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9B21M049

The London dance Shoppe: A turning Pointe

Lauren Nicolaas wrote this case under the supervision of Julie Gosse solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.

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Danielle Cameron, co-owner of The London Dance Shoppe (LDS), stared across the store at her precariously stacked boxes of inventory. She knew which tower of boxes held the ballet shoes she needed; the trick was to pull them out without knocking over the whole pile. This game of Jenga was a regular occurrence these days. It was January 2020, and business at LDS was better than ever, but evidence that Cameron had outgrown her retail space was mounting as quickly as the boxes.

Later that afternoon, Cameron met with Christina Morales, her business partner, to discuss the future of LDS. Moving LDS to a larger location was one of several options being considered, but Cameron also wondered if there were other ways to grow. She was also considering increasing her studio catering services or continuing to focus on the growth of her new online platform. As Morales was walking out the door, she turned around and said, “You know, Danielle, I’m not sure I’m up for any of these changes, and my other job is really taking off. I wonder if it’s time for us to discuss me selling my half of the business.” With that, Cameron was left alone in the shop to consider her options.

INDUSTRY CONSIDERATIONS

**Children’s Dance**

In 2014, dance was the third most popular children’s activity in Canada. Approximately 18 per cent of Canadian children took dance classes at least once a week.[[1]](#footnote-2) More Canadian children were enrolled in dance classes than they were in hockey, which was Canada’s national sport.[[2]](#footnote-3)

For the last decade, more than 60 per cent of Canadian children had failed to meet the appropriate levels of physical activity recommended by health experts.[[3]](#footnote-4) This led the Canadian government to implement various tax credits and advertising strategies to incentivize parents to enrol their children in organized activities. However, even with these tax credits, dance remained the second most expensive popular children’s activity. As such, families with low to average disposable incomes were significantly more likely to enrol their children in less expensive activities such as soccer or swimming.

Retail Dancewear

The term dancewear encompassed any items of clothing that were commonly worn by dancers, including dance shoes, leotards, tights, and belts. Driven by a renewed interest in the arts and in dance, the worldwide market for dancewear was expected to grow at a rate of 4.5 per cent over the next five years.[[4]](#footnote-5) The dancewear manufacturing industry was largely controlled by about a dozen major manufacturers, including Bloch, Capezio Ballet Makers Inc., and Freed of London Ltd.. However, the retail dancewear industry was highly fragmented, with most stores being independently owned.

Dance studios[[5]](#footnote-6) generally specified the dancewear that each dancer required at that specific studio. If a dancewear store did not have the required items or sizes, the dancer would need to find another retailer that carried the exact items required. Furthermore, dance shoes almost always needed to be checked for fit by a dance teacher before the dancer could use them. If the dance shoes were deemed unacceptable by the dance teacher, the shoes would need to be returned.

As specific and technical as dance apparel was, there was also an element of enchantment to the shopping experience. There was something magical about a dance store: walls lined with beautiful ballet shoes, tutus, leotards, and glittery dance bags. For many young children, especially, a trip to the dance store was often one of the most exciting days of the year.

One of the most important and expensive dancewear items was the ballet pointe shoe. Pointe shoes allowed a dancer to stand with all of their weight on the tips of their toes. Young ballet dancers typically received their first pair of pointe shoes around the age of 12, and this was commonly viewed as a big milestone in a dancer’s career. Finding pointe shoes that fit well was an intensive process. A proper pointe shoe fitting could take anywhere from 30 minutes to an hour and a half. There were many brands and styles of pointe shoes, and factors such as foot shape, ankle strength, and knee and hip alignment determined what type of shoe a dancer required. Once a dancer found the right fit, they were likely to use that shoe for the rest of their career. Pointe shoes retailed for an average of CA$120[[6]](#footnote-7) per pair.

THE LONDON DANCE SHOPPE

LDS opened its doors in 1995 in the Old East Village neighbourhood of London, Ontario. Founded by Karen Smith, LDS quickly established a reputation for providing excellent pointe shoe fittings and other dance apparel. Smith also owned a dance studio; she had originally established LDS as a side business to supplement her career as a dance teacher.

LDS moved to the Wortley Village neighbourhood of London in 2000, where it remained for almost 15 years before moving to its current location on Maitland Street in the city’s downtown area. In its 25 years in business, LDS had become a staple in the London dance community. Some parents, having bought dancewear at LDS as a child over 20 years ago, were now starting to bring their own children in for their first pair of dance shoes.

