

example #1

rm -rf \$PATHNAME

example #2


Showing 1 changed file with 1 addition and 1 deletion. index.html


all work is contextual

about me










Velocity Conference 2009



TRADE-OFFS UNDER PRESSURE:
HEURISTICS AND
OBSERVATIONS OF TEAMS
RESOLVING INTERNET SERVICE
OUTAGES

John Allspaw

LUND UNIVERSITY
SWEDEN





STELLA

Report from the SNAFUCatchers Workshop on Coping With Complexity

Brooklyn NY, March 14-16, 2017



Winter storm STELLA

Woods' Theorem: As the complexity of a system increases, the accuracy of any single agent's own model of that system decreases.

@ 2017 DD Woods

http://stella.report

Year-long project Researchers analyzed 3 incidents, at:





Six Themes


- Postmortems as re-calibration
- Blameless v. sanctionless after action actions
- Controlling the costs of coordination
- Visualizations during anomaly management
- Strange Loops
- Dark Debt


My Main Points


- 1. We have to start taking human performance seriously in our industry.
- 2. We can do this by looking at incidents, beyond what we currently do in postmortems.
- 3. Methods and approaches to do this exist from the study of resilience in other domains, but they require real commitment to pursue.
- 4. Doing this is both necessary and difficult (but very possible!) and will prove to be a *competitive advantage* for businesses who do it well.






























Time



How does our software break, really?

What do we do to keep it all working?

how to discover what happens "above the line"?

incidents


(outages, degradations, breaches, accidents, near-misses, "glitches", untoward/unexpected events, etc.)

what makes incidents interesting?

incidents as...

drivers of software design

- shape the design of new components, subsystems, architectures
- "incidents of yesterday inform the architectures of tomorrow"
- incidents "below the line" drive changes "above the line"
- staffing, budgets, planning, roadmaps, etc.



incidents as...

motivators for policy

- tend also to give birth to new forms of regulations, policies, norms, compliance requirements, explosion of documentation, auditing, constraints, etc.
- "incidents of yesterday inform the rules of tomorrow"
- influence *staffing*, *budgets*, *planning*, *roadmaps*, etc.



"Regulation SCI"

oss of \$1 trillion in market value in

<10min

3/23/2012 - BATS IPO - systems issue halted the exchange's own **IPO**

5/23/2012 - Facebook IPO - systems issue delayed IPO trading

8/1/2012 - Knight Capital - \$461 million in 45 minutes









PCI-DSS


1988-1998, Visa and MasterCard reported credit card losses due to fraud of \$750 million

incidents as...


opportunities

new training new tooling new organizational structures new funding dynamics insights your competitors don't have

"Look over here, there are things you need to pay attention to!"



incidents help us gauge the delta between



almost always greater than we imagine

incidents are unplanned investments resident Surviva your company's

incidents

burn money
burn time
burn reputation
burn staff

unavoidable sunk costs

You do not control the size of this investment.

The challenge is to maximize the ROI on that investment.

What is it doing?!

Why is it doing that?!

What will it do next?

How did it get into this state?

WTF is happening?

If we do Y, will it help us figure out what to do?


Is it getting worse?

It looks like it's fixed...but is it...?

If we do X, will it prevent it from getting worse...or make it worse?

Who else should we call that can help us?

Is this OUR issue, or are we BEING ATTACKED?!



In the beginning of any incident, it's often uncertain or ambiguous whether it is a "viability-crushing" event or not.

Only hindsight will tell us.

incidents provide calibration about...

how decisions are focused

how attention is *focused*

how coordination is *focused*

how escalation is focused

the *impact* of time pressure

the *impact* of uncertainty

the *impact* of ambiguity

the *consequences* of consequences


research validates these opportunities

"...nonroutine, challenging events, because these tough cases have the greatest potential for uncovering elements of expertise and related cognitive phenomena." (Klein, Crandall, Hoffman, 2006)


A family of well-worn methods, approaches, and techniques

Cognitive task/work analysis
Process tracing
Conversation analysis
Critical decision method
Critical incident technique
more...


How We Think PostMortems Have Value




How Post-Incident Reviews Actually Provide Value




How Post-Incident Reviews Actually Provide Value



AN OPENING TO RECALIBRATE MENTAL MODELS



AN OPENING TO RECALIBRATE MENTAL MODELS NOT ALIGNMENT!



"blameless" is table stakes

Etsy Code as Craft Speaker Series Events About Archive Q

Blameless PostMortems and a Just Culture




Posted by John Allspaw on May 22, 2012

Last week, Owen Thomas wrote a flattering article over at Business Insider on how we handle errors and mistakes at Etsy. I thought I might give some detail on how that actually happens, and why.

Anyone who's worked with technology at any scale is familiar with failure. Failure cares not about the architecture designs you slave over, the code you write and


more effort than typical post-incident reviews





THE CLOCK IS TICKING!

Everyone Has Their Own Mystery To Solve Don't Waste My Time On Details I Already Know



Application

Engineer

I understand how the database got wedged - I hope we don't waste time going over that part. I just have no idea about how the load balancer got involved in all of this, I hope we cover that!



DBA

I hope I can get a word in edgewise in this - I don't understand how it's so hard to give customers updates more frequently. That is the real priority here!!




Customer Service Agent


all work is contextual

maximizing that ROI means:

discovering, exploring, and rebuilding the context in which work is done....



assessments are trade-offs



all incidents can be worse

Useful at surface level:

what went wrong? how did it break? what do we fix?

Useful at a deeper level:

what are things that went into making it not nearly as bad as it could have been?

Useful at a strategic level:

how can we support, encourage, advocate, AND FUND the continual process of understanding our systems ("above the line") in a sustained way?

Challenges For You

- 1. Circulate the Stella Report (http://stella.report) in your company, start a dialogue.
- 2. Look deeply at how you are handling post-incident reviews.

Ask: "What value do you think our current post-incident reviews *really* have?"

3. Will you learn more — and faster — from incidents than *your competitors*?

Taking Human Performance Seriously

This discussion is happening...

in nuclear power
in air traffic control
in firefighting
in medicine

--

We need to do more than just acknowledge this - we need to embrace it.

What You Can Help Me With

Please spread this presentation, these ideas!

What resonated with you about this? Please come tell me!

What challenges do you face in your org? Please come tell me!

Thank You

http://stella.report

