Milestone 5

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1 Overview of Paper

My replication paper will be looking at Michael Barber and Jeremy C. Pope's paper, "Does Party Trump Ideologu? Disentangling Party and Ideology in America" which was published in the American Political Science Review in 2018. The paper tests whether citizens truly use their policy views to choose a partisan affiliation and if they see partisanship as more of a social identity. The paper asks: "how sincerely held are expressed political and policy opinions and are these opinions based on ideological convictions, or group loyalty?." The authors use Trump's unusual presidency to answer these questions. Since President Trump is both the leader of the GOP as well as a president that endorses both liberal and conservative views, the authors test the effect of Trump's political stances on voters' political stances.

The authors' main hypothesis asserts that the influence of President Trump will demonstrate the existence of a large bloc of party loyalists in the electorate when his influence moves opinion in either a liberal or conservative direction based on his political cue. Those who are most likely to be party loyalists have a lack of knowledge about the party's traditional views and a lack of self-proclaimed "symbolic ideological commitment." Their null hypothesis is that Trump's cue haas no effect on subgroups. They have four specific hypotheses that fall under their main hypothesis: **Knowledge Hypothesis-** Only the unknowledgeable should react to the cue and behave as party loyalists presumably because the knowledgeable gain little from the treatment (political cue). **Partisan Hypothesis-** Strong paarty affiliates that share party with the cue-giver are more likely to be party loyalists. **Approval Hypothesis-** Those who approve of the cue-giver should be more likely to be party loyalists. **Symbolic Ideology Hypothesis-** Self-described conservatives should hold firm to their presumed beliefs and are less likely to be party loyalists because they stick with their self-described policy tenets.

These hypotheses are tested by running a variety of regressions on data collected from surveys. Subjects were split into two groups, control and treatment, and asked about 10 political issues with clear partisan positions.

¹1, Barber and Pope

The authors chose questions that capture policy issues in which Trump has taken either a conservative stance or a liberal stance. The control group was asked if they agree with a policy. The treatment group was asked if they agree with a policy afte being prompted that Trump endorses this policy. Using this data, the authors ran regressions that explained subjects' support of policies using their partisanship, approval of the president, political knowledge, and symbolic ideology. The authors conclude that all of their hypotheses hold true except the sumbolic ideology hypothesis. They found that people who most strongly described themselves as conservative most strongly answered the Trump cues (both liberal and conservative).

All analysis for this paper is avilable at my Github profile and the original data is available on Dataverse.²

2 Figure

The original figure in the paper:

	Knowledge	Party strength	Trump approval	Ideology
Liberal treat × knowledge	-0.01* (0.005)			
Conservative treat \times knowledge	0.02** (0.006)			
Liberal treat \times party strength	, ,	0.03* (0.01)		
Conservative treat \times party strength		-0.07** (0.02)		
Liberal treat \times Trump approval		, ,	0.04** (0.01)	
Conservative treat \times Trump approval			_0.03** (0.01)	
Liberal treat \times ideology			, ,	0.03** (0.01)
Conservative treat \times ideology				-0.03 [*] * (0.01)
Liberal treatment	0.13** (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02** (0.03)
Conservative treatment	-0.12** (0.03)	0.12** (0.04)	0.04 (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)
Knowledge	-0.03** (0.003)	-0.05** (0.003)	-0.03** (0.002)	-0.03 [*] * (0.002)
Trump Approval	-0.08** (0.004)	-0.07** (0.01)	-0.08** (0.005)	-0.07** (0.004)
Ideology	-0.09** (0.01)	-0.11** (0.01)	-0.09** (0.01)	-0.09** (0.01)
Republican	-0.13** (0.01)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.13** (0.01)	-0.13 [*] * (0.01)
Party strength	`0.04 [*] * (0.004)	`0.05 [*] * (0.01)	`0.04** (0.004)	`0.04 [*] * (0.01)
White	0.04** (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
N	7,173	3,867	7,173	7,173

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression model, with standard errors in parentheses. In each model the dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent indicated supporting the liberal policy option and 0 if they supported the conservative policy option. In Model 2 we are testing the strength of Republican partisanship, so we exclude those who identify with the Democratic Party. Significance codes: $^*p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

