

DNS Intelligence Report

cisa.gov

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DNS & Trust Posture:

SECURE

All security controls enforced including DNSSEC.

EMAIL SPOOFING

Protected

BRAND IMPERSONATION

Not Setup

DNS TAMPERING

Protected

CERTIFICATE CONTROL

Open**✓ Configured**

DMARC (email spoofing protection), DKIM (1 selector(s), 2048-bit), DNSSEC (DNS responses signed)

- Not Configured

CAA (certificate authority control), MTA-STS (email TLS policy), TLS-RPT (TLS delivery reporting), BIMI (brand logo in inboxes)

REGISTRAR ([RDAP](#)) **get.gov**

Where you pay to own domain

WEB HOSTING

Unknown

Where website is hosted

EMAIL SERVICE PROVIDER

Proofpoint

Where email is hosted (MX)

DNS HOSTING

Standard

Where DNS records are edited

🛡 Email Security

Can this domain be impersonated by email?

No

Verdict: DMARC policy is reject - spoofed messages will be blocked by receiving servers. DKIM keys verified with strong cryptography (signed by Microsoft 365 via Proofpoint gateway).

✉ SPF Record [RFC 7208](#)**Success****-all****3/10 lookups**

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 3/10 lookups

```
v=spf1 include:spf.dhs.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf-00376703.gpphosted.com ~all
```

⚠ RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked

⚠ SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 §10.1 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it ensures every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) is fully evaluated before a decision is made.

Federal compliance context: CISA BOD 18-01 requires valid SPF records for federal civilian agency domains. The directive doesn't explicitly specify -all vs ~all, but -all is widespread federal practice as defense-in-depth. This domain's use of -all follows that convention.

DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked.

SPF flattened by Proofpoint EFD (Gov) (Proofpoint)

🔒 DMARC Policy i RFC 7489

Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

```
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:DMARC@hq.dhs.gov, mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov
```

Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed

🔑 DKIM Records i RFC 6376

Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

🛡 Mail routed through **Proofpoint (security gateway) — DKIM signed by **Microsoft 365** (sending platform).** This is a standard enterprise architecture.

✓ selector1._domainkey Microsoft 365 2048-bit

```
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEAAQ8AMIIIBCgKCAQEAv32BRAJaA0sxAp31ZqQwd7RYfbYowvb3F7lq8WQEyasI6w7Gm0bxPW57TFM04fM5flf1PYyCDSa3ckQzSQLYmMx9HiXYJYF1Dpk9PnjTarbdR9mm9fc7iBXT2pTFNJw+SRMH3NRrbkefv8GqqLdJotgCl2vWoyRlfKCANCfq5Bbq4qaztXqU/cHRurG8ZVSF7ZrhY4EBKvpzAyIisrf2g2Gky+v04LTMrgZeNnA/OyHmWmv1UC58e06jBLSysYyh1904MiU5eUhuT7MYTLwz6fI0l4PaT9HkmM0rH/fgcGSYc8ajCsrvxYA8LgoWR9IzYq5vYzDWLxSo/J0c+6pVWQIDAQAB;
```

⌚ MTA-STS i RFC 8461 Warning

No MTA-STS record found

 TLS-RPT [RFC 8460](#)Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

 Email Security ManagementActively Managed

 **Intelligence:** This domain uses dedicated email security management — indicating continuous monitoring and professional oversight, not a "set and forget" configuration. Most tools ignore reporting destinations; we extract the operational security partner network directly from DNS.

Proofpoint EFD (Gov) by Proofpoint**SPF flattening**

› SPF flattening (include:spf-00376703.gpphosted.com)

SPF flattening detected: Dynamic SPF management via Proofpoint EFD (Gov) — keeps include count within the 10-lookup limit automatically.

 Brand Security

Can this brand be convincingly faked?

Partially

 **Verdict:** No brand protection controls - attackers could obtain certificates or impersonate visually.

 BIMI [BIMI Spec](#)Warning

No BIMI record found

 CAA [RFC 8659](#)Warning

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

🛡 Domain Security

Can DNS itself be tampered with? No

 **Verdict:** DNS responses are authenticated from the root downward. Delegation is verified.

🔑 DNSSEC RFC 4033 Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated - AD flag confirmed by resolver

✓ Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.

