

# S-Mbank: Secure Mobile Banking Authentication Scheme Using Signcryption, Pair Based Text Authentication, and Contactless Smart Card

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**Abstract**— Nowadays, mobile banking becomes a popular tool which consumers can conduct financial transactions such as shopping, monitoring accounts balance, transferring funds and other payments. Consumers dependency on mobile needs, make people take a little bit more interest in mobile banking. The use of the one-time password which is sent to the user mobile phone by short message service (SMS) is a vulnerability which we want to solve with proposing a new scheme called S-Mbank. We replace the authentication using the one-time password with the contactless smart card to prevent attackers to use the unencrypted message which is sent to the user's mobile phone. Moreover, it deals vulnerability of spoofer to send an SMS pretending as a bank's server. The contactless smart card is proposed because of its flexibility and security which easier to bring in our wallet than the common passcode generators. The replacement of SMS-based authentication with contactless smart card removes the vulnerability of unauthorized users to act as a legitimate user to exploit the mobile banking user's account. Besides that, we use public-private key pair and PIN to provide two factors authentication and mutual authentication. We use signcryption scheme to provide the efficiency of the computation. Pair based text authentication is also proposed for the login process as a solution to shoulder-surfing attack. We use Scyther tool to analyze the security of authentication protocol in S-Mbank scheme. From the proposed scheme, we are able to provide more security protection for mobile banking service.

**Keywords**— *Secure mobile banking; Two factor authentication; Mutual authentication; Contactless smartcard; Signcryption scheme; Pair based text authentication; Mobile phone; Scyther Tools;*

## I. INTRODUCTION

Mobile phones nowadays become tools that consumers use for budgeting, shopping, banking, and payments. Based on Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System reports on March 2016, there is the huge rise in the usage of mobile banking [4]. The use of mobile banking raises many security issues. According to a survey in [4], the vast majority of participants stated financial transactions using mobile banking is not secure.

Currently, most of the online banking services are still applying the primitive system of single factor authentication based solely on the confidentiality of the user ID and PIN [2]. Passwords used on the scheme can be text-based login (textual

password) or image-based (graphical password). Text-based passwords are vulnerable to dictionary attack attempts, brute force attacks and shoulder surfing. While image-based passwords require greater resources and processing time is slower. In addition, image-based passwords are vulnerable to shoulder surfing.

Extra strength provided by banks is by generating random values (OTP) by token [3]. Authentication techniques such as single factor authentication cannot avoid direct attacks such as phishing, malware and in-the-middle/browser (MITM) [1], or a type of attack today is the synchronization token [4]. One of the vulnerabilities that arise is when customers access the E-banking services by using public internet access as in hotels, airports, cafes or eating places which unbeknown security is guaranteed. In addition to attacks using malware unwittingly steal confidential information of his customers. Moreover, the attacks on random value using the token are becoming very vulnerable to attack. The latest attacks were successfully carried out, namely the technique of phishing and malware (also called synchronization token) by pretending to ask for customer input response generated by the token to guess the value of the next generation is done [4].

Today many developing authentication methods that are able to ensure the confidentiality of customer's data. One of them is to apply the method PBTA [14] [15], mutual authentication, two-factor authentication and contactless smart card [13]. PBTA used to secure the login process from shoulder surfing attacks. Mutual authentication is to ensure entity in internet banking process [10][12][17][18]. Two-factor authentication ensures security against direct attacks such as phishing and man in the middle attack while the contactless smart card [19] to apply the principles of smart authentication that ensures authentication's speed, in addition to the contactless smart card, also provides secure storage of encrypted private key. Other method using Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [7].

Most of the proposed solution has their own advantages and disadvantages. On the other side, all of the solutions only authenticates the entities. So that, the needs of mutual authentication for both sides of the bank and the user, so the mobile banking transaction become more secure. We use signcryption scheme to make efficiency in computation than

sign-then-encrypt scheme [16][20]. Signcryption scheme combines sign and encrypts in a single process.

## II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS

Many security risks can be found on computing device especially in the mobile device has some different risk on it, below are the security risk can be found in mobile devices [19].

