

Effect of sovereign wealth funds in commodity-exporting economies when commodity prices affect interest spreads

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Abstract

We reconsider the role of a sovereign wealth fund in commodity-exporting economies facing recent volatile fluctuations of commodity prices due to the COVID-19 shock. We examine the welfare-improving effect of a sovereign wealth fund from the new perspective of the link between commodity prices and interest rate spreads, which is unique to emerging economies. We show that a sovereign wealth fund becomes more effective in improving welfare for commodity-exporting economies with a stronger link between their commodity prices and interest rate spreads.

KEYWORDS

commodity prices, DSGE model, emerging economies, financial frictions, interest rate spreads, sovereign wealth fund

JEL CLASSIFICATION

E32, E44, F32, O20, Q48

1 | INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic affected emerging economies through various channels. One of the most important channels is terms of trade deterioration

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due to a decline in global demand.¹ Commodity prices fell sharply in early 2020. Since the latter part of 2020, however, commodity prices recovered and surged partly owing to the limited supply (The Economist, 2021). Figure 1 shows the commodity price fluctuations faced by five Asian commodity-exporting countries: Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Mongolia. The export-weighted commodity price index for each country in Figure 1 is obtained by applying the country-specific commodity-export weights to the corresponding world commodity prices.² The surge in commodity prices in the first decade of the 2000s has been attributed to sustained strong growth in emerging market economies, in particular those in East Asia (Aslam et al., 2016). Although they had recovered from the sharp fall due to the global financial crisis, commodity




FIGURE 1 The export-weighted commodity price indices of five Asian commodity-exporting countries: Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Mongolia. For the export price data, we use the World Bank commodity price data (“pink sheet”). For the export weight data, we use the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. By applying the country-specific commodity-export weights to the corresponding world-commodity prices, we obtain the export-weighted commodity price index for each country.

¹Hevia and Neumeyer (2020) argue that the COVID-19 pandemic affects emerging economies through three main channels: (i) the direct negative effect of social distancing restrictions on economic activity; (ii) terms of trade deterioration; and (iii) global financial shock.

²For more details on the data, see Kitano (2021, p. 2).

prices fell again in the latter half of the 2010s, which has been attributed to slowing growth in these economies and increasing supply of commodities. After the fall in commodity prices in early 2020 when the pandemic started, commodity prices have drastically surged owing to the limited supply and recovering demand.

The sharp fluctuation in the commodity prices of exports may have serious impacts on commodity-exporting economies.³ The recent literature on the business cycles of emerging economies reports that commodity price shocks have a sizable contribution to business cycle fluctuations (e.g., Drechsel & Tenreyro, 2018). Amid sharp fluctuations in export commodity prices, the effectiveness of a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) in stabilizing prices has been widely discussed. Against this background, we reconsider the role of an SWF in commodity-exporting economies facing the recent volatile fluctuations of commodity prices using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Some prior studies analyze small open DSGE models of commodity-exporting economies with an SWF (e.g., Basu et al., 2013; Berg et al., 2013; Bergholt et al., 2019; Dagher et al., 2012; Melina et al., 2016).⁴ Dagher et al. (2012) analyze the impact of oil windfalls on low-income countries and show that an SWF can help achieve macroeconomic stability and improve welfare. Berg et al. (2013) focus on the macroeconomic effect of public investment financed by natural resource revenues in developing countries and compare different fiscal policies including an SWF. Motivated by Papua New Guinea's natural resource (LNG) boom, Basu et al. (2013) examine the policy implications of a variety of policy responses to the macroeconomic effects of a resource boom, showing that an SWF is a desirable means of dealing with macroeconomic fluctuations. Melina et al. (2016) compare two approaches: (i) a "spend-as-you-go" (SAYG) approach that invests all resource windfalls each period without saving and (ii) a "delinked public investment" approach combined with a resource fund (or an SWF). They show that the latter can reduce macroeconomic instability relative to the former. Overall, the literature recommends that policymakers in resource-rich developing countries save a resource windfall in an SWF. Our study contributes to the literature by reexamining the role of SWFs from the new perspective of recent empirical evidence on commodity-exporting countries.

The recent empirical evidence is that world commodity prices strongly affect the interest rate spreads of commodity-exporting countries (Bastourre et al., 2012; Fernández et al., 2018; Shousha, 2016). Specifically, interest rate spreads tend to fall (rise) when world commodity prices increase (decrease), which is unique to emerging economies. Concerning the mechanism behind the link between world commodity prices and interest rate spreads, Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018) argue that "[t]his could come in the form of a borrowing constraint, in which the value

³Using a structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) analysis, Kitano (2021) shows that world commodity price shocks may have a significant impact on Asian commodity-exporting economies.