🛡 **AD Flag:** Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures

DS Record (at registrar):

```
2371 13 2 5F15E517D7A353D755D9D3F8548A3475CE88A738E62B766F5E33CFC4163AB934
```

DNS Delegation Verified

3 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers:

```
blue.foundationdns.com blue.foundationdns.net blue.foundationdns.org
```

Multi-Resolver Verification: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results

⚠ (1 difference found).

⚠ Resolver Differences:

➤ A: Quad9 returned different results: ['184.27.230.106']

This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.

🌐 Traffic & Routing Where traffic flows & how services resolve

A IPv4 Address

```
23.4.61.38
```

Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAA IPv6 Address

```
2600:1407:3c00:a83::3ff9
```

```
2600:1407:3c00:a93::3ff9
```

✓ IPv6 ready

MX Mail Servers

```
10 mx-a-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.
```

```
10 mxb-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.
```

Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRV Services

```
_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 3600 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.
```

SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints

 **Web:** Reachable (1 IPv4, 2 IPv6)  **Mail:** 2 servers  **Services:** 1 endpoint

 **Δ Changes Detected:**   Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
 Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL

Real-time propagation comparison | See exactly what public resolvers return vs. what your authoritative nameserver has. Spot propagation delays, stale cache, and DNS misconfigurations instantly.

 **Live DNS Diff**

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)

Authoritative Records (Source of truth)

A Propagating 1 / 1 records

23.4.61.38

23.64.138.233

AAAA Propagating 2 / 2 records

2600:1407:3c00:a83::3ff9

2600:1404:ec00:128b::3ff9

2600:1407:3c00:a93::3ff9

2600:1404:ec00:128c::3ff9

MX Synchronized 2 / 2 records

10 mx_a-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.

10 mx_a-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.

10 mxb-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.

10 mxb-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.

TXT Synchronized 10 / 10 records

_e01yoinuk3n6xrtnc8q3m9bdjyihdd7

MS=ms36056523

adobe-idp-site-verification=edfd88b4c2bdf65395c78b55da3580466eefa9aa874d5bcfb853692813e80515

MS=ms41452370

google-site-verification=BNRBfY90BM54Mf_pgL4Eg07IkwbGvq5nsdZC0YadDlM

MS=ms53160703

f188eb27-a746-4aa8-b160-eb68b0aab05d

_e01yoinuk3n6xrtnc8q3m9bdjyihdd7

MS=ms36056523

_tufdw17aa2wht723upz8w56htpvgkw

v=spf1 include:spf.dhs.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf-00376703.gpphosted.com -all

adobe-idp-site-verification=edfd88b4c2bdf65395c78b55da3580466eefa9aa874d5bcfb853692813e80515

google-site-verification=wsLVyeZYgv0NLikdmfm2m3XPP-986Ylo8XxUkrjI0vA

f188eb27-a746-4aa8-b160-eb68b0aab05d

MS=ms41452370

google-site-verification=BNRBfY90BM54Mf_pgL4Eg07IkwbGvq5nsdZC0YadDlM

MS=ms53160703

google-site-verification=wsLVyeZYgv0NLikdmfm2m3XPP-986Ylo8XxUkrjI0vA

_tufdw17aa2wht723upz8w56htpvgkw

v=spf1 include:spf.dhs.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf-00376703.gpphosted.com -all

NS Synchronized

3 / 3 records

blue.foundationdns.org.

blue.foundationdns.com.

blue.foundationdns.net.

blue.foundationdns.net.


blue.foundationdns.com.

blue.foundationdns.org.

SRV

1 / 0 records

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 3600 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.



Confirm Your Email Configuration



This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to [Red Sift Investigate](#). Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.



Report reflects evaluated DNS security posture at time of generation.

Made by [IT Help San Diego Inc.](#)

Need help with DNS? Call [619-853-5008](#)