****

9B18M104

SOCIAL FOCUS CONSULTING: EVALUATING ITS LONG-TERM FEASIBILITY

John Paul de Silva and Anthony Goerzen wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.

*This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e)* [*cases@ivey.ca*](mailto:cases@ivey.ca)*;* [*www.iveycases.com*](http://www.iveycases.com)*.*

Copyright © 2018, Ivey Business School Foundation Version: 2020-12-04

In September 2017, John Paul de Silva, the founder and managing director of Social Focus Consulting (SFC), was pondering how feasible his company would be in the long term. Six years earlier, in December 2011, de Silva had founded SFC with the vision to help non-profit organizations (NPO) and students. His goal originated from his early life experience, having grown up in a neighbourhood affected by social issues such as gang violence and drug-related crime, and from the frustration related to attaining work experience for even an entry-level position. SFC exclusively hired students to help them gain professional experience, while also helping NPOs tap into the energy and ideas that Canada’s youth could offer.

On September 1, 2017, de Silva was excitedly preparing his team based in Kingston, Ontario, to work on projects for the sixth consecutive year. He was happy to reach this milestone, but wondered whether his for-profit firm, which was dedicated to providing consulting services to NPOs, would be feasible over the long term, given the current and potential market, the skills and resources required, the presence of competitors, its past financial performance, and the recent success and failure of new project acquisitions. De Silva had to ensure that the long-term business model would be feasible; moving forward with a venture that was not feasible over the long term could damage his professional reputation and waste a great deal of time and money.

The Canadian Non-Profit Industry

NPOs were corporations that existed for purposes other than to generate profit. In terms of percentage of total work force, Canada had the second-largest NPO sector in the world,[[1]](#endnote-1) with over 170,000 organizations,[[2]](#endnote-2) approximately half of which were registered charities.[[3]](#endnote-3) All NPOs had various benefits in common, such as tax exemption status; however, only registered charities could issue donation receipts for income tax purposes.[[4]](#endnote-4)

Charities generally fell into the following categories: advancement of religion (e.g., churches), relief of poverty (e.g., food banks), advancement of education (e.g., universities), and other purposes that benefited the community (e.g., libraries).[[5]](#endnote-5) Specific examples of NPOs included social, recreational, and hobby groups (e.g., the Canadian Automobile Association), amateur sports organizations (e.g., the Pan American Games), and festival organizations (e.g., the Toronto Caribbean Carnival).[[6]](#endnote-6)

The total annual operating budget for the Canadian charitable sector was around CA$228 billion,[[7]](#endnote-7) with a little more than half of that amount for wages and benefits.[[8]](#endnote-8) A charity’s operating costs were typically broken down into program costs (i.e., services provided to beneficiaries), administrative costs (e.g., salaries other than for fundraisers, office supplies, Internet access, website hosting, and others), and fundraising costs (i.e., costs directly attributed to raising funds, such as marketing, printing, mailing, and salaries for fundraisers). Given the extremely crowded sector, fundraising costs had almost doubled over 10 years from 18 cents to 35 cents spent to raise one dollar.[[9]](#endnote-9) Third parties such as *Money Sense* magazine graded and ranked charities based on how much of the raised donations went toward programs, rather than administrative and fundraising costs, adding pressure on charities to fundraise more efficiently.[[10]](#endnote-10) Charities could also be scrutinized by the Canada Revenue Agency for inefficient fundraising and risked losing their charitable status.[[11]](#endnote-11) Although the non-profit sector employed 2 million people, approximately half of Canadian charities were run entirely by volunteers.[[12]](#endnote-12) The total time contributed by Canadian volunteers was equivalent to half a million full-time jobs.[[13]](#endnote-13)

The Canadian charitable sector drew an estimated $246 billion in annual revenues, with about two-thirds coming from all levels of government.[[14]](#endnote-14) Almost all government funding (90 per cent) came from provincial bodies.[[15]](#endnote-15) When considering only so-called *core* NPOs (i.e., excluding hospitals, universities, and colleges), government funding accounted for one-fifth of total revenues, whereas almost half of all revenue was generated from sales of goods and services.[[16]](#endnote-16) Other sources for *core* NPOs included membership fees (16 per cent), donations from households (12 per cent), and investment income (5 per cent).[[17]](#endnote-17) Some NPOs also generated revenues through social enterprises, which were separate for-profit entities. The social sector was large, but it was also very fragmented, with 80 per cent of charities generating less than $500,000 annually and only 0.5 per cent generating more than $1 million annually.[[18]](#endnote-18) The top 1 per cent commanded 60 per cent of total revenues.[[19]](#endnote-19)

Donations came from three main sources: individuals (e.g., annual giving, monthly giving, and wills), corporations (e.g., employees giving to match corporate programs, sponsorships, check-out charities, and cause marketing), and foundations (e.g., public and private charities whose purpose was to fund other charitable purposes). While donations could be monetary, some were in-kind donations such as office supplies and canned food.

