 300,000 people in its public sector, which was still functioning as a Soviet-style institution informed by communist philosophies. The structure was vertical and autocratic; decisions were made by the most senior staff and were not subject to negotiation or questioning by any staff beneath the decision makers. Goal setting was illogical; the aim was not to solve the state’s problems or establish new laws or systems, but to maintain activity within the system and provide people with work, even if their work was pointless or unproductive. The system and its leaders focused more on process than on achieving results.

The bureaucracy typically attracted mediocre personalities for low salaries. Staff were not ready or willing to assume responsibility and left most of the purposeful work and decision making for senior staff. It seemed that the most important task for public servants was to create work for the minister and the minister’s deputies while appearing to be productive themselves. Their function was to keep busy driving the system, however the system was structured. The result was inefficiency, persistence of the status quo, and reinforcement of the vertical management structure. People were unmotivated and had no interest in change, and the departments suffered from a lack of talent.[[8]](#footnote-8)

When Husyev started his work in the ministry, he noted that the public servants believed everything was well and right. They seemed to be busy preparing and sending hundreds of documents, but they did not see that there was a connection between their work and the war in eastern Ukraine. Staff regularly voiced their beliefs: “The war is in the east. We are alright. Here, everything is good and calm.” They continued as if nothing had changed, lacking the experience, will, interest, or motivation to solve problems or implement decisions. Their position was that change was almost impossible and there was little anyone could do to fix that. Deputies tried to solve problems by involving various experts within the ministry; however, for each new suggestion or proposal, the favourite response was, “It’s impossible.”

When Husyev realized that “It’s impossible” was the favourite expression among staff and colleagues, he quickly forbade its use in his departments in the hope that he could at least decrease the negativity surrounding the possibility of reforms. He posted a notice in his office, informing everyone that using the word *impossible* was forbidden. Instead, he insisted that “We are searching and finding the ways. That’s our task.”Husyev believed that the ban on *impossible* really did make a difference. Staff began to discuss issues put forward at meetings, whether or not they believed there was a solution. They searched for ways to make the proposed ideas possible. It was a start.

THE VOLUNTEER LANDING PARTY: A Team for Change

With the government’s support, Husyev used his experience with volunteer groups to recruit professionals from volunteer cohorts to work in the ministry. To simplify hiring, these new government recruits were not required to have status as state servants.[[9]](#footnote-9) Instead, the recruits were to be hired as paid volunteers. The goal was to select not politicians or career bureaucrats but professionals from *outside* politics to address organizational issues and create an environment for reform *within* the system. Husyev wanted people with a wide range of concrete experience who could be tasked to promote reform for the greater good of Ukrainian soldiers and citizens.

Husyev was deliberate in building his team. He identified three key priorities for selecting team members and determining how they would interact. First, team members had to be qualified. Traditionally, the people appointed to Ukraine’s public service were hired because they were compliant and submissive. Instead, Husyev wanted team members who had passed several stages of selection, including professional and polygraph testing. Second, Husyev wanted quality experts. People’s skills and experience were important; what team members would do would be determined once they had been selected. Husyev explained, “I chose people primarily qualified in specific fields, and then with them, determined what their main goals and functions would be.” Finally, team members had to demonstrate collaboration and tolerance. The team would be working with public servants who were resistant to change, where conflicts, sabotage, and job dysfunction were possible. From Husyev’s point of view, the process for change would need to be paced, methodical, and transparent. Team members had to have calm, moderate, and communicative personalities in order to work effectively in the ministry’s organizational culture and working environment.

In December 2014, 10 Ukrainian citizens were chosen in an open competition. The chosen team members were talented and represented diverse professions and backgrounds: two lawyers, two people with degrees in international relations, a physician, an engineer, a web designer, two business owners, and a soldier. The members had previously worked for successful nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or had worked on successful business projects. They all had strong managerial skills and were effective problem solvers (see Exhibit 2). All of them were Maidan activists—evidence of their commitment to Ukraine. The team members called themselves the Volunteer Landing Party (VLP), evoking the purpose of military landing parties who went ashore in advance of troops to assess unknown territory and complete tasks that enabled the troops to do their work.

When the new team began its work in the ministry, its 10 members took various paid official posts. Some were appointed to leadership roles; others worked at the administrative level of the department. Salaries in the public service were low; VLP members were paid a salary of about US$200 per month. The salary, which was an average wage for public servants, was only 20 per cent or less of what team members had been paid at their previous workplaces. There were also other volunteers—many of whom were young experts—who did not hold positions within the ministry but were willing to help as much as they could. These volunteers were supported with small stipends from an international fund.

