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the Degree of

# Cyber-Security & Computer Networks

at the University of Northumbria at Newcastle

Project Report

## **An investigation into infrastruc- ture defence in relation to emer- ging threats**

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General Computing Hybrid Project



# Declaration

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# Acknowledgements



# Abstract

A summary of the entire project. From background to conclusions. I recon on about half a page as the upper end of the summary.

This is an example structure for the Terms-of-Reference and the Dissertation. Along with some notes.

You can start by forking the repository on github <https://github.com/dr-alun-moon/cs-dissertation>. Then you have a working copy of this document as a starting point.





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# Part I

## Introduction



# Part II

## Analysis





# Chapter 1

## Historic Attack & Defence

### 1.1 The Importance Of Computing History

### 1.2 Heartbleed

A heartbeat request asks for a open ssl session to be checked of a given length and content. The length was never checked though so it would read from outside the buffer potentially revealing passwords. Thousands of web servers were vulnerable, including yahoo. A patch was needed to fix this

ICMP [Gunnam and Kumar, 2017]

### 1.3 Loveletter



# Chapter 2

## Modern Security Landscape

### 2.1 The Cat & Mouse Game

Technology is always changing, often to the needs of the growing world. Changes range from potential to aid traditional sectors to common conveniences that are taken for granted everyday. Software usually has a purpose, and that purpose is normally pure in nature. Software is there to solve a problem, to make life easier. A problem arises in implementation however, as mistakes can happen. The software development process has various stages, the most important of which being testing. Usually testing is conducted in order to identify any potential bugs that might cause issues later. The quality and extent to which a given piece of software is tested varies from sample to sample, and sometimes bugs slip through.

Bugs can be minor or disterous in nature, and can lead to major problems for those who use it. The solution is usually to send out an update so that a given bug cannot be exploited any further, but this is not a perfect process. There can be reluctance to update, complacency to the maintaining infrastructure or disregard to the issue at hand. Once software is out in the wild, it cannot be retrated. Corporate implementations are already built, and can be abused by criminals who take note of the out of date software.

Both issues of a buggy release and slow update responce can essas-  
ibated by corporate culture that put strain on the process. Under-  
funded, unmotivated and untrained workers will struggle to work to  
their capability and as a result, security can suffer. Another poten-

tial pitfall is mission critical infrastructure. There could be potential issues with implementation, that cannot be fixed easily due to a 24/7 use window. Another issue is legacy reliance; software may work for a certain OS version only, and the new version that is safe could be too expensive or not exist at all. Careful consideration must be given to defence policy, strategy and potential response in order to stay ahead of the cat and mouse game that is cyber-security.

## **2.2 Response Theory**

### **2.2.1 Zero-Days**

When people think of the exploit-update cycle, the first thought would be of patching. Patching is incredibly important, it allows for security issues to be rectified; to an extent in which it's then up to maintenance. Zero day attacks are incredibly potent due to the distinct lack of a patch available. A zero day is essentially a brand new exploit that is suddenly sprung upon the blue team. These exploits can do any amount of damage, with their severity depending on the exploit at hand. Zero days are often sold on the dark net for prices that are in accordance with the severity. Zerodium - A company that tracks the pricing of various kinds of exploits prices a Windows 10 remote code execution exploit at around \$1 million. The price tag pertains to the huge amount of systems running windows as a base, with an incredibly large surface to implement on.

### **2.3 Emotet**

### **2.4 WannaCry**

### **2.5 NotPetya**

### **2.6 Mimikatz**

# Chapter 3

## Defence Technologies

### 3.1 Variation of Defence Systems

#### 3.1.1 Network Monitoring Capability

Monitoring is rather important. Particually in a manual capacity; having the ability to analyze the flow of the network can aid in both troubleshooting and manual anomaly detection. The difference in human congition to a machine's is massive; A machine will think as you tell it to think, and will not act dynamically unless you tell it how should learn. Humans on the other hand have excellent learning and analysis potential as is. This means it is important to utilize the human element to further harden a network via manual monitoring.

There are many ways to do this, perhaps with grafana dashboards which import all the key data metrics into one. Another avenue could be to use wireshark (or a similar implementated program) to check what is happening at a particular time.

For example, if there is suddenly lots of half open TCP or ICMP requests, there may be a DDoS attack. Another reason that a human brain is benefital is that it has the capacity of content. A flood of HTTPs traffic may look like a DDoS attack, but may actually be a holiday like black friday in which you may expect hightened traffic.