A View of the Market for Non-Profit Consulting

In Canada, the management consulting services market was estimated to be worth $12 billion, with almost 10 per cent of consulting services going to NPO clients.[[20]](#endnote-20) De Silva wanted to better understand the consulting market for NPO clients, so his team conducted a survey of Ontario NPOs, in which he asked what services they thought they would most benefit from (see Exhibit 1). After de Silva and his team compiled the survey results, they discovered that more than one quarter of respondents found fundraising and fund development most beneficial, with marketing and communications cited by approximately 25 per cent of respondents and partnerships selected by 15 per cent as most beneficial. The survey also asked NPOs about their satisfaction levels with consulting firms, if applicable. About 80 per cent of respondents were very satisfied or satisfied with consulting services, and only 20 per cent remained neutral.

Although de Silva knew that global consulting firms such as McKinsey & Company[[21]](#endnote-21) had social sector practices, he chose direct competitors that specialized in NPOs to define SFC’s target market. It was more strategic and defensible to build and grow a brand that was specialized, rather than one that was generalized. SFC had more than 10 direct competitors in the Greater Toronto Area alone (see Exhibit 2). Most firms offered a broad range of services, including marketing and communications, strategic planning, and fundraising; others specialized in areas such as corporate citizenship or human resources. NPO clients varied in type (e.g., social services, education, health, arts, and religion) and size (i.e., from local to national).

De Silva examined three firms in particular: The Goldie Company (Goldie) was the longest-running consulting firm for NPOs.[[22]](#endnote-22) KCI Ketchum Canada Inc. (KCI) was the largest one.[[23]](#endnote-23) Endeavour Volunteer Consulting for Non-Profits (Endeavour) worked only on a pro bono basis.[[24]](#endnote-24) Although Goldie was the oldest firm, with over 50 years of service, KCI was also a seasoned firm, with over 25 years of service. Endeavour, which had only 10 years of service, was highly localized to the Toronto area.[[25]](#endnote-25) In contrast, Goldie had four offices across Canada[[26]](#endnote-26) and KCI had seven offices in various locations, from Vancouver to Halifax.[[27]](#endnote-27) The senior leadership teams at KCI[[28]](#endnote-28) and Goldie[[29]](#endnote-29) were very similar, consisting of staff with decades of NPO experience and professional accreditations such as the Certified Fund Raising Executive (CFRE).[[30]](#endnote-30) Endeavour was entirely volunteer-run and had a younger and less sector-experienced team.[[31]](#endnote-31)

Goldie’s main point of differentiation was its decades of fundraising experience. For example, the company had once helped a small hospital foundation raise $10 million within two years.[[32]](#endnote-32) KCI positioned itself as a “thought leader” in the sector[[33]](#endnote-33) and boasted the largest NPO data bank in the country,[[34]](#endnote-34) with billions of dollars raised by its clients.[[35]](#endnote-35) Endeavour set itself apart from professional firms with its free, volunteer-run services.

SFC’s Business Model

Based on SFC’s business model, the company charged its NPO clients a fee for developing innovative marketing strategies that helped them raise more funds and awareness. SFC developed these strategies by first collecting information about the client and its external environment through interviews, surveys, and secondary research. To do so, SFC used a five-C’s research approach: company, customer, collaborator, competitor, and context (see Exhibit 3). SFC then analyzed the information using quantitative and qualitative business frameworks such as the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis and used insights to identify and prioritize the main problems faced by the NPO. Strategies to address these problems were accompanied by implementation plans and measures of success. Brainstorming and using business best practices were some of the ways that SFC developed and vetted strategies. In addition to long-term projects that ran between five and eight months on average, SFC also offered a workshop that lasted two to three hours over a few weeks. The affordable workshop was offered for a fee of $300 to $400 and was essentially a scaled down version of a long-term project that was priced at $2,500 to more than $10,000.

