Transformation-Induced Bias

Unbiased Coefficients Do Not Imply Unbiased Quantities of Interest*

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Abstract

Political scientists commonly focus on quantities of interest computed from model coefficients rather than on the coefficients themselves. However, the quantities of interest, such as predicted probabilities, first differences, and marginal effects, do not inherit the small sample properties of the coefficient estimates. Indeed, unbiased coefficients estimates are neither necessary nor sufficient for unbiased estimates of the quantities of interest. I characterize this transformation-induced bias, calculate an approximation, illustrate its importance with a hypothetical example, and discuss its importance to methodological research.

Political scientists use a wide range of statistical models $y_i \sim f(\theta_i)$, where $i \in \{1,...,N\}$ and f represents a probability distribution. The parameter θ is connected to a design matrix X of k explanatory variables and a column of ones by a link function g, so that $g(\theta_i) = X_i \beta$. The researcher usually estimates β with maximum likelihood (ML), and, depending on the choice of g and f, these estimates might have desirable small sample properties. ML does not produce unbiased estimates in general, though. For this reason, methodologists frequently use Monte Carlo simulations to assess small sample properties of estimators and provide users with rules of thumb about appropriate sample sizes.

Although methodologists tend to focus on estimating the model coefficients, substantive researchers tend to focus on "quantities of interest"– $transformations \tau$ of the model coefficients (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). Examples include marginal effects, first and second differences, predicted probabilities and expected values, and risk ratios. Fortunately, the invariance principle allows one to calculate estimates of the quantities of interest from the

^{*}All computer code necessary for replication is available at github.com/carlislerainey/transformation-induced-bias.

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coefficient estimates. The invariance principle states that if $\hat{\theta}$ is the ML estimate of θ , then for any function τ , the ML estimate of $\tau(\beta)$ is $\tau(\hat{\theta})$ (King 1998, pp. 75-76, and Casella and Berger 2002, pp. 320-321). Of course, if $\hat{\theta}$ is a consistent estimator of θ , then $\tau(\theta)$ is a consistent estimator $\tau(\hat{\theta})$. But the invariance principle raises an important question: Does $\tau(\hat{\theta})$ necessarily inherit desirable small sample properties of $\hat{\theta}$, such as unbiasedness? The answer is no. The estimates of the quantities of interest do not inherit the small sample properties of the coefficient estimates.

This subtle, but crucial point reveals a disconnect between the work done by methodologists, which tends to focus on coefficients, and the work done by substantive scholars, which tends to focus on transformations of the coefficients. Much (though certainly not all) methodological research implicitly suggests that an approximately unbiased coefficient estimate is necessary and/or sufficient for an approximately unbiased estimate of the quantity of interest. Classically, Nagler (1994) uses Monte Carlo simulations to assess the small sample properties of the scobit model coefficients but focuses on marginal effects and predicted probabilities in his illustrative application. Recently, Nieman (2015) uses simulations to assess the small sample properties of the coefficients in his strategic probit with partial observability, but focuses his illustrative application on predicted probability of civil war. In order to provide more compelling tools for substantive scholars, we must extend our focus beyond coefficients to the quantities that substantive researchers typically care about.

The Concepts

As a motivating example, consider the log-linear model

$$log(income_i) = \beta_{cons} + \beta_{edu} education_i + \epsilon_i$$

where $e_i \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$, education is measured in years, and income is measured in thousands of dollars. Assuming that we use the correct model, then least squares (the ML estimator) provides the best unbiased estimator of the coefficients β_{cons} and β_{edu} . However, we are not interested in log(income) directly. Instead, we are interested in income itself, in particular, the median income among those with 20 years of education med(income|education = 20) = $e^{\beta_{cons}+20\beta_{edu}}$. One might guess that unbiased estimates of β_{cons} and β_{edu} lead to unbiased estimates of med(income|education = 20), but that is not the case. If we suppose that N=10, $\beta_{cons}=2.5$, $\beta_{edu}=0.1$, $\sigma^2=1$, and education takes on integers roughly uniformly from 10 to 20, then $\tau(\beta_{cons},\beta_{edu})=e^{\beta_{cons}+20\beta_{edu}}\approx\$90k$. To calculate the bias in the estimate of the quantity of interest, though, I simulate 100,000 data sets. For each data set, I estimate the model coefficients and use the coefficient estimates to calculate the quantity of interest. Although $\hat{\beta}_{cons}$ and $\hat{\beta}_{edu}$ are unbiased, the estimate of med(income|education = 20) is strongly biased upward, with an expected value of about \$106k. But how does this simple transformation of unbiased estimates of the coefficients induce such a large bias in the estimate of the quantity of interest?

coefficient bias =
$$E(\hat{\beta}) - \beta$$
.