⁴For a comprehensive literature review of SWFs, see, for example, Alhashel (2015).

of the country's collateral depends directly on commodity prices through export earnings" (lines 15–18, RHS of p. 206). That is, a fall (rise) in commodity prices lessens (heightens) the value of the country's collateral. Accordingly, when commodity prices decrease (increase), creditors increase (decrease) the required interest rate spread. In other words, financial frictions are a key mechanism behind the negative relationship between world commodity prices and interest rate spreads. Using a DSGE model, Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018) show that the relation between world commodity prices and interest rate spreads is critical for replicating a counter-cyclical trade balance, which is a distinctive feature of the empirical dynamics of Argentina's economy. Using structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) and regression analyses, Kitano (2021) finds that among the sample Asian commodity-exporting countries, counter-cyclical trade balances occur only in the countries with a negative sensitivity of the interest rate spread to commodity prices. That is, whether a counter-cyclical trade balance occurs depends on the presence of financial frictions. From the new perspective of the link between commodity prices and interest rate spreads, we examine the welfare-improving effect of SWFs. We find that when the negative sensitivity of interest rate spreads to commodity prices is higher, the welfare-improving effect of SWFs becomes larger compared to that of a conventional fiscal policy. The policy implication of this result is that an SWF may play a more important role in absorbing commodity price shocks in countries under more severe financial frictions.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we explain the types of functions served by existing SWFs in Asia. In Section 3, we present a small open economy model of commodity-exporting countries augmented with public capital and the key link between commodity prices and interest rate spreads. In Section 4, we compare the welfare-improving effects of an SWF and a conventional fiscal policy under different degrees of sensitivity of interest rate spreads to commodity prices. We present our conclusions in Section 5.

2 | SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN ASIA

Sovereign wealth funds are defined as "[s]pecial purpose investment funds or arrangements that are owned by the general government" (IWG, 2008, p. 3). In terms of their underlying resource base, SWFs are generally classified into commodity and noncommodity funds (Aizenman & Glick, 2009). Commodity funds have been established mainly from revenues from natural resources. In Asia, SWFs in commodity-exporting countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Timor-Leste are in this group. In contrast, according to Park (2007), noncommodity funds have been established from one of the following sources: (i) foreign exchange reserves, (ii) government budget surplus, and (iii) foreign aid in the form of trust funds. For example, in Asia, Singapore is widely recognized as a role model of noncommodity funds because of the long

history and successful achievements of its two SWFs: Temasek Holdings and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC).

According to Al-Hassan et al. (2013, 2018), the following five types of functions served by SWFs can be distinguished in terms of their policy objectives:

1. Fiscal stabilization: Fiscal stabilization funds intend to insulate the budget and economy from commodity price volatility and external shocks.
2. Savings: Savings funds intend to share wealth across generations by transforming nonrenewable assets into diversified financial assets.
3. Development: Development funds intend to allocate resources to priority socioeconomic projects such as infrastructure.
4. Pension reserve: Pension reserve funds intend to meet future outflows with respect to pension-related liabilities on the government's balance sheet.
5. Reserve investment: Reserve investment institutions intend to reduce the negative carry costs of holding reserves or to earn higher return on reserves.

Table 1 presents the five functions served by existing SWFs in Asia. For the SWFs listed in their appendix A, we follow the classification used by Al-Hassan et al. (2013). For other SWFs not included in Al-Hassan et al. (2013), we classify them by mainly checking the fund profiles in Global SWF (<https://globalswf.com>) and SWFI (<https://www.swfinstitute.org>). Table 1 shows that some countries such as China, Kazakhstan, and Malaysia have more than two SWFs. In Table 1, seven among the 24 SWFs have functions of more than two types; six of the seven SWFs are those in commodity-exporting countries: “SOFAZ,” “NOF,” “NIC,” “KWAN/NTF,” “FHF + FSF,” and “TL PF.”⁵ Ten among the 24 SWFs are saving funds (type ii), which are the most common among the five functions. All the five stabilization funds (type i) are accompanied by savings funds (type ii). By contrast, there are only two pension reserve funds (type iv), the fewest among the five functions. Development funds (type iii) are not specific to commodity-exporting countries. They exist in different countries such as China, India, and Vietnam. The last column of Table 1 presents the assets under management of SWFs.⁶ After the Asian crisis, central banks in the region accumulated foreign exchange reserves on an unprecedented scale because of the counties' large and persistent current account surpluses. Reserve investment funds (type v) in high-reserve countries such as China, South Korea, and Singapore have quite large amounts of assets under management (e.g., “CIC,” “SAFE IC,” “KIC,” and “GIC”).

In Table 1, it is noteworthy that high-reserve countries such as China, South Korea, and Singapore have reserve investment SWFs (type v). By contrast, commodity-exporting countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,

⁵For the abbreviation of fund names, see Appendix A.

⁶Data of assets under management of SWFs are from Global SWF (June 2023) (<https://globalswf.com/ranking>).

TABLE 1 Sovereign wealth funds in Asia.

Country	Fund name	Fiscal stabilization	Savings	Development	Pension reserve	Reserve investment	AuM (\$b)
Azerbaijan	SOF AZ	✓	✓				45
	AIH			✓			22
Brunei	BIA		✓				55
	CIC					✓	1351
China	SAFE IC					✓	1034
	NSSF				✓		474
	CADF			✓			10
	HKMA EF				✓		514
India	NIIF			✓			4
Indonesia	INA			✓			7
Kazakhstan	NBK	✓	✓				59
	NOF NIC				✓	✓	71
Korea	Samruk Kazyna			✓			22
	Baiterek			✓			169
Malaysia	KIC					✓	30
	Khazanah		✓				3
Mongolia	KWAN / NTF	✓	✓	✓			81
	PNB		✓				0.2
	FHF + FSF	✓	✓				

TABLE 1 (Continued)

Country	Fund name	Fiscal stabilization	Savings	Development	Pension reserve	Reserve investment	AuM (\$b)
Singapore	GIC		✓			✓	690
	Temasek		✓				298
Timor-Leste	TL PF	✓	✓				17
Uzbekistan	UFRD			✓			23
Vietnam	SCIC			✓			2

Note: For the abbreviation of fund names, see Appendix A. AuM denotes the assets under management.
Source: Al-Hassan et al. (2013), Global SWF (<https://globalswf.com/ranking>), SWFI (<https://www.swfinstitute.org>), and authors.