#### 3.1.2 Firewall Rules

A firewall acts as a device between hosts and the internet and filter incoming and outgoing traffic. They can be in hardware and software

form.

An ACL is a series of IOS commands that control whether a router forwards or drops packets based on information found in the packet header. They can limit network traffic to increase performance, provide traffic flow control to restrict delivery of routing updates to ensure they are from a known source, and allow us to restrict part of the network from communicating with another part of the network, while allowing another. We can also block based on traffic type, e.g telnet, while allowing email. ACLs can also be used to tag traffic as priority. A VIP pass of sorts. We have inbound and outbound ACLs. Inbound filters packets coming from a specific interface, outbound does the same independant of the inbound interface, there could be multiple. An ACL uses a wildcard mask to select specific groupings to allow or deny access.

The above system uses the idea that only the vpn port is open, with everything else requiring local or vpn access. We use firewall rules to block everything else that is on the same device, such as my dns server. Additional firewall rules could be used internally to stop priv esc but unlikely in a home lan setup. I only allow local devices to even access the public IP other than for the VPN so it is a whitelist, very strong. The firewall is on the same device as the VPN purposely, if the device goes down, the firewall rules do sure, but so does the VPN which eliminates the access anyway.

## **3.2 Threat Definition**

### **3.2.1 Anomaly Detection**

Whitelist vs Blacklist Approach

### **3.2.2 Machine-Learning**

### **3.2.3 Protocol Adaptation**

### **3.2.4 Signature & Pattern Matching**

An interesting question could be made. What is considered a threat to a computer? The simplest answer is "something that is pre-defined". In computer science, a method of validating integrity is

to use a process called hashing; a process in which no two pieces of data can return the same value. There are various algorithms out there, some of which are broken like MD5, meaning they can be abused to return the same value for multiple datasets. If data can be represented as a value, then that value can be checked conditionally for a match against a database. This is the fundamental idea behind signature analysis, most commonly used in anti-virus technologies, as static analysis.

### 3.2.5 Behavioural Dynamic Analysis

Polymorphic encryption and malware versioning has historically shown that static analysis is not enough, it is an important part but cannot stand on its own. The idea behind dynamic detection is that rather than studying the data at rest, analysis is conducted on either the running malware, or a simulated version of it. Ultimately malware across versions aims to do the same task, albeit in slightly differing ways. If the methodology can be identified; the malware can be defeated. This requires a much more skilled approach; A comparison of before and after. ProcMon on Windows is excellent for this; it will let you see what registry keys have changed, what files are new and any peculiar processes.





# Chapter 4

## Entry Vectors & Profiling

### 4.1 Exposure & Scanning

The internet is about freedom of opportunity, and is why so many companies have succeeded. Services are accessible and convenient. The ability for anyone to access a service is 'double-edged'. If anyone is able to access it legitimately, it allows potential for a threat actor to conduct their processes also. The first process is often enumeration and scanning. Attacks are much more effective when they are meaningful, scoped and targeted. A criminal can use information gathered to hone in later attacks for full effect.

#### 4.1.1 Fingerprinting & Banner Grabbing

A threat actor can learn much from a network, particularly if it is widely exposed to the internet. Valuable enumerated data includes: software names and versions, operating system patch numbers, open ports and typical response. Much can be learned based off how software responds. It could respond in a way that is particularly unique, allowing for identification. This could be a message, or typical behavior for that piece of software. This probing is called banner grabbing and is one of the first steps in any hacking endeavour. A typical example is a web server; if a http request is made on port 80, there will likely be a http response (assuming the port is open). That page in such case would be a vector for identification, with the web server also having potential for version disclosure with default files. Another potential way to identify would be to use a standard ping

function. There is fingerprinting capability built into the variable implementation of the ICMP protocol. Different operating systems have differing ping response times, which gives away the platform. This is impactful as OS version and architecture disclosure means exploits are filtered down to those more likely to work.

These are trivial examples, but show that exposure can lead to the "hacker mindset" being utilised.

### 4.1.2 Firewalking

## 4.2 Social Engineering

### 4.2.1 Phishing

There are two main strands of phishing. The kind you are most likely familiar with is simply called phishing, and pertains to the act of sending a victim to an impersonated site with the intention of them putting real credentials and info down.

The second being spear phishing which is the same with one main difference. That difference being the scope and scale. A normal phishing attack tends to be widespread, generic and assuming. The spear counterpart prefers to use reconnaissance to tailor make the email into something that fits them. The goal being to exploit some kind of weakness for a higher payoff via privileged users such as CEOs and unsuspecting admins.