We usually think about bias as occurring in the model coefficients β , so that

But substantive researchers care mostly about bias in the quantities of interest, which I refer to as τ -bias, so that

$$\tau$$
-bias = $\mathbb{E}[\tau(\hat{\beta})] - \tau(\beta)$.

au-bias is more complex and subtle than biases in the coefficients. It can be rewritten and decomposed into two components: transformation-induced au-bias and coefficient-induced au-bias, so that

$$total \tau\text{-bias} = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[\tau(\hat{\beta})] - \tau[\mathbb{E}(\hat{\beta})]}_{\text{transformation-induced}} + \underbrace{\tau[\mathbb{E}(\hat{\beta})] - \tau(\beta)}_{\text{coefficient-induced}}.$$

Any coefficient bias passes through to the quantities of interest in the sense that, if the coefficient estimates are biased, then the transformation of the true coefficient is not equal to the transformation of the average coefficient estimate, so that

coefficient-induced
$$\tau$$
-bias = $\tau[E(\hat{\beta})] - \tau(\beta)$.

But the transformation itself introduces bias as well, so that

transformation-induced
$$\tau$$
-bias = $E[\tau(\hat{\beta})] - \tau[E(\hat{\beta})]$.

The bias occurs because, in general, $h[E(X)] \neq E[h(X)]$ for an arbitrary random variable X and function h.

Little methodology research explicitly recognizes this transformation-induced τ -bias and less fully appreciates its importance. Below I offer a general characterization using Jensen's inequality, and approximation to its magnitude, an example that illustrates its significance, and a discussion of its importance to methodological research.

A Characterization

For strictly convex and strictly concave transformations, Jensen's inequality enables a straightforward characterization of the direction of the transformation-induced τ -bias. This characterization also provides the key intuition for more complicated transformations as well as an approximation of the magnitude of the bias.

Theorem 1 Suppose a generic (non-degenerate) ML estimator $\hat{\beta}$. Then any strictly convex (concave) τ creates upward (downward) transformation-induced τ -bias.

Proof The proof follows directly from Jensen's inequality. Suppose that the non-degenerate sampling distribution of $\hat{\beta}$ is given by $S_{\beta}(b)$ so that $\hat{\beta} \sim S_{\beta}(b)$. Then $E(\hat{\beta}) = \int_{\mathbb{R}} bS_{\beta}(b)db$

and $E[\tau(\hat{\beta})] = \int_{B} \tau(b)S_{\beta}(b)db$. Suppose first that τ is convex. By Jensen's inequality, $\int_{B} \tau(b)S_{\beta}(b)db > \tau \left[\int_{B} bS_{\beta}(b)db\right]$, which implies that $E[\tau(\hat{\beta})] > \tau[E(\hat{\beta})]$. Because $E[\tau(\hat{\beta})] - \tau[E(\hat{\beta})] > 0$, the transformation-induced τ -bias is upward. By similar argument, one can show that for any strictly *concave* τ , $E[\tau(\hat{\beta})] - \tau[E(\hat{\beta})] > 0$ and that the transformation-induced τ -bias is downward.

In general, researchers do not restrict themselves to a strictly convex or strictly concave τ . For example, typical transformations of logistic regression coefficients, such as predicted probabilities, first and second differences, marginal effects, and risk ratios, all have both convex regions and concave regions. This situation is much more difficult to characterize generically, given that $\tau(b)$ might contain a mixture of strictly convex and strictly concave regions. Making matters even more difficult, at any particular point b, the multivariate function τ might be convex in one direction and concave in another. In general though, the direction of the bias depends on the *location* of the sampling distribution. If most of the sampling distribution is located in a "mostly concave" region, then the bias will be upward.

