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**COMPETING WITH PATANJALI: CAN YOU BEND LIKE THE BABA?[[1]](#endnote-1)**

*Marissa Sanwald wrote this case under the supervision of Professors* *Hari Bapuji and Rod White solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.*

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Colgate will be below Patanjali by this year, and in three years, we will overtake Unilever. . . . Patanjali will shut the “gate” in Colgate. The birds in Nestlé’s nest [logo] will also fly away.

Baba Ramdev[[2]](#endnote-2)

Patanjali Ayurved Limited (Patanjali) had, by 2017, become a major player in the Indian fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) market. Often billed as the fastest-growing FMCG company in India, Patanjali had reportedly grown its sales more than 100 per cent in recent years, reaching US$1,647.5 million by fiscal year (FY) 2016–17.[[3]](#endnote-3) Initially founded to provide Ayurvedic medicinal formulations, Patanjali now sold more than 400 products in a variety of categories, ranging from anti-aging creams to wheat noodles. Furthermore, there was seemingly no limit to the new products Patanjali introduced and the new markets it might enter. The company had announced plans to sell Patanjali branded apparel, and rumours had hinted at the possibility of Patanjali opening restaurant chains.[[4]](#endnote-4)

Business conglomerates were not a new concept in India. They had thrived in the past with government support and by filling institutional voids. After India’s economy was liberalized in the early 1990s, many of its conglomerates adjusted to this new reality and successfully adapted to the competition from multinational corporations (MNCs).[[5]](#endnote-5) But, unlike other Indian conglomerates, Patanjali threatened many established Indian companies, both domestic corporations as well as foreign MNCs.[[6]](#endnote-6) What made this threat very potent, real, and difficult to deal with was the configuration of factors that seemed to propel the success of Patanjali across a diverse set of markets—yoga and Ayurveda, natural and herbal products, prosperity for charity, and economic nationalism.[[7]](#endnote-7)

Not surprisingly, many Indian and multinational companies were perplexed by Patanjali’s unusual strategy and wondered whether they should respond, and if so, how. Some competitors argued that Patanjali’s growth was expanding the market, while others made moves to counter Patanjali’s rapid growth by introducing their own new or improved herbal products, or by changing their marketing strategies.[[8]](#endnote-8) However, neither of these tactics seemed enough to offset the threat posed by Patanjali. The company’s various competitors sought strategies to challenge Patanjali.

PATANJALI—AN AGILE COMPETITOR

Patanjali was founded in 2006 by Acharya Balkrishna and Baba Ramdev, who shared a decades-long history as friends and business partners after meeting at an Indian *gurukul*, where they studied Indian scriptures, Sanskrit, yoga, herbal medicines, and Ayurvedic therapies.[[9]](#endnote-9) In less than a decade, their unique combination of talents developed the company from a manufacturer and distributor of Ayurvedic and herbal medicines sold at yoga events to become one of India’s most significant companies in the FMCG sector.

While Baba Ramdev was the public face of the company, Acharya Balkrishna ran the business operations. Balkrishna held approximately 98 per cent of the equity in Patanjali. Baba Ramdev, being a *sannyasi*[[10]](#endnote-10) had renounced all worldly possessions, and could not possess any ownership share.

Baba Ramdev was a charismatic yoga guru, who dressed in saffron robes and *padukas*.[[11]](#endnote-11) His followers and students numbered the millions and included the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, and several other major political leaders. By 2017, Ramdev had become an influential public figure in India, able to attract crowds as large as those that surrounded any Bollywood superstar. He had an impressive social media following. His yoga camps were attended by thousands of followers, and he starred in yoga television shows that attracted millions of viewers.[[12]](#endnote-12) Ramdev used his public presence not only to promote Patanjali products, but also to share his vision for Patanjali. By asserting that Patanjali’s mission was to make India a prototype for the rest of the world, Baba Ramdev often stressed that the company’s profits were used for the betterment of India. Patanjali operations included social enterprises such as education, research, cattle protection, poverty eradication, and health institutions.[[13]](#endnote-13)

Appealing to rising nationalism in India, Patanjali had campaigned against MNCs, comparing their influence to the oppression and exploitation during India’s colonial times.[[14]](#endnote-14) Baba Ramdev had disparaged MNCs for reputedly not taking a more positive role within Indian society, and for repatriating their profits overseas. He associated Patanjali and its products with *swadeshi*,[[15]](#endnote-15) a key part of the Indian independence movement that still resonated with many Indians.

Many of Patanjali’s products had roots in Ayurveda, an Indian system of holistic medicine that used natural and herbal ingredients to treat ailments arising out of imbalances in bodily constitutions. By 2017, most products were manufactured by Patanjali in India, reportedly with natural raw materials, many sourced from small Indian suppliers to benefit the Indian people.[[16]](#endnote-16) The combination of healthy, Ayurvedic, and natural products combined with *swadeshi* seemed to appeal to many Indian consumers.

Patanjali also successfully realized a low-price, high-value product strategy. Most of the company’s products were priced 5–15 per cent cheaper than those of its large competitors.[[17]](#endnote-17) Patanjali claimed its products contained natural ingredients and were healthier and better for consumers than competitors’ products containing chemicals. To realize a cost advantage, Patanjali sourced cheaper raw material locally and claimed it spent significantly less on labour, marketing, advertising and administration. A main reason for Patanjali’s low marketing expenditure was the personal marketing by co-founder and brand ambassador Baba Ramdev through his TV and social media presence and his popular yoga camps. According to Patanjali, the two founders were not paid any wages; wages of staff were generally low since employees joining Patanjali were expected to work for the betterment of India.[[18]](#endnote-18)

By 2016, Patanjali had expanded its product offerings to include food and beverages (37 per cent of revenue), health care (19 per cent), toiletries (15 per cent), dental products (11 per cent), hair care (11 per cent), and cosmetics (7 per cent).[[19]](#endnote-19) It sold these products through 5,000 specialized Patanjali stores, which also offered free consultations with Ayurvedic doctors. Some argued Patanjali’s rapid growth was primarily due to the quick and unconventional introduction of new products, which often left the growing number of competitors surprised and unprepared. Ideas for new products often arose from followers approaching Ramdev. For example, Ramdev explained:

The idea (of the apparel brand) started with some followers asking me for Patanjali yoga wear. Then we thought “why not a whole range of dresses—Paridhaan—for everyone?” If we are fighting to bring economic independence for our country from multinationals by promoting indigenous and natural products, we should also be in the garments market.[[20]](#endnote-20)

Patanjali seemed to be unstoppable, expanding manufacturing facilities from Assam in Northeast India to Andhra Pradesh in South India, and into neighbouring Nepal. Moreover, Patanjali had increased its distribution network by establishing arrangements with large Indian retail chains such as Future Group, Reliance, and Tesco, and by creating both an online store and a mobile store.