Malaysia, and Mongolia have SWFs serving as fiscal stabilization and savings funds (types i and ii). Considering the existing SWFs of commodity-exporting countries in Asia, in Section 3, we build a small open economy model of commodity-exporting countries augmented with SWFs serving as the fiscal stabilization and savings funds. In Section 4, using the model, we conduct numerical experiments that elucidate the role of SWFs in commodity-exporting countries.

3 | MODEL

A small open economy consists of households, firms, and the government. Firms are divided into two sectors, a final goods sector and a commodity sector. The model framework is based on that of Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018), who embed a commodity sector and a negative association between commodity prices and interest spreads in a standard real-business-cycle model of a small open economy (e.g., Aguiar & Gopinath, 2007; Garcia-Cicco et al., 2010). However, unlike Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018), firms use public capital as a factor of production in our model.

3.1 | Households

The household's expected lifetime utility is

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{\left[C_t - \frac{\theta}{\eta^f} (N_t^f)^{\eta^f} - \frac{\theta}{\eta^c} (N_t^c)^{\eta^c} \right]^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma}, \quad (1)$$

where E_0 denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on the information available at time 0, C_t is final goods consumption, and N_t^f and N_t^c are the labor supply to the final goods sector and the commodity sector, respectively. The parameters $\beta \in (0, 1)$, $\gamma (> 0)$, $\theta (> 0)$, η^f , and η^c denote the discount factor, the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, curvature parameters on labor, and the labor coefficient, respectively.

The household's budget constraint is

$$C_t + K_{t+1} + D_t + T_t^h + \frac{\phi}{2} \left(\frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t} - 1 \right)^2 K_t = r_t^f K_t^f + r_t^c K_t^c + w_t^f N_t^f + w_t^c N_t^c + (1 - \delta) K_t + \frac{D_{t+1}}{1 + r_t}, \quad (2)$$

where D_t is foreign debt and T_t^h is a lump-sum tax. r^f and r^c denote real rental rates of capital in the final goods and commodity sectors, respectively. w^f and w^c denote the real wages in each respective sector. δ and ϕ represent the capital depreciation rate and adjustment cost parameter, respectively. K_t denotes aggregate capital in the two sectors:

$$K_t = K_t^f + K_t^c, \quad (3)$$

where K_t^f and K_t^c denote capital stocks in the final goods and commodity sectors, respectively. The aggregate (private) capital stock evolves according to

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t, \quad (4)$$

where I_t is private investment. The interest rate on foreign borrowing r_t consists of three parts: the (exogenous) world interest rate r^* , the country premium on foreign debt, and the effect of commodity prices on interest rate spreads:

$$r_t = r^* + \psi \left(e^{\tilde{D}_{t+1} - \tilde{D}} - 1 \right) - \chi (\ln p_t^c - \ln p^c), \quad (5)$$

where p_t^c and p^c denote the commodity price and its steady-state level, respectively. \tilde{D}_t and \tilde{D} denote the aggregate (per-capita) level of foreign debt and its steady-state level, respectively. As in related studies, we assume that the country premium is an increasing function of foreign debt to assure the stationarity of foreign debt.⁷ Following Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018), we introduce the last term to represent the effect of commodity prices on interest rate spreads. The parameter χ represents the sensitivity of interest rate spreads to commodity prices. As we argued in Section 1, according to the recent empirical evidence, interest rate spreads tend to rise (fall) when world commodity prices decrease (increase), which means a positive value of χ in Equation (5). Since commodity prices affect the commodity-exporting country's borrowing constraint, it also implies that a higher value of χ indicates a higher degree of financial friction. We will examine how the key parameter χ affects the dynamics of commodity-exporting countries in response to commodity price shocks in Section 4.

The household's first-order optimality conditions with respect to C_t , N_t^f , N_t^c , D_{t+1} , K_{t+1}^f , and K_{t+1}^c are

$$\left[C_t - \frac{\theta}{\eta^f} (N_t^f)^{\eta^f} - \frac{\theta}{\eta^c} (N_t^c)^{\eta^c} \right]^{-\gamma} = \lambda_t, \quad (6)$$

⁷The small open economy model with incomplete asset markets features equilibrium dynamics that possess a random walk component. See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) for details.

$$\left[C_t - \frac{\theta}{\eta^f} (N_t^f)^{\eta^f} - \frac{\theta}{\eta^c} (N_t^c)^{\eta^c} \right]^{-\gamma} \theta (N_t^f)^{\eta^f-1} = \lambda_t w_t^f, \quad (7)$$

$$\left[C_t - \frac{\theta}{\eta^f} (N_t^f)^{\eta^f} - \frac{\theta}{\eta^c} (N_t^c)^{\eta^c} \right]^{-\gamma} \theta (N_t^c)^{\eta^c-1} = \lambda_t w_t^c, \quad (8)$$

$$\lambda_t = \beta(1+r_t)E_t\{\lambda_{t+1}\}, \quad (9)$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \lambda_t \left[1 + \phi \left(\frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t} - 1 \right) \right] \\ &= \beta E_t \left\{ \lambda_{t+1} \left[r_{t+1}^f + 1 - \delta + \phi \left(\frac{K_{t+2}}{K_{t+1}} - 1 \right) \frac{K_{t+2}}{K_{t+1}} - \frac{\phi}{2} \left(\frac{K_{t+2}}{K_{t+1}} - 1 \right)^2 \right] \right\}, \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} & \lambda_t \left[1 + \phi \left(\frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t} - 1 \right) \right] \\ &= \beta E_t \left\{ \lambda_{t+1} \left[r_{t+1}^c + 1 - \delta + \phi \left(\frac{K_{t+2}}{K_{t+1}} - 1 \right) \frac{K_{t+2}}{K_{t+1}} - \frac{\phi}{2} \left(\frac{K_{t+2}}{K_{t+1}} - 1 \right)^2 \right] \right\}, \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

