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HISENSE’S INTERNATIONALIZATION DILEMMA: CO-OPERATION WITH LOEWE

Su Liu and Paul Beamish wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.

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In January 2013, Hisense Co., Ltd.’s German subsidiary presented a strategic co-operation proposal to Hisense’s headquarters. However, after six months of heated debate, Hisense’s decision makers still found it difficult to decide whether they should establish a strategic alliance with the German high-end television (TV) maker Loewe AG (Loewe). Loewe, a 90-year-old company with a good reputation, was suffering severe financial distress and preparing to file for bankruptcy protection. Loewe thus urgently needed both a new investor and a technology infusion to ease its huge financial pressure and help restructure its TV business. In turn, Hisense, despite being the world’s fourth-largest TV producer, wanted to improve its brand reputation and believed an association with Loewe could help. Both companies would gain access to the other’s primary distribution networks. No matter the form of involvement, Hisense would be risking significant financial losses if Loewe went bankrupt or continued to have unsatisfactory performance.

LOEWE: A GERMAN luxury tv brand

Loewe Technologies GmbH (Loewe) was a German high-end TV and entertainment system producer famous in Europe for its modern designs, sleek user interfaces, and high quality. Since it first invented and launched colour TVs in Germany, Loewe had kept the promise of “Made in Germany,”[[1]](#footnote-1) a business philosophy that was popular and welcomed by the European market. Despite Loewe’s high consumer recognition, its luxury-brand positioning limited its product range, which was only targeted at high-end customer needs.[[2]](#footnote-2) However, fierce market competition and the diversification of customer needs forced TV producers to be both cost-effective and able to respond quickly to technological changes; otherwise they would face bankruptcy. As a result, Asian producers had gradually dominated the TV industry. They were more cost-effective than other producers in various aspects of large-scale production, in part due to their lower research and development (R&D) costs per product line and to their synergies in a wide range of products. Loewe’s flat-screen TVs, even without the most advanced technologies and the best hardware configurations, sold for as much as €5,000 (US$6,650) each.[[3]](#footnote-3) This led Loewe to struggle for survival in such a highly competitive industry.

Loewe had suffered heavy losses for years due to its Asian competitors. Loewe’s sales revenue dropped from €374 million ($508 million) in 2008 to €250 million ($340 million) in 2012 (see Exhibit 1). In the first six months of 2013, Loewe’s sales worsened. Its revenue was €76.5 million ($104 million), a decline of 39 per cent versus the previous year, and net losses rose to €26.7 million ($36 billion) for the period. If Loewe failed to make significant business adjustments, it would go bankrupt.

The Ideal New Investor for Loewe

Initially, the strategy for Loewe had been to negotiate with potential investors to ease its financial distress. Moreover, Loewe hoped this new investor could also help restructure its TV business and strengthen its TVs’ competitiveness. In addition, Loewe wanted to expand its business to other promising markets. However, Loewe soon learned that no investor option could specifically meet all of its requirements and expectations.

Among the potential investors who could help Loewe restructure and strengthen its TV business might be the main global TV producers. By 2008, the global TV market was dominated by Chinese, Japanese, and Korean producers. With the increasing competition between TV producers, the market structure soon changed. By 2013, Chinese and Korean producers dominated, because many Japanese TV producers had lost their competitive advantage and had withdrawn from the TV market (often by divesting their TV business). Thus, it was highly unlikely that a Japanese TV producer would purchase a German TV producer.

There were still Korean and Chinese TV producers potentially available. In the European high-end TV market, Loewe’s market share prior to 2012 ranked second, behind only Samsung. As a world-famous TV brand in its own right, Samsung arguably did not need another brand label and did not necessarily want to help a competitor. LG, another famous Korean brand, was in the same situation as Samsung.

The many Chinese TV producers, such as Haier, Changhong, Konka, and Skyworth, undertook no TV manufacturing in Europe and exported few products from China to Europe. Therefore, the possibility of them acquiring Loewe seemed low. Only two Chinese TV producers, TCL and Hisense, adopted localization strategies and might have the capabilities and interest to purchase Loewe. In the case of TCL, in 2004 it acquired the French TV producer Thomson, but subsequently encountered unanticipated integration difficulties.[[4]](#footnote-4) Therefore, it seemed unlikely that TCL would quickly commit to purchase a German TV brand.