PATANJALI’S MAJOR COMPETITORS

Patanjali’s competitors ranged from established multinationals such as Hindustan Unilever Limited (HUL) and Colgate-Palmolive India Limited (Colgate) to well-known Indian companies such as Dabur India Limited (Dabur) and more recently established imitator companies such as Sri Sri Ayurveda, which followed the same principles of natural and Ayurvedic products.

Hindustan Unilever Limited—The FMCG Giant

Hindustan Unilever Limited (HUL) had a long history in India and had grown to become the biggest FMCG company in the country. HUL competed with Patanjali in various product categories, including food and beverages, as well as home, personal care, and cosmetic products. HUL had access to significant financial resources. In FY 2016–17, HUL realized a 10-year financial record of $5,379 million in revenues, an increase from $5,224 million from the previous year (see Exhibit 1).[[21]](#endnote-21) Unlike Patanjali, HUL did not have its origins in Ayurveda and was one of the MNCs Baba Ramdev crusaded against.

Despite the inclusion in its name of the word *Hindustan* (another name for India, preferred by Indian nationalists), HUL was the subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch FMCG giant Unilever, which first arrived in India in 1888. Unilever established its presence in the Indian market in 1931 with Hindustan Vanaspati Manufacturing Company, Lever Brothers India Limited, and United Traders Limited. In 1956, the three companies merged to become HUL[[22]](#endnote-22) and then grew to become India’s largest consumer goods company, offering more than 400 brands such as Dove soaps, Pepsodent toothpaste, Lipton tea, and Kwality Wall’s ice cream. HUL also sold *atta* (wheat flour), rice, salt, and over-the-counter medicines. Reportedly, nine out of 10 Indian households used one or more of HUL’s products on a daily basis.[[23]](#endnote-23) Manufacturing was done in 30 plants across India by a workforce of more than 18,000.

India was an important market for Unilever, due to the country’s high growth potential, particularly its growing middle class. To target India’s mass market, HUL partnered with one of India’s biggest grocery retailer operators, Future Group, to develop a private-label range of bakery goods.[[24]](#endnote-24) Apart from distributing its product through independent distributors and retailers, HUL was also involved in direct selling, and its network of sales agents—*Shakti* (meaning strength) entrepreneurs—made personal care products available in the more remote parts of the country.

HUL also introduced programs to aid social causes in India. For example, it increased female employment through its direct-selling network. By 2017, the network spanned more than 1,500 towns and cities across India and supported India’s women, who represented the majority of its employees.[[25]](#endnote-25) HUL had additionally launched initiatives to empower Shakti entrepreneurs to improve the sustainable sourcing of raw materials and programs to improve the health and hygiene of the Indian people.[[26]](#endnote-26)

In recent years, Unilever was keenly focused on the Indian market, given its significantly higher product growth rate than the European market and India’s promising economic outlook. By 2017, HUL had become the market leader in the hair care segment due to the strong performance of its Dove brand.[[27]](#endnote-27) Despite some portfolio overlap between HUL and Patanjali in the food and beverages market, Patanjali was not yet a serious threat to HUL’s market share in these segments (see Exhibit 2). First, nearly 50 per cent of HUL’s revenue was generated by canned fruit and vegetables, products not offered by Patanjali. Second, the pricing for some food products, such as noodles, was similar (see Exhibit 3). Although Patanjali offered some food products, such as jam, at a discount, food generated only 1 per cent of HUL’s profits and therefore did not represent a significant market.[[28]](#endnote-28) Differences in package size and variations in flavours of products also made comparing the prices of these products difficult. In the beverages segment, HUL was the established market leader for tea and had focused on premiumization.[[29]](#endnote-29) However, Patanjali had the potential to threaten HUL’s market share in mid-premium detergents and in the toothpaste market, due to its discount pricing and strong positioning.[[30]](#endnote-30)

Unsurprisingly, HUL took measures to defend its market share against Patanjali in some of its key markets, such as hair care. In December 2015, HUL acquired the local hair care brand Indulekha to add a natural hair oil product line to its hair care range.[[31]](#endnote-31) HUL also decided to launch numerous new products under its Ayurveda brand, *Ayush* (meaning life), including toothpaste, skin cream, soap, and shampoo. The Ayush brand was initially launched in 2001 but had lost momentum.[[32]](#endnote-32) A revival of this brand seemed a logical step following the growing popularity of Ayurveda products in general.

Colgate-Palmolive India Limited—The Oral Care Specialist

Colgate-Palmolive India Ltd. (Colgate) was also an Indian subsidiary of a MNC and was counted among India’s three largest Indian FMCG companies.[[33]](#endnote-33) Similar to HUL, Colgate had a long history in India, and since its formation, had launched products and charitable programs tailored to the Indian market. However, as opposed to HUL and Patanjali, Colgate was a more specialized company, focused on a few personal care product categories. Its most well-known product was Colgate toothpaste. It did not originally follow the Indian tradition of herbal and Ayurvedic products and, in the past, had advertised against such ingredients (e.g., charcoal and salt).[[34]](#endnote-34)

Colgate was first incorporated in India in 1937 as part of the U.S. MNC Colgate-Palmolive and opened its first manufacturing plant in Mumbai in 1949.[[35]](#endnote-35) Colgate started its journey in India by distributing Colgate Dental Cream toothpastes on handcarts and became one of the more successful dental care brands in India. By FY 2016–17, the company had reached a volume market share of 55.1 per cent and 47.4 per cent for its toothpaste and toothbrush categories, respectively. Colgate also recorded $700 million in revenue, an increase from $673 million in FY 2015–16 and from $242 million in FY 2007–08.[[36]](#endnote-36) Colgate offered products in the categories of toothpaste, toothbrushes, and mouthwash. Additionally, it sold shampoos and soaps under the Palmolive brands.

Over the years and through collaboration with the Indian Dental Association (IDA), Colgate gained the trust of Indian consumers. In 2016, it was named India’s number-one most trusted brand for the sixth consecutive year in the *Economic Times’s* Most Trusted Brand Survey.[[37]](#endnote-37) Colgate’s managing director believed Colgate had earned that title because of its decades of commitment and rapid innovations that were “made in India for Indians.”[[38]](#endnote-38) Many of Colgate’s oral health initiatives were developed in conjunction with the IDA, and Colgate toothbrushes were the first to become recognized under the IDA’s Seal of Acceptance in 1997.[[39]](#endnote-39)

Colgate implemented several social programs aimed at health and education. The first such program, established in 1976, was “Bright Smiles, Bright Futures,” which educated primary-school children on the importance of oral health and good dental hygiene. Since its introduction, the program had reached 142 million school children in 327,000 schools across urban and rural India.[[40]](#endnote-40) Another program focused on oral health was the “Colgate Oral Health Month.” This program offered free dental health checkups and used mobile vans to reach underprivileged areas. Other initiatives focused on empowering and employing women, and on promoting education, particularly for Indians from underprivileged and rural backgrounds. An example of such a program was the “Colgate Seva Mandir Education Scholarship Program,” which sponsored the education of children, in particular girls from Udaipur, Rajasthan. Lastly, Colgate promoted the sustainable use of water and supported organizations bringing water to underserved areas. In 2016, Colgate launched “Pocket Dentist,” a mobile ring-back service that provided individualized professional dental advice to rural India.[[41]](#endnote-41) The service recognized multiple dialects and could respond to the 30 most common oral health queries, which together addressed 91 per cent of oral health issues.

