****

9B19C026

transparency international ukraine

Lindsay Birbrager and Andrew Rozhdestvensky wrote this case under the supervision of Professor Lucas Monzani solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.

This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) cases@ivey.ca; www.iveycases.com. Our goal is to publish materials of the highest quality; submit any errata to publishcases@ivey.ca. i1v2e5y5pubs

Copyright © 2019, Ivey Business School Foundation Version: 2019-09-12

In August 2017, Andrii Borovyk was standing inside his new office in Kyiv (Kiev), the capital of Ukraine. As he waited to enter a meeting for the top management team, Borovyk reflected on his first year as chief operating officer (COO) at Transparency International Ukraine (TIU). While he had known from the start that managing a non-profit organization would be an uphill battle, after seeing the state of affairs at TIU, he wondered whether he was the right person for the role. Transparency International Ukraine still had significant organizational and operational issues, and Borovyk was not sure he had the energy to tackle them. A picture of Maidan Square reminded him of the Revolution of Dignity that had resulted from Ukraine’s rampant corruption. In his heart, he wondered what it would take to get things in order and whether he could make the sacrifice required to tackle the corruption that plagued his beloved country.

Borovyk was confident that he had the support of TIU’s newly appointed chief executive officer (CEO), Yaroslav Yurchyshyn, but he did not know whether the two of them would be able to influence the highly entrenched, corrupt public officers and the colluding oligarchic elites from the private sector. Borovyk did his best to push his concerns to the back of his mind for the time being. To curb his uneasiness, he decided to prepare for the meeting. He created a list of top priorities, and with that, he left for the meeting, hoping he would get a good night’s sleep tonight.

UKRAINE’S HISTORY OF CORRUPTION

Ukraine became an independent state in 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union; however, this did nothing to curb the widespread corruption in the country. Ukraine’s judicial system was one of the most commonly cited examples of institutionalized corruption by the media. Further, the few honest employees of the judicial system were undermined by the executive branch of government, which had suffered from frequent cases of nepotism. Nepotism in the executive branch resulted from promoting family and friends of powerful people into positions of power, despite their lack of technical expertise and know-how.

Ukraine’s mounting reputation as a corrupt country impeded its ability to conduct international business. Companies were deterred by the complicated business registration and trade procedures and by the expectations that they would bribe or facilitate payments to Ukrainian public officials. Companies brave enough to attempt business reported that officers pressured them to extort kickbacks in return for illegal tax cuts. The rampant corruption in Ukraine severely impeded fair competition, as it was burdened by favoritism.[[1]](#footnote-1)

The Orange Revolution

During the presidential election in 2004, Victor Yanukovych was declared the winner, but his opponent’s supporters accused him of fraud and staged mass protests, known as the Orange Revolution. According to the National Democratic Institute, voting had been rigged, leading to over one million extra votes for Yanukovych, and both the European Union and the United States denounced the election as fraudulent.[[2]](#footnote-2) On December 3, 2004, the Supreme Court of Ukraine ruled the election invalid and ordered a new runoff election on December 26; the pro-Western candidate Victor Yushchenko won. Yanukovych was defeated, and Yushchenko was inaugurated on January 23, 2005.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Revolution of Dignity

After this failed attempt in 2004, Yanukovych won the 2010 presidential election, and corruption intensified under his leadership. Power and wealth became concentrated within a small circle that included the president and his close associates. Yanukovych cut taxes for big corporations while increasing the tax burden on small entrepreneurs, leading to protests across the country. While Yanukovych claimed to favour privatization, his deals were neither transparent nor competitive. The most shocking aspect of this period was his use of the judicial system to repress opponents and the media. According to Georgia’s former president, Yanukovych boasted loudly about his corruption of senior officials in the supreme and constitutional court.[[4]](#footnote-4) Within the year, the popularity of Yanukovych’s party had fallen over 66 percent, and a vast majority of Ukrainians believed their country was moving in the wrong direction.[[5]](#footnote-5)

The Revolution of Dignity, which began in November 2013, focused on restoring justice and respect for the Ukrainian people.[[6]](#footnote-6) An order of the Ukrainian cabinet triggered the revolution; such order suspended the process of signing the agreement for association with the European Union. The same day, activists gathered at Independence Square, and the size of the protest steadily grew overnight, as community leaders, opposing party members, and nationalist groups joined. While local authorities tried to drive out the protesters, students across the country proclaimed a strike, and a pro-European march was planned. The youth fuelled the revolution; provoked by abuse from the police force and the violent suppression of student protesters, the student movement was transformed into a nationwide movement against the regime. The revolution came to an end in February 2014, when Yanukovych fled the country and was removed from power. During the revolution, more than 100 citizens were killed, and more than 1,100 were injured.[[7]](#footnote-7)