Hisense’s Possible Role: Technical Support

Hisense certainly had the potential ability to provide technical support to help Loewe strengthen the competitiveness of its TVs. In Hisense’s view, the design and development of a new top-class product should be the priority for Loewe. Only if newly designed products attracted more consumers would Loewe be able to materially increase its sales.

It was also difficult for Loewe to decide whether it should establish strategic co-operation with Hisense. If Loewe decided to co-operate with Hisense for technical support, Loewe still needed to find another new investor within a short period of time and ensure that this new investor would support its restructuring proposal and the long-term strategic co-operation with Hisense.

Hisense: A Chinese cost-effective TV BRAND

Hisense was founded in 1969 in Qingdao, China. It was a leading global company producing consumer electronics, household appliances, information technology equipment, and mobile communication devices, with 69,000 employees worldwide. Hisense was best-known for its smart TVs and had been the Chinese flat-screen-TV champion since 2004. After gradually accumulating technological capability, international experience, and overseas distribution channel resources, Hisense began in 2007 to adopt its own brand internationalization strategy and give priority to overseas market expansion.The effect of this strategy was obvious: by 2013, Hisense had become the world’s fourth-largest TV producer.[[5]](#footnote-5)

Though Hisense had a large sales volume, it was not yet a globally prominent brand. For example, Hisense had a relatively small market share in Europe and North America. Thus, if Hisense wanted to become a truly global brand, it needed to further improve its market share in these two regions.[[6]](#footnote-6)

To increase its limited European market share, Hisense could expand and strengthen co-operation with local distribution channels. In addition, co-operation with well-known European producers such as Loewe could potentially help Hisense expand its brand awareness and enhance its European sales volume. If Hisense was to establish some form of strategic co-operation with Loewe, it would have to be based on comprehensive consideration of four aspects: market demand, brand demand, technology demand, and channel demand.

Market Demand

In 2004, Hisense began to expand in Europe, choosing Germany, France, Italy, Britain, and Spain as its focal markets. It soon encountered great challenges, such as the complexity of products’ design and development, the lack of local business experience and professional talent, and cultural and language barriers.

Regarding product design and development, for example, despite their geographic proximity to each other, these five European countries differed greatly in their TV formats, certification standards, and TVs’ local intelligent applications. If Hisense wanted to expand its TV business there, it would have to adjust its products to match various local technical standards and meet different consumer usage preferences on a country-by-country basis. These high market-entry barriers presented great difficulties for Hisense.

Despite these difficulties, Hisense was making strong efforts to expand there. David He, Hisense’s European sales director, said:

We have a lot of opportunities in Europe and this market is Hisense’s blue ocean.’ Why? Currently, only a few Asian TV brands are active the European TV market. Japanese brands have exited or are preparing to exit this market. And except for Hisense and TCL, other Chinese TV producers, who are very competitive in China and many other overseas markets, have not expanded their businesses in Europe yet. European TV brands such as Loewe and Metz [Metz Consumer Electronics GmbH], with both long histories and good reputations, only focus their TV businesses on the high-end market segment.

Although the number of TV producers is declining, European consumers still need to buy TVs and it is highly unlikely that they would want to select TVs only between the Samsung [Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.] and LG [LG Corporation] brands. Therefore, as long as we can overcome the initial entry barriers and difficulties, we are confident we can achieve good sales performance in the future. In contrast, the Chinese market has too many brands competing there. Almost every day we are forced to face “barbaric” price wars and only have “paper-thin profit margins.” Our domestic TV market is really a “red ocean.”

If Hisense and Loewe could establish strategic co-operation, Loewe could provide Hisense its European business experience and a distribution network in the high-end TV market (see Exhibit 2). In turn, Hisense could offer Loewe marketing experience in selling TVs in Asia and access to the Asian market.

Brand Demand

Though Hisense’s brand was famous in China, most European consumers had never heard of it. When European consumers selected traditional home appliances, they were very unwilling to accept products of little-known brands. However, to build a famous brand, the company needed unremitting brand construction efforts for a long time. Then the brand could gradually gain recognition by consumers. Hisense had adopted two ways of improving its brand reputation: one was to strengthen its own brand building and the other was to establish strategic co-operative relationships with well-known European companies.

First, Hisense actively attended global consumer electronics tradeshows and sponsored popular sporting events. The tradeshows with a significant impact provided Hisense with opportunities to meet key retailers, buyers, and the media. These stakeholders could help Hisense expand in Europe and in other new locations. Sponsoring sporting events could enable Hisense’s brand to become familiar to more people. Indeed, these brand construction efforts helped Hisense expand its brand influence.