1. The Smaller size which causes mobile device is more susceptible to theft or loss.
2. More tendency for the user to use a device in a more personal and confidential way.
3. Unbounded limitation of processing power and battery life which causes many security risks.

According to [19], mobile device has many complexes risk related to the rapid growth of technology, i.e. the use of malware to obtain information illegally which causes privacy violations, wireless carrier infrastructure vulnerabilities, payment infrastructure threats, vulnerabilities in SMS system, hardware and operation system vulnerabilities, complexity of supply chain and new entrants of mobile ecosystem.

Nowadays, malware becomes an awesome challenge to the world of the mobile device. Based on [13], the percentage of malware which is targeted to attack mobile device rises by 155% in the past year. Spyware and Trojan in SMS ecosystem has a very high growth that is 95%.

User's privacy is now a challenging issue for the mobile device which lately more personalized and related to the user's identity than a personal computer. Legitimate applications sometimes utilized to pass user data to another application or used in an unauthorized manner is now catching more attention. Practically problems can be easily found around us, for example given that a case related to European customer's privacy which is sent to United States based advertiser. From this case, we found that several applications were accused of breaking European laws of data protection by passing the customer's privacy to United States advertising firm named MobClix without obtaining explicit permission from the users [18].

From the side of the internet, mobile devices have many risks related to the network of mobile communications. The wireless carrier is the primary interface of the mobile device, especially the radio component called cell sites. The cell sites later communicate through dedicated circuits or microwave to the Mobile Switching Center also called MSC which contains voice and data processing equipment and systems. MSC contains the gateway to the internet and another carrier networks. This part usually utilized to get customer's data.

From the risks above, we can conclude that SMS-based authentication has many risks for the second authentication. We assume that the first authentication factor which uses username and password is secure. Then, to substitute the SMS-based authentication which is used by bank's mobile banking service we propose to use a smart card to provide the second authentication method we propose to compete for the security services. Based on the SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room paper, the smart card option is categorized under the fourth

category, as random number created by an electronic device other than the e-token.

Near Field Communication is used to implement the uses of the smart card in authenticating between user and server [11]. The NFC is using the standardized protocol defined in ECMA-240: 2013 which is compliant to ISO/IEC 18092 standard for Near Field Communication Interface and Protocol 1 (NFCIP-1). NFCIP-1 using inductively coupled devices operating at the center of frequency of 13.56 Mhz for interconnection of computer peripherals for its communication modes. NFCIP-1 is specified for simple wireless communication between coupled devices with transfer rates of 106 kbps, 212 kbps, and 424 kbps.

Based on FFIEC IT Examination Handbook, there are some SMS-based authentication risks, such SMS typically transmitted unencrypted over the telecommunications networks and vulnerable to spoofing which allows an unauthorized user to send an SMS pretending to be from a different mobile number to mislead a customer into providing sensitive information to the unauthorized user. Fraudulent SMS messages may also mislead customers into revealing financial institution account information or information used to access financial systems, even the smart card also has the probability to be stolen or misplaced which may allow unauthorized access to the mobile wallet or user credentials [8].

## III. S-MBANK: OUR PROPOSED SCHEME

In this research, authentication scheme that we propose to develop mobile banking that ensures the security of customer data. We use signcryption scheme to make efficiency in computation [16][20]. S-MBank uses three additional elements to construct the scheme, which is:

- 1) PIN;
- 2) Public Key Encryption (PKE) key pairs; and
- 3) Smart card.

The key pair will be the second authentication's factor and also provides mutual authentication service [5]. The smart card is the third factor of authentication's factor and the PIN will be the fourth authentication's factor. The software will be installed on the smartphone and smart card will easily facilitate user to perform the authentication process. The user will also use Pair Based Text Authentication to enter the password login. PBTA use to prevent shoulder surfing of password [14][15]. Fig 1. Illustrates the proposed scheme. We use Fisheryates Random Number Generator to randomize the pair based text box [9]. The contactless smart card is also used in the second factor to provide the second factor of entity and data authentication to replace the one time password which is sent by SMS.




