APPENDIX

Table A: Replication of Rauchhaus (2009): coefficients and p-values for each of four levels of conflict, estimated using a General Estimating Equation (GEE). Model with the war dependent variable are used for the simulation in Table 1, column 1, row 1. Lower level conflict models are used for the simulations in Table 2, column 1.

	MID	Use of Force	Fatal MID	War
Both nuclear weapon	1.95 (0.00)	2.07 (0.00)	2.06 (0.00)	-14.81 (0.00)
One nuclear weapon state	0.71 (0.00)	0.81 (0.00)	0.85 (0.00)	0.90 (0.09)
Contiguity	-2.59 (0.00)	3.20 (0.00)	2.30 (0.00)	2.94 (0.00)
Distance	-0.58 (0.00)	-0.48 (0.00)	-0.74 (0.00)	-0.69 (0.00)
Capabilities	-0.30 (0.00)	-0.21 (0.00)	0.41 (0.00)	-0.64 (0.00)
Alliance	-0.31 (0.04)	-0.34 (0.04)	-0.35 (0.08)	-0.44 (0.24)
Major Power	1.81 (0.00)	1.25 (0.00)	1.53 (0.00)	2.35 (0.00)
Democracy	-0.06 (0.00)	-0.04 (0.00)	-0.06 (0.00)	-0.08 (0.03)
Interdependence	-50.18 (0.00)	-43.69 (0.00)	-112.79 (0.00)	-118.64 (0.00)
IGO Membership	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.05)

Table B: Coefficients and p-values for models using the war dependent variable. The first column uses Firth logit on Rauchhaus' original data (used for the simulation in Table 1, column 2, row 1). The second column uses Rauchhaus' original model (GEE) but recodes the Kargil war (used for the simulation in Table 1, column 1, row 2). The third column uses Firth logit and recodes the Kargil war (used for the simulation in Table 1, column 2, row 2).

	Firth logit	GEE (Kargil recoded)	Firth logit (Kargil recoded)
Both nuclear weapon	-0.47 (0.75)	0.35 (0.79)	0.75 (0.42)
One nuclear weapon state	0.93 (0.01)	0.93 (0.08)	0.95 (0.01)
Contiguity	2.91 (0.00)	2.94 (0.00)	2.91 (0.00)
Distance	-0.70 (0.00)	-0.69 (0.00)	-0.70 (0.00)
Capabilities	-0.64 (0.00)	-0.61 (0.00)	-0.61 (0.00)
Alliance	-0.42 (0.23)	-0.35 (0.30)	-0.34 (0.31)
Major Power	2.36 (0.00)	2.23 (0.00)	2.23 (0.00)
Democracy	-0.07 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.04)
Interdependence	-107.31 (0.02)	-122.15 (0.00)	-110.84 (0.02)
IGO Membership	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.00)	-0.03 (0.02)

Table C: Coefficients and p-values for Rauchhaus' original model examining low-level conflict, but controlling for pre-nuclear cumulative MIDs and coding Kargil as a war (used for the simulations in Table 2, column 2 and Table 3).

	MID	Use of Force	Fatal MID	War
Both nuclear weapon	1.27 (0.16)	1.06 (0.28)	0.77 (0.44)	-1.23 (0.34)
One nuclear weapon state	0.46 (0.01)	0.44 (0.02)	0.44 (0.06)	0.32 (0.500)
Pre-nuclear MIDs	0.16 (0.00)	0.14 (0.00)	0.15 (0.00)	0.17 (0.00)
Contiguity	2.08 (0.00)	2.71 (0.00)	1.70 (0.00)	2.08 (0.01)
Distance	-0.60 (0.00)	-0.49 (0.00)	-0.75 (0.00)	-0.71 (0.00)
Capabilities	-0.20 (0.00)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.27 (0.00)	-0.326 (0.08)
Alliance	-0.20 (0.12)	-0.20 (0.20)	-0.15 (0.44)	0.04 (0.90)
Major Power	1.75 (0.00)	1.22 (0.00)	1.43 (0.00)	1.95 (0.00)
Democracy	-0.05 (0.00)	-0.03 (0.00)	-0.04 (0.00)	-0.04 (0.25)
Interdependence	-42.92 (0.00)	-34.92 (0.01)	-107.25 (0.00)	-118.68 (0.07)
IGO Membership	-0.02 (0.00)	-0.02 (0.00)	-0.03 (0.00)	-0.03 (0.03)