Although Colgate was well established and had been the most popular toothpaste brand for decades, Patanjali’s toothpaste, Dant Kanti, was quickly gaining in popularity. Dant Kanti achieved a 4 per cent market share in 2015, was positioned as a therapeutic product with Ayurvedic ingredients, and sold at a competitive price.[[42]](#endnote-42) The product received positive consumer feedback, and Patanjali subsequently launched versions for children and for those with sensitive teeth. Colgate was unimpressed with Patanjali and its accusations against MNCs. As Colgate’s managing director pointed out,

Generation after generation have trusted Colgate. Forty-nine per cent of our shareholders are Indian, we work with several non-profits and some of these things, we don’t publicise. We’ve had amazing talent from India like my predecessor Prabha (Parameswaran) who heads our European division and Mukul Deoras our CMO [chief marketing officer]. We wish to conduct business in the highest ethical manner with integrity and respect for everyone.[[43]](#endnote-43)

Nevertheless, with the emergence of Patanjali, Colgate made numerous changes regarding its marketing and product strategies. In FY 2016–17, Colgate increased its advertising expenditure to $79.8 million from $69.8 million the preceding year.[[44]](#endnote-44) This increase of more than 14 per cent represented 11.4 per cent of revenue. Colgate’s Managing Director, Issam Bachalaani announced that Colgate would continue its strong marketing investments. Colgate also engaged celebrities such as YouTube star Shraddha Sharma, cricket player Virat Kohli, and Bollywood actor Ranveer Singh.[[45]](#endnote-45) Furthermore, Colgate introduced innovative product launch incentives—for example, a product demo on mobile phones that could be viewed with 3D glasses. To make its products more appealing to children, Colgate added collectable toys to its packaging and offered prizes for playing games and answering trivia questions.

Colgate also recognized the growing popularity of herbal and natural products. In 2016, the company added the herbal toothpastes Colgate Cibaca Vedshakti, with eucalyptus and basil, and Colgate Sensitive Clove to its natural product line. It also introduced a charcoal-infused toothbrush.[[46]](#endnote-46)

Dabur India Limited—The Science-Based Ayurveda Company

Dabur had its roots in Ayurveda and had evolved from a small Indian pharmacy. It developed its product portfolio in the health, home, and personal care categories and increased its size over decades. Despite having concentrated on a smaller variety of product categories than Patanjali, Dabur became one of India’s largest consumer products manufacturers, representing several brands and having products available in over 120 countries. Dabur also connected tradition with modern science and technologies. Although its products were based on traditional Ayurvedic knowledge, Dabur noted that its formulations were validated by and further developed with the help of modern science, clinical studies, and state-of-the-art laboratories.[[47]](#endnote-47) This approach ensured that Dabur products met high quality standards, and the company secured several patents for its products, formulations, and processes. In its advertisements, Dabur promoted the effectiveness of its medicines as proven by clinical studies or confirmed by Ayurvedic specialists.[[48]](#endnote-48) During its modernization process, Dabur tried to transform itself from a family-run business into a professionally run organization.

Dabur was founded in 1884 by Dr. Burman, who opened a small Ayurvedic pharmacy to make health-care products available in Calcutta.[[49]](#endnote-49) As the products’ popularity grew, Dabur opened its first manufacturing plant in 1896. In the following years, Dabur concentrated on developing Ayurvedic medicines by establishing research laboratories to develop standardized medicines for the mass market. In the following decades, Dabur expanded its distribution network and increased its manufacturing and research and development facilities. Dabur became a publicly listed company in 1986 and went public with an initial public offering in 1994, after a reverse merger with Vidogum Limited.

Dabur began its partnership with international corporations in 1992, when it entered a joint venture with the Spanish consumer goods manufacturer Agrolimen SA. Shortly after, it entered into joint ventures with Israeli and French food companies Osem and Bongrain before introducing its own food division in 1997. With the continuing growth of the company, Dabur decided to separate its pharmaceutical business, Dabur Pharma, from its FMCG business to ensure greater focus on both business lines. Five years later, Dabur Pharma was acquired by German health-care company Fresenius Kabi.[[50]](#endnote-50) As part of its growth strategy, Dabur acquired home and personal care businesses in 2005 and women’s skin care company Fem Care Pharma in 2008 before making its first overseas acquisitions, in 2010, of Turkish and U.S. personal care companies Hobi Kozmetik and Namaste Laboratories LLC.[[51]](#endnote-51)

By 2017, Dabur had become not only a leader in Ayurvedic research and product inventions but also a financially strong company with a market capitalization of $7,621 million. In FY 2016–17, Dabur realized $1,198 million in revenues and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) of $281 million, with an EBITDA margin of 23.5 per cent.[[52]](#endnote-52) Although revenue decreased slightly from the previous two years ($1,224 million in FY 2015–16 and $1,217 million in FY 2014–15), the company attributed the weaker performance to legislative and economic changes and to the demonetization of high-value currency notes in November 2016.[[53]](#endnote-53) Dabur spent $100 million, or 8.4 per cent of its revenue, on advertising and publicity across print, television, digital, radio, and events, some featuring Ayurvedic professionals. To target millennials, Dabur designed digital ad campaigns and campaigns with social media influences and worked to aggressively promote its e-commerce business. It also established a wide distribution network covering urban and rural areas with six million retail outlets in India and availability in more than 120 countries globally.[[54]](#endnote-54)