My stargazer figure:

 $^{^2} https://github.com/carine-h/milestone_5, \ https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/38BFML$


% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Marek Hlavac, Harvard University. E-mail: hlavac at fas.harvard.edu % Date and time: Sun, Mar 29, 2020 - 19:48:27

Table 1: Interaction Models, Including Control Variables


	Dependent variable:						
	Support Knowledg&Party StrengthTrump ApprovalIdeology						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Liberal Treatment	0.130*** (0.028)	$0.055 \\ (0.038)$	-0.038^* (0.023)	-0.018 (0.033)			
Knowledge	-0.029^{***} (0.003)	-0.049^{***} (0.003)	-0.028^{***} (0.002)	-0.028^{***} (0.002)			
Conservative Treatment	-0.116^{***} (0.030)	0.125*** (0.042)	0.041* (0.022)	0.070** (0.032)			
Trump Approval	-0.075^{***} (0.004)	, ,	-0.078*** (0.005)	-0.075*** (0.004)			
Ideology	-0.087^{***} (0.005)	-0.111*** (0.009)	-0.087*** (0.005)	-0.088*** (0.006)			
Republican	-0.128^{***} (0.015)	,	-0.132*** (0.015)	-0.129*** (0.015)			
Party Strength	0.035*** (0.004)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.036*** (0.004)	0.035*** (0.004)			
White	0.042*** (0.011)	0.026 (0.020)	0.044*** (0.011)	0.042*** (0.011)			
Liberal treat * Knowledge	-0.011^{**} (0.005)						
Conservative treat * Knowledge	0.019*** (0.006)						
Liberal treat * Party Strength		0.028** (0.014)					
Conservative treat * Party Strengtl	h	-0.066^{***} (0.015)					
Liberal treat * Trump Approval			0.041*** (0.007)				
Conservative treat * Trump Approx	val		-0.026^{***} (0.007)				
Liberal treat * Ideology				0.031*** (0.010)			
Conservative treat * Ideology				-0.033^{***} (0.010)			
Constant	1.183*** (0.026)	1.282*** (0.037)	1.183*** (0.026)	1.182*** (0.027)			

Graphic 3






Cue Effects on Democrats



Increased Probability of Voting for Liberal Policy ${}^6\!\!$





In these three plots, I demonstrate the effect of different political cues on different political groups in the study. In the paper, there is a graphic with this data however it combines nine models in one plot, making it quite difficult to decipher. I decided to split this plot up into three: one for each political group. Each graph looks at the increased probability of voting for liberal policies after receiving a conservative or liberal cue from President Trump as well as a conservative cue from GOP congressional leaders.

The first graph looks at the impact of these cues on Republicans' political tendencies. The plot shows that Republicans side more conservatively when they receive a conservative cue from Trump and side more liberally when they receive a liberal cue from Trump. There is a negligible effect from GOP congressional cues.

The second graph looks at the impact of the cues on Democrats' political tendencies. It shows that when presented with a conservative cue from Trump, Democrats are less likely to vote liberally. When presented with a liberal cue, Democrats' political tendencies do not change. The same is true with a GOP congressional cue.

The third graph looks at the impact of cues on Indepdents' political tendencies. In terms of magnitude change in probability of voting liberally, Independents show the least impact from all three cues. The conservative and liberal cues from Trump cause Independents to be more likely to vote liberally. The GOP congressional cue cause Independents to be slightly less likely to vote liberally.

4 Citations

Here is an in text citation for the paper I am replicating as well as its Dataverse data: Michael Barber (2018a) and Michael Barber (2018b). Here is an in text citation for the stargazer package I use: Hlavac (2018). I used this paper for supplementary information: Gary King (2000). Finally, I use many techniques from our textbook: Andrew Gelma (2019).

Bibliography

Andrew Gelma, Aki Vehtai, Jennifer Hill. 2019. Regression and Other Stories.

Gary King, Jason Wittenberg, Michael Tomz. 2000. Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2669316.pdf.

Hlavac, Marek. 2018. Well-Formatted Regression and Summary Statistics Tables. https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/stargazer/stargazer.pdf.

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