Fig. 1. The proposed Secure Mobile Banking Authentication Scheme




Fig. 2. Work flow for proposed authentication scheme

According to Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, Table I shows the notations and definitions used in S-MBank scheme.

TABLE I. NOTATION AND DEFINITION

Notation	Definition
$U$	User
$S$	Bank's Server
$P$	User's phone number
$a$	Username
$b$	Password (Pair Based Text)
$R_r$	Response nonce
$R_c$	Challenge nonce
$KV$	Private key
$KP$	Public key
$f$	Function to generate nonce

To explain the Fig. 1, detailed protocol and its explanation is showed below:

1. User enters username normally and password using Pair Based Text Authentication to prevent shoulder surfing, brute force, and dictionary attack. Server respond it with verifying the username and password by comparing it with database. If the username and password is entered correctly, it will proceed to the next step. Otherwise, it will redirect to the login page.

2. Server generates nonce namely Challenge nonce. This Challenge nonce will be combined with user's handphone number to compute Response nonce and save it in a database.

$$S : R_r = f(R_c || P).$$

3. Server signcrypting the nonce by signed hash value of nonce with the bank's private key and a half part of user's public key. Then server encrypts the nonce with the other a half part of user's public key.

$$U \leftarrow S : KP_U(KV_S(H(R_c))).$$

4. The server send the signcrypted nonce and display it to user on the mobile banking application.
5. The user places the smart card nearby smartphone and convert back the code into signcrypted nonce.

$$U : KP_U(KV_S(H(R_c))).$$

6. User unsigncrypts nonce with the private key of user and the public key of bank.

$$\begin{aligned} U : KP_S(KV_U(KP_U(KV_S(R_c)))) \\ U : KP_S(KV_S(R_c)) \\ U : R_c. \end{aligned}$$

7. User computes the combination of nonce, and user's handphone number itself using the mobile banking application to get the Response nonce.

$$U : R_r = f(R_c || P).$$

8. The user sends the "response" into the bank's server.

$$U \rightarrow S : R_r.$$

9. Server verifies Response nonce from the user, if it is identical, then the user can perform the further banking transaction. Otherwise, the authentication process terminated.

#### IV. ANALYSIS RESULTS USING SCYTHY TOOL

Scyther [6] is a tool which was released in 2006 by Casimier Joseph Franciscus Cremers. Scyther tool is formal automated protocol analysis tool in cryptography protocols using perfect cryptography assumption which assumes every of cryptographic function is perfect. Scyther allows user to compile multiple protocols in a run, which is the advantage of scyther tool than the other protocol analyzers. Adversaries cannot understand anything from encrypted messages except they know the decryption keys. This tool can be used to find the problems from how the protocol is constructed. This problem generally having a characteristic of undecidable, but practically many protocols can be proven whether it is correct or any attacks can be found. To show the vulnerabilities appear in the protocol, we provide the analysis results from the Scyther tool.

TABLE II. COMPARISON OF AVAILABILITY AND FALSIFICATION PROVIDED BY AUTOMATIC VERIFICATION TOOLS

Verification tool	Public availability	Falsification
NRL	Not available	No
Athena	Not available	Yes
LySatool	Available	No
Constraint solver	Available	Yes
OFMC	Available	Yes
Scyther	Available	Yes

TABLE III. COMPARISON OF VERIFICATION METHOD AND TERMINATION PROVIDED BY AUTOMATIC VERIFICATION TOOLS

Verification tool	Verification method provided	Termination
NRL	Unbounded	Yes
Athena	Bounded and Unbounded	Yes and No
LySatool	Unbounded	Yes
Constraint solver	Bounded	Yes
OFMC	Bounded	Yes
Scyther	Bounded and Unbounded	Yes