The volunteers believed they could make a difference and were ready to do whatever it took to make that difference. When asked about money, the VLP members reported that they were not interested in the money. They all claimed to be motivated by the opportunity to reform the country and make it a place where they would genuinely like to live. They were in financially stable situations and could sustain themselves long enough to focus on reforms. The VLP members knew their engagement with the ministry was short term. Once sufficient change had been made, the team would be dismissed.

Members of the VLP supported each other, and together they supported the ministry changes. The team members shared trust, values, and a common goal and approach. Two of the team members, Artur Pereverziev and Bogdan Kovalev, couldn’t say when they started trusting each other. They acknowledged that at some point, they just realized they had no other choice. They described their bonding as “being united against the common enemy of the inefficient bureaucratic mechanism standing in the way of effective reform.” They reinforced that team members were driven by shared values and approaches to work at the ministry; they all wanted qualitative changes, “not just an illusion of work.”

Team members agreed that, with time, trust had to form for them to make any positive changes. Members would notice each other’s actions and progress and develop respect for one another. It was quickly apparent who really wanted to make a difference and could be trusted.

Culture Clash

The ministry staff fell into two main groups of workers: public servants, who were paid but unmotivated, and volunteers, who were significantly underpaid but motivated. Therefore, one of the VLP’s first challenges was appreciating the conflict between motivation and responsibility as experienced by each group. Those who had worked with the army as volunteers generally loved the work they did. They cared about what they did, and the work aligned with their values. That work was also typically exciting and fast paced. When these volunteers took positions in the ministry, they experienced culture shock; they were unprepared for the routine and monotonous nature of day-to-day work. Following procedures and waiting for approvals took time, making the volunteers’ days very slow. They had enjoyed their volunteer work, which was visible to the public; public service was not as glamorous and was under-appreciated. VLP members were easily bored and were in constant search of action. They did not want to waste their time.

One solution to this situation was to give each group of workers different tasks according to their strengths. Public servants would carry out mechanical tasks and procedures, such as preparing procurement requests and corresponding with official authorities. VLP members would oversee processes and activity, and identify existing problems. The volunteers were seen as advisors to the public servants. Since so many volunteers had field military experience, they could, for example, help with issues such as the composition of military kits. The volunteers had a range of experience, so there was at least one who could provide expertise on each issue.

Calming the Clash with communication

The VLP had identified four broad goals for reform:

* *Military equipment*: The military needed modern and functional equipment that met or exceeded the minimum standards set by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[[10]](#footnote-10) Innovations in military science needed to be advanced and incorporated.
* *Food and clothing*: The military needed to have the basics of appropriate, quality clothing and adequate nutrition.
* *Military medicine*: The medical services available to soldiers needed to be improved to reach a level and quality of service similar to that provided by leading countries such as the United States, Turkey, Germany, and France.
* *Housing and real property*: Military housing and military equipment needed to be catalogued and better managed to ensure that resources were available, and to avoid duplication and unnecessary acquisitions.

To achieve these goals, fundamental changes were required in two areas:

* *Logistics*: The ministry needed to transform its logistical operations to a system that ensured acceptable quality, necessary materials were acquired without corruption and resources were accurately managed.
* *Organizational Structure*: Work was needed inside the ministry to establish cooperation within and between departments and a collective focus on problem-solving processes.

Addressing the issue of organization within the ministry would be key to achieving the other goals. Therefore, one of the first tasks the VLP undertook was to promote interaction between the VLP and department leaders. Together, they participated in several strategic sessions, which led to the formation of regular monthly meetings with organized agendas. Previously, the department heads had met monthly, but only to give brief reports; the meetings had little structure and did not lead to positive outcomes. The new meeting structure stimulated dialogue between departments and between the VLP and department leaders. The meetings allowed the VLP to introduce innovations to enhance efficiency and allowed better monitoring of progress as a whole.

The monthly meetings led to the development of streamlined teams, each focused on specific issues. Members of the VLP functioned as specialists according to their expertise, each aligned to relevant departments and teams. For example, one team member, Vsevolod Steblyuk, a military physician, worked on issues related to the organization and structure of the military medical support system, while Pereverziev worked with logistics. Another team member, Tetiata Domanovo, was a lawyer who had worked with colleagues for many years to try to make public procurement more transparent.

VLP members participated in weekly meetings within their departments and teams, but strictly as advisors, helping staff formulate policies. Decisions that concerned the practical problems of a department were resolved within the department. Important strategic decisions and decisions that crossed departments were taken to senior leaders—primarily Husyev. Team member Pereverziev noted,

Husyev . . . trusted us to work as professionals. He knew about our [experience] and what we had been involved with before coming to the ministry. He did not select people who were incompetent or unprofessional. We even went through professional testing, interviews, and a lie detector to ensure we were the right people with the right intentions.