Table D: Coefficients and p-values for models run on Gartzke and Jo (2009)'s data. All models use rare events logit with MID initiation as the dependent variable. Model 1 uses the variables used by Gartzke and Jo to predict MID initiation. Model 2 adds the variables Gartzke and Jo use as a determinants of nuclear weapons possession (used for simulations in Table 4). Model 3 adds an interaction between the capabilities ratio and nuclear weapons possession to test hypothesis 6 (used for simulations in Table 5, rows 3-4). Model 4 adds an interaction term between past MIDs and nuclear weapons possession to test hypothesis 7 (used for simulations in Table 5, rows 1-2).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Nuclear Weapons A	0.57 (0.00)	0.51 (0.01)	0.48 (0.02)	1.04 (0.00)
Nuclear Weapons B	-0.06 (0.78)	-0.14 (0.52)	-0.10 (0.62)	-0.20 (0.25)
Nuke A x Nuke B	-0.14 (0.67)	-0.14 (0.71)	-0.27 (0.39)	-0.04 (0.90)
Democracy A	0.06 (0.00)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.08)
Democracy B	0.11 (0.00)	0.10 (0.00)	0.11 (0.00)	0.09 (0.00)
Dem A x Dem B	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
Rivalry Status A	0.94 (0.00)	0.70 (0.00)	0.72 (0.00)	0.60 (0.00)
Rivalry Status B	0.41 (0.00)	0.45 (0.00)	0.44 (0.00)	0.36 (0.00)
Dyadic Rivalry	2.60 (0.00)	2.53 (0.00)	2.53 (0.00)	1.86 (0.00)
Contiguity	-0.49 (0.00)	-0.48 (0.00)	-0.48 (0.00)	-0.37 (0.00)
Distance (ln)	-0.05 (0.44)	-0.05 (0.39)	-0.05 (0.42)	-0.03 (0.53)
Alliance	0.15 (0.12)	0.19 (0.07)	0.19 (0.07)	0.05 (0.57)
CINC A	2.28 (0.27)	-1.39 (0.52)	-2.17 (0.27)	-2.10 (0.22)
CINC B	3.82 (0.08)	3.84 (0.11)	3.00 (0.15)	2.48 (0.22)
CINC A x CINC B	-26.30 (0.39)	-25.90 (0.37)		-1.81 (0.94)
Energy consumption per cap A		-0.01 (0.25)	-0.01 (0.15)	-0.00 (0.41)
Energy consumption per cap B		-0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.96)	-0.00 (0.03)
Latent nuclear capabilities A		0.10 (0.00)	0.11 (0.00)	0.08 (0.00)
Latent nuclear capabilities B		0.01 (0.48)	0.01 (0.65)	-0.01 (0.66)
Nuclear rival A		0.17 (0.06)	0.18 (0.05)	0.17 (0.04)
Nuclear rival B		-0.03 (0.81)	-0.02 (0.86)	0.05 (0.63)
Rival has nuclear ally A		0.27 (0.00)	0.26 (0.00)	0.27 (0.00)
Rival has nuclear ally B		-0.19 (0.07)	-0.18 (0.08)	-0.19 (0.05)
Capabilities ratio			-0.00 (0.23)	
Nuclear weapons A x cap. ratio			0.00 (0.42)	
Past MIDs				1.84 (0.00)
Nuclear weapons A x Past MIDs				-0.79 (0.00)
Peace Years	-0.14 (0.00)	-0.13 (0.00)	-0.13 (0.00)	-0.13 (0.00)

Peace Years ^{2}	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Peace Years ^{3}	-0.00 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.12)	-0.00 (0.06)
Intercept	-5.04 (0.00)	-5.17 (0.00)	-5.15 (0.00)	-6.04 (0.00)

Table E: Asymmetric nuclear dyads that experienced their first MIDs post-nuclearization.