Dabur competed with Patanjali in all its product categories: personal care (i.e., hair care, oral care, and skin care), home care, health care, and food products. It offered a range of more than 250 herbal and Ayurvedic products, including five flagship brands: *Dabur* for natural health care products, *Vatika* for premium personal care products, *Hajmola* for digestives, *Real* for beverages, and *Fem* for skin care products.[[55]](#endnote-55) Dabur’s health, personal, and home care businesses in India accounted for 54 per cent of sales; the food business accounted for 12 per cent; and other products made up 4 per cent, for a total domestic sales share of 70 per cent. Approximately 30 per cent of Dabur’s revenue was generated overseas, with its products enjoying particular popularity in the Middle East, Africa, the United States, Europe, Russia, and other South Asian countries. Dabur’s largest categories in the personal care segment included hair care (22 per cent of sales), health supplements (17 per cent), and oral care (16 per cent). A successful product in the oral care category, which competed directly with Patanjali’s Dant Kanti toothpaste, was Dabur’s Ayurvedic toothpaste brand, Dabur Red Paste, which became the third-largest toothpaste brand in India, generating revenues of almost $78 million in FY 2016–17. Another successful product line was Dabur’s hair oils, which competed directly with Patanjali’s Kesh Kanti hair care products.[[56]](#endnote-56)

Dabur also ran various social and charitable programs to improve the health, education, and economic development of Indian communities, particularly for women, children, and those who were uneducated and unemployed.[[57]](#endnote-57) Dabur tried to tailor its programs to the needs of specific communities and aimed to take a holistic approach to empowering communities to aid themselves. Dabur’s community development programs focused on eradicating hunger, poverty, and malnutrition; promoting health care; ensuring environmental sustainability; and enhancing employment and livelihood. For example, in FY 2016–17, Dabur offered remedial education to 115 underprivileged children, provided vocational training programs to 510 girls, constructed 1,253 household toilets, and aided 2,537 farmers with agricultural initiatives.[[58]](#endnote-58)

Sri Sri Ayurveda—Competition from a Popular Guru

The Indian brand Sri Sri Tattva, headed by Indian spiritual guru Sri Sri Ravi Shankar, under the Sri Sri Ayurveda Trust, followed a business model similar to Patanjali’s. In 2017, Ravi Shankar was estimated to have 370 million followers in India and in 155 countries around the world.[[59]](#endnote-59) An event he held in 2016 in India to celebrate cultural diversity attracted 3.75 million viewers, including a large number of national and international politicians.[[60]](#endnote-60) Ravi Shankar had 2.31 million followers on Twitter and also communicated with his followers through his own mobile app, Sri Sri App.

Ravi Shankar became known for teaching meditation and his special breathing technique, and he was recognized as an advocate for peace and human values. Born in Southern India in 1956, he became a scholar of Vedic studies and modern physics.[[61]](#endnote-61) After completing his studies, Ravi Shankar travelled and taught meditation until he came up with his distinct breathing technique “Sudarshan Kriya” in 1982, which formed the base of his Art of Living Foundation. The foundation promoted living a stress-free and violence-free life and finding an inner reservoir of peace and energy. It ran several programs, such as the Happiness Program based on Sudarshan Kriya and a range of meditation and yoga courses.

Sri Sri Ravi Shankar was also known for his humanitarian work and was a founder of the International Association of Human Values in Geneva, a global platform of volunteers and humanitarian initiatives.[[62]](#endnote-62) Some of his humanitarian works included provision of free education and electricity; a Youth Leader Program, which had reached more than 40,000 villages in India, Africa, and South America; a women’s empowerment program; and a water conservation program.[[63]](#endnote-63) Ravi Shankar also tried to bring peace to conflicted regions and provided crisis relief to people who had lived through natural disasters and traumatic experiences, such as returning soldiers. For example, he met with the Colombian government and rebels from Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, to discuss the possibility of a peace treaty before it was signed. For his efforts, he received many awards, such as the highest civilian awards in Paraguay, Colombia, and Mongolia, and the second-highest civilian award in India.

Ravi Shankar was also respected in the business world for his views on ethics and corporate social responsibility. He was part of the team that founded the World Forum of Ethics, which promoted ethical practices in business, sustainability, and corporate governance and brought together multiple stakeholders from business, academic, government, spiritual, and international organizations.[[64]](#endnote-64) Ravi Shankar was also chancellor of the Sri Sri University, chairman of the Quality Council of India Yoga Certification Committee, and holder of 16 honorary doctorates.

Ravi Shankar’s Art of Living Foundation began manufacturing Ayurvedic products in 2003 under the Sri Sri Ayurveda (SSA) Trust, and these were sold in Sri Sri Tattva (SST) branded stores.[[65]](#endnote-65) The SSA Trust was set up as a manufacturer of FMCG products, but it also oversaw the College of Ayurvedic Science and Research, a hospital, wellness centres, spas, and clinics. Its vision was to promote health and wellness to every household, and it was committed to social responsibility.[[66]](#endnote-66) The SSA Trust aggressively expanded its product portfolio and planned to build a strong distribution network. In August 2017, products were available on amazon.com; bigbasket.com; SST’s own webstore, sattvastore.com; and in some franchise stores and Divine Shops, which were similar to Patanjali stores. The SSA Trust also exported its products to 26 countries.[[67]](#endnote-67)

The SSA Trust’s chief executive, Tej Katpitia, was optimistic about the company’s potential: “People have now accepted Ayurvedic products in their daily lives, and we believe our brand offerings are different compared to those of existing players.”[[68]](#endnote-68) Seemingly the SSA Trust took note of Patanjali’s success, as the two companies had many similarities. For example, both began with the production of Ayurvedic products, were founded by a guru with a significant number of followers, and claimed to serve a greater, social good. Similar to Patanjali, the SSA Trust also offered medical clinics and centres, and claimed that all its products were produced in-house. The SSA Trust’s product portfolio was similar to that of Patanjali. In 2017, it offered products in the categories of food and beverages, personal care, health care, apparel, and organics. The product list included toothpaste, ghee, cookies, and healthy drinks. All products were offered under the umbrella brand Sri Sri. The SSA Trust planned to expand its home and food categories to more than 300 products.[[69]](#endnote-69) New products were expected to include detergent powder, dishwashing bars, floor cleanser, and lifestyle products. According to speculation, the SSA Trust was potentially targeting the more premium Ayurvedic and organic market.

Unlike Patanjali, the SSA Trust did not advocate against MNCs, or market its products as swadeshi. Instead, the SSA Trust highlighted its aim to bring health and wellness to the people.[[70]](#endnote-70) Another noteworthy difference was that Ravi Shankar did not serve as a brand ambassador for SST’s products. Katpitia believed that the quality and benefits of its products would drive sales. However, SST’s performance in the market was not commensurate with the following and celebrity of Ravi Shankar, due to limited distribution and brand visibility. Therefore, the SSA Trust planned to expand its product portfolio, increase its distribution network, and enhance its brand visibility. It aimed to open 50 SST-branded retail outlets in 2017, and 1,000 outlets in the next two years.[[71]](#endnote-71) Additionally, it began to invest in marketing and advertising by using mass media, point of sale, and by improving its digital presence.[[72]](#endnote-72)

FMCG MARKET IN INDIA—POISED FOR A SHAKEUP?

