

Carl Cortez
CIS 628
Chapter 2
Lab 3

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Lab 3 work

2.1

Normally $Y_i = e_{s_i}(X_i) \equiv X_i + S_i \pmod{2}$
 $X_i = d_{s_i}(Y_i) \equiv Y_i - S_i \pmod{2}$

Now w/ alphabet

• encrypt $Y_i = X_i + S_i \pmod{26}$

• decrypt $X_i = Y_i - S_i \pmod{26}$

* Using 26 for # of letters in alphabet.

2) Decrypt ¹⁷bsaspp ¹⁵KLKuospp w/ key
¹⁷trsidpy ¹⁵dKawoa

$$X_0 = 1 - 17 \pmod{26}$$


$$X_0 = -16 \pmod{26}$$

$$X_0 = 10$$

$$X_0 = K$$

See excel sheet for rest.

A	B	C	D	E
yi	ki	modded	Letter	
1	17	10	K	
18	18	0	A	
0	8	18	S	
18	3	15	P	
15	15	0	A	
15	24	17	R	
10	3	7	H	
10	10	0	A	
20	0	20	U	
14	22	18	S	
18	14	4	E	
15	0	15	P	
		0		
		0		

 Carl C.
 10:55 AM
 Blooper???

[Excel sheet for work on task 2](#)

Assuming there is a blooper, the decrypted message should be Kaspar Hauser.

Task 3) Kaspar was murdered by a stab to his left breast. What a shame!

2.2

The first thing that would worry me about this key is how data can be recovered if the disc is scratched or melted. Also with theft, it would be a shame if the CD fell into the wrong hands. From the definition, the key stream *should* only be known by the legitimate communicating parties. If a robbery occurred and the CD went missing, this could throw the communication line off. A possibility from this robbery is that the key gets copied.

For the life cycle of the key, if CDs become obsolete, it may be a challenge to read the CD. We're already seeing DVDs and physical copies of data dwindle down in production. Assuming our recipient is trustworthy, we should hope that they also destroy the CD in a timely fashion. Continuing to make sure that none of the data has slipped through or been leaked to another location.

In case there is a program that can revive one time keys, the CD should be stored indefinitely by the sender and recipient. Since using this CD once will jeopardize

the key, we shouldn't reuse the key to encrypt other data; one and done. Our sizing of the cipher and plaintext should match the capacity of the CD-ROM; exactly 1 GByte.

2.3

Since we have a short key of 128 bit, we will see some repetition of our key. By noticing patterns in the decrypted text being reused, we may be able to link back to what the original key is.


2.4

Given that we have a short message of 40 bit, the plaintext and key can potentially be a 40 bit as well. With brute force, we may get some type of success but won't know if our answer is truly the correct original plaintext. From the demonstration/proof in class on OTPs, it seems as if there is no clue or hint to harp on to ensure our success of hacking the message.

P. 159-160 PDF


Step 3 Parts A-B

I've gone to the website and clicked the lock all while on Google Chrome. I see that citibank.com reverts us to citi.com.




C

Taking a gander at the certificate information found under the details tab. This version of Chrome seems more updated than the textbook imagined. If this is not the correct details tab to show, please reach out and I can correct it.



D.E. and F

I've gotten out of the certificate window, clicked the customize and control button, and am clicking settings.



G

Finding security and heading to the Advanced section.

Security
Safe Browsing (protection from dangerous sites) and other security settings

Advanced

Always use secure connections
Upgrade navigations to HTTPS and warn you before loading sites that don't support it

Use secure DNS
Determines how to connect to websites over a secure connection

☒
With your current service provider
Secure DNS may not be available all the time

☐
With

Custom

H


Scrolling down in Advanced and clicking Certificates managed by Chrome, I'm able to see Chrome's trusted root certificate store.