SFC’s business model differed from competitors who had many years of NPO experience and credentials such as the CFRE. These firms typically provided expertise on traditional fundraising methods such as grant proposals and monthly giving programs. They often lacked experience, however, in youth-oriented trends, social media, and engagement, which were key trends for the NPO market.[[36]](#endnote-36) Although some pro bono firms such as Endeavour provided a wide range of services, they could not match the dedication and expertise in strategic marketing provided by professional firms such as SFC.

SFC had the skills and knowledge to uniquely help NPOs raise more funds and awareness by drawing on the complementary skill sets of its team members, who were undergraduate commerce and graduate Master of Business Administration students. The undergraduate students’ strength was in youth-oriented trends and engagement, and facility with social media. These strengths helped NPOs connect better with youth who used online channels to spread awareness. Awareness could lead to support, relationships, and donations. Undergraduates were also knowledgeable about fundraising and sponsorship through their student clubs, which sought corporate support to fund their events. For example, the Queen’s Marketing Association Conference was Canada’s largest such conference, attracting over 150 students from across Canada and sponsorship from corporations such as Unilever, Nestlé S. A., and International Business Machines Corporation.[[37]](#endnote-37) However, undergraduates lacked years of professional consulting experience and were not as dedicated to their roles or to the company as more senior team members were, given the students’ temporary involvement.

The lack of professional experience among undergraduate students was addressed by partnering them with the MBA students, who usually had some professional experience, for mentoring of their younger colleagues. The MBA students also drew on their business experience to help NPOs with discovery sessions (e.g., asking the right questions to understand the NPO’s current situation), market analysis (e.g., understanding donors and NPO competition), problem identification (e.g., understanding why a NPO was not achieving organizational goals), and measuring success (e.g., establishing short- and long-term key performance indicators to determine how well strategies were working).

With this business model, SFC’s team of more than 100 members had worked on over 60 projects with more than 60 clients from London to Ottawa, including organizations as small as Youth Diversion in Kingston and as large as the Ottawa Senators Foundation. SFC built its client list mostly by acquiring new customers, with John Paul dedicating more than half of his weekly hours to this activity. Due to the Canadian anti-spam Legislation[[38]](#endnote-38), e-mail marketing became more challenging and slowed business development substantially. Some help came from existing customers who referred SFC, leading to 10 per cent of new projects. About the same number of projects were new projects from previous customers. The number of projects from referrals or repeat clients would have been higher had it not been for the high turnover rate among executive directors at NPOs including SFC's clients. Director turnover occurred at about one third of all SFC’s clients annually. Executive directors at NPOs were key decision makers in securing projects for SFC. With their turnover, John Paul spent extra time tracking them to their new organizations or building relationships with the new directors. This extended the sales cycle significantly.

SFC was chosen as one of Canada’s 10 Most Remarkable Small Businesses by *The Globe and Mail*, among over 120 organizations that were nominated.[[39]](#endnote-39)

SFC’s Financial PERFORMANCE

Beginning in 2014, SFC saw increasing revenues, leading to a profitable year in 2015. However, the next year reverted to a negative cash flow. After launching a promotional workshop service in late 2013, de Silva expected higher revenues from long-term projects, which materialized in 2015. That year, long-term projects accounted for 84 per cent of total revenues, versus 76 per cent in 2014. In 2016, however, the workshop service represented 100 per cent of total annual revenues.

SFC’s main expenses consisted of travel costs such as gas, parking, hotels, and meals; payments to consultants and to the managing director; administrative costs such as office supplies, meeting expenses, computers, cell phones, and printing; and other miscellaneous expenses such as promotional costs and banking fees. SFC’s income statements from the previous three years showed travel expenses increasing substantially from 2014 to 2016 as a percentage of total expenses, which was based on de Silva’s increased business development efforts and meetings with clients. Similarly, administrative expenses increased. However, payments to consultants decreased substantially in 2016, as de Silva took on more consulting responsibilities with the smaller projects (see Exhibit 4).

SFC’s Success in Client Acquisition

In June 2015, de Silva emailed Kingston area NPOs pitching SFC’s low-cost high-value marketing workshops on branding, corporate sponsorship, and social media. Each email had the same basic content but was personalized to each NPO. To help make future workshops more effective, he included an online survey for the NPO executives with questions such as: What topics would you most like to see covered? What is the ideal length of time for a workshop? He also included a link to an article about SFC that depicted the organization as a source of value, rather than just a costly service. Juanita Colbert, the executive director of a rural Kingston essential skills organization called Pittsburgh Township Literacy & Skills (PTLS), made the effort to contact SFC to confirm that she had completed the survey and offered to forward it to other NPO executives, which de Silva greatly appreciated.