respectively, where λ_t is the Lagrange multiplier on Equation (2). As we assume that households are identical, the aggregate (per-capita) debt level is equal to the individual's debt level:

$$\tilde{D}_t = D_t. \quad (12)$$

3.2 | Final goods sector

Unlike Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018), our model assumes that firms use public capital as a factor of production. Both the commodity and final goods sectors use public capital. This is because public capital is important, especially for emerging economies' growth, and many studies on SWFs examine how public capital is financed.

The production function in the final goods sector is

$$Y_t^f = a_t^f (K_t^f)^{\alpha_k^f} (M_t)^{\alpha_m^f} (N_t^f)^{1-\alpha_k^f-\alpha_m^f} (K_t^g)^{\alpha_g^f}, \quad (13)$$

where Y_t^f , a_t^f , M_t , and K_t^g denote the output of final goods, total factor productivity in the final goods sector, commodity inputs, and public capital, respectively. The parameters α_k^f , α_m^f , and α_g^f , respectively, denote capital share, commodity share, and output elasticity with respect to public capital. Following prior studies using models with public capital, we assume constant returns to scale in private production inputs but increasing returns to scale in public capital.

The first-order conditions with respect to K_{t+1}^f , N_t^f , and M_t for the profit maximization problem are

$$r_t^f = \alpha_k^f a_t^f (K_t^f)^{\alpha_k^f - 1} (M_t)^{\alpha_m^f} (N_t^f)^{1 - \alpha_k^f - \alpha_m^f} (K_t^g)^{\alpha_g^f}, \quad (14)$$

$$w_t^f = (1 - \alpha_k^f - \alpha_m^f) a_t^f (K_t^f)^{\alpha_k^f} (M_t)^{\alpha_m^f} (N_t^f)^{-\alpha_k^f - \alpha_m^f} (K_t^g)^{\alpha_g^f}, \quad (15)$$

and

$$p_t^c = \alpha_m^f a_t^f (K_t^f)^{\alpha_k^f} (M_t)^{\alpha_m^f - 1} (N_t^f)^{1 - \alpha_k^f - \alpha_m^f} (K_t^g)^{\alpha_g^f}, \quad (16)$$

respectively.

3.3 | Commodity sector

The production function in the commodity sector is

$$Y_t^c = a_t^c (K_t^c)^{\alpha_k^c} (N_t^c)^{1 - \alpha_k^c} (K_t^g)^{\alpha_g^c}, \quad (17)$$

where Y_t^c is the output of commodities and a_t^c is total factor productivity in the commodity sector. The parameters α_k^c and α_g^c , respectively, denote capital share and output elasticity with respect to public capital (in the commodity production). As we argue in Section 3.4, commodity firms' incomes are taxed at the rate of τ^c . The first-order conditions with respect to K_t^c and N_t^c for the profit maximization problem are then

$$r_t^c = (1 - \tau^c) \alpha_k^c a_t^c p_t^c (K_t^c)^{\alpha_k^c - 1} (N_t^c)^{1 - \alpha_k^c} (K_t^g)^{\alpha_g^c}, \quad (18)$$

and

$$w_t^c = (1 - \tau^c)(1 - \alpha_k^c)p_t^c a_t^c (K_t^c)^{\alpha_k^c} (N_t^c)^{-\alpha_k^c} (K_t^g)^{\alpha_g^c}. \quad (19)$$

3.4 | Government

The government taxes households and commodity firms, makes government expenditures, and manages an SWF. The government's budget constraint is

$$\frac{F_{t+1}}{1+r^*} + G_t^{inv} + G_t^{con} = F_t + T_t^h + T_t^c, \quad (20)$$

where F_t is the asset value of the SWF. T_t^c denotes the tax revenue from the commodity sector:

$$T_t^c = \tau^c p_t^c Y_t^c. \quad (21)$$

Government spending consists of government consumption (G_t^{con}) and government investment (G_t^{inv}). Since public capital is important especially for emerging economies' growth as argued in Section 3.2, we assume that government spending includes investment for public capital. The public capital then evolves according to

$$K_{t+1}^g = \left[1 - \frac{\phi^g}{2} \left(\frac{G_t^{inv}}{G_{t-1}^{inv}} - 1 \right)^2 \right] G_t^{inv} + (1 - \delta^g) K_t^g, \quad (22)$$

where δ^g is the depreciation rate of public capital and ϕ^g is the investment adjustment cost parameter.