The Aftermath

In the wake of the Revolution of Dignity, most citizens believed that many things would change for the better. Three years later, Transparency International’s 2016 corruption perception index (CPI) ranked Ukraine 131 out of 180 countries (with a score of 29 out of 100 points). This low CPI score could be primarily attributed to the facts that none of the corrupt politicians from the old regime had been sent to jail and the billions stolen had not been returned—facts that allowed power to remain concentrated among a handful of oligarchic elites.[[8]](#footnote-8) While corruption remained an ongoing battle, some progress was made. One of the most significant reform efforts was the creation of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) in 2015.

The NABU was an investigative body, targeting officials suspected of corruption.[[9]](#footnote-9) Also, a new law adopted April 1, 2016 required that all procurement with a value of over UA₴200,000,[[10]](#footnote-10) or services valued at UA₴1.5 million, had to be conducted through a newly established e-procurement system.[[11]](#footnote-11)

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL

Transparency International (TI) was a global nongovernmental organization (NGO), founded in 1993, with the mandate to free the world of corruption. It had more than 100 national chapters worldwide and worked with government, business, and civil society partners to develop measures to tackle corruption. Corruption differed from country to country; the organization’s chapters were staffed with local experts to determine the priorities and approaches best suited to tackle corruption in each country.[[12]](#footnote-12)

Corruption Perception Index

TI’s corruption perception index (CPI) ranked 180 countries according to their perceived levels of public sector corruption, using a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 was highly corrupt and 100 was clean. By 2015, the most recent CPI indicated that the majority of countries were making little to no progress in ending corruption: more than two-thirds of countries scored below 50.[[13]](#footnote-13) Further analysis indicated that countries with the lowest rates of protection for press and NGOs tended to have the worst rates of corruption.[[14]](#footnote-14) In 2015, Ukraine scored 27 out of 100 points in TI’s CPI. The corruption Index in Ukraine averaged 24.61 points from 1998 to 2017 and reached an all-time high of 30 points in 2017 and record low of 15 points in 2000 (see Exhibit 1).[[15]](#footnote-15)

Tackling Corruption

According to the chair of TI, tackling corruption required a clear commitment from all levels of government, the private sector, and civil society. TI recommended that governments take the following actions: establish transparent rules on lobbying, ensure the independence of the judiciary, and adopt and enforce legislation to protect whistle-blowers.

Across the European Union, progress had been made, and companies were being held accountable for their corporate behaviour. Most countries created international anti-corruption conventions and frameworks for prosecuting corrupt leaders and seizing their illicitly gained riches.

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL UKRAINE

Transparency International Ukraine (TIU) was founded in 2014 after three prior failed attempts. These earlier attempts had failed due to a lack of financing and the composition of the executive team. The Revolution of Dignity created a window of opportunity at the national level, and in 2016, to signify its intention to change, TIU built a new office in the country’s capital, Kyiv. TIU was young and passing through an organizational crisis, so a new CEO was sought to stabilize the situation.

The New Chief Executive Officer: Yaroslav Yurchyshyn

Before his role as CEO of TIU, Yurchyshyn had worked as an advocacy manager. In this role, he was responsible for connecting civil society organizations with government players in order to promote reform across different spheres. After the Revolution of Dignity, a close friend had introduced him to anti-corruption NGOs. Yurchyshyn was impressed by the success that TI had had in other countries, and he envisioned the positive impact that TIU could have in Ukraine. It was at this point that an aspiration started to form.

In 2014, motivated to contribute to the progress of his country, Yurchyshyn sought out a position as a TUI board member in order to gain influence from within. By 2016, the organization had yet to achieve its desired results, and the global office decided to take drastic measures by hiring a new CEO. Yurchyshyn, who was driven to create something new and help people work together, participated in the open competition and beat out 100 other candidates to earn the title. His vision was to fight corruption by working with the government to change the perception of, and society’s acquiesce towards corruption in Ukraine.

As CEO, Yurchyshyn was responsible for leading all external processes, including public appearances and communication with politicians and public officials. When Yurchyshyn took office, TIU had two locations, one in the capital, Kyiv, and a regional office in the town of Kropyvnytskyi, about 300 kilometers away.