Ministry meetings had always been held regularly, even under the old government. However, those meetings had been formal, and attendance had been restricted to officials. Husyev opened the meetings to include more representatives. VLP members, other volunteers working with the departments, representatives of the military in the field, managers from the military’s general staff, officials from other ministries, and external experts and lawyers were also invited.

Involving more representatives who were involved in the system resulted in better recommendations. For example, one issue discussed was the introduction of military kits that passed NATO’s standard. In the past, kit composition had been determined by an expert commission, which had only an indirect relationship with military action. Input from volunteers who had experience with field kits and their strengths and weaknesses gave the ministry a more comprehensive and personal understanding of the issue, and the conclusion was that the kits were not sufficient or satisfactory. Volunteers, military personnel, and lawyers—various experts on the topic and on related financial considerations—were invited to weekly meetings to advise the ministry on changing and approving the contents of the kit.

Husyev’s communication with the staff also influenced the culture. He had a strong personality, and was passionate about changes and when interacting with others. Members of the VLP reported that Husyev often raised his voice and could be emotional. However, the team understood the source of Husyev’s volatility and accepted it as his way of interacting. His nature did not seem to create conflict; rather, Husyev’s strong leadership, stern attitude, and deep emotional drive motivated the team.

The VLP members felt trusted. Husyev gave them the authority and autonomy they needed to do their jobs. He spoke to them as professionals and was not condescending. The team was impressed by Husyev and his ability to be a leader, reformer, and manager all at once. They acknowledged that it was not an easy task. Husyev himself acknowledged that without drive, integrity, and collaboration, it would be impossible to make reforms in the ministry. When asked where he got his energy for dealing with the persistent need for change and resistance, Husyev said that when he lost his inspiration, he would go to the front lines and look into the soldiers’ eyes. He admitted that the support of friends and family also helped.

Changing Processes

SAP SE, a European software application company that specialized in streamlining processes, had been working with the Ministry of Defence to advance its accounting system to better track housing and real property. The goal was to eliminate corruption in the management of military housing and equipment. Previous attempts to do this had failed as a result of the strong process-oriented culture of the ministry. Understanding this, Husyev drew on his results orientation and drive for excellence to develop a new approach for integrating the software solution. He encouraged a shift to results orientation among the team working on the project by using regular communication to share results. Gantt charts were reviewed at weekly meetings to check on progress and assess results. Husyev prohibited postponing deadlines; he understood that if he let this happen once, the organizational culture would dominate again and his renewed attempt to integrate the software would fail. In the end, SAP’s application was implemented one day before the deadline—a notably unusual event for Ukraine’s public service.

After the revolution, the Ukrainian government collaborated with the business sector and civilians to develop an anti-corruption, public e-procurement system that would later come to be known as ProZorro. Several organizations, including volunteers and NGOs, had been involved in addition to the business community; however, implementation had so far failed.[[11]](#footnote-11) Among other problems, Husyev discovered that, ministry employees were asking vendors not to register in the new system. Husyev was infuriated; his drive for integrity and justice pushed him to deal with the situation immediately. All those guilty of attempting to sabotage the system were identified and fired. With the saboteurs out of the way, ProZorro was launched.

Husyev also began to work on the organizational culture typical in the Ukrainian public service, which was unacceptable for him. Instead of hierarchical subordination, he wanted shared responsibility. He assigned teams of staff who were open to this approach to work with their departments to define departmental purposes. This approach called for staff to be directly involved with decisions because they would be directly affected by the outcomes. Thus, staff had a reason to participate and embrace change.

The VLP proposed ambitious goals, but once staff were engaged, the challenges motivated them, determined to prove that they could achieve their goals. Husyev maintained this momentum by setting an example; he believed that if he modelled the change he wanted, his team would follow his behaviour. He developed an internal communication network and used that to share progress and outcomes. Roadmaps kept staff oriented and on track, and Gantt charts tracked the steps taken to achieve goals, showing what had already been accomplished and, importantly, showing what needed to be done next.

Conclusion

Internally, the ministry was functioning well, but that was not yet making a difference to individual soldiers in the field. The VLP members were doing their jobs. They saw themselves as problem solvers and believed that this was the main reason they were engaged in public administration. However, the VLP’s approach to problem solving was not as successful as they expected. The soldiers in the field were still struggling with old and dysfunctional equipment, procurements were still inefficient, and there was a lack of simple necessities like socks and food. The VLP members were frustrated. They understood the challenges in their search for solutions, but it was becoming increasingly clear to them that complete system reform would take too much time and there was not enough political will to champion sustainable change.