We define a resource windfall as extra revenue from the commodity sector that is beyond its steady-state level, $T_t^c - T^c$. We analyze two approaches to managing the resource windfall: the SAYG and SWF approaches.⁸

Following the literature (e.g., Basdevant et al., 2021; Melina et al., 2016), we define the SAYG approach as follows. Under the SAYG approach, the government spends all the resource windfall on government investment:

$$G_t^{inv} = G^{inv} + (T_t^c - T^c), \quad (23)$$

where G^{inv} denotes the steady-state level of government investment, and $T_t^c - T^c$ is the resource windfall defined as extra revenue from the commodity sector that

⁸Following the literature (e.g., Basdevant et al., 2021; Melina et al., 2016), we use the term SAYG.

is beyond its steady-state level T^c . Equation (23) means that when the tax revenue from the commodity sector increases, the government increases government investment; when it decreases, the government is forced to cut government investment. This implies that the SAYG approach is highly pro-cyclical. Under the SAYG approach, the government does not change the sovereign resource fund position and maintains the sovereign resource fund at its steady-state level:

$$F_t = F, \quad (24)$$

where F denotes the steady-state level of the sovereign resource fund.

Under the SWF approach, the government saves all the resource windfall in the sovereign resource fund:

$$F_{t+1} = F_t + (1 + r^*)(T_t^c - T^c), \quad (25)$$

which means that when the tax revenue from the commodity sector increases, the government increases its sovereign resource fund; when it decreases, the government reduces its sovereign resource fund. Unlike in the SAYG case, the government does not spend the resource windfall on government investment, which implies that it maintains government investment at its initial steady-state level:

$$G_t^{\text{inv}} = G^{\text{inv}}. \quad (26)$$

To make the two cases comparable to each other, we assume that extra interest revenue from the sovereign resource fund is spent as a part of government consumption as follows:⁹

$$G_t^{\text{con}} = T_t^h + \frac{r^*}{1 + r^*}(F_t - F). \quad (27)$$

Intuitively, Equation (27) plays a role in preventing the sovereign wealth fund from accumulating to infinity, which ensures the stationarity of the sovereign wealth fund.

3.5 | Equilibrium

As the economy consists of two sectors (and the final goods sector uses commodity inputs), GDP is

⁹We can confirm that both approaches satisfy the government's budget constraint by substituting Equations (23) and (24) under the SAYG approach or Equations (25) and (26) under the SWF approach along with Equations (27) into (20) (and using their steady-state equations).

$$Y_t = Y_t^f + p_t^c Y_t^c - p_t^c M_t \quad (28)$$

From the household's budget constraint (2) and the government's budget constraint (20) (along with Equations 4, 13–19, and 21), we obtain the trade balance:

$$TB_t = Y_t - C_t - I_t - G_t^{con} - G_t^{inv} - \frac{\phi}{2} \left(\frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t} - 1 \right)^2 K_t. \quad (29)$$

The world commodity price p_t^c exogenously evolves according to the following shock process:

$$\ln \left(\frac{p_t^c}{p^c} \right) = \rho^1 \log \left(\frac{p_{t-1}^c}{p^c} \right) + \rho^2 \log \left(\frac{p_{t-2}^c}{p^c} \right) + \epsilon_t^{p^c}, \epsilon_t^{p^c} \sim i.i.d. \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_{p^c}^2). \quad (30)$$

3.6 | Calibration

Kitano (2021) identifies world commodity price shocks using an SVAR model with a standard Cholesky decomposition for five Asian commodity-exporting economies (Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Mongolia). The first to third rows in Table 2, respectively, represent the identified values of ρ^1 , ρ^2 , and σ_{p^c} in Equation (30) for the five countries. In this study, we set ρ^1 , ρ^2 , and σ_{p^c} to the average number of the five countries (i.e., 1.1814, -0.4895 , and 0.0733), respectively.

We also set the steady-state ratio of net exports of commodities relative to GDP, TB^c/Y , to 0.2068, which is the average across the five countries (fourth row in Table 2).¹⁰ We set the discount factor β to 0.9792 using the five countries' average real interest rates (fifth row in Table 2).¹¹

Regarding the parameters related to the government sector, we obtain their empirical average for the five countries and set the steady-state ratio of government consumption to GDP, G^{con}/Y , to 0.1141.¹² Again, from the average across the five countries, we set the steady-state ratio of government investment

¹⁰We obtain this number using International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. Azerbaijan, 2001Q1–2016Q4; Indonesia, 1997Q1–2018Q3; Kazakhstan 1993Q4–2019Q4; Malaysia 1991Q1–2018Q4; Mongolia 2005Q1–2018Q3.

¹¹We calculate real rates using lending rates and GDP deflators from the IFS. Azerbaijan, 2001Q1–2016Q4; Indonesia, 1997Q1–2018Q3; Kazakhstan, 1993Q4–2019Q4; Malaysia, 1991Q4–2018Q4; Mongolia, 2005Q1–2018Q3.

¹²The data source is IFS. Azerbaijan, 2001Q1–2016Q4; Indonesia, 1997Q1–2018Q3; Kazakhstan, 1993Q4–2019Q4; Malaysia, 1991Q4–2018Q4; Mongolia, 2005Q1–2018Q3.

TABLE 2 Calibration (sample countries' data).

	Azerbaijan	Indonesia	Kazakhstan	Malaysia	Mongolia	Average
ρ^1	0.9250	1.2150	1.2930	1.1620	1.3120	1.1814
ρ^2	-0.3414	-0.4896	-0.4717	-0.4530	-0.6920	-0.4895
σ_{p^c}	0.0937	0.0629	0.0830	0.0518	0.0748	0.0733
TB^c/Y	0.4059	0.0571	0.2624	0.1001	0.2086	0.2068
β	0.9679	0.9797	0.9941	0.9884	0.9659	0.9792
G^{inv}/Y	0.0352	n.a.	0.0232	0.1090	0.0349	0.0506
G^{con}/Y	0.1110	0.0841	0.1246	0.1215	0.1291	0.1141
F/D	0.6907	0.2244	0.2626	n.a.	0.2214	0.3498
χ	—	0.2183	—	0.0368	0.3052	—

Source: Kitano (2021), World Development Indicators, International Financial Statistics, World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS).

to GDP, G^{inv}/Y , to 0.0506.¹³ We set the steady-state ratio of the SWF to foreign debt, F/D , to 0.3498 as it is the average foreign reserves for the five sample countries.¹⁴ This is because the SWFs that we examine in this study are only experimental.¹⁵ Using the steady-state levels of G^{con}/Y , G^{inv}/Y , and F/D , we set the (constant) tax rate on commodity production, τ^c ($=0.1664$), to satisfy the government's budget constraint (20) in the steady state (Table 3).