Many of Patanjali’s competitors took note of its astounding success. The Indian FMCG market was filled with numerous players, ranging from predominantly single-product companies such as Britannia to conglomerates such as ITC, which competed in tobacco, foods, personal care, hospitality, paper, and information technology (IT).[[73]](#endnote-73) The FMCG market also had players such as Marico, a public company focused on health and beauty segments; Himalaya Drug Company, a privately held company with strong roots in natural products for wellness and personal care; Amul, a co-operative of dairy farmers; and companies set up as trusts doing charitable and education work.[[74]](#endnote-74) This diverse range of companies had been affected by Patanjali’s success. As Patanjali expanded further, additional companies and industries would no doubt be affected.

It was not the first time a homegrown Indian brand had directly taken on large MNCs. A similar situation arose in the 1980s, when Nirma detergent powder gave stiff competition to HUL’s Surf; Nirma was priced at less than half the cost of Surf.[[75]](#endnote-75) The battle played out and resulted in Nirma carving a niche in the low-priced segment, but it did not dent HUL’s bottom line. Some analysts believed a similar situation was happening with Patanjali essentially selling packaged commodity products to the segments where large companies did not operate. Persistent rumours surrounded the quality of Patanjali’s products, and while these comments were rarely proven, they gave credence to this perception.[[76]](#endnote-76)

Yet another countryman, Subrata Roy, founded Sahara India Pariwar Ltd. (Sahara) in 1978 and grew it into a conglomerate with interests in construction, retailing, media, IT, and financial services.[[77]](#endnote-77) Known for its charitable work, its Guinness World Records (one, in 2013, for having more than 120,000 of its employees sing a national anthem), and its celebrity, the unlisted company seemed unassailable until allegations surfaced about questionable financial practices and duping of consumers.[[78]](#endnote-78) The pride of the nation until recently, Sahara group and its founder faced an uncertain future, with Roy and his senior executive serving jail time and struggling to return the money it owed to its investors. Not surprisingly, some saw shades of Sahara in Patanjali’s rise and wondered about the finances of this private company. This perception gained credence from the support Baba Ramdev enjoyed with nationalist groups and parties that currently wielded power in India and from rumours of favouritism by the government.[[79]](#endnote-79) Tales of Patanjali’s not so transparent practices, some of which were shared by its past chief executive officer, raised questions about Patanjali.[[80]](#endnote-80)

Spiritualism was prevalent in India, with gurus of various types holding sway over large sections of the population. The loyalty of the followers was unlike any loyalty a company might earn from its customers. An example of this spiritual loyalty was Gurmeet Singh Ram Rahim Insaan, who headed a socio-religious group and was revered as a messenger of God. He had millions of followers, was courted by many major political parties, and was listed among the 100 most powerful people in India. In 2016, he launched more than 150 products under his own brand name, MSG, and was poised to challenge Patanjali and other FMCG companies.[[81]](#endnote-81) However, this business declined in August 2017, when Insaan was convicted of rapes and sentenced to prison for 20 years. More than 200,000 of his followers assembled near the court hall when the judgment was pronounced.[[82]](#endnote-82) The unrest that followed his conviction resulted in dozens being killed, hundreds injured, and thousands arrested.

Some argued that the success of Patanjali and similar companies was propelled by the blind faith that some sections of the Indian population had placed in their holy men. Not surprisingly, some dubbed this phenomenon the faith-food industry.[[83]](#endnote-83) Sadhguru Jaggi Vasudev, who set up Isha Foundation, was another guru with millions of followers in India and abroad, who counted many political leaders among his supporters. Isha Business Pvt. Ltd. sold a range of products and claimed to use all profits to serve rural India; however, reports had surfaced of Isha Foundation’s involvement in land grabbing and the displacement of tribal communities.[[84]](#endnote-84)

While the reasons for Patanjali’s success and its sustainability would be revealed over time, the FMCG markets in India were witnessing substantial change. Companies, both established and new, specialists and generalists, Indian and MNCs, needed a strategy to navigate this fast-changing environment.

Exhibit 1: Financial Performance and Other Indicators of Patanjali and its Competitors

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Patanjali | HUL | Colgate | Dabur | SSA |
| Revenue FY 2017  ($ million) | 1,647 | 5,379 | 700 | 1,198 | – |
| Operating profit FY17 ($ million) | 210 (estimate\*) | 960 | 149 | 253 | – |
| Net profit FY 2015 ($ million) | – | 662 | 90 | 199 | – |
| R&D spend\*\*  Total ($ million)  % of revenues | 16–32  1–2% | 14 (FY14)  0.32% | 3  0.4% | 0.34 (FY13)  0.05%† | – |
| Advertising spend  Total ($ million)  % of revenues | 8–10% (CY16) | 541  10% | 79.8  11.4% | 100  8.4% | – |
| Number of products | > 400 | – | – | 400 | 300 (planned) |
| Product categories operating in | 6 | 20 | 4 | 7 | 7 |
| Number of brands | 1 | 35 | 3 | 5 | 1 |
| Number of factories | 1 (6 more proposed) | 30 | 5 | 29 | 1 |
| Number of countries operating in | 10 | 190 (Unilever) | > 200 (Colgate-Palmolive) | 120 | 23 |
| Number of employees | 20,000 | 18,000 | 2,414 | 7,243 | 201–500 |
| Distribution network (no. of retail outlets) | 47,000  5,000 Patanjali stores | 6.3 million | 5.8 million | 6 million | 1,000 (planned) |

Notes: HUL = Hindustan Unilever Limited; SSA = Sri Sri Ayurveda; FY = fiscal year; R&D = research and development; CY = current year; \* Estimate based on Baba Ramdev reporting a 100 per cent increase in profits as compared with the previous year; Shuchi Shukla, “Patanjali Profits Growing at 100%, Top Brand in 2 Years, Says Yoga Guru Ramdev,” NDTV, May 4, 2017, accessed December 10, 2017, <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/sanyasi-and-not-businessman-will-head-patanjali-after-me-says-yoga-guru-ramdev-1689458>); \*\* R&D spend from the latest available years was used if FY 2017 values were not available; † Based on Dabur’s reported FY12-13 revenue of $679 million.

Source: Case writers’ research based on company annual reports and company websites.

