


DNS Intelligence Report

cisa.gov

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DNS & Trust Posture:

SECURE

All security controls enforced including DNSSEC.

EMAIL SPOOFING

Protected

BRAND IMPERSONATION

Not Setup

DNS TAMPERING

Protected

CERTIFICATE CONTROL

Open


✔ Configured

DMARC (email spoofing protection), DKIM (1 selector(s), 2048-bit), DNSSEC (DNS responses signed)

✖ Not Configured


CAA (certificate authority control), MTA-STS (email TLS policy), TLS-RPT (TLS delivery reporting), BIMl (brand logo in inboxes)

REGISTRAR (RDAP)

 **get.gov**


Where you pay to own domain

WEB HOSTING

 **Unknown**


Where website is hosted

EMAIL SERVICE PROVIDER


 **Proofpoint**

Where email is hosted (MX)


DNS HOSTING


 **Standard** Gov Enterprise

Where DNS records are edited

 **Email Security**

Can this domain be impersonated by email? No

 **Verdict:** DMARC policy is reject - spoofed messages will be blocked by receiving servers. DKIM keys verified with strong cryptography (signed by Microsoft 365 via Proofpoint gateway).

 **SPF Record** 📘 RFC 7208

Success

-all

3/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 3/10 lookups

```
v=spf1 include:spf.dhs.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf-00376703.gpphosted.com -all
```

⚠ RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked

⚠ **SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC.** RFC 7489 §10.1 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it ensures every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) is fully evaluated before a decision is made.

Federal compliance context: CISA BOD 18-01 requires valid SPF records for federal civilian agency domains. The directive doesn't explicitly specify -all vs ~all, but -all is widespread federal practice as defense-in-depth. This domain's use of -all follows that convention.

DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked.

SPF flattened by Proofpoint EFD (Gov) (Proofpoint)

🔒 DMARC Policy [RFC 7489](#)

Success **p=reject**

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

```
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:DMARC@hq.dhs.gov, mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov
```

Alignment: **SPF relaxed** **DKIM relaxed**

🔑 DKIM Records [RFC 6376](#)

Found **2048-bit**

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

🔑 Mail routed through **Proofpoint** (security gateway) — DKIM signed by **Microsoft 365** (sending platform). This is a standard enterprise architecture.

✓ **selector1._domainkey** **Microsoft 365** **2048-bit**

```
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAA0CAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA32BRAJaA0sxAp31ZqQwd7RYfbYowvb3F7lq8WQEyasI6w7Gm0bxPW57TFM04fM5flf1PYyCDSa3ckQzSQLYmMx9HiXYJYF1Dpk9PnjTarbdR9mm9fc7iBXT2pTFNJw+SRMH3NRRbkefv8GqqLdJotgCL2vWoyRlfKCANCFq5Bbq4qaztXqU/CHRurG8ZVSF7ZrhY4EBKvpzAyIisrf2g2Gky+v04LTMrgZeNnA/0yHmWmvlUC58e06jBLSysYyh1904MiU5eUhuT7MYTLWz6fI0L4PaT9HkmM0rH/fgcGSYc8ajCsrvxYA8LgoWR9IzYq5vYzDWLxSo/J0c+6pVWQIDAQAB;
```

🔒 MTA-STS [RFC 8461](#) **Warning**

No MTA-STS record found

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

Email Security Management Actively Managed

Q Intelligence: This domain uses dedicated email security management — indicating continuous monitoring and professional oversight, not a "set and forget" configuration. Most tools ignore reporting destinations; we extract the operational security partner network directly from DNS.

Proofpoint EFD (Gov) by Proofpoint


SPF flattening

➤ SPF flattening (include:spf-00376703.gpphosted.com)

SPF flattening detected: Dynamic SPF management via Proofpoint EFD (Gov) — keeps include count within the 10-lookup limit automatically.

Brand Security

Can this brand be convincingly faked? Partially

 **Verdict:** No brand protection controls - attackers could obtain certificates or impersonate visually.

BIMI BIMI Spec Warning

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 Warning

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Domain Security

Can DNS itself be tampered with?