LDS stocked over 10 brands of dancewear and dance shoes, and offered the largest selection of pointe shoes in London. Professional pointe shoe fittings were offered by appointment, and custom services for dance competition teams were available upon request. These services included custom shoe fittings for a dance team as well as group dancewear orders. LDS also had regular store hours for drop-in customers.

DANIELLE CAMERON

Born and raised in London, Cameron began dancing at the age of three. By age 14, Cameron was a student at Canada’s National Ballet School in Toronto, Ontario. A year into her professional training, Cameron was visiting her parents for spring break when she broke her ankle in a trampoline accident. Several surgeries later, Danielle was informed that her dancing career was over, and she moved home to London. Struggling to maintain a connection to the dance community, Cameron sought employment at LDS. She was hired as a retail assistant, helping to organize inventory and fitting customers with dance shoes.

Cameron continued to work at LDS as she completed secondary school, as well as her bachelor’s degree at the University of Western Ontario. In 2012, a week before her graduation ceremony, Cameron was approached by her friend and long-time colleague Christina Morales. Morales wanted to buy LDS from Smith and was looking for a business partner. Cameron was interested but felt the timing was not quite right; she also lacked the capital to purchase half of LDS.

Morales ended up partnering with her parents and purchased LDS in 2012; Cameron was promoted to store manager. It quickly became evident that Cameron was a fast learner and a creative business manager. She began making changes to LDS’s inventory management systems, online sales platform, and website. In online reviews, customers praised Cameron for her great recommendations and attention to detail. Cameron enjoyed watching dancers “grow up” over the years as they returned to LDS for new shoes, and she prided herself on offering the best customer service in London.

Morales had developed great relationships with local studio owners, but took a less hands-on approach to running her store. Morales and her parents relied on Cameron’s business acumen and innovative thinking to grow the shop. After Cameron had worked for three years as the store’s manager, Morales’s parents offered to sell her their 50 per cent share of the business, and she accepted (see Exhibit 1).

Cameron was a young and confident business owner with very clear priorities. She continued working at LDS to maintain her connection to the dance community, and she tried to keep the dancers she served at the heart of every business decision. Cameron also loved to be challenged. She constantly sought out ways to improve LDS and had no fear when it came to trying something new. She saw LDS as a lifelong project. Though Cameron and her fiancée were not yet parents, they dreamed of one day bringing their children to “mom’s store” for their first pair of dance shoes.

RECENT CHANGES

Since Cameron had become part owner of the shop, it had undergone many changes. The Maitland Street location was a small 600-square-foot loft boutique in an industrial neighbourhood, with rent of $550 per month. Cameron remarked that the shop felt more like an inventory storage unit these days, rather than a premium service dance retailer. Although the Maitland Street shop did not have room for a ballet barre[[7]](#footnote-8) or a designated place to fit pointe shoes, Cameron was determined to make it work. Dancers still came to LDS and received premium service and fittings offered by Cameron and the team. During the peak season in August and September, fitting appointments at LDS were completely booked, and Cameron often wondered how many customers she was turning away as a result of the store’s lack of space.

Cameron had also launched a more sophisticated online store and website. The website included a blog where dancers could find dancewear tips and tricks, a place to make appointments or ask questions, and a well-designed online store. The online store had seen tremendous growth over the past two years, and Cameron was consistently surprised at the number of orders she received from outside of Ontario.

THE DANCERS

LDS’s customers could be loosely classified into two groups: recreational dancers and competitive dancers. Cameron recognized that some of her sales were to adult dancers, but this was far less common than the two aforementioned consumer segments.

**Recreational Dancers**

Recreational dancers were typically between the ages of three and 12, and took between one and four dance classes per week. August and September were the busiest months of the year for this segment. Dancers and their parents would often come in for shoes and dancewear as part of their back-to-school shopping.[[8]](#footnote-9)

Parents of recreational dancers looked for affordable and convenient options. Most parents were not knowledgeable about the different dancewear options, as they were not dancers themselves. Furthermore, they were acutely aware of the fact that their dancer would quickly grow out of whatever they purchased. Parents relied heavily on the advice of sales associates to educate them on their child’s studio requirements. For instance, one studio might want dancers in black dance shoes, while another studio might prefer beige dance shoes. It was therefore essential for dance stores to communicate with local studio owners before the peak season began so that they could advise their customers on what to buy and avoid frequent product returns.