Exhibit 2: Competitor Business Segments Facing Threats from Patanjali

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Category | FY 2015 Revenue Share | Business Description |
|  |  | **HINDUSTAN UNILEVER LIMITED (HUL)** |
| Soaps and Detergents | 49% | * Mature category with low margins * Overall sustainable growth expected at high single-digit to low double-digit levels |
| Personal Care Products | 29% | * Major long-term growth drivers were increasing penetration rate, rising per capita consumption, and premiumization * Most lucrative category for HUL, offering high growth and high margins |
| Beverages | 12% | * HUL was the market leader in the tea segment and was the value market share leader in the coffee segments * As the penetration level in the tea segment was high, HUL focused on premiumization |
| Packaged Foods | 6% | * Low-margin segment * Almost 50% of HUL’s revenue was generated from Kissan brand canned fruits and vegetables |
|  |  | **COLGATE-PALMOLIVE** |
| Oral Care | 46% | * Colgate possessed a superior distribution channel and was the market leader with 55.6% market share (compared with HUL at 19.6%, Dabur at 13.9%, and Patanjali at 1.3%) * The herbal toothpaste market had approximately 20% of the market share of the total toothpaste market; expected to increase to approximately 35% by 2020 * Dabur’s and Patanjali’s offerings were growing strongly |
|  |  | **DABUR** |
| Hair Care | 23% | * Dabur was the market leader in Amla-based hair oils and had strong brand equity with these products |
| Health Supplements | 18% | * Dabur held a strong leadership position with its Chyawanprash and Honey brands, while competitors were absent |
| Food  (fruit juices) | 19% | * Dabur developed a strong position in this category through its scale and reach; however, competition was intensifying through entrants such as Patanjali |
| Oral Care | 14% | * Dabur’s portfolio was growing strongly due to consumers’ increasing preference for herbal products |
| Supplements and Wellness | 9% | * Dabur was expanding its product portfolio and launching new products in emerging therapeutic areas |
| Digestives | 6% | * Dabur was the market leader in the category, and faced only modest competition |
| Home Care | 6% | * Although it faced large rivals in the segment, Dabur was growing strongly by increasing distribution |

Note: FY = fiscal year.

Source: Case writers’ research and information adapted from HSBC Global Research, *India Consumer—A Disruptive Force in the Indian Consumer Sector*, February 5, 2016.

EXHIBIT 3: COMPETING PRODUCTS OF Hindustan Unilever Limited, COLGATE, DABUR, Sri Sri Ayurveda, AND PATANJALI

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Company | Product Category | Brand | Volume | Price (INR) | Price (INR/kg) | Patanjali Brand | Volume | Price (INR) | Price (INR/kg) | Price Comparison |
| HUL | Body Care | Lakme Sun Expert SPF 30 Fairness Lotion | 50 ml | 225 | 4,500 | Sun Screen Cream SPF 30 | 50 gm | 100 | 2,000 | –79% |
| HUL | Face Wash | Fair & Lovely Fairness Face Wash | 50 gm | 60 | 1,200 | Saundarya Face Wash | 60 gm | 60 | 1,000 | –17% |
| HUL |  | Pears Pure & Gentle | 60 gm | 110 | 1,833 | Patanjali Activated Carbon Foam | 60 gm | 60 | 1,000 | –45% |
| HUL | Face Cream | Fair & Lovely Advanced Multi Vitamin | 50 gm | 93 | 1,860 | Beauty Cream | 50 gm | 70 | 1,400 | –25% |
| HUL | Shampoo | Clinic Plus Anti Dandruff | 175 ml | 99 | 566 | Kesh Kanti Anti Dandruff | 200 ml | 110 | 550 | –3% |
| HUL | Conditioner | Clinic Plus Soft & Silky Cream Conditioner | 80 ml | 67 | 838 | Conditioner with Protein | 100 gm | 60 | 600 | –28% |
| HUL | Hand wash | Lifebuoy Total 10 Hand Wash | 185 ml | 46 | 249 | Herbal Hand Wash (Anti–bacterial) | 250 ml | 60 | 240 | –4% |
| HUL | Soap | Hamam | 150 gm | 42 | 280 | Neem Kanti Body Cleanser | 75 gm | 15 | 200 | –29% |
| HUL |  | Lux International Creamy White Soap Bar | 75 gm | 31 | 413 | Rose Kanti Body Cleanser | 75 gm | 19 | 253 | –39% |
| HUL | Detergent Bars | Rin | 250 gm | 15 | 60 | Detergent Cake Popular | 250 gm | 12 | 48 | –20% |