Second, Hisense also actively looked for technical co-operation with many well-established European companies. Though such partners might present high requirements such as product models and production standards, Hisense would gain the benefits of co-brand advertising. If Hisense was to establish a strategic co-operative relationship with Loewe, for example, it might be able to “stand on the shoulders of a giant” and be more easily accepted by European consumers and distribution channels.

Technology Demand

In 2007, Hisense founded a European R&D centre in the Netherlands in order to gain a better understanding of European consumers’ needs and be able to provide them with the most suitable products. The main task of this R&D centre was to help Hisense’s China-based R&D centre collect information on product features, technical requirements, consumer usage habits, certification standards, and so on. Based on this information, Hisense’s domestic R&D centre could then design new products or make functional adjustments to the existing ones to cater to the European market’s needs. With sufficient technological and marketing experience in Europe, Hisense would then be able to provide TVs that could meet local preferences.

Among global TV producers, Hisense had its own advanced panel-display technologies and was a leader in drafting international light-emitting diode (LED) backlight standards. Moreover, Hisense held a lead in Internet and intelligent application technologies and had launched the first personal smart TV globally. Hisense also excelled at hardware design and had developed and built China’s first mass liquid crystal display (LCD) module production line. If Hisense was to apply its own advanced display technologies to Loewe’s products and help Loewe design its TVs’ hardware, it would help Loewe increase its TVs’ competitiveness. Furthermore, by co-operating with Loewe, Hisense could expand the application range of its TV technologies.

Channel Demand

The traditional TV distribution channels mainly included appliance retail chains, supermarkets, and independent retailers. With the development of the Internet, more and more consumers had begun to shop online. Thus, most distributors had gradually developed their online business. As a result, TV producers had to arrange and balance product categories and pricing not only between different distribution channels but also between each distribution channel’s online and offline sales. Moreover, due to differentiated consumer shopping habits and behaviour, the business scale proportions of channel types and the proportion of online and offline sales also differed greatly in each European country. This made it quite difficult for TV producers to manage such a complicated distribution network across countries. For example, for each of Hisense’s TV products, which distribution channels were suitable and willing to sell it? How should Hisense price it for the different distribution channels? Should this product be sold online or offline, or both? If both, should the prices of the same TV product be the same or different?

It was quite hard to arrange its distribution channels because TV producers first needed to possess in-depth knowledge of distribution channels and consumer consumption characteristics. They also needed to adopt different co-operation strategies with various types of distribution channels in different countries. They further needed to arrange and coordinate product prices, product models, time to market, logistics, and after-sales services in different European countries. All these issues were very difficult and time-consuming for Hisense to learn and adapt to. If Loewe could provide relevant experience to Hisense, Hisense would save time and avoid at least some missteps.

Conflicting Views from Hisense: Worthwhile or Not?

Hisense’s German subsidiary presented the co-operation proposal to Hisense’s headquarters in early January 2013. This proposal was discussed at length and not approved. Hisense’s decision makers had conflicting viewpoints in terms of Loewe’s sales potential, difficulties in designing and developing Loewe’s new TVs, the two parties’ strength in terms of resources and management, Hisense’s potential gains, and Loewe’s potential bankruptcy risk. Detailed discussion followed.

Loewe’s Sales Volume

Loewe was positioned as a luxury TV brand, with many people marvelling at its unique designs and quality. However, only a few consumers could afford its TVs at such high prices. Because of its low unit sales volume, Loewe had been slower to update its TV technologies than other mass TV producers. Loewe’s product competitiveness had thus declined.

In the TV industry, sales volume was a very important indicator of a producer’s survival. Youhai Yu, Hisense’s former European general manager, said:

Loewe usually just sells hundreds of thousands of TVs globally each year, while Hisense sells tens of millions of TVs. Therefore, Hisense has obvious competitive superiority over Loewe in terms of bargaining power over suppliers, production efficiency, ability to spread R&D expenses over products, and other perspectives. Scale is a magic weapon for winning in the TV industry.

The strengths and weaknesses of Loewe, according to Yu, were as follows:

One Loewe TV creates much more profit than one Hisense TV. Profits from the co-operation with Loewe will better support Hisense’s expansion in Europe.