Every website uses HTML files in some form. These usually can be replicated with proper CSS that is in public view. This means you can create a site that looks exactly like paypal for example, with the idea of the victim typing their real credentials in, which goes directly to the hacker's server. There are usually entry points to this, a sophisticated one is where "free wifi" is set up, someone connects to it, is sent to a login page that you made where they register and type their credit card info, as if they were the real hotel for example. It can be used in conjunction with DNS phishing below to make them indistinguishable at times.

Such attack could also be used to distribute malware in a drive-by attack as talked about. The legit site likely would never have such

code, but the custom one very much could. This can lead to much greater consequences. The thing that is fairly scary about this is how easy it is to setup a DNS server. You can even do so with a raspberry pi in about 10 mins for example.

A combination of the above could be used here, to hijack a DNS server to point to this, a cloned website, with a different premade template:

Spear phishing is where you send email enmasse to lure people into clicking some form of link or file. They are often non targeted and usually aim to trick the victim with techniques like urgency, trust and fear. The idea of these campaigns are not to trick everyone, in fact as a whole very very few people fall for it. You will get your small minority that it works on, and that's what they rely on. The solution to this is proper email sanitization, with checks of email header tampering, some form of verification and file/link whitelists.

#### **4.2.2 USB Dropping**

Autorun

### **4.3 Spoofing**

#### **4.3.1 ARP/MAC Spoofing**

#### **4.3.2 DNS Spoofing**

#### **4.3.3 IP Spoofing**



# Chapter 5

## Malware Mechanisms

Malicious software, often called 'Malware' is an ever growing problem for system administrators.

### 5.1 Classification of Threats

### 5.2 Obfuscation

#### 5.2.1 Signature & Behavior Evasion

Encoding & Compression

Shellcode

```
kx48 for H. Hello World!  
↪ kx48kx65kx6ckx6ckx6fkx20kx57kx6fkx72kx6ckx64kx21.
```

Steganography

Polymorphic Encryption

In this sense, the data, the encryption algorithm and the password can all change, while maintaining the goal of the algorithm. It is clear however that while hashing of the source will not work, you can fingerprint and monitor the actions it would take, and identify based from that. Sometimes the decryption methodology and code was actually hashed, and detected based on it. There are ways around this too in one of the links.



# Chapter 6

## Exfiltration

### 6.1 Side/Control Channels

#### 6.1.1 TLS

### 6.2 Proxy Chains & VPNs

#### 6.2.1 ToR Routing

### 6.3 Protocol Payload Abuse

#### 6.3.1 ICMP

#### 6.3.2 DNS

### 6.4 Data Breaching





# Chapter 7

## Persistence

Important for malware to have continued access, even after a reboot. I will try a few of these with a reverse shell. We need triggers, these triggers should be fairly legit, with malformed payloads. These triggers should be automatic, or at least on something that would be done normally.

### 7.1 Windows Systems

Windows works by leaving files for both reference, logs and to speed process up. These either are intrinsic to how the OS works or simply have been left behind. These are great for finding evidence and purpose. We can prove that the criminal acted at a given time, on a given file etc... These are some useful areas. This is windows 10, but older ones are still out there, 7 upwards are very similar. We need to be able to recreate.

#### 7.1.1 Registry

A hive that is normally maintained by the system. You can change values and implant whatever you want in there. Here are some strategic places. Many of these are ASEPs (AutoStart Extension Points), meaning they run without user interaction. The registry seems to have issues with wild wildcards, in that it will run essentially anything under a given hive at it's respective time and permissions. It's a rootkit waiting to happen. It's where forensic analysts will look first. When i'm testing this, I often use regedit.exe. Real malware

wouldn't do this, it would do it via scripting. A few example of the reg command are below. //expand upon with real scripting.

**Startup Keys** Keys that point to folders, that can launch shortcuts and executables as the given user, often during login or reboot

```
HKEYn+nbCURRENTn+nbUSERkSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerUser
↳ Shell Folders //will default to carl in my case
HKEYn+nbCURRENTn+nbUSERkSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerShell
↳ Folders
HKEYn+nbLOCALn+nbMACHINEkSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerShell
↳ Folders //for public
HKEYn+nbLOCALn+nbMACHINEkSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerUser
↳ Shell Folders //for users

Windows Startup folder Anything here auto execs on startup, even
↳ shortcuts. run shell:startup

C:kUsersUSERNAMEAppDataRoamingMicrosoftWindowsStart
↳ MenukProgramsStartup //seems to run as logged in user waits
↳ for login, rather than boot level
```