Table II and Table III show that every automatic verification tools have their own characteristics. Most of the verification tool is easy to get publicly, such as LySatool, Constraint solver, OFMC, and Scyther. Because of the newness of Scyther, it is desirable to choose Scyther as the verification tool used to analyze a protocol. Scyther also has its own advantage which provides falsification on the protocol, bounded and unbounded verification method, and termination. The availability of falsification service means that the tool can find attacks which can be useful to understands or repairs a protocol. Falsification also shows the nature of the problem relies on the protocol. Scyther provides bounded verification method means that Scyther typically does a model-checking based approach into the protocol. On the other sides, unbounded verification method means that Scyther provides a service that we can establish our own properties hold within the security of the protocol. Termination availability indicates whether the verification process of the automatic verification tool is guaranteed to terminate properly. We depicted Scyther's source code that contain of two roles as follows.

```

protocol SEMBank-Authentication (A, Server)
{role A {
  fresh PW: Ticket;
  fresh P: Ticket;
  fresh Nr: Nonce;
  fresh Nr1: Nonce;
  var Nr3: Nonce;
  var Nr2: Nonce;
  fresh kpc: SessionKey;
  send_1 (A, Server, W, Z);
  recv_2 (Server, A, X, Nr3);
  send_3 (A, Server, AuthU);
  claim_i1 (A, Secret, PW);
  claim_i2 (A, Secret, Nr);
  claim_i3 (A, Secret, Nr1);
  claim_i4 (A, Secret, Nr2);
  claim_i5 (A, Secret, Nr3);
  claim_i6 (A, SKR, kpc);

```

```

  claim_i7 (A, Nisynch);
  claim_i8 (A, Niagree);
}
role Server
{
  fresh P: Ticket;
  fresh Nr1: Nonce;
  fresh Nr3: Nonce;
  fresh Nr2: Nonce;
  var Nr: Nonce;
  var PW: Ticket;
  var kpc: SessionKey;
  recv_1 (A, Server, W, Z);
  send_2 (Server, A, X, Nr3);
  recv_3 (A, Server, AuthU);
  claim_i1 (Server, Secret, PW);
  claim_i2 (Server, Secret, Nr);
  claim_i3 (Server, Secret, Nr1);
  claim_i4 (Server, Secret, Nr2);
  claim_i5 (Server, Secret, Nr3);
  claim_i6 (Server, SKR, kpc);
  claim_i7 (Server, Nisynch);
  claim_i8 (Server, Niagree);
}
}

```

Claim	Status	Comments
SEMBank_Authentication, i1	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
SEMBank_Authentication, i2	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
SEMBank_Authentication, i3	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
SEMBank_Authentication, i4	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
SEMBank_Authentication, i5	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
SEMBank_Authentication, i6	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
SEMBank_Authentication, i7	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
SEMBank_Authentication, i8	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
Server, SEMBank_Authentication, Server1	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
Server, SEMBank_Authentication, Server2	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
Server, SEMBank_Authentication, Server3	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
Server, SEMBank_Authentication, Server4	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
Server, SEMBank_Authentication, Server5	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
Server, SEMBank_Authentication, Server6	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
Server, SEMBank_Authentication, Server7	Ok	No attacks within bounds.
Server, SEMBank_Authentication, Server8	Ok	No attacks within bounds.

Fig. 3. Scyther Verification Result

In Fig. 3 verification result of our protocol using Scyther is displayed. Based on above analysis our proposed scheme has no vulnerability within bounds. It means that our proposed scheme has no possibility of attacks defined by Scyther tools.

## V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

The design of secure mobile banking scheme we proposed is applying the pair based text authentication method to input the password which the users input onto the login page which has the goal to improve the protection of the vulnerability in shoulder-surfing attack usually done in mobile devices from

people around us. This scheme uses Fisheryates Random Number Generator algorithm and replaces one-time password with the contactless smart card to provide the data and entity authentication and also because of the prospect of the near field communication technology in the future. This replacement is stimulated by the messages sent by SMS is transmitted unencrypted or in plain text, so that very vulnerable to the attack of unauthorized people. We use ECSCS1 because of its advantage in implementation which has 58% lower in the average time of computation. It also has a better memory size usage which is 70% lower than the sign-then-encrypt scheme in the discrete logarithm problems. Compared with the usage of sign-then-encrypt scheme with the RSA algorithm system, the signcryption scheme needs 50% lower computation's time in average and 91% lower in message space. From the automated analysis using Scyther, the protocol has no vulnerability yet.

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