Nuclear initiator	Non-nuclear target	Year of 1st dispute	CINC ratio of initiator to target	No. subsequent MIDs
USA	Canada	1974	13.20	3
USA	Grenada	1983	11902.82	1
USA	Venezuela	2000	31.49	1
USA	Switzerland	1954	185.55	2
USA	East Germany	1958	26.82	1
USA	Austria	1953	65.95	1
USA	Czechoslovakia	1953	28.47	3
USA	Yugoslavia	1946	119.21	3
USA	Liberia	1998	786.51	1
USA	Sudan	1998	62.15	1
USA	Egypt	1956	51.64	3
USA	Yemen	1982	382.72	1
USA	Afghanistan	1998	113.76	2
USA	Cambodia	1964	191.13	3
USA	Vietnam	1961	51.59	2
United Kingdom	Afghanistan	2001	5.70	1
France	Haiti	1993	46.41	1
France	Croatia	1993	16.53	1
France	Yugoslavia	1992	5.43	2
France	Gabon	1964	790.65	1
France	DRC	1991	7.44	1
France	Comoros	1989	704.50	1
France	Lebanon	1989	56.71	1
France	Afghanistan	2001	4.98	1
France	New Zealand	1985	30.91	1
Russia	Belgium	1960	23.34	2
Russia	Portugal	1999	25.87	1
Russia	Czechoslovakia	1968	16.91	1
Russia	Moldova	1992	122.41	2
Russia	Ukraine	1992	4.35	3
Russia	Denmark	1959	113.15	2
Russia	Laos	1960	400.36	1
South Africa	Zimbabwe	1986	7.37	2
South Africa	Lesotho	1982	113.51	2
South Africa	Botswana	1984	101.59	5
South Africa	Swaziland	1986	145.51	2
Israel	Greece	1976	1.01	1
Israel	Cyprus	1987	15.98	1
Israel	Uganda	1976	3.91	1
Israel	Tunisia	1985	3.84	1
Israel	Libya	1973	2.52	2
Israel	Turkey	1976	0.34	1
China	Austria	2001	47.64	1
India	Papua New Guinea	1992	299.16	1

Figure 1: Loess lines showing the rate of MID occurrence for all nuclear dyads that experience more than 5 MIDs over the entire time period, both prior to and after nuclearization. These provide a non-parametric visualization of the rate of conflict before and after nuclearization.



ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: Undirected Dyads

Table F: Coefficients and p-values using Rauchhaus' data, for the three levels of conflict, estimated using a logit generalized estimating equation (GEE), but including a dummy variable for the United States.

	Fatal MID	Use of Force	MID
Pre-Nuclear MIDs	0.156	0.143	0.157
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
One nuclear weapon state	0.360	0.346	0.386
	(0.126)	(0.091)	(0.023)
Both nuclear weapon	0.463	0.604	0.798
	(0.470)	(0.253)	(0.208)
Capabilities	-0.335	-0.157	-0.262
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Alliance	-0.214	-0.297	-0.300
	(0.261)	(0.0476)	(0.0201)
Democracy	-0.048	-0.035	-0.055
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Interdependence	-107.1	-35.23	-43.41
	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.000)
Distance	-0.774	-0.527	-0.666
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Contiguity	1.715	2.776	2.093
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Major Power	1.265	1.040	1.631
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IGO Membership	-0.027	-0.017	-0.016
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
US Dummy	2.128	2.211	1.981
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-0.795	-2.807	-0.876
	(0.377)	(0.000)	(0.157)

Table G: Coefficients and p-values for war dependent variable using Rauchhaus' data, using firth logit but including peace years, peace years^2 and peace years^3.