Version: 8	
SHA 256 Hash	Subject
55926084ec963a64b96e2abe01ce0ba86a64fbfebcc7aab5afc155b37fd76066	CN=Actalis Authentication Root CA,O=Actalis S.p.A./03358520967,L=N
18ce6cfe7bf14e60b2e347b8dfe868cb31d02ebb3ada271569f50343b46db3a4	CN=Amazon Root CA 3,O=Amazon,C=US
1ba5b2aa8c65401a82960118f80bec4f62304d83cec4713a19c39c011ea46db4	CN=Amazon Root CA 2,O=Amazon,C=US
568d6905a2c88708a4b3025190edcfedb1974a606a13c6e5290fcb2ae63edab5	CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2,O=Starfield Tech Inc.,L=Scottsdale,ST=Arizona,C=US
8ecde6884f3d87b1125ba31ac3fcb13d7016de7f57cc904fe1cb97c6ae98196e	CN=Amazon Root CA 1,O=Amazon,C=US
e35d28419ed02025cfa69038cd623962458da5c695fbdea3c22b0bfb25897092	CN=Amazon Root CA 4,O=Amazon,C=US
5c58468d55f58e497e743982d2b50010b6d165374acf83a7d4a32db768c4408e	CN=Certum Trusted Network CA,OU=Certum Certification Authority,C Technologies S.A.,C=PL
b676f2eddae8775cd36cb0f63cd1d4603961f49e6265ba013a2f0307b6d0b804	CN=Certum Trusted Network CA 2,OU=Certum Certification Authority Technologies S.A.,C=PL
f356bea244b7a91eb35d53ca9ad7864ace018e2d35d5f8f96ddf68a6f41aa474	CN=Atos TrustedRoot 2011.O=Atos,C=DE

Step 4

Task A-B

Back at it again on citi.com via Mozilla and clicking the lock. Continuing to click Connection Secure.



Task C-F

Finding the information about the certificate, CA, and CA's root.

Certificate

www.citi.com	DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA	DigiCer
<hr/>		
Subject Name		
Business Category	Private Organization	
Inc. Country	US	
Inc. State/Province	Delaware	
Serial Number	2154254	
Country	US	
State/Province	New York	
Locality	New York	
Organization	Citigroup Inc.	
Common Name	www.citi.com	
<hr/>		
Issuer Name		
Country	US	
Organization	DigiCert Inc	
Organizational Unit	www.digicert.com	
Common Name	DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA	

Certificate


www.citi.c...	DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA	DigiC
<hr/>		
Subject Name		
Country	US	
Organization	DigiCert Inc	
Organizational Unit	www.digicert.com	
Common Name	DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA	
<hr/>		
Issuer Name		
Country	US	
Organization	DigiCert Inc	
Organizational Unit	www.digicert.com	
Common Name	DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA	
<hr/>		
Validity		
Not Before	Tue, 22 Oct 2013 12:00:00 GMT	
Not After	Sun. 22 Oct 2028 12:00:00 GMT	

ate

ti.c...	DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA	DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA
<hr/>		
Subject Name		
Country	US	
Organization	DigiCert Inc	
Organizational Unit	www.digicert.com	
Common Name	DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA	
<hr/>		
Issuer Name		
Country	US	
Organization	DigiCert Inc	
Organizational Unit	www.digicert.com	
Common Name	DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA	
<hr/>		
Validity		
Not Before	Fri, 10 Nov 2006 00:00:00 GMT	
Not After	Mon, 10 Nov 2031 00:00:00 GMT	


Task G-H

Clicking the three horizontal lines, Preferences, and soon navigating to Privacy and Security.



Task I-K

Clicked privacy and security, view certificates, and looked over Firefox's trusted root certificate store. Since I had to download Firefox for this task, I didn't have anything under the first four tabs; just the Authorities tab.



Certificate Manager

X

Your Certificates

Authentication Decisions

People

Servers

Authorities

You have certificates on file that identify these certificate authorities

Certificate Name	Security Device
AC Camerfirma S.A.	
Chambers of Commerce Root - 2008	Builtin Object Token
Global Chambersign Root - 2008	Builtin Object Token
AC Camerfirma SA CIF A82743287	
Camerfirma Chambers of Commerce R...	Builtin Object Token
ACCV	
ACCV	Builtin Object Token

View...

Edit Trust...

Import...

Export...

Delete or Distrust...

OK