| HUL |  | Surf Excel | 250 gm | 29 | 116 | Detergent Cake Superior | 250 gm | 16 | 64 | –45% |
| HUL | Detergent Powder | Active Wheel Active Lemon and Orange | 1,000 gm | 52 | 52 | Popular Quality Powder with Herbs | 1,000 gm | 50 | 50 | –4% |
| HUL |  | Rin | 1,000 gm | 79 | 79 | Superior Quality Powder with Herbs | 1,000 gm | 70 | 70 | –11% |
| HUL |  | Surf Excel Quick Wash | 500 gm | 100 | 200 | Premium Quality | 500 gm | 95 | 190 | –5% |
| HUL | Dishwasher Bars | Vim | 200 gm | 18 | 90 | Super Dish Wash Bar | 175 gm | 10 | 57 | –37% |
| HUL | Noodles | Knorr Desi Masala Chaska | 66gm | 15 | 227 | Atta Noodles | 70 gm | 15 | 214 | -6% |
| HUL | Jam | Kissan Mixed Fruit | 200 gm | 60 | 300 | Mixed Fruit | 500 gm | 75 | 150 | –50% |
| HUL | Ketchup | Kissan Fresh Tomato | 500 gm | 99 | 198 | Tomato | 500 gm | 70 | 140 | –29% |
| Colgate | Toothpaste | Cibaca Vedshakti | 175 gm | 55 | 314 | Dant Kanti Natural | 200 gm | 75 | 375 | 19% |
| Colgate |  | Herbal Natural | 100 gm | 51 | 510 | Dant Kanti Medicated | 100 gm | 45 | 450 | –12% |
| Colgate |  | Sensitive | 80 gm | 99 | 1,238 | Dant Kanti Advanced | 100 gm | 90 | 900 | –27% |
| Colgate |  | Kids Toothpaste Bubblefruit/Strawberry | 40 gm | 35 | 875 | Dant Kanti Junior | 100 gm | 35 | 350 | –60% |
| Colgate |  | Family Toothpaste | 300 gm | 110 | 367 | Dant Kanti Natural Family Value Pack | 300 gm | 112 | 373 | 2% |
| Colgate | Toothbrush | Kids 2+ Years | 1 | 20 | –– | Junior Toothbrush | 1 | 15 | – | –25% |
| Colgate |  | Super Flexi | 1 | 18 | –– | Active Care | 1 | 15 | – | –17% |
| Colgate |  | Sensitive Toothbrush, Ultra Soft | 1 | 45 | –– | Sensitive | 1 | 30 | – | –33% |
| Dabur | Hair Oil | Amla | 90 ml | 40 | 444 | Kesh Kanti Amla Hair Oil | 100 ml | 40 | 400 | –10% |
| DABUR |  | Almond for Damage Free Hair | 100 ml | 60 | 600 | Almond Oil | 100 ml | 50 | 500 | –17% |
| DABUR | Toothpaste | Dabur Red Family Value Pack | 300 gm | 142 | 473 | Dant Kanti Natural Family Value Pack | 300 gm | 112 | 373 | 21% |
| Dabur | Digestives | Hajmola Regular | 120 tablets | 30 | - | Pachak Methi Nimbu | 100 gm | 35 | 350 | - |
| Dabur | Chyawanprash | Dabur Chyawanprash | 1,000 gm | 295 | 295 | Special Chyawanprash | 1,000 gm | 190 | 190 | −36% |
| Dabur | Honey | Dabur Honey | 500 gm | 199 | 398 | Patanjali Honey | 500 gm | 135 | 270 | −32% |
| Dabur | Fruit Juices | Real (Mango, Guava) | 200 ml | 20 | 100 | Mango, Guava | 200 ml | 20 | 100 | 0% |
| Dabur |  | Real (Apple, Orange, Pineapple, Litchi, Mixed Fruit) | 1,000 ml | 99 | 99 | Apple, Orange, Pineapple, Litchi, Mixed Fruit | 1,000 ml | 85 | 85 | –14% |
| SSA | Body Care | Protecting Sunscreen | 60 ml | 80 | 1,333 | Sun Screen Cream SPF 30 | 50 gm | 100 | 2,000 | 50% |
| SSA | All Purpose Cream | Extra Nourishing Moisturiser | 60 ml | 60 | 1,000 | Moisturizer Cream | 50 gm | 75 | 1,500 | –50% |
| SSA | Foot Cream | Crack Free Cream | 25 gm | 35 | 1,400 | Crack Heel Cream | 50 gm | 60 | 1,200 | –14% |
| SSA | Shampoo | Anti Dandruff Shampoo | 200 ml | 150 | 750 | Kesh Kanti Anti Dandruff | 200 ml | 110 | 550 | –27% |
| SSA | Conditioner | Hydrating Conditioner | 60 gm | 50 | 833 | Conditioner with Protein | 100 gm | 60 | 600 | –30% |
| SSA | Hair Oil | Bhringamlakadi Taila | 100 ml | 100 | 1,000 | Kesh Taila | 100 ml | 85 | 850 | –15% |
| SSA | Toothpaste | Sudanta | 100 gm | 56 | 560 | Dant Kanti Medicated | 100 gm | 45 | 450 | –20% |
| SSA | Ghee | Cow’s Pure Ghee | 1,000 ml | 530 | 530 | Cow’s Ghee | 1,000 ml | 560 | 560 | 6% |
| SSA | Chyawnaprash | Chaywanprash | 1,000 gm | 360 | 360 | Special Chyawanprash | 1,000 gm | 190 | 190 | –47% |
| SSA | Detergent Bar | Detergent Bar | 200 gm | 15 | 75 | Detergent Cake Popular | 250 gm | 12 | 48 | –36% |
| SSA |  | Premium Detergent Bar | 250 gm | 23 | 92 | Detergent Cake Superior | 250 gm | 16 | 64 | –30% |
| SSA | Honey | Honey | 500 gm | 250 | 500 | Patanjali Honey | 500 gm | 135 | 270 | –46% |
| SSA | Fruit Juices | Amla Juice | 1,000 ml | 200 | 200 | Amla Juice | 1,000 ml | 100 | 100 | –50% |
| SSA | Fruit Juices | Aloe Vera Juice | 1,000 ml | 250 | 250 | Aloe Vera Juice with Fibre | 1,000 ml | 200 | 200 | –20% |