Table 3 summarizes all the parameter values we use in our analysis. Regarding the other parameters not mentioned above, we choose the standard values from the related literature. We set the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ to 2 (as in, e.g., Aguiar & Gopinath, 2007). Following Drechsel and Tenreiro (2018), we set the parameters related to labor ($\theta^f, \theta^c, \eta^f$, and η^c) to 1.6. Following Shousha (2016), we set capital share in production (α_k^f and α_k^c) and commodity share in final goods production (α_m^f) to 0.32 and 0.05, respectively. In line with Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010), we set the depreciation rate of capital (δ and δ^g) to 0.1255/4. We set the adjustment cost parameter ϕ to 9 to obtain the impulse responses of trade balance (ratio to GDP) to a commodity price shock in Figure 2. Following Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), we set the coefficient on the interest rate premium term (ψ) and the steady-state level of debt to GDP (D/Y) to 0.001 and 0.1, respectively. As in Melina et al. (2016), we set the output elasticity with respect to public capital (α_g^f and α_g^c) to 0.15. We set the parameter for the adjustment cost of government investment ϕ^G to 2.06 so that

¹³The data source is the World Development Indicators. Azerbaijan, 1993–2007; Kazakhstan, 1992–2006; Malaysia, 1990–2019; Mongolia, 1995–2007. Data for Indonesia are not available.

¹⁴The data source is the World Development Indicators. Azerbaijan, 1993–2019; Indonesia, 1971–2019; Kazakhstan, 1993–2019; Mongolia, 1992–2019. Data for Malaysia are not available.

¹⁵Although all these countries have them, their SWFs are still underdeveloped. See, for example Park and Estrada (2009), Borst (2015), and Mohaddes and Raissi (2017) for Asian SWFs.

TABLE 3 Calibration.

Description		Value
Household parameters		
γ	Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution	2
β	Discount factor	0.9792
θ^f, θ^c	Labor coefficient	1.6
η^f, η^c	Curvature parameter on labor	1.6
Production parameters		
α_k^f, α_k^c	Capital share in production	0.32
α_m^f	Commodity input share in final goods production	0.05
α_g^f, α_g^c	Output elasticity with respect to public capital	0.15
δ	Depreciation rate of capital	0.1255/4
ϕ	Parameter for adjustment cost on investment	9
Open economy parameters		
TB^c / Y	Steady-state ratio of net exports of commodities relative to GDP	0.2068
D / Y	Steady-state ratio of (private) foreign debt to GDP	0.1
ψ	Interest rate premium parameter with respect to foreign debt	0.001
Government parameters		
G^{con} / Y	Steady-state ratio of government consumption to GDP	0.1141
G^{inv} / Y	Steady-state ratio of government investment to GDP	0.0506
F / D	Steady-state ratio of SWF to foreign debt	0.3498
τ^c	Tax rate on commodity production	0.1664
ϕ^G	Parameter for adjustment cost of government investment	2.06
Commodity shock parameters		
ρ^1	Coefficient	1.1814
ρ^2	Coefficient	-0.4895
σ_{p^c}	Standard deviation	0.0733

the welfare levels under the SAYG and SWF cases become equal in the benchmark case of $x = 0$.

In Section 4, we examine how the negative sensitivity of interest rate spreads to commodity prices affects the impulse responses of the main variables and the welfare levels in commodity-exporting economies. In this sense, the parameter for the sensitivity of interest rate spreads to commodity prices, x , is the most important parameter in our analysis. Kitano (2021) regresses the interest rate spread of each country on the country-specific commodity price index. The last row of Table 2 represents the estimated coefficient x for each




FIGURE 2 Impulse responses of the trade balance (ratio to GDP) to a one-standard deviation positive commodity price shock under different values of x ($= 0, 0.2$, and 0.4): Baseline model without spend-as-you-go (SAYG) or sovereign wealth fund (SWF), where $F_t = F$ and $G_t^{inv} = G^{inv}$.

country.¹⁶ In Section 4, we therefore use the range of x between 0 and 0.4, which includes these estimated values.

4 | NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT RESULTS

In this section, we present numerical experiments that shed light on the role of an SWF for commodity-exporting economies. As we argued in Section 1, commodity price shocks have a sizable contribution to the business cycle fluctuations of emerging economies (e.g., Drechsel & Tenreyro, 2018). At the same time, world commodity prices strongly affect the interest rate spreads of commodity-exporting countries (Bastourre et al., 2012; Fernández et al., 2018; Shousha, 2016). Interest rate spreads tend to fall (rise) when world commodity

¹⁶The coefficients for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are not significant.

prices increase (decrease), which is a unique observation for emerging economies. We therefore consider commodity price shocks as exogenous in our numerical experiments.

As Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018) show, the negative sensitivity of interest rate spreads to commodity prices is critical for replicating a counter-cyclical trade balance. We first show how the sensitivity of interest rate spreads to commodity prices affects the impulse response of the trade balance in commodity-exporting economies. In this numerical experiment, we assume that the government adopts neither the SAYG nor the SWF approach. Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of the trade balance (ratio to GDP) to commodity price shocks under different values of x ($= 0, 0.2$, and 0.4) in Equation (5). As we stated in Section 3, the parameter x represents the sensitivity of interest rate spreads to commodity prices. A higher value of x indicates a larger response of interest rate spreads to a commodity price shock.

In Figure 2, we depict the corresponding impulse responses to positive commodity price shocks with $x = 0, 0.2$, and 0.4 by the solid curve, dashed-dotted curve, and dashed curve, respectively. Figure 2 shows the baseline case without SAYG or SWF. Specifically, the baseline case without SAYG or SWF means the case where $F_t = F$ and $G_t^{inv} = G^{inv}$. The government maintains its sovereign resource fund and government investment at their steady-state levels, respectively. On impact, in the first case with $x = 0$, the trade balance becomes a surplus. In the second and third cases with $x = 0.2$ and 0.4 , however, the trade balance becomes a deficit. Comparing the three cases with $x = 0, 0.2$, and 0.4 , we can see that the impulse response of the trade balance depends on x and that a higher value of x is associated with a larger deficit in the trade balance in response to a positive commodity price shock. The result in Figure 2 is in line with prior studies (Drechsel & Tenreyro, 2018; Kitano, 2021) in the sense that the negative sensitivity of interest rate spreads (i.e., a positive value of x) is associated with a counter-cyclical trade balance. The intuitive mechanism behind this result is as follows. Without the negative sensitivity of interest rate spreads, a positive commodity price shock raises the export prices, which causes a positive trade balance. However, in the case of the negative sensitivity of interest rate spreads, a positive commodity price shock reduces borrowing rates and increases present consumption and investment, which leads to a negative trade balance.

Based on a model consistent with those in previous studies, we first show how the sensitivity of interest rate spreads to commodity prices affects the main macroeconomic variables (GDP, consumption, investment, and trade balance) under the SAYG approach. Figure 3 shows the impulse responses of GDP, consumption, investment, and the trade balance (ratio to GDP) under different values of x ($= 0, 0.2$, and 0.4) in the SAYG case.¹⁷ The impulse response of the trade balance is similar to that in Figure 2. That is, the trade balance depends

¹⁷Investment includes private and government investment (i.e., $I_t + G_t^{inv}$).




FIGURE 3 Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation commodity price shock in the spend-as-you-go (SAYG) case under different values of χ ($= 0, 0.2$, and 0.4).

on χ , and a higher value of χ is associated with a larger deficit of the trade balance on impact. Regarding GDP, consumption, and investment, the dashed curve deviates the most, and the solid curve deviates the least from zero on impact, which implies that a higher value of χ is associated with larger responses of GDP, consumption, and investment. In other words, a higher value of χ increases the volatility of GDP, consumption, investment, and trade balance, which implies that a higher value of χ destabilizes the economy.

We next show how the sensitivity of interest rate spreads to commodity prices affects the main macroeconomic variables under the SWF approach. Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of GDP, consumption, investment, and the trade balance (ratio to GDP) under different values of χ ($= 0, 0.2$, and 0.4) in the SWF case. Regarding the trade balance, the implication is again similar to that of Figure 2 (i.e., a higher value of χ is associated with a larger deficit of trade balance on impact). Regarding GDP, consumption, and investment, as in the SAYG case, a higher value of χ is associated with larger responses in these variables. In other words, a higher value of χ increases the volatility of GDP,




FIGURE 4 Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation commodity price shock in the sovereign wealth fund (SWF) case under different values of x ($=0, 0.2$, and 0.4).

consumption, investment, and trade balance, which implies that a higher value of x destabilizes the economy.

Comparing Figures 3 and 4, we note that the impulse responses have similar shapes. We next check whether the cases have similar impulse response sizes. Figure 5 compares the impulse response of each variable in Figure 4 with that in Figure 3 when x is 0.4. In Figure 5, the solid curve is closer to zero than the dashed-dotted curve, which implies that the government is able to stabilize the economy against commodity price shocks more effectively if it adopts the SWF approach rather than the SAYG approach.

As we argued above, Figure 5 shows that the SWF approach is better than the SAYG approach in stabilizing the economy. This result implies that the economy's welfare level achieved by the SWF approach is highly likely to be greater than that achieved by the SAYG approach. To confirm this finding, we formally measure by how much the SWF approach improves the economy's welfare level compared to the SAYG approach. We also examine whether (and how) the key parameter x (i.e., the sensitivity of interest rate spreads to commodity prices) affects the




FIGURE 5 Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation commodity price shock in the sovereign wealth fund (SWF) and spend-as-you-go (SAYG) cases ($x = 0.4$).

welfare-improving effect of the SWF approach. The welfare associated with different values of x under the two approaches (SWF or SAYG) is

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t, N_t^f, N_t^c) = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U((1 + \xi)C, N^f, N^c), \quad (31)$$

where C , N^f , and N^c are their non-stochastic steady states. Using the perturbation method, we perform a second-order approximation of the model and calculate the expected welfare conditional on the initial state.¹⁸ We can evaluate the welfare-improving effect of the SWF approach by comparing ξ under the SWF approach to that under the SAYG approach for different values of x .¹⁹ Figure 6 shows the difference between the welfare levels under the SWF and SAYG cases

¹⁸As linearization may generate spurious welfare reversals when long-run distortions exist in the model, second-order solutions are necessary (Kim & Kim, 2003). We conduct the second-order computation with Dynare (see Adjemian et al., 2011).