Two months after initial contact, de Silva’s average time between contact points, he learned that PTLS was seeking funding from existing donors to pay for consultants to develop a marketing strategy and plan. This was SFC’s specialty, so he eagerly expressed interest in bidding for the project and scheduled a call. The next day, de Silva spoke with Colbert for about 30 minutes to get a better understanding of her organization and its needs. As he did with all discovery types of calls, de Silva prepared for his discussion by reviewing the NPO’s website and social media feeds. He also prepared one of his five-C’s framework documents (see Exhibit 3), which included a set of questions for a structured approach to the call. His curiosity often helped him pursue various different paths of questioning, depending on the prospective client’s answers to de Silva’s questions.

De Silva learned that PTLS was having difficulty getting clients and meeting government quotas. If this issue continued, the NPO could lose its Ontario government funding and could be forced to shut down. He asked what they were doing to get new clients. Colbert explained that they mainly relied on referrals from other agencies, including the Ontario government initiative Job Skills, which offered free job search support. For example, when a Job Skills client expressed an interest in a position but lacked basic skills required for that job, the applicant was referred to PTLS or other similar agencies. PTLS also used promotional posters, flyer inserts in local newspapers, online advertising, Facebook, and its website for marketing purposes. Other topics covered in de Silva’s call included whether enough potential clients were available, the reasons why a client would choose PTLS over a competitor, the organization’s marketing budget, and other relevant matters.

De Silva also used the meeting to explain how SFC could best meet the needs of PTLS. He talked about SFC’s consulting process being based on research and analytics, how it differed from other firms by having a team of undergraduate commerce and graduate MBA students, and how SFC’s founding stemmed from de Silva’s growing up in a socially disadvantaged neighbourhood. He explained how his background helped him relate to the important work PTLS was doing.

After the meeting, he emailed Colbert thanking her for her time and mentioned that a project proposal would be sent to PTLS the next day. He reviewed his meeting notes and felt that the organization’s best approach would be interviewing current clients to understand what had brought them to PTLS, how they like PTLS so far, and whether they would recommend the NPO to others. He wanted to get a more well-rounded understanding by also interviewing employees, volunteers, and partners, as well as conducting secondary research on the NPO’s surrounding area including infrastructure and demographics.

De Silva included in the proposal an estimated project time frame and breakdown of 100 total people hours, which included 45 hours for research, 20 hours for analysis, and 35 hours for strategy and implementation formulation. PTLS’s budget for the project was $500, including sales tax. Although this was far below market rates, he saw this project as useful experience for SFC. The proposal was forwarded to a private funder for approval, but after three weeks had passed without a decision, de Silva contacted Colbert for an update and forwarded her a relevant article about essential skills trends in Ontario. A short time later, SFC’s proposal was approved and de Silva called PTLS to discuss next steps.

Colbert first explained to de Silva why SFC was chosen among all bidders on the project. She liked his personal story of growing up in a socially disadvantaged neighbourhood and felt that his personal connection to social causes would make him relate better to PTLS and its clients, who came mainly from backgrounds similar to his. She also thought his company’s name conveyed a specialty of working with social causes. Colbert was impressed by de Silva’s questions and his efforts to listen and understand PTLS’s needs and current situation. She was glad he avoided suggesting a social media solution for PTLS before he fully understood the organization.

Colbert also informed de Silva that the project’s budget had been increased five-fold to $2,500, which de Silva would use for three $300 honorariums, one each for three students, who would each work about 10 to 15 hours on the project. The rest would be invested into SFC. Less than a year after the project was completed, Colbert was excited to report that SFC’s strategy had already led to a 76-per-cent increase in program registrants, which made de Siva proud of his team’s work.