Notes: HUL = Hindustan Unilever Limited; INR = India rupee; currency has been converted at an exchange rate of US$1 =₹ 0.015600, as of August 12, 2017; kg = kilogram; ml = millilitre; gm = gram; SSA = Sri Sri Ayurveda.

Source: Case writers’ research and information adapted from HSBC Global Research, *India Consumer—A Disruptive Force in the Indian Consumer Sector*, February 5, 2016.

Endnotes

1. This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives presented in this case are not necessarily those of Patanjali Ayurved Limited or any of its employees. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. “Patanjali Will Shut the Gate in Colgate, Make Nestle’s Bird Disappear: Baba Ramdev,” *Economic Times*, April 30, 2016, accessed December 10, 2017,http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/cons-products/fmcg/patanjali-will-shut-the-gate-in-colgate-make-nestles-bird-disappear-baba-ramdev/articleshow/52024817.cms. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. All currency amounts are expressed in US$ unless stated otherwise; Currency has been converted at an exchange rate of US$1 =₹ 0.015600, as of August 12, 2017; ₹ = INR = Indian rupee. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. ET Online, “Acharya Balkrishna: The Man behind Baba Ramdev’s Double-Growth Plan for Patanjali,” *Economic Times*, May 6, 2017, accessed December 10, 2017, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/company/corporate-trends/acharya-balkrishna-the-man-behind-baba-ramdevs-double-growth-plan-for-patanjali/articleshow/58548493.cms; Jayanta Roy Chowdhury and R. Suryamurthy, “Ramdev to Launch Jeans,” *Telegraph*, September 10, 2016, accessed December 10, 2017, https://www.telegraphindia.com/1160910/jsp/frontpage/story\_107393.jsp#.WLZXHvl9600; ENS Economic Bureau, “Patajali’s FY17 Turnover up 111% to Rs10,561 Crore,” *Indian Express*, May 5, 2017, accessed December 10, 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/business/companies/ramdev-patanjalis-fy17-turnover-up-111-to-rs-10561-crore-4641082/. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. J. Ramachandran, K. S. Manikandan, and Anirvan Pant, “Why Conglomerates Thrive (Outside of U. S.), *Harvard Business Review* 91, no. 12 (2013): 110–119. Available from Ivey Publishing, product no. R1312H; [Aprameya Rao and Kishor Kadam](http://www.firstpost.com/author/aprameya-rao-and-kishor-kadam), “25 Years of Liberalisation: A Glimpse of India’s Growth in 14 Charts,” *First Post*, July 7, 2016, accessed December 10, 2017, www.firstpost.com/business/25-years-of-liberalisation-a-glimpse-of-indias-growth-in-14-charts-2877654.html. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Varun Sinha, “How Baba Ramdev Emerged as a Threat to Big Companies,” NDTV Profit, February 6, 2016, accessed December 12, 2017, http://profit.ndtv.com/news/corporates/article-meteoric-rise-of-baba-ramdevs-patanjali-threatens-big-players-report-1274192; Sulekha Nair, “Patanjali Shakes Up Colgate: The Threat of Baba-Cool Companies Is Real for MNCs,” *First Post*, August 29, 2016, accessed December 12, 2017, www.firstpost.com/business/patanjali-shakes-up-colgate-the-threat-of-baba-cool-companies-is-real-for-mncs-2927542.html. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. *Ayurveda*, loosely translated as “knowledge of life,” was a system of medicine that had historical roots in the Indian subcontinent. Ayurveda was based on the idea of balancing bodily systems through the use of diet, herbal treatment, and lifestyle changes to restore balance and thus health; Rahul Bhatia and Tom Lasseter, “As Modi and His Right-Wing Hindu Base Rise, So Too Does a Celebrity Yoga Tycoon,” Reuters, May 23, 2017, accessed December 12, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/india-modi-ramdev/. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Viveat Susan Pinto and Arnab Dutta, “Competition from Patanjali Prompts FMCG’s to Hit Back,” *Business Standard*, January 18, 2016, accessed December 10, 2017, www.business-standard.com/article/companies/competition-from-patanjali-prompts-fmcgs-to-hit-back-116011800008\_1.html. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. A g*urukul* was a type of residential school in India with pupils living near the guru, often in the same house, and supporting the guru in his day-to-day life. In a gurukul, students resided as equals, irrespective of their social standing. The word *gurukul* was a contraction of the Sanskrit *guru* (teacher or master) and *kula* (extended family); *Collins Dictionary Online*, “Gurukul,” accessed August 15, 2017, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/submission/6516/Gurukul; Megha Bahree, “India’s Baba Ramdev Billionaire Is Not Baba Ramdev,” *Forbes*, October 26, 2016, accessed December 10, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/meghabahree/2016/10/26/indias-baba-ramdev-billionaire-is-not-baba-ramdev/#26d9c9df2d2e. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Patanjali Ayurved Limited, *Details of Shareholders as of 28.03.2016*, March 28, 2016; A s*annyasi* was a male individual who was in the life stage of renunciation within the Hindu philosophy of four age-based life stages known as *ashramas*—i.e., *brahmacharya* (celibacy/student), *grihastha* (householder/worldly), *vanaprastha* (forest dweller/retiree), and *sannyasa*. Although sannyasa was conceptualized as occurring in the later years of one’s life, some young people skipped the earlier stages, renounced worldly and materialistic pursuits, and dedicated their entire lives to spiritual pursuits. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. *Padukas* were the simplest form of Indian footwear, consisting of a wooden sole and a knob that fit between the big toe and the second toe. Padukas had been worn by religious men as early as the 7th century, fitting well with their simple lifestyles. Although padukas were worn rarely in modern times, they continued to be valued as a symbol of religious devotion. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Bhatia and Lasseter, op. cit.; Bahree, op. cit.; Rama Lakshmi, “India’s Baba Ramdev Is Guru, TV Star and Source of Controversy,” *Washington Post*, December 24, 2009, accessed December 10, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/23/AR2009122302978.html. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Patanjali, “Vision & Mission,” accessed December 10, 2017, http://patanjaliayurved.org/vision-mission.html; Patanjali home page, accessed December 10, 2017, http://patanjaliayurved.org/. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Shambhavi Anand, “Patanjali Ayurved Brings out Advertisements Comparing MNC Rivals to East India Company,” *Economic Times*, August 16, 2016, accessed December 10, 2017, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/advertising/patanjali-ayurved-brings-out-advertisements-comparing-mnc-rivals-to-east-india-company/articleshow/53714677.cms. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. BT Online, “Baba Ramdev Says Patanjali’s Sales Will Make MNCs Do ‘Kapalbhati’; Reports Rs10,561 Cr Turnover,” *Business Today*, May 5, 2017, accessed December 12, 2017, www.businesstoday.in/current/corporate/baba-ramdev-patanjali-ayurved-turnover-fy17/story/251433.html; In Sanskrit, *swadeshi* literally meant “of our country,” but its origin and usage traced back to the Indian independence movement aimed at removing the British Empire from power in India. Swadeshi ideology sought to improve economic conditions by boycotting British products and following the principle of self-sufficiency. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Bhatia and Lasseter, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. HSBC Global Research*, India Consumer—A Disruptive Force in the Indian Consumer Sector*, February 5, 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid.; Namrata Singh and Partha Sinhal, “The Man Who Owns 94% of Patanjali Ayurved,” *Times of India*, April 30, 2016, accessed December 11, 2017, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/The-man-who-owns-94-of-Patanjali-Ayurved/articleshow/52047722.cms. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. HSBC Global Research, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Chowdhury and Suryamurthy, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Hindustan Unilever Limited, *Annual Report 2016*–17, accessed December 11, 2017, https://www.hul.co.in/Images/annual-report-2016-17\_tcm1255-507593\_en.pdf. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. D&B Hoovers, *Hindustan Unilever Limited Profile,* accessed December 1, 2016, www.hoovers.com/company-information/cs/company-profile.hindustan\_unilever\_limited.a1e72c8c8fc3f873.html. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Hindustan Unilever Limited, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. D&B Hoovers, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Hindustan Unilever Limited, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. D&B Hoovers, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. HSBC Global Research, op. cit.; Hindustan Unilever Limited, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. HSBC Global Research, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. HSBC Global Research, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. P. R. Sanjai and Bibhudatta Pradhan, “India’s Bearded Yogis Are Snatching Sales from Global Brands,” Bloomberg, November 30, 2016, accessed December 11, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-30/yoga-gurus-the-leaders-behind-india-s-hottest-consumer-products. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Sagar Malviya, “Hindustan Unilever Launching a Raft of Ayurvedic Products to Counter Patanjali,” *Economic Times*, December 29, 2016, accessed December 11, 2017, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/coming-soon-a-sequel-of-wheel-vs-nirma-behemoth-vs-baba/articleshow/56227190.cms. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Colgate-Palmolive (India) Limited, *Annual Report 2016–2017*, accessed December 11, 2017, www.colgate.co.in/Colgate/IN/Corp\_v2/Investor/FinancialReports/annual-report-2016-17.pdf. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Namrata Singhi, “Colgate’s Charcoal U-Turn Irks Users,” *Times of India*, September 25, 2015, accessed December 11, 2017, timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Colgates-charcoal-U-turn-irks-users/articleshow/49100310.cms. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Colgate-Palmolive (India) Limited, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Colgate-Palmolive (India) Limited, “Statement of Results for the Quarter and Year Ended March 31, 2017,” May 15, 2017, accessed December 11, 2017, www.colgate.co.in/Colgate/IN/Corp\_v2/Investor/FinancialReports/4q16-17.pdf. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. Ravi Balakrishnan, “Most Trusted Brands 2016: Tracing Colgate’s Winning Formula,” *ET Brand & Equity*, January 25, 2017, accessed December 11, 2017, http://brandequity.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/business-of-brands/most-trusted-brands-2016-tracing-colgates-winning-formula/56761054. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. Colgate-Palmolive (India) Limited, *Annual Report 2016–2017*, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
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