**Services** Winload.exe is the first to load in the OS, reads the hive to see what drivers need to be loaded. It is responsible for the "starting windows" message.

```

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services

//view drivers (admin)
reg query hkLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s | findstr
  ↳ ImagePath 2nul | findstr /Ri .*k.sysk

C:\k\WINDOWSTEMP\INSTB64.SYS
  ↳ C:\k\Users\USERNA1\k\AppData\Local\Temp\cpuz135\kcpuz135\n+nbx64.sys
  ↳ C:\k\Windows\TEMP\0099471.EXE
  ↳ C:\k\Users\username\AppData\Local\Temp\ALSysIO64.sys
//temp or user folders would be very sus! Its about looking for
  ↳ anomalous locations.

ksubparagraphn+nbBrowser Helper Objectsn+nb
A DLL module that loads on internet explorer startup. Its
  ↳ reactionary, requires reasonable setup, but is fairly reliable.
  ↳ A favourite for data theft.
HKEYn+nbLOCALn+nbMACHINE\k\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser
  ↳ Helper Objects

```

```

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\hivelist
HKEYn+nbLOCALn+nbMACHINE\k\SYSTEM\ControlSet\002\k\Control\Session M

```

### BootExecute Keys

As far as locations in the registry where malicious processes or modules can be configured to launch from, the BootExecute key is the earliest. Smss.exe will load any programs it finds listed here. By default the only entry in this string array is autocheck autochk \* which runs Autochk during boot.”

```

//Decodes to this, loads this on boot. This is the view of an
  ↳ online sandbox analyzer
autocheck autochk * aHdqEPamx

```

### 7.1.2 Symbolic Locations

**DLL Search Order Hijacking** If a process is executed, it will look in it's own folder first, and use it's DLL, even over a windows one, to overwrite it. If not, it will read the location of root, to the destination with spaces, and means you can inject a dll where you know it will

look before the real one. Even explorer.exe does this!

**AppInit<sub>DLLs</sub>** Everytime User32.dll is loaded by an exe, this string is read and modules are loaded that are listed. This is invoked a fair few times on system loadup from multiple initilized processes.

```
User (For then priv esc):
HKEYn+nbCURRENTn+nbUSERkSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun
HKEYn+nbCURRENTn+nbUSERkSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun

Admin Level:
HKEYn+nbLOCALn+nbMACHINEkSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun
HKEYn+nbLOCALn+nbMACHINEkSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun
HKEYn+nbLOCALn+nbMACHINEkSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionPol
//depending on architecture
HKLMkSoftwareWow6432NodekMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun
HKCUkSoftwareWow6432NodekMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce

reg add
↪ HKEYn+nbCURRENTn+nbUSERkSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersion
↪ /v Pentestlab /t REGn+nbSZ /d C:kUserspentestlabpentestlab.exe
reg add
↪ HKEYn+nbCURRENTn+nbUSERkSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersion
↪ /v Pentestlab /t REGn+nbSZ /d C:kUserspentestlabpentestlab.exe
reg add
↪ HKEYn+nbCURRENTn+nbUSERkSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersion
↪ /v Pentestlab /t REGn+nbSZ /d C:kUserspentestlabpentestlab.exe
reg add
↪ HKEYn+nbCURRENTn+nbUSERkSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersion
↪ /v Pentestlab /t REGn+nbSZ /d C:kUserspentestlabpentestlab.exe
```

Run RunOnce Keys

## 7.2 Linux Systems

### 7.2.1 Command Injection

We can use command injection to run any command that user has available. This may include netcat or any allowed system command. This could all be prevented with a few steps.

Proper input validation on the entry point.Lack of access that the web application has to system commands, as well as up the date packages of the languages that have this vulnerable. There is no reason that netcat should be on a target system.

The following is possible otherwise. We could use this attack in a input that runs a command, we end the command and run another as that user, in this case popping a shell for us to run commands more easily ourselves.

### **7.2.2 Cron**

### **7.2.3 User Account Creation**

## **7.3 Process Hijacking**

## **7.4 Rootkits**

## **7.5 Exploitation**

### **7.5.1 Bind Reverse Shells**

A Bind/Remote shell is you connecting from your machine to the shell. This is more of a backdoor. This is usually blocked by firewalls and can be ruined by change of ports, additionally DHCP and NAT cause IPs to change and as a result you do not know the IP of the listener you have setup. A reverse shell is the shell connecting to a listening service (Netcat) on your machine.