Husyev believed that he and his deputies had chosen highly qualified and responsible people. They had implemented the SAP-built system and ProZorro, which dealt with corruption. But after several months, there were few other changes that contributed to accomplishing the identified goals. Instead of actively and strategically resolving problems, VLP members were caught up in processes. They were being kept busy attending meetings and pushing paper—reading and signing documents and writing numerous recommendations. These tasks were time consuming and tedious, and left little time for discussing strategy and solving problems. Without change, the pressing problems with procurement would continue.

What could Husyev do to advance the necessary changes as urgently as needed?

Exhibit 1: The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine



Source: Created by the authors based on data from Ministry of Defence of Ukraine website, accessed March 14, 2017, www.mil.gov.ua/en.

Exhibit 2: Volunteer Landing Party—Member Profiles

The following seven individuals were key members of the Volunteer Landing Party (VLP).

**Tetiana Domanova** (age 25) had a background in law. She worked as an assistant judge in Kiev, then opened her own art gallery, which gave her business experience. She was one of the first people recruited to the VLP. Her objective was to observe from the inside how the system was built and how it could be reorganized for maximum efficiency in times of conflict. Domanova identified a problem with collective irresponsibility among ministry officials, who also collectively avoided work. This complicated the work of the entire ministry and made it difficult to identify who was responsible for a task or problem.

**Bogdan Kovalev** (age 31) was originally from the eastern Ukrainian city of Kremenchug. He graduated from vocational school as a generalist machine operator in metal and worked in a factory for a year until he realized that was not for him. He was drafted into the military soon after, but quickly realized he did not want to take part in “such a mess.” Kovalev then worked with his father in their family business. Given his educational background, Kovalev continued to be interested in machinery and weapons and was helping people he knew in the military. He joined the ministry as an unpaid volunteer. His task was to investigate and discover schemes of legal violations and corruption. He maintained that volunteers were accustomed to quickly and effectively solving problems, while paid officials were accustomed to the slow bureaucratic systems that had persisted for years.

**Artur Pereverziev** (age 25) joined the ministry in a position with a newly established department that coordinated work with a volunteer council. He was involved in investigating procurement processes. He quickly realized that procurements were broken down into too many bids and contracts, with too many people involved in decision making. The system was too detailed, and although many were involved in decision making, few were specialists who understood the technical issues. With so many bids to be considered by the committee each day, none of them could be examined in depth.

**Igor Ponomarenko** (age 59) was the principal engineer for the ministry’s clothing supply. After a month and a half of work at the ministry, he concluded that laws and regulations were contributing to ministry ineffectiveness. For example, he cited a problem within the cabinet order that regulated clothing supply for the military. The order set too many limitations, not just for uniforms but also for pillows and mattresses. He also concluded that, while many were under the impression that the ministry was the only corrupt organization, many others were also engaged in such activities. Most businesses that the ministry dealt with were corrupt, creating an entire system of corruption with far-reaching implications.

Exhibit 2 (continued)

**Vsevolod Steblyuk** (age 47) was assistant to the minister of defence in the Directorate of Medical Support. He was a military physician with extensive field experience. Steblyuk believed it would be difficult to surprise him; nevertheless, he was surprised by the level of useless bureaucracy, duplication of functions, and system inertia in the Ministry of Defence. At one point, Steblyuk managed a hospital run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While in that position, he completed courses on the procurement of medicines and conducted tenders; therefore, Steblyuk knew the procedures well. He commented, “In the ministry, I saw clear and absolutely accepted corruption schemes for medical support; they were built into the system. For example, requests for medication were not made by people delivering care but by the department staff in Kiev—as if they knew better what the needs of the hospital were.” The first thing Steblyuk did as a member of the VLP was to check the system of public procurement of medicines. The general trend was that procurement did not meet the needs. Some discoveries were handed over to law enforcement authorities. He also identified inconsistencies between the activities of volunteers, the responsibilities of the state, and the real needs of the people. For example, the VLP managed to stop the procurement of unnecessary, expensive equipment; in one case, there had been an attempt to buy an expensive operating table and a 100-litre steam sterilizer for a mobile hospital, which was not what the hospital needed.

**Nelly Stelmakh** (age 51) joined the team in January 2015 as head of the state procurement department. She was also head of the tender committee. Stelmakh had a background in project engineering and was actively volunteering for the army. She was astonished when she looked through lists of supplies kept at the warehouses. Volunteers had been providing soldiers with needed clothes and equipment, but according to the supplies list, the ministry warehouses were full. Her work revealed some corruption schemes and blocked some ineffective deals.