An Approximation

Next, I approximate the magnitude of the transformation-induced τ -bias using a second-order Taylor expansion. First, notice that $\mathrm{E}[\tau(\hat{\beta})] = \mathrm{E}[\tau(\mathrm{E}[\hat{\beta}] + (\hat{\beta} - \mathrm{E}[\hat{\beta}]))]$. Now approximate the term inside the right-hand expectation with a second order Taylor expansion, so that

$$E[\tau(\hat{\beta})] \approx E\left[\tau[E(\hat{\beta})] + \sum_{r=1}^{k+1} \frac{\partial \tau[E(\hat{\beta})]}{\partial \beta_r} [\hat{\beta}_r - E(\hat{\beta}_r)] + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{r=1}^{k+1} \sum_{s=1}^{k+1} \frac{\partial^2 \tau[E(\hat{\beta})]}{\partial \beta_r \beta_s} [\hat{\beta}_r - E(\hat{\beta}_r)] [\hat{\beta}_s - E(\hat{\beta}_s)]\right]$$

Taking the expectation of the right-hand side eliminates the middle term and allows expressing the final term as a function of the variance of the sampling distribution, so that

$$E[\tau(\hat{\beta})] \approx \tau[E(\hat{\beta})] + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{r=1}^{k+1} \sum_{s=1}^{k+1} H_{rs} \Sigma_{rs},$$

where H represents the Hessian matrix of second derivatives of τ at the point $E(\hat{\beta})$ and, conveniently, Σ represents the covariance matrix of the sampling distribution. Rearranging gives an approximation to the magnitude of the transformation-induced τ -bias, so that

transformation-induced
$$\tau$$
-bias = $\mathbb{E}[\tau(\hat{\beta})] - \tau[\mathbb{E}(\hat{\beta})] \approx \frac{1}{2} \sum_{r=1}^{k+1} \sum_{s=1}^{k+1} H_{rs} \Sigma_{rs}$.

If H is constant then the approximation is exact. If $\hat{\beta}$ is unbiased, then $\tau[E(\hat{\beta})]$ can be replaced with $\tau(\beta)$, so that Equation ?? represents both transformation-induced and the total τ -bias.

Equation 1 does not depend on a strictly convex or concave transformation. The approximation is reasonable if $H(\beta)$ resembles the curvature of τ over most of the sampling distribution. As long as τ is not highly non-linear (e.g., $\left|\frac{\partial^3 \tau}{\partial \beta_r \partial \beta_s \partial \beta_t}\right| >> 0$), then Equation 1 provides a reasonable estimate of the direction and magnitude of the bias.

Equation 1 quantifies two intuitions. First, the amount of bias depends on the standard error and/or sample size. As the sample size grows large, Σ shrinks to zero, which drives the bias to zero as well. This matches the previous observation that $\tau(\hat{\beta})$ is a consistent estimator of $\tau(\beta)$. Secondly, the amount of bias depends on the curvature in τ . If τ is nearly linear so that $H \approx 0$, then the transformation introduces minimal bias. On the other hand, more curvature, so that H >> 0, leads to greater bias.

An Example

Many substantive researchers realize that logistic regression estimates are biased away from zero in small samples and use "rules of thumb" to judge whether asymptotic properties, such as asymptotic unbiasedness, apply to a finite sample. When non-events outnumber events, one rule of thumb requires ten events per explanatory variable (Peduzzi et al. 1996). In this example, I illustrate the importance of accounting for transformation-induced bias in Monte Carlo studies. I show that the sample size required for approximately unbiased estimates of marginal effects can be much larger than the sample sizes required for approximately unbiased coefficient estimates.

For simplicity, I focus on the model $\Pr(y) = \operatorname{logit}^{-1}(\beta_{cons} + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \beta_3 x_3 + \beta_4 x_4 \beta_5 x_5 + \beta_6 x_6)$, where y indicates whether or not observation i equals and the x_j represented fixed explanatory variables that I create by simulating from independent, standard normal distributions. For this simulation, I set $\beta_{cons} = -1$ and $\beta_j = 0.15$ for $j \in \{1, ..., 6\}$. I assume that "approximately unbiased" means a bias of less than three percent, where

percent bias =
$$100 \times \frac{E[\tau(\hat{\beta})] - \tau(\beta)}{\tau(\beta)}$$
. (1)

I vary number of observations N from 100 to 2,500. For each sample size, I simulate 100,000 data sets, use each data set to estimate the coefficients, and use the estimated coefficients to calculate the marginal effects. I use these 100,000 estimates to calculate the percent bias by Equation 1.