	War
One nuclear weapon state	0.805
	(0.028)
Both nuclear weapon	-0.258
	(0.862)
Capabilities	-0.592
	(0.000)
Alliance	-0.355
	(0.313)
Democracy	-0.086
	(0.007)
Interdependence	-106.4
	(0.023)
Distance	-0.638
	(0.000)
Contiguity	2.876
	(0.000)
Major Power	2.535
	(0.000)
IGO Membership	-0.006
	(0.675)
Peace Years	-0.095
	(0.008)
Peace Years ^{2}	0.002
	(0.080)
Peace Years ^{3}	-0.000
	(0.191)
Intercept	-3.734
	(0.001)

Table H: Coefficients and p-values for three levels of conflict, using Rauchhaus' data and estimated using a logit GEE, freezing capabilities and major power status prior to nuclearization for dyads that acquire nuclear weapons to address post-treatment bias.

	Fatal MID	Use of Force	MID
Pre-Nuclear MIDs	0.157	0.141	0.157
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
One nuclear weapon state	0.357	0.372	0.419
	(0.095)	(0.068)	(0.013)
Both nuclear weapon	0.754	1.101	1.325
	(0.456)	(0.271)	(0.157)
Pre-Nuclear Capabilities	-0.186	-0.014	-0.108
	(0.002)	(0.784)	(0.016)
Alliance	-0.184	-0.211	-0.217
	(0.334)	(0.187)	(0.104)
Democracy	-0.047	-0.033	-0.053
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Interdependence	-96.52	-29.06	-36.82
	(0.000)	(0.025)	(0.001)
Distance	-0.733	-0.504	-0.622
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Contiguity	1.741	2.719	2.047
	(0.000	(0.000)	(0.000)
Pre-Nuclear Major Power	1.333	1.135	1.664
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IGO Membership	-0.020	-0.013	-0.012
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Intercept	-1.443	-3.232	-1.475
	(0.120)	(0.000)	(0.017)

Table I: Coefficients and p-values for three levels of conflict, using Rauchhaus' data and estimated using Rare Events Logit.

	Fatal MID	Use of Force	MID
Pre-Nuclear MIDs	0.138	0.100	0.101
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
One nuclear weapon state	0.278	0.321	0.255
	(0.250)	(0.078)	(0.092)
Both nuclear weapon	0.262	0.543	0.722
	(0.790)	(0.480)	(0.285)
Capabilities	-0.265	-0.076	-0.162
	(0.000)	(0.060)	(0.000)
Alliance	-0.118	-0.074	-0.077
	(0.507)	(0.581)	(0.494)
Democracy	-0.066	-0.045	-0.062
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Interdependence	-84.34	-22.92	-30.96
	(0.000)	(0.026)	(0.001)
Distance	-0.653	-0.406	-0.493
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Contiguity	1.681	2.428	1.726
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Major Power	1.694	1.429	1.869
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IGO Membership	-0.009	0.006	0.011
	(0.198)	(0.175)	(0.009)
Peace Years	-0.135	-0.171	-0.214
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Peace Years ^{2}	0.003	0.003	0.004
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Peace Years ^{3}	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-1.139	-2.824	-1.205
	(0.130)	(0.000)	(0.022)

Table J: Coefficients and p-values for three levels of conflict, estimated using logit GEE and controlling for nuclear age.

	Fatal MID	Use of Force	MID
Pre-Nuclear MIDs	0.149	0.143	0.157
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Nuclear Age	0.005	0.011	0.014
	(0.682)	(0.214)	(0.057)
One nuclear weapon state	0.342	0.253	0.194
	(0.255)	(0.328)	(0.345)
Both nuclear weapon	0.548	1.078	1.076
	(0.617)	(0.287)	(0.234)
Capabilities	-0.283	-0.088	-0.206
	(0.000)	(0.066)	(0.000)
Alliance	-0.159	-0.172	-0.181
	(0.419)	(0.257)	(0.165)
Democracy	-0.046	-0.029	-0.050
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.000)
Interdependence	-106.4	-34.88	-42.74
	(0.000)	(0.014)	(0.000)
Distance	-0.744	-0.494	-0.612
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Contiguity	1.715	2.704	2.081
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Major Power	1.446	1.165	1.718
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IGO Membership	-0.026	-0.017	-0.018
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-1.063	-3.051	-1.269
	(0.208)	(0.000)	(0.020)