In his new role, Yurchyshyn quickly identified several operational inefficiencies inside TIU that were affecting day-to-day activities and took action, even though this was not his position’s explicit mandate. Disappointed with the state of affairs at the Kropyvnytskyi office, Yurchyshyn decided to bring in new employees to create a newer, more professional team. To facilitate this transition and to combat crippling internal issues, he created a new position for a chief operating officer (COO). By delegating authority to a direct report, Yurchyshyn risked giving away part of the recognition from TI Global if the turnaround efforts at TIU were to be effective.

The New Chief Operating Officer: Andrii Borovyk

Andrii Borovyk had an impressive educational background. He had graduated from the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy with a master’s degree in economic policy. Later, he graduated from the Warwick Business School in the United Kingdom with a master of science degree in business analytics and consulting. Motivated to make an impact, Borovyk joined the public prosecutor’s office in 2015, where he worked in the reforms department.

In 2016, Borovyk left the office and was introduced to Yurchyshyn. The two built a strong connection, and Borovyk applied for the open position of COO at TIU. Borovyk aspired to deliver justice, but his earlier efforts in the prosecutor’s office had been ineffective due to the prevailing corruption in the Ukrainian judicial system. His aspiration to “do things right,” paired with his ability to challenge the status quo, stood out to Yurchyshyn, who hired him in August 2016.

Centralizing TIU’s Operations in Kyiv

Yurchyshyn’s first decision as the CEO was to centralize TIU’s operations in Kyiv. For this to happen, he had to close the regional office at Kropyvnytskyi. The primary rationale for this decision was that the regional office lacked influence on external decisions and policy-makers and was highly ineffective in its day-to-day operations, increasing budgetary pressures on TIU.

This centralization, of course, implied letting go those collaborators who would not relocate to Kyiv, and it naturally created some divisions between the existing collaborators at the Kyiv office and the newcomers from the former Kropyvnytskyi regional office. While the centralization was unpopular, it helped TIU reduce its costs and balance its budget—something that was essential for any NGO, given that they usually lacked a steady cash flow and had to use their limited resources prudently.

Shifting the Organization’s Culture

Upon initial analysis of TIU’s operations, Borovyk identified the existing, toxic culture of TIU as one of the most substantial barriers to overcome. Driven to improve organizational effectiveness, Yurchyshyn and Borovyk took actions that included hiring Andrew Rozhdestvensky, an external consultant specializing in human resource management, to provide his expertise and assist them in reshaping the existing culture.

As his first step, Rozhdestvensky facilitated a two-day session where the entire team came together to brainstorm and build out clear organizational values. This session resulted in alignment on seven core values, which were to become the basis for personnel assessment and decision making.

The team also added new roles and reorganized departments to create cross-functional teams, in order to create a culture that fostered employee engagement. For a similar reason, Borovyk changed the nature of the weekly meetings. Under the previous leadership, these meetings had lasted three to four hours and had had a negative tone, as previous management had utilized this platform to shame collaborators, exposing their shortcomings in front of their peers. Such an approach was not only an inefficient use of time, but it also damaged relationships by alienating people instead of engaging them with the organization.

To accelerate the cultural shift, Borovyk decided to hold bi-weekly meetings with the project managers and a monthly meeting with the entire team. Transforming the meetings had a positive effect on the organization, as the status updates presented improved transparency across departments, and the discussion of strategic issues ensured the right stakeholders were involved in decision making.

Building a Clear Organizational Structure

After working with Rozhdestvensky, it became apparent to Borovyk and Yurchyshyn that TIU had no clear organizational structure. While TIU had a board of directors, the board members were far removed from the results of the team on the floor. To ensure that TIU was adequately positioned to achieve its strategic goals, Borovyk built out a functional organizational structure, including departments for human resources, international relations, and finance. He mapped out each member’s role and established a chain of command so that it was clear who reported to whom and how the flow of communication would alter.

Building out a detailed structure proved to be effective. Before this restructuring, Borovyk had directly managed 11 collaborators, and as a result, he was unable to allocate sufficient time and support to each one. With the new structure, he had fewer direct reports, and more seasoned staff members were encouraged to own their projects, which reduced the number of actors involved in each decision.

Developing a Human Capital Strategy

In his role as an external consultant, Rozhdestvensky sought to critically assess TIU’s internal processes. Upon review, he recommended that TIU should develop a new, comprehensive human capital strategy.