Competitive Dancers

The second consumer segment typically consisted of older dancers between the ages of 12 and 21 for whom dance was a significant part of their life. These dancers sought a custom experience, with professional shoe fittings and advice from sales associates.

These dancers and their parents were less price sensitive but cared deeply about the quality and longevity of the items they were purchasing. In addition, these dancers were often loyal to a certain brand of dance shoe and would seek out a retailer who carried their preferred brand and style. These consumers were less seasonal and made more frequent purchases.

THE COMPETITION

Cameron had identified two local competitors: Pointe & Pick (P&P) and Dancewear Plus (DP). However, she also viewed the large Toronto dance stores as some of her biggest competitors.

Pointe & Pick

P&P opened in 2014 in the Hyde Park neighbourhood in Northwest London, less than five minutes away from three of the city’s largest dance studios.[[9]](#footnote-10) P&P carried figure skating, dance, gymnastics, yoga, and other fitness apparel. The store managers both had significant experience in figure skating and ice dance, but limited experience in ballet or other forms of dance. P&P carried a wide range of jazz, tap, and ballet shoes and had become a one-stop shop for children’s dancewear. However, it did not offer pointe shoe fittings and only carried one brand of pointe shoes and three lines of dancewear.

Dancewear Plus

DP was a large apparel store located behind an auto mall in South London, just five minutes outside of Wortley Village. Like P&P, DP offered figure skating, gymnastics, yoga, and other fitness apparel for both children and adults.[[10]](#footnote-11) The store specialized in custom dance costumes as well as standard dancewear. DP was owned and operated by Anne Perron, a seamstress and designer who had been making custom dance costumes for over 20 years. DP offered pointe shoe fittings by appointment with professional fitters; however, the store carried only two brands of pointe shoes. DP had long-standing relationships with various London gymnastics coaches and was best known for its excellent customer service and custom costumes.

Toronto Dancewear Stores

Canada’s largest city, Toronto, Ontario, was two hours from London by car or train. It was not uncommon for dancers to make a trip to downtown Toronto—home to over a dozen large, beautiful dancewear stores—for their first pointe shoe fitting. This was especially true of dancers who lived in the Oxford County area. Oxford County was 45 minutes from London and 90 minutes from Toronto. There was no large dance store in the Oxford County area; therefore, dancers had to choose which city to go to for dancewear.

The first pair of pointe shoes was a big milestone for a dancer, and some parents enjoyed making an event out of it by including lunch at a nice café, some shopping in downtown Toronto, and, of course, the pointe shoe fitting itself. After the initial fitting, students did not necessarily need to be fitted again for a year or two, with additional pairs ordered online from the store in Toronto, to be delivered to the dancers’ homes.

ALTERNATIVES

Status Quo

Morales had asked Cameron to seriously consider staying the course for now; the shop had recently undergone many changes, and the co-owners were simply trying to keep up with their current number of customers. Morales liked their small shop the way it was and was reluctant to engage in conversations about possible changes.

About one year ago, Cameron had expanded their online shopping offerings and was beginning to see an increase in LDS’s online sales. Sales were made Canada-wide, but customers could choose between delivery or in-store pickup. She wondered if keeping to the status quo and maintaining her focus on LDS’s online offerings would be the best option. Would customers who made a purchase online have the same loyalty as her current customer base? What would happen when these dancers were older and needed greater support in making dancewear choices?

Cameron estimated that next year’s online sales would be about 20 per cent greater than 2019 and that in-store sales would remain the same. With increased online sales, Canada Post would provide LDS with a discount on shipping rates. As a result, she expected courier and postage fees to decrease to 1.5 per cent of online sales. The merchant and services fees account and the wages account were projected to remain at the same percentage of sales. Cameron expected all other operating expenses to remain at the same dollar amount or proportion of total revenue as 2019 (see Exhibits 2, 3, and 4).

Return to Wortley Village

Cameron also wondered whether the timing was right to move the shop back to Wortley Village. She was fielding more and more requests for fitting appointments and simply did not have the space to accommodate all of her loyal customers at the current Maitland Street location.

A 1,200-square-foot space had become available across the street from LDS’s previous location in the heart of Wortley Village. Wortley Village was the centre of London’s Old South neighbourhood and was voted Canada’s best neighbourhood in 2013.[[11]](#footnote-12) Home to many cafés, boutiques, and art studios, Wortley Village was an affluent neighbourhood and a popular place for families to wander on lazy Saturday afternoons. The prospective storefront was in the centre of the village between a small art studio and the popular Sidetrack Café.