However, Loewe’s scale is too small and its products are quite different from ours. This will cause us a lot of trouble. For example, the guaranteed period for our TV parts is five years, but Loewe requires a 10-year guarantee. Given Loewe’s requirements, we would have to obtain specialized procurement from our global suppliers for its TV parts. This procurement quantity is so small that only a subset of our global suppliers would be willing to accept such a small order.

Difficulties in Designing and Developing Loewe’s New TVs

If Hisense and Loewe decided to jointly design Loewe’s new products, they might encounter at least two major challenges: product development time and complex product development co-ordination. If they decided to combine the two companies’ R&D advantages, Loewe would be primarily responsible for software design and Hisense for hardware design. However, Loewe’s new product development required a long time. It was unknown whether new products would be successful.

To launch new TVs rapidly, Loewe and Hisense would need to quicken their development speed. However, the two companies had different R&D management principles and processes, and would need time to adapt to each other. David He, also Hisense’s leader for strategic co-operation in addition to his European sales director role, said:

If we want to jointly develop Loewe’s new products, we would have to coordinate between Hisense’s R&D partners in China, the Netherlands, and the United States, Hisense’s Chinese and German R&D centres, and Loewe’s headquarters in Germany and subsidiary in China. You can imagine how complicated the coordination of this project would be, as hundreds of engineers from different companies would take part. Another problem is that you cannot ensure that everyone has enough initiative to undertake this project. The most difficult thing is that Loewe still requires a very high standard for all its new products, though it is encountering severe difficulties.

One supporting argument according to He was that:

Hisense has established many strategic co-operative relationships with various global leading high-tech companies and has also founded several overseas R&D centres. Therefore, we need to further optimize our global R&D efficiency and accumulate more international R&D co-operation experience. Strategic co-operation with Loewe would be a good opportunity to improve ourselves.

One opposing argument according to Xiaofeng Lin, Hisense’s R&D director, was that:

Every company’s R&D resources are limited. We export our products to more than 130 countries and regions every year. Because each has its specific requirements for our products, our R&D staff have to make adjustments according to different requirements. Moreover, our R&D staff also need to develop new technologies and new products for our global market. Therefore, considering our limited R&D resources, our R&D staff should focus more on our own products.

Analysis of the Two Companies’ Resource and Management Superiority

Loewe’s strengths were embodied in its luxury brand, strict quality-control system, prestigious design capabilities, well-established distribution network, and marketing experience in selling TVs in the high-end TV market. Comparatively, Hisense’s strengths were embodied in its high R&D efficiency and capacity, innovative display and intelligent application technologies, large-scale procurement and manufacturing, cost control system, and marketing experience in selling TVs in highly competitive markets. If Loewe and Hisense could establish strategic co-operation, Hisense would help Loewe design its TVs’ hardware and provide Loewe with marketing experience in Asia; in turn, Loewe would provide Hisense with Loewe’s European marketing experience in the high-end TV market and Loewe’s distribution network.

The strengths and weaknesses of Loewe, according to Lan Lin, Hisense’s vice president, were as follows:

Though we have been striving to improve our brand image, our top-class products can only be accepted by consumers who are willing to purchase at medium prices. We still lack sufficient marketing experience and available distribution channels in the European high-end TV market. If we co-operate with Loewe, distribution channels and consumers will accept our products at higher prices more easily. The advertising effect of this co-operation will be very helpful for us to improve our brand reputation and expand our business in the high-end TV market.

However, Loewe is a luxury TV brand. Because of its long history, consumers will pay a premium for its products. Because Loewe is unique, it cannot be imitated or replicated by other TV competitors. It is currently unrealistic for Hisense to position itself as a high-end TV brand and we need to improve our brand image step-by-step. If we use Loewe’s marketing experience and distribution network, and then think that we can sell Hisense’s same products at higher prices in Europe, it will be a big strategic mistake. Enhancing our brand image will take a long time.

Hisense’s Potential Gains

By 2013, Hisense had been expanding in Europe for nine years. Before considering the strategic co-operation with Loewe, Hisense had established not only its European headquarters in Germany but also a European R&D centre and several subsidiaries in many main consumption regions in Europe. Hisense’s Czech TV factory was also under construction and planning to manufacture TVs in 2015. Therefore, the first step of Hisense’s strategic approach to Europe was nearly complete. Hisense’s next step was to improve its European sales volume and its brand reputation.

