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FIELDS Labor Economics, Political Economy, Economic History

EDUCATION Ph.D., Managerial Economics and Strategy, Northwestern University (anticipated) 2024

Dissertation: Essays in Labor Economics and Political Economy Committee: Joel Mokyr (Co-Chair), Matthew Notowidigdo (Co-Chair),

Nancy Qian (Co-Chair), Edoardo Teso

M.Sc., Managerial Economics and Strategy, Northwestern University

M.Sc., Economic and Social Sciences (summa cum laude), Bocconi University

B.A., Economic and Social Sciences (summa cum laude), Bocconi University

2014

Fellowships & Awards

Global Impacts Graduate Fellowship, Buffett Institute, Northwestern University

PhD Research Grant, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

Doctoral Fellowship, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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CONFERENCES Economic History Association (EHA) 2023 Annual Meeting, Allied Social Sciences Associations

(ASSA) 2024 Annual Meeting [scheduled]

Reference American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Explorations in Economic History

Job Market Paper

"Closing Ranks: Organized Labor and Immigration"

This paper shows that immigration positively affected the development of organized labor in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. I digitize archival data to construct a new dataset on labor unions during 1900–1920 and use a shift-share instrument to exploit plausibly exogenous variation in immigration. My analysis yields several novel findings. I document that counties that received more immigration experienced an increase in the probability of having any branch of a labor union, the number of branches, their size, and the share of unionized workers. I explore the mechanisms behind this effect and find that unionization occurred as a reaction to both the economic and the social threats brought by immigrants. First, the increase was more prominent for unions representing skilled workers, both along the extensive and the intensive margin. Second, I show evidence consistent with unions growing as a reaction to the immigrants' labor competition. Third, I document that the growth of labor unions was more prominent in counties that received larger shares of culturally distant immigrants and that displayed worse attitudes towards immigration. These findings highlight immigration as a novel driver of unionization in the early twentieth-century United States, which accounted for approximately 14% of the average union density during this period. They also identify an unexplored consequence of immigration: the development of institutions that aim to protect workers' status in the labor market.

WORKING PAPERS

"The Impact of the Chinese Exclusion Act on the U.S. Economy" with Joe Long, Nancy Qian, and Marco Tabellini

This paper examines the economic effects of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which banned Chinese immigration to the United States, across U.S. counties between 1860 and 1940. The Act reduced the size of the Chinese population and employment in all major economic sectors, and lowered the quality of jobs among the Chinese who remained. Contrary to the expectations of its proponents, the Act also reduced the employment and income of white workers, both native and foreign born ones, and had sharp negative effects on manufacturing and agriculture. The negative impact of the Act was concentrated in the western United States, where the majority of Chinese immigrants lived in 1880, and persisted until at least 1940.

WORK IN PROGRESS

"Patronage, Careers, and Performance in the Civil Service: Evidence from U.S. Federal Judges" with Massimo Pulejo

Political connections are a pervasive method for the selection of public sector workers worldwide. Yet, the existing literature on patronage has largely focused on developing countries or drawn case studies from historical contexts. This paper analyzes the consequences of patronage in the federal civil service of the United States, which still occurs today. Focusing on the federal judiciary system from 1789 to the present and leveraging previously unused data, we use a difference-in-differences design to compare the career and performance of judges before and after the senator who recommended their nomination leaves Congress. In our preliminary results, we show that the probability of a judge to be promoted from a district court to a court of appeal decreases by 55% after losing the connection to their recommender. In ongoing work, we are exploring whether and how this event influences judges' productivity and sentencing decisions. This project aims to make three contributions. First, to document the consequences that the selection of public officials through patronage has in a major, developed economy. Second, to show how patronage appointments for entry-level positions can affect careers within an organization. Third, to challenge the claim that political appointments may solve biases arising from the direct election of public officials.

"Political Cycles in Black Union Membership"

A broad strand of literature in economics has studied political cycles, especially focusing on how politicians manipulate budgets to increase their chances of re-election. Much less attention has been given to how the political cycle affects the incentives and behavior of organizations. In this paper, I study how elections affect public sector labor unions, a type of organization with well-acknowledged ties to politics, and the Democratic party in particular. I find that, in presidential election years, unionization rates increase for Black workers. The effect is larger in the occurrence of open seat elections; in Blue states; and, among constituencies where other institutions that mobilize Black voters, such as the NAACP or the Black church, are less present. This evidence is consistent with a mechanism in which labor unions increase their membership to more effectively lobby politicians ahead of a general election, by targeting and mobilizing workers who are otherwise less likely to turn out to vote, and more likely to lean Democratic.

"The Economic Effects of Public Hiring Constraints" with Maria Carreri, Edoardo Di Porto, Edoardo Teso, and Silvia Vannutelli

How do public administrations cope with tight limits on external hiring? What is the effect of these limits on public sector performance? How does the size of public employment affect local labor markets and private sector growth? In this paper, we aim to address these questions by: (i) leveraging rich administrative data on the universe of both public and private sector employees in the Italian labor market; and, (ii) exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in hiring constraints across different Italian public administrations induced by a 2008 reform that limited public sector hiring. With the findings of this paper, we aim to contribute to a long-standing debate on the public employment effects on the labor market, by exploiting exogenous variation in the size of local public employment; and, to the literature on internal labor markets, by focusing on a unique setting that allows us to document how the internal labor market of public sector organizations responds to shocks in external hiring ability.

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