To implement the new human capital strategy, TIU hired a permanent human resources (HR) manager, Lilia, who had previously worked in reformist teams as an HR adviser. The HR manager finalized the human capital strategy that Rozhdestvensky had drafted and developed a human resource system (HRS). The HRS comprised a general HR policy and modules that included more refined recruitment and selection criteria, detailed job descriptions matching the criteria, new onboarding practices, and a 360-degree feedback system.

As a result, TIU was filling vacant positions with qualified candidates within a four to six week period. The HRS increased the transparency of the recruitment and selection process and enabled TIU to communicate its new values to newly hired collaborators, all in support of TIU’s new culture. Similarly, the 360-degree evaluation system increased the perceived transparency of performance evaluations. As a secondary benefit, the 360-degree evaluation system helped identify the level of individuals’ core competencies and the best ways to close gaps in their skillsets. The new evaluation system allowed TIU to plan its human capital strategy more effectively. It enhanced the organization’s ability to identify employees’ training needs, build development plans, and undertake career succession initiatives.

Creating a Sustainable Rewards System

In order to engage and motivate their collaborators, Yurchyshyn and Borovyk worked alongside Rozhdestvensky to build a sustainable rewards system. Upon their initial assessment, they concluded that most collaborators were intrinsically motivated to work hard in their roles because they deeply believed in TIU’s values. Collaborators’ intrinsic motivation was derived from their desire to build something from the ground up and to have their efforts make a meaningful impact in ending corruption in Ukraine. While tapping in to collaborators’ intrinsic motivation worked for a while, both Yurchyshyn and Borovyk understood that this would not be sustainable in the long term without adequate, tangible rewards. Even the energy of the most intrinsically motivated collaborator might fade if there were no tangible rewards to support their efforts.

Rozhdestvensky encouraged Yurchyshyn and Borovyk to investigate what incentive models other NGOs were using to encourage their workforce, without eroding their members’ intrinsic motivation. The main barrier Borovyk identified came from TIU’s limited budget, which could be balanced only if collaborators were willing to volunteer some of their work hours.

Establishing an Efficient Information Systems

When Borovyk first started working at TIU, the organization had formalized yet outdated procedures for communication; most employees commonly used email as their preferred communication procedure. Consequently, long email chains involving all collaborators were frequent and created substantial noise and security threats. For example, a few months after Borovyk’s arrival, a disgruntled employee broke into TIU’s internal email system, stealing confidential information and compromising TIU’s day-to-day operations. Clearly a more robust and secure internal communication policy was needed.

A new communication policy was set up after this security breach. The policy mandated that collaborators must each receive separate emails, which had to be matched back with all previous correspondence on a given topic; information exposure would be kept to a minimum to protect confidentiality. Consequently, Borovyk decided to switch the organization over to Microsoft Corporation’s Office 365 software. He opted for Office 365 because his research had shown that it proved to be the most secure and efficient communication platform when compared against the other available software alternatives in Ukraine.

Initiating Value-Added Projects

Only after the organizational redesign process was in its later stages did Borovyk and his newly formed cross-functional teams initiate a variety of projects with external stakeholders. Individual teams now had project managers, who made low-level decisions and organized the day-to-day tasks required to advance their projects. As a result of the freed-up capacity, TIU could start focusing on its mandate to fight corruption in Ukraine. More precisely, TIU concentrated on developing communication campaigns to raise citizen awareness about corruption and build up the transparency of local authorities, civic monitoring platforms for public procurement, the process of asset recovery, and so forth.

ACHIEVEMENTS TO DATE

Ukraine’s Position in the Corruption Perceptions Index

In two years, Ukraine had moved up two positions in TI’s CPI. While this quick win was both encouraging and energizing, the young leaders set their sights higher, aspiring to create an organization that could not only deliver performance but also sustain it over time. Yurchyshyn’s new aspiration was to move Ukraine further up in TI’s CPI ranking, and he had a plan for that.

Securing Funding

In theory, Transparency International provided its subsidiaries with funds for public procurement monitoring projects and, to a lesser extent, for labour expenses. When Yurchyshyn took office, the headcount at TIU had been 15, but the budget could support only eight collaborators. Similarly, during the redesign effort, Yurchyshyn and Borovyk had had to sacrifice their own salaries in order to pay the external consultants. To avoid allowing such budget issues to detract from value-added projects, and to support their new initiatives, the teams at TIU secured a US$100,000 grant from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

Protecting Whistle-Blowers

To help encourage the public to take a stand, TIU offered consultations to prospective whistle-blowers, offering authoritative information about how individuals should act, write, or send such notices.