Hisense’s decision makers who supported the co-operation with Loewe said that:

It can help us enhance our brand reputation in Europe. When people talk about Loewe, Hisense will be mentioned as well. Moreover, Loewe can help us extend our distribution network in the European high-end TV market and provide us with the relevant marketing experience. The potential profits from the joint development will be satisfactory. We really need to accumulate international R&D co-operation experience. Product design co-operation with Loewe is a good opportunity.

Hisense’s decision makers who objected to the co-operation with Loewe said that:

Firstly, co-operation with Loewe will increase the pressure on Hisense’s R&D system and procurement system. Secondly, this joint development project needs a long period of time. Thirdly, it is uncertain whether this project will be successful and how much Hisense can benefit from this co-operation. Hisense will deviate from its consistent business philosophy of steady management if co-operating with Loewe.

Loewe’s Potential Bankruptcy Risk

As Hisense considered the issue of co-operation with Loewe, Loewe was on the verge of bankruptcy. It needed to find a new investor and also to make significant adjustments to strengthen the competitiveness of its TV business. However, Hisense was not particularly interested in making an equity investment in Loewe—only in possibly providing Loewe with technical support. It was beyond Hisense’s control whether Loewe could find a suitable new investor and a feasible restructuring scheme. These issues also played an important role in determining whether Loewe would survive.

One positive view at Hisense was that:

Loewe’s decline in recent years is caused by its slower response to new technologies and hardware updates, especially its hardware updates. The design and development of high-tech hardware is exactly our strength. If we can integrate the two companies’ complementary R&D capabilities, the new products will be very popular and Loewe will survive.

A more negative view at Hisense was that:

The TV industry is a sunset industry, characterized by production overcapacity, a slow increase in consumption demand, and relatively low profit margins. So I think it is difficult to find some investors who would like to invest in the highly competitive TV industry. Moreover, Loewe’s scale of sales is small and Loewe always persists on the promise of “Made in Germany.” Both of these two points deviate from the TV industry’s two general principles of large-scale production and outsourcing manufacturing to lower-cost regions. Thus, it will be even more difficult for Loewe to find a new investor, let alone find an ideal new investor within a short period of time. If Loewe cannot find the new investor, everything is over!

Loewe’s New Product Planning

One objective of any new co-operation would be to jointly design and develop Loewe’s new products. To a large extent, these new products would determine whether Loewe would be able to retake its lost market share and survive its bankruptcy crisis. However, with regard to Loewe’s future product planning, Hisense’s decision makers held different concerns.

One Hisense decision maker said that:

It is better for us to help Loewe design a wider TV product range spanning medium-end to high-end products, which can subsequently attract more consumers. However, if Loewe also provides medium-end products, it may compete with part of our higher-end products. This will negatively influence Hisense’s high-end products’ sales. This effect should be taken seriously. Another problem would be whether we should provide our best designs to Loewe or keep them for our own use.

Another Hisense’s decision maker said that:

If Loewe begins to provide TVs with mid-range hardware configurations in the market, because of its luxury brand positioning, these products may be even more expensive than Samsung’s products with the highest hardware configurations. In this case, I think consumers will prefer to purchase Samsung’s highest-end products than Loewe’s medium-end products. In my opinion, it is more reasonable for Loewe to develop only high-end TVs that are as good as or better than Samsung’s highest-end TVs. For the same high-end level of TVs, Loewe could sell its high-end TVs at prices much higher than Samsung’s because of Loewe’s brand premium. Consumers will find it relatively easier to accept Loewe’s high-end TVs at the highest prices in the market.

Therefore, Loewe is only suitable for selling the best TVs at the highest prices in the high-end market segment. Hisense’s technical support for Loewe is critical, because only by combining Loewe’s traditionally outstanding software designs with Hisense’s best hardware designs, could Loewe then provide TVs that are at least good enough to compete with Samsung’s.

For Hisense’s decision makers, it was unclear how to proceed.