**Vitaliy Zhdanov** (age 42) was a member of the public procurement department. He concluded that major problems in the ministry were overstaffing and a faulty system that threatened decision makers with criminal charges as a consequence of making errors. Department heads spent most of their time on correspondence with prosecutors, and fear of decision making pervaded the system. Zhdanov believed that the most important changes for the ministry were to create simple procedures and hire quick, efficient workers. The biggest discovery for Zhdanov was that everyone knew about the corruption but pretended to be unaware. He equated the solution to farming: “If we harvested bad crops, it would be necessary to burn the stubble. Here is the same situation: it is necessary to remove the source of the corruption.”

Source: Created by the authors based on government information.

1. Vitaliy Portnikov, “The Real Kamikaze Government of Ukraine,” EuroMaidan Press, November 29, 2014, accessed September 19, 2017, http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/11/29/the-real-kamikaze-government-of-ukraine. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Yuriy Shveda and Joung Ho Park, “Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity: The Dynamics of Euromaidan,” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 7, no. 1 (2016): 85–91. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Maidan Nezalezhnosti(Independence Square) was the epicentre of the protests and later, the riots; Euromaidan (Euro + Maidan) reflected the protestors’ petition for independence in an association with the European Union. “Ukraine: The February Revolution,” *Economist*, February 27, 2014, accessed September 20, 2017, www.economist.com/news/briefing/21597974-can-ukraine-find-any-leaders-who-will-live-up-aspirations-its-battered-victorious; Alan Yuhas and Raya Jalabi, “Ukraine’s Revolution and Russia’s Occupation of Crimea: How We Got Here,” *Guardian*, March 5, 2014, accessed September 20, 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/05/ukraine-russia-explainer. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Richard Balmforth, “Ukraine’s ‘Kamikaze’ PM Relishes Hawkish Reputation,” Reuters, November 7, 2014, accessed September 20, 2017, http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-yatseniuk/ukraines-kamikaze-pm-relishes-hawkish-reputation-idUKKBN0IR17B20141107; Joshua Yaffa, “Reforming Ukraine after the Revolutions,” *New Yorker*, September 5, 2016, accessed September 20, 2017, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/09/05/reforming-ukraine-after-maidan. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Yaffa, op. cit. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Charles McPhedran, “Corruption Eats Away at Ukraine Military,” Daily Beast, October 21, 2014, accessed September 20, 2017, www.thedailybeast.com/corruption-eats-away-at-ukraine-military. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Asociaciya Narodnyx Volonteriv Ukrayiny translated to “People’s Volunteer Association Ukraine” in English, but the organization used the English name “Association of National Volunteers Ukraine” (ANV). “Association,” Association of National Volunteers Ukraine , accessed March 30, 2017, http://anv.org.ua/asotsiatsiya. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Yaffa, op. cit. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The *Law of Ukraine on Civil Service* endeavoured to create an improved public service that was responsible for serving the needs of the public. According to the statute, state service in Ukraine was a professional activity of those who occupied positions in central and local governments. Those “on the state’s service” were paid from public funds and were expected to have appropriate professional instruction. International Labour Organization, *Law of Ukraine on Civil Service* (1991), accessed September 20, 2017, www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/89883/103365/F1584137912/UKR89883\_English.pdf; Juri Polianski, “Government/Citizen Relationship in Ukraine,” *Openness and Transparency in Governance: Challenges and Opportunities* (Maastricht: NISPAcee, 1999) 134–144, accessed September 20, 2017, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan006513.pdf. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was an intergovernmental political and military alliance founded by the *North Atlantic Treaty of 1949*. Ukraine was not a member of NATO but had a defined relationship with the alliance. Ukraine was also dependent on NATO’s support in the Russia–Ukraine conflict. NATO established certain military standards that were universally accepted as benchmarks. “What is NATO?,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed September 20, 2017, www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Mara Lemos Stein, “Ukraine Looks to Unmask Corruption with ProZorro E-Procurement,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 19, 2016, accessed September 20, 2017, https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2016/05/19/ukraine-looks-to-unmask-corruption-with-prozorro-e-procurement; Yuriy Bugay, “ProZorro: How a Volunteer Project Led to Nation-Wide Procurement Reform in Ukraine,” Open Contracting Partnership (blog), July 28, 2016, accessed September 20, 2017, www.open-contracting.org/2016/07/28/prozorro-volunteer-project-led-nation-wide-procurement-reform-ukraine. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)