SFC’s Failure in Client Acquisition

Despite previous success gaining new clients and projects, de Silva and SFC began struggling to secure clients and projects. On March 23, 2016, for example, de Silva received an email with a request for proposal (RFP) from Virginia St. Bernard, a manager at Gananoque Public Health (GPH). GPH was seeking a social marketing consultant to help the organization better reach and engage young adults, age 18 to 29, who lived in apartments, condos, and other multi-unit dwellings (MUDs). She found SFC’s service provider listing on the online job posting website CharityVillage, which referred to itself as “Canada’s favourite site for non-profit professionals.”[[40]](#endnote-40) The goal of the project was to turn young adults into advocates for smoke-free housing after 38 per cent (roughly 1 million) of Ontarians living in MUDs were exposed to second-hand smoke from neighbouring units. In contrast, 80 per cent of MUD residents had indicated a preference to live in smoke-free housing, which was in very short supply. GPH attributed the short supply of smoke-free housing to landlords and property managers who either believed that it was illegal to institute a smoke-free policy or were concerned about the vacancies that a smoke-free policy would create. GPH felt that tenants were unaware that they could express a preference for smoke-free housing or that they did not want to wait until smoke-free housing became available.

To achieve the project’s goal, GPH was seeking a consultant who would use a “cascading influence model” to develop a social marketing strategy in collaboration with a working group that included GPH staff and a focus group of young adults called planners. The model’s six to 10 planners would apply a social marketing strategy to have 10 to 200 young adult advocates engage and raise awareness among Ontario’s young adults. GPH suggested that additional channels could be used as part of the strategy, including online housing search platforms such as Kijiji and large housing providers such as Homestead.

The project included four major deliverables: 1) a social marketing planning framework to lead the working group throughout the project; 2) facilitating the working group and project through in-person meetings, conference calls, shared online spaces, and emails; 3) a social marketing strategy that included messaging, channels, and potential partnerships; and 4) a written report documenting the process, findings, and recommendations for next steps.

GPH defined the ideal consultant’s background as follows: 1) proven knowledge of social marketing principles and practices, ideally in public health; 2) extensive experience in multi-stakeholder group facilitation; 3) proven knowledge of young adults as a target market; and 4) ability to complete projects on time, on budget, and within specifications. To complete the RFP, the prospective consultant needed to include four key items: 1) a resume that demonstrated meeting or exceeding the background requirements noted above; 2) a detailed plan and description of how the deliverables would be achieved; 3) the total cost and breakdown for the contract; and 4) two references, preferably from the public health field.

After reviewing the RFP, de Silva submitted questions to St. Bernard on three different dates. On March 24, he asked how it was determined that the “cascading influence model” was the right approach and whether GPH was open to other approaches. She replied that the model had been used by GPH and other public health organizations for years. Although GPH was open to new ideas, it felt that the model was best for this situation. On April 6, de Silva asked whether GPH would recruit the planners, whether space would be provided for the in-person meetings, and whether those meetings would only take place in Gananoque. St. Bernard replied the next day to confirm that GPH would recruit the planners and that 10 people were already interested. Meeting space would be provided in Gananoque, but the meetings could also be located in Belleville, if necessary. On April 9, de Silva asked how the RFP requirement for “a detailed plan and description of how the deliverables will be achieved” differed from the required deliverable of “a social marketing planning framework to lead the working group throughout the project.” On April 10, St. Bernard replied as follows: “The plan to achieve the deliverables is the plan on how to achieve the social marketing plan. We are looking for an explanation of how you plan to achieve all the pieces of the project. One of the pieces is the social marketing planning framework.”

On April 13, the RFP’s deadline, de Silva submitted SFC’s proposal highlighting key SFC accomplishments that directly addressed GPH’s needs (see Exhibit 5). He offered to discuss the proposal and address any questions. The project cost breakdown was $19,000 for consulting fees, $1,000 for travel costs (including gas and hotel expenses), and $2,600 for sales tax. Of the total fee, 10 per cent was due on acceptance of the proposal and another 10 per cent was due upon completion of the social marketing planning framework. The remaining 80 per cent was due upon submission of the final deliverables, which was targeted for mid-September. The project leaders would be de Silva and an MBA student from Queen’s University who had over eight years of provincial health care management experience. The plan for her salary and working hours was not finalized by the RFP submittal date.

The contract was expected to be awarded on April 22, but de Silva had not received a response to his RFP by April 23, so he assumed that SFC was not selected for the contract and asked St. Bernard for feedback on the RFP for future reference. Four days later, St. Bernard confirmed that another agency was a better fit with GPH’s objectives and had been awarded the contract. Although feedback was not normally provided, St. Bernard sensed that SFC could use some feedback as a provider in its early stages.