The new Wortley Village space included a retail space and a front office. The five-year lease would have a monthly rent expense of $1,760, excluding common area maintenance (CAM) fees. Monthly CAM fees for the property would be $0.42 per square foot. This rent was significantly more than the current rent at the Maitland Street location, but Cameron felt she would not need the small front office and thought she could sublet[[12]](#footnote-13) the space for about $600 per month (including all fees). Cameron would be able to cancel her current rental agreement on Maitland Street but would incur a one-time lease termination fee equal to two months’ rent at the Maitland Street location.

The new landlord was offering to pay one-time construction fees for adding new flooring and repainting the space, at a total cost of $2,000. Cameron estimated that she would need to spend about $700 on a custom wall-mounted ballet barre and about $5,000 on other leasehold improvements such as shelves, racks, and other furniture.[[13]](#footnote-14) She had just recently spent $400 on new artworks for the Maitland Street shop and thought that they would fit in the new location beautifully. Cameron planned to finance any investments by loaning personal funds to LDS.

As a direct result of the move, Cameron estimated that retail sales would grow 25 per cent compared to fiscal 2019 levels. As with the status quo option, online sales were still expected to grow by 20 per cent if she moved to the new location. Cameron would also need to increase the number of hours worked by her store associates during the peak seasons at the proposed Wortley Village location. She estimated that the shop would require an additional 150 hours total to assist with fittings and customers. LDS associates earned $17.50 per hour for any work performed.

The relocation was a lot of work, but Cameron saw it as a longer-term strategy for LDS. Still, she wondered if some of the upfront investments would be worth it.

Studio Catering Services Expansion

LDS had seen some success with its current studio catering services. Dance studios in London would call LDS and set up a fitting for their students. LDS employees would go directly to the studio with a wide array of dancewear, dance shoes, and accessories, all in various sizes. Dancers would be fitted for all of their dancewear needs and would then prepay for all of their items. LDS would then order the items in and deliver them directly to the studio for the dancers.

In order to entice studio owners and dancers’ parents to utilize this service, Cameron typically offered items at a discounted price, lowering her average gross margin on studio catering sales to 37 per cent. Despite the lower margins, Cameron loved this service for a number of reasons. First, it allowed each student to be custom-fitted for their dancewear by knowledgeable employees. Catering services also helped LDS manage its inventory levels because Cameron only needed one shoe or item in each size as a sample. Finally, Cameron knew that this was often the first step toward gaining new long-term, loyal customers. She frequently saw dancers come to the shop for additional items after having made a purchase through the studio catering service.

With this in mind, Cameron wondered if it might be time to expand this service outside of London and into the Oxford County region. Although there were many dance studios in the small towns surrounding London, there were not many dance stores.

If she expanded this service offering, Cameron would target studios that were located an average 60 minute-drive outside of London. Two associates would need to drive to the studio, and each associate would spend an average of 30 minutes fitting one student,[[14]](#footnote-15) and then drive back to London. After all of the dancewear had been ordered to the shop, one associate would need to drive another round trip to the studio to deliver the items. Gas and vehicle costs for each round trip were estimated at $100.

A dancer typically spent an average of $105 at a studio catering appointment, and Cameron wondered how many dancers the target studios would need to have to make this option financially feasible. Between the work it took to coordinate the studio catering service and the potential for sales cannibalization, Cameron wanted to earn at least $400 of profit per catering day.

Partner Buyout

When Cameron started working for LDS 10 years ago, she never imagined owning 50 per cent of the business, let alone owning it in its entirety. Still, the more she worked to grow LDS, the clearer it became that she and Morales had different visions for the shop’s future. Morales held great relationships with the local studio owners, but all of the aforementioned options were Cameron’s ideas, and she knew that she would be hard pressed to convince Morales to make any major strategic investment or time commitment.

Over the last few months, Cameron had committed many extra hours to improving the online platform, inventory management, and reputation of LDS. Morales had plans to sell her share in the business in the next five years; as such, she was somewhat less interested in these longer-term strategic initiatives. Cameron wondered whether it made sense to try to buy her out now, before implementing any of her other big ideas.