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EXHIBIT 1: KEY FINANCIAL DATA FOR LOEWE AG, 2008–2012 (€ MILLION)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2012** | **2011** | **2010** | **2009** | **2008** |
| **Key financial performance** | | | | | |
| Sales | 250.00 | 274.30 | 307.30 | 324.00 | 374.00 |
| EBIT | −29.00 | −10.50 | −5.30 | 13.50 | 28.50 |
| Net income/loss | −44.50 | −10.70 | −7.00 | 8.00 | 18.90 |
| Earnings per share | −3.42 | −0.82 | −0.54 | 0.62 | 1.45 |
| Dividend per share | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.50 |
| Net bank balance | 8.20 | 27.00 | 13.10 | 35.10 | 33.90 |
| Free cash flow | −37.90 | 18.90 | −23.10 | 7.80 | 39.90 |
| Development costs | 13.20 | 14.40 | 15.90 | 16.10 | 14.40 |
| **Sales by product area** | | | | | |
| Televisions | 202.30 | 220.70 | 249.80 | 280.50 | 323.60 |
| Audio, video games, etc. | 21.00 | 21.70 | 25.50 | 15.80 | 23.60 |
| DVD/Blu-ray | 3.40 | 6.30 | 5.90 | 7.70 | – |
| Others | 23.30 | 25.60 | 26.10 | 20.00 | 26.80 |
| **Sales structure by region** | | | | | |
| Germany | 156.40 | 170.40 | 179.70 | 193.00 | 199.60 |
| Other European countries | 86.40 | 98.60 | 122.40 | 126.30 | 167.30 |
| Countries outside Europe | 7.20 | 5.30 | 5.20 | 4.70 | 7.10 |
| **Number of employees** | 1,004.00 | 1,022.00 | 1,0620.00 | 1,042.00 | 1,007.00 |

Note: EBIT = earnings before interest and tax; DVD = digital video disc

Source: Created by authors using data from www.morningstar.com.

EXHIBIT 2: lcd tv market in western europe and loewe’s share

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2012** | **2011** | **2010** | **2009** | **2008** |
| **LCD TV market in Western**  **Europe (in € million)** | | | | | |
| Germany | 5,249.4 | 5,105.8 | 5,050.1 | 4,590.0 | 4,123.6 |
| United Kingdom | 2.828,9 | 3,122.4 | 3,525.8 | 3,644.6 | 3,989.4 |
| France | 2,455.3 | 3,260.5 | 3,568.3 | 3,462.2 | 3,293.1 |
| Italy | 2,009.5 | 2,269.4 | 2,837.1 | 2,439.1 | 1,999.3 |
| Spain | 1,354.1 | 1,614.6 | 2,173.8 | 1,982.3 | 2,030.6 |
| Netherlands | 780.1 | 889.9 | 1,030.7 | 1,002.3 | 1,149.1 |
| Switzerland | 566.9 | 571.3 | 579.3 | 509.7 | 533.2 |
| Austria | 538.0 | 539.2 | 597.4 | 472.3 | 446.4 |
| Belgium | 512.8 | 629.2 | 568.1 | 562.9 | 454.9 |
| Sweden | 476.2 | 538.9 | 520.6 | 505.6 | 569.1 |
| **Loewe’s share of qualified**  **retail LCD TV market in Europe (%)** | | | | | |
| Germany | 7.9 | 8.6 | 8.6 | 9.7 | 10.1 |
| United Kingdom | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| France | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.8 |
| Italy | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.1 |
| Spain | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 3.0 | 4.4 |
| Netherlands | 2.2 | 2.7 | 4.0 | 5.2 | 7.1 |
| Switzerland | 7.6 | 6.8 | 7.4 | 8.0 | 6.3 |
| Austria | 6.0 | 5.9 | 6.4 | 6.8 | 7.2 |
| Belgium | 3.4 | 3.6 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 6.2 |
| Sweden | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 |

Note: LCD TV = liquid crystal display television; € = EUR = European euro; €0.76 = US$1 on January 2, 2013.

Source: “Industries,” GfK, accessed August 31, 2017, www.gfk.com/industries/industries.

1. “Loewe Business,” Loewe Technologies GmbH, accessed August 31, 2017, www.loewe.tv/int/business.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
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3. € = EUR = European euro; all currency amounts are in € unless otherwise specified; €0.76 = US$1 = on January 2, 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. “Li Dongsheng Rethinkng TCL’s Ten Years Internationalization: The Acquisition of Thomson Strategy Is Right,” http://news.cnfol.com/guoneicaijing/ 20141129/19579829.shtml, November 29, 2014, accessed August 31, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
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6. “World Household Electrical Appliance Industry’s Market Size and Distribution,” China IRN, December 28, 2012, accessed August 31, 2017, www.chinairn.com/news/20121228/672619.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)