She stated that many of the other proposals were significantly longer, with more detail about their relevant experience. They suggested plans for the new public health program using descriptive examples of similar previous work. Further, most of the applicants did not contact St. Bernard prior to the deadline but still seemed to understand GPH’s needs. Other than SFC’s questions, she only received a question about budgets. She said there was nothing wrong with asking questions, but some of the questions de Silva sent made her believe he was unclear about what GPH needed. She also felt that his tone was “curt” or “aggressive” when he asked how one of the deliverables was different from one of the RFP requirements. St. Bernard also seemed to disapprove of de Silva questioning the “cascading influence model” approach, given GPH’s many years of experience in public health communication and behaviour change theory.

Next steps for SFC

After six years of efforts to build and develop his venture, de Silva was suddenly uncertain about SFC’s future. Was the long-term business model feasible? Given the current and potential market, did SFC have the skills and resources required to compete? De Silva was under pressure to determine whether SFC had a future.

Exhibit 1: Social Focus Consulting survey results

Which consulting services are most beneficial to Ontario’s non-profit organizations?

Source: Created by the authors using data from the company’s survey.

Exhibit 2: Competitor consulting firms in the Greater Toronto Area

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Competitor Firm** | **Services Offered** | **Client Type** |
| Endeavour | Corporate strategy (strategic planning), marketing strategy (segmentation, branding), operations strategy (process redesign), organizational strategy (change management) | Organization with social mission, budget under CA$2 million, in operation for over two years, with preference to those in Greater Toronto Area |
| Fundamentals | Grant proposals, prospect research, online funding applications, individual giving, direct response, strategic planning, program analysis, leadership | Health, social service, international development |
| Peacock Philanthropic | Strategic planning (development assessments, fundraising plans, innovation), major gifts (case for support, cultivation and solicitation, proposal development, coaching), interim management (placement, development, new perspective) | Mostly health, education, social services |
| Offord Group | Counsel, board retreat, staff training, organizational capacity assessment, leadership readiness assessment, fundraising/campaign readiness assessment, strategic marketing and communications, philanthropic consulting | Mostly education and health, with some arts and culture |
| Mendicant Group | Societal needs assessment and market research, strategic planning and facilitation, program plans and organizational design, operational effectiveness and monitoring, evaluation | Mostly social services and health |
| KCI Ketchum Canada Inc. | Fundraising strategy and planning, campaign management, strategic planning, executive search, training and talent management, communications, prospect research, analytics | Education, health care, community service, art and culture, religion, international |
| Harvey McKinnon Associates | Integrated fundraising, direct mail, monthly giving, digital fundraising, legacy giving, data intelligence, program audits, fundraising training | Mostly health, some international development, social services, environmental |
| The Goldie Company | Fundraising, sponsorship, human potential, community engagement, strategic planning | Mostly health, community services, children and youth services |
| Blakely Journey | Strategy, insights, creative, channels (direct mail, advertising, television) | Mostly health |
| Manifest Communications | Full-service social marketing and cause marketing agency | Non-profit (mostly social services and health), for-profit, and government |
| crawfordconnect | Executive search and talent management | Health, arts and culture, education, social services, environmental |

Source: Endeavour Volunteer Consulting for Non-Profits, *Endeavour Volunteer Consulting for Non-Profits SAMPLE Project Application and Instructions*, November 2015, accessed April 8, 2018, https://endeavourvolunteer.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Sample-Client-Application-Form-2015.pdf; “Our Services,” Fundamentals, accessed October 16, 2017, https://www.fundamentals.solutions/our-services.html; “Clients,” Fundamentals, accessed October 16, 2017, https://www.fundamentals.solutions/clients.html; “Services,” Peacock, accessed October 16, 2017, http://peacockinc.ca/services/; “Clients & Testimonials,” Peacock, accessed October 16, 2017, http://peacockinc.ca/clients-testimonials/; “Services,” The Offord Group, accessed October 16, 2017, www.theoffordgroup.com/services/; “Clients,” The Offord Group, accessed October 16, 2017, www.theoffordgroup.com/clients/; “Mendicant Group,” Mendicant Group, accessed October 16, 2017, mendicant.ca; Mendicant Group, “Our Work: Client List,” Mendicant Group, accessed October 16, 2017, https://mendicant.ca/clients.html;“KCI Ketchum Canada,” LinkedIn, accessed October 10, 2017, www.ca.linkedin.com/company/kci-ketchum-canada; “Clients,” Ketchum Canada Inc., accessed October 17, 2017, http://kciphilanthropy.com/lang/en/#panel-5-b; “Services,” Harvey McKinnon Associates, accessed October 17, 2017, www.harveymckinnon.com/services/; “Our Clients,” Harvey McKinnon Associates, accessed October 17, 2017, wwwharveymckinnon.com/about-us/our-clients/; “Our Services,” The Goldie Company, accessed October 18, 2017, http://thegoldiecompany.com/our-services/; “Case Studies,” The Goldie Company, accessed October 10, 2017, http://thegoldiecompany.com/case-studies/; “Welcome to an Agency with Benefits,” Blakely Journey, accessed October 30, 2017, http://blakelyjourney.com/#talk-to-us; “Our Work,” Manifest Communications, accessed October 17, 2017, http://manifestcom.com/change/our-work/; crawfordconnect *Introducing crawfordconnect*, June 2017, accessed April 8, 2018, crawfordconnect.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/cc-Brochure-June-2017.pptx.