Cameron would need to buy out her partner for 50 per cent of LDS’s value. She believed that she could likely obtain a bank loan to help her finance the buyout. Cameron and her fiancée had big wedding plans but no major financial commitments at the moment. She had spoken to her accountant about different valuation methods but was still wondering which method was the most appropriate. She was also unsure of how the valuation would need to be adjusted, given that both she and Morales did not take a formal salary for their work.

THE DECISION

Cameron felt simultaneously excited and overwhelmed by the opportunities at hand. While she had been compiling her information, two more online sales had been processed, and she had received yet another fitting appointment request. A friend of Cameron’s had just dropped off a plant-based burger and a salad for her, and attached was a note that read, “You can’t make good decisions on an empty stomach.” Cameron smiled, grateful to be supported by her friends and family. She took a bite and contemplated her choices.

EXHIBIT 1: The London Dance Shoppe TIMELINE OF EVENTS

The London Dance Shoppe timeline of events

Note: LDS = The London Dance Shoppe.

Source: Company files.

EXHIBIT 2: The London Dance Shoppe STATEMENT OF EARNINGS For the year ending December 31 (CA$)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **2019** | **2018** |
| **Revenue** | |  |  |
|  | In-store Sales, Net | $ 188,131 | $ 183,890 |
|  | Online Sales, Net | 66,100 | 37,664 |
| **Total Net Sales** | | **$ 254,231** | **$ 221,554** |
|  | |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Less: Cost of Goods Sold | | 133,999 | 113,251 |
| **Gross Profit** | | **$ 120,232** | **$ 108,303** |
|  | |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Operating Expenses** | |  |  |
|  | Accounting and Legal | $ 1,473 | $ 2,305 |
|  | Advertising and Promotion | 1,234 | 1,465 |
|  | Courier and Postage | 1,243 | 797 |
|  | Merchant and Service Fees | 7,228 | 6,569 |
|  | Office Supplies | 2,967 | 2,333 |
|  | Meals and Entertainment | 1,545 | 2,424 |
|  | Travel and Fuel | 6,359 | 5,775 |
|  | Rent | 6,600 | 6,600 |
|  | Depreciation | 2,763 | 2,755 |
|  | Wages | 15,746 | 14,698 |
|  | Phone and Internet | 1,179 | 1,284 |
|  | Other Expenses | 755 | 199 |
| **Total Operating Expenses** | | **$ 49,092** | **$ 47,204** |
|  | |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Net Income before Tax** | | **$ 71,140** | **$ 61,099** |
|  | Income Tax | 10,671 | 9,165 |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Net Income after Tax** | | **$ 60,469** | **$ 51,934** |

Source: Company files.

EXHIBIT 3: The London Dance Shoppe STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION As at December 31 (CA$)

|  |  | **2019** | **2018** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **ASSETS** | |  |  |
| **Current Assets** | |  |  |
|  | Cash | $ 7,708 | $ 6,170 |
|  | Accounts Receivable | 1,090 | 586 |
|  | Inventory | 40,833 | 37,025 |
|  | Prepayments | 1,505 | 1,499 |
| **Total Current Assets** | | $ 51,136 | $ 45,280 |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Fixed Assets** | |  |  |
|  | Furniture and Equipment | $ 8,556 | $ 7,508 |
|  | Computer Equipment\* | 7,002 | 7,002 |
| Total Fixed Assets | | $ 15,558 | $ 14,510 |
|  | Less: Accumulated Depreciation | 9,651 | 6,888 |
| **Net Fixed Assets** | | $ 5,907 | $ 7,622 |
|  |  |  |  |
| **TOTAL ASSETS** | | **$ 57,043** | **$ 52,902** |
|  |  |  |  |
| **LIABILITIES AND EQUITY** | |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| **LIABILITIES** | |  |  |
| **Current liabilities** | |  |  |
|  | Accounts Payable | $ 17,322 | $ 14,456 |
|  | Wages Payable | 606 | 565 |
|  | Unearned Revenue† | 3,502 | 4,437 |
| **Total Current Liabilities** | | $ 21,430 | $ 19,458 |
|  |  |  |  |
| **TOTAL LIABILITIES** | | **$ 21,430** | **$ 19,458** |
|  |  |  |  |
| **EQUITY** | |  |  |
|  | Common Stock | $ 20,000 | $ 20,000 |
|  | Retained Earnings | 15,613 | 13,444 |
|  |  |  |  |
| **TOTAL EQUITY** | | **$ 35,613** | **$ 33,444** |
|  |  |  |  |
| **TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY** | | **$ 57,043** | **$ 52,902** |

\* Included computer hardware, servers, and point-of-sale systems.