Figure 1 plots the bias in the coefficients as the sample size increases. The left panel plots the bias in $\hat{\beta}_{cons}$ and the right panel plots and $\hat{\beta}_1$. With N=100, the $\hat{\beta}_{cons}$ and $\hat{\beta}_1$ are biased away from zero by about ten percent. However, this bias drops to about three percent for N=250 and nearly disappears for N=2,500. This suggests that as long as events are relatively common (i.e., more than 20% and less than 80%, see King and Zeng 2001 for a discussion of

rare events data), logistic regression coefficients are nearly unbiased for sample sizes typically encountered in political science.

Figure ?? plots the bias in the estimates of the marginal effects as the sample size increases. The left panel plots the total bias, the middle panel plots the coefficient-induced bias, and the right panel plots the transformation-induced bias. Since the marginal effect of x_1 varies with x_1 itself, I plot the estimates for a range of values of x_1 .

Two features stand out. First, small sample bias is much larger for the marginal effects than for the coefficients. For N=100, the estimate of the marginal effect is biased by about 75% when x=-3, 50% when x=-2 and 25% when x=-1. Second, the small sample bias in the estimates of the marginal effects descends to zero more slowly than the coefficient estimates. While the coefficient estimates were approximately unbiased for about N=250, the estimates of the marginal effects retain substantial bias for this same sample size. Indeed, the bias in the estimates of the marginal effects drops below the 3% threshold at about N=2, 500–more than ten times the rule of thumb that works well for the coefficients.




Figure 1: This figure shows the percent bias for the intercept and coefficient. The rule of thumb requiring ten events per explanatory variable suggests a minimum sample size of about 219. For samples larger than about 250, the bias falls below three percent and it nearly disappears as the sample size approach 2,500.




Figure 2: This figure shows the total, coefficient-induced, and transformation-induced τ -bias for the marginal effects. The rule of thumb requiring ten events per explanatory variable suggests a minimum sample size of about 219. However, the bias falls well outside the three percent threshold for this suggested sample size. The estimates fall within the three percent threshold only for sample sizes nearing 2,500–more than ten times the rule of thumb that works well for the coefficients. Also notice that while the coefficient-induced bias receives the most attention from methodologists, the transformation-induced bias is *much* larger.

The Implications

Quantities of interest do not inherit the small sample properties of the coefficient estimates. This fact has important implications for how we study the small sample properties of estimators.

First, it has important implications for the sample sizes that methodologists recommend to substantive researchers. Methodologists usually parameterize models so that the coefficients lie in an unbounded space. This allows the coefficient estimates to rapidly approach their asymptotic distribution, which ensures the estimates have acceptable small sample properties. Substantive researchers, though, usually transform these coefficient estimates into quantities of interest, and the estimate of the quantity of interest does not inherit the small sample properties of the coefficient estimates. Because the quantity of interest often lies in a bounded space, it might approach its asymptotic distribution more slowly. As a result, substantive researchers might need much larger sample sizes than methodologists usually recommend.

Secondly, it has important implications for the bias-variance tradeoff in choosing an estimator. Methodologists usually recognize a tradeoff between bias and variance in estimating parameters. However, the approximation to the transformation-induced bias given in Equation 1 points out

an important fact. Greater variance in the coefficient estimates lead to increased bias in the quantities of interest. This implies that if an estimator is essentially unbiased, then greater efficiency translates to reduced bias in the quantities of interest. Similarly, small reductions in bias at the expense of large loss in efficiency might lead to greater bias in the quantities of interest.

As methodologists, we cannot ignore transformation induced bias. Nearly unbiased estimates of coefficients are not enough. We must be aware of the quantities of interest to substantive researchers and calibrate our tools for these quantities.

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