Exhibit 3: Social Focus Consulting Five-C’s framework (Selection)

Company Perspective

* Challenges?
* Goals
* Mission, Vision, Values?
* Programs and Services?
* Level of impact? (i.e., number of people served annually)
* One site or multiple locations?
* Resources
* Staff (FT and PT) and organizational structure?
* Volunteers?
* Funding? (What is their financial health?)
* Marketing Efforts
* Website (Does it look professional? Has it been updated recently? What kind of content? Does the information seem complete? Is it easy to navigate?)
* Social media (What platforms? For each platform, how many followers? How recent are the posts? How often are the posts? What kind of content? What is the engagement like?)
* Events (How many? What kind of events? How much is raised from each event?)

Note: FT = full time; PT = part time.

Source: Created by the authors using data from company documents.

Exhibit 4: Social Focus Consulting income statements (in CA$)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **REVENUES** | **2014** | **2015** | **2016** |
| Long-term projects | $11,242 | $49,520 | $0 |
| Workshop service | 3,550 | 9,432 | 7,399 |
| **TOTAL** | **14,792** | **58,952** | **7,399** |
| **EXPENSES** |  |  |  |
| Consultants | 8,499 | 19,957 | 648 |
| Administration | 3,616 | 8,316 | 2,374 |
| Miscellaneous | 723 | 4,435 | 1,079 |
| Travel | 5,244 | 22,729 | 6,691 |
| **TOTAL** | **18,082** | **55,437** | **10,793** |
| **NET INCOME** | **–$3,291** | **$3,515** | **–$3,394** |

Source: Created by the authors using data from company documents.

Exhibit 5: Social Focus Consulting key accomplishments

Selected Information Included in Social Focus Consulting’s response to the Request for Proposal from Gananoque Public Health

* Re: Proven knowledge of social marketing principles and practices, ideally in public health
* 25-per-cent increase in participants for an NPO’s annual fundraising event via social marketing
* 40-per-cent more revenues for an NPO’s annual fundraising event via social marketing
* 400-per-cent increase in revenues for a health-related NPO’s social enterprise
* Re: Extensive experience in multi-stakeholder group facilitation
* Collaborated with multiple stakeholders (students, professors, and administration) to develop and plan a facilitated learning teams program for university students
* Trained 150+ students to facilitate 16,000+ hours of group time for 700+ students
* Re: Proven knowledge of young adults as a target market
* Social Focus Consulting consists exclusively of young adults, so we can bring organizations our unique perspectives on social marketing. For this unique approach, we were recognized by *The Globe and Mail* as one of Canada’s 10 most remarkable small businesses
* Ability to complete projects on time, on budget, and within specifications
* 100 per cent of clients say we are “better” or “much better” than other firms
* 4.6 out of 5.0 average client satisfaction rating

Note: NPO = non-profit organization.

Source: Created by the authors using data from the original document.

Endnotes

1. Michael H. Hall, Cathy W. Barr, M. Easwaramoorthy, S. Wojciech Sokolowski, and Lester M. Salamon, *The Canadian Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector in Comparative Perspective* (Toronto, ON: Imagine Canada, 2005). [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. “Key Facts about Canada’s Charities,” Imagine Canada, accessed October 7, 2017,