NB: The nuclear age variable here makes the "one nuclear weapon state" variable insignificant. This is because the nuclear age variable is post-treatment to nuclear status and cannot take a non-zero value when nuclear status is zero (in this way it is similar to an interaction term). The simulation results below of the risk ratios of non-nuclear to asymmetric dyads for different nuclear ages shows that the addition of nuclear age variables does not significantly alter the aggregate risk ratios reported in the paper (although asymmetric nuclear dyads become marginally more conflict prone as they age), and confidence intervals become somewhat broader (especially at low nuclear ages).

Nuclear Age	MIDs	Use of Force	Fatal MID
5	0.766 {0.53; 1.11}	0.735 {0.46; 1.16}	0.69 {0.41; 1.16}
10	0.715 {0.51; 1.01}	0.697 {0.46; 1.06}	0.67 {0.42; 1.09}
15	0.669 {0.49; 0.92}	0.663 {0.45; 0.99}	0.66 {0.41; 1.04}
20	0.624 {0.45; 0.87}	0.629 {0.43; 0.93}	0.64 {0.40; 1.04}
25	0.583 {0.42; 0.83}	0.596 {0.41; 0.89}	0.62 {0.37; 1.07}
Ratios reported in paper (not inc. nuclear age)	0.633 {0.46; 0.87}	0.644 {0.44; 0.94}	0.64 {0.41; 1.02}

Directed Dyads

Table K: coefficients and p-values for MID initiation, estimated using Rare Events Logit and (1) controlling for nuclear age, (2) controlling for nuclear age and including the interaction between Past MIDs and Nuclear Weapons A, and (3) controlling for Sensitive and Civilian Nuclear Assistance.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Nuclear Age A	0.021	0.017	
	(0.007)	(0.010)	
Nuclear Age B	-0.004	-0.006	
	(0.648)	(0.455)	
Past MIDs		1.828	
		(0.00)	
Nuclear weapons A x Past MIDs		-0.799	
		(0.001)	
Civilian Nuclear Assistance A			0.096
			(0.398)
Civilian Nuclear Assistance B			-0.127
			(0.264)
Sensitive Nuclear Assistance A			-0.536
			(0.001)
Sensitive Nuclear Assistance B			-0.131
			(0.341)
Nuclear Weapons A	0.092	0.704	0.709
	(0.724)	(0.011)	(0.001)
Nuclear Weapons B	-0.055	-0.086	-0.093
	(0.826)	(0.688)	(0.680)
Nuke A x Nuke B	-0.111	-0.020	-0.139
	(0.755)	(0.947)	(0.687)
Energy consumption per cap A	-0.009	-0.007	-0.010
	(0.123)	(0.229)	(0.100)
Energy consumption per cap B	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.056)	(0.032)	(0.062)
Rival has nuclear ally A	0.247	0.249	0.271
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Rival has nuclear ally B	-0.182	-0.181	-0.184
	(0.074)	(0.049)	(0.067)
Nuclear rival A	0.182	0.178	0.223
	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.020)
Nuclear rival B	-0.012	0.061	0.023
	(0.913)	(0.554)	(0.854)
Latent nuclear capabilities A	0.105	0.088	0.111
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Latent nuclear capabilities B	0.007	-0.011	0.025
	(0.689)	(0.475)	(0.212)
Democracy A	0.042	0.031	0.035
	(0.016)	(0.065)	(0.048)
Democracy B	0.106	0.094	0.105
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Dem A x Dem B	-0.015	-0.013	-0.015
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rivalry Status A	0.700	0.598	0.683
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rivalry Status B	0.446	0.354	0.447
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Dyadic Rivalry	2.546	1.872	2.560