No

Verdict: DNS responses are authenticated from the root downward. Delegation is verified.

DNSSEC RFC 4033 **Signed** **ECDSA P-256/SHA-256**

DNSSEC fully configured and validated - AD flag confirmed by resolver

✓ **Chain of trust:** Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.

✓ **AD Flag:** **Validated** - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures

DS Record (at registrar):

2371 13 2 5F15E517D7A353D755D9D3F8548A3475CE88A738E62B766F5E33CFC4163AB934

NS Delegation **Verified**

3 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers:

blue.foundationdns.com

blue.foundationdns.net

blue.foundationdns.org

Multi-Resolver Verification: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results

⚠ (1 difference found).

⚠ Resolver Differences:

➤ A: Quad9 returned different results: ['184.27.230.106']

This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.

Traffic & Routing Where traffic flows & how services resolve

A IPv4 Address

23.4.61.38

Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAA IPv6 Address

2600:1407:3c00:a83::3ff9

2600:1407:3c00:a93::3ff9

✓ IPv6 ready

MX Mail Servers

10 mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.

10 mxb-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.

Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRV Services

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 3600 5061 sipf
ed.online.lync.com.

SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints

 **Web:** Reachable (1 IPv4, 2 IPv6)  **Mail:** 2 servers  **Services:** 1 endpoint

 **Δ Changes Detected:** A AAAA Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
 Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL

 **Live DNS Diff**

Real-time propagation comparison | See exactly what public resolvers return vs. what your authoritative nameserver has. Spot propagation delays, stale cache, and DNS misconfigurations instantly.



DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison



Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)



Authoritative Records (Source of truth)

A

🕒 Propagating

1 / 1 records

23.4.61.38

23.64.138.233

AAAA

🕒 Propagating

2 / 2 records

2600:1407:3c00:a83::3ff9

2600:1404:ec00:128b::3ff9

2600:1407:3c00:a93::3ff9

2600:1404:ec00:128c::3ff9

MX

✔ Synchronized

2 / 2 records

10 mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.

10 mxa-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.

10 mxb-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.

10 mxb-00376703.gslb.gpphosted.com.

TXT

✔ Synchronized

10 / 10 records

_e01yoinuk3n6xrtnc8q3m9bdjyihdd7

MS=ms36056523

adobe-idp-site-verification=edfd88b4c2bdf65395c78b55da3580466eefa9aa874d5bcfb853692813e80515

MS=ms41452370

google-site-verification=BNRBFY90BM54Mf_pgL4Eg07IkwbGvq5nsdZC0YadDlM

MS=ms53160703

f188eb27-a746-4aa8-b160-eb68b0aab05d
_e01yoinuk3n6xrtnc8q3m9bdjyhdd7
MS=ms36056523
_tufdw17aa2wht723upz8w56htpvpgkw
v=spf1 include:spf.dhs.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf-00376703.gpph osted.com -all
adobe-idp-site-verification=edfd88b4c2bdf65395c78b55da3580466eefa9aa874d5bcfb853692813e 80515
google-site-verification=wsLVyeZYgv0NLikdmfm2m3XPP-986Ylo8XxUkrjIOvA
f188eb27-a746-4aa8-b160-eb68b0aab05d
MS=ms41452370
google-site-verification=BNRBFy90BM54Mf_pgL4Eg07IkwbGvq5nsdZC0YadDlM
MS=ms53160703
google-site-verification=wsLVyeZYgv0NLikdmfm2m3XPP-986Ylo8XxUkrjIOvA
_tufdw17aa2wht723upz8w56htpvpgkw
v=spf1 include:spf.dhs.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf-00376703.gpph osted.com -all

NS

✔ Synchronized

3 / 3 records

blue.foundationdns.org.
blue.foundationdns.com.
blue.foundationdns.net.
blue.foundationdns.net.
blue.foundationdns.com.
blue.foundationdns.org.

SRV

1 / 0 records

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 3600 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.

Confirm Your Email Configuration



This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to

[Red Sift Investigate](#). Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.



Report reflects evaluated DNS security posture at time of generation.

Made by [IT Help San Diego Inc.](#)

Need help with DNS? Call [619-853-5008](#)