   www.imaginecanada.ca/resources-and-tools/research-and-facts/key-facts-about-canada%E2%80%99s-charities. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Mark Blumberg, “Blumbergs’ Snapshot of the Canadian Charity Sector 2014,” Canadian Charity Law, April 14, 2016, accessed April 8, 2018, www.canadiancharitylaw.ca/blog/blumbergs\_snapshot\_of\_the\_canadian\_charity\_sector\_2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. “What Is the Difference between a Registered Charity and a Non-Profit Organization?,” Government of Canada, June 23, 2016, accessed April 8, 2018, www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/charities-giving/giving-charity-information-donors/about-registered-charities/what-difference-between-a-registered-charity-a-non-profit-organization.html. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. All currency amounts are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise specified. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Mark Blumberg, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Raveena Aulakh and Amy Dempsey, “Audit of Charities Encounters Resistance,” *Toronto Star*, November 15, 2011, accessed April 8, 2018, www.thestar.com/news/gta/2011/11/15/audit\_of\_charities\_encounters\_resistance.html. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Mark Brown, “2017 Charity 100: Grades,” *Money Sense*, November 16, 2016, accessed April 8, 2018, www.moneysense.ca/save/financial-planning/canadas-top-rated-charities-2017/. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. “Types of Revocation," Government of Canada, April 27, 2017, accessed April 8, 2018, www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/charities-giving/charities/revoking-registered-status/types-revocation.html#audit. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. “Key Facts about Canada’s Charities,” op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Michael H. Hall, Cathy W. Barr, M. Easwaramoorthy, S. Wojciech Sokolowski, and Lester M. Salamon, op cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Blumberg, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Cynthia Haggar-Guenette, Malika Hamdad, Denise Laronde-Jones, Tasmin Pan, and Mingyu Yu, “Satellite Account of Non-profit Institutions and Volunteering 2007,” 18–19, Statistics Canada, December 2009, accessed April 8, 2018, www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/13-015-x/13-015-x2009000-eng.pdf. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Mark Brown, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. “Key Facts about Canada’s Charities,” op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. “Management Consulting in Canada—2016 Industry Report,” Canadian Association of Management Consultants, November 2016, accessed April 8, 2018, www.cmc-canada.ca/professionaldevelopment/publications/professionaldevelopment-publications-2016-industry-study. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. “Social Sector: Addressing Society's Most Urgent Challenges,” McKinsey & Company, accessed October 10, 2017, www.mckinsey.com/industries/social-sector/how-we-help-clients. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. “Contact,” The Goldie Company, accessed October 10, 2017, http://thegoldiecompany.com/contact/. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. “About KCI,” Ketchum Canada Inc., accessed October 10, 2017, kciphilanthropy.com/lang/en/#panel-5. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. “About Us,” Endeavour, accessed October 30, 2017, endeavourvolunteer.ca/about/. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. “Contact,” op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. “About KCI,” op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. “KCI’s Senior Leadership Team,” Ketchum Canada Inc., accessed October 10, 2017, kciphilanthropy.com/lang/en/#panel-5-a. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. “Our People,” The Goldie Company, accessed October 10, 2017, thegoldiecompany.com/our-people/. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. “Mission/Vision/Values,” Certified Fund Raising Executive, accessed October 10, 2017, www.cfre.org. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. “Executive Team,” Endeavour Volunteer Consulting for Non-Profits, accessed October 30, 2017, endeavourvolunteer.ca/about/executive-team/. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. “Case Studies,” The Goldie Company, accessed October 10, 2017, thegoldiecompany.com/case-studies/. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. “KCI Ketchum Canada,” LinkedIn, accessed October 10, 2017, www.ca.linkedin.com/company/kci-ketchum-canada. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. “About KCI,” op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. “KCI Ketchum Canada,” op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Steven N. Pyser, “Millennials and the Reshaping of Charity and Online Giving,” *Nonprofit Quarterly*, October 13, 2014, https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2014/10/20/millennials-and-the-reshaping-of-charity-and-online-giving/. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. “The Queen's Marketing Association (QMA),” LinkedIn, accessed October 25, 2017, https://ca.linkedin.com/company/the-queen%27s-marketing-association-qma-/?originalSubdomain=ca. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. "From Canada’s Anti-Spam Legislation (CASL) Guidance on Implied Consent," Government of Canada, January 24, 2019, accessed August 27, 2020, crtc.gc.ca/eng/com500/guide.htm. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. “Canada's 10 Most Remarkable Small Businesses," *The Globe and Mail,* September 12, 2014, https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/small-business/sb-managing/remarkable/article20557482/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. “Welcome to CharityVillage,” CharityVillage, accessed October 30, 2017, https://charityvillage.com. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)