	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Contiguity	-0.471	-0.362	-0.501
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Distance (ln)	-0.053	-0.035	-0.038
	(0.353)	(0.493)	(0.516)
Alliance	0.197	0.062	0.165
	(0.056)	(0.517)	(0.110)
CINC A	-1.476	-2.149	-2.664
	(0.487)	(0.207)	(0.210)
CINC B	3.892	2.589	3.241
	(0.111)	(0.211)	(0.192)
CINC A x CINC B	-26.21	-2.031	-18.91
	(0.348)	(0.934)	(0.522)
Peace Years	-0.130	-0.129	-0.133
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0)
Peace Years ^{2}	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Peace Years ^{3}	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.128)	(0.071)	(0.110)
Intercept	-5.173	-6.034	-5.129
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)

NB: As above, the nuclear age variable here makes the "Nuclear Weapons A" variable insignificant in model 1. This is because the nuclear age variable is post-treatment to nuclear status and cannot take a non-zero value when nuclear status is zero (in this way it is similar to an interaction term). The below simulation results (using Model 1) of the risk ratios of asymmetric to non-nuclear dyads for different nuclear ages shows that the addition of nuclear age variables does somewhat alter the aggregate risk ratios reported in the paper for low levels of nuclear age, although the core finding remains. In Model 2, nuclear status is associated with significantly higher levels of MIDs regardless of nuclear age.

	Estimate	95% conf. int
Aggregate (reported in paper)	0.598	(0.397; 0.904)
Nuclear age=5	0.816	(0.515; 1.294)
Nuclear age=10	0.736	(0.481; 1.131)
Nuclear age=15	0.666	(0.445; 0.997)
Nuclear age=20	0.601	(0.407; 0.888)
Nuclear age=25	0.542	(0.367; 0.803)

Table L: Coefficients and p-values for MID initiation, estimated using Rare Events Logit and (1) freezing Rival has Nuclear Ally, Nuclear Rival, Latent Nuclear Capabilities, and CINC scores pre-nuclearization for dyads that acquire nuclear weapons, and (2) running the same model but including nuclear age.

	(1)	(2)
Nuclear Weapons A	1.082	0.780
	(0.000)	(0.010)
Nuclear Weapons B	-0.205	-0.104
	(0.255)	(0.634)
Nuke A x Nuke B	0.139	0.093
	(0.644)	(0.762)
Energy consumption per cap A	-0.006	-0.008
	(0.304)	(0.186)
Energy consumption per cap B	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.044)	(0.052)
Democracy A	0.035	0.034
	(0.039)	(0.042)
Democracy B	0.086	0.087
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Dem A x Dem B	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rivalry Status A	0.609	0.606
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rivalry Status B	0.367	0.363
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Dyadic Rivalry	1.887	1.893
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Contiguity	-0.299	-0.302
	(0.004)	(0.003)
Distance (ln)	-0.071	-0.069
	(0.230)	(0.238)
Alliance	0.064	0.078
	(0.497)	(0.416)
Past MIDs	1.829	1.815
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Nuclear weapons A x Past MIDs	-1.077	-1.088
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rival has nuclear ally A (Pre-Nuclear)	0.222	0.216
	(0.010)	(0.012)
Rival has nuclear ally B (Pre-Nuclear)	-0.187	-0.191
	(0.046)	(0.040)
Nuclear rival A (Pre-Nuclear)	0.220	0.215
	(0.015)	(0.019)
Nuclear rival B (Pre-Nuclear)	-0.015	-0.001
	(0.893)	(0.991)
Latent nuclear capabilities A (Pre-Nuclear)	0.076	0.0816
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Latent nuclear capabilities B (Pre-Nuclear)	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.816)	(0.872)
CINC A (Pre-Nuclear)	0.415	-0.454
	(0.817)	(0.801)
CINC B (Pre-Nuclear)	2.910	2.964
	(0.175)	(0.180)
CINC A x CINC B (Pre-Nuclear)	-21.44	-17.60
	(0.435)	(0.519)
Nuclear Age A		0.020

		(0.013)
Nuclear Age B		-0.006
		(0.482)
Peace Years	-0.126	-0.124
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Peace Years ^{2}	0.003	0.003
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Peace Years ^{3}	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.079)	(0.089)
Intercept	-6.121	-6.115
	(0.000)	(0.000)

Table M: Coefficients and p-values for MID initiation, estimated using (1) probit and (2) logit.