¹⁹The non-stochastic steady-state levels of C , N^f , and N^c are identical in the SWF and SAYG cases.

associated with different values of x . In Figure 6, the horizontal axis is x , while the vertical axis denotes the difference between ξ in the SWF and SAYG cases for the corresponding values of x . The difference between them indicates the extent to which the SWF approach improves the economy's welfare level compared to the SAYG approach. In Figure 6, we can see that the difference in welfare levels between the two approaches increases as the value of x increases. This result implies that if an economy is facing a higher sensitivity of interest spreads to commodity prices, the economy benefits more from adopting the SWF approach than the SAYG approach. In Figures 3 and 4, we find that a higher value of x is associated with higher volatility of GDP, consumption, investment, and trade balance in both the SWF and SAYG cases. However, in Figure 5, we find that the SWF stabilizes the macroeconomic variables by smoothing the use of windfall revenues over time (compared to the SAYG case). The result in Figure 5 suggests that when the economy is more volatile, the SWF's stabilization effect is likely to be larger compared to the SAYG case. In Figure 6, we explicitly confirm this by showing that when the economy is more volatile (i.e., when x is higher), the SWF's welfare-improving effect through smoothing the use of windfall revenues overtime is larger compared to the SAYG case.

5 | CONCLUSION

In this study, we examined the two main approaches that commodity-exporting countries can adopt to mitigate the exogenous shock of volatile fluctuations in commodity prices in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Fluctuating commodity prices make the government's revenues from exporting commodities unstable. A conventional approach that the government can take for balancing revenue and expenditure is to adjust its spending on government investment. The other potential approach is to let an SWF absorb fluctuations in the government's revenues from exporting commodities (and let its spending on government investment remain stable). Comparing the impulse responses and welfare levels under the two approaches, we show that SWFs can contribute to stabilizing commodity-exporting economies facing volatile fluctuations in commodity prices. To cope with the sharp fluctuations in the commodity prices of their exports, SWFs are likely to be an effective tool for commodity-exporting countries. Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018) suggest that "sovereign wealth funds may offer a promising avenue for tackling volatility in commodity producing countries" (p. 213). In other words, using the empirically estimated key parameters from the Asian commodity-exporting countries' data and also building a model reflecting the functions of the existing SWFs of Asian commodity-exporting countries, this study accomplishes the task left by Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018). Our result on the stabilization role of SWFs is in line with previous studies (e.g., Basu et al., 2013; Berg et al., 2013; Bergholt et al., 2019; Dagher et al., 2012; Melina et al., 2016). Nonetheless, we contribute




FIGURE 6 Difference in welfare levels between the sovereign wealth fund (SWF) and spend-as-you-go (SAYG) cases.

to the literature by showing that the welfare-improving effect of SWFs is larger as the elasticity of interest spreads to commodity prices increases. This result implies that if a country suffers from a higher degree of financial friction, then SWFs may play a more important role in absorbing commodity price shocks. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to show how this type of financial friction affects the welfare-improving effect of SWFs.

The intuition of our model is quite straightforward. Commodity-exporting economies with a high sensitivity of interest rate spreads to commodity prices tend to experience volatile business cycle fluctuations, including trade balances, due to volatile interest rate spreads. The role of an SWF in stabilizing fluctuations is, therefore, more important in countries with more severe financial friction.

We emphasize that our study has important empirical implications as well as theoretical implications. Considering existing SWFs in Asia, we build a model of commodity-exporting countries augmented with SWFs in accord with their actual functions. Moreover, our calibration is based on recent empirical evidence, using the key parameters of the negative relation between world commodity prices and interest spreads estimated for Asian commodity-exporting

countries. Commodity price fluctuations exert profound effects on emerging countries in the real world. We show that the SWFs are likely to be useful for absorbing serious difficulties of commodity price fluctuations and also likely to be more effective for countries with more severe financial friction.

Although it is beyond the scope of this study, a comparison study using other regions' data would be fruitful. Would we obtain similar results and implications for commodity-exporting countries in the other regions? Are our results specific to the Asian commodity-exporting countries? We leave this for future research.

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APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATION OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN TABLE 1.

Abbreviation	Name
SOFAZ	The State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan
AIH	Azerbaijan Investment Holding
BIA	The Brunei Investment Agency
CIC	The China Investment Corporation
SAFE IC	The State Administration of Foreign Exchange Investment Center
NSSF	The National Council for Social Security Fund
CADF	China Africa Development Fund
HKMA EF	The Hong Kong Monetary Authority's Exchange Fund
NIIF	The National Infrastructure Investment Fund
INA	The Indonesia Investment Authority
NBK (NOF + NIC)	National Bank of Kazakhstan (The National Oil Fund + The National Investment Corporation)
KIC	The Korea Investment Corporation
Khazanah	Khazanah Nasional Berhad
KWAN/NTF	Kumpulan Wang Amanah Negara / The National Trust Fund of Malaysia
PNB	Permodalan Nasional Berhad
FHF + FSF	Future Heritage Fund + Fiscal Stability Fund
GIC	The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation
TL PF	The Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund
UFRD	The Uzbekistan Fund for Reconstruction and Development
SCIC	The State Capital Investment Corporation

Source: Global SWF (<https://globalswf.com>) and SWFI (<https://www.swfinstitute.org>).