† Related to gift cards purchased that had not yet been used.

Source: Company files.

EXHIBIT 4: The London Dance Shoppe SELECT FINANCIAL RATIOS

|  | | |  | **2019** | **2018** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Profitability** | | |  |  |  |
| **Revenue** | | | |  |  |
|  | In-store Sales, Net | | | 74.0% | 83.0% |
|  | Online Sales, Net | | | 26.0% | 17.0% |
| **Total Net Sales** | | | | **100.0%** | **100.0%** |
|  | | |  |  |  |
| Less: Cost of Goods Sold | | | | 52.7% | 51.1% |
| **Gross Profit** | | | | **47.3%** | **48.9%** |
|  | | |  |  |  |
| **Total Operating Expenses** | | | | **19.3%** | **18.6%** |
|  | | |  |  |  |
| **Net Income before Tax** | | | | 28.0% | 27.6% |
|  | | Income Tax | | 4.2% | 4.1% |
|  | |  | |  |  |
| **Net Income after Tax** | | | | **23.8%** | **23.4%** |
|  | | |  |  |  |
|  | | |  |
| **Liquidity** | | | |  |  |
| Current Ratio | | | | 2.39:1 | 2.33:1 |
| Quick Ratio | | | | 0.41:1 | 0.35:1 |
|  | | |  |  |  |
| **Efficiency** | | | |  |  |
| Days of Accounts Payable | | | | 46.5 days | 46.0 days |
| Days of Inventory | | | | 109.7 days | 117.7 days |
|  | | |  |  |  |
| **Stability** | | | |  |  |
| Debt to Equity | | | | 0.47 | 0.45 |
| Interest Coverage | | | | N/A | N/A |
|  | | |  |  |  |
| **Growth** | | | | **2018–2019** | |
| Revenue | | | | 15% | |
| Profit | | |  | 16% | |
| Equity | | |  | 5% | |
| Assets | | |  | 7% | |

Source: Company files.

1. Vividata (website), accessed July 11, 2020, https://vividata.ca. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. “Massive Competition in Pursuit of the $5.7 Billion Canadian Youth Sports Market,” Solutions Research Group Consultants Inc., June 16, 2014, accessed July 20, 2020, http://www.srgnet.com/2014/06/10/massive-competition-in-pursuit-of-the-5-7-billion-canadian-youth-sports-market/. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Joel Barnes, *2018 ParticipACTION Report Card on Physical Activity for Children and Youth*, June 19, 2018, accessed July 19, 2020, https://participaction.cdn.prismic.io/participaction%2F38570bed-b325-4fc8-8855-f15c9aebac12\_2018\_participatio n\_report\_card\_-\_full\_report\_0.pdf. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Global Info Research, *Global Dancewear Market 2018 by Manufacturers, Regions, Type and Application, Forecast to 2023*, Orian Research, June 15, 2018, accessed July 2, 2020, https://www.orianresearch.com/report/global-dancewear-market-2018-by-manufacturers-regions-type-and-application-forecast-to-2023/549492. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. A dance studio referred to the place where a dancer trained and took dance classes. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. All dollar amounts are in Canadian dollars. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. A ballet barre was a handrail that helped dancers balance while training. The barre was very useful during the pointe shoe fitting process. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Emma Bedford, *Back-to-School Items Most Likely to Be Purchased in Canada in 2019*,Statista, October 21, 2019, accessed accessed July 27, 2020 https://www-statista-com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/statistics/592916/popular-back-to-school-products-canada/. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Pointe & Pick (website), accessed July 2, 2020, https://pointeandpick.com. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. Dancewear Plus (website), accessed July 2, 2020, https://dancewearplus.ca. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. “2013 Winners,” Great Places in Canada, accessed July 27, 2020, http://greatplacesincanada.ca/2013-winners/. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Subletting referred to taking a rented space and renting it to a third party to help cover rental costs. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. The new items had a useful life of seven years. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Though a pointe shoe fitting took much longer than 30 minutes, not all dancers required pointe shoes, and some dancers could be fitted for items in under 10 minutes. Therefore, on average, Cameron felt that 30 minutes was an appropriate estimate. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)