	(1)	(2)
Nuclear Weapons A	0.253	0.512
	(0.000)	(0.014)
Nuclear Weapons B	-0.0361	-0.139
	(0.633)	(0.508)
Nuke A x Nuke B	-0.174	-0.147
	(0.221)	(0.687)
Energy consumption per cap A	-0.003	-0.007
	(0.174)	(0.186)
Energy consumption per cap B	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.040)
Rival has nuclear ally A	0.115	0.275
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Rival has nuclear ally B	-0.090	-0.188
	(0.019)	(0.068)
Nuclear rival A	0.0840	0.174
	(0.019)	(0.058)
Nuclear rival B	0.0101	-0.028
	(0.811)	(0.806)
Latent nuclear capabilities A	0.046	0.101
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Latent nuclear capabilities B	0.006	0.012
	(0.359)	(0.481)
Democracy A	0.015	0.041
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Democracy B	0.038	0.104
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Dem A x Dem B	-0.006	-0.015
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rivalry Status A	0.184	0.704
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rivalry Status B	0.167	0.451
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Dyadic Rivalry	1.094	2.539
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Contiguity	-0.140	-0.477
	(0.001)	(0.000)
Distance (ln)	-0.048	-0.051
	(0.055)	(0.384)
Alliance	0.070	0.185

	(0.098)	(0.070)
CINC A	-0.937	-1.365
	(0.222)	(0.522)
CINC B	1.509	3.820
	(0.094)	(0.107)
CINC A x CINC B	-3.395	-26.44
	(0.817)	(0.360)
Peace Years	-0.059	-0.133
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Peace Years ^{2}	0.002	0.003
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Peace Years ^{3}	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.104)
Intercept	-2.377	-5.178
	(0.000)	(0.000)

Table N: Coefficients and p-values for models where the dependent variable is (1) MIDs regardless of initiator, and (2) MIDs that involve fatalities, regardless of initiator, estimated using ReLogit and including the Past MIDs x Nuclear Weapons A interaction.

	(1)	(2)
Past MIDs	2.324	2.811
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Nuclear weapons A x Past MIDs	-1.054	-1.752
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Nuclear Weapons A	0.999	0.997
	(0.000)	(0.002)
Nuclear Weapons B	0.104	-0.389
	(0.407)	(0.056)
Nuke A x Nuke B	-0.358	1.486
	(0.138)	(0.001)
Energy consumption per cap A	-0.005	-0.030
	(0.203)	(0.056)
Energy consumption per cap B	-0.001	-0.005
	(0.025)	(0.007)
Rival has nuclear ally A	0.118	0.095
	(0.082)	(0.369)
Rival has nuclear ally B	0.115	0.148
	(0.083)	(0.180)
Nuclear rival A	0.402	0.990
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Nuclear rival B	0.445	0.778
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Latent nuclear capabilities A	0.032	-0.044
	(0.012)	(0.075)
Latent nuclear capabilities B	0.022	-0.058
	(0.077)	(0.014)
Democracy A	0.059	0.077
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Democracy B	0.058	0.093
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Dem A x Dem B	-0.019	-0.025
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rivalry Status A	0.595	1.158

	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rivalry Status B	0.563	0.632
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Dyadic Rivalry	1.233	1.017
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Contiguity	-0.075	-0.023
	(0.257)	(0.781)
Distance (ln)	-0.137	-0.148
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Alliance	-0.052	-0.291
	(0.498)	(0.020)
CINC A	-0.955	0.627
	(0.514)	(0.790)
CINC B	-2.086	1.891
	(0.174)	(0.412)
CINC A x CINC B	-9.814	-105.9
	(0.707)	(0.002)
Peace Years	-0.349	-0.512
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Peace Years ^{2}	0.013	0.018
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Peace Years ^{3}	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-4.885	-6.075
	(0.000)	(0.000)