Netcat lets us set up connections between a host and a listener. You can also connect to any listener that is not yours also, which is referred to as banner grabbing, simply using nc on a ip port can do this. A useful.

Let's say we have found a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability on the target host. We can then issue the Netcat command with `-e` on the target host and initiate a reverse shell with Netcat to issue commands.

### **MSFVenom**

### **7.5.2 Data Cryptors**

Data is our most valuable asset, with much of it being irreplaceable. This is true for both home and corporate users of technology. There is no feasible retaking of a deceased loved one's photo, or the

reacquisition of millions of customer records. This is the sad reality of what data cryptors target. There are two main motivations for an attack of this kind, one in which access to given data is removed, often permanently.

Firstly, Ransomware. The goal is to encrypt as much data as possible with a randomized key, rendering data useless without said key. The attackers then offer the key in exchange for a large amount of money, often in cryptocurrency for anonymity. Distressed victims may then pay the ransom and may or may not get their data back. There is controversy at the time of writing about paying the ransom, which gets even more complicated by the 'professionalism' that is evolving into the very lucrative ransomware business. The idea being that if an attacker group has 24/7 live chat and customer service, they are even more likely to hand over money.

Secondly, encryption for destruction. From time to time there are attacks that are not in it for direct financial gain, rather obstruction and distress. This variant encrypts just the same, with a few notable differences. There is no ransom, the key often is not transmitted and it is more likely to corporate rivalry or hacktivism.

### 7.5.3 Network Pivoting

One of the most potent traits of malware (particularly worms) is their ability to spread rapidly. Once malware has a foothold in a network, it can take advantage of the networked nature of infrastructure to check what that machine can talk to. It can then conduct either manual or automatic network reconnaissance and enumeration, with the hope to find a vulnerable service to exploit. The advantage of hacking multiple machines is that they can have different levels of security and access, leading to potential privilege escalation.

The Metasploit Framework has a program called meterpreter which allows you to run modules using the victim system, and push it through by binding to a process. The process being targeted depends on the architecture and software security level, but is dangerous because it means that the tools on the system are fairly irrelevant.

#### 7.5.4 Command & Control

Malware traditionally is static, meaning that it executes a given task and then finishes. Malware that can be maleable is an asset to a cyber criminal. Some malware has since adapted a command and control model, often shortened to CC or C2. Such model dictates there are 'zombie' machines and a respective master, a master whom sends commands for the zombies to conduct. A botnet.

No longer is malware a sequential process in such case, a threat actor could order it's army to carry out any number of malicious actions. Such systems do have advantages; A large army can do major damage to vulnerable systems, whether in the form of denial of service or otherwise. Another reason to use a system such as this is that it creates a layer of pseudo anonymity. The zombies are conducting the attack; not the master technically. Defence systems would flag up the attackers directly, with the real threat actor getting away with the attack potentially.

A few things of note; systems are usually zombies without knowledge through some kind of botnet malware. Additionally, if analysis is conducted of a zombie machine (perhaps an acquisition of a cloud virtual machine), then the communication channel may be clear. Proxy chains can help avoid this, creating more layers of relay.

#### 7.5.5 Denial of Service

This attack makes use of the simple fact that downtime for a server or host can often cause frustration and in many cases loses people money. This means to some people there is an incentive to be able to do this. The general idea is that if you flood a host with enough ICMP (ping) traffic, it will halt and not be able to process anymore information, this is not only for the attacker but for everyone. This would be considered a DOS attack. This usually can't do nearly as much damage as the next version can.

The attack I am meaning is the Distributed Denial Of Service or DDOS attack. This uses the same concept but with a network of attacking machines all linked together. This could be a large number of machines the attacker owns or zombie machines that the attacker

has gained control of with malware and is using for their attack. This multiplies the scale of the attack up to thousands sometimes and is a real problem; it can take down industry standard servers if care is not taken to analyse what traffic is coming in.



# Part III

## Synthesis



# Part IV

## Evaluation



# Bibliography

Ganesh Reddy Gunnam and Sanjeev Kumar. Do icmp security attacks have same impact on servers? *Journal of Information Security*, 10:274–283, 07 2017. doi: 10.4236/jis.2017.83018.



# Part V

## Appendices





# Appendix A

## Terms of Reference

### A.1 Ethics Form

If you scan the Ethics form on one of the multifunction printers, you can get a pdf copy. This can then be included with the  $\text{\LaTeX}$  command

```
cincludgraphicsethics.pdf
```

### A.2 Risk Assessment Form

Likewise you can scan and include the Risk Assessment Form

```
cincludgraphicsriskassesment.pdf
```