Data Sharing

TIU influenced Ukraine to share data regarding the ownership and control of Ukrainian companies. TIU, the Ukrainian government, and the OpenOwnership initiative signed an agreement to integrate Ukraine’s beneficial ownership information into OpenOwnership’s global register. As a result, Ukraine’s data was automatically linked to data from other countries and made freely available to the general public.[[16]](#footnote-16)

OUTSTANDING ISSUES

Disregard for the Chain of Command

In his early months on the job, Borovyk struggled to have a positive influence on his close collaborators, some of whom seemed to resist his every indication. Moreover, his lack of positive influence also prevented Borovyk from improving TIU’s organizational outcomes, as requested by the CEO. One way that Borovyk’s collaborators undermined his authority was by “jumping the chain of command,” or approaching the CEO with initiatives that Borovyk had already rejected, asking for approval for the same initiatives elsewhere.

From informal conversations, Borovyk had discovered that this covert disregard for his authority originated in a Soviet work ethos that many TIU collaborators still followed. While “jumping the chain of command” was a practice from the now-extinct Soviet Union, it endured at TIU. Similarly, following the same Soviet logic, even TIU members who were lower in the hierarchy approached Yurchyshyn requesting decisions about issues that were far removed from the strategic issues he was supposed to address as CEO.

Collaborators’ Resistance to Change

While Borovyk aspired to transform TIU into a self-sufficient organization, he was having a hard time influencing the employees to be more proactive in their day-to-day tasks. In interviews with Rozhdestvensky, some TIU members declared that they perceived the change in management style as a threat to their daily routines.

Existing collaborators lacked experience in participative goal setting and lacked the confidence to work autonomously, make decisions, and voice concerns regarding dysfunctional work practices. Thus, even when they were operating under a leader who encouraged them to take initiative and partake in open and transparent communication, they continued to wait for instructions from the top to diffuse the risk of being held accountable for their decisions.

Disjointed Teams

Borovyk struggled to build rapport among the new cross-functional teams—particularly those teams that included members from the Kropyvnytskyi regional office. The cross-functional teams at TIU consisted of individuals with different backgrounds, personal motives, and understanding of the new TIU values. In the early months of Borovyk’s tenure as COO, collaborators lacked a clear, shared understanding of the organization’s mission and strategy, and this impeded their willingness to engage with their roles.

Inability to Find the Right Collaborators

TIU’s leaders needed to keep their collaborators committed—not only to TIU’s success but also to their more significant aspirations for the nation. NGOs, in general, required candidates who were results oriented, adaptable, and comfortable working with ambiguity. Finally, TIU collaborators had to possess a high tolerance for frustration because, in Ukraine, the pace at which public policy changes took place was slower than the pace in the private sector. Thus, to sustain their early success, TIU had to remain an organization whose high-engagement culture and work environment was able to attract and retain the best available talent.

One year into Yurchyshyn’s tenure as CEO, TIU still faced challenges hiring professionals who had experience taking initiative and working autonomously. As with most NGOs, TIU was unable to match the salaries and benefits of for-profit organizations. If TIU could not find a way to attract the “right” candidates, Borovyk and the other leaders would again have to sacrifice their valuable time with a hands-on management style.

NEXT STEPS

One year later, in August 2017, Yurchyshyn and Borovyk sat across from each other, silent and lost in their own thoughts, just before entering a top management team meeting. The global leadership of TI had requested TIU’s leaders to present their three-year strategy by October 1, 2017. After a long year, they finally had some progress to show TI’s global leadership. For example, in just three years, they had renewed their firm internally and Ukraine and also moved two points up in TI’s CPI ranking (from 26 in 2015 to 30 in 2017). While this was hardly a spectacular result, such a quick win might help consolidate TIU’s attempted cultural shift.

While both Yurchyshyn and Borovyk were still driven to transform the organization to fulfill their aspirations of tackling corruption in Ukraine, both leaders lacked clarity on how to move TIU from good to great. The pressing issue was whether the TIU leadership should focus on a strategic plan that presented a roadmap for the future or a strategic plan that would get the organization running. There were compelling arguments for each alternative.