Table O: Coefficients and p-values for four models run on Gartzke and Jo (2009)'s data, fixing the incorrectly missing regime type data for observations involving the United States (see Missing Data Robustness.dta). All models use rare events logit with MID initiation as the dependent variable. Model 1 uses the variables used by Gartzke and Jo to predict MID initiation. Model 2 adds the variables Gartzke and Jo use as a determinants of nuclear weapons possession. Model 3 adds an interaction between the capabilities ratio and nuclear weapons possession to test hypothesis 6. Model 4 adds an interaction term between past MIDs and nuclear weapons possession to test hypothesis 7.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Nuclear Weapons A	0.50 (0.01)	0.40 (0.04)	0.34 (0.09)	1.05 (0.00)
Nuclear Weapons B	-0.03 (0.85)	-0.10 (0.59)	-0.09 (0.64)	-0.27 (0.09)
Nuke A x Nuke B	-0.44 (0.08)	-0.40 (0.11)	-0.38 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.49)
Democracy A	0.08 (0.00)	0.08 (0.00)	0.08 (0.00)	0.06 (0.00)
Democracy B	0.12 (0.00)	0.12 (0.00)	0.12 (0.00)	0.10 (0.00)
Dem A x Dem B	-0.02 (0.00)	-0.02 (0.00)	-0.02 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
Rivalry Status A	0.94 (0.00)	0.71 (0.00)	0.72 (0.00)	0.55 (0.00)
Rivalry Status B	0.44 (0.00)	0.55 (0.00)	0.48 (0.00)	0.42 (0.00)
Dyadic Rivalry	2.73 (0.00)	2.70 (0.00)	2.69 (0.00)	1.77 (0.00)
Contiguity	-0.44 (0.00)	-0.43 (0.00)	-0.43 (0.00)	-0.32 (0.00)
Distance (ln)	-0.05 (0.27)	-0.05 (.27)	-0.04 (0.28)	-0.02 (0.56)
Alliance	0.22 (0.02)	0.24 (0.02)	0.25 (0.01)	0.08 (0.39)
CINC A	3.84 (0.01)	1.61 (0.35)	1.86 (0.28)	0.84 (0.52)
CINC B	5.69 (0.00)	5.98 (0.00)	6.04 (0.00)	4.20 (0.00)
CINC A x CINC B	-7.75 (0.66)	-4.95 (0.79)	-6.87 (0.71)	8.38 (0.53)
Energy consumption per cap A		-0.00 (0.80)	-0.00 (0.89)	0.00 (0.84)
Energy consumption per cap B		0.00 (0.57)	0.00 (0.69)	0.01 (0.38)
Latent nuclear capabilities A		0.07 (0.00)	0.08 (0.00)	0.05 (0.00)
Latent nuclear capabilities B		0.01 (0.60)	-0.00 (0.94)	-0.01 (0.72)

Nuclear rival A		0.14 (0.13)	0.15 (0.12)	0.12 (0.16)
Nuclear rival B		-0.05 (0.52)	-0.07 (0.51)	0.02 (0.80)
Rival has nuclear ally A		0.27 (0.00)	0.27 (0.00)	0.25 (0.00)
Rival has nuclear ally B		-0.19 (0.06)	-0.19 (.006)	-0.21 (0.02)
Capabilities ratio			-0.00 (0.18)	
Nuclear weapons A x cap. ratio			0.00 (0.20)	
Past MIDs				2.25 (0.00)
Nuclear weapons A x Past MIDs				-1.04 (0.00)
Peace Years	-0.08 (0.00)	-0.07 (0.00)	-0.08 (0.00)	-0.08 (0.00)
Peace Years ^{2}	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Peace Years ^{3}	-0.00 (0.00	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Intercept	-5.59 (0.00)	-5.73 (0.00)	-5.66 (0.00)	-6.58 (0.00)