On one hand, Yurchyshyn felt lost every time he contemplated the organization’s future. It seemed that, for each new accomplishment, another setback emerged. There was something systematically impeding the leaders’ ability to achieve TIU’s strategic goals, but he could not figure out what it was. Because of this lack of clarity, Yurchyshyn wondered whether he was the right person to navigate TIU across the complex Ukrainian environment; more importantly, he wondered if he had the strength to fulfill his aspirations. He said to himself, “Clearly, a strategic plan focused on the near future would help me resolve these inner doubts.”

On the other hand, Borovyk was completely energized and ready to carry out the action plan that he and Rozhdestvensky had established for TIU. Borovyk decided to make the plan happen, no matter the cost. However, the constant sacrifices he had to make to achieve TIU’s organizational goals drained much of his energy. In particular, he recalled long 16-hour workdays and weekends spent at the office instead of sharing his free time with his close ones.

Borovyk was clear about his commitment to making the sacrifices necessary to advance TIU’s strategic goals, but he wondered if his collaborators would be willing to make such sacrifices as well. He was still struggling to engage his collaborators with the culture he envisioned and thus, he was not sure how to gain influence over them. Consequently, Borovyk believed that, if the top management developed a strategic plan that focused further on streamlining the day-to-day processes, that would help him gain influence over his collaborators.

The time for reflection was up. Yurchyshyn called the room to order, took a deep breath, and addressed his top management team: “Regarding the matter of what should be the focus for the strategic plan . . .”

Exhibit 1: Historical trend for Ukraine’s scores in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI)

Note: A higher score represented a decrease in perceived corruption; Ukraine scored 32 points out of 100 on the 2018 corruption perceptions index reported by Transparency International; The corruption Index in Ukraine averaged 24.61 points from 1998 to 2017 and reached an all-time high of 30 points in 2017 and record low of 15 points in 2000.

Source: “Corruption Perceptions Index 2018,” Transparency International, accessed 29 August, 2019, www.transparency.org/cpi2018.

1. “Ukraine Corruption Report,” GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal, August 2017, accessed November 15, 2018, www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/ukraine/. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. William Schneider, “Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution,’” *Atlantic*, December 2004, accessed November 15, 2018, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/ukraines-orange-revolution/305157/. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. “The Orange Revolution and the Yushchenko Presidency,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed November 15, 2018, www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Orange-Revolution-and-the-Yushchenko-presidency. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Shaun Walker, “Viktor Yanukovych Boasted of Ukraine Corruption, Says Mikheil Saakashvili,” *Guardian*, February 25, 2014, accessed November 15, 2018, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/25/viktor-yanukovych-ukraine-corruption-mikheil-saakashvili. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Anders Aslund, “Is Viktor Yanukovych Ukraine’s Putin,” *Washington Post*, May 1, 2011, accessed November 15, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-viktor-yanukovych-ukraines-putin/2011/04/27/AFVH3sUF\_story.html?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.de05c7f0452d. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Tamila Varshalomidze, “Was Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity in Vain?,” AlJazeera, January 7, 2018, accessed November 15, 2018, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/ukraine-revolution-dignity-vain-171219084627117.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Yuriy Shveda and Joung Ho Park, “Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity: The Dynamics of Euromaidan,” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 7, no. 1, (2016): 85–91. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Melinda Haring, “How Corruption Actually Works in Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, August 15, 2018, accessed November 15, 2018, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-corruption-actually-works-in-ukraine. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Leonid Ragozin, “Four Years After Its Revolution, Ukraine is Still a Mess,” Bloomberg Businessweek, August 1, 2018, accessed November 15, 2018, www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-08-01/ukraine-reforms-stall-as-economy-lags-and-corruption-lingers. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. UA₴ = Ukrainian hryvnia; UA₴1 = US$0.03812 as of December 16, 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. “Ukraine Corruption Report,” op. cit. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. “25 Corruption Scandals that Shook the World,” Transparency International, accessed November 15, 2018, www.transparency.org/. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,” Transparency International, accessed August 29, 2019, www.transparency.org/cpi2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. “Ukraine Corruption Index,” Trading Economics, accessed August 20, 2019, https://tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/corruption-index. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. “Ukraine Takes Important First Step towards Ending Corporate Secrecy,” Transparency International, June 1, 2017, accessed November 15, 2018, [www.transparency.org/news/feature/ukraine\_takes\_important\_first\_step\_towards\_ending\_corporate\_secrecy](http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/ukraine_takes_important_first_step_towards_ending_corporate_secrecy). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)